The 50 Major Engineering Failures (1977-2007) Part-1

List of Engineering Failures Contributed by Material Failures, Corrosion, Design Flaw, and Construction Defect in Oil and Gas Production Facilities, Hydrocarbon Processing, and Oil and Gas Distribution (Part 1 of ! " Mu#a$$ad %bdu# (abdu#&re'solindo(co(id! %s 'ey c#ain in world energy su))ly, t#e industry wit#in oil and gas )roduction, #ydrocarbon refinery, storage and distribution, and )ower )lant industry stri*e to ac#ie*e t#e #ig#est le*el of integrity and reliability of t#eir facilities, structures, tool and e+ui)$ent syste$( ,ndustry sta'e#olders t#at ranging fro$ oil and gas )roducer, engineering, )rocure$ent, contractors, $aterial su))liers, and ins)ection co$)anies fro$ day to day i$)ro*e t#e +uality standards, disco*ering new te#cnologies, de*elo) new tec#ni+ues and $et#odologies in order to raise t#e engineering integrity for t#e i$)ro*e$ent of safety for )eo)le , en*iron$ent conser*ation, and securing econo$ic in*est$ent( Tak ada gading yang tak retak( %s an ancient ,ndonesian )ro*erb is also #a))ened to engineering structure- t#ere will be no design wit#out flaw and t#ere will be no construction wit#out defect( Failures so$eti$es occur( ,n se*eral cases t#e after$at# of failures #a*e a significant i$)act to t#e )eo)le safety and econo$ic ris'( .ut industry gain a *aluable e/)erience eac# accident occurs( 0#ere always be o))ortunities to i$)ro*e o)eration )rocedures, *alue )erce)tions, tec#nical code re*isions, and regulatory i$)ro*e$ents( 0#is )ublication as a result of literature wor' is ai$ed is to de*elo) an alternati*e engineering failure database associated wit# $aterial failures,corrosion, design flaw and construction defect t#at lead to $aterial failure in oil and gas )roduction, #ydrocarbon industry, oil and gas distribution networ', and energy )ower )lant( 1. Umm ai! "atar # $%ril &' 1977 ((el! Failure' )as Pro*essing Plant' & +ille!' U , 7-'&50'000.179'000'000) % tan' containing 123,444 barrels of refrigerated )ro)ane at 5 6F failed at weld( 7ear"$iss" accident a year earlier re)orted at si$iliar tan' weld caused 15,444 barrels of )ro)ane released( 0#e )ossible cause of /el! 0ailure was corrosion by t#e influence of sul)#ate reducing bacteria t#at re$ained inside t#e tan' after #ydrotest wit# seawater( 0#e wa*e of li+uid )ro)ane swe)t o*er t#e di'es before igniting a near tan' contained 11 ,444 barrels of but#ane( ,t too' eig#t days to co$)letely e/tinguis#ed t#e fire( (8ource, Location! 2. $12ai2 au!i $ra1ia # $%ril 15' 1973 (4orrosion' )as Pro*essing Plant' U , 5&'700'000.117'000'000) % 11"inc# )i)e o)erated at 44 )sig in gas trans$ission syste$ corroded and releasing *a)or cloud( 0#e first ignition occured fro$ a flare 1, 44 feet downwind( 0#e second ignition occured w#en 9et w#i))ed )i)e section struc' t#e *a)or s)ace of a 14,444 barrels s)#eroid tan'( (8ource, Location! &. E+o0is+ 5or/a6 # Mar*h 27' 1930 ((el! Failure' 700shore Plat0orm' 12& +ille!)

%le/andra L :ielland Platfor$, a se$i"sub$ersible oil drilling )latfor$ located at E'ofis' field 7ort# 8ea ca)si;ed during a stor$( 0#e )latfor$ su))orted by fi*e colu$ns standing on fi*e 11 $eter dia$eter )ontoons( 0#e fi*e <( dia$eter colu$ns on t#e )ontoons were interconnected by a networ' of #ori;ontal bracings( 0#e crac'ed bracing $ade fi*e ot#er bracing bro'e off due to o*erload, and t#e *ertical colu$n connected wit# t#e crac'ed bracings beca$e se)arated fro$ t#e )latfor$( 0#e )latfor$ subse+uently beca$e unbalanced and ca)si;ed( 0#e in*estigation s#owed t#at a fatigue crac' #ad )ro)agated fro$ t#e double fillet near t#e #ydro)#one $ounted to one of t#e #ori;ontal bracing( 8o$e crac's related to lamellar tearing were found in t#e #eat affected ;one (H%=! of t#e weld around t#e #ydro)#one( Learning fro$ t#is accident so$e counter$easures were underta'en including t#e a$end$ent of t#e standards in for stability, $otion c#aracteristics, $anue*erability, watertig#t doors, and structural strengt# in Mobile Offs#ore Drilling >nits (MOD>! Code by t#e ,nternational Mariti$e Organi;ation( (8ource 1, 1! 8. E!monton 4ana!a # $%ril 13' 1932 (Fatigue' Petro*hemi*al Plant' U , 21'000'000.&&'000'000) ?ibration fro$ t#e reci)rocating co$)ressor was belie*ed causing trans*erse fatigue of 1@< stainless steel instru$ent tubing( Hig# )ressure et#ylene released causing a fire by static electricity ignition( %lt#oug# t#e co$)ressor building e+ui))ed wit# gas detection syste$ t#e gas release was not accurately relayed to t#e control roo$( %uto$atic fail"safe *al*es functioned )ro)erly by bloc'ing t#e flow of $ore et#ylene w#ic# was u) to 11,444 )ounds of gas already released causing da$age to t#is low density )olyet#ylene )lant( (8ource! 5. 9emeo:ille ;llinois U - <ul6 2&' 1938 ((el! Failure' 9e0iner6' 17 +ille!' U , 191'000'000.27&'000'000)

% *essel for $onoet#anola$ine absorber was constructed ten years earlier wit# one"inc# t#ic' %80M % 13 Gr A4 steel )lates rolled and welded wit# full sub$erged arc wit#out )ost weld #eat treat$ent( Bust )rior to ru)ture a -- in*hes *ra*+ !ete*te! at *ir*um0erential /el! and by t#e ti$e o)erator close inlet *al*e crac' s)read to 15 inc#es( 0#e area was already cleared for e*acuation and w#en fire brigade arri*ing t#e e/)losion occured( 0#is e/)losion created se+uential fire and e/)losion wit#in refinery )lant( % boiling li+uid e/)anding *a)or e/)osion (.LE?E! occured in a al'ylation unit *essel( 0ec#nical in*estigation )ointed t#at crac' initiated at H%= of welded s#ell of t#e colu$n by #ydrogen crac'ing, and )rogressed by t#e $ec#anis$ of #ydrogen induced ste)wise crac'ing (H,8C!( 0est according to 7%CE )rocedure confir$ed t#at $aterial was susce)tible to H,8C( (8ource 1, 1! -. an <uan ;=huate%e* Me=i*o 4it6 Me=i*o # 5o:em1er 19' 1938 (Pi%e >ea+ing' >P) Terminal' -50 +ille! -8'000 injure!' U , 19'980'000.29'000'000) % 11"inc#es )i)eline between cylinder and s)#ere storage ru)tured( ,nitial blast caused a series of .LE?Es( 0#e oustanding cause of escalation was t#e ineffecti*e gas detection syste$ and as a result of lac' of e$ergency isolation( 0#is e/)losion and fire is )er#a)s t#e $ost de*astating incident e*er( 0#e #ig# deat# toll was due to t#e )ro/i$ity of t#e LPG ter$inal to residence co$)le/( >ntil now t#ere is no *lear in0ormation about t#e cause of )i)e ru)ture( (8ource 1, 1! 7. >as Pie!ras ?ene@uela- Ae*em1er 1&' 1938 (B6!rogen Em1rittlement' 9e0iner6' U , -2'07-'000.39'000'000) % fracture occured in <"inc# line carrying #ot oil fro$ #ydrode sulfuri;er( 4ra*+ 0oun! in heat a00e*te! @one a1out 1 # 1.2 in*hes 0rom /el!( Hot oil at A44 )si and 3 4 oF s)rayed and ignited at t#e #ydrogen units( Fire causing se+uential ru)ture of 13"inc# gas line and successi*ely blow torc# to )i)ing syste$ in ad9acent areas( ?ibration analysis nine years earlier 9udged t#at t#e failed line was #a*ing e/cessi*e *ibration and it strengt#ened t#e confidence t#at t#e #ot oil line failed in fatigue do$inantly due to #ydrogen e$brittle$ent( (8ource! 3. 5or*o >ouisiana- U Ma6 5' 1933 (Erosion-4orrosion' 9e0iner6' 8 +ille!' 20 injure!' 8500 e:a*uate! U , 258'700'000.&&-'000'000) %n elbow at de)ro)ani;er colu$n )i)ing syste$ in a fluid catalytic crac'ing (FCC! unit failed( % large *a)or wit# esti$ated 14,444 )ounds of C2 #ydrocarbon cloud esca)ed fro$ t#e failed elbow and ignited in FCC c#arge #eater( 0#e e/)losion of FCC unit was t#e $ost se*ere da$age( % re)ort )ointed t#at t#e failed elbow suffering e/cessi*e locally t#inning( 0#e failed elbow was located downstrea$ of t#e in9ection )oint w#ere a$$oniated water was added to reduce )ro)ani;er condensation or fouling((8ource 1, 1! 9. Pi%er $l%ha 5orth ea UC # <ul6 3' 1933 ()as >ea+ing' 700shore Plat0orm' 1-7 +ille!' U ,9-5'000'000.1'270'000'000)

,t was do$inantly o)eration error w#en gas lea'ing fro$ two blind flanges t#en gas ignited and e/)loded( % )u$) fro$ two a*ailable )u$)s was tri))ed, and an o)erator inad*ertently c#anging t#e bac'u) )u$) wit# )ressure relief *al*e t#at #ad been re$o*ed for $aintenance( 8e*erity da$age of t#e e/)losion was due to large )art t#e contribution of oil and gas )i)elines connected to Pi)er %l)#a( C#ile t#e )latfor$ was in fire two ot#er )latfor$ 0artan and Clay$ore continued )u$)ing gas and oil( (8ource 1,1, ?ideo! 10. $nt/er% Delgium # Mar*h 7' 1939 (Fatigue.(el! Failure' Petro*hemi*al Plant' U , 77'000'000.99'000'000) E/)losion is belie*ed initiated fro$ a hairline *ra*+ in /el!e! seam o0 %i%ing at t#e ald#eyde colu$n( Et#ylene o/ide esca)ed fro$ t#e lea', for$ed )olyet#ylene glycol (PEG! in t#e insulation $aterial and accu$ulated for a )eriod of ti$e( 8e+uential e/)losion was belie*ed by t#e c#e$ical $ec#anis$ inside t#e insulating $aterial and PEG( 0#e e/)losion caused e/tensi*e da$age to t#e )lant and it was closed for at least 15 $ont#s wit# total business interu)tion cost u) to >8D 1A4,444,444( (8ource, Location! 11. 9i*hmon! 4ali0ornia U # $%ril 10' 1939 ((el! Failure' 9e0iner6' 3 injure!'U ,37'170'000.112'000'000) Failed line carrying #ydrogen gas caused a #ig# )ressure #ydrogen fire and resulted in fla$e i$)inge$ent to calciu$ silicate insulation of t#e #ydrocrac'er reactor s'irt( 0#e reactor w#ic# was 14 to 11 feet in dia$eter and wall t#ic'ness of se*en inc#es failed subse+ently( 0#e reactor was in $aintenance cycle for #ydrogen )urging( ,t is belie*ed t#at lea'ing started fro$ a failed elbow of 1" inc# line at 2,444 )si( (8ource, Location! 12. Daton 9auge >ouisiana U # Ae*em1er 28' 1939 (Drittle Fra*ture' 9e0iner6'U , -3'900'000.39'000'000) 0#e record for low te$)erature (14 oF and A44 )si! at t#e region is belie*ed as t#e $a9or contributor to t#e failure of <"inc#es )i)eline carrying gas $i/ture of et#ane and )ro)ane( %fter few $inutes of *a)or cloud was ignited and )i)erac' containing A4 lines ru)tured subse+uently( %lso wit# two storage tan's containing 2,344,444 gallons and 11 s$all tan's containing <<1,444 gallons of lube oil also contribute to subse+uent fire( (8ource, Location! 1&. 4oat@a*oal*os Me=i*o # Mar*h 11' 1991 (Pi%e >ea+ing' Petro*hemi*al Plant'U , 91'&00'000.112'000'000) Gas lea'ing fro$ )i)e rac' lead to e/)losion( 0#e first e/)losion occured and caused additional da$age to t#e )i)e rac'( 8econd e/)losion was $ore )owerful and could be felt $ore t#an 1 $iles fro$ t#e facility creating da$age to offsite t#ird )arty facility( 0#e e/)losion and fire $ade t#is *inyl c#loride )lant, a significant out)ut for Me/ico national de$and, s#ut down for se*en $ont#s( (8ource, Location! 18. Aha+a Dangla!esh # <une 20' 1991 ((el! Failure' Petro*hemi*al Plant' U , 71'000'000) 0#e fertili;er )lant w#ic# was constructed in 1EA4 suffer significant da$age due to an e/)losion( 0#e failure of a welded 9oint between carbondio/ide stri))er and $ain cylindrical body resulted in t#e release of #ig# )ressure gas w#ic# consisted of a$$onia, carbon dio/ide, and carba$ate li+uids( (8ource!

15. 5orth 9hine )erman6 # Ae*em1er 10' 1991(Erosion-4orrosion' 9e0iner6' U , 50'500'000.-2'000'000) % Pi)e failed at 0"9unction in #ydrocrac'er unit resulted in #ydrocarbon and #ydrogen release( 0#e release of t#e gas ignited and e/)losion occured and $ade se*ere da$age to t#e #ydrocrac'er unit and ad9acent substantial )art of t#e )lant( 0#e #ydrocrac'er unit was s#ut down for se*en $ont#s( 0#e failure of t#e )i)e was contributed by erosion"corrosion due to )lant aging( (8ource! 1-. )ua!alajara Me=i*o # $%ril 22' 1992 (4orrosion' Fuel Pi%eline' 20- +ille!' 500 injure!' 15'000 e:a*uate!' U , &00'000'000)

Guadala9ara, Me/ico second largest city, e/)erienced series of ten $assi*e e/)losion t#at e+uals to A,4 ric#ter scale fro$ fuel )i)eline blast( %n in*estigation into t#e disaster re*ealed t#at t#e $ost )ossible cause for t#e e/)losion was t#e interference of fuel )i)eline wit# new water )i)ing syste$( 0#e fuel )i)eline was carbon steel and t#e sewer syste$ was ;inc"coated co))er( 0#ese two lines were close enoug# to interfere eac#"ot#er( 0#ree days before t#e e/)losion, t#ere were co$)laints fro$ t#e city residents about gasoline"li'e s$ell co$ing fro$ t#e water )i)e and sewer syste$( (8ource 1, 1, Location! 17. (estla+e >ouisiana U # <ul6 23' 1992 ((el! Failure.4orrosion' Petro*hemi*al Plant' U , 25'000'000.&0'000'000) % reactor *essel in urea $anufacturing unit e/)loded( 0#e force of t#e e/)losion could be felt in areas u) to 14 $iles fro$ t#e )lant( 0#e frag$ented s#ell of t#e colu$n )ro)elled u) to E44 feet fro$ t#eir original location( 0#e reactor was constructed 1 years earlier wit# E4 feet tall and 3 feet in dia$eter( 0#e s#ell consisted of 5"inc#es la$inations including 2@< inc#es stainless steel liner( 0#e e/)losion resulted fro$ carba$ate lea'ing at t#e inside *essel( ,$)ro)er weld on a brac'et su))orting a tray inside t#e reactor created carba$ate lea' and subse+uent corrosion and contain$ent of t#e *essel( (8ource, Location! 13. (ilmington 4ali0ornia U # 7*to1er 3' 1992 (Erosion-4orrosion' 9e0iner6' U , 7&'&00'000.9-'000'000) %n e/)losion initiated fro$ #ydrogen )rocessing unit( 8e+uential fire and e/)losion occured to #ydrocrac'er unit, and #ydrode sulfuri;ation( 0#e e/)losion could be felt a))ro/i$ately 14 $iles fro$ t#e )lant( 0#e e/)losion $ade t#e )lant o)erator reduce )roduction ca)acity to 4 )ercent fro$ its nor$al A ,444 barrels )er"day( ,t too' < $ont#s to reco*er t#e )roduction ca)acity( 0#e e/)losion resulted fro$ ru)tered carbon"steel"elbow suffering locally t#inning due to long ter$ erosion"corrosion( (8ource, Location! 19. o!egaura <a%an- 7*to1er 1-' 1992 (Fatigue' 9e0iner6' 10 +ille!' 7 injure!' U , 1-0'500'000.19-'000'000)

%n e/)losion fro$ failed #eat e/c#anger in t#e #ydrode"sul)#uri;ation unit caused #ydrogen release and ignited fire and e/)losion( 0ec#nical in*estigation to t#e failure noted a co$)le/ity of t#e failure $ec#anis$( 0#e cause of t#e failure initiated by re)etition of *ariation of te$)erature lead to decrease of dia$eter gas'et retainer and bending defor$ation of roc' ring( 0#ese e*ents contributed to brea' out of roc' ring and $ade s)outs #ydrogen gas( (8ource, Location! 20. >a Me!e' Fran*e 5o:em1er 9' 1992 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 9e0iner6' U , 2-0'000'000.&13'000'000) % )i)e failed at 0"9unction in #ydrocrac'er unit resulted in #ydrocarbon and #ydrogen release detection( 8ubse+uent fire and e/)losion caused se*ere da$age to FCC unit, gas )lant, control roo$, and two new )rocess unit under construction( 0#e e/)losion also causing offsite da$age nearby residential wit#in t#e radius of 3 $iles away( 0#e business interu)tion loss due to t#is accident is esti$ated at >8D 1<4,444,444( (8ource, Location! 21. Daton 9ouge >ouisiana U # $ugust 2' 199& (4ree%' 9e0iner6 Plant' U A -5'200'000.73'000'000) %n elbow in t#e feed line of co'er unit ru)tured w#en feed switc#ing were )erfor$ed( Ot#er )i)es in unit ru)tured subse+uently releasing $ore #ydrocarbons and fueling $ore fire to t#e )lant( .ecause of t#e accident t#e co'er unit was s#ut down for t#ree wee's( ,n*estigation to t#e failed elbow noted t#at carbon steel elbow was wrong $aterial c#osen wit# less cree) resistance instead of Cr alloy steel( 22. im%son:ille a*ramento U - <une -' 199- (Pitting 4orrosion' Fuel Pi%eline' U A 27'000'000.&&'000'000) %n abo*eground )i)e seg$ent failed by corrosion releasing 11,<44 barrels of diesel fuel( 0#e )i)e $anufactured in 1E31 wit# 23"inc#es in dia$eter, 4(1<"inc#es in t#ic'ness, and #as s)ecified $a/i$u$ yield strengt# (8MF8! 1 ')si( 0#e )ressure of )i)e at t#e ti$e of failure was 2EE )si, t#e designed $a/i$u$ )ressure was <42 )si( (8ource! 2&. 9io Pie!ras an <uan Puerto 9i*o # 5o:em1er 21' 199- ((rong Material in B4$' )as Aistri1ution Pi%eline' && +ille!' -9 injure!' U A 5'000'000)

Polyet#ylene )i)e trans)orting )ro)ane gas to consu$er was failed leading to fire and e/)losion( 0#e e/)losion occurred in fi*e stories full occu)ied business center at s#o))ing district Gio Piedras 8an Buan Puerto Gico( 0#e lea'ing of )lastic )i)e was belie*ed due to construction e/ca*ation da$age around t#e )i)eline( More t#an 14 )i)es and conduits surrounding t#e )lastic )i)e w#ic# were being constructed, being used and #ad been abandoned( Construction e/ca*ation da$age to )lastic )i)e was rat#er una*oidable and t#ere s#ould be )i)eline design wit# #ig#er integrity wit#in #ig# conse+uence area (HC%! li'e Gio Piedras s#o))ing district( (8ource! 28. Martine@ 4ali0ornia U # <anuar6 27' 1997 (4ree%' 9e0iner6' U A 30'000'000.32'000'000) %n effluent line fro$ reactor in #ydrocrac'er unit failed at )i)e body leading to fire and e/)losion( Geleased #ydrocarbon were auto"ignited because #ig# te$)erature of t#e line seconds before e/)losion( %nalysis of t#e failed )i)e noted t#at t#e failure $ec#anis$ was cree) abo*e 1244 6F w#ic# e/)anded t#e 11"inc#es )i)e circu$ferentially by "inc#es causing locali;ed bulge in t#e )i)e )rior to ru)ture( (8ource! 1 ( Eo++ai*hi Mie <a%an # Ma6 2' 1997 (Erosion-4orrosion' Petro*hemi*al Plant) % 0"9oint of #ig#")ressure )i)ing for recycle et#ylene gas failed and lead to e/)losion( 0#e e/)losion occurred by t#e ignition of released et#ylene gas by static electricity( Failure was contributed by erosion corrosion e*ent by t#e e*idence of )resence of water and a local *orte/ acco$)anying a #ig#"s)eed flow( Erosion corrosion caused a local t#inning and t#e )i)e could no longer wit#stand internal )ressure( (8ource! 2-. ?isa+ha%atnam ;n!ia # e%tem1er 18' 1997 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 9e0iner6'50 +ille!' 27 injure!' 100 e:a*uate!' U A -8'000'000) Pi)ing in loading )ort and storage tan' lea'ed( 0#e #ea*ier t#an air gas s)read at ground le*el and ignited( % *a)or cloud e/)losion to t#is refinery beca$e $ore se*ere due to lac' of anti"fire foa$( 0#e )lant layout in w#ic# t#e LPG tan's and )i)elines were *ery close to se*eral ad$inistrati*e building caused large nu$ber of fatalities( (8ource 1, 1! 27. t Belena 4ali0ornia U # Ae*em1er 2' 1997( 4orrosion-Pitting' Fuel Pi%eline' U A 18'000'000.17'000'000) 23"inc#es )i)e failed wit# u) to 14,444 barrels of gasoline s)illed( .ot# unifor$ and )it corrosion were found at t#e failed seg$ent( 0#e )i)e was carbon steel wit# 8MF8 1 ')si, designed at o)erating )ressure <5 )si and $a/i$u$ allowable )ressure at A < )si( 0#e )ressure at t#e )oint of failure was 25 )si( (8ource! 23. Dintulu era/a+ Mala6sia -Ae*em1er 25' 1997 ()as Pro*essing Plant' Bigh Tem%erature Failure' 12 injure!' U A 275'000'000.298'000'000) ,nci)ient co$bustion e*ent at air se)aration unit (%8>! at a gas"to" li+uid (G0L! )lant and wit# t#e )resence of li+uid o/ygen caused t#e e/)losi*e burning of t#e alu$inu$ #eat e/c#anger ele$ents( 0#e ele$ents ru)tured e/)losi*ely( 0#e )lant was s#ut down for se*eral $ont#s for re)air( (8ource! 29. >ong0or! ?i*toria $ustralia - e%tem1er 25' 1993 (Drittle Fra*ture' )as Pro*essing Plant' 2 +ille!' 3 injure!' U A 1-0'000'000.171'000'000)

Figure 8#owing GP E4 Heat E/c#anger of Longford Gas Plant O)eration error of a by)ass *al*e allowed condensate to s)ill o*er into ot#er )arts of t#e syste$ e*entually causing t#e failure of war$ oil )u$)s( 0e$)erature of a #eat e/c#anger decreased sufficiently to lead to $aterial brittle transition( O)erator t#en $ade error of restarting t#e war$ oil flow w#ic# caused t#e #eat e/c#anger to fracture( %n initial release a))ro/i$ately 11,444 )ounds of #ydrocarbon *a)or e/)loded and $ade t#e )lant burned for two and a #alf days( ?ictoria was said to be in c#aos for 1E days( 0#e accident caused a large socio"econo$ic e/cess( 0#ere were 14,444 litigants signed a class action suit t#at $ade it a largest class action in %ustralian legal #istory( (8ource 1,1,2! &0. Derre lFEtang Fran*e # 7*to1er -' 1993 (4orrosion' 9e0iner6'U A 22'000'000.2&'000'000) % )i)e failed due to corrosion and released gas ignited w#en contacting #ot )rocess line( 0#e fire caused t#e failure of 'erosene air cooler and adding $ore fuel too t#e fire( 0#e fire created se*ere da$age to 11A,444 barrels")er"day crude unit and a 1A,444 barrels")er"day refor$er( Corrosionwas largely associated wit# t#e )resence of $ore corrosi*e na)#tanic acid( (8ource! &1. ;!jerhe 5iger Aelta 5igeria # 7*to1er 17' 1993 (Pi%e >ea+ing'Fuel Pi%eline'100 +ille!) Pi)e lea'ed a day before t#e e/)losion( Large nu$ber of *icti$ due to )eo)le fro$ surrounding )i)eline rig#t of way gat#ers to fetc# t#e fuel s)ill( 0#e )i)e t#at burst runs )arallel to Gi*er Et#io)e and #as two $a9or foot )at#s to it fro$ t#e road( 0#e )i)eline was laid in t#e early 1EA4( 0#e area is acti*ely culti*ated by t#e local )eo)le( 7e/t to t#e buried fuel )i)e is a gas )i)eline about 1 $eters a)art( Poor )i)eline $aintenance was associated wit# t#e lea'ing( (8ource! &2. Cno=:ille Tennesse U # Fe1ruar6 9' 1999 (Drittle Fra*ture' 15 e:a*uate!' U A 3'100'000)

Figure 8#owing Circu$ferential Crac' of :no/*ille Pi)eline (708. >8! % )i)e failed releasing 2, 44 barrels of diesel fuel( 0#e )i)e was 14"inc#es in dia$eter, %P, L H" 51 8MF8 51 ')si, electric resistance weld (EGC! carbon steel and wit# 4(1 inc#es in t#ic'ness( Circu$ferential crac' was found at t#e failed seg$ent( 0#e )ossible cause for crac'ing was noted by t#e low toug#ness of t#e $anufactured )i)e $aterial( 0#e )i)e was constructed in 1E31 w#en t#ere was no ade+uate toug#ness re+uire$ent fro$ a*ailable )i)e code and design( 7ational 0rans)ortation 8afety .oard #ad already gi*en reco$$endation for toug#ness re+uire$ent to De)art$ent of 0rans)ortation Gesearc# and 8)ecial %d$inistration %gency (G8P%! w#en a si$ilar failure occurred in 1EE5 in 7ew Bersey( ,n 1444 res)onding t#e re+uest fro$ G8P%, %$erican Petroleu$ ,nstitute (%P,! added $ini$u$ toug#ness re+uire$ents to %P, 8)ecification L( (8ource! &&. Martine@ 4ai0ornia U # Fe1ruar6 2&' 1999 (4orrosion' 8 +ille!' 1 injure!) Lea'age and fire occurred and originated fro$ a #eat e/c#anger( 0#e #eat e/c#ganer condensed *a)or fro$ a #ig# te$)erature and #ig# )ressure se)arator at t#e outlet of t#e reactor of a fuel oil #ydro" desulfuri;ation unit( One #eat transfer tube of t#e fin"fan cooler was was corroded( Corrosion was caused by inade+uate re"design of #eat e/c#anger c#anging ser*ice( (8ource! &8. (in*hester Centu*+6 U # <anuar6 27' 2000 (4ru!e 7il Pi%eline' Fatigue' U A 7'100'000)

Figure s#owing Cinc#ester fatigue crac'ed )i)eline % 15"inc#es )i)eline ru)tured and released 11,355 barrels of crude oil( Laboratory e/a$ination of t#e failed seg$ent s#owed a transgranular crac's t#at #ad t#e a))earance of ty)ical fatigue )rogression( 0#e fatigue crac'ing was caused by a dent in )i)e wit# t#e co$bination of fluctuating )ressures wit#in t#e )i)e )roducing #ig# local stress in t#e )i)e wall( (8ource!

&5. Bunt Te=as U - Mar*h &' 2000 (4orrosion' Fuel Pi%eline' U A 80'000'000) 1<"inc#es in dia$eter )i)e failed due to e/ternal corrosion causing 12,544 barrels of gasoline s)ill( 0#e failed seg$ent was sub$erged below ground( Lea'ing originated at t#e body )i)e( 0#e $aterial was carbon steel wit# 8MF8 1 ')si, designed at A 1 )si to $a/i$u$ E )si( 0#e )ressure at t#e failed seg$ent was A4 )si( (8ource! &-. Prin*e )eorges U # $%ril 7' 2000 (Pi%e >ea+ing' Fuel Pi%eline' U A 50'000'000. 57'000'000) % sub$erged )i)e carrying refined )etroleu$ )roduct failed( %t t#e ti$e of failure, t#e )i)e was 1A years in o)eration, #as 8MF8 1(31 ')si and designed )ressured at 4 )si@1344 )si( 0#is )i)e failure caused t#e largest loses of fuel s)ill t#at recorded by >8 DO0 PHM8%( % re)ort said t#at no corrosion significantly susce)tible for t#e cause of failure neit#er in t#e weld( (8ource! &7. Mina $l-$hma!i Cu/ait # <une 25' 2000 (Erosion-4orrosion' 9e0iner6' 5 +ille!' 50 injure!' U A812'000'000. 8&&'000'000)

F,gure 8#owing Mina %l"%#$adi Gefinery E/)loded % condensate line between a 7GL )lant and refinery failed( 0#e o)erators were trying to isolate t#e lea'ing line and t#e e/)losion occurred( 0#ree crude units and two refor$ers were da$aged( %ccident to t#is national biggest oil refinery $ade an enor$ous econo$ic looses and e/cess in socio)olitic w#en :uwait oil $inister offers resignation( 0#e failed )i)e was an aging )i)e t#at suffered erosion"corrosion and sli))ed t#roug# t#e ins)ection and $aintenance( (8ource! &3. 4arls1a! 5e/ Me=i*o U # $ugust 19' 2000 (4orrosion-Pitting' )as Pi%eline' 12 +ille!' U A 100'000'000)

Figure s#owing $icrogra)# corroded")it of Carlsbad Pi)eline % 4"years, 24"inc#"dia$eter natural gas trans$ission )i)eline ru)tured( 0#e release gas ignited and burned for $inutes( ,n*estigation of t#e failed seg$ent re*ealed se*ere internal )it"corrosion as $a9or contributing cause of t#e failure( %t t#e ti$e of failure t#e )i)e wit#stand <4I of $a/i$u$ design )ressure( 7ational 0rans)ortation 8afety reco$$ended a$end$ent in 5E Code of Federal Gegulations (CFG! Part 1E1 to re+uire t#at new or re)laced )i)elines be designed and constructed wit# features to $itigate internal corrosion and to 7ational %ssociation of Corrosion Engineer (7%CE! to establis# $ore guidelines to control internal corrosion ( Pi)eline o)erator s)end >8D 1 , 44,444 for legal fine and >8D <3,444,444 for )i)eline $odifications( (8ource! &9. 9on*a!or Dra@il # Mar*h 15' 2001 (Tan+ >ea+ing' 700shore Plat0orm' 2 +ille!' 3 misse!' U A 515'000'000)

Figure 8#owing P"23 listing and arrange$ent of ED0 Official in*estigation re)ort to t#e fire, e/)losion, and sin'ing to P"23 t#e largest offs#ore )roduction facility said t#at t#e P"23 accident did not occur due to one single cause but was )ro*o'ed by a series of factors( C#ronology of t#e accident started fro$ t#e failure of starboard e$ergency drain tan' (ED0!( E/cessi*e )ressure in 8tarboard ED0 due to a $i/ture of water, oil, and gas, w#ic# caused ru)ture and lea'ing t#e ED0 fluids into t#e fourt# le*el of t#e colu$n( 0#e une/)ected flow t#roug# t#e entry *al*e of t#e starboard ED0 can be related wit# t#e bloc'ing of t#e *ent and t#e rac'et absence in t#e entry *al*e( 0#e ru)ture of t#e ED0 caused da$age to ot#er *ital ele$ents in t#e colu$n including t#e sea water ser*ice )i)e t#at initiating t#e flooding of t#is co$)art$ent and released gas to and ignited e/)losion( (8ource 1, 1, 2, Location! 80. 4arson 4it6 4ali0ornia U # $%ril 2&' 2001 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 9e0iner6' U A 120'000'000.128'000'000) % )i)e seg$ent lea' resulted fire in a refinery co'er unit( % re)ort said t#at s$o'e fro$ t#e fire rose to o*er 2,444 feet and t#e co'er unit was s#ut down for a))ro/i$ately two $ont#s( 0#e e/act cause of )i)e lea'in is still under in*estigation( (8ource, Location! 81. 9a/!hatain Cu/ait # <anuar6 &1' 2002 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 9e0iner6' 8 +ille!'13 injure!' U A 200'000'000) % )i)e lea' resulted in $a9or e/)losion at an oil gat#ering center 'illing four )eo)le and $ade 1< ot#er se*erely in9ured( 0#ree $ain facilities at t#e )roduction site were destroyed( Production restored to its nor$al 44,444 bbl@day a $ont# later( (8ource! 82. Droo+!ale Manito1a 4ana!a- $%ril 18' 2002 ( tress 4orrosion 4ra*+ing' 5atural )as Pi%eline' U A 1&'000'000)

% 23"inc#es dia$eter natural gas )i)eline ru)tured at a ;one of near neutral )H stress corrosion crac'ing (8CC!( Following t#e ru)ture t#e sweet natural gas ignited( 0ec#nical in*estigation re)ort deter$ined t#at )i)eline ru)tured due to o*erstress e/tension of )re"e/isting crac's( 0#e crac's #ad initiated on t#e outside surface of t#e )i)e and )rogressed in a $ode of failure of transgranular 8CC( 0#e )i)eline was constructed , 1EA4 by double sub$erged arc welded straig#t sea$ )i)e by t#e accordance of %P, L Grade H3 ( (8ource, Location! 8&. Moom1a $ustralia # <anuar6 1' 2008 (>i2ui! Metal Em1rittlement' )as Pro*essing Plant' U A 5'000'000)

Figure s#owing failed HE 7o;;le of Moo$ba Gas Plant (Courtesy of %O7! 0#e gas was released t#at led to *a)or cloud e/)losion( 0#e gas released was caused by t#e failure of a #eat e/c#anger inlet no;;le in t#e li+uids reco*ery )lant( 0#e failure of t#e inlet no;;le was due to li+uid $etal e$brittle$ent of t#e train . alu$iniu$ #eat e/c#anger by ele$ental $ercury( (8ource, Location! 88. +i+!a $lgeria # <anuar6 19' 2008 (>i2ui! Metal Em1rittlement' >5) Plant' 27 +ille! 72 injure!' U A &0'000'000)

Figure s#owing destroyed 8'i'da L7G Plant % re)ort noted t#at t#e e/)losion was t#e conse+uence of a catastro)#ic failure in one of t#e cold bo/es of >nit 54, w#ic# led to a *a)our cloud e/)losion of eit#er L7G or refrigerant( 0#e $ost )robable source of ignition was t#e boiler at t#e nort# end of >nit 54( 0#e re)ort concluded t#at t#e esca)ed gas was fro$ t#e cryogenic #eat e/c#anger( (8ource, Location! 85. Bum1er Estuar6 Cillingholme UC # $%ril 1-' 2001 (Erosion 4orrosion' 9e0iner6' U A 32'800'000)

Figure s#owing destroyed Hu$ber Estuary Gefinery (H8E >:! On 13 %)ril 1441 a fire and e/)losion occurred at Hu$ber Gefinery following t#e catastro)#ic failure of an o*er#ead gas )i)e( ,n*estigation was carried by 0#e Co$)etent %ut#ority and t#e )lant o)erator co$)any by legislati*e $ec#anis$ under Control of Ma9or Ha;ard (COM%H! Gegulation 1EEE( Hu$ber refinery was one of a))ro/i$ately 1444 $a9or #a;ard site under t#is regulation( 0#e co$)etent aut#ority consisted of Healt# and 8afety E/ecuti*e (H8E! >: and En*iron$ent %gency (E%!(

Figure s#owing failed elbow of Hu$ber Estuary Gefinery (H8E >:! 0#e cause of t#e )i)ing syste$ failure was t#e erosion corrosion of t#e 3"inc#es dia$eter )i)e, 'nown P5232, w#ic# carried t#e o*er#ead line fro$ t#e De"et#ani;er (C512! to t#e #eat e/c#anger (H5 1! in saturate gas )lant (8GP! unit( 0#e failure occurred down strea$ of a closely water in9ection )oint( E/a$ination to t#e failed elbow reco*ered fro$ t#e da$age site s#owed wall t#ic'ness t#inning fro$ A"< $$ to a $ini$u$ 4(2 $$( C#en t#e )i)e failed it burst o)en catastro)#ically causing a full bore ty)e of release t#e )i)e contents( 0#e water in9ection )oint was not t#e original design of t#e )i)ing syste$( Cater in9ection to t#e *a)or strea$ between t#e to) de"et#ani;er colu$n and t#e #eat e/c#anger was addressed to sol*e t#e )re*ious )roble$ of salts or #ydrates fouling in #eat e/c#anger H5 1@2( %n in9ection )oint was created in P5232 by )i)ing water to an e/isting 1 inc#es *ent )oint on t#e )i)e wit#out in9ection +uill or dis)ersal de*ice and $ade t#e water entering t#e )i)e as a free 9et( 8i$ilar %ccident- Cil$ington California >nited 8tates < October 1EE1, 7ort# G#ine Cest P#alia Ger$any 14 Dece$ber 1EE1,Fo''aic#i Mie Ba)an 1 May 1EEA, Mina %l"%#$adi :uwait 1 Bune 1444( (8ource, Location! 8-. )hislenghien Delgium- <ul6 &0' 2008 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 5atural )as Pi%eline' 28 +ille!' 120 injure!)

Figure s#owing a da$aged industrial )ar' as t#e e/cess of G#isleng#ien Pi)eline E/)losion % )i)e lea' caused a $a9or underground #ig#")ressure natural gas )i)eline e/)losion( Most of t#e dead are officials and fire"fig#ters res)onding to re)orts of a gas lea'( 0#e e/act cause of t#e )i)e lea' is still not clear( % #eat transfer $at#e$atic $odel can be used to describe a ductile"brittle transition of )i)e $aterial due to significant cooling of t#e surrounding )i)e"wall( 0#is brittle transition occurred w#en t#e fluid wit# certain *elocity esca)e t#roug# an initial t#roug#"wall defect( 0#e significant reduction in t#e fracture toug#ness co$bined wit# t#e acco$)anying )ressure stresses t#en result in fracture growt# and ru)ture of t#e )i)e seg$ent( (8ource 1, 1, Location! 87. Mihama <a%an $ugust 9' 2008 (Erosion-4orrosion' Po/er Plant' - +ille!' 5 injure!) % stea$ eru)tion occurred fro$ failed )i)ing syste$ in a )ressuri;ed water reactor (PCG!( %n orifice )late was inad*ertently inserted to t#e )i)e networ' to $easure t#e coolant flow rate( 0#is caused a locali;ed $etal loss in cross sectional area of t#e )i)ing year"to"year, and t#e stress le*el beca$e #ig#er, at last )lastic colla)se was occurred and t#e )i)e seg$ent ru)tured( >nfortunately t#e )i)e t#ic'ness was not c#ec'ed for 1A years due to o*ersig#ts( (8ource! 83. Te=as 4it6 Te=as U # Mar*h 2&' 2005 (Bigh Tem%erature B6!rogen $tta*+' 9e0iner6' 15 +ille!' 170 injure!' U A &0'000'000)

Figure s#owing 8e*erely Da$aged 0e/as City Gefinery On 12 Marc# 144 , 1 )eo)le were 'illed and o*er 1A4 #ar$ed as t#e result of a fire and e/)losion on t#e iso$eri;ation unit at a refinery )lant in 0e/as City >nited 8tates( 0#e accident was an e/)losion caused by #ea*ier"t#an"air #ydrocarbon *a)ors co$busting after co$ing into contact wit# an ignition source( 0#e se*erity of t#e accident was increased by t#e )resence of $any )eo)le congregated in t#e *icinity of origin of e/)losion( Detailed in*estigations were carried by t#e )lant o)erator and >nited 8tates C#e$ical 8afety .oard( Fro$ t#e #ealt# and safety )ers)ecti*e #ig# nu$ber of fatalities was concluded to be caused by loss of contain$ent, inade+uate trailer sitting at t#e )lant layout and t#e fault of design engineering of t#e blowdown stac'(

Figure s#owing failed elbow in 0e/as City Gefinery E/)losion 0#e release of gas was originated at t#e lea'ing elbow $ade of carbon steel in t#e e/c#anger )i)ing syste$ resid #eat #ydrotreater unit (GH>!( ,n*estigation to t#is GH> accident deter$ined t#at ina))ro)riate $aterial as inad*ertently installed in a #ig# )ressure and #ig# te$)erature #ydrogen line( 0#e failure of t#e elbow was noted by t#e $ec#anis$ of #ig# te$)erature #ydrogen attac' (H0H%!( (8ource 1, 1! 89. i!oarjo East <a:a ;n!onesia- 5o:em1er 22' 200- (Pi%e >ea+ing' 5atural )as Pi%eline'11 +ille!)

%erial *iew s#owing location of 8idoar9o ru)ture )i)e nearby $ud *olcano big #ole (:LH! 7atural gas )i)eline wit# 554 )sig )ressure failed and caused a $a9or e/)losion( Most of t#e *icti$s were go*ern$ent officials in an acti*ity of sur*eying $ud *olcano site( 0#e $ud *olcano was a )re*iously $a9or gas blow out e*ent in location near t#e accident( 0#e $ost )robable cause of )i)eline failure was largely associated wit# geo#a;ard( %t least 1 industrial gas consu$er affected by t#e gas su))ly interu)tion because of t#e e/)losion including national )ower )lant PL7 and )etroc#e$ical )lant Petro'i$ia Gresi'( (8ource 1, 1, 2! 50. Free To/n ierra >eone # Ae*em1er 21' 2007 (Pi%e >ea+ing' 5atural )as Pi%eline' 17 +ille!) % gas e/)losion on a crowded street 'illed 1A )eo)le( 0#e e/)losion tore t#roug# a crowded s#o)( 0#ere is no clear infor$ation on t#e e/act cause of t#e )i)e lea'ing( (8ource!

?. 7%eration an! Maintenan*e O)eration *ariables ($ec#anical load, te$)erature, fluid c#e$ical, conta$inant, en*iron$ent, etc! s#ould be 'e)t in control( %ny uncontrolled *ariable could lead to une/)ected $aterial under" )erfor$ and un"antici)ated da$age growt#( Ce s#ould #ig#lig#t corrosion and $aterial defect as t#ese are t#e biggest da$age contributor, Figure ( Maintenance in ob9ecti*e of e+ui)$ents and structures integrity s#ould consider as)ects as follows" Materials Ca)acity 0#e ca)acity of $aterials $ust be wit#in its )erfor$ance to wit#stand all designed ser*ice load, detain t#e growt# of finger")rint defect, and defend against corrosion and corrosion growt#( 8er*ice load and finger )rint defect is designed wit#in t#e design code, w#ilst in ser*ice da$age is 'e)t wit#in defect codification( " Control of O)eration ?ariable O)eration *ariables s#ould be controlled, any de*iation can be unfa*orable for $aterial )erfor$ance (ser*ice te$)erature, )ressure, flow rate, erosi*e conta$inants, CO1@H18 gas concentration!( >ncontrolled abrasi*e conta$inants can lead to erosion corrosion and uncontrolled H18 lead to 8CC( " Control of Defect and Da$age %ny )ossible defect and da$age s#ould be under safety criterion( Crac' )ro)agation, fatigue, and corrosion growt# s#ould be under )redicti*e in range of ti$e, $ec#anical load, and te$)erature(

Figure ( Pi)eline %ccident Gecords Da$age assess$ent is t#e $ost critical )art of integrity $anage$ent( Many o)erator co$)anies )erfor$ fitness for ser*ice assess$ent during design or $anufacture, but t#e $ost econo$ic way t#e FF8 s#ould be )erfor$ed in ti$e during ser*ice( Defect $anage$ent and standardi;ations effort in oil and gas industry can be su$$ari;ed as followsa( Defect Codification( % consensus between 7%CE, ,L,%, and %8ME toget#er create defect infor$ation standard11 w#ic# categori;ed 1 t#reats as follow" 0i$e De)endent (corrosion, 8CC! " 8table ($anufacturing defect, welding defect! " 0i$e inde)endent (weat#er related, *andalis$!

%n in"#ouse standard by 8#ell12 offer $ore sc#e$atic defect infor$ation( (no$enclature, geo$etry definition, and infor$ation structure! b( Defect ,nfor$ation Gat#ering Gecent )rogress in non destructi*e testing bot# inline (MFL, >0! and stand" alone 7D0 ins)ection ()#ased"array >0, 0OFD >0, long range >0!, abo*eground ins)ection (%C?G, DC?G, Pearson, C"8can! can be utili;ed for getting t#e best infor$ation of $aterial defect c( Defect %ssess$ent Many docu$ent #as )ublis#ed to )ro*ide t#e industry t#e )rocedure to assess defect in e+ui)$ent and structure( 8o$e of t#e$ are fitness for ser*ice assess$ent (%P, AE and .8 AE14!, structural integrity assess$ent )rocedure (8,70%P!, and D7?"F141 for corrosion( d( Data ,ntegration 0#e o))ortunity to de*elo) an integrated infor$ation syste$ for $ore effecti*e and efficient internal cor)orate co$$unication s#ould ta'e t#e ad*antage of G,8 data )rogra$$ing, intelligent )igging, and ris' $anage$ent )olicy15,1 , Figure 3( 0#e out)ut for t#is syste$ can be ins)ection )lan, ris' le*el infor$ation, and furt#er direct assess$ent )lan(

Figure 3( 8creens#ot of an a))lication for G,8"Gis' %ssess$ent Data ,ntegration ?;. Engineering 9is+ Management 0o a*oid defect fro$ $anufacture out)ut nearly i$)ossible, as well as to a*oid t#e defect initiation during ser*ice( .ut defect or da$age is controllable( Engineering ris' $anage$ent dealing wit# defect assess$ent, defect $a))ing@ins)ection( % ty)ical ris' $anage$ent )rocess is s#own in Figure A(

Figure A( 0y)ical Gis' Manage$ent Process

Met#od for defect assess$ent was long ti$e defined by researc#er in .attelle in 1EAE, and de*elo)ed furt#er for 7G"1< E+uation w#ic# t#en beco$e t#e basis for assess$ent $et#od in %8ME .21G and $odified .21G (G80GE7G!( ,n England, in 1E<1 Gesearc#er at 0#e Celding ,nstitute c#aracteri;ed t#e fracture be#a*ior of welds containing defects by $eans of crac' ti) o)ening dis)lace$ent (C0OD!, leading to t#e de*elo)$ent of .8 PD35E2 for t#e assess$ent of flaws in fusion welded structures( 0#ese docu$ents t#en e$erged to beco$e widely used defect assess$ent guideline %P, AE GP J Fitness for 8er*ice in >nited 8tates and .8 AE14 Guide on Met#ods for %ssessing t#e %cce)tability of Flaws in Fusion Celded 8tructures in England( Fro$ current a*ailable )rocedures and tec#ni+ues in fitness for ser*ice assess$ent t#e $ost widely used are .8 AE14, %8ME .21(G, G3, and %P, AE13, Figure <( ,ndustrial dri*er for Fitness for 8er*ice as engineering toolbo/, w#ic# based on 0C, 8ur*ey on 1441 are as follow" Deter$ining t#e residual life of da$aged )lantK " Ensuring safe o)eration beyond design lifeK " Down"rating da$aged )lant below designK " De$onstrating tolerance to defects wit#in a safety caseK " E/tending ins)ection inter*alsK and " Geducing duration of outage and s#utdown(

Figure <( Most widely used FF8 Procedures in Euro)e and >nited 8tates(E> Fitnet 8ur*ey! Fro$ $any )rocedures of assess$ent, we can learn si$)le decision flow to c#oose w#ic# )rocedure is best fit( ,n 1441, s)onsored by fifteen international oil and gas co$)anies (%d*antica 0ec#nologies, .P, C8M, D7?, EMC, Gas de France, Healt# and 8afety E/ecuti*e >:, MOL, Petrobras, P,,, 87%M, Gate Gas, 8#ell Global 8olution, 8taoil, 0o#o Gas, and 0otal Finaelf! a )rotocol docu$ent na$ed Pi)eline Defect %ssess$ent Manual (PD%M! #as been )ublis#ed1A, Figure E( Featured guideline docu$ents in PD%M are" D7? F"141 (for corrosion defect! " Modified .21G@G80GE7G (for corrosion defect! " .8 AE14 (for defect related wit# welding! " %P, AE (corrosion@$etal loss, $ec#anical dent@gouge, welding defect! " :iefner E+uation 7G"1< (corrosion( $ec#anical defect@dent@gouge! " 8c#ul;e Global Colla)se 8olution (lea' and ru)ture $odes in circu$ferentially orientated stress! " Leis P%FC (Pi)e %/ial Flaw Failure Criteria, for $ec#anical dent, gouge! " :astner Local Colla)se 8olution (circu$ferentially orientated $anufacturing defect! " 0#e EPGG Guidelines on t#e %ssess$ent of Defects in 0rans$ission Pi)eline Girt# Celds

Gecent de*elo)$ent of FF8 )rocedures de$and re+uire $ore guidance to esti$ate residual stress, $aterial and t#er$al #istory, loading #istory, and 7DE infor$ation reliability( Failure $nal6sis # AonFt ma+e mista+e t/i*eG Many e+ui)$ent fail e*en in strict co$)any +uality standard because t#ere always a de*iation fro$ t#e initial assu$)tions( Failure analysis is reco$$ended action w#en t#ere is a failure occurs in order to find out t#e root cause and to gi*e feedbac' to o)eration set"u) and $aterial )rocure$ent(

Figure E( Flow of wor' for fitness for ser*ice assess$ent in Pi)eline Defect %ssess$ent Manual Failure is li'ely to occur in #ig# )ressure syste$, su$$ari;ed root causes of failure fro$ H8E >: studies1< are as follows" ,nade+uate design and@or $aterial for t#e loading and o)erating t#e en*iron$entK " ,ncorrect and@or defecti*e $anufactureK " >n"antici)ated in ser*ice da$ageK " 8yste$ error in o)erationK " Malfunction of instru$ent " Hu$an errorsK " E/ternal E*ent (fire, i$)acts, etc! Conclusion Engineering integrity is one funda$ental ele$ent in corridor of integrity $anage$ent in oil and gas industry( Engineering integrity s#ould be considered as a syste$ w#ere one ele$ent affect t#e ot#er( Engineering integrity as a syste$ ranges fro$ $aterial selection and ,)re"ser*ice testing@co$$issioning, during o)eration and $aintenance, defect@da$age related ris' $anage$ent, to da$age $itigation( De*elo)$ent of engineering integrity needs $ultidisci)linary contribution of e/)ertise in $aterial and $anufacturing )rocess and )rocess s)ecialist incor)orated wit# t#e ad*ance tec#nology fro$

ins)ection co$)anies( .est Practice for Gis' .ased ,ns)ection as a Part of Plant ,ntegrity Manage$ent, 0C, and Goyal L 8un%lliance Engineering for t#e Healt# and 8afety E/ecuti*e >:, 1441(