What is the Difference Between Data, Information, and Knowledge?

One of the main reason that current risk assessment systems are ineffective is that many people confuse data, information, and knowledge. They equate more data with higher levels of accuracy, and believe that an accumulation of data will automatically result in good decision-making. This belief can be dangerous. Data the discrete, objective facts about events is the essential raw material needed for the creation of information; however, it cannot be used to make decisions because it has no meaning. It lacks meaning because it has no inherent structure; no established relationships between entities.

Knowledge Information Data

Data becomes information when we add meaning . We add meaning by providing a context to the data. The context identifies the purpose, and circumstance, that surround the gathering of data; it removes ambiguity. We can remove ambiguity in a variety of ways: categorizing, calculating, condensing, etc. Information is helpful because it allows us to answer the who, what, where, when, and how many questions. While information is necessary for good decision-making; alone it is insufficient. The reason is that information is simply a message: it has a sender and a receiver; and it is ultimately the receiver, not the sender, who decides whether the message is informative (and thus becomes information). A message full of unconnected observations may be considered to be information by the sender, but judged to be noise by the receiver. Since information is meant to change the way the receiver perceives something (to have an impact on his/her judgment and behavior), the message must be tailored to the knowledge and experience level of the user. Good information is: Accurate - conveys the true situation. Timely - is available in time to make decisions. Useable - is portrayed in common, easily understood formats and displays. Complete - provides all necessary data. Precise - has the required level of detail. In short, information helps us decide what to do, not how to do it. The how requires knowledge.

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Knowledge is the data (facts), information, and skills acquired through experience or education. The hallmark of knowledge is judgment: the ability to make decisions or come to sensible conclusions. Knowledge comprises not only the ability to choose the appropriate course of action, but also the skills to execute it. The key ingredient perspective allows us to understand the relative importance of each piece of information. It also allows us to see the connections between the bits of information, understand the consequences each piece of information has on a potential decision, and compare the current situation to past situations. By comparing situations and recognizing patterns, we dont have to build a solution to a problem from scratch.

Data: 4, 2 (without context, these value are meaningless) Information: Temperature 4C, Dew Point 2C (context adds meaning) Knowledge: A temperature of 4C and a dew point of 2C, together with a rain, means that there is a chance of icing (connection established). This icing can adversely affect the performance of my aircraft (consequences identified). This is the same conditions that led to an accident last year (comparison made). I should deice my aircraft (action taken, risk mitigated).

Knowledge can be obtained via experience or education. Knowledge gained through experience is the most memorable, but it is also the most time consuming and costly to obtain. Experience refers to what we have done and what has happened to us in the past. Since time and money are limited resources, the amount of knowledge we can obtain from experience is also limited. Knowledge obtained through experience is also high-risk because we learn through our mistakes: we identify our errors and make corrections. However, if the mistake is not similar to any previous situation we have encountered, then we have no database to draw from; we will try different things until we stumble on the right solution. In aviation, this approach can be deadly; our first error could be your last.

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For example, JFK, Jr. was a relatively inexperienced VFR pilot who had no experience flying overwater in night, overcast (IFR-like) conditions. When he became spatially disoriented, he had no knowledge in his arsenal to draw from, and he did not have the time to build the answer from scratch. Unfortunately, his first spatial disorientation encounter was also his last. When experience is codified, it can be transferred to other people. This education can take a variety of forms, both formal and informal: simulator training, classroom instruction, regulations, manuals, casual conversation, etc. Education supplements experience; it allows us to gain knowledge from the mistakes of others. It is an efficient, cost-effective, and low-risk way to increase the breadth of our knowledge. However, since knowledge acquired through education is not as memorable (as first-hand experiences), it does not last as long. It must be constantly reinforced. Education and experience are complementary; they work together to establish a framework for decisionmaking. Those with fewer experiences and less education tend to have more fragile frameworks; those with more experiences and education tend to have more robust frameworks. By finding unique ways to share knowledge, we can create robust frameworks and improve decisionmaking. However, we must also take into account our values and beliefs. Values and beliefs are integral to knowledge; they determine what we see, remember, and conclude from our observations. People often see different things based on their values. This can have a profound affect on safety culture. Healthy cultures encourage self examination; they are open to new ideas. For knowledge to remain relevant, it must adapt to new circumstances (e.g., evidence, environment, assumptions). If it does not adapt, it becomes dogma. This dogma can be detrimental to decision making.

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Flying by the Seat of the Pants Dogma

In the early days of aviation, pilots prided themselves on being able to fly by the feel of the aircraft. When a pilots senses contradicted his instruments, he was taught to trust his senses. Besides, most pilots believed that the instruments only worked in clear weather. As soon as a plane entered the clouds, the devices seemed to go haywire; the instruments indicated turns that the pilot was not making. In 1926, Army Air Corp Captain William Ocker began to study this phenomena. He realized that the problem was not with the instruments; they worked just fine. The problem was the pilots instinct; they mistakenly trusted the semicircular canals of the ears. Captain Ocker stated that: instinct is worse than useless in the clouds; it can induce deadly spirals. Despite the evidence, few people were convinced. By the late 1920s, this phenomenon spatial disorientation resulted in the deaths of over two thousand pilots. Even the Wright Brothers, at their school in Dayton, found it difficult to get students to use instruments. Army pilots would often shame them by stating: Do you have to have instruments to tell you how to fly?

Today we know the answer - YES!

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FlightRisk is a product of Polaris Aero, LLC.