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Ghazz l!, Ibn Rushd and Islams Sojourn into Modernity: A Comparative Analysis 1
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Some modern Muslim thinkers, like Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri [Mu "ammad #bid al-J bir!], argue that Ibn Rushds thought provides a better framework for Islams sojourn into modernity than Ghazz l!s. According to these critics, Ghazz l! (d. 555/1111) undermines the value of reason and rationality as a means of attaining knowledge. In its place he advocates the spiritual and mystical path to inner enlightenment. Because reason and rationality have fundamentally shaped the contours of modern culture, these critics argue that Ibn Rushds exposition of the scope and nature of reason is a more adequate appreciation of the subject matter and therefore a better starting point for Islams engagement with modernity. This critique of Ghazz l!, in my view, is mistaken on two different accounts: (a) it is a misreading of Ghazz l!s position on the scope and nature of reason/rationality, and (b) it is a misreading of the modern appreciation of reason/rationality and the needs of contemporary culture. It is also my view that while Ghazz l!s thought offers a better alternative than Ibn Rushds, it does contain some shortcomings. These shortcomings have been noted by some traditional Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) as well as modern Muslim scholars such as Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). But in spite of these problems Ghazz l!s thought still provides a better framework for Islams sojourn into modernity than Ibn Rushds.

Al-Jabris Critique of Ghazz l! and Advocacy of Ibn Rushd

Al-Jabri sees Islamic history as a stage on which two fundamentally opposed intellectual forces have been struggling for pre-eminence a dynamic, scientific rationalism pitted against a reactionary, obscurantist gnosticism. The
I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to Professor Ebrahim Moosa (Duke University), Professor Peter Ochs (University of Virginia) and Mohammed Hozein for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
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struggle between these two forces already had a centuries old history behind it by the time Ghazz l! and Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) emerged on the scene. AlJabri identifies the traditionalists ( fuqah ) and the Sufis as the historical antecedents of Ghazz l!s position and the Mutazilites as the historical antecedents of Ibn Rushds position. 2 He argues that during the course of Muslim history the rationalism of the philosophers had had to face two indomitable enemies simultaneously: gnosticism (which later developed into Sufism) and the traditionalist jurists [ fuqah ].3 For al-Jabri, Ghazz l!s work embodies the most insidious integration of fiqh and ta!awwuf and presents the most formidable obstacles that Muslims have had to (and still must) overcome if they are to reclaim the original spirit of Arab-Islamic philosophy. 4 Al-Jabri argues that the essence of Ghazz l!s ta!awwuf cannot be located anywhere in the authentic Arab-Islamic tradition. If anything, the scholars and jurisconsults who firmly espoused Islams original character, its Arab character, always rejected Sufism, in which they saw a foreign commodity imported from Persia and incompatible with Muslim religion. 5 He goes on to note that Ghazz l!s ideas about Sufism are actually a reworking of Ibn S!n s un-Islamic gnostic metaphysics of. In quite harsh terms, al-Jabri writes:
Avicenna reconstructed the pagan-based Harranian emanationist metaphysics with an Islamic varnish, Ghazali borrowed it from him to make of it an alternative to Aristotelean philosophy. But as a partisan of the Asharite doctrine, Ghazali spread this Avicennian oriental commodity as Sunni Sufism. 6

It is not only on account of presenting a pagan-based metaphysics in Islamic garb that Ibn S !n s thought is inimical to rationalism. Al-Jabri argues that Ibn S!n s exposition of his metaphysics is based on a methodology borrowed from Muslim theologians analogical reasoning ( qiy s). Even
Pervez Hoodbhoy makes a similar argument identifying the Mutazilites as being the proponents of rationalism in Muslim thought and the traditionalists, especially the Asharites, as the upholders of orthodoxy and conservatism in Muslim history. According to Hoodbhoy, the lack of scientific and intellectual development in the Muslim world is due to the victory of Asharites over the Mutazilites. For Hoodbhoy, scientific and intellectual development in the Muslim world requires a recovery and renaissance of Mutazilite rationalism. See Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (London: Zed Books, 1991). Besides being an inaccurate reading of history, Hoodbhoys position is flawed because it is a facile and simplistic reading of both the Mutazilites and the Asharites. 3 M. A. Al-Jabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A contemporary Critique (Austin, TX: University of Texan Press, 1999), 50. 4 Al-Jabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy , 48. 5 Ibid., 124. 6 Ibid.
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though qiy s is not un-Islamic in the same sense as is gnosticism, its use is highly problematic because an investigative method based on qiy s cannot possibly attain the rigor of the demonstrative method and becomes as a result unfit for membership by scholars and philosophers. 7 After noting that Ibn S!n (d. 428/1037) abandons the demonstrative method of the genuine philosophers, al-Jabri notes that he,
limited himself to the theologians method, i.e., the two-term analogical reasoning [qiy s], a process which amounts to equating two totally heterogeneous worlds, the visible and the invisible. 8

Al-Jabri argues that the use of qiy s was pioneered by the fuqah in order to link the principal/foundation ( a!l) to the case in point ( far) and it was adopted by the mutakallim"n and philosophers to link the known ( sh hid) to the unknown ( gh ib).9 He goes on to note that the theologians analogical reasoning ( qiy s)is no less futile [than that of the fuqah ] because the nature of the known (the world of man) being other than that of the unknown (the divine world), there can be no analogy between them. 10 Consequently, any use of qiy s in the attempt to reconcile religious and philosophical notions must be rejected on purely methodological grounds, 11 because it obfuscates the distinction between two entirely different realms the known human world and the unknown divine world. For al-Jabri, gnosticism represents the spirit of Ibn S!n s oriental philosophy and qiy s represents its method the two combined embody the Avicennian moment in Islamic history. The continuation of the Avicennian moment in Islamic history and its implications are summed up by al-Jabri in these words:
post-Averroes Arabs, have lived on the margin of history (in inertia and decline), because we kept clinging to the Avicennian moment after Ghazali granted it currency within Islam.12

In sum, there are two major shortcomings in Ghazz l!s thought, according to al-Jabri. Firstly, Ghazz l!s Sufism is based on an un-Islamic, pagan-based metaphysics. Secondly, his theoretical thinking is based on the unsound methodology of analogical reasoning ( qiy s) of the fuqah and
Ibid., 101. Ibid., 89. 9 Ibid., 74. 10 Ibid., 75. 11 Ibid., 89. 12 Ibid., 124.
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mutakallim"n. Ghazz l!s Sufism is a departure from the spirit of the Qur n because the discourse of the Koran was one of reason not one of gnosticism or illuminism.13 Moreover, Ghazz l!s use of qiy s, along with other Muslim theologians, leads to distorting reality and obstructing the activity of reason.14 Al-Jabri posits that Ibn Rushds philosophy offers a better alternative to Ghazz l!s thought on both these accounts. In contrast to Ghazz l!s gnosticism, Ibn Rushds philosophy is a mathematically minded approach that investigates all issues from the perspective of mathematics and logic. This rationalist approach is far from the polemics of theologians [ mutakallim"n] and the problematics of conciliating reason and transmission [the major concern of the fuqah ].15 And in place of Ghazz l!s dependence on the inadequate tool of qiy s (analogical reasoning), Ibn Rushd uses the more rational and dependable tool of taw#l (interpretation). Al-Jabri argues that while the use of qiy s inevitably obscures the distinction between the religious and philosophical domains and contorts the meaning of the religious texts, the use of taw#l maintains the distinct identity of the two realms but posits a relationship between them. Ibn Rushds understanding of taw#l seeks to maintain the apparent meaning of the religious texts and in case the meaning is not clear or appears to be in conflict with a philosophical position, to resort to the inductive examination of all the revealed text. 16 Al-Jabri goes on to note:
Following this methodology, Averroes succeeds in establishing the truths that are attested through the indicational way of the revelation and those that are proven through the philosophers demonstrative method are in agreement and in harmony.17

While religion and philosophy may differ from each other in terms of premises, principles and methods of argumentation, they both converge on the all-important goals of attaining the truth and acquiring virtue. 18 A proper and disciplined use of reason, based on the principles of mathematics and logic, allows the religious and philosophical domains to maintain their individual autonomy but sees them as pursuing the same goals. For al-Jabri the gloom and oriental thinking of Ibn S !n , which was given an Islamic coating by
Ibid., 125. Ibid. 15 Ibid., 86. 16 Ibid., 102. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., 1034.
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Ghazz l!, condemns Muslims to live at the margins of modern history and modern civilization. In stark contrast, the Averroist spirit is adaptable to our era because it agrees with it on more than one point: rationalism, realism, axiomatic method and critical approach. 19

Ghazz l! on the Scope and Limitations of Philosohy

A look at Ghazz l!s corpus reveals that al-Jabris valuation of Ghazz l! is based on a flawed reading of Ghazz l!s corpus. While Ghazz l! does critique philosophy rather harshly at times, his critique is very focused and specific. In the words of M.E. Marmura, Ghazz l!s ultimate purpose is to refute the Islamic philosophers metaphysical theories and not their natural science. 20 A closer look at Ghazz l!s critique reveals that a key point on which he castigates the philosophers is precisely the same point that is of so much concern to Ibn Rushd (and al-Jabri) the illegitimate use of qiy s. Furthermore, any analysis of Ghazz l!s critique of philosophy has to be balanced by an appreciation of his approval of various disciplines within philosophy. The final judgment on Ghazz l!s attitude towards philosophy has to take into account the points on which he speaks approvingly of philosophy something that al-Jabri fails to do. In his work al-Munqidh min al-$al l, Ghazz l! notes that philosophy can be reduced to six divisions: mathematical, logical, physical, metaphysical, political, and moral. 21 With respect to mathematics, Ghazz l! notes:
The mathematical sciences deal with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. But nothing in them entails denial or affirmation of religious methods. On the contrary, they concern rigorously demonstrated facts which can in no wise be denied once they are known and understood. 22

If someone attacks the validity of the mathematical sciences for the sake of defending religion, Ghazz l! notes: Great indeed is the crime against religion committed by anyone who supposes that Islam is to be championed by the denial of these mathematical sciences. 23 Ghazz l!s appraisal of the physical sciences is similar to his appraisal of the mathematical sciences: he
19 20

Ibid., 128. Michael E. Marmura, Ghazzali and Demonstrative Science, Journal of the History of Philosophy, no. 3 (1965), 188. 21 Richard Joseph McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghaz l#s al-Munqidh min al-$al l and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghaz l# (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1980), 72 22 Ibid., 73. 23 Ibid., 74.

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appreciates the analytical tools that science offers and critiques the unwarranted religious criticism/ condemnation of science:
The physical sciences are a study of the world of the heavens and their stars and the sublunar worlds simple bodies, such as water, air, earth, and fire, and composite bodies such as animals, plants and minerals. They also study the causes of their changing and being transformed and mixedAnd just as religion does not require the repudiation of the science of medicine, so also it does not require repudiation of the science of physics 24

After mentioning the natural phenomena of eclipses and the scientific theory explaining these phenomena, Ghazz l! cautions:
Whoever thinks that to engage in a disputation for refuting such a theory is a religious duty harms religion and weakens it. For these matters rest on demonstrations geometrical and arithmetical that leave no room for doubt. 25

As for those exponents of religion who engage in the reckless practice of disputing demonstrable scientific truths, Ghazz l! has some very harsh words:
The greatest thing in which the atheists rejoice is for the defender of religion to declare these [astronomical demonstrations] and their like are contrary to religion. Thus, the [atheists] path for refuting religion becomes easy if the likes [of the above argument for defending religion] are rendered a condition [for its truth].26

Turning from the scientific to the political aspects of philosophy, Ghazz l! notes that all that the philosophers have to say comes down to administrative maxims concerned with secular affairs and the government of rules.27 The moral sciences come down to listing the qualities and habits of the soul, and recording their generic and specific kinds, and the way to cultivate the good ones and combat the bad. 28 In both cases the philosophers merely plagiarize from different religious sources and present the ideas as their own. In the case of their writings on politics: They simply took these over from the scriptures revealed to the prophets by God Most High and from the

Ibid., 75ff. Ghazz l!, Tah fut al-Fal sifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, tr. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 6. 26 Ibid., 7. 27 R. J. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment, 77 28 Ibid.
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maxims handed down from the predecessors of the prophets. 29 In the case of their teachings on ethics, the philosophers simply took [these] over from the sayings of the Sufis.30 Consequently, anything of genuine worth in politics and ethics is already found in the religious sources, and there is no need to concern oneself with the mixed bag of truth, speculation and falsehood offered by the philosophers. But even here Ghazz l! goes on to remark:
However, assuming that [certain ideas] are found only in the writings of the philosophers, if what is said is reasonable in itself and corroborated by apodeictic proof and not contrary to the Quran and Sunna, then why should it be shunned and rejected? If we were to open this door and aim at foregoing every truth which had been first formulated by the mind of one in error, we would have to forgo much of what is true.31

As far as the science of logic is concerned, Ghazz l! notes that this science does not have anything to do with religion by way of negation or affirmation.32 While logic may not have any explicit religious content, it is a valuable tool that scholars can use to sharpen their intellect so that they are better equipped to attain and evaluate knowledge:
Knowledge is either a concept, and the way to know it is the definition or it is an assent (ta!d#q) and the way to know it is the apodeictic demonstration. There is nothing in this that must be rejected. On the contrary, it is the sort of thing mentioned by the mutakallim"n and the partisans of reasoning in connection with the proofs they use. The philosophers differ from them only in the modes of expression and technical terms and in a greater refinement in definitions and subdivisions. 33

In this passage Ghazz l! is alluding to and refuting the claim of some of the leading proponents of philosophy that logic is the exclusive property of the philosophers. Ghazz l! notes that this is one of the claims that the proponents of philosophy use to mislead people. He makes the point that logic is not limited to the domain of philosophy because it has always been a part of religious discourse, though under a different name. Commenting on the assertion of the philosophers that logical sciences must be mastered, Ghazz l! states:
Yes, when they say that the logical sciences must be mastered, this is true. But logic is not confined to them. This is the principle in the discipline of theology
Ibid. Ibid. 31 Ibid., 79. 32 Ibid., 74. 33 Ibid., 75.
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we name The Book of Reflection. They changed its expression to logic to magnify itBut when the one seeking to be clever, who is weak, hears the name logic, he thinks it is an unfamiliar art, unknown to the theologians, known only to the philosophers. 34

Ghazz l! the theologian posits that logic is an integral part of theology that goes by a different name ( na%ar). The philosophers try to trick the people by playing language games the fact that the term logic ( man&iq) is not used in theology, is provided as proof of the claim that theology is devoid of logic. Ghazz l! argues that the absence of the term does not imply the absence of the science. In the areas of theology ( kal m) and jurisprudence ( fiqh), the science of logic appears under a different name. It is not only theology that contains logic. Ghazz l! the jurist knows (and states) that while the religious commands that are the subject matter of juridical inquiry are of Divine origin, the principles of jurisprudence are actually based on logic. 35 Ghazz l! goes on to note that if linguistic differences are accounted for, it can be easily demonstrated that theology and jurisprudence contain all the logic that the work of the philosophers contains. Consequently, any defence or exposition of religion that is based on the rejection of logic can only be counterproductive. In light of what Ghazz l! has said about unwarranted religious criticism of the natural and mathematical sciences, the following valuation offered by Ghazz l! of the religious criticism of logic has a familiar ring to it:
When [logic] is rejected, the only effect of such a rejection in the minds of logicians is a low opinion of the rejecters intelligence, and, what is worse, of his religion, which, he claims, rests on such rejection. 36

For Ghazz l! the difference between philosophy and religion is not that one employs logic and the other does not; for, in fact, both disciplines employ logic. Theology and jurisprudence employ logic in a disciplined manner, whereas the branch of philosophy called metaphysics employs logic in an unrestricted (and therefore) illegitimate manner. Ghazz l! notes:
To be sure, the philosophers themselves are guilty of a kind of injustice in the case of this science of logic. This is that in logic they bring together for apodeictic
Ghazz l!, Tah fut al-Fal sifah: The Incoherence of Philosophers, 9. For citations of Ghazz l!s works that explicitly mention the place of logic and rationality in theology (kal m) and jurisprudence (fiqh), see Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghaz l# and the Asharite School (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 811. 36 McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment, 75.
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demonstration, conditions known to be undoubtedly sure and certain knowledge. But when in metaphysics they finally come to discuss questions touching on religion, they cannot satisfy those conditions but rather are extremely slipshod in applying them. 37

Consequently,
[i]t is in the metaphysical sciences that most of the philosophers errors are found. Owing to the fact that they could not carry out apodeictic demonstration according to the conditions they had postulated in logic, they differed a great deal about metaphysical questions. 38

More specifically it is on three particular issues that the philosophers fail to live up to the standards that they have set for themselves. As a result not only do they commit an injustice against the science of logic, this injustice leads them to make metaphysical claims that are contradictory to religious teachings. Using their knowledge of philosophy the philosophers: (a) deny the possibility of bodily resurrection, (b) deny Gods knowledge of particulars and claim that he only knows universals, and (c) assert the co-eternity of God and the world. On a very basic level Ghazz l! argues that these three positions are at odds with the plain sense meaning of the Qur n and the teachings of the Prophet(peace be on him). Speaking of the religious warrant for the claim that there will be bodily resurrection, Ghazz l! cites a passage from the Qur n (3: 163) and a number of a' d#th about the present condition of righteous souls and the encounter with Munkir and Nak !r in the grave and then goes on to note:
[this] indicates the revival and resurrection thereafter namely the resurrection of the body. This is possible by returning [the soul] to the body, whatever body this may be, whether [composed] of matter from the first body [or from that] of another or from matter whose creation commences anewThis lies within Gods power and would be a [true] return of that soul. 39

The claim that God only knows universals but not particulars is out and out unbelief. On the contrary the truth is that there does not escape Him the weight of an atom in the heavens or in the earth (Qur n: 34: 3 and 10: 61).40
Ibid. Ibid., 76. 39 Ghazz l!, Tah fut al-Falasifah; The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 219. 40 McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment, 76ff.
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As for the philosophers claim that the world and God are co-eternal, Ghazz l! argues that by taking this position:
They have rendered His state approximating that of a dead person who has no information of what takes place in the world, differing from the dead however, only in His self-awareness. This is what God does with those who are deviators from His path and destroyers of the way of guidance; who deny His saying, I did not make them witness the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor the creation of themselves (Qur n: 18: 51).41

In addition to being in clear contradiction with the plain sense meaning of the Qur nic narrative, the positions of the philosophers on these three issues are filled with inner contradictions. In his Tah fut al-Fal sifah, Ghazz l! devotes the [First] Discussion to demonstrating the inner contradictions of the claim that the world and God are co-eternal, the [Thirteenth] Discussion to refuting the claim that God does not know particulars, and the [Twentieth] Discussion to refuting the claim that there will be no bodily resurrection. The fact that there are inner contradictions on these points is amply evidenced by the fact that there is a great deal of disagreement among the philosophers on the specifics of their arguments and there is also a palpable shame that is discernible in the way that they present their arguments. Even though he is talking about one of the three aforementioned issues, Ghazz l!s valuation holds just as well for the other two. Speaking of Ibn S !n s disagreement with his fellow philosophers on the issue of God only knowing Himself this is what the philosophers assert but agreeing with them that God cannot know plurality and multiplicity, Ghazz l! notes:
How, then, does he [Avicenna] share with them their denial of plurality but disagree with them in affirming [Gods] knowledge of other [things]? When he was ashamed that it should be said that God does not know anything at all in this world and the next, but knows only Himself, whereas another knows Him and also knows Himself and others, thereby becoming nobler than Him in knowledge [Avicenna] forsook this [position], being embarrassed and repelled by this doctrine. But he was not ashamed in insisting on the denial of plurality in all respects, claming that [Gods] knowledge of Himself and of others indeed, of all things constitutes His essence without any addition. This is the very contradiction of which the rest of the philosophers were ashamed because of the manifest contradiction [in Avicennas doctrine] at first reflection. Hence no party among them is free from shame as regards this doctrine.42

41 42

Ghazz l!, Tah fut al-Fal sifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 70ff. Ibid., 103ff.

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For Ghazz l! the fundamental problem with the philosophers position is that they think that the inner nature of divine matters is grasped by reflection and imagination 43 in the same way that human reflection and imagination can be used to understand mathematics, logic, astronomy, medicine, etc. 44

Evaluating Ghazz l!s Legacy

Ibn Khald%n notes that prior to Ghazz l!, the mutakallim"n had advanced a number of arguments offering a rational defence of religious teachings to counter the heretical claims of a variety of sects. But many of these arguments were based on elementary and unsound reasoning. Ibn Khald %n credits Ghazz l! and Im m Lis n al-D !n Ibn al-Kha &!b Mu"ammad b. Abd All h (d. 776/1375) for being among the first Muslim thinkers to utilize the science of logic to offer a coherent exposition and rational defence of religious faith. 45 He goes on to note that while the use of logic and reason is of great value, its misuse by the philosophers leads to deviation from the religious teachings. Speaking of the scope of philosophical metaphysics and religious law, Ibn Khald%n notes:
There is a great difference between the two positions. The perceptions of which the Master of the religious law (Mu "ammad) had are wider (than those of the philosophers), because they go beyond rational views. They are above them and include them, because they derive their support from divine light. 46

In a very approving tone Ibn Khald %n notes that Ghazz l! refuted a good many of the (opinions of the metaphysicians) 47 that were in vogue during his day. With respect to the relationship between logic, reason, philosophy and religion, Ibn Khald %n is much closer to Ghazz l!s position than that of Ibn Rushd. Charles Issawi and Oliver Leaman note that while Ibn Khaldun rarely agrees with Ibn Rushd, he considers Ghazz l! as the surer guide to the
Ibid., 104. Speaking of Ghazz l!s argument in the Tah fut, Adamson notes: al-Ghaz l! does not reject scientific or philosophical knowledge altogether. What he does do is to show that it does not measure up to the rather high standard that the philosophers have set for themselves, namely that knowledge be of relationships which are logically necessaryThe al-Ghaz l! of the Tah fut should be classed not with the anti-rationalists, but with those concerned to keep philosophy in its proper place. Peter Adamson, AlGhazali, Causality, and Knowledge, A paper presented at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Available on-line at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/papers/medi/MediAdam.htm 45 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 3: 1436. 46 Ibid., 3: 154. 47 Ibid., 3: 153.
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truth48 than Ibn Rushd. On the whole, Ibn Khald %n tends to follow alGhazali in reconciling mysticism [sufism] with theology. 49 With specific reference to the relationship of logic and intellect to religious issues, Issawi and Leaman summarize Ibn Khald %ns position thus:
He refers to the intellect as like a balance which is meant for gold, but which is sometimes inappropriately used for weighing mountains. Logic cannot be applied to this area of inquiry, and must be restricted to non-theological topics. 50

In sum, not only does Ibn Khald %n offer a very positive valuation of Ghazz l!s contribution to the history of Islamic thought, but this appreciation is also juxtaposed with a critique of Ibn Rushd. Ibn Tamiyyah, another leading medieval Muslim thinker, offers a more critical evaluation of Ghazzal ! than Ibn Khald %n. While he agrees with Ghazz l!s critique of the philosophers in general, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the critique does not go far enough. According to Kamali:
Ibn Taymiyah believes that Ghazali misrepresents Islam in recognizing its opposition to Philosophy on three points only viz. the eternity of the world, the contentless universality of Gods knowledge, and (skepticism with regard to) the resurrection of the dead.51

Furthermore,
It is not only Ghazalis omissions, but also some positive aspects of his teachings that appear (to Ibn Taymiyah) to be coloured by his persistent philosophical interests. To be specific, Ibn Taymiyah charges him with initiating the practice of presenting Fiqh in terms or concepts borrowed from Greek philosophy. 52

Among modern Muslim thinkers, Iqbal echoes Ibn Taymiyyahs critique of Ghazz l! by noting that, Ghazali, on the whole remained a follower of Aristotle in Logic. 53 In spite of this shortcoming, Iqbal sees striking parallels

Charles Issawi, and Oliver Leaman Ibn Khaldun, Abd al-Rahman in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998) 4: 623-27, especially. 49 Ibid., 625. 50 Ibid., 626. 51 Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Types of Islamic Thought in Criticism and Reconstruction: A Comparative Study of Ghaz l#s Thah fut and I'y , Ibn Tamiyyahs Radd and Sh h Wal#y All hs (ujjat (Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1963), 54. 52 Ibid., 55. 53 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1999), 102.
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between the mission of Ghazz l! and Kant in that Ghazalis mission was almost apostolic like that of Kant in Germany in the eighteenth century. 54 The challenge facing both thinkers in their respective historical situations was to demonstrate the limits of human reason and thereby preserve the integrity of religious teachings that were not capable of rational demonstration. On this point, Ghazz l! succeeded where Kant failed. It is worth quoting Iqbal at length on this point:
[Kants] Critique of Pure Reason revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins. And justly he has been described as Gods greatest gift to his country. Ghazalis philosophical skepticism which, however, went a little too far, virtually did the same kind of work in the world of Islam in breaking the back of that proud but shallow rationalism which moved in the same direction as pre-Kantian rationalism in Germany. There is, however, one important difference between Ghazali and Kant. Kant, consistent with his principles, could not affirm the possibility of the knowledge of God. Ghazali, finding no hope in analytic thought, moved to mystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independent of science and metaphysics.55

While Ghazz l!s philosophical skepticism is a rather unsafe basis for religion and not wholly justified by the spirit of the Quran, 56 his response to the challenge of philosophical rationalism succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist in a way that Kants philosophy could not do. While Ghazz l!s accomplishment is noteworthy on this account, for Iqbal it comes at a heavy price. There appears to be a vague awareness on Ghazz l!s part that the rational/scientific study of the world has some type of religious significance. The study of the natural world has the potential of opening an individuals eyes/heart to the wonders of God. Using the example of anatomy to illustrate a more general point about the natural world as a whole, Ghazz l! states:
Indeed no one can study the science of anatomy and the marvelous use of organs without acquiring this compelling knowledge of the perfect governance of Him Who shaped the structures of animals, and especially that of man. 57
Ibid., 4. Ibid., 4. 56 Ibid., 3. 57 McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment, 71.
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But in the final analysis Ghazz l! comes down on the side of skepticism, in terms of the religious significance of philosophical reflection. After describing the salient features of the six branches of philosophy and their relationship to religious teachings, the final judgment that Ghazz l! offers is: But to all of them, despite the multiplicity of their categories, cleaves the stigma of unbelief and godlessness. 58 The implications of this skepticism are quite far reaching when looking at the fundamentals of religious teachings in the context of the explosion of scientific knowledge in the modern era. If Ghazz l! is correct in his assessment of philosophy (or natural philosophy, another name for modern science) then there is no religious significance whatsoever of all the knowledge about the natural world that has resulted from (and will continue to result from) the scientific exploration of the natural world. Speaking of the value of a rational inquiry into the nature of the world, and the value of such an inquiry, Ghazz l! states:
Once its [the worlds] temporal existence is established, it makes no difference whether it is a sphere, a simple body, a hexagon; no difference whether the highest heaven and what is beneath them are thirteen layers, as they say, or lesser or greater. For the relation of the inquiry into [these matters] to the inquiry into divine [matters] is similar to the relation of looking at the number of layers of an onion [or] the number of seeds in a pomegranate. What is intended here is only [the worlds] being Gods act, whatever mode it has. 59

Besides the general fact that the world is Gods act, there is no religious significance of the particular mode of the worlds being. For Ghazz l! the scientific judgment whether the world is a sphere, simple body or hexagon is religiously irrelevant. In short, the specifics of the empirical world and their study is a spiritually irrelevant matter. This philosophically skeptical attitude towards scientific exploration of the empirical world opens the door for speculative mysticism. When viewed with the aid of historical hindsight and an awareness of the modern cultural condition, Ghazz l!s philosophical skepticism is very problematic, because of the significance that modern culture invests in scientific truth. While Iqbal sees Ghazz l!s philosophical skepticism as seriously problematic, Leor Halevi, a contemporary historian of ideas, argues that a tempered interpretation of this skepticism invests it with a significance that makes this skepticism of great value for modern rational, philosophical inquiry. Halevi notes that if this skepticism is interpreted as a functional
58 59

Ibid., 70. Ghazz l!, Tah fut al-Fal sifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 7.

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skepticism rather than a type of Cartesian doubt, then Ghazz l!s use of Greek philosophy and logic can be explained differently. Halevi makes his point by comparing Ghazz l!s critique of philosophy at the turn of 11th century with the critique of philosophy offered by Wittgenstein at the turn on the 20th century. Halevi notes:
In the unusual sections where Ghazali applies Aristotelian language to a world not following the ordinary laws of physics, some have found Ghazali slipping unconsciously perhaps, into an Aristotelian frame of mind. I will show that, as a skeptical theologian with a dialogic imagination, he was rather deconstructing Aristotelian discourse while playing a Wittgensteinian sort of language game. 60

Halevi goes on to point out that while there are obvious differences between Ghazz l! and Wittgenstein both theological and historical there are structural similarities between them that elucidate the skepticism of one and the other. 61 Detailing these similarities, Halevi states:
Wittgensteins pronouncements on Darwinian and Newtonian believers bear all the marks of Ghazalis attacks on Aristotelian believers. Indeed, more generally, his view of philosophys role vis--vis natural science corresponds deeply to Ghazalis view of theologys role vis--vis natural philosophy. 62

Wittgenstein argues that one must be skeptical of the way that people use language, because more often than not they are actually abusing it.
Wittgenstein was both fascinated and disturbed by the language of psychoanalysis because of its claims upon the reality of dreams, and its causal psychological reference, violated the rules of the language-game by blurring the lines between logical facts, natural things, and interpretation of outlying senses. 63

Similarly:
Ghazzaliwas not opposed to a neutered causal theory upholding the possibility of divine agency. But what drove him mad about natural philosophy was its language, which like psychoanalysis obscured the difference between causation and reasoning. By inferring future situations from a causal nexus established
Leor Halevi, The Theologians Doubts: Natural Philosophy and the Skeptical Games of Ghazali, Journal of the History of Ideas, 63: 1 (2002) 1939, especially, 20. 61 Ibid., 34. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., 35.
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imperfectly by habitual observation and without clearly distinguishing logic from reality, natural philosophy violated the rules of the language game. 64

While Ghazz l! does not state the issue in such terms, the fundamental mistake made by the philosophers is that they conflate the results of logical reasoning with empirical reality. Centuries before Wittgenstein, Ghazz l! argues that in doing so philosophy violates its own rules and trespasses on a domain over which it has no jurisdiction. Well before Ibn Rushds critique of the improper use of qiy s by the mutakallim"n, Ghazz l! had traced the root cause of the inner contradictions of philosophical doctrines to the philosophers inability to maintain the distinction between the religious and philosophical domains. The philosophers used the same intellectual apparatus to pass judgment on religious issues related to the divine and hereafter that they used to pass judgment on philosophical issues related to the natural world,65 thereby violating the rules of both the religious and the philosophical language games. On this count Ghazz l!s skepticism is more suited to the modern condition not only because this skepticism is critical of taql#d in the religious domain but also because it is critical of the trespasses of reason in the religious and philosophical domains. While Ibn Rushds thought offers a safeguard against taql#d in the religious domain, there is no recognition of the limits of reason and rationality in either the religious or the philosophical domains. By comparing the position of the philosophers on three key points with the plain sense reading of the Qur n, Ghazz l! demonstrates that it is the taw#l of the philosophers (and Ibn Rushd) that is stretching the meaning of the Qur n beyond recognition. 66 In other words, it is Ghazz l!s reading of the Qur n that remains true to plain sense meaning, not that of the philosophers. Consequently, if rationalism, realism, axiomatic method and
Ibid. On one level this could be the summary of Ghazz l!s critique of philosophy that he formulates in Tah fut al-Fal sifah. Because they employ the same intellectual apparatus they use to study the natural world to pass judgment on the origin of the universe, the nature of Gods knowledge and the reality of resurrection, the philosophers inevitably and invariably make egregious mistakes. 66 Bello notes that Ibn Rushds attempt to defend the philosophers from Ghazz l!s charge of deviating from Islamic teaching on the three issues of the eternity of the world, denial of bodily resurrection and the nature of Gods knowledge fails because it is Ibn Rushds taw#l of Qur nic passages that stretches the meaning beyond rational limits. Bello notes: With the aid of quotations from the Qur n, Ibn Rushd claims that the opinion of the Aristotelians conforms to the apparent meaning of the Scripture while that of the theologians is merely an interpretation of it. In fact, however, Ibn Rushds quotations are out of context Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijm and Taw#l in the Conflict Between Al-Ghazz l# and Ibn Rushd (Leiden and New York: E.J. Bril, 1989), 149.
64 65

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critical approach 67 combined with maintaining the integrity of the religious and philosophical domains is necessary for Islams successful sojourn into modernity, then Ghazz l! offers a more promising start than Ibn Rushd. A brief survey of modern thought in the 19th and 20th centuries reveals that it is not so much a lack of reason and rationality in modern universal contemporary thought that is problematic, but rather its over-abundance. This fact has been commented upon by not just the Romantic critics of Enlightenment thought (i.e. William Blake, Goethe, Friedrich Nietzsche) but also by rationalists such as Max Weber, Edmund Husserl , Sigmund Freud, Emile Durkheim, etc. For all of these rationalists, the greatest danger facing modern culture was not so much the lack of rationalism but rather the penetration of rationalism into all domains and spheres of modern life. For Weber rationalization was leading to the demise of culture itself. For Husserl the Cartesian-Kantian philosophical project was threatening the very existence of Western civilization, because moderns had lost the ability to live inwardly. For Durkheim the collective effervescence, that is, the very glue of human society was being corroded by rationalism. And for Freud the health and wellbeing of the modern human personality was being undermined by a particular type of rationalism. Building on the work of these great modernist thinkers, post-modern philosophy has further detailed the corrosive and destructive aspects of undisciplined rationalism that comes to dominate and colonize all spheres of human culture. Michel Foucault, Ferdinand Baudrillard, Jean Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, to name a few, have documented the limitations and shortcomings of human reason and rationality. For the postmodern thinkers, these limitations have to be acknowledged and the shortcomings overcome if modern universal culture is to regain any sense of meaning, coherence and vitality. For Paul Ricoeur human reason and rationality, unaware of its own limitations and shortcomings, inevitably leads to the emergence of a degenerate sacred and a scientific-technological ideology. He describes the resultant cultural condition in these words:
I think it is the fact that the degenerate sacred and the scientific-technological ideology constitute a single cultural configuration. And this cultural configuration is that of nihilism. The scientistic illusion and the retreat of the sacred into its own particular phantoms together belong to the forgetfulness of our roots. In two different yet convergent manners the desert is spreading. And what we are in the midst of discovering, contrary to the scientific-technological
67

Al-Jabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, 128.

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ideology, which is also the military-industrial ideology, is that humanity is simply not possible without the sacred. 68

For Ricoeur, the most pressing challenge facing contemporary culture is to rein in the excesses of human reason and rationality and recover an authentic sense of the sacred that is not delimited by the human intellect. He posits that there can be no hope of affirming the humanity of the human being without the sacred a sacred that simultaneously lies beyond the domains of human intellect and at its very roots. Given the fruits of Enlightenment reason and a critical evaluation of its historical development, from a postmodern perspective modernity is neither a fact nor our destiny. It is henceforth an open question. 69 Those most well informed about the characteristics, problematics and challenges facing universal contemporary thought are exploring the horizons that lie beyond (or at the very roots of) reason, rationality and intellect. In his advocacy of Ibn Rushd, al-Jabri appears to be oblivious of the historical condition in which he is living. While his advocacy might have had some merit in the pre-Nietzschean period, it carries practically no weight in the aftermath of Nietzsches devastating critique of the Enlightenment project. The most pressing challenge facing universal contemporary thought is to recognize the limitations of human reason/rationality, its grounding in a supra-rational domain that lies beyond the intellect and the relationship between the two. Ibn Rushds corpus offers virtually nothing of value that could make a meaningful contribution to delineating the scope and limits of human rationality and its relationship to the supra-rational domain the very tasks that post-modern thinkers have identified as a critical need of contemporary universal culture. If modern Islamic thought is to make a positive contribution to universal contemporary thought it can make a much needed contribution to modern philosophical discourse by describing and identifying the limits of rational thoughtas this is one of most pressing needs of the day. On this particular issue, Ghazz l!s corpus contains a great deal more resource than Ibn Rushds. But contemporary Islamic thought will have to go beyond Ghazz l! in establishing and describing the relationship between the rational and suprarational domains. On this count there is a significant degree of similarity between Ghazz l! and Ibn Rushd in that both of them consider these to be completely differentiated and autonomous domains. Modern developments in
Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination, tr. David Pellawar, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 64. 69 Ibid., 63.
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the areas of semiotics (especially the work of C.S. Peirce), philosophy of science (the work of Gerald Holton and John Polkinghorne) and hermeneutics (George Hans Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur) offer interesting possibilities of establishing a bridge between the two domains. These modern developments open up options that were not possible in previous centuries. While modern Muslim thought will have to go beyond Ghazz l! on this particular point, he still offers a better starting than Ibn Rushd. In conclusion an adequate reading of Ghazzalis views on reason and nationality and an adequate understanding of the contemporary cultural condition shows Ghazzali to be a better starting point for Islams sojourn into modernity than Ibn Rushd.

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