RULE 128 EVIDENCE defined Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth

respecting a matter of fact. Sources of Rules of Evidence The 1987 onstitution of the !hilippines "ules 1#8 and 1$$ of the "evised "ules of ourt "esolution of the %upreme ourt dated &arch 1', 1989 approving the !roposed "ules on Evidence submitted by the "ules of ourt "evision ommittee on (ugust $1, 1987 "ule 11), %ection 1, *ormerly "ule +++, %ection 1 of the "ules of ourt ,"ight of defendant at the trial-. %ubstantive and "emedial %tatutes. /udicial decisions

That ?ind of evidence :hich in a trial is presented by :itnesses verbally. Evidence is the generic term and testimony that of the species.

$R%U"EN (rgument and evidence, ta?en together, represent the means by :hich the tribunal is sought to be persuaded as to some fact-in-issue.

F$C U" PRO&$NDU" F$C U" PRO&$N!:

distinguished

from

F$C U" PRO&$NDU" 'F()t in issue* The u"timate fact or the fact sought to #e esta#"ishe$ "efers to proposition

T0E "12E% 3* E4+5E6 E ("E %!E +*+ (227 (!!2+ (82E 3627 +6 /15+ +(2 !"3 EE5+69% F$C U" PRO&$N!The means of ascertaining in a JUDICIAL PROCEEDING the truth respecting a matter of fact ! The decision of a barrio council, respecting the settlement of o:nership and possession of a parcel of land, is ultra vires because a barrio councils, :hich are not courts, have no judicial po:ers. ; &iguel v atalino,#< % "( #$' +s the e%i$entiar& fact or the fact #& 'hich the factum pro#an$um is to #e esta#"ishe$ &aterials :hich establish the proposition

+IND! $ND DE%REE! OF EVIDENCE Dire)t E,iden)e (nd Cir)umst(nti(- E,iden)e:

Therefore, said decision, if introduced as an e=hibit is not admissible in a judicial proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact of o:nership and possession. %upra T"1T0 +% 8E%T (% E"T(+6E5 165E" (6 (54E"%("7 %7%TE& 3* /1%T+ E. ;"epublic v 4alencia, 1'1 % "( '># EVIDENCE distinguished from: PROOF "efers to the degree or ?ind of evidence :hich :ill produce full conviction, or establish the proposition to the satisfaction of the tribunal. !roof is the effect or result of evidence :hile evidence is the medium of proof.

DIREC EVIDENCE ; that :hich proves the fact in dispute :ithout the aid of any interference or presumption ,2a?e ounty vs. 6ellon.CIRCU"! $N I$L EVIDENCE ; is the proof of a fact or facts from :hich ta?en either singly or collectively, the e=istence or a particular fact, in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable conse@uence ,%tate vs. (very, 11$, &o., '7), '9', #1, %.A. 19$-

!rimary Evidence and %econdary EvidenceB PRI"$R# EVIDENCE ; that :hich the la: regards as affording the greatest certainty of fact in @uestion. (lso referred to as the best evidence

E! I"ON#-

!ECOND$R# EVIDENCE ; that :hich is inferior to the primary evidence and is permitted by la: only :hen the best evidence is not available. Cno:n as the substitutionary evidence

cumu"ati%e to that of his teachers an$ me$ica" men upon the same /uestion .E ,9ardner vs. 9ardner, # 9ray ,&ass. '$'--

Prim( F()ie E,iden)e (nd Con)-usi,e E,iden)eB PRI"$ F$CIE EVIDENCE ; is that :hich suffices for the proof of a particular fact, until contradicted and overcome by other evidence

!ositive Evidence and 6egative EvidenceB PO!I IVE EVIDENCE ; :hen the :itness affirms that a fact did or did not occur. Entitled to a greater :eight since the :itness represents of his personal ?no:ledge the presence or absence of a fact NE%$ IVE EVIDENCE ; :hen the :itness did not see or ?no: of the occurrence of a fact. There is a total disclaimer of personal ?no:ledge, hence :ithout any representation or disavo:al that the fact in @uestion could or could not have e=isted or happened. +t is admissible only if it tends to contradict positive evidence of the other side or :ould tend to e=clude the e=istence of fact s:orn to by the other side.

CONCLU!IVE EVIDENCE ; is that :hich is incontrovertible. Ahen evidence is received :hich the la: does not allo: to be contradicted. asesB D(ccordingly, a party introducing in evidence a letter :ritten by his agent to the adverse party, is bound by the statements contained therein E ,2ilian "ealty o. v. Erdum, 1#< 6.7.%. 7'9In an action to reco%er mone& pai$ in sett"ement of an account in stoc0 transactions) p"aintiff is #oun$ #& his o'n testimon& that the transactions 'ere gam#"ing transactions) so as to prec"u$e reco%er& #& him ,(t:ater v. (.9. Ed:ards 8ro?erage o, 1'7 &o. (. '$>, 1#> %.A. 8##-

orroborative Evidence and umulative EvidenceB CORRO&OR$ IVE EVIDENCE ; is additional evidence of a different ?ind and character tending to prove the same point ,Ayne v. 6e:man, 7), 4a., 811, 817-

aseB The testimonies of the prosecution 'itnesses that the %ictims$ie$ #ecause of sta# 'oun$s inf"icte$ #& the arme$ men 'ho entere$ their resi$ence on the night of Decem#er () *+,- remain uncontro%erte$ ... Their $eath certificates therefore are on"& corro#orati%e of the testimonies of the prosecution 'itnesses ! ,!eople vs. Aatson ,19>)- CU"UL$ IVE EVIDENCE ; evidence of the same ?ind and to the same stale of facts. aseB DThus) on the issue of the capacit& of a #o& to 'rite a certain paper) e%i$ence of his schoo" fe""o's as to his capacit& is

Re-e,(nt E,iden)e (nd "(teri(- E,iden)e: RELEV$N EVIDENCE ; evidence having any value in reason as tending to prove any matter provable in an action. The test is the logical relation of the evidentiary fact to the fact in issue, :hether the former tends to establish the probability or improbability of the latter. "$ ERI$L EVIDENCE ; evidence directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive la: and pleadings. The test is :hether the fact it intends to prove is an issue or not. (s to :hether a fact is in issue or not is in turn determined by the substantive la:, the pleadings, the pre-trial order and by the admissions or confessions on file

Com.etent E,iden)eB Evidence is competent :hen it is not e=cluded by la: in a particular case ,!orter v. 4alentine-

Evidence supplied by :ritten instruments or derived from conventional symbols, such as letters, by :hich ideas are represented on material substances

Irre-e,(nt/ In)om.etent/ Imm(teri(- E,iden)eB

In(dmissi0-e/

(nd

estimoni(- E,iden)eB +s that :hich is submitted to the court through the testimony or deposition of a :itness

Irre"e%ant in strictness, signifies that the offered piece of evidence has no probative value. The rules of circumstantial evidence are :hat determine the irrelevancy. Incompetent, in strictness, signifies that an offered :itness is not @ualified, under the rule of testimonial evidence.

E3.ert E,iden)eB +s the testimony of one possessing in regard to a particular subject or department of human activity, ?no:ledge not usually ac@uired by other persons ,1.%. v. 9il, 1$ !hil. )$<-

Immateria", in strictness, signifies that the offered evidential fact is e=cluded by some rule of evidence, no matter :hat the rule. The rules of substantive la: ad of pleading are :hat determine immateriality.

!u0st(nti(- E,iden)eB +s that amount of relevant evidence :hich a reasonable mind might accept as ade@uate to justify a conclusion ,!hilippine 3verseas 5rilling and 3il 5evelopment orp. v. &inistry of 2abor, 1'> % "( 79-

Re0utt(- (nd !ur-re0utt(- E,iden)eB Re0utt(- E,iden)e ; is that :hich is given to e=plain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party ,%tate v. %ilva-. +t is also defined as evidence in denial of some affirmative care or fact :hich the adverse party has attempted to prove. , arver v. 1nited %tates, 1>< 1.%. ))$-

ROLE OF 4E RULE! OF EVIDENCEB Ahat part does the "ules of Evidence play in the :hole system of la:F Enforcement of the rules re@uires the application of the la: to an individual person.

54$ O01e)t 'Re(-* E,iden)eB 5irectly addressed to the senses of the court and consist of tangible things e=hibited or demonstrated in open court, in an ocular inspection, or at place designated by the court for its vie: of observation of an e=hibition, e=periment or demonstration. This is referred to as autoptic preference.

4E RULE! OF EVIDENCE DE ER"INEB

Do)ument(r2 E,iden)eB

(ll rights and liabilities are dependent upon and arise out of facts. Every judicial proceeding :hatever has for its purpose the ascertaining of some right or liability. +f the proceeding is riminal, the object is to ascertain the liability to punishment of the person accused. +f the proceeding is ivil, the object is to ascertain some right of property or status, or the right of one party and the liability of other to some form of relief. NECE!!I # FOR RULE! OF EVIDENCEB

+t is necessary that :e have "ules of Evidence :hich :ill limit the field of matters that can properly be ta?en into consideration in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the la: of evidence, as :e have, is in the shape of a set of primary rules for the e=clusion of evidence that is logically probative, :hich but for such e=clusionary rules :ould be legal evidence, and a further set of e=ceptions to these rules. To facilitate the ascertainment of truth.

must be ad are the same in all cases and in all civiliIed countries

DIFFERENCE IN 4E RULE! OF EVIDENCE IN CRI"IN$L $ND CIVIL C$!E!B CIVIL !arties accord attend by CRI"IN$L The accused attends by compulsion !resumption of innocence attends the accused throughout the trial until the same has been overcome by prima facie evidence of his guilt +t is an implied admission of guilt

%OOD CO""$ND OF 4E RULE! OF EVIDENCE E!!EN I$L: ases are not al:ays :on by the righteousness of the clientGs cause but by the evidence :hich his counsel presents in court to support his claim or defense

There is no presumption as to either party

RULE! OF EVIDENCE NO ! $ ICB "ules of EvidenceHare not static. They are constantly undergoing change, in the interest of the successful development of the truth. The changes are sometimes made by the legislatures, sometimes by the ourts.

(n offer to compromise does not, as a general rule, amount to an admission of liability &ust prove by preponderance of evidenceB "eason is that there is no presumption ad due to the fact that the proof :ill only result in a judgment of pecuniary damages

9uilt beyond reasonable doubt

Section 2. Scope- The Rules of Evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearin s! e"cept as other#ise provided b$ la# or these rules. ,%ec. #, "evised "ules of ourt, hereinafter, ""3 -

$PPLIC$&ILI # OF RULE! OF EVIDENCE B The rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before the 2abor (rbiter and the 6ational 2abor "elations ommission ,5el "osario J %ons 2ogging Enterprises, +nc. vs. 62" , 1$> % "( >>9-. EmployeesG ompensation ommission ,!hilippine 3verseas 5rilling and 3il 5evelopment orporation vs. &inister of 2abor, 1'> % "( 79-. %ecurities and E=change ommission. ommission on Elections ,9eromo v. 3&E2E , et al., 118 % "( 1>)-. (grarian ases ,8agsican v. (, 1'1 % "( ##>-. +mmigration !roceedings ,&oy 7o?e %hue v. /ohnson, #9< *ed. >#1-. ourt of Ta= (ppeals , elestino o. J ompany v. ollector of +nternal "evenue, 8T( ase 6o. 19), 3ct. ', 19)', affirmed by the %upreme ourt on (ug. $1, 19)>, 9.". 6o. 2 8)<>-. !robation ourt. 8oard of

RE$!ON! FOR 4E RULEB The "ules of Evidence must be applied in all courts and in all trials and hearings for the follo:ingB The relation bet:een the evidentiary fact and a particular proposition is al:ays the same, :ithout regard to the ?ind of litigation in :hich that proposition becomes material to be proved. +f the rules of evidence prescribe the best course to arrive at the truth that

Transportation. !olice ommission. 3il +ndustry ommission. and other similar bodies ,(ldeguer v. 0os?yn, # !hil. )<<. (yala de "o=as v. ase, 8 !hil. 197-

NO VE! ED RI%4 OF PROPER # IN RULE! OF EVIDENCE: There is no vested right of property in rules of evidence. 0ence, any evidence inadmissible according to the la:s in force at the time the action accrued, but admissible according to the la:s in force at the time of the trial, is receivable.

"eception of evidence of doubtful admissibility is in the long run the less harmful course, since all materials necessary for final adjudication :ould come before the appellate tribunals ,3bispo, et. (l. vs. 3bispo, )< 3.9. >1'-

"12E% 3* E4+5E6 E %(6 T+36E5 87 T0E 36%T+T1T+36 (663T 8E (2TE"E5 87 2E9+%2(T+36B ( onstitutional provision sanctioning a rule of evidence has the legal effect of ma?ing it unalterable by ordinary statutory legislation.

aseBDTrial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence :hich crystalliIed through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. 8ut in connection :ith evidence :hich may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting themH===E ,8anaria v. 8anaria, et. al., (. 6o. '1'#, &ay $1, 19)<DEven in case of doubt as to the materiality or relevancy of such @uestion, it :ould be more in ?eeping :ith the administration of justice to allo: the ans:er to such @uestion and render the ruling as to its admissibility :hen all evidence are in.E ,!eople v. /aca, et al., 9.". 6o. 2-1<971, 6ov. #8, 19)9DAhere a judge is in doubt as to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence, he should declare in favor of admissibility rather than nonadmissibility.E ,The ollector v. !ala?adhari, 1# (. ,1899--

RULE! OF EVIDENCE "$# &E 5$IVED ,:hen available-B The parties may :aive such rules during the trial of a case The can also ma?e the :aiver in a contract aseB D( contract of insurance re@uiring the testimony of eye:itness as the only evidence admissible concerning the death of the insured person is valid.E ,6ational (cc. %oc. 4. "alstin, 1<1, +ll. (pp., 19#. onnel v. Travelling &enGs (ssGn, 1$9, ''' 6.A. 8#<D ontract :aiving the privilege against the disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to a physician is also valid.E ,Ceeler v. +ss. o., 9) &o. (pp., >#7, >9 %.A. >1#D0o:ever, if the rule of evidence :aived by the parties has been established by la: on grounds of public policy, the :aiver is void. (ccordingly, the :aiver of the privilege against the disclosure of state secrets is void.E ,"o:land v. "o:land, '< 6.+. E@., #81!32+ 7 T3 8E 38%E"4E5 87 31"T% +6 T0E E6*3" E&E6T 3* T0E "12E% 3* E4+5E6 EB

RULE 128/ !e)6 76%dmissibilit$ of evidence. 16 Re8uisites of (dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e6 a. Evidence is relevant to the issue b. Evidence is competent, that is, it does not belong to that class of evidence :hich is e=cluded by the la: or the "ules of Evidence C(ses: Peo.-e ,s6 !ori(g( ,%6R6 No6 191792 "(r)h 1:/ 2;11*6 The non-compliance :ith %ection #1 of said la:, particularly the ma?ing of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated andKor seiIed, :ill not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. 1nder %ection $ of

"ule 1#8 of the "ules of ourt, evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the issue and is not e=cluded by the la: or these rules. *or evidence to be inadmissible there should be a la: or rule :hich forbids its reception. +f there is no such la: or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary :eight that :ill be accorded it by the courts.

The admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence. The admissibility of evidence does not depend on its :eight and sufficiency. credibility and :eight being @uestions of fact.

The :eight of evidence has to do :ith the effect of evidence admitted, its tendency to convince and persuade. The :eight of evidence is not determined mathematically by numerical superiority of :itnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case. +t involves credibility of :itnesses and all inherent probabilities and improbabilities deducible from the evidence as a :hole.

&!& %ROUP/ INC ,s6 %o '%6R6 No6 1<8<:: Fe0ru(r2 1</ 2;1;-. The testimony of &arasigan on the particulars of respondentGs supposed ban? account :ith %ecurity 8an? and the documentary evidence represented by the chec?s adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being e=cluded by operation of ".(. 6o. 1'<). They are li?e:ise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for @ualified theft.

26

=o (3ioms of $dmissi0i-it2 a. None but facts havin rational probative value are admissible. > +t prescribes that :hatever is presented as evidence shall be presented on the hypothesis that it is calculated, according to the prevailing standards of reasoning, to effect rational persuasion. b. %ll facts havin rational probative value are admissible! unless some specific rule forbids. ; This principle does not mean that anything that has probative value is admissible. 8ut everything having a probative value is ipso facto entitled to be assumed to be admissible, and therefore any rule of policy :hich may be valid to e=clude it is a superadded and abnormal rule.

ILLU! R$ ION: ( defendant is accused of murder and by :ay of defense, he attempts to establish an alibi. 1. 0is mother testifies that he :as at home in bed at the time the murder :as committed. or #. ( distinguished physician testifies that he :as attending the defendant in his home at the time the murder :as committed. (s :ill be observed, both ,1- and ,#- are e@ually admissible. 8ut it is li?ely that the court :ould give greater :eight to the testimony of a disinterested physician than of a mother, :ho might be e=pected to commit perjury in an effort to save her son. C(se: $tien?( ,s6 &OD '%6R6 No6 1@@:;@ Fe0ru(r2 9/ 2;11-. (dmissibility of evidence refers to the @uestion :hether or not the circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. 3n the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the @uestion of :hether or not it proves an issue.

76 $dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e distinguished from =eight of e,iden)e $dmissi0i-it2 E,iden)e of 5eight of E,iden)e :6

2.es of $dmissi0i-it2

$6 "u-ti.-e $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6 Ahen a fact is offered for one purpose, and is admissible in so far as it satisfies all rules applicable to it :hen offered for that purpose, its failure to satisfy some other rule :hich :ould be applicable to it if offered for another purpose does not e=clude it. &6 Condition(- $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6 Ahere t:o or more evidentiary facts are so connected under the issues that the relevancy of one depends upon another not yet received, and the party is unable to introduce them both at the same moment, the offering counsel may be re@uired by the court as a condition precedent '1* to state the supposed connecting facts, and '2* to promise to give the evidence later. Effect if condition precedent is not fulfilled& 1pon motion by the opposite party, the court may stri?e out the evidence thus conditionally admitted C6 Cur(ti,e $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6 Ahere an inadmissible fact has been offered by one party and received :ithout objection and the opponents after:ards, for the purpose of negativing or e=plaining or other:ise counteracting, offers a fact similarly inadmissible, such fact is admissible if it serves to remove an unfair effect upon the court :hich might other:ise ensue from the original fact. A6 Ru-es of E3)-usion (nd E3)-usion(r2 Ru-es Ru-es of E3)-usion 9overned by the rules of evidence E3)-usion(r2 Ru-es Evidence e=cluded by the onstitution

3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ and the "evised "ules on Evidence do not provide for the e=clusion from evidence of the birth certificates in @uestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly ta?en into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against the respondent.

$6 $dmissi0i-it2 of e-e.hone Con,ers(tions6 1nless other:ise objectionable, a telephone conversation bet:een a :itness and another person is admissible in any case in :hich a face to face conversation bet:een a :itness and another person :ould be admissible in evidence, provided that the identity of the person :ith :hom the :itness :as spea?ing is satisfactorily established, but not other:ise. Proof of Identit2 > through :itnessG recognition of the voice of the person :ith :hom he :as spea?ing, ho:ever, it may be established by means other than the recognition of the voice.

&6 $dmissi0i-it2 of r(dio 0ro(d)(st6 Evidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence :hen the identity of the spea?er is established by the follo:ingB 8y the testimony of a :itness :ho sa: him broadcast his message or speech 8y the :itness recognition of the voice of the spea?er

C6 $dmissi0i-it2 re)ordings6

of

=iret(..ing

(nd

t(.e

C(se: o-entino ,s6 "endo?( '$D"6 C$!E NO6 A1A1 O)to0er 19/ 2;;:*6 6ote that "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but no:here does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule :ould render said records inadmissible in evidence. 3n the other hand, the "evised "ules of Evidence only provides for the e=clusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seiIures. %ince both "ule #', (dministrative

"ecording of conversations, statement, confessions, speech, and the sounds of various ?inds, are admissible in evidence, subject of course, to the general rules relating to hearsay, best evidence, relevancy, privilege and the li?e, and subject to the proper authentication by foundation testimony. 16 The :iretapping and other related violations of the privacy of communications are prohibited and penaliIed by "epublic (ct 6o. '#<<.

REPU&LIC $C 5IRE $PPIN% $C

:2;;/

$N I-

issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation. &6 EBE"P ED $C ! 16 !e)tion 7/ .(r 16 (ny peace officer, :ho is authoriIed by a :ritten order of the ourt, to e=ecute any of the acts declared to be unla:ful in cases involvingB crimes of treason, espionage, provo?ing :ar and disloyalty in case of :ar, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, ?idnapping as defined by the "evised !enal ode, and violations of ommon:ealth (ct 6o. >1>, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security Re8uirements: That such :ritten order shall only be issued or granted upon :ritten application and the e=amination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the :itnesses he may produce and a sho:ingB 1. That there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committedB Pro%i$e$) ho'e%er, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only

$6 UNL$5FUL $C ! 16 !e)tion 1/ .(r 16 +t shall be unla:ful for any person, not being authoriIed by all the parties to any private communication or spo?en :ord, to tap any :ire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo?en :ord by using a device commonly ?no:n as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or :al?ie-tal?ie or tape recorder, or ho:ever other:ise described 26 !e)tion 1/ .(r 26 +t shall also be unla:ful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penaliIed in the ne=t preceding sentence, to ?no:ingly possess any tape record, :ire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spo?en :ord secured either before or after the effective date of this (ct in the manner prohibited by this la:. or to replay the same for any other person or persons. or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in :riting, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, :hether complete or partial, to any other person !rovided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section $ hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. 76 !e)tion 26 (ny person :ho :ilfully or ?no:ingly does or :ho shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unla:ful in the preceding section or :ho violates the provisions of the follo:ing section or of any order

upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed. #. That there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence :ill be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes. and $. That there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. 26 !ur,ei--(n)e of !us.e)ts (nd Inter)e.tion (nd Re)ording of Communi)(tions 12ection 3) Repu#"ic Act No +435) 6uman securit& Act7 The provisions of "epublic (ct 6o. '#<< ,(nti-Aire Tapping 2a:- to the contrary not:ithstanding, a police or la: enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a :ritten order of the ourt of (ppeals, listen to, intercept and record, :ith the use of any mode, form, ?ind or type of electronic or other surveillance e@uipment or intercepting and trac?ing devices, or :ith the use of any other suitable :ays and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spo?en or :ritten :ords bet:een members of a judicially declared and outla:ed terrorist organiIation, association, or group of persons or of any person charged :ith or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. !rovided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications bet:een la:yers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authoriIed.

C6 $dmissi0i-it2 (ny communication or spo?en :ord, or the e=istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this (ct shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, @uasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. 12ection () R A (5887 'aanan vs. I%C! et al.! ()* SCR% ((2.The la: refers to a DtapE of :ire or cable or the use of a device or arrangementE for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communicationH The e=tension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a 5ictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in %ection 1 of ".(. 6o. '#<< as the use thereof cannot be considered as DtappingE the :ire not installed for that purpose.

26 "e@uisites to be established before a recording of conversation can be given probative valueB a. ( sho:ing that the recording device :as capable of ta?ing testimony. b. ( sho:ing that the operator of the device :as competent. c. Establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording. d. ( sho:ing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made. e. ( sho:ing of manner of the preservation of the recording. f. +dentification of the spea?ers. and g. ( sho:ing that the testimony elicited :as voluntarily made :ithout any ?ind of inducement

D6 $dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e i--eg(--2 sei?ed6 "ights protected under (rticle +++, 8ill of "ights of the 1987 onstitutionB 1. "ight against unreasonable search and seiIure. , %ec. ##. "ight to privacy and inviolability of communication , %ec. $-

$. "ight of a person under investigation for an offense ,%ec. 1#'. "ight against self-incrimination ,%ec. 17C(se: $m0re ,s6 Peo.-e ,%6R6 No6 191A72 $ugust 1A/ 2;12*6%ection #, (rticle +++ of the onstitution mandates that a search and seiIure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial :arrant predicated upon the e=istence of probable cause, absent :hich such search and seiIure becomes LunreasonableL :ithin the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seiIure is tainted and should be e=cluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. +n the language of the fundamental la:, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

a. Evidence is relevant :hen it relates directly to a fact in issue. or to a fact :hich, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the e=istence or non-e=istence of a fact in issue. b. Evidentiary facts are relevant :here there is such rational and logical connection bet:een them and the matter in issue that proof of the former logically tends to ma?e the latter more probable or improbable, that is, :here the facts offered in evidence have a legitimate tendency to establish the truth concerning a controversial issue. C(se: 4errer( ,s6 $-0( ,%6R6 No6 1:822; Cune 1A/ 2;;A*6Evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not other:ise e=cluded by statute or the "ules of ourt. Evidence is relevant :hen it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its e=istence or none=istence. %ection '9 of "ule 1$<, :hich governs the admissibility of e=pert testimony, provides that the opinion of a :itness on a matter re@uiring special ?no:ledge, s?ill, e=perience or training :hich he is sho:n to possess may be received in evidence. This "ule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of 56( analysis as evidence. +ndeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allo:ed L:hen it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. 26 est of Re-e,(n)2 a. Every fact or circumstance tending to thro: light on the issue is logically inferable b. (ny circumstance is relevant from :hich tends to ma?e the proposition at issue more or less probable, or :hich is calculated to e=plain or establish facts pertinent to the in@uiry c. The test is :hether the evidence conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis being one :hich, if sustained, :ould logically influence the issue d. *acts are relevant if they fairly tend to prove the offense charged e. The test is the connection bet:een the fact proved and the offense charged.

This e=clusionary rule is not, ho:ever, an absolute and rigid proscription. 3ne of the recogniIed e=ception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a la:ful arrest. +n this e=ception, the la: re@uires that a la:ful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. (s a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected :ith a valid :arrant of arrest.

E6 $dmissi0i-it2 of E-e)troni) Do)uments6 (n electronic document is admissible in evidence ifB 1. +t complies :ith the "ules on admissibility prescribed by the "ules and related la:s. and #. +t is authenticated in the manner by the "ules on Electronic Evidence F6 !)ientifi) Dete)tion De,i)es6 1. 2ie detector #. %peed detection and recording devices $. hemical tests for drun?enness '. Truth serums and hypnosis ). 8lood grouping tests

RULE 128/ maters.

!e)tion

:6Relevanc$+

Collateral

16 Re-e,(n)2 of E,iden)e

76 Re-e,(n)2 does not gener(--2 de.end u.on its sour)e6 Ahether evidence offered is relevant does not, as a general rule, depend upon its source. 6either does relevancy depend upon the importance or :eight of the evidence, :eight being a matter for the court. :6 Logi)(- re-e,(n)2 distinguished form -eg(re-e,(n)2 Logi)(- re-e,(n)2 &eans that evidence must be absolutely essential to the fact in issue. The main condition of admissibility Leg(- Re-e,(n)2 "e@uires a higher standard of evidentiary force and includes logical relevancy. (ll rules e=cluding evidence :hich is logically relevant are e=ceptions to the general rule. The attribute of all those logically relevant matters :hich are not declared inadmissible by one or more of the e=cluding rules.

<6 F()t defined +t is a thing done, or e=isting. *acts are thus eitherB a. !hysical, e.g. the e=istence of visible objects b. !sychological, e.g. the intention or animus of a particular individual in doing a particular act @6 F()ts in issue (s distinguished from f()ts re-e,(nt to the )(se F()ts in issue Those facts the truth or e=istence of :hich the right or liability to be ascertained in the proceeding depends F()ts re-e,(nt to the issue *acts from the e=istence of :hich inference as to the truth or e=istence of the right or liability to be ascertained may logically be dra:n

86 Co--(ter(- f()ts defined Those facts :hich are outside of the controversy, or are not directly connected :ith the principal matter in issue in dispute, as indicated in the pleadings of the parties. 96 Co--(ter(- f()ts in e,iden)e %ener(- Ru-e: ollateral facts are not admissible for they tend to dra: a:ay the mind of the court and to prejudice and mislead it. E3)e.tion: Evidence on collateral matters shall be allo:ed :hen it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. "elevant collateral mattersB a. +ntention to commit crime b. &otive and absence of motive c. ircumstances preceding the crime d. 9uilty ?no:ledge e. !lan, design or conspiracy f. 3pportunity g. (libi h. 4alue 1;6 Pro0(0i-it2 (nd im.ro0(0i-it2 of e,identi(f()t The truth of any statement of fact may be considered from the standpoint of the probability or improbability of the fact per se. +ts probability or improbability is to be measured by the degree

C(se: Peo.-e ,s6 #(t(r ,%6R6 No6 1A;22: "(2 19/ 2;;:*6 9enerally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes Lsomething more than a minimum of probative value,L suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a Lplus value.L This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being e=aggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence :ithout Lplus valueL may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. +t is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the li?ely harm that :ould result from its admission. A6 Issue defined6 +t is the point or points in @uestion, at the conclusion of the pleadings :hich one side affirms, and the other denies. +ssues arise upon the pleading :here a fact or conclusion of la: is maintained by one party, and is controverted by the other.

:ith :hich the fact as stated accords :ith the general e=perience of man?ind. RULE 128/ !e)6 76%dmissibilit$ of evidence. <6 Re8uisites of (dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e6 a. Evidence is relevant to the issue b. Evidence is competent, that is, it does not belong to that class of evidence :hich is e=cluded by the la: or the "ules of Evidence

according to the prevailing standards of reasoning, to effect rational persuasion. b. %ll facts havin rational probative value are admissible! unless some specific rule forbids. ; This principle does not mean that anything that has probative value is admissible. 8ut everything having a probative value is ipso facto entitled to be assumed to be admissible, and therefore any rule of policy :hich may be valid to e=clude it is a superadded and abnormal rule.

C(ses: Peo.-e ,s6 !ori(g( ,%6R6 No6 191792 "(r)h 1:/ 2;11*6 The non-compliance :ith %ection #1 of said la:, particularly the ma?ing of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated andKor seiIed, :ill not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. 1nder %ection $ of "ule 1#8 of the "ules of ourt, evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the issue and is not e=cluded by the la: or these rules. *or evidence to be inadmissible there should be a la: or rule :hich forbids its reception. +f there is no such la: or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary :eight that :ill be accorded it by the courts.

86 $dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e distinguished from =eight of e,iden)e $dmissi0i-it2 E,iden)e of 5eight of E,iden)e The :eight of evidence has to do :ith the effect of evidence admitted, its tendency to convince and persuade. The :eight of evidence is not determined mathematically by numerical superiority of :itnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case. +t involves credibility of :itnesses and all inherent probabilities and improbabilities deducible from the evidence as a :hole. ILLU! R$ ION: ( defendant is accused of murder and by :ay of defense, he attempts to establish an alibi. 1. 0is mother testifies that he :as at home in bed at the time the murder :as committed. or #. ( distinguished physician testifies that he :as attending

The admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence. The admissibility of evidence does not depend on its :eight and sufficiency. credibility and :eight being @uestions of fact.

&!& %ROUP/ INC ,s6 %o '%6R6 No6 1<8<:: Fe0ru(r2 1</ 2;1;-. The testimony of &arasigan on the particulars of respondentGs supposed ban? account :ith %ecurity 8an? and the documentary evidence represented by the chec?s adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being e=cluded by operation of ".(. 6o. 1'<). They are li?e:ise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for @ualified theft.

@6

=o (3ioms of $dmissi0i-it2 a. None but facts havin rational probative value are admissible. > +t prescribes that :hatever is presented as evidence shall be presented on the hypothesis that it is calculated,

the defendant in his home at the time the murder :as committed. (s :ill be observed, both ,1- and ,#- are e@ually admissible. 8ut it is li?ely that the court :ould give greater :eight to the testimony of a disinterested physician than of a mother, :ho might be e=pected to commit perjury in an effort to save her son. C(se: $tien?( ,s6 &OD '%6R6 No6 1@@:;@ Fe0ru(r2 9/ 2;11-. (dmissibility of evidence refers to the @uestion :hether or not the circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. 3n the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the @uestion of :hether or not it proves an issue.

Ahere an inadmissible fact has been offered by one party and received :ithout objection and the opponents after:ards, for the purpose of negativing or e=plaining or other:ise counteracting, offers a fact similarly inadmissible, such fact is admissible if it serves to remove an unfair effect upon the court :hich might other:ise ensue from the original fact. 1;6 Ru-es of E3)-usion (nd E3)-usion(r2 Ru-es Ru-es of E3)-usion 9overned by the rules of evidence E3)-usion(r2 Ru-es Evidence e=cluded by the onstitution

C(se:

96

2.es of $dmissi0i-it2

$6 "u-ti.-e $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6 Ahen a fact is offered for one purpose, and is admissible in so far as it satisfies all rules applicable to it :hen offered for that purpose, its failure to satisfy some other rule :hich :ould be applicable to it if offered for another purpose does not e=clude it. &6 Condition(- $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6 Ahere t:o or more evidentiary facts are so connected under the issues that the relevancy of one depends upon another not yet received, and the party is unable to introduce them both at the same moment, the offering counsel may be re@uired by the court as a condition precedent '1* to state the supposed connecting facts, and '2* to promise to give the evidence later. Effect if condition precedent is not fulfilled& 1pon motion by the opposite party, the court may stri?e out the evidence thus conditionally admitted C6 Cur(ti,e $dmissi0i-it2 of E,iden)e6

o-entino ,s6 "endo?( '$D"6 C$!E NO6 A1A1 O)to0er 19/ 2;;:*6 6ote that "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but no:here does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule :ould render said records inadmissible in evidence. 3n the other hand, the "evised "ules of Evidence only provides for the e=clusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seiIures.%ince both "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ and the "evised "ules on Evidence do not provide for the e=clusion from evidence of the birth certificates in @uestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly ta?en into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against the respondent.

%6 $dmissi0i-it2 of e-e.hone Con,ers(tions6 1nless other:ise objectionable, a telephone conversation bet:een a :itness and another person is admissible in any case in :hich a face to face conversation bet:een a :itness and another person :ould be admissible in evidence, provided that the identity of the person :ith :hom the :itness :as spea?ing is satisfactorily established, but not other:ise.

Proof of Identit2 > through :itnessG recognition of the voice of the person :ith :hom he :as spea?ing, ho:ever, it may be established by means other than the recognition of the voice. 46 $dmissi0i-it2 of r(dio 0ro(d)(st6 Evidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence :hen the identity of the spea?er is established by the follo:ingB 8y the testimony of a :itness :ho sa: him broadcast his message or speech 8y the :itness recognition of the voice of the spea?er I6 $dmissi0i-it2 re)ordings6 of =iret(..ing (nd t(.e

+t shall also be unla:ful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penaliIed in the ne=t preceding sentence, to ?no:ingly possess any tape record, :ire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spo?en :ord secured either before or after the effective date of this (ct in the manner prohibited by this la:. or to replay the same for any other person or persons. or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in :riting, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, :hether complete or partial, to any other person !rovided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section $ hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

"ecording of conversations, statement, confessions, speech, and the sounds of various ?inds, are admissible in evidence, subject of course, to the general rules relating to hearsay, best evidence, relevancy, privilege and the li?e, and subject to the proper authentication by foundation testimony. 76 The :iretapping and other related violations of the privacy of communications are prohibited and penaliIed by "epublic (ct 6o. '#<<. REPU&LIC $C 5IRE $PPIN% $C :2;;/ $N I-

<6 !e)tion 26 (ny person :ho :ilfully or ?no:ingly does or :ho shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unla:ful in the preceding section or :ho violates the provisions of the follo:ing section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation. E6 EBE"P ED $C ! 76 !e)tion 7/ .(r 16(ny peace officer, :ho is authoriIed by a :ritten order of the ourt, to e=ecute any of the acts declared to be unla:ful in cases involvingB crimes of treason, espionage, provo?ing :ar and disloyalty in case of :ar, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,

D6 UNL$5FUL $C ! :6 !e)tion 1/ .(r 16 +t shall be unla:ful for any person, not being authoriIed by all the parties to any private communication or spo?en :ord, to tap any :ire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo?en :ord by using a device commonly ?no:n as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or :al?ie-tal?ie or tape recorder, or ho:ever other:ise described A6 !e)tion 1/ .(r 26

inciting to sedition, ?idnapping as defined by the "evised !enal ode, and violations of ommon:ealth (ct 6o. >1>, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security Re8uirements: That such :ritten order shall only be issued or granted upon :ritten application and the e=amination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the :itnesses he may produce and a sho:ingB 1. That there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committedB Pro%i$e$) ho'e%er, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed. #. That there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence :ill be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes. and $. That there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The provisions of "epublic (ct 6o. '#<< ,(nti-Aire Tapping 2a:- to the contrary not:ithstanding, a police or la: enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a :ritten order of the ourt of (ppeals, listen to, intercept and record, :ith the use of any mode, form, ?ind or type of electronic or other surveillance e@uipment or intercepting and trac?ing devices, or :ith the use of any other suitable :ays and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spo?en or :ritten :ords bet:een members of a judicially declared and outla:ed terrorist organiIation, association, or group of persons or of any person charged :ith or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. !rovided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications bet:een la:yers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authoriIed.

F6 $dmissi0i-it2 (ny communication or spo?en :ord, or the e=istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this (ct shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, @uasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. 12ection () R A (5887 'aanan vs. I%C! et al.! ()* SCR% ((2.The la: refers to a DtapE of :ire or cable or the use of a device or arrangementE for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communicationH The e=tension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a 5ictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices

:6 !ur,ei--(n)e of !us.e)ts (nd Inter)e.tion (nd Re)ording of Communi)(tions 12ection 3) Repu#"ic Act No +435) 6uman securit& Act7

enumerated in %ection 1 of ".(. 6o. '#<< as the use thereof cannot be considered as DtappingE the :ire not installed for that purpose. :6 "e@uisites to be established before a recording of conversation can be given probative valueB h. ( sho:ing that the recording device :as capable of ta?ing testimony. i. ( sho:ing that the operator of the device :as competent. j. Establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording. ?. ( sho:ing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made. l. ( sho:ing of manner of the preservation of the recording. m. +dentification of the spea?ers. and n. ( sho:ing that the testimony elicited :as voluntarily made :ithout any ?ind of inducement C6 $dmissi0i-it2 of e,iden)e i--eg(--2 sei?ed6 "ights protected under (rticle +++, 8ill of "ights of the 1987 onstitutionB ). "ight against unreasonable search and seiIure. , %ec. #>. "ight to privacy and inviolability of communication , %ec. $7. "ight of a person under investigation for an offense ,%ec. 1#8. "ight against self-incrimination ,%ec. 17C(se: $m0re ,s6 Peo.-e ,%6R6 No6 191A72 $ugust 1A/ 2;12*6%ection #, (rticle +++ of the onstitution mandates that a search and seiIure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial :arrant predicated upon the e=istence of probable cause, absent :hich such search and seiIure becomes LunreasonableL :ithin the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seiIure is tainted and should be e=cluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. +n the language of the fundamental la:, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

This e=clusionary rule is not, ho:ever, an absolute and rigid proscription. 3ne of the recogniIed e=ception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a la:ful arrest. +n this e=ception, the la: re@uires that a la:ful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. (s a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected :ith a valid :arrant of arrest.

+6 $dmissi0i-it2 of E-e)troni) Do)uments6 (n electronic document is admissible in evidence ifB $. +t complies :ith the "ules on admissibility prescribed by the "ules and related la:s. and '. +t is authenticated in the manner by the "ules on Electronic Evidence L6 !)ientifi) Dete)tion De,i)es6 >. 2ie detector 7. %peed detection and recording devices 8. hemical tests for drun?enness 9. Truth serums and hypnosis 1<. 8lood grouping tests RULE 128/ maters. !e)tion :6Relevanc$+ Collateral

116 Re-e,(n)2 of E,iden)e c. Evidence is relevant :hen it relates directly to a fact in issue. or to a fact :hich, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the e=istence or non-e=istence of a fact in issue. d. Evidentiary facts are relevant :here there is such rational and logical connection bet:een them and the matter in issue that proof of the former logically tends to ma?e the latter more probable or improbable, that is, :here the facts offered in evidence have a legitimate tendency to establish the truth concerning a controversial issue. C(se: 4errer( ,s6 $-0( ,%6R6 No6 1:822; Cune 1A/ 2;;A*6Evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not other:ise e=cluded by statute or the "ules of ourt. Evidence is relevant :hen it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its e=istence or non-

e=istence. %ection '9 of "ule 1$<, :hich governs the admissibility of e=pert testimony, provides that the opinion of a :itness on a matter re@uiring special ?no:ledge, s?ill, e=perience or training :hich he is sho:n to possess may be received in evidence. This "ule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of 56( analysis as evidence. +ndeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allo:ed L:hen it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

must be absolutely essential to the fact in issue. The main condition of admissibility

standard of evidentiary force and includes logical relevancy. (ll rules e=cluding evidence :hich is logically relevant are e=ceptions to the general rule. The attribute of all those logically relevant matters :hich are not declared inadmissible by one or more of the e=cluding rules.

126

est of Re-e,(n)2 a. Every fact or circumstance tending to thro: light on the issue is logically inferable b. (ny circumstance is relevant from :hich tends to ma?e the proposition at issue more or less probable, or :hich is calculated to e=plain or establish facts pertinent to the in@uiry c. The test is :hether the evidence conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis being one :hich, if sustained, :ould logically influence the issue d. *acts are relevant if they fairly tend to prove the offense charged e. The test is the connection bet:een the fact proved and the offense charged.

C(se: Peo.-e ,s6 #(t(r ,%6R6 No6 1A;22: "(2 19/ 2;;:*6 9enerally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes Lsomething more than a minimum of probative value,L suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a Lplus value.L This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being e=aggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence :ithout Lplus valueL may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. +t is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the li?ely harm that :ould result from its admission. 1A6 Issue defined6 +t is the point or points in @uestion, at the conclusion of the pleadings :hich one side affirms, and the other denies. +ssues arise upon the pleading :here a fact or conclusion of la: is maintained by one party, and is controverted by the other. 1<6 F()t defined +t is a thing done, or e=isting. *acts are thus eitherB c. !hysical, e.g. the e=istence of visible objects d. !sychological, e.g. the intention or animus of a particular individual in doing a particular act

176 Re-e,(n)2 does not gener(--2 de.end u.on its sour)e6 Ahether evidence offered is relevant does not, as a general rule, depend upon its source. 6either does relevancy depend upon the importance or :eight of the evidence, :eight being a matter for the court.

1:6 Logi)(- re-e,(n)2 distinguished form -eg(re-e,(n)2 Logi)(- re-e,(n)2 &eans that evidence Leg(- Re-e,(n)2 "e@uires a higher

1@6 F()ts in issue (s distinguished from f()ts re-e,(nt to the )(se F()ts in issue Those facts the truth or e=istence of :hich the right or liability to be ascertained in the proceeding depends F()ts re-e,(nt to the issue *acts from the e=istence of :hich inference as to the truth or e=istence of the right or liability to be ascertained may logically be dra:n

is no such la# or rule! the evidence must be admitted sub-ect onl$ to the evidentiar$ #ei ht that #ill be accorded it b$ the courts. F$C !: !ursuant to a buy-bust operation conducted by the police, %oriaga :as placed under arrest and brought to the office of the (nti-illegal 5rugs %pecial 3peration Tas? *orce. The evidence seiIed :as turned over to police investigator !3# "eynaldo /uan. (n e=amination :as conducted on the contents of the plastic sachet :hich tested positive for &ethylamphetamine 0ydrochloride.%oriaga :as charged :ith 4iolation of %ection ), (rt. ++, "( 91>). +n addition to the above-mentioned charge, %oriaga :as indicted for illegal use of dangerous drugs under %ection 1), (rticle ++, also of ".(. 6o. 91>). The trial court rendered a decision ac@uitting %oriaga of this charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs but finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegally selling dangerous drugs. %oriaga appealed the decision arguing that that buy-bust team failed to comply :ith the re@uisites of %ection #1, (rticle ++ of ".(. 6o. 91>) and its implementing rules re@uiring the immediate inventory and photograph of the items seiIed in the buy-bust operation. *urther, %oriaga proceeds to @uestion the chain of custody of the seiIed shabu. I!!UE: Ahether or not the non-compliance :ith the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seiIed drugs render the items seiIed or confiscated inadmissible as evidence. 4ELD: No6 ( buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment :hereby :ays and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the la:brea?ers in the e=ecution of their criminal plan. +n this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is underta?en.L The that non-compliance :ith %ection #1 of said la:, particularly the ma?ing of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated andKor seiIed, :ill not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. 1nder %ection $ of "ule 1#8 of the "ules of ourt, evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant

186 Co--(ter(- f()ts defined Those facts :hich are outside of the controversy, or are not directly connected :ith the principal matter in issue in dispute, as indicated in the pleadings of the parties. 196 Co--(ter(- f()ts in e,iden)e %ener(- Ru-e: ollateral facts are not admissible for they tend to dra: a:ay the mind of the court and to prejudice and mislead it. E3)e.tion: Evidence on collateral matters shall be allo:ed :hen it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. "elevant collateral mattersB i. +ntention to commit crime j. &otive and absence of motive ?. ircumstances preceding the crime l. 9uilty ?no:ledge m. !lan, design or conspiracy n. 3pportunity o. (libi p. 4alue 2;6 Pro0(0i-it2 (nd im.ro0(0i-it2 of e,identi(f()t The truth of any statement of fact may be considered from the standpoint of the probability or improbability of the fact per se. +ts probability or improbability is to be measured by the degree :ith :hich the fact as stated accords :ith the general e=perience of man?ind. %6R6 No6 191792 "(r)h 1:/ 2;11 PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE! !ORI$%$ 2 ! O6 DO"IN%O

vs.

ROLL#

,or evidence to be inadmissible! there should be a la# or rule #hich forbids its reception. If there

to the issue and is not e=cluded by the la: or these rules. *or evidence to be inadmissible there should be a la: or rule :hich forbids its reception. +f there is no such la: or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary :eight that :ill be accorded it by the courts. There is no provision or statement in said la: or in any rule that :ill bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated andKor seiIed drugs due to noncompliance :ith %ection #1 of "epublic (ct 6o. 91>). The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance :ith said section, is not of admissibility, but of :eight M evidentiary merit or probative value M to be given the evidence. The :eight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. %6R6 No6 1<8<:: Fe0ru(r2 1</ 2;1; &!& %ROUP/ INC6/ re.resented 02 its President/ "r6 RIC$RDO &$N%$#$N/ vs. !$LL# %O (6D6(6 !$LL# %O-&$N%$#$N The testimon$ and the documentar$ evidence presented are not onl$ incompetent for bein e"cluded b$ operation of R.%. No. ().*. The$ are li/e#ise irrelevant to the case! inasmuch as the$ do not appear to have an$ lo ical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for 0ualified theft. F$C !: "espondent %ally 9o, cashier of petioner 8%8 9roup, +nc. :as charged :ith @ualified theft. 3n the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject chec?s and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal ban?ing account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena ducestecum Kad testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of %ecurity 8an? and &etroban? :hich :as granted by the trial court. The prosecution :as able to present in court the testimony of Elenita&arasigan, the representative of %ecurity 8an? :hose testimony sought to prove that respondent, :hile engaged as cashier at the 8%8 9roup, +nc., :as able to run a:ay :ith the chec?s issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account :ith %ecurity 8an?. +n the course of the testimony, the subject chec?s :ere presented to &arasigan for identification and mar?ing as the same chec?s received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her

personal account :ith %ecurity 8an?. 8ut before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a &otion to %uppress, see?ing the e=clusion of &arasiganGs testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject %ecurity 8an? account. This time respondent invo?es, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under ".(. 6o. 1'<). The trial court in its order denied respondentGs motion to suppress. I!!UE: Ahether or not the testimony of &arasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and :hether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of ban? deposits and, hence, e=cluded by operation of ".(. 6o. 1'<). 4ELD: #es6 +n ta?ing e=clusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent :ith %ecurity 8an? contains the proceeds of the chec?s that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the e=ceptions in %ection # of ".(. 6o. 1'<) that the money ?ept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. Ahat indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to %ection # of ".(. 6o. 1'<) has been pointedly and amply addressed in 1nion 8an? of the !hilippines v. ourt of (ppeals, in :hich the ourt noted that the in@uiry into ban? deposits allo:able under ".(. 6o. 1'<) must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action. 9iven this perspective, the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent :ith the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. +n the criminal +nformation filed :ith the trial court, respondent, un@ualifiedly and in plain language, is charged :ith @ualified theft by abusing petitionerGs trust and confidence and stealing cash. The said +nformation ma?es no factual allegation that in some material :ay involves the chec?s subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. 6either do the allegations in said +nformation ma?e mention of the supposed ban? account in :hich the funds represented by the chec?s have allegedly been ?ept. +t comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondentGs %ecurity 8an? account serves no other purpose than to establish

the e=istence of such account, its nature and the amount ?ept in it. +t constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible in@uiry into a ban? deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of :hich is protected by la:. 3n this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it :as raised before the trial court. +n sum, the ourt holds that the testimony of &arasigan on the particulars of respondentGs supposed ban? account :ith %ecurity 8an? and the documentary evidence represented by the chec?s adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being e=cluded by operation of ".(. 6o. 1'<). They are li?e:ise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for @ualified theft.

documentary e=hibits. ( motion for reconsideration :as filed by the petitioner but :as denied by the 83&. 0ence, a petition for certiorari :as filed before the ourt of (ppeals but :as dismissed by the ourt.0ence, this petition. I!!UE: Ahether or not the documentary e=hibits are inadmissible as evidence and incompetentF 4ELD: No6 (s held by the %upreme ourt in the case of PNOC 2hipping an$ Transport Corporation % Court of Appea"s, admissibility of evidence is distinguished from probative :eight of evidence, asB (dmissibility of evidence refers to the @uestion :hether or not the circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. 3n the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the @uestion of :hether or not it proves an issue. The fact sought to be established by the admission of EdithaGs e=hibits, that her L?idneys :ere both in their proper anatomical locations at the timeL of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. The rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they li?e:ise provide for some facts :hich are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. 2a:s of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural ma?e-up and composition of living things such as human beings. +n this case, the ourt may ta?e judicial notice that EdithaGs ?idneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as :ith most human beings, :ere in their proper anatomical locations. $D"6 C$!E NO6 A1A1 O)to0er 19/ 2;;: PEDRO %6 OLEN INO vs. $ #6 NOR&ER O "6 "ENDOE$ Since both Rule 2)! %dministrative 1rder No. (! series of (223 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the e"clusion from evidence of the birth certificates in 0uestion! said public documents are! therefore! admissible as evidence.

%6R6 No6 1@@:;@ Fe0ru(r2 9/ 2;11 RICO RO""EL $ IENE$/ vs. "EDICINE (nd EDI 4$ !IO!ON

&O$RD

OF

%dmissibilit$ of evidence refers to the 0uestion #hether or not the circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. 1n the other hand! the probative value of evidence refers to the 0uestion of #hether or not it proves an issue. F$C !: ( complaint for gross negligence :as filed before the 8oard of &edicine against the doctors, including the petitioner (tienIa, :ho allegedly participated in the fateful ?idney operation :hich led to the removal of the private respondentGs functional right ?idney instead of the left non-functioning ?idney. The complaint :as heard by the 83&. !rivate respondent Editha filed her formal offer of documentary evidence, :hich is offered for the purpose of proving that her ?idneys :ere both in proper anatomical locations at the time she :as operated. !etitioner objected to the formal offer of e=hibits alleging that they are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters :hich are hearsay and incompetent to prove the purpose for :hich they are offered. 0o:ever, the 83& admitted the

F$C !: "espondent (tty. 6orberto &. &endoIa :as administratively charged :ith 9rossly +mmoral onduct and 9ross &isconduct. omplainants alleged that respondent, a former &unicipal Trial ourt /udge, abandoned his legal :ife, *elicitas 4. 4alderia in favor of his paramour, &arilyn dela*uente, :ho is, in turn, married to one "amon 9. &arcos. 3n the other hand, respondent averred that complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of his alleged daughters &ara Chrisna harminadela*uente &endoIa and &yrraChrisna6orminadela*uente &endoIa, in violation of "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence. I!!UEB Ahether or not birth certificates are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ :hich provides for strict confidentiality of a personGs birth record. 4ELD: No6 %ection $, "ule 1#8 of the "evised "ules on Evidence provides that Levidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the issue and is not e=cluded by the la: or these rules.L There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only @uestion, therefore, is :hether the la: or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$. 6ote that "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but no:here does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule :ould render said records inadmissible in evidence. 3n the other hand, the "evised "ules of Evidence only provides for the e=clusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seiIures. +t should be emphasiIed. ho:ever, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seiIures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state.

onse@uently, in this case :here complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seiIures does not apply. %ince both "ule #', (dministrative 3rder 6o. 1, series of 199$ and the "evised "ules on Evidence do not provide for the e=clusion from evidence of the birth certificates in @uestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly ta?en into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.

%6R6 No6 191A72 $ugust 1A/ 2;12 "$R%$RI $ $"&RE # C$#UNI/ vs. PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE! The e"clusionar$ rule is not! ho#ever! an absolute and ri id proscription. 1ne of the reco ni4ed e"ception established b$ -urisprudence is search incident to a la#ful arrest. F$C !: (mbre :as charged :ith the crime of violation of %ection 1), (rticle ++ of "epublic (ct 1R A 7 6o. 91>). *rom the testimonies of prosecution :itnesses, it appeared that on (pril #<, #<<), the aloocan !olice %tation (nti-+llegal 5rug-%pecial 3peration 1nit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police, the buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of (mbre having pot session, in particular, :as caught sniffing :hat :as suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil. The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution :as able to establish :ith certitude the guilt of (mbre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of %ection 1), (rticle ++ of ".(. 6o. 91>), ho:ever, ac@uitted (mbre on the crime of violation of %ection 1#, (rticle ++ of ".(. 6o. 91>) for failure of the prosecution to prove :ith particularity the drug paraphernalia found in her possession.

I!!UE: Ahether the :arrantless arrest of (mbre and the search of her person :as valid. and :hether the items seiIed are admissible in evidence. 4ELD:

#es6 %ection #, (rticle +++ of the onstitution mandates that a search and seiIure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial :arrant predicated upon the e=istence of probable cause, absent :hich such search and seiIure becomes LunreasonableL :ithin the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seiIure is tainted and should be e=cluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. +n the language of the fundamental la:, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This e=clusionary rule is not, ho:ever, an absolute and rigid proscription. 3ne of the recogniIed e=ception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a la:ful arrest. +n this e=ception, the la: re@uires that a la:ful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. (s a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected :ith a valid :arrant of arrest. +n this case, there is no gainsaying that (mbre :as caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be la:fully arrested :ithout a :arrant. 0is conviction stands.

!etitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under "ule >) asserting that the trial court acted Lin e=cess of, or :ithout jurisdiction andKor :ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac? or e=cess of jurisdictionE, in issuing the order of 56( testing, ho:ever, the petition :as denied. I!!UE: Ahether or not a 56( test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation and as such be admissible in evidence in a paternity suit. 4ELD: #es. Evidence is admissible :hen it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not other:ise e=cluded by statute or the "ules of ourt. Evidence is relevant :hen it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its e=istence or non-e=istence. %ection '9 of "ule 1$<, :hich governs the admissibility of e=pert testimony, provides that the opinion of a :itness on a matter re@uiring special ?no:ledge, s?ill, e=perience or training :hich he is sho:n to possess may be received in evidence. This "ule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of 56( analysis as evidence. +ndeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allo:ed L:hen it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.L +n assessing the probative value of 56( evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the follo:ing dataB ho: the samples :ere collected, ho: they :ere handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure follo:ed in analyIing the samples, :hether the proper standards and procedures :ere follo:ed in conducting the tests, and the @ualification of the analyst :ho conducted the tests. 56( analysis that e=cludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. +f the value of !robability of !aternity ,A- is less than 99.9N, the results of the 56( analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. +f the value of !robability of !aternity ,A- is 99.9N or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. The policy of the *amily ode to liberaliIe the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is :ithout prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her o:n defenses. Ahere the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities

%6R6 No6 1:822; Cune 1A/ 2;;A RO!ENDO 4ERRER$ vs. RO!ENDO $L&$ Evidence is admissible #hen it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not other#ise e"cluded b$ statute or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant #hen it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its e"istence or none"istence. F$C !: Thirteen-year-old "osendo (lba represented by his mother (rmi (lba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. !etitioner 0errera denied that he is the biological father of respondent and denied physical contact :ith respondentGs mother."espondent filed a motion to direct the ta?ing of 56( paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.!etitioner opposed 56( paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability and further argued that 56( paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondentGs motion to conduct 56( paternity testing on petitioner.

of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the la:, rules, and jurisprudence. %6R6 No6 1A;22: "(2 19/ 2;;: PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE!/ ,s6 COEL #$ $R (-i(s F+$5I F The le al relevanc$ of evidence denotes 5somethin more than a minimum of probative value!5 su estin that such evidentiar$ relevance must contain a 5plus value.5 This ma$ be necessar$ to preclude the trial court from bein satisfied b$ matters of sli ht value! capable of bein e"a erated b$ pre-udice and hast$ conclusions. Evidence #ithout 5plus value5 ma$ be lo icall$ relevant but not le all$ sufficient to convict. F$C !: /oel 7atar :as convicted by the trial court :ith rape :ith homicide defined and penaliIed under (rticle #>>-( of the "evised !enal ode, as amended by ".(. 8$)$, other:ise ?no:n as the (nti-"ape 2a: of 1997, and :as accordingly, sentenced to Death. !ursuant to (rticle '7 of the revised !enal ode, an automatic revie: :as made, the appellant alleging that the trial court gravely erred in giving :eight to the evidence presented by the prosecution not:ithstanding their doubtfulness and thereby he should be ac@uitted from the crime charged due to reasonable doubt.

9enerally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes Lsomething more than a minimum of probative value,L suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a Lplus value.L This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being e=aggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence :ithout Lplus valueL may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. +t is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the li?ely harm that :ould result from its admission. The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only :hen there is relevant evidence from :hich the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. !roof beyond reasonable doubt re@uires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. &oral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those :ho are bound to act conscientiously upon it. +t is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This re@uires that the circumstances, ta?en together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. leading, on the :hole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. +n vie: of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, :e rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty. 0o:ever, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the re@uirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction :hen there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Thus, appellantGs motive to se=ually assault and ?ill the victim :as evident in the instant case. +t is a rule in criminal la: that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of :itnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or :ords that may e=press it or from :hich his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. (ccordingly, the ourt is convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special comple= crime of rape :ith homicide. (ppellant se=ually assaulted Cathylyn1ba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victimGs lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

I!!UE: Ahether or not the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the accused of the crime charged on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 4ELD: No6 ircumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to :arrant a conviction, must form an unbro?en chain :hich leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the e=clusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine :hether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three re@uisites must concurB ,1- there is more than one circumstance. ,#- facts on :hich the inferences are derived are proven. and ,$- the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

RULE 129 5h(t Need Not &e Pro,ed

!e)tion 16Ju$icia" notice) 'hen man$ator&. M ( court shall ta?e judicial notice, :ithout the introduction of evidence of theB a. the e=istence and territorial e=tent of states. b. their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality. c. the la: of nations.

-it is mandatory as far as those matters enumerated in %ec. 1, "ule 1#9.

- 1nder %ec. #, on matters :hich are of public ?no:ledge, or are capable of un@uestionable demonstration, ought to be ?no:n to judges because of their judicial functions.

d. the admiralty and maritime courts of the :orld and their seals. e. the political constitution and history of the !hilippines the official acts of legislative, e=ecutive and judicial departments of the !hilippines. f. the la:s of nature.

g. the measure of time. h. and the geographical divisions. Cudi)i(- Noti)e, $efine$B -+t is the cogniIance of certain facts :hich judges may properly ta?e and act on :ithout proof because they already ?no: them.

Note9 The application of the doctrine of judicial notice is not confined to the courts of record. ertain special tribunals :hich are not strictly courts but :hich parta?e of their nature and the findings of :hich parta?e of the nature of judgments may ta?e judicial notice on certain matters. Points to Remem0er: a. (ll courts of justice are bound to ta?e judicial notice of the territorial e=tent of the jurisdiction e=ercised by the government the la:s of :hich they administer and of the e=tent and boundaries of the territory under :hich they themselves can e=ercise jurisdiction. b. +t is :ithout an e=ception for the court to ta?e judicial notice :ithout of those great historical events :hich have affected the destiny of our nation or other nations. c. The rule must be ta?en :ith the @ualification that it relates only to such governments as have been recogniIed by the home government. The recognition of a foreign government is a political

-+t is the notice ta?en by the court, :ithout the production of evidence, of facts, :hich are :ithin common ?no:ledge and e=perience.

C+65% 3* /15+ +(2 63T+ E &(65(T3"7 5+% "ET+36("7

rather than a judicial matter and therefore courts follo: the determination of the e=ecutive department of the forum. d. +n conformity to the la: of nations all courts in a government, :here that government has recogniIed the e=istence of a foreign nation, but not in the absence of such recognition :ill ta?e cogniIance of the flag and great seal of that nation or provinces. e. *oreign la: must be proved as facts, those rules :hich by common consent of man?ind have been ac@uiesced in as las stand upon an entirely different footing. Note9 +t is :ell settled that foreign la:s do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authoriIed to ta?e judicial notice of them. 2i?e any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. f. 6o proof need be given of the seals of foreign maritime and admiralty courts. 8y common consent and general usage, the seal of a court of admiralty has been considered as sufficiently authenticating its records. i.

conduct of the litigant or :itness in a similar matter. 9eneral "uleB ourts are not authoriIed to ta?e judicial ?no:ledge of contents of the other cases, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, even though the trial judge in fact ?no:s or remember the contents thereof. ourts judicially recogniIe all public matters :hich :ill affect the government of the country. 3n this principle, the accession and death of the sovereign and principal officers of the state are recogniIed. /udicial 6otice is ta?en of the familiar and un@uestionable la:s of nature and of the e=istence of fact :hich happened according to the course of nature. ourts :ill judicially notice the things belonging to the almanac. alendar of the periods :ithin the calendar. /udicial 6otice is ta?en of the fact that the !hilippines is divided into provinces, municipalities, cities, and cities is divided into lots, bloc?s, streets.

j.

?. l.

g. &atters relating toB 1. 2egislative 5epartment ourts are bound to ta?e judicial notice, as a matter of la:, of dates :hen ongress begins and closes its session, the number, function, privileges of its members. ourts judicially recogniIe all public matters :hich :ill affect the government of the country. 3n this principle, the accession and death of the sovereign and principal officers of the state are recogniIed.

67RIS8R7DENCE /udicial notice may be ta?en of petitionerOs oath ta?ing as evidenced by a certification from the "ecords 3fficer of the office of the !rovincial 9overnor. The oath ta?ing parta?es of an official act, :hile the certification is an official act of an official of the E=ecutive 5epartment of the government., 2opeI v. %andiganbayan, 9" 6o. 1<$911Ae uphold the submission that the factual defenses of petitioner are matters :ithin the concept of mandatory judicial notice. Ahile it is true that, as pontificated by the ourt a /uo) factual defenses on the part of the accused are evidentiary matters :hich may be presented only during trial on the merits, the facts alleged by the accused are facts admitted, :hether directly or impliedly, in pleadings of the prosecution., 2opeI v. %andiganbayan, 9" 6o. 1<$911!e)tion 26Ju$icia" notice) 'hen $iscretionar&, generallyB (6 "(tters =hi)h (re of .u0-i) Dno=-edge.

#. E=ecutive 5epartment

$. 5epartment

/udiciary

The %upreme ourt has ta?en judicial notice of its record in a previous case in connection :ith the

- /udicial ?no:ledge of facts is measured by general ?no:ledge of the same fact. ( fact is generally ?no:n :hen its e=istence or operation :hen it is accepted by public :ithout @ualification or contention. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the :isdom and discretion of the courts. The po:er to ta?e judicial notice is to be e=ercised by courts :ith caution. care must be ta?en that the re@uisite notoriety e=ists. and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 9enerally spea?ing, matters of judicial notice have three material re@uisitesB ,1- the matter must be one of common and general ?no:ledge. ,#- it must be :ell and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain. and ,$- it must be ?no:n to be :ithin the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining :hat facts may be assumed to be judicially ?no:n is that of notoriety. 0ence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. ,2atip vs. huaThings of Lcommon ?no:ledge,L of :hich courts ta?e judicial notice, may be matters coming to the ?no:ledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary e=periences of life, or they may be matters :hich are generally accepted by man?ind as true and are capable of ready and un@uestioned demonstration. Thus, facts :hich are universally ?no:n, and :hich may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common ?no:ledge of every person., 2atip vs. hua, 9" 63. 1778<906 &atters capable 5emonstration of 1n@uestionable

1. Ahen in the absence of any objection, :ith the ?no:ledge of the opposing party, the contents of said other case are clearly referred to by title and number in a pending action and adopted or read into the record of the latter. #. :hen the original record of the other case or any part of it is actually :ithdra:n from the archives at the courtGs discretion upon the re@uest, or :ith the consent of the parties and admitted as part of the record of the pending case. Note& /udicial notice is not judicial ?no:ledge. The mere personal ?no:ledge of the judge is not judicial ?no:ledge of the court. judicial cogniIance is ta?en only of those matters :hich are DcommonlyE ?no:n. !EC ION 7 > CUDICI$L 4E$RIN% NECE!!$R# NO ICE/ 54EN

5uring the trial, the court on its o:n initiative, or on re@uest of a party, may announce its intention to ta?e judicial notice of any matter and allo: the parties to be heard thereon. (fter the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, or its o:n initiative or on the re@uest of a party, may ta?e judicial notice of any matter and allo: the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue or in the case. PURPO!E OF 4E$RIN%

This refers o facts, theories and conclusions :hich have come to be established and accepted by the specialists in the areas of natural science, natural phenomena, technology, history, geography, scientifically facts and other fields of scientific ?no:ledge.

To afford the parties reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety of ta?ing such judicial notice or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

I"E 54EN CUDICI$L NO ICE "$# &E $+EN:

)6 &atters ought to be ?no:n by judges by reason of their judicial function Cudi)i(- Noti)e of Pro)eedings in $nother C(se6 %ENER$L RULE: ourt is not authoriIed to ta?e judicial notice of the contents of another case even if said case :as heard by he same judge. E=ceptionB

5uring trial (fter trial and before judgment 3n appeal +n all instances, the court may act on its o:n initiative or on re@uest of a party.

 CUDICI$L NO ICE $+EN DURIN% RI$L DI! IN%UI!4ED FRO" 4$ $+EN $F ER &U &EFORE CUD%"EN OR ON $PPE$L

1. 3ral as a verbal :aiver of proof made in open court #. ( :ithdra:al of a contention $. ( disclosure made before a court '. (dmission made by a :itness in the course of testimony or deposition ). +n :riting as in pleadings >. 8ill of particulars 7. %tipulation of facts 8. "e@uest for admission

51"+69 T"+(2 ; any matter (*TE" T"+(2 81T 8E*3"E /159&E6T 3" 36 (!!E(2 ; (ny matter if such decisive of a material issue in the case.

DE ER"IN$ ION OF F$C ! !U&CEC OF CUDICI$L NO ICE >

9. /udicial admission contained in an affidavit used in a case.

The court may refer to appropriate and reliable sources of information. Ahere judicial notice must be ta?en of a fact, the court is re@uired to pursue in@uiries sufficient to ma?e that ?no:ledge real as far as possible. !EC ION : ; (n admission, verbal or :ritten, made by or a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not re@uire proof of the admission may be contradicted only by sho:ing that it :as made through palpable mista?e or that no such admission :as made. CUDICI$L $ND EB R$ $D"I!!ION! DEFINED6 CUDICI$L

CONCLU!IVENE!! $D"I!!ION

OF

CUDICI$L

annot be contradicted unless previously sho:n to have been made through a palpable mista?e or that no such admission :as made.

$D"I!!ION IN PLE$DIN%! >

&ay be made by an e=press ac?no:ledgement of some fact or facts set forth in the pleading of the opposite party.

/15+ +(2 ; is one made in the pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial. +t is conclusive upon the party ma?ing them.

8y failure to deny or other:ise controvert the truth of such fact or facts.

EPT"( /15+ +(2 (5&+%%+36 ; one made out of court. (s a rule, is disputable e=cept on estoppel.

NO $D"I!!ION DEFEND$N I! DEF$UL 6

$RI!E! 54EN $DCUD%ED IN

FOR" OF CUDICI$L $D"I!!ION >

%uch failure to ans:er does not amount to an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.

/15+ +(2 (5&+%%+36% &(7 8EB

 &ILL OF P$R ICUL$R! >

Aritten statements in nature of bill of particulars, purporting to be signed by a partyGs attorney, and :hich the opposing party claims :as delivered to his counsel as a bill of particular :as been held admissible.

to be introduced, and :here, in case of a pleading :ithdra:n by leave of court, no order is made relieving the pleader from the admissions made. and the probative force of such statements has even been given a prima facie value.

$D"I!!ION! IN ! IPUL$ ION OF F$C ! >

VERIFIED $ND PLE$DIN%! >

UNVERIFIED

4erification is considered essential to the admission of statements in a pleading against the pleader. +f a party does not verify, authoriIe or adopt a pleading, allegations thereof are not admissible against him.

$D"I!!ION! &# $

ORNE# >

%tipulations of facts in a case are agreements or admissions regarding certain facts included in the litigation and are conclusive bet:een the parties. (cts or facts admitted do not re@uire proof and cannot be contradicted, unless it be sho:n that the admission :as made through a palpable mista?e, for parties are not allo:ed to gain say their o:n acts or deny rights :hich they have previously recogniIed. ( party may not :ithdra: from an agreement of facts :ithout the consent of the other party or :ithout leave of court on justifiable reasons.

(dmissions by counsel made in the trial of a cause may be conclusive on the party unless :ithdra:n or set aside by the court for good cause sho:n as mista?e or lac? of authority.

&INDIN% EFFEC OF F$C ! >

OF ! IPUL$ ION

$D"I!!ION! !UPER!EDED PLE$DIN%

IN 5I 4DR$5N/ OR $"ENDED

( concession or stipulation as to a fact made for the purpose of trial has the force and effect of an established fact binding on the party ma?ing the same, as :ell as on the court, unless the court in its reasonable discretion allo:s the concession to be later :ithdra:n, e=plained, or modified if it appears to have been made by improvidence or mista?e. $FFID$VI !/ DEPO!I ION! $ND E! I"ON# >

The pleading :hich has been :ithdra:n or stric?en out or superseded by amendment, still remain as statements seriously made and are admissible in evidence, on behalf of the opposite party as admissions by the pleader, :here he is a party to the subse@uent litigation, :here the statements are material and relevant to the issues in connection :ith :hich they are sought

( judicial admission in an affidavit used in the case is admissible against the party ma?ing or adopting the affidavit, and it may also be admitted in another action to :hich he is a party. %tatements made in a deposition, relevant to the issues, may be admitted

against the deponent as admissions against the interest in the same or another action to :hich he is a party, even though he is present in court and able to testify, or has testified The testimony given by or for a party at the trial of a case may be used against him as an admission in the same, or on a subse@uent trial, or even in another action, provided such testimony is material and relevant.

CUDICI$L $D"I!!ION OF $ F$C DI! IN%UI!4ED FRO" $N $D"I!!ION 4$ $ CER $IN 5I NE!!/ IF C$LLED/ 5OULD !O E! IF#6

+n the first case, there is a judicial admission of the facts, and they cannot be contradicted. +n the second case, it :ill only have the same effect as if the :itness had testified to the facts. %uch testimony of the party is free to contradict. Constitution(- Right not ,io-(ted 02 ins.e)tion of s)ene of )rime, provided that the same is :ith consent of and accompanied by counsel for the accused, it further appearing that no evidence :as ta?en during the inspection. Inform(tion o0t(ined on ( ,ie= is inde.endent e,iden)e to be ta?en into consideration by the curt in determining the issues in the case. Order den2ing or gr(nting ,ie= not re,ie=(0-e :hen it appears that the condition of the premises or property has changed since the time of occurrence in issue and before the demand for a vie:, or that the facts involved are such that they can be accurately described to the court by oral testimony, or by the use of maps or diagrams :ith proper e=planations, or vie: :ould be unreasonable e=pensive or cause unreasonable delay, or serve no useful purpose, unless here appears a clear abuse of discretion. DOCU"EN $R# EVIDENCE Section 2 Documentar$ evidence

PROOF OF PLE$DIN%/ DEPO!I ION >

$D"I!!ION $FFID$VI

IN OR

Ahere a pleading, affidavit or depositionis offered in evidence, the statements relied on as admissions and the @ualifying statements must be construed together. The party offering :ritten admissions is not stopped to disprove them.

CO"PRO"I!E $%REE"EN -

( judicial admission in a compromise agreement submitted to the court cannot be contradicted unless previously sho:n to have been made through palpable mista?e.

! IPUL$ ION OF CRI"IN$L C$!E! >

F$C !

IN DOCU"EN ; any substance having any matter e=pressed or described upon it by mar?s capable of being read. +f it is produced :ithout regard to the message :hich it contains, it is treated as real evidence. DOCU"EN $R# EVIDENCE- evidence supplied by :ritten instruments, or derived from the conventional symbols, such as letters, by :hich ideas are represented on material substances. documents. documents produced for the inspection of the court or judge. $D"I!!I&ILI # OF DOCUE"N $R# EVIDENCEsubject to the same basic rules on relevancy, materiality, e=clusionary rules and court discretion as determined by the issues in the particular case. +dentity and authenticity of the document must be

+t is not proper to consider a case closed, or to render judgment therein, by virtue of an agreement entered into bet:een the fiscal and counsel for the accused :ith reference to facts some of :hich are favorable to the defense, and others related to the prosecution, :ithout any evidence being adduced or testimony ta?en from the :itnesses mentioned in the agreement. such practice is not authoriIed and defeats the purposes of the criminal la:.

reasonably established as a pre-re@uisite to its admission. I"POR $N EVIDENCE1. #. $. '. RULE! ON DOCU"EN $R#

:ith identical contents, all such copies are e@ually regarded as originals. and ,c- Ahen an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are li?e:ise e@ually regarded as originals. 6oteB Q 3riginal may depend on the substantive la: applicable Q 3riginal may depend on the act of the parties Q:here there may be duplicate original, either is an original ad may be used :ithout accounting for another QAhenever a document is e=ecuted in several parts, each part is a primary evidence Q Ahenever a document is e=ecuted in counterpart, each part e=ecuted by one or more of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties :ho e=ecuted it Peo.-e ,s !to6 om(s 178 !CR$ 2;< The trial court correctly rejected the =ero= copy of the marriage certificate, since the admission :ould violate the best evidence rule. For the (..-i)(tion of the 0est e,iden)e/ it is essenti(- th(t: the original :riting or if it is a private document, be first duly identified, and a sufficient and a sufficient foundation be laid, so as to entitle the :riting to be admitted in evidence, and it must be available to the opposite party for cross-e=amination. &est E,iden)e Ru-e in Crimin(- C(ses- +n criminal cases, :here the issue is not only :ith respect to the contents of the document but also as to :hether such document actually e=isted, the original itself must be presented. U! ,s %regorio 1@ Phi- A22 *or only only presenting the Pero= copy of the falsified documents, prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. +n the absence of the original document, it +s improper to conclude, :ith only copy of the said original in vie:, that there has been a falsification of the document :hich :as neither found nor e=hibited, because in such a case, even the e=istence of such document may be doubted. 6on-.rodu)tion of the origin(- do)ument unless justified in %ection $, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence.

8est Evidence "ule "ule on %econdary Evidence !arol Evidence "ule "ule on (uthentication and !roof of 5ocuments ). +nadmissibility of :ritten document in an unofficial language unless translated in English and *ilipino 16 &est E,iden)e Ru-e &E! EVIDENCE or PRI"$R# EVIDENCEparticular means of proof :hich is indicated by the nature of the fact under investigation as the most natural and satisfactory that affords the greatest certainty of the fact in @uestion and on its face indicates that no better evidence remains behind. &E! EVIDENCE RULE - is that rule :hich re@uires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Pur.ose of the ru-e re8uiring the .rodu)tion of the 0est e,iden)e: prevention of fraud, because if the best evidence is not presented then the presumption of suppression of evidence :ill be present. &est e,iden)e ru-e (..-ies on-2 =hen the .ur.ose of the .roof is to est(0-ish the terms of =riting/ therefore 63T applicable to e=ternal or collateral facts about the document such as its e=istence, e=ecution or delivery. Peo.-e ,6 (ndo2 '199;* The 8est Evidence "ule applies only :hen the contents of the document are the subject of in@uiry. +t does not apply :hen the issue is only as to :hether or not such document :as actually e=ecuted or in the circumstances relevant to its e=ecution. (n objection by the party against :hom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application. Ahere secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of evidence might have been successfully invo?ed if proper and timely objection had been ta?en 54$ CON! I U E! 4E ORI%IN$L: ,a- The original of the document is one the contents of :hich are the subject of in@uiry. ,b- Ahen a document is in t:o or more copies e=ecuted at or about the same time,

$mended Do)uments- :here a duplicate or copy is amended or altered by the party or parties, it becomes the original. Do)ument e3e)uted in t=o or more identi)()ontents each one of the parts is primary evidence and the other need not be proved. "e)h(ni)(--2 re.rodu)ed )o.ies: aarbon copy- admissible as duplicate original :hen e=ecuted at the same time or about the same time. +mperfect carbon copies, although made at the same time as the original but if there is something else to be done for it to be binding or there is incomplete signature, itGs not the best evidence. b- "eproduction from the same matri= i.e. mimeograph, hectograph- admissible as duplicate original :hen produced from the same matri= as original c- 8lueprints and vellum tracings- have been held to be originals rather than copies d- Telegraph and cable messagesif the issue is the contents of the telegram as received by the addressee- then the original dispatch is the copy of the message sent to the addressee. as sent by the sender- the original is the message delivered if the issue is the inaccuracy of transmission, both telegrams as sent and received are originals e- 2etter press copies- merely secondary evidence as its prone to improper reproduction and are not produced simultaneously as the original f- Thermofa=- merely secondary evidence as it lac?s satisfactory reproduction as some portions are not clearly printed g- !hotographs and Pero=merely secondary evidence since they are reproduced at a latter time but if authenticated photostatic copy of income ta= returns, public and business records are allo:ed as evidence

has been signed by the physician :ho e=ecuted the same and his signature :as identified b him at the :itness stand. Pro,in)i(- Fis)(- of P(m.(ng( ,s Re2es $ugust A/ 1971 The provincial fiscal of !ampanga filed t:o informations for libel against 9uevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, :ith malicious intent, published on page 9 of the :ee?ly paper Ing :agumasi$. The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one libelous article in the Ing :agumasi$ for /uly 1$, 19$<. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution E=hibits (, 8, , and 5, :hich are copies of the Ing :agumasi$ containing the libelous article :ith the innuendo. ounsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, :hich objection :as sustained. !etitioner contends that the e=hibits in @uestion are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted. +ssueB Ahether the e=hibits are admissible. "ulingB The rule of procedure :hich re@uires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. (nd certainly the copies of the :ee?ly :here the libelous article :as published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The ne:spaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. Thus if the issue is the contents of the articles sent for publication, the best evidence is the manuscript. 8ut is if issue is on :hat :as actually published, then the best evidence is the copy of the ne:s paper. "espondent judge of the *+ :as re@uired to admit E=hibits (, 8, , and 5, in @uestion. "(n)hester G L(=ren)e ,s FisD '18A<* ( copy of the standard tariff rate posted at the rail:ay depots, the court held them to be the best evidence in an action over a rail:ay freight charge as each of the printed copies as original and the :hole of the natre of duplicates, so that the proof of anyone :ould be competent evidence of the contents of the :hole. there being necessary in the :hole nature of the process of printing strong presumptive evidence that the impression from the same types must be similar. Section 3. 1ri inal document must be produced+ e"ceptions

Peo.-e ,s "(ngu-(0n(n A2 O% <A72 (t the trial, presented as evidence a post-mortem report of the injuries received by the deceased. This :as admitted over the objection of the accused, :ho contend that a mere carbon copy is inadmissible. The court ruled that the fact the post-mortem report is a mere carbon copy is also of no moment for it

%ENER$L RULE: :hen the subject of the in@uiry is the contents of the document, the original document must be produced. EBCEP ION!: 5hen se)ond(r2 e,iden)e 0e (dmitted 1. Ahen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, :ithout bad faith on the part of the offeror. #. Ahen the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against :hom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. $. Ahen the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents :hich cannot be e=amined in court :ithout great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the :hole. and '. Ahen the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office Com.(ni( "(ritim( ,s $--ied Free 5orDers Union 77 % "( #' ,1977*actsB +n 19)#, ompania &aritima , &- and (llied *ree Aor?ers 1nion ,(*A1- entered into a :ritten contract :hereby the 1nion agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring :or? in +ligan, effective for one month. +t :as stipulated that the ompany :ould revo?e the contract before the e=piration of the agreed term, if the 1nion failed to render proper service. (fter a month, the contract :as verbally rene:ed. +n 19)', the 1nion sent a letter to & re@uesting to recogniIe it as the e=clusive bargaining unit, to load and unload he cargo of its vessels in +ligan. & ignored the re@uest. The 1nion subse@uently filed in +" a petition for certification election. 5espite the certification case, & sent notice to the 1nion for termination of their contract and entered into a ne: contract :ith another stevedoring association. & assailed that the termination of the contract :as due to 1nion :or?erGs inefficiency and that the ompany suffered financial losses due to such service. To ascertain its annual losses, &Gs manager hired auditors. & relied only upon such auditorsG report and presented in court only a summary of damages. The sales invoices :ere not produced. +ssueB A36 the non-submission as evidence of the records of the alleged losses of the ompany is e=cused because of the rule e=empting voluminous records from being produced in court. "ulingB The best evidence of the ompanyGs losses :ould have been the sales invoices instead of the &anagerG oral testimony. The rule that :hen the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents :hich cannot be e=amined in court

:ithout great loss of time and the fact sought to be established in only the general result of the :hole, the original :ritings need not be produce, (663T 8E (!!2+E5 because the voluminous character f the records :as 63T 5127 E%T(82+%0E5. +t is also a re@uisite for the application of the rule that the records of accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-e=amination. 5hen (n entr2 is re.e(ted in the regu-(r )ourse of 0usiness, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are regarded as originals. *or as long as they are made :ithin reasonable time, it is sufficient. ( much longer but reasonable delay and :hen entries appear to have been made :hile the memory as to the transaction as clear or the source of such ?no:ledge :as unimpaired, still ma?es it admissible. 0o:ever, a boo? of account containing only a single entry, or charge of money lent, :hich sho: no mutual recourse of dealing bet:een the parties, is not admissible. RULE! OF $D"I!!I&ILI # $6 O&CEC 'RE$L EVIDENCE* !EC ION 1/ RULE 17; 1b-ect as evidence ; object as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. Ahen an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be e=hibited to, e=amined or vie:ed by the court. !our)e ; This provision is a reproduction of %ection 1, "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt :ith the follo:ing differencesB a. The title of the section D4ie: of an object,E has been changed to D3bject as evidence,E in the present provision.

b. The phrases Das to afford reasonable grounds of belief respecting the latter. such objectE. or its e=istence, situation, condition, or character proved by :itnesses, as the court in its discretion may determine.E and Dhas such a relationE, have been deleted in the present provision. c. The phrase D3bjects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the courtE and the :ords Dis relevantE. DitE. De=aminedE have been added in the present provision.

O01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e defined ; 3bject ,realevidence is that :hich is addressed to the senses of the tribunal, as :here objects are presented for the inspection of the court. 3bject ,real- evidence may consist of articles or persons, :hich may be e=hibited inside or outside the courtroom. it may also consist in the mere inspection of an object. or in an e=periment. !)o.e of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e -- This source of persuasion has been resorted to in a great number of instances. ( :itness may use his o:n body, or an article, to illustrate or e=plain the evidence. +n the same :ay counsels, to sho: its meaning on their theory of the case, may ma?e any use of the court room or furniture. and it has also been held permissible to use the furniture from the room :here a crime :as committed, arranged so as to illustrate the testimony of a :itness. 3bject ,real- evidence is not limited to that :hich may be ?no:n by the sense of vision. it e=tends to :hat is perceived by the senses of hearing, taste, smell or touch. (ny article made important by the evidence or by the nature of the investigation may be produced for inspection, or :here the circumstances are such that it cannot be or should not be brought to the court, it may be inspected at the place :here it is to be found. +nspection evidence of this character may range over any line of human activity, as building or mechanical trades, the medical or surgical profession, or nautical affairs. ( fre@uent application of the rule is found in the production of the tools or implements :ith :hich as certain act :as, or is claimed to have been :orn by a person at the time of an occurrence in controversy. Ahere properly identified and :here relevant to a material issue, objects such as the follo:ing have been received in evidenceB a. +n abortion cases, the instrument or medicine :ith :hich the crime :as committed, and the clothing of the victim. b. +n arson, articles used in starting the fire, and burned objects. c. +n any case :here a :eapon is used, the :eapon, including, if it is a firearm, bullets and shells. :eapons other than the one used, to sho: intent. :eapons

found on or near the victim, to sho: self-defense. d. +n cases involving an assault or a homicide, the clothing of the victim to sho: the location of :ounds, the manner or means of death, the relative positions of the victim and his assailant or the distance bet:een them, or to thro: light on any material issue. also the clothing of the victimGs companion :here relevant. e. +n homicide, the bones or flesh of the victim, to sho: the character and location of :ounds ,it is :ithin the courtGs discretion to order the victimGs s?ull e=humed so it may be offered in evidence-. objects used to help hide the body. f. +n theft cases, the stolen goods, burglarsG tools, other objects :hich help accomplish the theft.

g. +n a hit-and-run case, headlight glass partly recovered from the scene and partly from the garage :here repairs :ere made. h. +n a drun?en driving case, li@uor, tools to aid in its manufacture, mar?ed money used in its purchase. i. +n li@uor cases, the li@uor, tools to aid in its manufacture, mar?ed money used in its purchase. +n narcotics trials, the drug, a drug container, the syringe, needle and spoon, mar?ed money used to purchase the drug. +n fraud and cheating cases, any object :hich sho:s ho: the result :as accomplished. +n counterfeiting. machine. the counterfeiting

j.

?.

l.

m. +n gambling cases, paraphernalia.

the

gambling

n. +n rape, any :eapon used to subdue or intimidate the victim, the clothing of the victim, the clothing of the accused.

o. +n se= cases other than rape, objects :hich thro: light on the crime. p. The clothing of the accused, to identify him or to thro: light on other issues. @. (ny object :hich is accomplishing the crime. r. used in

5ra:ings and maps :hich help e=plain the crime or the defendantGs escape route. 3bjects :hich illustrate a consciousness of guilt on defendantGs part. 3bjects :hich corroborate or illustrate verbal testimony.

s.

t.

Re(son for (dmissi0i-it2 of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e ; to a rational man of perfect organiIation the best and highest proof of :hich any fact is susceptible is the evidence of his senses. This is the ultimate test of truth, and is therefore the first principle in the philosophy of evidence. 0ence, the evidence of oneGs o:n senses, furnishes the strongest probability and indeed the perfect and indubitable certainty of the e=istence of any sensible fact. !hysical evidence is evidence of the highest order. +t spea?s more elo@uently than a hundred :itnesses.

Re8uisites for (dmissi0i-it2 of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e ; an object may be e=hibited, e=amined or vie:ed by the court :hen ,1- it is relevant to the fact in issue, and ,#- the present condition of the object is the same at the time in issue.

+f, by some principle of relevancy, a fact offered to be sho:n is not admissible, because irrelevant, it cannot be sho:n, either in this or in any other :ay. *or e=ample, :hether a personGs color is blac? or :hite is best ascertained by inspecting the person. but if his color :hen ascertained :ould be irrelevant for the purpose concerned, an inspection to learn his color :ould obviously be unnecessary, and therefore improper. Thus, his color might be relevant to sho: his race-ancestry, but not to sho: his state of health. in the former case inspection :ould be allo:ed in the latter case not, the ruling in

each instance depending on the admissibility of the fact sho:n by inspection. +n a large number of instances this is the real @uestion. (dmission of clothing :orn by plaintiff at time of accident has been held improper :here the fact of injury :as uncontroverted. The present condition of an object offered may not be the same as to be proper evidence of its former condition. accordingly, autoptic preference is allo:able only on the assumption that the condition is the same or sufficiently similar. E=periments to sho: the @uality or operation of a substance, a machine, etc., are often e=cluded because of the dissimilarity of circumstances or because of probable confusion of issues. and for this reason the e=hibition of such e=periments before the tribunal may of course be forbidden. (s a general rule it seems essential that articles sho:n to the court be connected, at least prima facie, :ith the crime in issue. (n article of personal property, the relevancy of :hich has been sho:n by its identification :ith the subject-matter of the crime, may be e=hibited in the courtroom, :hether as direct evidence of a relevant fact, or to enable them to understand the evidence or to realiIe more completely its cogency and force, or to assist the court in solving a material, controverted or doubtful point. (dmission of visual, e=hibitive or demonstrative evidence is much :ithin the discretion of the court, and the e=tent of identification of such articles necessary before admission varies :ith circumstances. The court may inspect and smell the contents of a bottle properly identified and admitted in evidence. omparison of materials may also be made by the court, aided by the evidence of e=pert :itnesses. %o in case the @uality of an article, or its adaptability to a specific use or purpose, is in issue, a sample may be sho:n to the court, together :ith a specimen of a li?e material :hich is sho:n to be of good @uality or adapted to the re@uired purpose, and the court may then ma?e a comparison to ascertain possible points of difference. E3hi0ition of .erson ; Trial courts, in actions to recover damages, have an inherent discretionary po:er to order a reasonable physical e=amination of the plaintiff to be made before trial by competent physicians and surgeons :henever such e=amination is necessary to ascertain the nature, e=tent, or permanency of alleged injuries. Trial courts also are generally deemed to have po:er to compel the e=hibition of the plaintiffGs person, under proper restrictions, in the trial of a personal-injury action. and it is :ithin the discretion of the trial judge,

:hen the physical condition of a party is in @uestion, as in personal-injury actions, to permit the injured party to e=hibit his person to the court in order to sho: the e=tent and nature of his injury. %uch e=hibitions of part of the plaintiffGs person are often permitted :ithout objections. 1nder the rule stated, the plaintiff may be permitted to e=hibit an arm, hand, leg, foot, and other parts of the body, such as the shoulder, head, etc., provided the e=hibition is not objectionable on the ground of indecency. Ahere an arm or a leg has been amputated, the e=hibition of the na?ed remnant may be permissible. The e=tent to :hich one may be allo:ed to e=hibit his person to the court on the trial is a matter largely of discretion of the court. +f it appears that the e=hibition by the plaintiff :ould necessitate an e=posure :hich :ould be indecent, the court, in the e=ercise of its discretion, should not permit the e=hibition before the court. Ahere an issue as to personal injuries or disability is involved, the injured person may be permitted to e=hibit to the court the :ound or injury, or the member or portion of his body on :hich such :ound or injury :as inflicted. Thus, the court has permitted the e=hibition of an an?le, a ?nee, a foot, a leg, an arm, a hand, an eye soc?et, and various other parts of the body. ( similar e=hibition may be made :here the injury has resulted in the death of the injured person or the loss of a member or part of his body. Inde)en)2 or im.ro.riet2 (s ground for dis(--o=ing the introdu)tion of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)eH e3)e.tion ; :hen the object produced as evidence is indecent, or improper, it should be e=cluded, unless the same is necessary for ascertaining the truth. 8ut :hen justice and the discovery of truth, are at sta?e, the ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feeling cannot be allo:ed to impose a prohibition upon necessary measures. +f such matters :ere not unshrin?ing discussed and probed, many ?inds of crime :ould remain unpunished. 6evertheless, needless spectators having no responsibility for the course of justice may :ell be avoided. Ahere it is a @uestion of :hat :ould other:ise be an indecency, t:o limitations seems appropriateB ,a- there should be fair necessity for inspection, the trial court to determine. ,b- the inspection should ta?e place apart from the public courtroom, in the sole presence of the tribunal and the parties. Introdu)tion of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e for the .ur.ose of (rousing undue .re1udi)e ; The

object of all evidence is to inform the trial tribunal of the material facts, :hich are relevant as bearing upon the issue, in order that the truth may be elicited and that a just determination of the controversy may be reached. +t is not objectionable, in these cases, :hich the evidence may go beyond the oral narrative and may be addressed to the senses. provided that it is ?ept :ithin reasonable limits by the e=ercise of a fair judicial discretion. +t should be only of a nature to assist the court to an understanding of a situation, of an act, or to comprehend objective symptoms resulting from an injury. E=amples of this class of evidence are fre@uent. in the vie:ing of the place of an occurrence, in the e=hibition of the person and of the mar?s, or obvious evidences, of injuries sustained. !ersonal injuries may be simulated and deception may be practiced in such e=hibitions. but that cannot more be prevented, than can perjury in testimony. Ahen, ho:ever, proof is attempted to be made by allo:ing the plaintiff to act out upon a judicial stage before the court :hat he or his physicians, have testified to be some nervous affection, resulting from an injury, the e=hibition is improper because it is unfair. (s something under the sole control of the :itness himself, it is beyond the ordinary tests of e=amination. 6or does such evidence allo: any record, beyond the reporterGs notes of :hat he sa: upon the trial. +t is intended to prejudice the mind of the judge and it is calculated to affect the calm judicial atmosphere of a court of justice. The plaintiff, in such cases, has sufficient advantages :ithout adding to them a spectacular illustration of his symptoms. The e=hibition of the :eapons or tools of a crime, or of the clothing or the mutilated members of the victim of the crime, has often been objected to on grounds of 1ndue !rejudice. The objection thus indicated seems to be t:o-fold. *irst, there is a natural tendency to infer from the mere production of any material object, and :ithout further evidence, the truth of all that is predicated on it. %econdly, the sight of deadly :eapons or of cruel injuries tends to over:helm reason and to associate the accused :ith the atrocity :ithout sufficient evidence. The objection in its first phase may be at least partly overcome by re@uiring the object to be properly authenticated, before or after the production. and this re@uirement is constantly enforced by the courts. The objection in its second phase cannot be entirely overcome, even by e=press instruction from the ourt. but it is to be doubted :hether the necessity of thus demonstrating the method and results of the crime should give :ay to this possibility or undue prejudice. 6o doubt such an effect may be

occasionally and in an e=treme case be produced. and no doubt the trial court has a discretion to prevent the abuse if the process. 8ut, in the vast majority of instances :here such objection is made, it is frivolous and there is no ground for apprehension. (ccordingly, such objections have almost invariably been repudiated by the ourts. Ahere it appears that the real evidence is produced merely for the purpose of arousing feeling, admission has been held error. *or e=ample, :here the plaintiff, a little girl, sues for the loss of her leg, and the defendant admits the fact of amputation and the child is present in court, the introduction of the amputated limb as preserved in spirits :arrants a ne: trial. 3f such a case, the court said that, it may ho:ever, be assumed that technically the rule of evidence authoriIed the e=hibition of the foot. %uch rule, ho:ever, is :ithout force :hen the legitimate purpose for :hich the e=hibit may be made is light, and the strong tendency is to :or? improper and illegitimate results. +t is perfectly clear in the present case that the direct tendency of the e=hibition of this mangled foot, coupled :ith the other considerations already noted, :as to arouse the prejudice and inflame the passions of the court into an angry resentment against the author of the misfortune. This condition far overbalanced any legitimate purpose for :hich the e=hibit might have been made, and made the e=hibition of this foot, under the circumstances of this case, improper. Other grounds for den2ing (..-i)(tion for the .rodu)tion of o01e)t 're(-* e,iden)e ; 8eyond @uestion it rests in the discretion of the court to deny applications for the production of real evidence in cases :here the order :ill cause great inconvenience, or :here, for other reasons, it is unjust. Thus, in &ississippi case, the court refused to order the e=humation of a dead body. although the defendant, an insurance company, claimed that the deceased had made admissions that he had in childhood received a severe injury to the s?ull :hich could only be prove by an e=amination. +t may happen that it is impracticable to bring an animal into the room :here the court is sitting, and in such cases the e=amination need not necessarily be has in the courtroom, so long as it is under the direction of the court and in the presence of the parties. %imilar holdings may be found :ith reference to articles of great :eight, such as large steel bars. Photogr(.hs ; the courts ta?e judicial notice that all civiliIed communities rely on photographic pictures for presenting resemblances

of persons and animals, scenery, natural objects, buildings, and other artificial objects. +t is accordingly :ell established that photographs of persons, things, and places, :hen duly verified and sho:n by e=trinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subjects as of the time in @uestion, are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids to it in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or premises, the circumstances of an accident, or the condition or identity of a person :hen any such matter is relevant to the issues being litigated. Ahere depositions of subscribing :itnesses to a :ill are ta?en, a photographic copy of the :ill may be presented to the :itnesses on their e=amination and they may be as?ed the same @uestions :ith respect to said copy as if it :ere the original :ill and testimony as to the identity of the photographic copy sho:n to the :itnesses is admissible in evidence. +n the case of "odelas vs. (ranIa. 9. ". 6o. 2)8)<9 5ecember 7, 198#B

The appellant &arcela "odelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic :ill of "icardo 8. 8onilla and the issuance of letter testamentary in her favor. 0o:ever, it :as opposed on the follo:ing groundB a.an a holographic :ill :hich :as lost be proved by means of a photostatic copyF

0eldB The %upreme ourt ruled in the affirmative. +t is necessary that there be a comparison bet:een sample hand:ritten statements of the testator and the hand:ritten :ill. 8ut, a photostatic copy of a holographic :ill may be allo:ed because comparison can be made :ith the standard :ritings of the testator. The facts as depicted by photographs are usually reasonably correct representations and constitute evidence of a satisfactory and conclusive nature. !hotographs of any place :hich may be vie:ed by the trial court are admissible in evidence upon proof of their e=actness and accuracy. The logic underlying the admission of photographs :hich have been authenticated by the operator of the camera, or by some other :itness :ho can testify from personal ?no:ledge as to the

accuracy of the representation, is dra:n principally from the cases admitting maps and diagrams. There are, ho:ever, t:o fundamental distinctions bet:een diagrams, or dra:ings, and photographs, :hich emphasiIe the prejudicial implications to the latterB ,1- the photograph is generally accepted by courts as an accurate machine-made reproduction of nature. :hile the diagram or dra:ing is recogniIed by them as man-made and considerably less accurate. a slight inaccuracy or distortion of siIe, distance or shape in a photograph is thus far more objectionable that an error of similar degree in a diagram. ,#- the vital, mirror-li?e appearance of a photograph ma?es it capable of inciting passions and prejudices of a court, :hereas a lifeless map or dra:ing of the same subject :ould not have this effect. Thus, :hile photographs may be of a fairly similar evidential character as diagrams, and maps, there is little room for comparison as to their respective degrees of probative force. The court has in effect an eye :itness vie: of the subject matter. !hotographs are admissible in evidence in criminal cases upon the same principles and rules governing their admission in civil cases. The test of admissibility is :hether the photograph accurately portrays the scene at the time of the crime, and the photographer is not a necessary :itness. !hotographs of the scene, ta?en several months after the crime :as committed, :ere properly admitted :here it appeared that the condition of the premises has not materially changed in the meantime. +f the correctness of the photograph as a li?eness sho:n prima facie, either by the testimony of the person :ho made it or by other competent :itnesses, to the effect that it faithfully represents the object portrayed, it should go to the court subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Ahether the photograph is an accurate li?eness then becomes a @uestion of fact to be determined by the court. The photograph or must be relevant as :ell as correct. +ts relevancy :ill depend on the relevancy of the scene or object it represents. +f a photograph purports to represent a relevant scene or object, but portrays it in a grossly inaccurate manner, so that it practically represents something else, and the scene or object :ould scarcely be recogniIed thereby, the non-reliability of the photograph as a correct li?eness may almost be considered as producing irrelevancy. 8ut usually the @uestion of relevancy is distinct from that of correctness, and is for the judge e=clusively. +t is to be determined upon the considerations :hich

govern :hen the relevancy of any other sort of evidence is corrected. !hotographs are received in evidence for the follo:ing purposesB a. To sho: the scene of the crime ,the picture need not sho: the complete premises- sometimes :ith the body of the victim still at the scene. b. To sho: the victim of an assault or a homicide. c. To sho: the identity of persons alive or dead, including the defendant and the victim or his remains, even :hen decomposed.

d. To sho: :ound or other physical injuries, or that a child or an animal has been ill-treated or not properly fed. e. To sho: the fruits of the crime, contraband, and the :eapons used. f. To supply facsimiles of public records.

g. To illustrate hand:riting testimony and fingerprint testimony. h. To rebut testimony of the other side.

Use of de,i)es to ())entu(te .hotogr(.hi) e,iden)e ; +n many instances a photograph :ill not sufficiently depict important details of a scene to give it significance in the eyes of the court. This is especially true in cases involving s?id mar?s, scratches, gouges, and other mar?s left on the road by tires or other parts of vehicles involved in a collision. +n such instances it is not an unusual practice to lay do:n stic?s, roc?s or other objects to indicate or intensify such features of the picture. These do not affect its admissibility :hen the presence of the mar?ers is verified and e=plained by the :itnesses. 3bviously, :hen a photographic representation includes foreign objects mar?ing such details it is not sufficient that the general accuracy of the photograph be verified. %omeone must also e=plain :hy the objects appear therein and :hat they purport to represent or mar?. +f the object is nothing more than a mar?er, the e=hibit is not subject to the objection that it is a DposedE picture for it does not purport to recreate a bygone scene. (n e=ample of this :ould be the placing of a yardstic? to indicate the distance

bet:een the ground and rear fender of the cat involved in a fatal hit and run accident. En-(rgements ; (lthough magnification that constitutes distortion may be objectionable, it is no valid objection to the introduction of the photograph that it is an enlargement made from an original. Enlargements are, of course, subject to the usual tests of accuracy and relevancy that any photograph :ould be. Co-or .i)tures ; color photographs or slides are admissible on the same basis as ordinary blac? and :hite pictures. The same test is applies by courts, the test of probative value. The color tends to be regarded as a more faithful type of representation that blac? and :hite photographs. $eri(- .hotogr(.hs ; (erial photographs, depicting ground areas pertinent to the particular issue, are held admissible upon the same foundation basis as other photographs. B-r(2 ; +n one :ay or another, P-rays are perhaps the modality of medical treatment or diagnosis most commonly appearing in litigation. 5iagnostic P-ray films often provide counsel :ith his best source of objective proof of his clientGs injuries, establishing in a manner that all can see that plaintiffGs leg bones indeed :ere fractured a year before trial, and the li?e. Even :hen P-ray films do not reveal their secrets clearly enough for a court to understand them :ithout e=pert interpretation, they nevertheless comprise a means of dramatic persuasion often of inestimable value. The same rules and principles :hich apply to ordinary pictures are applicable to an P-ray photograph, although subject to e=planation or interpretation by e=perts in order to ma?e them intelligible to the court. "otion .i)tures ; !rinciples underlying admissibility of tal?ing motion pictures are not different from those governing the admissibility of still pictures and phonograph records. +t is a matter of common ?no:ledge that motion pictures are no longer a novelty. They are constantly used for commercial and scientific purposes. The tal?ing motion picture, or movie tone, as it is technically ?no:n, results merely from adaption of the scientific processes used in producing photographic records in order that :ords spo?en, or sounds produced at the time of the ta?ing of the picture, may be reproduced :ith the picture. The movie tone, in

basic characteristics, is no different from ordinary photography, in regard to the visual pictures reproduced, and on the other hand, from phonographic records, in regard to the auditory recording of sound. ( movie tone, duly authenticated as a true portrayal of the actions and :ords of a defendant at the time it :as ta?en is admissible evidence. The @uestion of permitting a motion picture to be displayed before the court is :holly :ithin the discretion of the court, and :here the picture does not amplify matters, no reversible error is committed in refusing to allo: its admission or display as evidence. (uthentication of motion pictures ordinarily includes ,1- evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the ta?ing of the film. ,#- the manner and circumstances surrounding the development of the film. ,$- evidence in regard to the projection of the film. ,'- testimony by the person present at the time the motion pictures :ere ta?en that the pictures accurately depict the events as he sa: them :hen that occurred. Video t(.e ; The use of the video tape in the courtroom have become more commonplace in recent times. ( &ichigan court has saidB D( video tape is nothing more than a motion picture synchroniIed :ith a sound recording. Therefore, a complete video tape may be received into evidence if the offering party lays the foundation necessary to admit a motion picture and the foundation necessary to admit sound recording. Thus, :here it is testified that the video tape is a true and accurate representation of :hat it is purported to represent, it is sufficient authentication. 4ideo tapes have been admitted for confessions, admissions, lineups, crime scenes, :itnessGs testimony, drin?ing driverGs condition and even to sho: the actual commission of the crime. Di(gr(ms/ sDet)hes (nd m(.s ; !encil, pen and in? dra:ings and maps have been received to identify or e=plain localities or positions of objects. Though they are received as primary evidence appealing to the eyes of the court under the rule admitting photographs, they differ from the latter in that their accuracy as portraits or li?eliness must be affirmatively sho:n by the testimony of the artist or other competent :itness. There is no presumption of correctness founded on general use and employment, or on their being mechanical reproductions by a process :hich the court :ill judicially notice, as e=ists in the case of photographs. The :itness called to prove their

correctness must testify of his o:n ?no:ledge that they faithfully represent the object depicted, and their accuracy, if disputed, is a @uestion for the court, turning upon the credibility of the :itnesses The draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy, but any other :itnesses may refer to it :hile testifying, to illustrate his testimony. +t is not material by :hom the map or diagram :as prepared providing that he can testify that the map or diagram is accurate and based on ?no:ledge derive from his o:n investigation. The use of diagrams, models and casts as testimony of the objects represented rests fundamentally upon the theory that they represent a method of pictorial communication of a @ualified :itness :hich he may use of instead of, or in addition to, some other method. Evidence of this character is helpful in aiding the court to visualiIe the objects and scenes in the action. Thus a model of a machine, a mechanical device or a bridge, may be submitted to the court to aid them in understanding ho: an event occurred or might have been prevented. This type of evidence is properly described as illustrative evidence. +t is a type of demonstrative evidence especially useful to police officers and other :itnesses in describing traffic accident scenes. Finger.rints/ .(-m .rints/ foot.rints/ tr()Ds/ et)6 ; ( method of proof no: commonly resorted to in providing identity is in the use of evidence as to the correspondence or similarity of the fingerprints, palm prints and footprints. (uthenticated fingerprints, palm prints, or footprints or photographs thereof of a person may be introduced in evidence and compared :ith other fingerprints, palm prints, or footprints found at or near the scene of the crime. This comparison is usually made by e=perts. Testimony concerning trac?s and footprints discovered near the scene of crime is admissible if a connection :ith defendant by means of comparison or other:ise is sho:n. ( comparison of footprints, proved to have been made by the prisoner, :ith other trac?s or footprints found near the scene of the homicide is relevant, but the opinion of the :itness that footprints near the scene of the crime :ere those of the accused not based on a comparison, is not admissible. The :itness generally must have made some actual comparison of the footprint ; not just loo?ed at it. The correspondence of footprints to shoes, feet or other footprints is a matter not restricted to

e=pert opinion. ( :itness may give his opinion as to the correspondence of footprints to shoes, feet or other footprints after testifying as to the measurements or peculiarities thereof upon :hich such opinion is based. Phonogr(.h (nd t(.e re)ordings ; %ound recordings are generally admitted in evidence :here a proper foundation has been laid to assure the authenticity of the recording. The phonograph, the 5ictaphone, the tal?ing motion picture machine, and similar recording devices, :ith reproducing apparatus, are no: in such common use that the verity of their recordingand reproducing sounds, including those made by the human voice in conversation, is :ell-established. and as advances in such matters of scientific research and discovery are mad and generally adopted, the courts :ill be permitted to ma?e use of them by :ay of presentevidentiary facts. Voi)e.rints 's.e)trogr(ms* ; +t is established la: that an accused person in la:ful custody may be re@uired to demonstrate his voice for identification purpose on the same grounds that he may be subjected to fingerprinting, photographing, measurements, and the li?e. This can be done through line-ups, tape recordings, video tape, or other similar methods, in addition to spea?ing in court. (nother method of voice identification has been developed in recent years called Dvoice printE or DspectrogramsE. This device consists of a magnetic recording device, a variable electronic filter, a paper-carrying drum :hich is coupled to the recording device, and an electronic stylus that mar?s the paper as the drum rotates. %pectrograms can be compared point for point to determine if any significant similarities e=ist. +t is based on the theory that no t:o persons have e=actly the same physical voice properties.

Person(- (..e(r(n)e of ( .erson ; +t has been held that to determine :hether a person is an alien or not, his personal appearance, ethnological and racial characteristic, language, customs, dress and manners may be ta?en into consideration. The age of a person may also be determined by his personal appearance. The resemblance bet:een a minor and his alleged father is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. 3f course, the absence of such resemblance :ould not be sufficient to sho: that parentage does not e=ist.

The accused cannot object if he be identified in open court :ithout being re@uired to stand. ( direction to a :itness to loo? about the court and point out a person in court :ho he thin?s committed the crime is al:ays proper. The court or the prosecuting attorney may even point out the accused and as? a :itness if that is the person :ho committed the crime. +f the accused shall voluntarily stand up and so thus be identified by a :itness pointing him out, he should not be granted a ne: trial upon the ground that he has been compelled to testify as against himself. (nd it has been held merely directing the accused to stand up for identification is not compelling him to be a :itness against himself, nor is the bringing of the defendant into court for inspection or identification or dressed in clothes connected :ith the crime. +t has been held in some cases, ho:ever, that to go father and re@uire accused to do some affirmative act, such as putting on clothing found at the scene of the crime, violates his constitutional rights. E3.eriment ; +n instances :here it is necessary to sho: the condition or @uality of a certain article or substance, the thing itself is the most po:erful evidence that can be produced. it may be introduced in evidence as supplementing the testimony of :itnesses, or as direct evidence :hen properly identified. Evidence of the result of an actual e=periment or test is admissible to aid in determining the issues in a case :here it is sho:n that the conditions under :hich the e=periment or test :as made :ere the same or similar to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the occurrence involved in the controversy. %uch evidence should, ho:ever, be admitted only :here it is obvious to the court from the nature of the e=periments that the court :ill be enlightened, rather than confused. 5hen e,iden)e of (n e3.eriment is not (dmissi0-e ; Evidence of e=periments performed is admissible in both civil and criminal cases :hen the judge, in his discretion, is of the opinion that the evidence is beneficial, and that it does not tend to distract or confuse. 3n the other hand, tests and e=periments are not :ithout danger. 3bviously, if the e=periment is too complicated to afford any fair inference, or if it cannot be performed in such a manner as fairly to illustrate the fact to be found, it should be e=cluded. +f the trial judge, e=ercising reasonable judgment, concludes that evidence of such e=periment is more li?ely to confuse than to shed light upon the matter in dispute, he may

e=clude such evidence. +t is plain that evidence of an e=periment :hereby to test the truth of testimony that a certain thing occurred is not admissible :here the conditions attending the alleged occurrences and the e=periments are not sho:n to be similar. "ode (nd .-()e of .resent(tion (nd ins.e)tion ; 6o distinction shall be ta?en as regards the mode of presentation by the party. (n object may be merely set forth for inspection, or some e=perimental process may be conducted in the tribunalGs presence. :hether the mode involves a sho:ing or doing, neither is in itself objectionable. 6or is any distinction to be ta?en as to the mode of inspection by the tribunal. +t may merely employ its senses directly. or it may use some suitable mechanical aid, such as a microscope. and it may merely loo? on, or it may ta?e an active share in the process of e=perimentation. 6or is there any distinction as to the place of inspection. the thing may be brought into the court, or the tribunal may go to the place :here the thing is. O01e)t must 0e ins.e)ted in o.en )ourt (nd in the .resen)e of the defend(nt ; Ahen the trial court is of the opinion that the ends of justice :ill be advanced by permitting the introduction of an object in evidence, the court may permit its e=amination or inspection, but such e=amination or inspection must be in open court, and in the presence of the defendant, and at all times subject to the control of the court. The rule permitting an inspection by the judge of places or premises, :hen in his judgment the ends of justice :ill be promoted thereby, is simply an e=tension of the po:er of inspection to places and premises :hich cannot be brought into court. O)u-(r ins.e)tion or ,ie= of (n o01e)t out of )ourt ; :here the object in @uestion cannot be produced be produced in court because it is immovable or inconvenient to remove, the natural proceeding is for the tribunal to go to the object in its place and there observe it. This process, traditionally ?no:n as a Dvie:E has been recogniIed as an appropriate one. +t should be remembered, ho:ever, that :hether or not an ocular inspection or vie: of an object out of the court should be made, rest entirely on the sound discretion of the trial court. The inconvenience of adjourning court until a vie: can be had, or of postponing the trial for the purpose, may suffice to overcome the advantages of a vie:, particularly :hen the nature of the issue or of

the object to be vie:ed renders the vie: off small conse@uence. O)u-(r ins.e)tion or ,ie= must 0e m(de in the .resen)e of/ or =ith noti)e to the .(rties ; The inspection or vie: outside the court room should be made in the presence of the parties or at least previous notice to them in order that they may sho: the object to be vie:ed. %uch inspection or vie: is a part of the trial, inasmuch as evidence is thereby being received, :hich is e=pressly authoriIed by la:. Thus, it is error for the judge to go alone to the land in @uestion, or to the place :here the crime :as committed and ta?e a vie:, :ithout previous ?no:ledge or consent of the parties.

ideas are represented on material substances. documents. documents produced for the inspection of the court or judge. $D"I!!I&ILI # OF DOCUE"N $R# EVIDENCE- subject to the same basic rules on relevancy, materiality, e=clusionary rules and court discretion as determined by the issues in the particular case. +dentity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a prere@uisite to its admission. I"POR $N RULE! ON DOCU"EN $R# EVIDENCE1. #. $. '. 8est Evidence "ule "ule on %econdary Evidence !arol Evidence "ule "ule on (uthentication and !roof of 5ocuments ). +nadmissibility of :ritten document in an unofficial language unless translated in English and *ilipino

Constitution(- Right not ,io-(ted 02 ins.e)tion of s)ene of )rime ; !rovided that the same is :ith consent of and accompanied by counsel for the accused, it further appearing that no evidence :as ta?en during the inspection. Inform(tion o0t(ined on ( ,ie= is inde.endent e,iden)e >To be ta?en into consideration by the curt in determining the issues in the case. Order den2ing or gr(nting ,ie= not re,ie=(0-e >Ahen it appears that the condition of the premises or property has changed since the time of occurrence in issue and before the demand for a vie:, or that the facts involved are such that they can be accurately described to the court by oral testimony, or by the use of maps or diagrams :ith proper e=planations, or vie: :ould be unreasonable e=pensive or cause unreasonable delay, or serve no useful purpose, unless here appears a clear abuse of discretion.

26 &est E,iden)e Ru-e &E! EVIDENCE or PRI"$R# EVIDENCEparticular means of proof :hich is indicated by the nature of the fact under investigation as the most natural and satisfactory that affords the greatest certainty of the fact in @uestion and on its face indicates that no better evidence remains behind. &E! EVIDENCE RULE - is that rule :hich re@uires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Pur.ose of the ru-e re8uiring the .rodu)tion of the 0est e,iden)e: prevention of fraud, because if the best evidence is not presented then the presumption of suppression of evidence :ill be present. &est e,iden)e ru-e (..-ies on-2 =hen the .ur.ose of the .roof is to est(0-ish the terms of =riting/ therefore 63T applicable to e=ternal or collateral facts about the document such as its e=istence, e=ecution or delivery. Peo.-e ,6 (ndo2 '199;* The 8est Evidence "ule applies only :hen the contents of the document are the subject of in@uiry. +t does not apply :hen the issue is only as to :hether or not such document :as actually e=ecuted or in the circumstances relevant to its e=ecution. (n objection by the party against :hom secondary evidence is sought to be introduced is

DOCU"EN $R# EVIDENCE Section 2 Documentar$ evidence DOCU"EN ; any substance having any matter e=pressed or described upon it by mar?s capable of being read. +f it is produced :ithout regard to the message :hich it contains, it is treated as real evidence. DOCU"EN $R# EVIDENCE- evidence supplied by :ritten instruments, or derived from the conventional symbols, such as letters, by :hich

essential to bring the best evidence rule into application. Ahere secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of evidence might have been successfully invo?ed if proper and timely objection had been ta?en 54$ CON! I U E! 4E ORI%IN$L: ,a- The original of the document is one the contents of :hich are the subject of in@uiry. ,b- Ahen a document is in t:o or more copies e=ecuted at or about the same time, :ith identical contents, all such copies are e@ually regarded as originals. and ,c- Ahen an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are li?e:ise e@ually regarded as originals. 6oteB Q 3riginal may depend on the substantive la: applicable Q 3riginal may depend on the act of the parties Q:here there may be duplicate original, either is an original ad may be used :ithout accounting for another QAhenever a document is e=ecuted in several parts, each part is primary evidence Q Ahenever a document is e=ecuted in counterpart, each part e=ecuted by one or more of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties :ho e=ecuted it

U! ,s %regorio 1@ Phi- A22 *or only only presenting the Pero= copy of the falsified documents, prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. +n the absence of the original document, it +s improper to conclude, :ith only copy of the said original in vie:, that there has been a falsification of the document :hich :as neither found nor e=hibited, because in such a case, even the e=istence ofsuch document may be doubted. 6on-.rodu)tion of the origin(- do)ument unless justified in %ection $, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence. $mended Do)uments- :here a duplicate or copy is amended or altered by the party or parties, it becomes the original. Do)ument e3e)uted in t=o or more identi)(- )ontents each one of the parts is primary evidence and the other need not be proved. "e)h(ni)(--2 re.rodu)ed )o.ies: harbon copy- admissible as duplicate original :hen e=ecuted at the same time or about the same time. +mperfect carbon copies, although made at the same time as the original but if there is something else to be done for it to be binding or there is incomplete signature, itGs not the best evidence. i- "eproduction from the same matri= i.e. mimeograph, hectograph- admissible as duplicate original :hen produced from the same matri= as original j- 8lueprints and vellum tracings- have been held to be originals rather than copies ?- Telegraph and cable messagesif the issue is the contents of the telegram as received by the addressee- then the original dispatch is the copy of the message sent to the addressee. as sent by the sender- the original is the message delivered

Peo.-e ,s!to6 om(s 178 !CR$ 2;< The trial court correctly rejected the =ero= copy of the marriage certificate, since the admission :ould violate the best evidence rule. For the (..-i)(tion of the 0est e,iden)e/ it is essenti(- th(t: the original :riting or if it is a private document, be first duly identified, and a sufficient and a sufficient foundation be laid, so as to entitle the :riting to be admitted in evidence, and it must be available to the opposite party for cross-e=amination. &est E,iden)e Ru-e in Crimin(- C(ses > +n criminal cases, :here the issue is not only :ith respect to the contents of the document but also as to :hether such document actually e=isted, the original itself must be presented.

if the issue is the inaccuracy of transmission, both telegrams as sent and received are originals l- 2etter press copies- merely secondary evidence as its prone to improper reproduction and are not produced simultaneously as the original

m- Thermofa=- merely secondary evidence as it lac?s satisfactory reproduction as some portions are not clearly printed n- !hotographs and Pero=-merely secondary evidence since they are reproduced at a latter time but if authenticated photostatic copy of income ta= returns, public and business records are allo:ed as evidence Peo.-e ,s"(ngu-(0n(n A2 O% <A72 (t the trial, presented as evidence a post-mortem report of the injuries received by the deceased. This :as admitted over the objection of the accused, :ho contend that a mere carbon copy is inadmissible. The court ruled that the fact the post-mortem report is a mere carbon copy is also of no moment for it has been signed by the physician :ho e=ecuted the same and his signature :as identified b him at the :itness stand. Pro,in)i(- Fis)(- of P(m.(ng( ,s Re2es $ugust A/ 1971 The provincial fiscal of !ampanga filed t:o informations for libel against 9uevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, :ith malicious intent, published on page 9 of the :ee?ly paper Ing:agumasi$. The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one libelous article in the Ing:agumasi$ for /uly 1$, 19$<. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution E=hibits (, 8, , and 5, :hich are copies of the Ing:agumasi$ containing the libelous article :ith the innuendo. ounsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, :hich objection :as sustained. !etitioner contends that the e=hibits in @uestion are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted. +ssueB Ahether the e=hibits are admissible. "ulingB The rule of procedure :hich re@uires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. (nd certainly the copies of the :ee?ly :here the libelous article :as published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The ne:spaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. Thus if the issue is the contents of the articles sent for publication, the best evidence is the manuscript. 8ut is if issue is on :hat :as actually published, then the best evidence is the copy of the ne:s paper.

"espondent judge of the *+ :as re@uired to admit E=hibits (, 8, , and 5, in @uestion.

"(n)hester G L(=ren)e ,s FisD '18A<* ( copy of the standard tariff rate posted at the rail:ay depots, the court held them to be the best evidence in an action over a rail:ay freight charge as each of the printed copies as original and the :hole of the natre of duplicates, so that the proof of anyone :ould be competent evidence of the contents of the :hole. there being necessary in the :hole nature of the process of printing strong presumptive evidence that the impression from the same types must be similar. Section 3. 1ri inal document must be produced+ e"ceptions %ENER$L RULE: :hen the subject of the in@uiry is the contents of the document, the original document must be produced. EBCEP ION!: 5hen se)ond(r2 e,iden)e 0e (dmitted 1. Ahen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, :ithout bad faith on the part of the offeror. #. Ahen the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against :hom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. $. Ahen the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents :hich cannot be e=amined in court :ithout great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the :hole. and '. Ahen the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office Com.(ni("(ritim(,s$--ied Free 5orDers Union 77 % "( #' ,1977*actsB +n 19)#, ompania&aritima , &- and (llied *ree Aor?ers 1nion ,(*A1- entered into a :ritten contract :hereby the 1nion agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring :or? in +ligan, effective for one month. +t :as stipulated that the ompany :ould revo?e the contract before the e=piration of the agreed term, if the 1nion failed to render proper service. (fter a month, the contract :as verbally rene:ed. +n 19)', the 1nion sent a letter to & re@uesting to recogniIe it as the e=clusive bargaining unit, to load and unload he cargo of its vessels in +ligan. & ignored the re@uest. The 1nion subse@uently filed in +" a

petition for certification election. 5espite the certification case, & sent notice to the 1nion for termination of their contract and entered into a ne: contract :ith another stevedoring association. & assailed that the termination of the contract :as due to 1nion :or?erGs inefficiency and that the ompany suffered financial losses due to such service. To ascertain its annual losses, &Gs manager hired auditors. & relied only upon such auditorsG report and presented in court only a summary of damages. The sales invoices :ere not produced. +ssueB A36 the non-submission as evidence of the records of the alleged losses of the ompany is e=cused because of the rule e=empting voluminous records from being produced in court. "ulingB The best evidence of the ompanyGs losses :ould have been the sales invoices instead of the &anagerG oral testimony. The rule that :hen the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents :hich cannot be e=amined in court :ithout great loss of time and the fact sought to be established in only the general result of the :hole, the original :ritings need not be produce, (663T 8E (!!2+E5 because the voluminous character f the records :as 63T 5127 E%T(82+%0E5. +t is also a re@uisite for the application of the rule that the records of accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-e=amination. 5hen (n entr2 is re.e(ted in the regu-(r )ourse of 0usiness, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are regarded as originals. *or as long as they are made :ithin reasonable time, it is sufficient. ( much longer but reasonable delay and :hen entries appear to have been made :hile the memory as to the transaction as clear or the source of such ?no:ledge :as unimpaired, still ma?es it admissible. 0o:ever, a boo? of account containing only a single entry or charge of money lent, :hich sho: no mutual recourse of dealing bet:een the parties, is not admissible. 26 !ECOND$R# EVIDENCE %E T+36 ), "12E 1$< !e)6 A 6 <hen origina" $ocument is una%ai"a#"e6 I 5hen the origin(- do)ument h(s 0een -ost or destro2ed/ or )(nnot 0e .rodu)ed in )ourt/ the offeror/ u.on .roof of its e3e)ution or e3isten)e (nd the )(use of its un(,(i-(0i-it2 =ithout 0(d f(ith on his .(rt/ m(2 .ro,e its )ontents 02 ( )o.2/ or 02 ( re)it(- of its )ontents in some (uthenti) do)ument/ or 02 the testimon2 of

=itnesses in the order st(ted6 1. !our)e6MThis provision is a reproduction of %ection ', "ule 1$< the "ules of ourt :ith the follo:ing differencesB %ection ' Dsecondary evidence :hen original is lost or destroyedE Dand loss or destruction, or unavailabilityE. Dmay be provedE. DrecollectionE !e)tion A D:hen original document is unavailableE deleted

Title of the section hange s

(ddedB Dor e=istence and the cause of its unavailability :ithout bad faith on his part, may proveE and the :ords DdocumentE. Dthe offerorE. DtestimonyE. Din the order statedE 26 !e)ond(r2 e,iden)e e3.-(ined6 Definition& a. That :hich sho:s that better, or primary evidence e=ists as to the proof of the fact in @uestion. b. +t is that class of evidence :hich is relevant to the fact in issue, it being first sho:n that the primary evidence of the fact is not obtainable. c. !erforms the same function as that of primary evidence but is 2E%% "E2+(82E and A3"T07 3* 8E2+E*

E=. ( :arrant itself is better evidence of :hat it contains than a copy of it ( chec? is better evidence of :hat it contains than the stub 1n #h$ secondar$ evidence is admitted&

+t is admitted upon the theory that the original cannot be produced by the party by :hom the evidence is offered :ithin a reasonable time by the e=ercise of reasonable diligence. RThis is applicable in both civil and criminal cases. Rationale for re0uirin ori inal! t#o-fold& 1. production of

A6 Due e3e)ution of -ost (n)ient do)uments need not 0e est(0-ished6 2ost document is more than $< years oldsecondary evidence of their contents is admissible :ithout proof of their e=ecution <6 Proof of -ost or destru)tion of origin(-6

opies and oral testimony are more prone to inaccuracy and subject to fraud.

Destruction The thing no longer e=ists

#. The appearance of the document may furnish information as to its authenticity. 76 Re8uisites for the se)ond(r2 e,iden)e: (dmissi0i-it2 of

Loss %ignifies merely that it cannot be discovered

8ut the t:o come together for consideration in this rule. Test for the sufficienc$ of proof of loss&

a. E=ecution and e=istence of the original b. 2oss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court c. 1navailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror

+ncludes practically not only the cases of loss in the narro:er sense but also the cases in :hich destruction is more or less e=plicitly put for:ard as the reason for non-production.

Destruction of the instrument ma$ be proved b$& :6 Proof of due e3e)ution (nd e3isten)e of origin(9eanin of e"ecution& The accomplishment of a thing, the completion of an actor instrument, the fulfilment of an underta?ing Even though the production of an original may be e=cused because of loss or destruction, it is still necessary to authenticate the absent document. 8efore proof of contents can be admitted, the court should be satisfied of the e=istence and due e=ecution of the original in the same manner as if the original :ere produced. 8efore a party can be permitted to introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a :ritten instrument, satisfactory proof must be made of he former e=istence of the instrument, and this necessarily involves proof of its proper e=ecution or genuineness. 1. (ny person ?no:ing the loss #. (nyone :ho has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient e=amination in the place or places :here the document or papers of similar characters are usually ?ept by the person in :hose custody the document :as lost :as, and has been unable to find it $. Aho has made any other investigation :hich is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost R( "E(%36(82E !"38(8+2+T7 of its loss is sufficient, and this may be sho:n by a 836(*+5E and 5+2+9E6T %E(" 0, fruitlessly made, for it in places :here it is li?ely to be found. @6 Proof of e3e)ution/ -oss or destru)tion of the origin(- =riting re)orded in ( .u0-i) registr2 8efore the record or a certified copy of the recital made in a public registry of the contents of the document, it is indispensable to establish the follo:ingB 1. The documentKdeed really e=isted

#. +t :as duly e=ecuted $. +t :as lost

86 Proof of (dmission

-oss

dis.ensed

=ith

02

1. Ahere both parties admit that an instrument has been lost, this is sufficient to :arrant the reception of secondary evidence. #. The contents of an instrument may be proved against a party by his admissions in :riting, :ithout accounting for non-production of the original document.

RAhen primary evidence has been :ilfully destroyed, receipt of secondary evidence may depend upon the reasons for the destruction, and such evidence :ill not be received from the party :ho destroyed the primary evidence. RThe burden of proving absence of bad faith falls on the proponent. 116 Di-igent se(r)h for the do)ument )-(imed to h(,e 0een -ost must 0e sho=n6 There must be proof that a diligent search has been made in the place :here it is most li?ely to be found and that the search has not been successful. a. Ahere the paper is such that from its nature it may be fairly assumed that it has some particular place of deposit, that search should be search in the utmost good faith, or the person in :hose custody it is sho:n to have been should be produced. b. The testimony of the last custodian of the paper or record should be produced. and, if this person is sho:n to be dead, his representative or successor should be called. c. The general statement that diligence has been used, or a mere perfunctory sho:ing of some diligence :ill not ordinarily suffice.

96 Proof of non-.rodu)tion in )ourt 1. +t is sufficient to sho: that it is deposited in a place from :hich it cannot be removed for the purpose of being produced in court. #. 3r that it is not in the possession or under the control of the party see?ing to sho: the facts. $. 0e is unable to produce it :ithin a reasonable time after the e=ercise of reasonable diligence. RAhen the original of the document e.g. receipt, cannot be produced in court, the !hotostat copy thereof is admissible as evidence. 1;6 $0sen)e of 0(d f(ith on the .(rt of the offeror 1. %econdary evidence is inadmissible :hen the party offering it had himself destroyed the original, :ith the object of preventing its production in court, for in such a case, secondary evidence of its contents could probably be regarded as in all li?elihood false or misleading. #. +f destruction :as done in the ordinary course of business or by mista?e, or :here the proponent first removes, to the satisfaction of the court any reasonable suspicion of fraud, secondary evidence is admissible.

d. +n every case, the testimony should sho: that the party has in good faith e=hausted all the sources of information and means of discovery :hich the circumstances naturally suggest and :hich have been accessible to him. %RB The loss or destruction of the document need not be proved beyond the possibility of mista?e. it is enough if the testimony satisfies the court of the fact :ith reasonable certainty. (nd the lost or destruction may be proved by circumstantial evidence. :hat constitute a dili ent search& The matter of the :hole foundation or predicate for admission of such secondary evidence is subject to the :ide discretion of

the court although courts should be cautious in the reception of such evidence. 'eneral rule concernin instrument& proof of a lost

1. "easonable search shall be made for it in the place :here it :as last ?no:n to have been. #. +f such search does not discover it, then in@uiry should be made of persons most li?ely to have its custody. or $. Aho have some reason to ?no: of its :hereabouts. Im.ort(nt .oints: 1. The party must sho: that he has in good faith, and to a reasonable degree, made an effort to discover the instrument, and to that end has e=hausted all sources of information and means of discovery :hich :ere open to him, and :hich in the nature of the case :ere possible. #. 6o fi=ed rule as to the necessary proof to establish loss, or :hat constitutes reasonable search, can be formulated. $. The sole object of such proof is, to raise a reasonable presumption, merely that the instrument is lost, and this is a preliminary in@uiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.

RAhen originals of a public document in the possession of the parties have been proven lost, a E"T+*+E5 3!7 of the document made before it :as lost is admissible as %E 365("7 E4+5E6 E of its contents, and the 81"5E6 3* !"33* is upon the !("T7 S1E%T+36+69 +T% (1T0E6T+ +T7 to sho: that it is not a true copy of the original.

C(se: 16 Countr$ ;an/ers Insurance Corp. vs. %ntonio <a man %6R6 No6 1<A:8@ Cu-2 17/ 2;11 $ .hoto)o.2/ 0eing ( mere se)ond(r2 e,iden)e/ is not (dmissi0-e un-ess it is sho=n th(t the origin(- is un(,(i-(0-e . %ection ), "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt statesB

%E .) <hen origina" $ocument is una%ai"a#"e. M Ahen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its e=ecution or e=istence and the cause of its unavailability :ithout bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of :itnesses in the order stated. &efore ( .(rt2 is (--o=ed to (ddu)e

126 Proof of true )o.2 of origin(-6 This may be sho:n by the testimony of a person :ho has had the opportunity to compare the copy :ith the original and found it to be correct. In order that the testimon$ of such person ma$ be admissible! it is sufficient& 1. That the original :as read to him by another person :hile he read the copy and found that it corresponded :ith :hat :as read to him. #. Ahere the person :ho made the original a short time thereafter made a copy by :riting do:n the dictation of another reading from the original.

se)ond(r2 e,iden)e to .ro,e the )ontents of the origin(-/ the offeror must .ro,e the fo--o=ing: '1* the e3isten)e or due e3e)ution of the origin(-H '2* the -oss (nd destru)tion of the origin(- or the re(son for its non-.rodu)tion in )ourtH (nd '7* on the .(rt of the offeror/ the (0sen)e of 0(d f(ith to =hi)h the un(,(i-(0i-it2 of the origin(- )(n 0e (ttri0uted6 he )orre)t order of .roof is (s fo--o=s: )ontents. +n the case at bar, 2agman mentioned during the direct e=amination that there are actually four ,'- duplicate originals of the 199< 8ondB the first is ?ept by the 6*(, the second is :ith the 2oan 3fficer of the 6*( in Tarlac, the third is :ith ountry e3isten)e/ e3e)ution/ -oss/ (nd

8an?ers and the fourth :as in his possession. $ .(rt2 must first .resent to the )ourt .roof of -oss or other s(tisf()tor2 e3.-(n(tion for the non.rodu)tion of the origin(- instrument6 5hen more th(n one origin(- )o.2 e3ists/ it must (..e(r th(t (-of them h(,e 0een -ost/ destro2ed/ or )(nnot 0e .rodu)ed in )ourt 0efore se)ond(r2 e,iden)e )(n 0e gi,en of (n2 one6 $ .hoto)o.2 m(2 not 0e used =ithout ())ounting for the other origin(-s6 Des.ite Dno=-edge of the e3isten)e (nd =here(0outs of these du.-i)(te origin(-s/ L(gm(n mere-2 .resented ( .hoto)o.2 . 0e admitted that he ?ept a copy of the 199< 8ond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his he ties did not :ith e=plain ountry :hy 8an?ers. 0o:ever,

b- The failure of the :ritten agreement to e=press the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. c- The validity of the :ritten agreement. or d- The e=istence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the e=ecution of the :ritten agreement. The term LagreementL includes :ills. %ener(- Ru-e Paro" E%i$ence Ru"e The so-called Dparol evidenceE forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a :ritten instrument by testimony purporting to sho: that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms :ere orally agreed upon by the parties The e=istence of a valid contract is a condition precedent to the application of the rule. Ahere the terms of an agreement are reduced to :riting, the document itself, being constituted by the parties as the e=positor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in respect to that agreement :hich the la: :ill recogniIe, so long as it e=ists for the purpose of evidence. Ahen an agreement has been reduced to :riting, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices :hich to all purposes :ould alter the :ritten agreement. Ahatever is not found in the :riting must be understood to have been :aived and abandoned. 2oriano %s Compania Genera" $e Ta#acos $e =i"ipinas) *5- Phi" >8 +f oral testimony or parol evidence is presented on facts or circumstances :hich do not refer to the terms or contents of a :riting, the prohibition in the parol evidence rule does not apply. Ta"osig %s ?$a De nie#a) (4 2CRA (35

severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears from the 1989 8onds, 2agman himself is a bondsman. 6either did 2agman e=plain :hy he failed to secure the original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. Ahile he apparently :as able to find the original :ith the 6*( 2oan 3fficer, he :as merely contented :ith producing its photocopy. the origin(-6 P$ROL EVIDENCE RULE !e)tion 9/ Ru-e 17; !e)6 9 6Evidence of #ritten a reements. M Ahen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to :riting, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, bet:een the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the :ritten agreement. 0o:ever, a party may present evidence to modify, e=plain or add to the terms of :ritten agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadingB a- (n intrinsic ambiguity, mista?e imperfection in the :ritten agreement. or learly, L(gm(n f(i-ed to e3ert di-igent efforts to .rodu)e

Reason for the Ru"e The purpose of the rule is give stability to :ritten agreements and to remove the temptation and possibility of perjury, :hich :ould be afforded if parol evidence :ere

admissible. Castro %s CA GR L@ 4(,*4) Januar& 5,) *+>+ Paro" e%i$ence ru"e not strangers to the instrument app"ica#"e to

Paro" e%i$ence ru"e $istinguishe$ from #est e%i$ence ru"e +f the ambiguity is patent ,one :hich appears upon the face of the instrumento e=trinsic evidence not admissible o testatorGs intention is to be ascertained from the :ords of the :ill, ta?ing into consideration the circumstances under :hich it :as made, e=cluding oral declarations +f the ambiguity is latent ,one :hich is not discoverable from a perusal of the :illo e=trinsic evidence admissible :hen it names a person as the object of a gift or a thing as the subject of it and there are t:o persons or things that ans:er such name or description :here there is a misdescription of the object or subject

The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invo?ed by either party to the litigation against the other, :here at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the :ritten instrument in @uestion and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. Lechugas %s CA) *(4 2CRA 44-

Paro" e%i$ence not a$missi#"e to %a"i$ate a %oi$ contract Ahere an instrument is on its face illegal or void, because it sho:s a violation of some statutory provision, or omits something :hich the la: ma?es essential to its validity, or for any reason, parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict to sho: a violation of the statute, to supply the omission, or other:ise to ma?e effectual that :hich the la: declares shall be of no effect, unless it can be sho:n that the provision :hich renders the instrument void :as inserted by mista?e.

E3)e.tions <hen paro" e%i$ence is a$missi#"e Ahen any of the follo:ing is put in issue in the pleadingB a. an intrinsic ambiguity, mista?e or imperfection in the :ritten agreement. b. the failure of the :ritten agreement to e=press the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. c. the validity agreement. or of the :ritten

<ai%er of #enefit of ru"e by failure to object to introduction of parol evidence the

EAceptions to paro" e%i$ence must #e put in issue in the p"ea$ing Paro" e%i$ence ru"e app"ica#"e to 'i""s That means that there is no evidence on the terms of the :ill and of its attestation clause other than the contents of the same

d. the e=istence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the e=ecution of the :ritten agreement Bin$s of am#iguities in $ocuments a. patent - instrument on its face is intelligible b. latent - the :ords of the instrument are clear, but their application to the circumstances is doubtful

Test of the $ifference #et'een "atent an$ patent am#iguities ( good test of the difference bet:een the t:o forms of ambiguities is to put the instrument into the hands of an ordinarily intelligent educated person. +f on perusal he sees no ambiguity, but there is nevertheless an uncertainty from merely reading the instrument, it is patent.

:hich he has not chosen to do for himself. <here #oth intrinsic am#iguities appear in the 'riting an$ eAtrinsic

Latent or intrinsic am#iguit& $efine$ (n uncertainty :hich does not appear on the face of the instrument, but :hich is sho:n to e=ist for the first time by the matter outside the :riting ; may be e=plained or clarified by parol evidence

Ahere the :ords are all sensible, and have a settled meaning but the same time consistently admit of t:o interpretations. +n such a case, parol evidence may be admitted to sho: the circumstances under :hich the contract :as made, and the subjectmatter to :hich the parties referred

Ru"es go%erning the a$missi#i"it& of paro" e%i$ence to eAp"ain am#iguit& 1"atent am#iguit&7 a. Ahere the instrument itself seems to be clear and certain the ambiguity arises from some e=trinsic or collateral matter, the ambiguity may be helped by parol evidence. ,latent ambiguityb. Ahere the ambiguity consists in the use of e@uivocal :ords designating the person or subject-matter, parol evidence of collateral or e=trinsic matter may be introduced for the purpose of aiding the court in arriving at the meaning of the language used. ,intermediate ambiguityc. Ahere the ambiguity is such that a perusal of the instrument sho:s plainly that something more must be added before the reader can determine :hat of several things are meant, the rule is infle=ible that parol evidence cannot be admitted to supply the deficiency. :ista0e in the 'ritten instrument To justify the reformation of a :ritten instrument upon the ground of mista?e, the concurrence of three things is necessaryB ,a- that the mista?e should be of fact. ,b- that the mista?e should be mutual or common to both parties to the instrument. ,c- that the mista?e should be alleged an proved by clear and convincing evidence. a. &ista?e of fact ; The rule admitting parol evidence in case a :ritten instrument, through mista?e, does not correctly e=press the intention of the

Bin$s of "atent am#iguities a. :here the description of the devises or the property devised is clear upon the face of the :ill, but it turns out that there is more than one estate or person to :hich the description applies b. :here the devisee or property devised is imperfectly or, in some respects, erroneously described, so as to leave it doubtful :hat person or property is meant EAtrinsic or patent am#iguit& Custification for reforming the 'riting not a

The contest and every legitimate rule of e=position may be listed and used in obedience to the ma=im ut res magis%a"eat /uam pereat ,That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed- but parol testimony or e=traneous proof of any ?ind, is deemed to be inadmissible The rule e=pressly mentions intrinsic or latent ambiguity and not e=trinsic or patent ambiguity as one of the e=ceptions to the parol evidence rule. "eason for the ruleB if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol evidence, you create and do not merely construe the contract. you attempt to do that for the party

parties applies only in cases of mista?e of fact and not :here a party has contracted under a mista?e of la:. b. &ista?e must be mutual ; The parties must sho: that there :as a valid contract bet:een them, :hich contract is not correctly set forth in the :riting to be reformed. c. &ista?e should be alleged and proved ; the e=istence of mista?e must be alleged in the pleadings and the allegations must be sustained by proof Imperfection in the 'ritten agreement !arol evidence is admissible :here there is imperfection of the :riting

In$ucement Contract -

in

<ritten

Agreement

or

Ahere a parole contemporaneous agreement :as the inducing and moving cause of the :ritten contract, or :here the e=ecution of a :ritten agreement has been induced on the faith of :hich the party e=ecuted the :riting and :ithout :hich he :ould not have e=ecuted it, evidence of the oral agreement or stipulation may be given although it may have effect of varying the contract.

Proof of =rau$ The rule :hich prefers :ritten to un:ritten evidence does not so apply as to e=clude the latter :hen its object to prove that the :riting :as fraudulently obtained and thereby avoid the contract evidenced by it.

<ritten agreement $oes not eApress the true intent an$ agreement of the parties +f a :ritten contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that all contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere inspection of the instrument, e=trinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and the facts and circumstances surrounding them :hen they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to ma?e a proper interpretation of the instrument. !arol evidence is admissible :here it is offered, not for the purpose of varying the terms of a :ritten contract, but for the purpose of e=plaining and sho:ing that true nature and character of the transaction evidenced thereby.

*urthermore, the rule does not e=tend to evidence offered to sho: that the contract :as made in furtherance of objects forbidden by statute, by the common la: or by public policy.

?a"i$it& of <ritten Agreement The prohibition does not apply :here the purpose of the parole evidence is to sho: that no :ritten contract ever e=isted and that there never e=isted any consideration upon :hich such an agreement could be founded. !arole Evidence "ule finds no application :here the validity of the document is the very fact in dispute.

Prior Contemporaneous Distinct greement The rule e=cluding parole evidence to vary or contradict a :riting but does not e=tend so far as to preclude the admission of e=trinsic evidence to sho: prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements bet:een the parties. %uch evidence may be received regardless of :hether or not the :ritten agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement.

2u#se/uent Agreements The parole evidence rule does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole an agreement bet:een the parties to a :riting entered into subse@uent to the time :hen the :ritten instrument :as e=ecuted regardless such agreement varies or contradicts.

claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. "easonB parties cannot be presumed to have intended the :ritten instrument to cover all their possible subse@uent agreements :hich for that reason may be considered as separate transactions. 4e-d: !r6 ,s6 4eirs of %ection 9 of "ule 1$< of the "ules of providesB %ection 9.E%i$ence of 'ritten agreements M Ahen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to :riting, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, bet:een the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the :ritten agreement. 0o:ever, a party may present evidence to modify, e=plain or add to the terms of :ritten agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadingB ,a-(n intrinsic ambiguity, mista?e or imperfection in the :ritten agreement. 1#7The fai"ure of the 'ritten agreement to eApress the true intent an$ agreement of the parties theretoD 1c7The %a"i$it& of the 'ritten agreementD or ,d-The e=istence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the e=ecution of the :ritten agreement. The term LagreementL includes :ills. !aragraphs ,b- and ,c- are applicable in the case at bench. The failure of the 5eed of %ale to e=press the true intent and agreement of the parties :as clearly put in issue in the (ns:er of the 0eirs of (lfonso to the omplaint. +t :as alleged that the 5eed of %ale :as only made to lessen the payment ourt

RECEN L# DECIDED C$!E! 4eirs of Po-i)ronioUret(/ Li0er(toUret(

%6R6 No6 1<A@:86 !e.tem0er 1:/ 2;11 The app"ica#i"it& of the paro" e%i$ence ru"e re/uires that the case #e #et'een parties to the 'ritten instrument in /uestion an$ their successors@in@ interest F()ts: +n his lifetime, (lfonso 1reta 1A"fonso7 begot 1' children, namely, !olicronio, 2iberato, 6arciso, !rudencia, 4icente, *rancisco, +nocensio, "o@ue, (dela, Aenefreda, &erlinda, 8enedicto, /orge, and (ndres. The children of !olicronio 16eirs of Po"icronio7, are opposed to the rest of (lfonsoOs children and their descendants 16eirs of A"fonso7. (lfonso and four of his children, namely, !olicronio, 2iberato, !rudencia, and *rancisco, met at the house of 2iberato. 0e e=ecuted four ,'- 5eeds of %ale covering several parcels of land in favor of his four children in order to reduce the inheritance ta=es. 6o monetary consideration :as given, (lfonso continued to o:n, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. 7ears after (lfonsoGs and !olicronioGs death, the formerGs heirs e=ecuted a 5eed of E=tra/udicial !artition, :hich included all the lands that :ere covered by the four ,'- deeds of sale that :ere previously e=ecuted by (lfonso for ta=ation purposes. 8elieving that the si= parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, e=cluded from the 5eed of E=tra-/udicial !artition, the 0eirs of !olicronio filed a omplaint for 5eclaration of 3:nership, "ecovery of !ossession, (nnulment of 5ocuments, !artition, and 5amages against the 0eirs of (lfonso. The "T ruled in favor of the 0eirs of (lfonso. 2i?e:ise, the ( affirmed the finding of the "T that the 5eed of %ale :as void. +t found the 5eed of %ale to be absolutely simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. Issue: Ahether or not parol evidence rule may be properly invo?ed by either party in the litigation against the other, :here at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the :ritten instrument in @uestion and does not base a

of estate and inheritance ta=es and not meant to transfer o:nership. The e=ception in paragraph ,bis allo:ed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over :hat the document appears to be on its face. (s the true intent of the parties :as duly proven in the present case, it no: prevails over :hat appears on the 5eed of %ale. The validity of the 5eed of %ale :as also put in issue in the (ns:er, and :as precisely one of the issues submitted to the "T for resolution. The operation of the parol evidence rule re@uires the e=istence of a valid :ritten agreement. +t is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding :here the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as :hen a contract may be void for lac? of consideration. onsidering that the 5eed of %ale has been sho:n to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lac? of consideration, the 0eirs of (lfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, e=plain or add to the terms of the :ritten agreement. +ndeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule re@uires that the case be bet:een parties and their successors-in-interest. +n this case, both the 0eirs of (lfonso and the 0eirs of !olicronio are successors-in-interest of the parties to the 5eed of %ale as they claim rights under (lfonso and !olicronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule e=cluding evidence a"iun$e) ho:ever, still cannot apply because the present case falls under t:o e=ceptions to the rule, as discussed above. CIR E+ E"PLO#EE! L$&OR UNIONFEDER$ ION OF FREE 5OR+ER! vs6 CIR E+ ELEC RONIC!/ INC6 %6R6 No6 19;A1A6 Cune </ 2;11 Theparo" e%i$ence ru"e) "i0e other ru"es on e%i$ence) shou"$ not #e strict"& app"ie$ in "a#or cases F()ts:

+n determining arbitral a:ards then, aside from the &3(, courts considered other factors and documents including, as in this case, the financial documents submitted by respondent as :ell as its previous bargaining history and financial outloo? and improvements as stated in its o:n :ebsite. The appellate courtOs ruling that giving credence to the EPaha&agE and the minutes of the meeting :hich :ere not verified and notariIed :ould violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. Theparol evidence rule, li?e other rules on evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphi" La#oratories Emp"o&ees Union@==< % Interphi" La#oratories) Inc teachesB JRKe-i(n)e on the .(roe,iden)e ru-e is mis.-()ed6 In -(0or )(ses pending before the ommission or the 2abor (rbiter, the ru-es of e,iden)e .re,(i-ing in )ourts of -(= or e8uit2 (re not )ontro--ing. "ules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. 0ence, the 2abor (rbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluatingevidence other than, (nd e,en )ontr(r2 to, :hat is stated in the 8(.

"EINR$DO ENRILUE $6 &ELLO vs6 PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE! %6R6 No6 199:7; "(r)h 21/ 2;12 Fase$ on theparo" e%i$ence ru"e) there can genera""& #e noe%i$ence of the terms other than the contents of the 'ritten agreement F()ts:

The then (cting %ecretary of 2abor &anuel 9. +mson ruled that the :age increases to be given are !1< per day effective /anuary 1, #<<' and !1) per day effective /anuary 1, #<<). "espondent averred that the %ecretary of 2abor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties. Issue: Ahether or not the parol evidence rule should be strictly applied in labor cases.

%andiganbayan convicted petitioner of violation of ".(. $<19, %ec. $ ,e- for acting in evident bad faith in the purchase of the property sold by 9licerio !laIa as part of the (rmed *orces of the !hilippines M "etirement %eparation and 8enefit %ystem ,(*!-"%8%alamba 2and 8an?ing !roject, The %andiganbayan found that the true consideration of the sale made by !laIa to (*!"%8% :as only !##7,'>< as stated in a unilateral 5eed of (bsolute %ale, and not the disbursed amount of !1,)$1,)>' as reflected in the bilateral 5eed of %ale.

4e-d:

Issue: Ahether or not the unilateral 5eed of %ale should be the basis to determine the true consideration. 4e-d: +n any event, the finding that the true consideration :as only !##7,'>< and not !1,)$1,)>' is supported by the evidence on record. 0ere, the %andiganbayan found that the unilateral 5eed of %ale :as the official document used by the buyer (*!-"%8% and seller !laIa in the registration of the sale. as :ell as in the payment of the registration fee, transfer ta=, capital gains ta=, and documentary stamp ta= necessary to effect transfer. This finding :as not disputed by the petitioner. (t most, petitioner relied on the testimony of !laIa, :hich referred to a consideration of !1,1$7,$<< to !1,#1$,1#< as purchase price of the property. 0o:ever, based on the parol evidence rule, there can generally be no evidence of the terms other than the contents of the :ritten agreement. and even if this :ere the case, it still appears that the consideration cannot be the !1,)$1,)>' disbursed according to the %tatus Transaction "eport signed by petitioner. 6either did the seller or the buyer dispute the validity of the unilateral 5eed of (bsolute %ale. The subse@uent bilateral 5eed of (bsolute %ale did not repeal or modify the earlier sale either. (s the deed :as a valid agreement of conveyance, not:ithstanding that only the seller signed the deed, the%andiganbayan did not err :hen it used the unilateral 5eed of %ale as basis to determine the true consideration. "ODE! O LEOVER$! vs6 C$!I"ERO V$LDEE %6R6 No6 1<998A6 Cune 1A/ 2;11 To a%oi$ the operation of the paro" e%i$ence ru"e) the Ru"es of Court a""o's a part& to present e%i$ence mo$if&ing) eAp"aining or a$$ing to the terms of the 'ritten agreement if he puts in issue in his p"ea$ing) as in this case) the fai"ure of the 'ritten agreement to eApress the true intent an$ agreement of the parties The fai"ure of the 'ritten agreement to eApress the true intention of the parties is either #& reason of mista0e) frau$) ine/uita#"e con$uct or acci$ent) 'hich ne%erthe"ess $i$ not pre%ent a meeting of the min$s of the parties F()ts: Ahen 8enigna2imas died, she :illed her share of a parcel of land e@ually to her sisters (lejandra 2lamas and /osefa 2lamas. Thus,

(lejandra and /osefa each o:ned one-half ,1K#- of 8enignaOs share. 3n /une 1', 19>9, (lejandraOs heirs sold their predecessorOs one-half ,1K#- share ,roughly e@uivalent to 1<,)>' s@uare meters- to the respondent, as evidenced by a 5eed of (bsolute %ale. (lso on /une 1', 19>9, /osefa sold her o:n one-half ,1K#- share 1su#Cect propert&7 to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another 5eed of (bsolute %ale. 7ears later, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner, see?ing the reconveyance of the 1,<<'-s@uare meter portion ,$ispute$ propert&-, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the $,<#< s@uare meters identified in the partiesO (greement. 3n the other hand, the petitioner claimed that the respondent voluntarily participated in e=ecuting the (ffidavit, :hich corrected the mista?e in the previously e=ecuted (greement and confirmed the petitionerOs o:nership over the disputed property. 0e claimed that since the (greement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the (ffidavit :as subse@uently e=ecuted in order to reflect the partiesO true intention. +ssueB Ahether or not the :ritten agreement failed to e=press the true intent and agreement of the parties therefore beyond the ambit of parol evidence rule. 4e-d: The petitionerOs argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i e , :hen the terms of an agreement are reduced to :riting, the :ritten agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than :hat is contained in the :ritten agreement. Ahatever is not found in the :riting is understood to have been :aived and abandoned. To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the "ules of ourt allo:s a party to present evidence modifying, e=plaining or adding to the terms of the :ritten agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the :ritten agreement to e=press the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the :ritten agreement to e=press the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mista?e, fraud, ine@uitable conduct or accident, :hich nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. (t the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting the (ffidavit, :hich allegedly corrected the mista?e in the previously e=ecuted (greement and confirmed his o:nership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. +t :as the petitionerOs staunch assertion that the respondent co-e=ecuted this (ffidavit supposedly to reflect the partiesO true intention. T c+a(

+n the present petition, ho:ever, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the &enign( Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondentOs cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. %ince the (ffidavit merely reflects :hat is embodied in the 8enigna 5eed, the petitionerOs admission, coupled :ith the respondentOs denial of his purported signature in the (ffidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedroc? of the petitionerOs defense. IN ERPRE $ ION OF DOCU"EN ! Inter.ret(tion of Contr()ts under the CIVIL CODE: %rticle (3=. Civil Code - If the terms of a contract are c"ear an$ "ea%e no $ou#t upon the intention of the contracting parties) the "itera" meaning of its stipu"ations sha"" contro" If the 'or$s appear to #e contrar& to the e%i$ent intention of the parties) the "atter sha"" pre%ai" o%er the former +t is an elementary rule of contract that the la:s in force at the time the contract :as made must govern its interpretation. &atters bearing upon the e=ecution, interpretation, and validity of a contract are determined by the la: of the place :here the contract is made. The terms of the contract :here unambiguous are conclusive, in the absence of averment and proof of mista?e, the @uestion being not :hat the intention e=isted in the minds of the parties but :hat intention is e=pressed by the language used.

Ahere a specific provision in a contract is follo:ed by a general provision covering the same subject matter, the former :ill be held to prevail over the latter :hen the t:o cannot stand together. Ahere both the general and special provisions may be given reasonable effect, both are to be retained.

%rt. (3=3! Civil Code@ If some stipu"ation of an& contract shou"$ a$mit of se%era" meanings) it sha"" #e un$erstoo$ as #earing that import 'hich is most a$e/uate to ren$er it effectua" Ahen an agreement is susceptible of several meanings one of :hich :ould ma?e it effectual, it should be given such interpretation. The terms of a contract must if possible be construed to mean something rather than nothing.

%rt. (3=)! Civil Code - The %arious stipu"ations of a contract sha"" #e interprete$ together) attri#uting to the $ou#tfu" ones that sense 'hich ma& resu"t from a"" of them ta0en Coint"& %rt. (3=*! Civil Code - <or$s 'hich ma& ha%e $ifferent significations sha"" #e un$erstoo$ in that 'hich is most in 0eeping 'ith the nature an$ o#Cect of the contract Ahen a term is susceptible of different meanings, it should be understood in that sense :hich is most in accord :ith the nature and object of the contract in :hich it is used, in line :ith the rule that the intention of the parties must prevail.

%rticle (3=(! Civil Code @ In or$er to Cu$ge the intention of the contracting parties) their contemporaneous an$ su#se/uent acts sha"" #e principa""& consi$ere$ The contemporaneous and subse@uent acts that may serve as indicia of the intention of the parties are those in :hich both of them participate.

%rt. (3=>! Civil Code@ The usage or custom of the p"ace sha"" #e #orne in min$ in the interpretation of the am#iguities of a contract) an$ sha"" fi"" the omission of stipu"ations 'hich are or$inari"& esta#"ishe$ The usage or custom of the place :here the contract :as entered into may be resorted to as aids in ma?ing definite :hat is uncertain or in clearing up :hat is doubtful or ambiguous in a contract.

%rt. (3=2! Civil Code- 6o'e%er genera" the terms of a contract ma& #e) the& sha"" not #e un$erstoo$ to comprehen$ things that are $istinct an$ cases that are $ifferent from those upon 'hich the parties inten$e$ to agree

%rt. (3==! Civil Code- The interpretation of o#scure 'or$s or stipu"ations in a contract sha"" not fa%or the part& 'ho cause$ the o#scurit& %rt. (3=?! Civil Code@ <hen it is a#so"ute"& impossi#"e to sett"e $ou#ts #& the ru"es esta#"ishe$ in the prece$ing artic"es) an$ the $ou#ts refer to inci$enta" circumstances of a gratuitous contract) the

"east transmission of rights an$ interests sha"" pre%ai" If the contract is onerous) the $ou#t sha"" #e sett"e$ in fa%or of the greatest reciprocit& of interests If the $ou#ts are cast upon the principa" o#Cect of the contract in such a 'a& that it cannot #e 0no'n 'hat ma& ha%e #een the intention or 'i"" of the parties) the contract sha"" #e nu"" an$ %oi$ Thus if the ontract is gratuitous such interpretation should be made :hich :ould result in the least transmission of rights and interest. +f the doubt refers to the principal object of the contract in @uestion and such cannot be resolved not:ithstanding the application of said rule, the contract shall be null and void.

(n agreement should be interpreted as a :hole and the meaning gathered from the entire conte=t, and not form the particular :ords, phrases, or clauses.

b. +6TE"!"ET(T+36 3* %E4E"(2 +6%T"1&E6T% A0+ 0 ("E !("T 3* 36E T"(6%( T+36- Ahere several instruments are made as part of one transaction, they :ill be read together, and each :ill be construed :ith reference to the other. !e)tion 12: Interpretation accordin to intention+ eneral and particular provisions - +n the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued. and :hen a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. %o a particular intent :ill control a general one that is inconsistent :ith it. a. +6TE6T+36 3* T0E !("T+E% ; The court must ascertain the intention of the parties only :hen the terms of the contract are not clear and leave doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, other:ise, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. !e)tion 17: Interpretation accordin to circumstances ; for the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under :hich it :as made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be sho:n, so that the judge may be places in the position of those :hose language he is to interpret. a. 36%T"1 T+36 3* +6%T"1&E6T 3"5+69 T3 %1""3165+69 +" 1%T(6 E% ; the surrounding circumstances at the time it :as made should be considered for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning, but not for the purpose a ne: distinct underta?ing. b. !"E2+&+6("7 (9"EE&E6T% (65 6E93T+(T+36% ; +n the interpretation of a :riting :hich is intended to state the entire agreement, preliminary negotiations bet:een the parties may, ho:ever, be considered in order to determine their meaning and intention, but not to vary or contradict the plain terms of the instrument. (

%rt. (3=2! Civil Code- The princip"es of interpretation state$ in Ru"e *54 of the Ru"es of Court sha"" "i0e'ise #e o#ser%e$ in the construction of contracts IN ERPRE $ ION OF DOCU"EN ! UNDER 4E REVI!ED RULE! OF COUR !e)tion 1;: Interpretation of a #ritin to its le al meaning ; The language of to be interpreted according to the legal bears in the place of its e=ecution, parties intended other:ise. REGUI2ITE29 1. The court must give to the legal :ords or phrases the meaning they bear in the place :here the :riting :as e=ecuted. #. That such meaning shall be disregarded if the contract sho:s that the parties have intended to give such :ords or phrases a meaning different from that they have at the place of the e=ecution of the :riting. !e)tion 11B Instruments construed so as to ive effect to all provisions ; +n the construction of an instrument :here there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as :ill give effect to all. a. 36%T"1 T+36 (% ( A032E- ( contract must be construed as a :hole, and the intention of the parties is to be collected from the entire instrument and not from detached portions, it being necessary to consider all of its parts in order to determine the meaning of any particular part as :ell as of the :hole. accordin a :riting is meaning it unless the

!e)tion 1:: 8eculiar si nification of terms - The terms of a :riting are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to sho: that they have local,

technical, or other:ise peculiar signification, and :ere so used and understood in the particular instance, in :hich case the agreement must be construed accordingly. a. &E(6+69 3* A3"5%B 3"5+6("7 %E6%E - in construing a :ritten contract the :ords employed :ill be given their ordinary and popularly accepted meaning, in the absence of anything to sho: that they :ere used in a different sense. b. TE 06+ (2 A3"5% 36%T"1E5 ; Ahere technical :ords are employed by parties :ho are obviously unfamiliar :ith their meaning, they may be construed in such manner as to effectuate the true intention of the parties. c. +5+3&(T+ 1%(9E !"E4(+2% 34E" 2+TE"(2 T"(6%2(T+36 ; ( translation made in accordance :ith the idiomatic usage of the language from :hich it is made :ill prevail over a literal translation :hich, :hile :ord for :ord correct, is not idiomatic. !e)tion 1A::ritten #ords control printed@ Ahen an instrument consists partly of :ritten :ords and partly of printed forms, and the t:o are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. a. +6 36%+%TE6 7 8ETAEE6 A"+TTE6 (65 !"+6TE5 !"34+%+36% ; :here a part of a contract is :ritten and part is printed, and the :ritten and printed parts are apparently inconsistent or there is reasonable doubt as to the sense and meaning of the :hole, the :ords in :riting :ill control. b. 5+% "E!(6 7 8ETAEE6 A3"5% (65 *+1"E% ; +n case of an inconsistency bet:een :ords and figures in a contract the :ords govern. !e)tion 1<:E"perts and interpreters to be used in e"plainin certain #ritin s ; Ahen the characters in :hich an instrument is :ritten are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of the persons s?illed in deciphering the characters, or :ho understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the language. a. (5&+%%+8+2+T7 3* EP!E"T TE%T+&367 T3 EP!2(+6 T0E 0("( TE"% 3* (6 +6%T"1&E6T A0+ 0 ("E 5+**+ 12T T3 5E +!0E" ; ( person :ho is s?illed in the handling and inspection of documents may state meaning of abbreviations, and of obscure or elliptical entries or figures. and :hether a set of figures, letters, mar?s, or :ritings contain an arrangement in cipher, and, if so, :hat they mean.

!e)tion 1@: 1f t#o constructions! #hich preferred ; Ahen the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in :hich he supposed the other understood it, and :hen different constructions of a provision are other:ise e@ually proper, that is to be ta?en :hich is the most favorable to the party in :hose favor the provision :as made. a. 36%T"1 T+36 (9(+6%T !("T7 1%+69 A3"5%- Ahere a contract is ambiguous it :ill be construed most strongly against the party preparing it. The reason for the rule being that a man is responsible for ambiguities in his o:n e=pressions and has no right to induce another to contract :ith him on the supposition that his :ords mean one thing, :hile he hopes the court :ill adopt a construction by :hich they :ould mean another thing more to his advantage.

!e)tion 18:Construction in favor of natural ri ht ; Ahen an instrument is e@ually susceptible of t:o interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. a. 6(T1"(2 "+90T ; is meant those rights :hich are necessarily inherent, rights :hich are innate and :hich come from the very elementary la:s of nature such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and selfpreservation. !e)tion 19:Interpretation accordin to usa e ; (n instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character. a. 1%(9E (5&+%%+82E T3 EP!2(+6 A0(T +% 5318T*12 ; 1sage may be admissible to e=plain :hat is doubtful, it is never admissible to contradict :hat is plain. E! I"ONI$L EVIDENCE !e) 2; Ru-e 17; Lu(-ifi)(tion of 5itnesses - an perceive, and perceiving can ma?e ?no:n their perception to others. 9eneral "ule- ( disinterested person could be compelled to give his testimony through subpoena. E=ceptions- !ersons :ho are immune from the process of subpoena by tradition, convention or la:B

(mbassadors of foreign countries by virtue of treaty obligations !resident of the !hilippines or other country C(se: Peo.-e Vs6 De Cesus The fact that complainant displayed difficulty in comprehending the @uestions propounded on her is undisputed. 0o:ever there is no sho:ing that she could not convey her ideas y :ords or signs. +t appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently intelligent ans:ers to the @uestions propounded by the court and the counsels. The trial court is satisfied that the complainants can perceive and transmit in her o:n :ay her o:n perceptions to others. %he is therefore found to be a competent :itness. Testimonial 5uty of itiIensT to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony :henever he is properly summoned. !rocess to enforce dutyT the performance of the citiIenGs testimonial duty can only be invo?ed by the %tate after ade@uate notice is given. AitnessT a person :ho testifies in a case or gives evidence before a judicial tribunal. T a person called to be present at some transaction soa s to be able to attest to its having ta?en place. +nterested persons as :itnessesT :hile rightfully subjected to careful scrutiny, should not be rejected on the ground of bias alone. T if testimony is reasonable and consistent ad is not contradicted by evidence from any reliable source, there is no reason, as a general rule, for not accepting it. C(se: U! ,s6 "(nte 2@ Phi- 17: The testimony s interested :itnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny but they should not be rejected on the ground of bias alone. aseB !eople vs. 6atividad , (- )< 39 )8#' %uch testimony must be judged on their o:n merits. +f they are clear ad convinving and are not destroyed by other evidence of record, they may be believed. (nd the testimony of these :itnesses fulfil the re@uirement.

(ttorney as :itnessT counsel should not testify as a :itness unless it is necessary and that they should :ithdra: from the active management of the case. T e=cept :hen it is essential to the ends of justice /udge as :itnessT judicial conduct should not be subject to cross-e=amination or comment, the peculiar duties of the judge in administering oaths to the :itnesses in case the court has no cler?, and in deciding upon their competency, :ith his po:er to commit for contempt :hen his testimony concerns merely formal or preliminary matters about :hich there is no dispute, as :here he testifies in a perjury prosecution that the defendant gave testimony before him in another proceeding in another court. !ersons convicted of crime as :itnessT persons ho have been convicted of perjury are not e=cluded la:. Tsince perjury is a crime involving moral turpitude, the convict :henever mad a co-accused in any criminal case, cannot be discharged to become a :itness for the government in that case, because under the "3 , the court may direct the discharge of one of the several co-accusers for that purpose :hen, in its judgement, such accused has ot at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. !resumption of competency of :itnessT means legal fitness or ability of a :itness to be heard on the trial of a case.

3bjection to competency of :itnessT must be made before he has given any testimony. T+f the incompetency appears on the trial, it mst be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent. Aaiver of objectionT may be done e=pressly or by silence. The ff may be considered a :aiver of the objectionB a. Ahere the :itness testifies :ithout objection, though at that time the party ?no:s of his incompetency.

b. 0ere the party :ho might have made the objection o:ns the :itness in support of his o:n case. !e) 21 Ru-e 17; 5is@ualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity a. Those :hose mental condition, at the time of their production for e=amination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently ma?ing ?no:n their perception to others. b. hildren :hose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting :hich they are e=amined and of relating them truthfuly.

Ru-e 17;/ !e)tion 226 Dis0ualification b$ reason of marria e6 I During their m(rri(ge/ neither the hus0(nd nor the =ife m(2 testif2 for or (g(inst the other =ithout the )onsent of the (ffe)ted s.ouse/ e3)e.t in ( )i,i- )(se 02 one (g(inst the other/ or in ( )rimin(- )(se for ( )rime )ommitted 02 one (g(inst the other or the -(tterMs dire)t des)end(nts or (s)end(nts6 %ener(- Ru-e 5uring their marriage, neither the husband nor the :ife may testify for or against the other :ithout the consent of the affected spouse. Re(son This is based on principles :hich are deemed important to preserve the marriage relation as one of full confidence and affection, and that this is regarded as more important to the public :elfare than that the e=igencies of the la:suits should authoriIe domestic peace to be disregarded, for the sa?e of ferreting out facts :ithin the ?no:ledge of strangers. This applies only to a la:ful :ife ; not a bigamous one, nor to a paramour, nor to an affiance. A"%areH %s RamireH) (34 2CRA 35 1Riano7 The specific reasons for the rule are the follo:ingB a. there is identity of interests bet:een husband and :ife b. if one :ere to testify for or against the other, there is a conse@uent danger of perjury c. the policy of the la: is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the ris? of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness d. :here there is :ant of domestic tran@uility, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other !)o.e The rule forbidding one spouse to testify for or against the other applies to any form of testimony. therefore it protects against using the spouse:itnessG admission, or against compelling himKher to produce documents. 0o:ever, res gestae declarations of husband and :ife are admissible for or against each other, even though each is incompetent to testify.

C(se: Peo.-e ,s6 !(-omon ( mental retardate is not for this reason alone dis@ualified from being a :itness. aseB !eople vs. &endoIa "e@uisites of competency of a child as :itness,Bcapacity of observation, capacity of recollection, and capacity of communication. +nsane person as a :itnessT general rules is that a lunatic or a person affected :ith insanity is admissible as a :itness if he has sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and is capable of giving correct account of the matters :hich he has seen or hears :ith respect to the @uestions at issue. &onomanica as :itnessT he understand the nature and obligation of an oath and can give correct account of :hat he ha seen or heard. 5eaf and 5umb T may be a competent :itness although he us uneducated in the use of signs and his capacity to convey his ideas to others is very circumscribed and limited.

( husband may not testify for or against his :ife :ithout her consent. nor a :ife for or against her husband :ithout his consent, e=cept in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed against the other. This provision deals :ith t:o different matters :hich rest on different grounds of policyB the dis@ualification of the husband and :ife to testify in each otherGs behalf, as :ell as their privilege not to testify against each other. Peop"e %s Pansenso&) 4>> 2CRA ,,+ 1Riano7 1nder this rule, neither the husband nor the :ife may testify for or against the other :ithout the consent of the affected spouse, e=cept in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latterGs direct descendants or ascendants. 0o:ever, objections to the competency of a husband and :ife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be :aived as in the case of other :itnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made :hen he or she is first offered as a :itness. +n this case, the incompetency :as :aived by appellantGs failure to ma?e a timely objection to the admission of his :ifeGs testimony. Either !.ouse "ust &e ( P(rt2 to the C(se (s to the adverseness of the testimony, courts generally hold this to mean that the other spouse must be a party to the cause, not a third person :ho happens to be involved someho: in the case. other:ise the testimony does not hurt the other spouseGs legal interests. 5hen Pri,i-ege Ce(ses (fter the death or the divorce of one spouse, the privilege ceases for the reason ceases. Ahen the marriage is dissolved by death, there is no more marriage and therefore, the privilege can no longer be claimed. +t has been held that no unfavorable inference may be dra:n from a fact that a party spouse invo?es the privilege to prevent the :itness-spouse from testifying against him or her. EAceptions

a. that the case in :hich the husband or the :ife is called to testify is not a civil case instituted by one against the other b. that it is not a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other Reason for the EAceptions The identity of interests disappears and the conse@uent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-e=isting. The security and confidence of private life :hich the la: aims at protecting :ill be nothing but ideals :hich, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Or$ono %s Da/uigan) ,5 2CRA 538 1Riano7 The %upreme ourt ruled that the :ife is allo:ed to testify against her husband :ho :as accused of raping their daughter. +t ruled that the correct rule is the one laid do:n in argill vs. %tate :hich held that, DThe rule that the injury must amount to a physical :rong upon the person is too narro:. The better rule is that, :hen an offense directly attac?s or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relations, it comes :ithin the e=ception to the statuteHE Peop"e %s Gui$ato Jr ) 5+3 2CRA * 1Riano7 &ay a spouse testify in a trial :here the spouse is a co-accusedF The ourt ruled in the affirmative but li?e:ise held that the testimony of the :ife in reference to her husband must be disregarded since the husband timely objected thereto under the marital dis@ualification rule. The ourt e=plained that the dis@ualification is bet:een husband and :ife, but the rule does not preclude the :ife from testifying :hen it involves other parties or accused. 0ence, the :ife could testify in the murder case against the brothers :ho :ere jointly tried :ith the husband of the :itness. The ourt stressed, ho:ever, that the testimony cannot be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of ta?ing judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case :ithout violating the marital dis@ualification rule. DAhat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.E

5(i,er of Pri,i-ege

Aigmore asserts that the privilege of objecting to testimony concerning anti-marital facts belongs to the spouse :ho is a party to the action and not to the spouse :ho is being used as a :itness. This seems to be the rule in this jurisdiction. 0ence, the right to object to the competency of one spouse pertains solely to the spouse-party and not to the other spouse :ho is offered as a :itness. 8ar #<<> ,"iano2eticia :as estranged from her husband !aul for more than a year due to his suspicion that she :as having an affair :ith &anuel, their neighbor. %he :as temporarily living :ith her sister in !asig ity. *or un?no:n reasons, the house of 2eticiaGs sister :as burned, ?illing the latter. 2eticia survived. %he sa: her husband in the vicinity during the incident. 2ater, he :as charged :ith arson in an +nformation filed :ith the "T , !asig ity. 5uring the trial, the prosecutor called 2eticia to the :itness stand and offered her testimony to prove that her husband committed the arson. an 2eticia testify over the objection of her husband on the ground of marital privilegeF %uggested (ns:er 2eticia cannot testify. %ection ## of "ule 1$< bars her testimony :ithout the consent of the husband during the marriage. The separation of the spouses has not operated to terminate their marriage. ,6oteB This is an ans:er based on the tenor of the "ules of ourt.The follo:ing ans:er should also be consideredB 2eticia may testify over the objection of her husband. Ahere the marital and domestic relations bet:een her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace, or tran@uility to be preserved, there is no longer any reason to apply the &arital 5is@ualification "ule. ,!eople vs. astaneda, #71 % "( )<'. (lvareI vs. "amireI, '7$ % "( 7#!e)tion 276Dis0ualification b$ reason of death or insanit$ of adverse part$6 I P(rties or (ssignor of .(rties to ( )(se/ or .ersons in =hose 0eh(-f ( )(se is .rose)uted/ (g(inst (n e3e)utor or (dministr(tor or other re.resent(ti,e of ( de)e(sed .erson/ or (g(inst ( .erson of

unsound mind/ u.on ( )-(im or dem(nd (g(inst the est(te of su)h de)e(sed .erson or (g(inst su)h .erson of unsound mind/ )(nnot testif2 (s to (n2 m(tter of f()t o))urring 0efore the de(th of su)h de)e(sed .erson or 0efore su)h .erson 0e)(me of unsound mind6 O01e)t (nd Pur.ose of the Ru-e This is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in @uestion on the part of the surviving party and further, to put the t:o parties to a suit upon terms of e@uality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. +f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his o:n uncontradicted and une=plained account of the transaction. The underlying principle of the prohibition and the reason for the same is to protect the estate from fictitious claims and to discourage perjury. Dea$ :anIs 2tatute 1Riano7 To level the playing field bet:een the luc?y survivor and the poor deceased, our remedial la: ancestors devised a rule that :ould seal the lips of the survivor by declaring him incompetent to testify on the transaction bet:een him and the deceased. The rule is definitely one that does not protect the survivor even at the ris? of not paying a just and valid claim because it is the survivor :ho has the stronger reason to file a false claim. The rule is for the protection of the guy :ho died. 0ence, the name 5ead &anGs %tatute. "e@uisites of the 5is@ualification a. that the :itness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or of a person in :hose behalf a case is prosecuted +t is only parties :ho assert claims against an estate :ho are rendered incompetent to testify. The :ord DpartiesE does not refer to the e=ecutor or administrator :ho is the party defendant. The term DassignorE of a party means assignor of a cause of action :hich has risen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. 0o:ever, this rule does not operate to e=clude the testimony :hich is favorable to the representative of the deceased or incompetent person.

b. that the action is against an e=ecutor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind The term Drepresentative of a deceased personE has been interpreted to include not only the e=ecutor or administrator of a deceased person but also the person or party :ho has succeeded to the right of the deceased :hether by purchase or descent or operation of la:. RaHon %s IAC) 583 2CRA 54( 1Riano7 (s held by the ourt, the rule contemplates a suit against the estate, its administrator or e=ecutor and not a suit filed by the administrator or e=ecutor of the estate. ( defendant :ho opposes the suit filed by the administrator to recover alleged shares of stoc? belonging to the deceased is not barred from testifying as to his transaction :ith the deceased :ith respect to the shares. 2unga@Chan %s Chua) 4,4 2CRA 5(+ 1Riano7 (lso :hen a counterclaim is set up by the administrator of the estate, the case is removed from the operation of the Ddead manGs statute,E the plaintiff may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim :hich is not brought against the representative of the estate but by the representative. c. that the subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind The :ords Dclaim or demandE mean any action or proceeding :hich may affect the real or personal properties of a deceased or insane person. They are restricted to debts or demand enforceable by personal actions upon :hich money judgments can be rendered. (s to other actions against estates, no incompetency of :itnesses e=ists. (n action for damages for breach of an agreement to devise property for services rendered is a claim against an estate. 8ar #<<1 ,"iano&a=imo filed an action against !edro, the administrator of the estate of the

deceased /uan, for the recovery of a car :hich is part of the latterGs estate. 5uring the trial, &a=imo presented :itness &ariano :ho testified that he :as present :hen &a=imo and /uan agreed that the latter :ould pay a rental of !#<,<<< for the use of &a=imoGs car for one month, after :hich /uan should immediately return the car to &a=imo. !edro objected to the admission of &arianoGs testimony. +f you :ere the judge, :ould you sustain !edroGs objectionF AhyF %uggested (ns:er The objection of !edro should not be sustained. The testimony is admissible because the :itness is not dis@ualified to testify. Those dis@ualified under the dead manGs statute or the survivorship dis@ualification rule are parties to a case or persons in :hose behalf a case is prosecuted. The :itness is not one of those enumerated under the rule ,%ec. #$, "ule 1$<, "ules of ourt-. d. that his testimony refers to any matter of fact :hich occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind This refers to testimonies :hich relates to any matter of fact occurring before the death of the decedent or before the person became of unsound mind. The phrase Dmatter of factE is literally interpreted to include not only facts tending to establish the claim or demand but also incidental facts. 6egative facts are not included in the matters prohibited by la:. The testimony of a plaintiff denying the occurrence of a transaction :ith the deceased may be admitted on the ground that such plaintiff does not testify to a fact Doccurring before the death of the decedentE but on the contrary, that such fact has not occurred. Aaiver ( :aiver occurs :hen plaintiffGs deposition is ta?en by the representative of the estate, :hen counsel for the representative cross-e=amines the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased lifetime. ,Riano- The survivorship dis@ualification rule is intended to benefit the estate of the deceased or insane person, hence, this protection may be :aived byB

a. failing to object to the testimony b. cross-e=amining the :itness on the prohibited testimony ,%antos vs. %antos, $>> % "( $9)c. by offering evidence to rebut the testimony

in attendin such patient in a professional capacit$! #hich information #as necessar$ to enable him to act in capacit$! and #hich #ould blac/en the reputation of the patient+ @dA % minister or priest cannot! #ithout the consent of the person ma/in the confession! be e"amined as to an$ confession made to or an$ advice iven b$ him in his professional character in the course of discipline en-oined b$ the church to #hich the minister or priest belon s+ @eA % public officer cannot be e"amined durin his term of office or after#ards! as to communications made to him in official confidence! #hen the court finds that the public interest #ould suffer b$ the disclosure. @2(aA (. Source %. C1997NIC%TI1N C7S;%ND %ND :I,E 2. The rule The husband or the :ife during of after the marriage, cannot b e=amined :ithout the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage. ;ET:EEN

8ar #<<7 ,"ianoTrue or *alse The surviving parties rule bars &aria from testifying for the claimant as to :hat the deceased /ose had said to her, in a claim filed by !edro against the estate of /ose. %uggested (ns:er *alse. The rule bars only a party plaintiff or his assignor or a person in :hose behalf a case is prosecuted. &aria is merely a :itness and is not one of those enumerated as barred from testifying.

Sec. 2)- Dis0ualification b$ reason of privile e communication. - The follo#in persons cannot testif$ as to matters learned in confidence in the follo#in cases& @aA The husband or the #ife! durin or after the marria e! cannot be e"amined #ithout the consent of the other as to an$ communication received in confidence b$ one from the other durin the marria e e"cept in a civil case b$ one a ainst the other! or in a criminal case for a crime committed b$ one a ainst the other or the latterBs direct descendants or ascendants+ @bA %n attorne$ cannot! #ithout the consent of his client! be e"amined as to an$ communication made b$ the client to him! or his advice iven thereon in the course of! or #ith a vie# to! professional emplo$ment! nor can an attorne$Bs secretar$! steno rapher! or cler/ be e"amined! #ithout the consent of the client and his emplo$er! concernin an$ fact the /no#led e of #hich has been ac0uired in such capacit$+ @cA % person authori4ed to practice medicine! sur er$ or obstetrics cannot in a civil case! #ithout the consent of the patient! be e"amined as to an$ advice or treatment iven b$ him or an$ information #hich he ma$ have ac0uired

3. Reason of the rule That the admission of such testimony :ould have a po:erful tendency to disturb the peace of families To :ea?en, if not destroy the mutual confidence upon :hich the happiness of the married state depends.

). Re0uisite of the rule a. Spouses must be le all$ married +f they live together in illicit cohabitation, they are not entitled to the privilege

+t is immaterial :hether they believed in good faith that they :ere married if in fact they :ere not. be the

considered confidential

to

be

as

b. The communication must confidential and made durin marria e -

3nly those communication, :hether by :ord or deed, as pass from one to the other by virtue of the confidence resulting from their intimate relation. 3nly the ?no:ledge :hich the husband and the :ife obtains from the other :hich for the marital relation and the confidence gro:ing out of it, :ould have been communicated, or :hich is of such nature or character as that to repeat the same :ould tend to unduly embarrass or disturb the parties in their marital relations.

the prohibition to testify is directed only to the :ife and not to the third person so the latter cannot be prevented from testifying P!6 to P!6B if the third person comes into the possession of the communication by 3221%+36 and 43216T%"7 5+% 23%1"E on either spouse, he becomes an agent of such spouse and cannot testify :ithout the consent of the other.

c. ,orm of communication (pplies to any form of confidence disclosure. &aybe :ords or conduct. e.i Q letters from husband to the :ife Q :ife sa: husband counting stolen money and put it in his poc?et. *. Communication presumed confidential &arital communication presumed to be confidential, but the presumption may be overcome by proof that they :ere not intended to be private. 6ot:ithstanding that one spouse subse@uently :ithout consent of the other disclosed such communication to a third person.

b. ommunication intended for transmission to third person. ( letter :ritten to the defendant by his :ife and seiIed by the police in search of his effects on the day of his arrest is admissible because a privilege communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, :hether legally or not :ithout collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse , the privilege is thereby e=tinguished and if competent becomes admissible. %tatements from the notes of a stenographer to :hom the husband dictated the letter and :ho had transcribed it is admissible, because normally the husband and the :ife communicate :ithout a stenographer . here the communications have been voluntarily revealed.

>. :hen communication bet#een husband and #ife cease to be confidential a. Ahen made in the presence of a third person. P!6B if the confidential communication is o%erhear$ by a third person still

%tatements in the :ifeGs diary not sho:n to the husband is admissible. Those business and other communication not related to or dependent on mutual trust are not privilege. 8ut sometimes business transaction bet:een husband and :ife are held privileged "es gestae made in the presence of the spouse may be received. Testimony of the former :ife as to the sanity of the husband :ho is charged :ith homicide is admissible.

(.. %nti-marital facts The spouse may not testify as to as to facts related to the crime she learned before they got married.

((. Incompetenc$ as to anti.marital facts distin uished from incompetenc$ as to privile e communication

Incompetenc$ as to anti-marital facts !rohibits adverse testimony regardless of the source E=ists only :hen a party to the action is the husband or :ife eases upon death or either spouse

incompetenc$ as to privile e communication !rohibits only as to ?no:ledge obtained through confidence or the marital realtio E=ists :hether the husband or :ife is a party to the action or not ontinues even after the termination of the marriage.

7. Rule not applicable to d$in declarationon the trial of the one :ho ?illed him. The :ido: is competent to testify on behalf of the defense regarding the dying declaration made to her by the deceased, considering the cause of death.

(2. :aiver of privile e This privilege may be :aived if not objected to. 3bjection to the admission is timely if made before the ans:er to the @uestion for its revelation.

?. Duration of the privile e ontinues in effect even after the marital relation has been terminated. This privilege is not affected by death of the other spouse or absolute divorce. 8ut :hen the communication is needed in behalf of his estate, the surviving should be entitled to :aive it.

!rivilege belongs to the communicating spouse. The prohibition arises only :hen the person in :hose favor the privilege e=ist demands by timely objection to the testimony.

2. E"ceptions a. That the case in :hich the husband or the :ife is called to e=amined is a civil case instituted by one against the other. or b. a criminal case for a crime omitted by one against the other

;. C1997NIC%TI1N %TT1RNED %ND C<IENT (3. The rule -

;ET:EEN

The attorney could not be compelled, nor :ould be allo:ed to disclose the follo:ingB

a. the privilege communication made by the client to his attorney or his advice given thereon in the course of or :ith a vie: o professional employment

confidentiality is inferred and presumed until the contrary is sho:n there must be an e=isting attorney and client relation. There must sho:ing that the parties agreed there is an employment .or (t least that he had consulted the :itness to that end and the latter had not refused the employment +f a la:yer friend :ithout e=press employment or hope of compensation, :as as?ed by the accused :hile visiting that latter :ould plead guilty, the communication is not privilege. ommunication in the ordinary intercourse is not privilege.

g. attorney :itness

acting

as

attesting

h. notary public procure a loan i. j.

as

agent

to

manager of clientGs property acting as intermediary bet:een members of a family as to corporation affairs :hen the attorney is elected as a director identification of the copy of the by-la:s

?.

l.

b. any fact the ?no:ledge of :hich has been ac@uired by the attorneyGs secretary, stenographer or cler?, in their respective capacity.

+t is not essential to create the privilege that any proceeding or civil, should be pending or even in contemplation. The attorney may testify or communication not privilegeB a. that his client did not communicate certain things to him b. as to the residence of client c. as to the circumstance surrounding the dra:ing of the :ill and the conversations had :ith the testator at the time

(% ( 9E6E"(2 "12E ( 2(A7E" &(7 63T "E*1%E T3 5+4129E T0E +5E6T+T7 3* 0+% 2+E6T. "(T+36(2E. M (s a matter of public policy, a clientOs identity should not be shrouded in mystery. 1nder this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as :ell as in the 1nited %tates is that a la:yer may not invo?e the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are :ell established. *irst, the court has a right to ?no: that the client :hose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. %econd, the privilege begins to e=ist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. *inally, due process considerations re@uire that the opposing party should, as a general rule, ?no: his adversary. L( party suing or sued is entitled to ?no: :ho his opponent is. 0e cannot be obliged to grope in the dar? against un?no:n forces. ,"egala vs. %andigan8ayan, 9.". 6o. 1<)9$8EP E!T+36. A0E6 T0E 2+E6TO% +5E6T+T7 +% !"+4+2E9E5. M The general rule is, ho:ever, @ualified by some important e=ception. 1- lient identity is privileged :here a strong probability e=ists that revealing the clientOs name :ould implicate that client in the very activity for :hich he sought the la:yerOs advice. #- Ahere

d. attorney employed merely to act as scrivener e. copying a :ill f. preparing leases assignments or

disclosure :ould open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. $- Ahere the governmentOs la:yers have no case against an attorneyOs client unless, by revealing the clientOs name, the said name :ould furnish the only lin? that :ould form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clientOs name is privileged. (part from these principal e=ceptions, there e=ist other situations :hich could @ualify as e=ceptions to the general rule. *or e=ample, the content of any client communication to a la:yer lies :ithin the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on :hich the client see?s legal assistance. &oreover, :here the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed an$ it is the i$entit& 'hich is inten$e$ to #e confi$entia", the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation :ould other:ise result in disclosure and the entire transaction. %ummariIing these e=ceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall :ithin the ambit of the privilege :hen the clientOs name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure :ould then reveal client confidences. ,"egala vs. %andigan8ayan, 9.". 6o. 1<)9$8-

Test :hether the communications are made to an attorney :ith a vie: to obtaining professional assistance or advice- if so, then privilege. Ahen is communication not privilegeB 1. 6o professional relation e=ist the time the communication :as made but subse@uently employs the atty in relation to such statement #. those voluntarily made after the attorney refused to accept employment

for the claim of this privilege it is not necessary that the attorney sought to be prevented from testifying be in active practice.

b. Communication b$ client to attorne$ The privilege is not confined to verbal or :ritten communications but e=tends to other means of communications. +t is necessary that the communication is confidential and be intended as confidential other:ise if confidence :as not contemplated then the testimony of the attorney or client may be compelled. +t is held that there is no privilege in cases :here abstract legal opinions are sought and obtained on general @uestions of la:, either civil or criminal because no facts are disclosed so nothing confidential of character to conceal. Communication must have been made to the attorne$ in the course of professional emplo$ment or :ith a vie: or professional employment or in hi professional capacity ( communication to an attorney us said to be in Dhis professional capacityE :hen the client ma?es the same :ith the purpose of obtaining from hi a legal advice and opinion concerning his legal rights, obligation or duties relative to the subject matter of communication.

(). Reason for the rule 8ased on upon the ground of public policy To encourage clients to ma?e full disclosure of facts in the interest of the administration of justice +ntended to enable a client to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in his attoryney in matters affecting his rights and obligations :ithout danger of having disclosures forced from the attorney on the :itness stand. c. -

(*. Re0uisite of the rule a. 8rofessional emplo$ment The atty-client relationship must e=ist at the time the communication is made.

+t must be related to :hich the attorney is consulted or to put him in possession of information to ebale him to properly and intelligently serve the client. !rivilege also applies to agents and a consultaion :ith an agent in the attorneyGs office. Ahen privilege does not apply 1. (n in@uiry made of a friend :ho is not an attorney #. onsultation :ith e.i cler? of court, deputy sheriff an unadmitted la: student

testifying and not to leave his client :ithout proper representation

(=. 8rivile e not applicable to attorne$ #ho is subscribin #itness to his clientEs #ill (ttorney may testify to the attending circumstances of the e=ecution of his clientGs :ill. The testator :aives privilege as to his attorneyGs testimony concerning testamentary communication.

(?. Communication made to -ud es are privile e The principle is not affected by the fact that the attorney in this case :as also a judge. The fact that he occupied that position gave an increased :eight to his advice. +t is in the nature of the confidence :hich e=ist bet:een the client and the attorney.

$. The attorney cannot testify to the fact the he had received silver coin as part of his retainer from a client :ho is accused for stealing a @uantity of current silver coin. '. Those information obtained by a detective posing as an attorney of celebrity is e=cluded by court ,!! v. 8ar?er). %ide:al? advice from attorney upon legal @uestions do :hich no compensation is as?ed or e=pected and none given e=cept a luncheon should not be regarded as privilege. >. Those communication bet:een an attorney and :itness for the client to sho: that the attorney attempted to corrupt or influence a :itness to color his testimony in favor of the accused. (>. 8rivile e applicable to counsel de oficio ( counsel de oficio cannot testify in open court :ithout the consent of his client as to any fact imparted by h, to his client in professional consultation. Even if the consent is obtained, it is his duty to as? first to be relieved and have another attorney ta?e his place before

(2. Communications to an attorne$ as a public officer to enable the latter to act in that capacit$ not privile e 8ecause a complaint made to a prosecutor :ill usually be made for the purpose of inciting public prosecution and not for the protection of the complainantGs rights.

2.. Communication for unla#ful purpose not privile e Those for the purpose is to commit a crime parta?es of the nature of conspiracy or attempted conspiracy +t is not unla:ful to divulge such communication and under some circumstances it is the duty of the attorney to do so. ommunication is not privilege :here the client see?s advice that :ill enable him to pertpetrate a fraud.

The attorneyGs ignorance of his clientGs intentions deprives the information of a professional character as full confidence has been :ithheld. 8ut :here a contemplated act is criminal only if committed under certain circumstances or :ith a certain intent and such circumstances or intent are not sho:n to be present, the la:fulness of the act :ill be presumed and the privilege :ill hold.

22. :hen an attorne$ ma$ be compelled to produce or disclose the contents of a document entrusted to him b$ his client +f the documents are not privilege :hile in the hands of the client he cannot ma?e them privilege by placing them in possession of his counsel (n attorney cannot be compelled cannot order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet it having proven that it belongs to the attorney and that he ?eeps records and documents of his client there.

2(. Communication b$ a client to his attorne$ in the presence of! or overheard b$ third persons not #ithin the privile e This contemplates a situation :here the third party is not an agent of either client or attorney. :ho are considered as agent, presence of :hich does not negate the confidential nature of the communication 1. +nterpreter #. (gent of the client $. !arent of the client :ho is a child. '. "epresentative attorney of an -

23. 8rivile e not applicable to actions brou ht b$ client a ainst attorne$ 8ecause if the attorney is not allo:ed in such case to disclose confidential communications of his client he :ill suffer manifest injustice.

2). To #hom privile e belon s The privilege belongs to the client and he alone can invo?e it. 0e may claim not only :hen his attorney is called to disclose professional communicatios but also :hen he himself is as?ed to ma?e disclosure. Ahen the privilege belongs to t:o or more client, the consent of each is essential to constitute :aiver. +n a criminal trial, the court may interpose of its o:n motion for the protection of an accused :ho is entirely ignorant of his rights to remain silent :hen he is called to state :hat he said to is attorney.

The privilege e=ists if the client if not notice the presence of the third person overhearing the communication Third person foreign to the relation are competent to testify to the communications they overheard. Ahere the communication :as made for the purpose of having the attorney tell others, it :as not a privileged communication (n employee of a corporation :ho :as also stenographer :here such counsel may give evidence as to corporate correspondence :here such evidence did not come from her relationship :ith corporation attorney

Dur(tion of .ri,i-egeB ontinues e,en (fter the re-(tion of )-ient (nd (ttorne2 is termin(ted, the seal of the la: once fi=ed upon them remains forever, unless removed by the party himself in :hose favor it is there placed. 5(i,er of .ri,i-ege: either 0e e3.ress or im.-ied "esultB the attorney may give in evidence matters confidentially communicated either for the purpose

of giving evidence in chief or purposes of impeachment Im.-ied =(i,er )onsists of: alients failure to object to attorneys testimony b- +n giving evidence on the privilege communication c- Ahen privilege communication falls on the hands of the adverse party d- +n calling or cross e=amining his attorney regarding privileged communication The clients representative may, :aive the privilege, but only :hen the application of the rule :ould be disadvantageous to his estate. The :aiver of the right precludes the (ssertion of the right u.on (..e(- or u.on su0se8uent tri(- of the case but does not )onstitute ( =(i,er of the .ri,i-ege in (nother inde.endent tr(ns()tion. CO""UNIC$ ION &E 5EEN P4#!ICI$N $ND P$ IEN ')ur(ti,e/ .re,enti,e or .(--i(ti,e tre(tment* !rivilege is intended to facilitate and ma?e safe, full and confidential disclosure by patient of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subse@uent and enforced disclosure and publication on the :itness stand -to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient -lend a sense of security and confidence to the relation of patient and physician so that the patient :ill not be reticent about ma?ing disclosures :hich may be material to his physical :elfare Re8uisites for the ru-e to (..-2: a- (ction in :hich the (dvice or treatment given or any information be in a )i,i- )(se 0* Ph2si)i(n (nd .(tient re-(tions e3isted c- +nformation :as ()8uire =hi-e .rofession(--2 attending the patient d- +nformation :as ne)ess(r2 for the .erform(n)e of his .rofession(- dut2 e- 5isclosure of the inform(tion =ou-d tend to 0-()Den the re.ut(tion of the .(tient 2imited to civil cases onlyB in criminal cases the privilege does not apply for the maintenance of public order and the life and liberty of the citiIens are deemed more important than the purpose for :hich the privilege :as created - 6ot conferred to shieldK :eapon to be used by a person charged :ith crime 6ot indispensable that the patient should have actually employed the physician, surgeon or obstetrician. &ay be applied in e=tremis in vie: to a curative treatment any information obtained by him for that reason is privilege

!rivilege cannot be e=tended by construction to persons employing curative processes not coming :ithin the ordinary meaning of the term practice of medicine, surgery or obstetrics. ommunications made by a patient to dentist/ .h(rm()ists/ (nd nurses =ho (re not ()ting (s (gents of .h2si)i(ns/ surgeons/ or o0stetri)s (re not .ri,i-eged. overs all facts learned by the observation and by all methods necessary to enable the physician to prescribe, including communication by the physician by third person on behalf of the patient to enable him to perform his professional duty. Communi)(tions of the 0od2/ o0ser,(tion of s2m.toms/ resu-ts of the do)tors e3(min(tion/ the .(tientNs )ondition (s fund 02 the do)tor/ the n(me of the (i-ment/ the n(ture of (n2 o.er(tion .erformed/ the st(tement of f()ts or o.inion gi,en to the .(tient6 +ncluding opinions and prescriptions. The attending physician may not testify even though employed as an e=pert :itness by the other side. Pri,i-ege in)-udes e3(min(tion of .(tients em.-o2ed 02 ( third .(rt2 in order for the physician to report to his principal and to the efficacy of certain treatment, being given by other physicians. B-r(2 .-(tes (nd r(diogr(.hs (re )onsidered .ri,i-ege including the oral communications or observations made or had for the purpose of enabling the physician to treat or prescribe for his patient. Ahere information is clearly immaterial to the patientGs treatment, it cannot be considered privilege, but if it :as obtained from observation and inspection of the patientGs body, privilege applies regardless of :hether or not such information :as necessary for the treatment. end to 0-()Den his re.ut(tion- :hich might 0ring re.ro()h or disgr()e u.on the .(tient6 !rivilege rests u.on the .erson o01e)ting and must sho= th(t re-(tion of .h2si)i(n (nd .(tient e3isted. The court not the physician determines :hether the physician must testify, court may hold preliminary hearing to determine circumstances. 6ot the duty of the court to re@uire physician to testify. (fter the patient h(s gone to his gr(,e/ the -i,ing (re not .ermitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory. (n e=press :aiver maybe made by the patient himself, or the deceased personGs

representative or the beneficiary of the insurance policy. (lso by giving e=press consent, to the testimony of the physician, or by calling the physician to testify as to the privilege matter. The guardian of the minor may also give his consent provided that it is not to the minorGs prejudice. +mplied :aiver is found :hen the .(tient himse-f t(Des the st(nd to testif2 (0out his .h2si)(- )ondition, including the sending of ( .h2si)i(nNs )ertifi)(te of ( )(use of de(th , as part of the proofs of death re@uired by a life insurance policy. 3nce the :aiver is made, such :aiver is final and cannot be recalled. !rivilege is not :aived by the patient in ma?ing voluntary disclosure outside the court. Ahere the :aiver is procured by fraud or coercion, the :aiver is not effect and the privilege may not be claimed. Pri,i-ege not (..-i)(0-e =here .(tient 0rings ()tion (g(inst .h2si)i(n, for is a patient ma?es public in a court of justice the occurrences of the sic?room, for obtaining a judgment for damages against his physician , he cannot shut out the physician himself not any other :ho :as present at the time covered by the testimony. &2 his ,o-unt(r2 ()t he 0re(Ds do=n the 0(rrier (nd the .rofession(- dut2 of se)re)2 )e(ses6 CO""UNIC$ ION &E 5EEN "INI! ER OR PRIE! OR PENI EN "E(%36B To compel a minister or priest to testify to a confession to him by a peninet is e@uivalent to an annulment of the confessional institution, for many :ould no longer ma?e confessions, not done by government :here religious tolerance is sanctioned by la:. he .ri,i-ege )o,ers on-2 )onfessions of ( .enitenti(- in their )h(r()ter/ )onfessions of sins =ith ( ,ie= to o0t(ining .(rdon (nd s.iritu(- (d,i)e or (ssist(n)e , to )-erg2men in o0edien)e to some su..osed re-igious dut2 or o0-ig(tion and do not em0r()e )ommuni)(tions clergymen, ho:ever, confidential, :hen not m(de in )onne)tion =ith or in dis)h(rge of some su)h su..osed re-igious dut2 or o0-ig(tionH or :hen made to them :hile in discharge of duties other than those :hich pertain to the office of a clergyman. Communi)(tions m(de not in the )ourse of re-igious dis)i.-ine 0ut in the )ontem.-(tion of ( )rime/ (re not .ri,i-eged6 (ccuse met the priest on a railroad train and :ith no intent to secure his professional advice, assistance or consolation, told his story

incriminating himself, it :as held that the communication :as not privileged. !rosecution for the crime of bigamy that the statements made by the accused to a priest :ho :as to communicate them to the first :ife, to induce are not privileged. $ )ommuni)(tion to ( .riest m(de other=ise th(n in his e))-esi(sti)(- )(.()it2 is not .ri,i-eged6 Confession must 0e m(de in the .rofession )h(r()ter of the .riest (nd in the )ourse of dis)i.-ine en1oined 02 the ru-es of .r()ti)e of the denomin(tion to =hi)h the .riest or minister 0e-ongs6 6ot including statements made by a church member in the presence of his minister and fello: members. There can be no privilege, :here a minister is consulted, but as a notary or a friend and interpreter, Determin(tion through the 8uestion from the )ir)umst(n)es (nd f()ts leading up to the ma?ing of the confession, disclosure should not be re@uired unless it appears that the claim of privilege is erroneously made. 5(i,er of .ri,i-ege :hen a penitent to the e3tent of gi,ing e,iden)e of =h(t tooD .-()e at the confessional he cannot complaint of evidence :hich goes no further to established the facts revealed by him. E=ceptions to the ruleB 1- !olicy of the state re@uires the disclosure #- +nnocent party is charged :ith a crime, conviction for :hich he can escape only by a disclosure of facts given in the confessional $lergyman receiving the confession is authoriIed to testify by the person confessing '- 5isclosure is necessary in order to prevent an impending crime anon 17)7B The follo:ing are e=cluded as incapable of :itnessing. !riests, in :hatever concerns any ?no:ledge they may received through sacramental confession, eventhough they may have been released from the obligation of the seal, even more, anything :hatsoever heard by anyone, or in any :ay in the confession may not be accepted as even an indication of the truth. PU&LIC OFFICER! $ND PU&LIC IN ERE! "eason for the ruleB +t is the duty of every citiIen to communicate to his government any information :hich he has of the commission of an offense against the la:.

and a court of justice :ill not compel or allo: such information to be disclosed, either by the subordinate officer to :hom it is given, by the informer himself or by any other person :ithout the permission of the government. The evidence being e=cluded not for the protection of the :itness or of the party in the particular case, but upon general grounds of public policy, because of the confidential nature of such communication. !ublic interest means more than mere curiosity, something in :hich the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by :hich their legal rights or liabilities are affected. 3&&16+ (T+36% to public officialsB privilege applies to communication to such offers only as have a responsibility or duty to investigate or to prevent public :rongs, and not to officials in general. The la: recogniIes the duty of every citiIen to communicate to the government and to its officers such information as he may have concerning the commission of offenses against the la:s. Pur.ose: for en)our(ging the .erform(n)e of their duties =ithout fe(r of )onse8uen)es/ a :itness cannot be compelled to disclose the names of persons by :hom and to :hom information had been given :hich led to the discovery of the offense. ommunications bet:een officialsB covers matters not ordinarily made public in the course of their duties, and :hom their disclosure :ould tend to injure seriously the :elfare of the %tate. !rivilege can be recogniIed in matters involving data upon the 6ational 5efense or upon international negations pending. ourts :ill not compel the disclosure of state secrets by the other departments of the government in ordinary judicial proceedings, or re@uire the publication of a state document that may involve the danger to the nation or of communications bet:een government of a confidential nature. !rivilege does not applyB 5isclosure :ill be compelled Ahen :hat is as?ed is useful evidence to vindicate the innocence of an accused person, 3r lessen the ris? of false testimony, 3r is essential to the proper disposition of the case 3r the benefit to be gained by a correct disposition of the litigation :as greater than any injury :hich :ould inure to the relation by disclosure of the information

5isclosure of the name of the informer maybe necessary in a case :here the accused claims he is the victim of false accusations by an enemy 3r :here he claims he is the victim of a groundless arrest or persecution by the police O 4ER PRIVILE%ED "$ ER!

Editors m(2 not 0e )om.e--ed to dis)-ose the sour)e of .u0-ished ne=sThe publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any ne:spaper, magaIine or periodical or general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any ne:s report or information appearing in said publication unless the court or a house of committee of congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the state. Voters m(2 not 0e )om.e--ed to dis)-ose for =hom the2 ,oted to protect legal voters in the secrecy of ballot The practice compelling @ualified electors to disclose for :hom they voted has long been condemned as a ?ind of in@uisitorial po:er un?no:n to the principles of a free government. (n illegal voter may decline to ans:er for :hom he voted, on the ground that his ans:er might incriminate himself, but in such case the contents of the ballot maybe sho:n by other testimony. O R$DE !ECRE ! There is a privilege not to disclose onesG trade secrets. +t covers usually formulas of manufacture, but may also include price lists and customerGs lists. +t is not absolute. the trial court may compel disclosure :here it is indispensable for doing justice. O (3 )ensus returns O&(nD De.osits- all ban? deposits are absolutely confidential and may not be e=amined, in@uired or loo?ed into e=cept in those cases enumerated therein -(nti 9raft -une=plained :ealth is similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty

26 estimoni(- Pri,i-ege !e)tion 2A6Parenta" an$ fi"ia" pri%i"ege. M 6o person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

%copeB The former filial privilege ta?en from (rt. $1) of the ivil ode :as e=panded to include other direct ascendants and to e=empt parents from being compelled to testify against their children or other direct descendants.

guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense :ith :hich he is charged. onfessionB a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntary and :ithout compulsion or inducement, stating or ac?no:ledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. 4E UNI ED ! $ E!/ ,s6 CO!E CORR$LE! %6R6 No6 L-927;/ No,6 1;/ 191:

"eason of the ruleB To preserve Dfamily cohesionE.

Ahen privilege may be invo?edB the privilege may no: be invo?ed in both civil and criminal cases. 76 $dmissions (nd Confessions !e)tion 2<6A$mission of a part&. M The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. 1. (dmission defined. (n admission is a voluntary ac?no:ledgement in e=press terms or by implication, by a party interest or by another by :hose statement he is legally bound, against his interest, of the e=istence or truth of a fact in dispute material to the issue.

#. (dmission lassified. (dmission may be classified into judicial, e=tra-judicial, e=press and implied. E=press admissions- made in e=press terms and of the very fact in issue or in dispute. +mplied admissions- those :hich result from an act done or undone.

8ut a distinction must be made bet:een confessions and admissions. ( confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and :ithout compulsion or inducement, stating or ac?no:ledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other had, is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused :hich do not directly involve an ac?no:ledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense :ith :hich he is charged. The statutory provision e=cluding evidence as to confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation is laid not applicable to admissions, :hich do not amount to confessions although they may be sufficient, :hen ta?en together :ith other evidence of surrounding circumstances to sustain an inference of the guilt of the accused. The reason for the rule e=cluding evidence as to confessions unless it is first made to appear that they are made voluntarily does not apply in cases of admissions, although, of course, evidence of the fact that a particular statement :as made under duress :ould tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value.

$.

ertainty. (n admission should possess the same degree of certainty as :ould be re@uired in the evidence :hich it represents, and hence mere conjectures or suggestions as to :hat might have happened are not competent. distinguished from

A6 $dmission distinguished de)-(r(tion (g(inst interest6 (dmissionB !rimary evidence.

from

:6 $dmission )onfession6

"eceivable :hen declarant is available as :itness. ompetent declarant is a party to the action. 5eclaration against interestB %econdary evidence. only :hen

(dmissionB usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused :hich do not directly involved an ac?no:ledgement of the

"eceivable only declarant is unavailable as :itness.

:hen

ompetent even if declarant is not a party to the action.

+t may be introduced in evidence in t:o :aysB a- as independent evidence, and b- as impeaching evidence. a- $s inde.endent e,iden)e- admission are original evidence and no foundation is necessary for their introduction of evidence. i. 3ral (dmissions. (dmission :as made orally, it may proved by any competent :itnesses :ho heard them. PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE!, vs. CO!EFIN$ N6 !$"!ON, %6R6 No6 L-1:11; "(r)h 29/ 19<7 The appellant claims that there is no competent evidence that the victim and the appellant :ere husband and :ife. The claim is :ithout merit. The testimon& of the appe""ant on $irect eAamination $isc"ose$ se%era" times that she 'as marrie$ to the $ecease$ in #oth Church an$ ci%i" marriages ! On cross eAamination) she testifie$ on the eAact $ate of her marriage to the $ecease$ 1( Ju"& *+4(7 an$ the p"ace 1Pi"i) Camarines 2ur7 'here the& 'ere marrie$ 2he $i$ not on"& a$mit that the $ecease$ 'as her hus#an$ #ut a"so #rought out the fact that out of the marriage the& ha$ fi%e chi"$ren an$ that on"& three are "i%ing) name"&9 G"en$a) :anue" an$ =e"iA +ndeed, there could be no better proof of marriage in a parricide case than the admission by the accused of the e=istence of such marriage. &ore, "amon &. 4elasco, mayor of 2ibon, (lbay, and uncle of the deceased testified that :hen he sa: the appellant in the afternoon of 1$ 3ctober 19)' at the municipal jail, she immediately begged for his forgiveness and told him that she had shot her husband !epe ,referring to the deceased- because the latter had a mistress and she could not bear or suffer it any longer. $dmission m(de o,er te-e.hone6 (n admission made in a telephone conversion may be proved, :here the :itness identified the spea?er by his voice or other:ise, and there is no doubt as to the identity of the person :ho made the admission. $dmissions m(de through inter.reter6 ( competent oral admission may be made through an interpreter, :here such method of conversation is, in some manner, voluntarily adopted by the parties.

<6 $dmission distinguished from )ontr(di)tion6 (dmission is for a party-opponent.

se-f-

%elf-contradiction is to :itness- a statement made some:here else, and inconsistent :ith his allegations of claim or defense in the case on trial. @6 Re-e,(n)2 (nd m(teri(-it26 +n order that a statement offered as an admission may be received it must, at the time :hen it is offered be relevant to, and have a material bearing on the issues in the case.

$D"I!!ION &# $C (dmission implied from conduct or utterance of a party. %ENER$L !4IPPIN% CO6/ INC6/ vs. 5OR+"ENM! CO"PEN!$ ION CO""I!!ION %6R6 No6 L-1:97< Cu-2 7;/ 19<; The record also sho:s that the company has voluntarily paid a part of the compensation, :hich circumstances li?e:ise indicates admission of the compensability of the claim, ,8achrach &otor o. +nc. vs. 5omingo !analigan, 99 !hil., #$8. )# 3ff. 9aI., U7V $)8$-. The above facts are admissions against interest and admissible in evidence against the respondent company ,%ec. 7, "ule 1#$, "ules of ourt-. There may be no other evidence presented by the claimant but the admissions of the company as above-indicated together :ith the causes stated in the claim, are sufficient evidence to sustain the decision sought herein to be set aside. The finding that the claim is compensable involves an e=ercise of discretion by the Aor?menOs ompensation ommission and the same should not be disturbed on appeal because there is no abuse thereof. $D"I!!ION &# DECL$R$ ION

i.

Aritten (dmissions. Ahen the admission is in a private document, there must be some proof of the authenticity or identity of the document in accordance :ith %ection #<, "ule 1$# of the "evised "ules of ourt, that is, the party offering it must prove its due e=ecution and authenticity.

There is nothing in the description contained in this document :hich indicates that it is the same land described in the complaint in this action. The !laintiff, ho:ever, testified that it :as, and that he had been in possession thereof from 18>< to 19<#, :hen he :as dispossessed by the 5efendants. There is no other evidence in the case :hich relates to any of the 5efendants e=cept to the 5efendant Tran@uilino 8ascos. (s to him the !laintiff introduced in evidence a document signed by 8ascos in &ay, 189$. This document stated that the tract of land for :hich 8ascos had obtained the deed from the %tate had been returned by him to its former o:ner, the !laintiff. +t sho:ed that the 5efendant 8ascos had not delivered the possession of this land to the !laintiff, and his claim is that he :as induced to sign the document by reason of threats made at the time by the parish priest of the locality. +t is claimed by the !laintiff that this document operated as a transfer of the title of the land from the 5efendant 8ascos to the !laintiff. Ae do not thin? that it can be given any such effect. +t amounted, in our opinion, only to an e=trajudicial admission that the !laintiff :as the o:ner of the land. +t :as competent for the 5efendant to overcome the effect of this admission by evidence sho:ing that the !laintiff :as not in fact the o:ner of the land, and the evidence produced by the 5efendant did, in our opinion, prove that the !laintiff :as not the o:ner. $!UNCION %EFE!, vs. !$LVIO/ E $L6 , %6R6 No6 L-1178@/ Fe0ru(r2 @/ 191@ The fact is indisputable that these lands did not belong to the defendant, and if he bought them at public auction in 5ecember, 19<8, for !>>1, he did so :ith his :ife (suncionGs o:n money. This is evidenced by E=hibit (, a document signed by the said %alvio before the notary 6icolas Tomas on &arch #7, 19<9, in :hich he clearly sets forth that the said sum of !>>1, !hilippine currency, :hich he paid for the properties above-mentioned, belonged to the private funds of his :ife (suncion 9efes. 0e furthermore declared in the said document that she :as the true and absolute o:ner of the said lands by him purchased out of his :ifeGs funds and in her behalf. This document :as ratified before a notary and attests the truth of all its contents, even against third persons. The defendantGs denial of its authenticity is not supported by any reliable evidence, nor by the affidavit ,record, p. 7)presented for the purpose of obtaining a reopening

(dmission made in letters. Ahere the statement offered against a party is in the form of a :ritten declaration, such admissions re@uires greater :eight than mere verbal admissions. (dmissions made in documents or memoranda.

"UNICIP$LI # OF O$!/ vs. RO$/%6R6 No6 L-2;1@ No,em0er 2:/ 19;< The t:o statements signed by "oa, one in 189# and the other in 189$, are competent evidence against him. They are admissions by him to the effect that at that time the pueblo :as the o:ner of the property in @uestion. They are, of course, not conclusive against him. 0e :as entitled to, and did present evidence to overcome the effect of these admissions. The evidence does not ma?e out a case of estoppel against him. ,sec. $$$, par. 1, ode of ivil !rocedure.The admissibility of these statements made by "oa do not rest upon section #78 of the ode of ivil !rocedure, :hich relates to declarations or admissions made by persons not a party to the suit, but it rests upon the principle that :hen the defendant in a suit has himself made an admission of any fact pertinent to issue involved, it can be received against him. EV$N%ELI! $/ ,s6 &$!CO!/ E 2772/ No,em0er 1;/ 19;A6 $L6/ %6R6 No6

The evidence does not sho: that he has any documentary title to any of the land. 0e introduced in evidence a paper, e=ecuted by the principales of the to:n in 18><, :hich purported to give him and 2eonardo Evangelista the o:nership of a certain tract of land in said barrio for the purpose of cultivating the same. The title to this land could not have been granted by this instrument, because the persons e=ecuting it had no po:er to convey it.

of the case. *urthermore, it is to be noted that the defendant %alvio cannot be heard to repudiate :hat he solemnly declared in a notarial document. (dmissions made in previous case. 4E UNI ED ! $ E!/ vs. C4IN% PO %6R6 No6 L@@;@/ De)em0er </ 19126 The procedure in criminal cases in the !hilippine islands provides that a defendant in a criminal proceeding may be a :itness in his o:n behalf. Ahen he avails himself of this right, he is subject to a rigid cross-e=amination and is bound by his admissions, voluntarily given, in such e=amination. 0is admissions are presumed to be given voluntarily and :hen thus given on a previous trial, they may be used against him in a subse@uent cause. In the "(tter of the Est(te of CO$LUIN$ "IC$RE! DE F$RIn$!6 - ENRILUE DE L$ VE%$/ vs. VICEN E L$VIN %6R6 No6 L-:8@8Fe0ru(r2 2@/ 19;9 2ater in the proceedings an ans:er :as presented in her behalf. +n this she stated that :hat she declared :hen as?ed to recogniIe the authenticity of the documents :as that her deceased husband o:ed 2avin 1,171 pesos and not 1,#$$ pesos. +t does not appear that she signed this ans:er. +t may have been signed by her solicitor. Un$er these circumstances the contents of the ans'er can not #e consi$ere$ as a$missions ma$e #& her 'hich cou"$ #e use$ as e%i$ence against her in another procee$ing entire"& $isconnecte$ 'ith the su#Cect@ matter of the procee$ing in 'hich the ans'er 'as ma$e There is, therefore, nothing in the proceeding of 189' :hich proves either the e=istence of a debt from the husband !aulino 2avin or any recognition of such supposed indebtedness by the deceased. b- $s im.e()hing e,iden)e- if proof of the admissions is sought for impeachment purposes, a proper foundation must be laid for the impeaching @uestions, by calling the attention of such party to his former statement so as to give him an opportunity to e=plain before such admissions are offered in evidence. CU$N #!"$EL G CO6/ INC6, vs.N$%EE& 6 4$!4I" (nd $FIFE $&DO C4E#&$N %OR$#E& %6R6 No6 L-2<2:@/ "(r)h 18/ 192@ The third assignment of error cannot be sustained. +n offering in evidence the testimony given by &r.

0emady and the 0ashims in the earlier case, the defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to the action or their agents. if such had been the case, the testimony :ould have been admissible :ithout the laying of a foundation and :ithout the :itnesses having testified in the case at bar. 8ut the purpose of the offer of the testimony :as evidently to impeach the testimony of the same :itnesses in the present case and if so, a foundation should have been laid by calling the attention of the :itnesses to the former statements so as to give them opportunity to e=plain before the statements :ere offered in evidence. UNI ED ! $ E!, vs. CO!E I6 &$LU#O %6R6 No6 L-1::@</ No,em0er </ 1919 +t is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-e=amination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a :itness. though undoubtedly the matter is to a large e=tent in the discretion of the court. $D"I!!ION &# O"I!!ION (n admission may be implied from an omission. %U IERREE RIV$C(nu(r2 4ER"$NO!, vs. 12/ 19;9/ %6R6 DE L$ No6 :<;:

The plaintiffs having been made it at a certain rate and having notified the defendant thereof it :as clearly his duty to object to the rate if he :as not satisfied :ith it. (s is seen, he made no objection :hatever at the time, and as far as appears never made any objection until he filed his ans:er herein. The evidence is sufficient to sho: that he assented to the rate at :hich the change :as made. The judgment of the court belo: :ith reference to this objection must be sustained. Peo.-e ,6 &e-endre?/ et (-6 :@ O6%6 A17: 5elay in instituting a criminal prosecution unless satisfactorily e=plained, creates suspicion about the motive of the supposed offended party and gives rise to reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. CON! RUC ION/ CONCLU!IVENE!! 5EI%4 OF $D"I!!ION! $ND

onstruction of admissions- Every admission is to be ta?en as an entirety of the fact :hich ma?es for

the one side :ith the @ualifications :hich limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. (dmission not conclusive evidence- The general rule is that admissions are not conclusive :hen proved, but maybe disproved by ordinary evidence. This rule is not affected by the fact that the admission :as made under oath as a :itness or other:ise. Aeight to be given to evidence of admissions may depend upon various matters affecting its accuracy. !ELF-!ERVIN% DECL$R$ ION! %elf-serving declarations are uns:orn statements made by the declarant out of the court and :hich are favorable to his interests. %elf-serving declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, :hether they arose by implications from acts and conduct or :ere made orally or reduced in :riting. 3bjectionsB hearsay character. untrust:orthy declarations, open door to fraud and perjuries. 5eath does not render self-serving declarations admissible.

the pistol of the deceased to the moment :hen he presented it to the authorities together :ith his o:n, lay strong grounds for the belief that appellant concocted the jamming of the pistol so as to enable him to present in court a self-serving evidence. 4E %OVERN"EN !ERVICE IN!UR$NCE !#! E"/ vs. U! ODIO/%6R6 No6 L-2<1@;/ C(nu(r2 2@/ 19<9 (s to the appellantsO having repudiated their signatures, the same :as a self-serving act, more indicative of a belated intention to s@uirm out of a disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it :ith open eyes, :hich is no ground for setting the same aside ,6oble vs. ity of &anila, >7 !hil. 1-. ertainly, it should ta?e much :eightier proof to invalidate a :ritten instrument ,cf. &endeIona vs. !hil. %ugar Estates, '1 !hil. '9$. 8an? of the !hil. +s. vs. *idelity %urety o., )1 !hil. )7-. !ersons :hose uns:orn declarations in behalf of a party are not admissible in favor of the latter areB 1agents, as regards their principal. #- a guardian, as regards his :ard. $- a co-defendant or co-partner, as regards the other. '- a principal, as regards his surety. )- a husband or :ife, as regards his or her spouse. >- an employee, as regards his employer. 7officers of the corporation, as regards the corporation. 8- a public officer, as regards a public corporation. and 9- predecessors in title, as regards an o:ner of the property. PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE!/ vs.$URELIO $LVERO '(-i(s RELI* %6R6 No6 L-82;/ $.ri- 11/ 19A;6 (s a rule, diaries are inadmissible because they are self-serving in nature, unless they have the nature of boo?s of account ,)1 2. ". (. U6.%V, 81$-81)-. but it has also been held that an entry in a diary being in the nature of a declaration, if it :as against interest :hen made, is admissible. %elf-serving declarations made by a party are admissible in his o:n behalf in the follo:ing casesB 1- :hen they form part of res gestae, including spontaneous statements, and verbal acts. #- :hen they are in the form of complaint and e=clamation of pain and suffering. $- :hen they are part of a confession offered by the prosecution. '- :here the credibility of a party has been assailed on the ground that his testimony is a recent fabrication, provided they :ere made at a time :hen a motive to misrepresent did not e=ist. )- Ahen they are offered by the opponent.

LI"-C4IN%CO/vs. ER$RIR$#/ E 2127/ O)to0er 7/ 19;A

$L ., %6R6 No6

!laintiff also offered in evidence another :ritten document, :hich :as a protest made by the defendants against this inventory, on the ground that it did not include the land in @uestion. The court refused to admit this document, to :hich the plaintiff e=cepted. The claim of the plaintiff is that the inventory made by the e=ecutor contained the same lands as those described in the :ill of &arcelo, and conse@uently that the protest made by the defendants :as an admission that the :ill did not describe these lands. +t does not appear from the evidence in the case that the lands described in this inventory are the same as those described in the :ill. There :as no error in this ruling. PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE!/ vs. &EDI$/%6R6 No6 L-22A2/ "(2 71/ 19:9 (ppellantOs defense hinges on the jamming of the deceasedOs pistol. 0is theory is that the deceased failed to fire his pistol because it jammed :hen he attempted to fire the first shot against appellant. +t appears, ho:ever, upon e=pert testimony on record, that the jamming of the firearm :as due not to any mechanical defect but to intentional insertion of a bullet from the outside into the pistolOs barrel. The fact that the appellant had e=perience in handling firearms and the fact that it too? him more than the necessary length of time from the moment he too?

>- Ahen they are offered :ithout objection, the evidence cannot after:ard be objected to as incompetent. PEOPLE OF 4E P4ILIPPINE!/ vs. DE"I$R%6R6 No6 L-1A17;/ "(2 71/ 19<; +t is also contended for appellant that the trial court erred in admitting appellantOs letter to his brother-inla: 2ope &ayol ,E=h. (- and that there is nothing in the letter :hich :ould sho: that appellant admitted his guilt. (ppellant argues that, instead of considering said letter as evidence indicative of his guilt, the trial court should have considered it in his favor, because he disclaimed therein as?ed forgiveness from his sisters and begged them to testify that their mother died of natural illness and not of strangulation, :e fail to see :hy said statements could not be ta?en as an admission of appellantOs guilt. (s to the argument that said letter should have been considered in appellantOs favor, it may stated that self-serving statements made e=trajudicially cannot be admitted as evidence in favor of the person ma?ing them, although the incriminating statement is evidence against him. !e)tion 2@6Offer of )om.romise not (dmissi0-e6 M In ci%i" cases) an offer of compromise is not an a$mission of an& "ia#i"it&) an$ is not a$missi#"e in e%i$ence against the offeror In crimina" cases) eAcept those in%o"%ing /uasi@ offenses 1crimina" neg"igence7 or those a""o'e$ #& "a' to #e compromise$) an offer of compromise$ #& the accuse$ ma& #e recei%e$ in e%i$ence as an imp"ie$ a$mission of gui"t A p"ea of gui"t& "ater 'ith$ra'n) or an unaccepte$ offer of a p"ea of gui"t& to "esser offense) is not a$missi#"e in e%i$ence against the accuse$ 'ho ma$e the p"ea or offer An offer to pa& or the pa&ment of me$ica") hospita" or other eApenses occasione$ #& an inCur& is not a$missi#"e in e%i$ence as proof of ci%i" or crimina" "ia#i"it& for the inCur& Com.romise defined ompromise is an agreement made bet:een t:o or more parties as a settlement of matters in dispute. Offer of )om.romise in )i,i- )(ses (n offer to compromise in civil cases does not amount to an admission of liability. +t is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. Offer of )om.romise in )rimin(- )(ses

+n criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 5hen offer of )om.romise in )rimin(- )(ses not (n im.-ied (dmission of gui-t Curis.ruden)e: U6! ,s6 orres '7: Phi-6 99:* +n criminal cases :here compromise is allo:ed by la:, as in opium or usury cases, no implied admission of guilt arises against the accused :ho ma?es an offer to compromise. The ollector of +nternal "evenue may compromise any civil or other case arising under the Ta= ode or other la: or part of la: administered by the 8ureau of +nternal "evenue. %imilarly, in criminal cases involving @uasioffenses ,criminal negligence- an offer of compromise does not constitute an implied admission of guilt. Ci,i- Code .ro,isions on )om.romise 6o compromise @uestions shall be validB upon the follo:ing

The civil status of persons The validity of a marriage or a legal separation (ny ground for legal separation *uture support The jurisdiction of courts *uture legitime

P(2ment of medi)(- (nd simi-(r e3.enses The traditional ground for this rule is that the payment or offer is usually made from the humane impulses and not from an admission of liability. !e)tion 286$dmission 02 third .(rt26 M The rights of a part& cannot #e preCu$ice$ #& an act) $ec"aration) or omission of another) eAcept as hereinafter pro%i$e$ %ener(- ru-e: 1nless he assents thereto, a party to an action cannot be affected by the admission of a person :ho does not occupy to:ard him any relation of privity, agency, or joint interest. The act, declaration or omission of another is generally

irrelevant and that in justice a person should not be bound by the acts of mere unauthoriIed strangers. E3)e.tions: (dmission by a co-partner (dmission by an agent (dmission by joint o:ner or debtor or one jointly interested (dmission by conspirator (dmission by privies

that the admission :as made during the e=istence of the agency

Re(son for the ru-e (s a general rule parties are not chargeable :ith the declarations of the agents, unless such declarations or statement are made during the transaction of business by the agent for the principal and in relation to such business, and :hile :ithin the scope of agency. +n other :ords, :hat is so done, by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as a mere instrument. $dmission 02 1oint o=ner/ 1oint de0tor/ or other .erson 1oint-2 interested =ith the .(rt2 that there e=ists a joint interest bet:een the joint o:ner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested :ith the part and such party, :hich joint inter must first be made to appear by evidence other than the act of declaration itself that the act or declaration :as made :hile the interest :as subsisting that the act relate to the subject matter of the joint interest for other:ise it :ould be immaterial and irrelevant

!e)tion 296$dmission 02 )o-.(rtner or (gent6 J The act or $ec"aration of a partner or agent of the part& 'ithin the scope of his authorit& an$ $uring the eAistence of the partnership or agenc&) ma& #e gi%en in e%i$ence against such part& after the partnership or agenc& is sho'n #& e%i$ence other than such act or $ec"aration The same ru"e app"ies to the act or $ec"aration of a Coint o'ner) Coint $e#tor) or other person Coint"& intereste$ 'ith the part& Re8uisites for the ru-e $dmission 02 .(rtner That the partnership be previously proven by evidence other than the admission itself That the admission refers to a matter :ithin the scope of his authority That the admission :as made during the e=istence of the partnership

Person 1oint-2 interested =ith the .(rt2 The mere fact that several persons have a common interest, as contradistinguished from a joint interest, in the subject matter involved in the suit, does not render their admissions competent against each other. This is properly true :ith regard to rights under :ill. There may be many legatees and devisees, but, although they derive their benefit from a common source ,testator- they clearly have no rights based on the benefit of each other. They have interest in common in that each derives his interest form the same source. but plainly they have no joint interest through any relation inter se. !e)tion 7;6$dmission 02 )ons.ir(tor6 M The act or $ec"aration of a conspirator re"ating to the conspirac& an$ $uring its eAistence) ma& #e gi%en in e%i$ence against the co@conspirator after the conspirac& is sho'n #& e%i$ence other than such act of $ec"aration Re8uisites of the ru-e that the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself

Re(son for the ru-e The admissions of one partner are received against another, not on the ground that they are parties to the record, but on the ground that they are identified in interest, and that each is agent for the other, and that the acts or declarations of one during the e=istence of the partnership, :hile transacting, :hile transacting its business and :ithin the scope of the business are evidence against the other or others. $dmission 02 (gent that the agency be previously proved by evidence other than the admission itself that the admission refers to a matter :ithin the scope of his authority

that the admission relates to the common object it has been made :hile the declarant :as engaged in carrying out the conspiracy

each is liable for the result of his act in the degree and manner of participation. !e)tion 716$dmission 02 .ri,ies6 M <here one $eri%es tit"e to propert& from another) the act) $ec"aration) or omission of the "atter) 'hi"e ho"$ing the tit"e) in re"ation to the propert&) is e%i$ence against the former Pri,it2 (nd .ri,ies defined

=o re8uisites (re ne)ess(r2 for the e3isten)e of ( )ons.ir()2 determination or decision to act, that is, a definite purpose to commit a crime agreement or meeting of the minds of t:o or more persons

Pri,it2 means mutual succession relationship to the same right of property.

of

Curis.ruden)e: Peo.-e ,s6 C(r0one- ':7 Phi-6 <A/ @8* +f it is proved that t:o or more persons aimed by their acts to:ards the accomplishment of the same unla:ful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, :ere in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. R(din ,s6 U6!6/ 189 Fed6 A<8/ A@; 111 CC$ < onspirators do not go out upon the public high:ays and proclaim their intentions. They accomplish their purpose by dar? and sinister methods and must be judged by their acts. Peo.-e ,s6 C(t(o/ %6R6 No6 L-9A72 Cune 7;/ 19<; +t is enough that from the individual acts of each accused, it may be reasonably deduced that they had a common plan to commit the felony. Peo.-e ,s6 !i-,estre 'A< Phi-6 7A7* +t is :ell-?no:n rule that, :ithout the proof of conspiracy, mere passive presence at the scene of anotherGs crime does not constitute complicity. F(i-ure to .ro,e )ons.ir()2 Peo.-e ,s6 C((2(o/ '%6R6 No6 L-:;7A/ De)em0er 1</ 19:9* Ahere there is lac? of proof of conspiracy, the responsibility of the accused is individual and

Pri,ies are those :ho have mutual or successive relationship to the same right of property or subject matter, such as personal representative, heirs, devisees, legatees, assignes, voluntary grantees or judgement creditors or purchases from them :ith notice of the facts. Re(son for the ru-e +t is an established rule of evidence that the declarations of a person under :hom title is claimed are receivable against the successor so claiming, on the theory that there is sufficient identity of interest to render the statements of the former e@ually receivable :ith the admissions of the present o:ner, and that the rights of the latter are those, and only those, of the former.

The principle on :hich such evidence is received is that the declarant :as so situated that he probably ?ne: the truth, and his interest :ere such that he :ould not have made the admissions to the prejudice of his title or possession, unless they :ere true. The regard :hich one so situated :ould have to his interest is considered sufficient security against falsehood. Limit(tions of ru-e The most important limitations upon the admission in evidence of admissions of a predecessor in interest, or other privy, is that such evidence is not admissible to contradict the terms of :ritten instrument, as for e=ample, to vary the tenor of a deed or destroy the record title. +t :ould be an anomaly in our la: if by the rules of evidence, titles to real estate can be made to depend on the mere declaration of a prior o:ner, :hen every contact for the sale of land is re@uired to be in :riting and title can only be conveyed by deed. %uch declarations are not admissible to affect the title to lands, although they may be admitted to e=plain the character of a possession.

0ence, in as much as the basis of admissibility of the statement is privity, it cannot be used against on :ho claims no under, but against the interest derived from the grantor. %uch a claim cannot be affected be the mere declarations of the holder of an adverse title :hich, in that case, are a?in to self- serving statement. Three e=ceptions are recogniIed to the rule that declarations of the transferor, made subse@uent to the transfer, are admissibleB :here the declarations are made in the presence of the transferee and he ac@uiesces in the statements, or asserts no rights :here he ought to spea? Ahere there has been a prima facie case of fraud established as :here the thing granted has a corpus and the possession of the thing after the sale or transfer, remains :ith the seller or transferor. Ahere the evidence establishes a continuing conspiracy to defraud, :hich conspiracy e=ists bet:een the vendor and the vendee

instinct of nature, :hich leads us to resist an unfounded demand. The rule rests on that universal principle of human conduct :hich leads us to repel an unfounded imputation or claim. Ru-e (..-i)(0-e in )rimin(- (s =e-- (s in )i,i)(ses The rule allo:ing silence of a person to be ta?en as an implied admission of the truth of the allegation uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal as :ell as in civil cases. RULE 17; !EC ION 77 Confession ; he de)-(r(tion of (n ())used ()Dno=-edging his gui-t of the offense )h(rged/ or of (n2 offense ne)ess(ri-2 in)-uded therein/ m(2 0e gi,en in e,iden)e (g(inst him6 16 !our)e6 > "eproduction of %ection #9, "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt 26 Confession defined6 ; onfession is an ac?no:ledgement by the accused that he is guilty of the crime charged. 76 Confession distinguished from (dmission6 ;( DconfessionE is a declaration made at any time by a person voluntarily, stating or ac?no:ledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term Dadmission,E on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused :hich do not directly involve an ac?no:ledgement of guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense :ith :hich he is charged. :6 Confession confessionB )-(ssified6 ; # ?inds of

!e)tion 726$dmission 02 si-en)e6 IAn act or $ec"aration ma$e in the presence an$ 'ithin the hearing or o#ser%ation of a part& 'ho $oes or sa&s nothing 'hen the act or $ec"aration is such as natura""& to ca"" for action or comment if not true) an$ 'hen proper an$ possi#"e for him to $o so) ma& #e gi%en in e%i$ence against him Re8uisites of the ru-e That he heard and understood the statement That he :as at liberty to interpose a denial That the statement :as in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in :hich he as ten interested, and calling, naturally, for an ans:er That the facts :ere :ithin his ?no:ledge That the facts admitted or the inference to be dra:n from his silence :ould be material to the issue.

a. /udicial confession ; those made in conformity to la: before a committing magistrate or in court in the course of legal proceedings b. E=trajudicial confession ; those :hich are made by a party else:here than before a magistrate or in court. A6 Form of )onfession6 ;( confession is not re@uired to be in any particular form. +t may be oral or :ritten, formal or informal in character.

Re(son for the ru-e The rule that the silence of a party against :ho a claim or a right is asserted may be construed as an admission of the truth of the assertion rests on that

<6 Rights of ( .erson under in,estig(tion6 ; 1nder the onstitution, Dany person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his o:n choice. +f the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided :ith one. These rights cannot be :aived e=cept in :riting and in the presence of counsel.E @6 9iranda re8uirements6 ; +n order to combat the pressures and to permit a full opportunity to e=ercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be ade@uately and effectively apprised of his rights and the e=ercise of those rights must be fully honored. ,!lease read &iranda v. (riIona, $8' 1.%. '$>, 199>86 5(rning of si-en)e6 ; +f a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and une@uivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. *or those una:are of the privilege, the :arning is needed simply to ma?e them a:are of it. The :arning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the e=planation that anything said can and :ill be used against the individual court. 96 5(rning of right to )ounse-6 ;(n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult :ith a la:yer and to have the la:yer :ith him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege. 1;6 5(i,er of rights6 ; +f the interrogation continues :ithout the presence of an attorney and a statement is ta?en, a heavy burden on the government to demonstrate that the defendant ?no:ingly and intelligently :aived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retain or appointed counsel. ( valid :aiver :ill not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after :arnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession :as in fact eventually obtained.

116 United !t(tes )ourt de)ision sin)e 9iranda6 ; !lease read &iranda v. (riIona ,$8' 1.%. '$>, 8> %. t. 1><#,a1%T357 "ES1+"E&E6T - The :iran$a ourt limited its holding to situations in :hich Da person has been ta?en into custody or other:ise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant :ay.E

,b- +6TE""39(T+36 ; (n accused may not yet be entitled to the :iran$a :anings, due to the fact that no interrogation as D@uestioning initiated by la: enforcement officers.E ( statement freely and voluntarily made :ithout compelling influence is admissible into evidence. ,c- A("6+69% ; +t is the point :hen the accused is in custody and the police :ish to interrogate him that :iran$a re@uires the :arnings to be given. The :arnings need not be given :ord for :ord to the accused, though substantial compliance is re@uired. ,d- A(+4E" ; (fter :arnings are given, :iran$a presents the accused :ith three options. 0e can :aive his right to remain silent and to an attorney and tal? to the police, prevent police @uestioning by asserting his right to remain silent, or prevent @uestioning by as?ing for an attorney. ,e- TE"&+6(T+36 3* (65 8"E(C% +6 T0E +6TE""39(T+36 ; (fter :iran$a, the accused may terminate the interrogation by re@uest. ,f- !"E%E6 E 3* 316%E2 ; The presence of counsel is Dthe ade@uate protective device necessary to ma?e the process of police interrogation conforms to the dictates of the privilege.E ,g- *1"T0E" 5E*+6+69 T0E % 3!E 3* :IRANDA ; The :iran$a decision did not limit its holding only to certain ?inds of offenses, though some lo:er courts have held that :arnings are inapplicable to misdemeanors or traffic violations.

,h- +&!( T 3* :IRANDA 36 3T0E" %T(65("5% ; The :iran$a holding impinged upon several court and legislatively created rules. ,i36 21%+36% ; The la: of confessions has moved from the caseby-case, totality of the circumstances analysis that e=isted under the due process voluntariness approach to the application of the definite standards announced in the :iran$a opinion. (s the la: of confessions stands no:, after :iran$aB ,1- 1ncensored admissions are admissible if made before an individual is in custody or if they are spontaneous in the sense that an interrogation by the police has not yet begun. ,#- 0o:ever, admissions that occur during a custodial interrogation are not admissible to establish guilt unless the accused is given the :iran$a :arnings. ,$- Aaiver of the :iran$a right must be voluntary and intelligent. ,'- The accused has the right to stop an interrogation at any time, :hich can be accomplished merely by refusing to ans:er @uestions or by as?ing to see an attorney. ,)- (s a general rule, confessions that :ere voluntarily made under a Dtotality of the circumstancesE test. 126 Constitution(.ro,ision '9iranda do)trine* h(s no retro()ti,e effe)t6 > ( confession obtained before the effectivity of the 197$ onstitution, even if accused had not been informed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence. 176 &(si) test for ,(-idit2 of )onfession6 ; The basic test for the validity of a confession is ; :as it voluntarily and freely made. 1:6 No .resum.tion of ,o-unt(riness6 ; The prosecution must prove that an e=trajudicial confession :as voluntarily given, instead of

relying on a presumption and re@uiring the accused to offset it. 1A6 hre(ts/ ,io-en)e/ torture or fe(r6 ; onfessions obtained by putting the accused in fear by means of threats of violence to the person of the accused made to obtain his confession are generally inadmissible in evidence since they are involuntary in character. Threats, violence, torture or fear (ny confession or admission by the accused obtained through torture, force, violence, threat, intimidations, any other means :hich vitiates the free :ill shall be inadmissible as evidence against him. onfession secured by Dthird-degreeE methods E=amplesB 1. onfession secured from an accused after he had been subjected to almost continuous e=amination by police officers. #. 3ne secured by a protracted searching e=amination by public officials accompanied by threats, invective and false statements and profanity. $. 3ne secured by @uestioning a suspect throughout a night and hitting him :ith clubs. - onfessions e=tracted through these means is inadmissible in evidence. ,b- !romise of benefit or re:ard ( confession induced or influenced by promises made to the accused :hich hold out a hope of benefit or a re:ard or a promise of immunity is not a voluntary confession and is not admissible in evidence

,a-

,c- Ahat constitutes benefit The term DbenefitE, :hen used in connection :ith the procurement of a confession, means a temporal or :orldly benefit. To ma?e the confession

involuntary, the benefit :hich influences a confession must not only be temporal, but have reference to the personGs escape from punishment for the crime :ith :hich he is charged or his partial escape. ,d- 3ffer of re:ard or pardon ( confession influenced by the promise of a pardon is involuntary and inadmissible in evidence against the person ma?ing it.

( common form of threat :hich renders a confession involuntary is that the accused :ill be prosecuted if he does not confess. 8ut it is clear that an unconditional threat to prosecute does not render a resulting confession of involuntary.

,j- *orce or violence need not be inflicted upon the confessor +f :ithin his hearing and almost in his immediate presence, physical violence is inflicted upon his co-defendant, his confession made thereafter should be rejected for lac? of that free and voluntary character :hich :ould other:ise give it value as evidence.

,e- !romise of immunity or not to prosecute or to compromise ( promise not to prosecute the accused or to compromise the matter, made by the person personally injured by the commission of the offense, might :ell be deemed to create such a hope of benefit as :ould render the statement of the accused of doubtful credibility.

,?- (ge, mental condition, or intelligence of confessor 1pon the @uestion :hether a confession is voluntary, the age, the character and situation of the accused at the time the confession :as made is an important consideration.

,f- 5eception or promise of secrecy The employment of any artifice, deception, or fraud to obtain a confession does not render it inadmissible, if the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement.

,l- +nsanity Ahile the mere fact that the accused is not in the full possession of his faculties at the time of a confession does not necessarily render it inadmissible or involuntary, evidence of insanity or mental :ea?ness :hich :ould be sufficient to render the defendant incompetent to testify is sufficient to render his confession incompetent

,g- (dvice and e=hortation to confess or tell the truth ( confession is not rendered involuntary by telling the accused that it :ould be better for him to spea? or tell the truth nor a sufficient inducement to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied.

,m- &ental incapacity ( confession may be involuntary because of ignorance or mental incapacity of the accused at the time of ma?ing the confession sought to be introduce in evidence.

,h- Effect of refusal to ?eep the agreement to turn stateGs :itness +f a confession is obtained on the assurance that the accused :ill be used as a stateGs :itness and he after:ards repudiates the agreement, such confession may be used against him as a voluntary confession.

,n- +nto=ication The into=icated condition of the accused at the time of ma?ing a confession does not, unless such into=ication goes to the e=tent of mania, affect the admissibility in evidence of such confession if it :as other:ise a voluntary one, although the

,i- Threats to prosecute

fact of into=ication may affect its :eight and credibility :ith the court. ,oonfession made :hile asleep Aords uttered by the accused :hile sleeping are involuntary and cannot be admitted in evidence against him as a confession.

violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. 2;6 Confession of third .ersons ( confession on the part of a third person that he committed the crime :hich the defendant is charged :ith having committed, even though it is made in e=pectation of imminent death or by a person jointly indicted :ith the accused, is not admissible as substantive evidence tending to e=culpate the accused :here the confession does not constitute a part of res gestae.

1<6 $dmonition to 1udges/ fis)(-s (nd other offi)ers /udges, fiscals and other officers to :hom persons accused of a crime are brought for s:earing the truth of their statements D to adopt the practice of having the confessants physically and thoroughly e=amined by independent and @ualified doctors before administering the oath, even if it is not re@uested by the accused.

216 !e,er(- )onfessions The rule is that if one confession is obtained by such methods as to ma?e it involuntary, all subse@uent confessions made :hile the accused is under operation of the same influence are also involuntary. 0o:ever, a confession other:ise voluntary is not affected by the fact that a previous one :as obtained by improper influences if it is sho:n that these influences are not operating :hen the later confession is made.

!urposeB %horten and speed up criminal trials , :here the accused persons almost invariably repudiate their confessions- by precluding future controversies on :hether the statements :ere obtained through torture or not. 1@6 Pro,ing )onfession (n oral admission on the part of an accused indicating guilty complicity in the commission of the crime :ith :hich he is charged is admissible in evidence, though not reduced to :riting, or if reduced into :riting, though not signed by him.

226 P(rti(- or unfinished )onfession ( partial or unfinished confession :hich :as interrupted :hile the defendants :as rendering it is not admissible in evidence. -e(rned through (n

186 &urden of .roof The heavy burden is on the prosecution because the %tate is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstance under :hich the interrogation ta?es place and has the only means of ma?ing available corroborated evidence of :arnings given during communicado interrogation. he e3)-usion(r2 ru-e The constitution provides that Dany confession or admission obtained in

276 Confession inter.reter -

( confession cannot be received in evidence by the testimony of a :itness :ho, although present :hen it :as made, learned its purport through an interpreter. %uch testimony is hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible.

196

2:6 Confession su0se8uent to (n in,o-unt(r2 )onfession Ahere a confession has been obtained from the accused by improper inducement, any statement made by him :hile under that influence is inadmissible.

296 5hen )onfession of (n ())used is (dmissi0-e (g(inst his )o-())used The general rule that the confession of an accused may be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent evidence against his co-accused, recogniIes various e=ceptionsB

2A6 Confession of other )rimes ( confession of an offense different from that :ith :hich the accused is charged is not admissible on his trial for the offense charged unless such other offense is a part of the same scheme or so connected :ith the one charged as not to be severed from it. of ,1- Ahen several accused together, the confession one of them during implicating the others is against the latter. are tried made by the trial evidence

2<6 Identifi)(tion (nd introdu)tion )onfession (s e,iden)e -

8efore a confession :ill be admitted into evidence, the prosecution must prove the ma?ing thereof if accused objects that the confession :as not in fact made by him. +n laying a predicate for the admission of a confession, it is proper for the prosecution, as a preliminary @uestion, to in@uire :hether a confession :as made at the time and place of the ma?ing of the confession and the persons present. introdu)ed in

,#- Ahen one of the defendant is charged from the information and testifies as a :itness for the prosecution, the confession made in the course of his testimony is admissible against his codefendants, if corroborated by indisputable proof. ,$- +f a defendant, after having been apprised of the confessions of his co-defendant, ratifies or confirms said confession, the same is admissible against him. ,'- Ahere several e=trajudicial confessions have been made by several persons charged :ith an offense and there could have been no collusion :ith reference to said several confessions, the facts that the statements therein are in all material respects, identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendant and is admissible against co-defendants. This is commonly ?no:n as D+nterloc?ing confession.E ,)- ( statement made by one defendant after his arrest, in the presence of his co-defendant, confessing his guilt and implicating his codefendant :ho failed to contradict or deny it, is admissible against his codefendant. ,>- Ahen the confession is of a conspirator and made after conspiracy and in furtherance of its

2@6 Confession must 0e e,iden)e in its entiret2 -

The :hole confession must be put in evidence by the prosecuting officer. To allo: the introduction of fragments of a confession admitting those indicative of the prisonerGs criminality and suppressing others :hich, by limiting or modifying the former, may establish his innocence, is utterly inconsistent :ith all principles of justice and humanity. (g(inst

286 Confessions (dmissi0-e )onfessor (-one -

Ahile the confession of one of several co-accused may be introduced in evidence against him, it is not competent evidence against his coaccused.

object, the same is admissible against his co-conspirator. ,7- The confession of one conspirator made after the termination of a conspiracy, is admissible against his co-conspirator if made in his presence and assented to by him, or admitted its truth or failed to contradict or deny it. 7;6 5(i,er of o01e)tion (s to (dmissi0i-it2 ( confession offered in evidence and not objected to by the defendant is regarded as prima facie voluntary and therefore, admissible in evidence. of (dmissi0i-it2 of

not do the s(me or ( simi-(r thing (t (nother timeH 0ut it m(2 0e re)ei,ed to .ro,e ( s.e)ifi) intent or Dno=-edge/ identit2/ .-(n/ s2stem/ s)heme/ h(0it/ )ustom or us(ge/ (nd the -iDe6 16 !our)e This provision is a reproduction of %ection '8, "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt :ith the follo:ing differencesB a. The title of the section DEvidence of similar actsE has been changed to D%imilar acts as evidenceE in the present. b. The :ords Domitted toE in the "ules of ourt have been deleted in the present provision. c. The :ords Ddid notE have been added in the present provision. 26 In gener(The general rule is that the la: :ill not consider evidence that a person has done a certain act at a particular time as probative of a contention that he has done a similar act at another time. 0o:ever, there is no rule of la: :hich prevents the trial of collateral issues, since the objection thereto is purely a practical one, and the general rule is that the admission of evidence of similar acts or occurrences as proof that a particular act :as done or that a certain occurrence happened, rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, provided the conditions are substantially the same.

716 Determin(tion )onfession -

The test of a confessionGs admissibility is not the :eight of the testimony or the credibility of the :itness, but the testimonial un:orthiness of the confession. suffi)ien)2 of 1udi)i(-

726 5eight (nd )onfession -

The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and :ith full ?no:ledge of the conse@uences and meaning of his act, and :ith a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information. %uch a plea of guilty, :hen formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information.

76 Re(sons for the ru-e +t is improper for the court to assume that the motive of the previous crimes is continuing and is the basis of the present crime. +f evidence of previous crimes is to be used, the accused shall face charges :hich he has no information and confuses him in his defense. Evidence of collateral matters must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses in the present trial.

776 5eight (nd suffi)ien)2 of e3tr(1udi)i()onfessions (n e=trajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

!e)tion 7:62imi"ar acts as e%i$ence ; E,iden)e th(t one did or did not do ( )ert(in thing (t one time is not (dmissi0-e to .ro,e th(t he did or did

:6 Ru-e must 0e stri)t-2 enfor)ed

The general rule is that evidence is not admissible :hich sho:s that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime :holly independent of the offense of the present trial. ( man may have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the crime presently charged. 3ne :ho commits one crime may be more li?ely to commit another. yet, logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation bet:een them that proof of one tends to prove the other.

aiming at a person, or just cleaning the gun, etc..

b. +n the delivery of money, the intent at that time determines :hether it is a payment, or a loan or a deposit. The personGs conduct is naturally the chief circumstantial evidence of this intent ; as it is also of a plan.

@6 Prior ()ts sho=ing gui-t2 Dno=-edge Evidence :hich tends to sho: scienter or such ?no:ledge on the part of the accused as is necessary to constitute his act a crime is admissible.

A6 E3)e.tions to the gener(- ru-e Evidence of other crimes is admissible :hen such evidenceB al:ays

a. tends directly to establish the particular crime. b. it is usually competent to prove the motive and intent. the absence accident. of mista?e or

E=amplesB a. 3n a charge against P, a cler?, of stealing from his employerGs sage, the safe having been opened by manipulating the combination loc?, P denied having ?no:ledge of such combination. 0ere the fact that P had been seen on a previous instance of surreptitiously opening the safe :ould be admissible to sho: his ?no:ledge.

a common scheme or plan embracing t:o or more crime so related to each other. or, the identity of the person charged :ith the commission of the crime on trial.

b. 3n a charge against W of uttering counterfeit money, to :it, a 1<<-peso bill, the fact that W had tried on other previous occasions, but unsuccessfully, to pay out similar bills to (, 8, and is admissible to evidence his ?no:ledge of the bill in issue being counterfeit.

Ahen the fact of a former crime is an element in the offense charged.

<6 Prior ()ts sho=ing intent +ntent is of course entirely distinct from intention ,design, plan-. The latter is almost al:ays an evidential fact only, but the former is a fact-in-issue, being usually an element of the offense or of the evil act done. +ntent is a specific state of mind at the very time of the act charged. E=amplesB a. +n a shooting, the nature of the offense depends on the state of mind as to 86 Identifi)(tion of ())used 02 .roof of other )rimes 9eneral "uleB Evidence of separate and independent crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt of a person upon trial for a criminal offense.

E=ceptionsB Ahen evidence tends to aid in identifying the accused as the person :ho committed the particular crime under investigation.

There is a logical connection bet:een the crimes that proof on one :ill naturally tend to sho: that the accused is the person :ho committed the other.

176 Ru-e the s(me in )i,i- )(ses (s =e-- (s in )rimin(- .rose)ution +n civil cases the rule as to proof of commission of an act by sho:ing the commission of similar acts by the same person at other times and under other circumstances is the same as in a criminal prosecution. !e)tion 7A6 Unaccepte$ offer > $n offer in =riting to .(2 ( .(rti)u-(r sum of mone2 or to de-i,er ( =ritten instrument or s.e)ifi) .erson(- .ro.ert2 is/ if re1e)ted =ithout ,(-id )(use/ e8ui,(-ent to the ()tu(- .rodu)tion (nd tender of the mone2/ instrument/ or .ro.ert26 16 !our)e This provision is a reproduction of %ection '9, "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt :ith the only difference that the phrase D:ithout valid causeE has been added in the present provision.

96 Prior ()ts sho=ing .-(n/ design/ or s)heme Evidence of other crimes is competent in a criminal trial to prove the specific crime charged :hen it tends to establish a common scheme, plan, or system embracing the commission of t:o or more crimes so related to each other than proof of one tends to establish the others, not:ithstanding the general rule e=cluding evidence :hich sho:s, or tends to sho: that the accused has committed another crime :holly independent of that for :hich he is on trial.

1;6 Prior ()ts sho=ing h(0it or )ustoms 26 Ci,i- Code .ro,ision Evidence of a course of conduct or dealing may be admitted :here pertinent to an issue in the case :hen it fits as deemed by the court. ustoms may, li?e any other facts or circumstances be sho:n :hen their e=istence :ill increase or diminish the probability of an act having been done or not done, :hich act is the subject of contest. 116 Prior ()ts sho=ing neg-igen)e 1pon a criminal prosecution for injuries caused by negligence, evidence of other acts, disconnected though similar, is irrelevant. 0o:ever, :hen a party is charged :ith the negligent use of a dangerous agency, and the case against him is that he did not use care proportionate to the danger, then the @uestion becomes material :hether he ?ne:, or ought to have ?no:n, the e=tent of danger. 126 Proof of su0se8uent offenses (ccording to one of the authorities, evidence of offenses committed subse@uent to the act charged is never admissible in evidence. 3ther authorities favor the admissibility of such proof in certain instances, as in the case of offenses arising out of se=ual intercourse, upon the theory that subse@uent acts disclose the disposition of the parties. +f the creditor to :hom tender of payment has been made refuses :ithout just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. (ccording to the above provision, tender of payment must precede consignation, and only :hen such tender is refused :ithout just cause :ill the consignation of the thing or sum due release the debtor from his obligation. !e)tion 7<6 Testimon& genera""& confine$ to persona" 0no'"e$geD hearsa& eAc"u$e$ > $ =itness )(n testif2 on-2 to those f()ts =hi)h he Dno=s of his .erson(- Dno=-edge/ th(t is/ =hi)h (re deri,ed from his o=n .er)e.tion/ e3)e.t (s other=ise .ro,ided in these ru-es 16 !our)e The :ord Do:nE in the "ules of ourt has been deleted in the present provision and the :ord DpersonalE has been added. 26 %ener(--2 The :itness can testify only to those facts :hich he ?no:s from his personal ?no:ledge, that is, :hich are derived from his o:n perception. 76 4e(rs(2 e,iden)e

 0earsay evidence has been defined as evidence :hich derives its value, not solely from the credit to be given to the :itness upon the stand, but in part from the veracity and competency of some other persons. 0earsay is not limited to oral testimony. :riting may be hearsay. (

+n other :ords, if the fact sought to be established is, that certain :ords :ere spo?en, :ithout reference to the truth or falsity of the :ords, the testimony of any person :ho heard the statement is original evidence and not hearsay.

Evidence is hearsay :hen its probative value depends in :hole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other that the :itness. 0earsay evidence is the evidence not of :hat the :itnesses ?no:s himself but of :hat he has heard from others.

@6 !t(tements =hi)h (re )ir)umst(nti(- e,iden)e of the f()ts in issue The statements from :hich the facts in issue may be inferred, may be testified to by :itnesses :ithout violating the hearsay rule. 3f this ?ind areB a. %tatements of a person sho:ing his state of mind, that is his mental condition, ?no:ledge, belief, intention and other emotions. b. %tatements of a person :hich sho: his physical condition, as illness and the li?e. c. %tatements of a person from :hich an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, ?no:ledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter.

:6 Re(son for e3)-uding he(rs(2 e,iden)e 3ne reason is the fact that hearsay testimony is not subject to the tests :hich can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of the truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for cross-e=amination. The court is :ithout opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person :ho made them.

d. Those :hich may identify the date, place, and person in @uestion. and, e. Those sho:ing the lac? of credibility of a :itness. 86 !t(tements sho=ing the s.e(DerNs st(te of mind ( manGs state of mind or feeling can only be manifested to others by countenance, attitude or gesture, or by sounds or :ords, spo?en or :ritten. 96 !t(tements sho=ing the s.e(DerNs .h2si)()ondition %tatements of a person :hich may fairly sho: his bodily condition at the time he made the statements are admissible as circumstantial evidence of such condition. Ahen the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual e=pression of such feelings are original and competent evidence.

A6 Inde.endent-2 re-e,(nt st(tements The hearsay rule does not apply :here, regardless of the truth or the falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be sho:n.

9roups a. Those statements :hich are the very facts in issue. and, b. Those statements :hich are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. <6 !t(tements =hi)h (re the ,er2 f()ts in issue Ahere the statements, or utterances of specific :ords, are the facts in issue, the testimony of :itnesses thereto is not hearsay.

1;6 !t(tements of ( .erson from =hi)h the st(te of mind of (nother m(2 0e inferred !ertains to ?no:ledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter may be testified to by a :itness :ithout violating the hearsay rule. 116 !t(tements identif2ing the time/ d(te/ .-()e/ or .erson in 8uestion &ay be validly testified to by the :itness. 126 !t(tements of ( =itness im.e()hing his )redi0i-it2 %tatements made out of court are admitted for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching a :itness. ( :itness may be impeached by the party against :hom he :as called . . . by evidence that he had made at other times statements, inconsistent :ith present testimony . . .

The failure of a party to object to the admission of hearsay evidence constitutes a :aiver of his right to ma?e such objection, and, conse@uently, the evidence offered may be admitted. 3bjection to its admission made for the first time on appeal is too late. 1@6 5eight of he(rs(2 e,iden)e (dmitted =ithout o01e)tion The %upreme ourt held that although the @uestion of admissibility of evidence cannot raised for the first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay, it has no probative value and should be disregarded :hether objected or not. 186 "u-ti.-e he(rs(2 There is no good reason :hy a hearsay declaration, :hich :ithin itself contains a hearsay statement, should not be admissible to prove the truth of the included statement, if both the statement and the included statement meet the tests of an e=ception to the hearsay rule. EBCEP ION! O 4E 4E$R!$# RULE !e)tion 7@6 D&ing $ec"aration > he de)-(r(tion of ( d2ing .erson/ m(de under the )ons)iousness of (n im.ending de(th/ m(2 0e re)ei,ed in (n2 )(se =herein his de(th is the su01e)t of in8uir2/ (s e,iden)e of the )(use (nd surrounding )ir)umst(n)es of su)h de(th6 16 D2ing de)-(r(tion defined ( dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts :hich concern the cause and circumstances of the ?illing and :hich is uttered under a belief of an impending death. 26 Re(sons for (dmissi0i-it2 (6 Ne)essit2 ; because the declarantGs death renders impossible his ta?ing the :itness stand. and it happens often that there is o other e@ually satisfactory proof of the crime. 06 rust=orthiness ; since the declaration is made in e=tremity, :hen the party is at the point of death and every hope of this :orld is gone. :hen every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most po:erful considerations to spea? the truth.

176 E,iden)e of ()ting u.on ( st(tement/ not he(rs(2 +f the statement is introduced for the purpose of establishing the fact that a party relied and acted thereon, it is not objectionable on the ground of hearsay. 1:6 !t(tements m(de through inter.reter/ not he(rs(2 "easonB 8oth the original :itness and the interpreter are under oath and subject to crosse=amination. E=ceptionsB a. The interpreter had been selected by common consent of the parties endeavoring to converse. or, b. 8y the party against :hom the statements of the interpreter :ere offered in evidence. 1A6 Presum.tion th(t testimon2 is not he(rs(2 +n the absence of any sho:ing to the contrary, a :itness is presumed to be testifying of his o:n ?no:ledge. 1<6 O01e)tion to he(rs(2 )(nnot 0e r(ised for the first time on (..e(-

76 $dmission un)onstitution(-

of

d2ing

de)-(r(tions

not

+t does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to confront and cross-e=amine the :itness against him, because the person :ho testifies to the dying declarations is the :itness against the accused and the :itness :ith :hom the accused is entitled to be confronted. :6 !)o.e 3nly in homicide cases for the ?illing of the declarant and no: its e=tended to civil cases. A6 Conditions of (dmission of d2ing de)-(r(tions The conditions are as follo:sB a. That death be imminent and that declarant be conscious of that fact. b. That the preliminary facts :hich bring the declaration :ithin its scope be made to appear. c. That the declaration relate to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death. and,

that he :as about to die. it may be laid by sho:ing that the surrounding circumstances :ere of such a character as to satisfy the court that the declarant believed that he :ould die. 86 Introdu)tion of d2ing de)-(r(tions in e,iden)e 02 the ())used +t is settled by a long line of decisions that dying declarations, :hen they tend to e=culpate or e=onerate the defendant, may be introduced by him. +f such declarations are competent evidence to prove facts, it does not matter if such proof tends to ac@uit the defendant, rather than convict him.

96 5hen de)-(r(tion of ( d2ing m(n m(2 0e (dmissi0-e not (s ( d2ing de)-(r(tion 0ut (s .(rt of res gestae Ahere a man after having been seriously :ounded :as ta?en to a municipal building and there he told a person in authority that he had been :ounded by the accused that statement, although not admissible as dying declaration because it :as not made in the belief that the declarant :as about to die, yet it is admissible as part of the res gestae. 1;6 Im.e()hment of d2ing de)-(r(tions

d. That declarant :ould have been competent to testify had he survived.

<6 Form of d2ing de)-(r(tions 6o particular form is re@uired. ( dying declaration may be a communication by means of signs, an oral statement or ejaculation, a mere formal statement, or ans:ers to @uestions put by the person to :hom the declaration is made, a :riting signed by the declarant, or an affidavit.

5ying declarations, :hen admitted, are subject to impeachment in the same manner and for the same causes that the testimony of a :itness given on the :itness stand may be impeached.

116 5eight of d2ing de)-(r(tions 5ying declarations are given great :eight since it is made at the point of death. ourts, ho:ever, must not be unmindful of the fact that men on the very threshold of death had sometimes been s:ayed by a spirit of vindictive revenge or heated passion or by a desire to shield themselves or others even in ma?ing ante-mortem statements.

@6 Introdu)tion of d2ing de)-(r(tion in e,iden)e 02 the .rose)ution ( proper predicate must be laid for the introduction of dying declaration. The proper predicate is the proof that the declarant has made his declaration under a consciousness of impending death. +t is generally a sufficient predicate to sho:, by the repeated assertions of the declarant,

!e)tion 786 Dec"aration against interest > he de)-(r(tion m(de 02 ( .erson de)e(sed/ or un(0-e to testif2/ (g(inst the interest of the de)-(r(nt/ if the f()t (sserted in the de)-(r(tion =(s (t the time it =(s m(de so f(r )ontr(r2 to de)-(r(ntNs o=n interest/ th(t ( re(son(0-e m(n in his .osition =ou-d not h(,e m(de the de)-(r(tion un-ess he 0e-ie,ed it to 0e true/ m(2 0e re)ei,ed in e,iden)e (g(inst himse-f or his su))essors in interest (nd (g(inst third .ersons6 16 !our)e This is a reproduction of %ection $$, "ule 1$< of the "ules :ith the difference that the phrase Dor outside the !hilippinesE and the :ords Dpecuniary or moralE have been deleted in the present provision.

A6 !)o.e +t is safe to assume that the declaration against interest under the present provision has been e=panded to include all ?inds, i.e., pecuniary, proprietary, moral or penal interests. <6 Re8uisites for the de)-(r(tions (g(inst interest (6 testif26 (s in the case :hen he is dead, mentally incapacitated, physically incompetent, of advanced age, or other irremediable cause. (dmissi0i-it2 of

De)-(r(nt must not 0e (,(i-(0-e to

26 Re(sons for the ru-e The necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declarations asserts facts :hich are against his o:n pecuniary or moral interest. 76 De)-(r(tion (g(inst interest distinguished from (dmission a. The admission is not necessarily against the interest of the person :ho made the admission, :hile the present e=ception must be a declaration against interest. b. (n admission may be used although the admitter is still alive, :hile the present e=ception refers to a declaration against interest of a deceased person. and, c. (n admission may be used only against the admitter and those identified :ith him in legal interest :hile a declaration against interest admissible against third persons. :6 De)-(r(tion (g(inst interest distinguished from se-f-ser,ing de)-(r(tion ( self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to that interest of the declarant and not admissible :hile a declaration against the interest is admissible in evidence, not:ithstanding its hearsay character, only if the declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a :itness.

06 he de)-(r(tion must )on)ern ( f()t )ogni?(0-e 02 de)-(r(nt +t is essential to relevancy in the declaration that the declarant should have ade@uate ?no:ledge :ith respect to the subject covered by his statement.

)6 he )ir)umst(n)es must render it im.ro0(0-e th(t ( moti,e to f(-sif2 e3isted6 To be admissible, there should be a circumstantial guaranty of the trust:orthiness of the declaration.

@6 De)-(r(tions (g(inst .e)uni(r2 interest !ertains to those :hich may bar in :hole or in part the declarantGs money claim, or :hich may give rise to a monetary claim against him, as for instance, :here he ac?no:ledges that his credit is already paid or that he is indebted to some person. 86 De)-(r(tions (g(inst .ro.riet(r2 interest Those :hich are at variance :ith the declarantGs property rights, as for instance, :here he, being in possession of a chattel or a piece of land, declares that he is not the o:ner thereof, or that he is holding it as a mere trustee, or that he has already sold it, and the li?e. 96 De)-(r(tions (g(inst mor(- interest

&oral interest should not be confused :ith moral obligation, :hich is a duty :hich one o:es, and :hich he ought to perform, but :hich he is not legally bound to fulfill. *or instance, :here a man o:es a debt barred by the statute of limitations, this cannot be recovered by la:, though it subsists in morality and conscience. 1;6 De)-(r(tions (g(inst .en(- interest This cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such an admission if oral. The inclusion of declarations against penal interest in the e=ception for declarations against interest has raised a host of intert:ined constitutional and evidentiary problems in the 1nited %tates. %ee !eople v. Toledo ,)1 !hils. 8#)-.

The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence :here it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship bet:een the t:o persons is sho:n by evidence other than such act or declaration. The :ord LpedigreeL includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates :hen and the places :here these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. +t embraces also facts of family history intimately connected :ith pedigree. !edigree defined. - +t is the history of the family descent :hich is transmitted from one generation to another by both oral and :ritten declarations and by traditions. - &ay includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates :hen and places :here these facts occurred, the names of the relatives, and the facts of family history intimately connected. - +ncludes also paternity and legitimacy. "eason of (dmissibility To avoid a failure of justice, as greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission and that individuals are generally supposed to ?no: and to be interested in those facts of family history about :hich they converse, and that they are generally under little temptation to state untruths in respect to such matter. "e@uisites for (dmissibility a- 5eclarant is dead or unable to testify - 5eclarations :ill not be received :hen better evidence is available, in case his alive and able his direct testimony is considered a better evidence. - The fact that there are living members of the family :ho could be e=amined on the same point does not e=clude the declaration. - 5eclarations are admissible :hen the declarant is dead, outside of the !hilippines, or :hen his testimony is unobtainable, li?e :hen he becomes insane, declarations made before his insanity are admissible.

116 Contr(r2 to interest 7 "ethods in 4(nd-ing De)-(r(tion )ont(ining 0oth se-f-ser,ing (nd disser,ing f()ts: 1. (dmit the entire declaration because part is disserving and hence by a ?ind of contagion of truthfulness, all :ill be trust:orthy. #. ompare the strength of the self-serving interest and the disserving interest in ma?ing the statement as a :hole, and admit it all if the self-serving interest is greater.

$. (dmit the disserving parts of the declaration, and e=clude the self-serving facts. The third solution seems the most realistic method. 126 Form of de)-(r(tion (g(inst interest &ay be oral or :ritten. *orm is immaterial provided all the essential re@uisites for its admissibility are present.

%ec. $9 . $)t or De)-(r(tion (0out Pedigree6

b- 6ecessity that pedigree be in issue - 9enerally, declarations as to pedigree can be received only :here pedigree itself is directly in issue. - 0o:ever, in many cases the fact that pedigree is relevant to the issue is sufficient to admit in evidence and as to matters of genealogy or facts incidentally or inferentially connected there:ith, such as the dates of genealogical importance, such as births, deaths, and marriage, too? places, names, number, residence of a branch of the family, or their o:nership of property, regardless of :hether pedigree is separately in issue. c- 5eclarant must be a relative of the person :hose pedigree is in @uestion - 9enerally, declarations as to pedigree to be admissible, it must have been made by someone related to the family concerned, it is enough if some relationship is sho:n, although the declarations of very remote relatives entitled to very little :eight. - "elationship of declarant to the family may be by birth or by affinity. 0ence, the declaration of the husband regarding the pedigree of his :ife and his :ifeGs relatives and vice versa, is admissible. 8ut declarations of the husbandGs relatives regarding the pedigree of the :ifeGs relatives, or vice versa, are not admissible. - +f it appears that the evidence offered does not emanate from someone related to the family concerned, the presumption of the reliability of the source of information is rebutted and the evidence becomes inadmissible. ourts :ill not receive declarations as to pedigree made by intimate friends or neighbors, or even by persons living in the family or by servants, ho:ever trust:orthy or long he has been employed by the family. made before the

him to state the facts other:ise than as he understood it. - 5eclarations made after a controversy has originated, are e=cluded, on the ground that the bias under :hich they :ere uttered suffices to render them untrust:orthy. ontroversy as used in this provision is not meant mere idle rumors, or doubts of curious scandalmongers :hose discussions of the family matters of their neighbors are made :ithout reverence for sanctity, morality, privacy or religion.

e- The relationship bet:een the declarant and the person :hose pedigree is in @uestion must be sho:n by evidence other than such act or declaration - 9enerally, the relationship of declarant to the family concerned must be established by evidence other than the statement of declarant himself. - E=ception, :here the subject of the declaration is the declarantGs o:n relationship to another person it seems absurd to re@uire, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very facts :hich the declaration is offered to establish. - Evidence to prove relationship may either direct or circumstantial, such as declarantGs bearing the family name or a name identical :ith that of the subject of declaration, recognition of declarant by the family, or mention of him in family conveyance and other dispositions of property. !roof concerning !edigree a- oral declaration of declarant - &ay be proved by the testimony of any person :ho is a competent :itness and :ho has heard such declarations of the declarant. b- :ritten acts or declarations of the declarant - &ay be proved by the statement in :riting relating to pedigree made or recogniIed by the declarant, or made under his direction. - E=ception, :here the :riting is in the form of an entry in a family 8ible or testament :hich is produced from the proper custody, in :hich event the assent of the family is presumed. c- (cts or conduct of a person deceased or outside of the country or unable to testify

d- 5eclarant must be controversy occurred

- 9enerally, declarations to be received in proof of pedigree re@uires that the declarations must have been made ante "item motam ,before suit brought-, before the controversy, and under such circumstances that the person ma?ing them could have no motive to misrepresent the facts. +t is necessary that the declarant should have been disinterested to the e=tent of having no motive :hich can fairly be assumed to be such as :ould induce

- &ay consist of proof of acts or conduct of relatives and the mode of treatment in the family of one :hose parentage or decent is in @uestion. "elationship must be legitimate - +n order to render a declaration as to pedigree admissible it is necessary that the relationship of declarant to the family should be of a legitimate character. - ( bastardGs declarations as to the pedigree of his putative family, or conversely, and vice versa, are not admissible, but in some cases the courts have sho:n a tendency to rela= the rule. %ubject matter of declaration of pedigree - The facts regarded as those of genealogy or pedigree, ta?e a :ide range, and embrace any notable fact in the life of a member of the family or in the family history, or his o:n relationship to the family. (ge - 6aturally, the testimony of a :itness concerning his o:n age is based upon hearsay, but according to the general rule, this circumstances does not render such testimony inadmissible. - +t is based on statements of his parents, records recogniIed as family records, reputations in the family, and, according to some authorities, general reputation in the community. - Testimony of a priest concerning the age of a person, :hom he had baptiIed at the time of baptism based upon statement made at the time by a parent of such person is not admissible :here it appears that the parent is available. !aternity and 2egitimacy - 5eclarations of deceased members of a family that he :as the father or mother of a child are admissible on the @uestion of paternity or parentage of the child, :ith or :ithout accompanying proof of marriage. - 5eclaration of deceased relatives other than the parents are admissible as proof of paternity if made ante "item motam ,before the controversy-. - There is authority :hich permits declarations of persons not related by blood may, under some circumstances, be admissible to establish the parentage of an illegitimate. &arriage - 5eclarations and general repute are admissible as proof of a marriage, :hether or not members of the family.

- "easonB The public interest is ta?en in @uestion of the e=istence of a marital relation. - Ahere a formal marriage is proved, repute is not admissible to establish that there :as no marriage. 5eath - The fact of death is a matter of pedigree :ithin the rule :hich permits the admission of hearsay evidence, such as reputation in proof of matters of pedigree. - %light proof of relationship of the declarant is sufficient to :arrant admission of the declaration. - ( ne:spaper announcement of the death of an individual is not admissible to prove the fact of such personGs death. *orm of 5eclaration - 5eclaration may be in any form capable of conveying thought, provided the authenticity of the vehicle conveying the statement is established to the satisfaction of the court by evidence as by recognition in the family or production from proper custody. - &ust be a statement of fact, and not opinion. - &ay be oral or in :riting. the oral statement is as competent as :ritten evidence on the same point. %ec. '< F(mi-2 Re.ut(tion or r(dition reg(rding Pedigree6 The reputation or tradition e=isting in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the :itness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family boo?s or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the li?e, may be received as evidence of pedigree. "eputation or Tradition in matters of pedigree - meant such declaration and statements as have come do:n from generation to generation from deceased relatives in such a :ay even though it cannot be said or determined :hich of the deceased relatives originally made them, or :as personally cogniIant of the facts therein stated. - +t appears that such declarations and statement :ere made as family history, ante "item motam ,before the controversy-, by a deceased person

connected by blood or marriage :ith the person :hose pedigree is to be established. "eason for (dmissibility - *amily affairs are constantly tal?ed over in the family, and the members :ho ?no: :hat happened tell :hat they ?no:, :ith spontaneous sincerity, to those :ho did not ?no:. - 5eclaration as to pedigree made by deceased although based upon hearsay :ithin the family, and that, having been made before any controversy had arisen, there is no motive to spea? other than the truth. "e@uisites for (dmissibility a- There is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any members of a family - "eputation in the family gives rise to an inference to the e=istence of such facts as birth, descent, failure of issue, heirship, identity, marriage, celibacy, parentage, or relationship. or facts incidentally connected :ith genealogy, such as residence or the dates of events of family history. and evidence of such reputations :ill be received on an issue of pedigree concerning any member of any branch of the family - Tradition in the family, being a form of family history or reputation is admissible to prove facts of genealogy

concerned must be a member of the family of said person, either by consanguinity or affinity. - "elationship bet:een the :itness and the family need not be proved by independent evidence. it may be sho:n by the :itnessG o:n testimony.

*orm of 5eclaration "elating to !edigree - (ny form capable of conveying thought, provided the authenticity of the vehicle conveying the statement is established to the satisfaction of the court by evidence as by recognition in the family or production from proper custody. %ec. '1 Common re.ut(tion ommon reputation e=isting previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. &onuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. &atters of public interest vs. matters of general interest - &atters of public interest are common to all the citiIens of the state or to the entire people, - matters of general interest are common only to a single community or to a considerable number of persons forming part of the community. &atters :hich may be established by common reputation a- *acts of public or general interest more than $< years old. b- &arriage and related facts. and c- +ndividual moral character. ommon "eputation "especting *acts of !ublic or 9eneral +nterest more than Thirty 7ears 3ld - "eputation must class of people position to have and to contribute the opinion. have been formed among a of persons :ho :ere in a sound sources of information intelligently to the formation of

(ge ; - &embers of the family of the person in @uestion, or others having an intimate ac@uaintance :ith the family, may testify as to age, although their testimony is based on family tradition or reputation 5eath ; - Evidence of reputation in the family or in the community or family tradition, has been held admissible to establish the fact of death, provided there has been a considerable lapse of time. - 0earsay evidence is inadmissible to prove the manner or cause of death. b- The reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person, concerned e=isted previous to the controversy ommon reputation or tradition arising after the controversy is supposed to be tainted :ith bias and therefore unreliable.

c- The :itness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person

ommon "eputation vs. "umor

- "umor is a story current :ithout ?no:n authority for its truth, and, therefore, by its nature, does not yet represent the prevailing belief in the community ommon "eputation presupposes the e=istence of a general or undivided belief already formed on :hich the general opinion is founded.

Test of (dmissibility - Ahether the act, declaration, or e=clamation is so intimately inter:oven or connected :ith the principal factor event :hich it characteriIes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also :hether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. %tatements and (cts 9estae onstituting !art of "es

ommon "eputation "especting &arriage a- The common reputation must have been formed previous to the controversy. b- The common reputation must have been formed in the community or among the class of persons :ho are in a position to have sources of information and to contribute intelligently to the formation of the opinion. %ec. '# P(rt of res gest(e %tatements made by a person :hile a starting occurrence is ta?ing place or immediately prior or subse@uent thereto :ith respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. %o, also, statements accompanying an e@uivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. "es 9estae 5efined omprehends a situation :hich presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during :hich interval, certain statements are made under such circumstance as to sho: lac? of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their contents.

a- %tatement made by a person :hile a startling occurrence is ta?ing place or immediately prior or subse@uent thereto :ith respect to the circumstances thereof. b- (cts and circumstances :hich are incidents of a particular litigated act and :hich are illustrative of such act. c- %tatement accompanying an e@uivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, and are called by :riters as Dverbal factsE or Dverbal actsE E=amplesB - 5eclaration of the parties made :ith regard to matters of business, if contemporaneous :ith the acts they tend to e=plain and @ualify, are admissible - 5eclarations by a party relating to o:nership of property made by a person in possession thereof, may be admitted :hen uttered under such circumstances as satisfy the re@uirements applicable to other statements sought to be admitted under this e=ception to hearsay rule. - 5eclaration made at the time of a transaction :hich are pertinent to the @uestion of fraud are generally vie:ed as admissible. - %tatements made by an injured person relating to present pain and suffering or at the time of an accident or so shortly thereafter as to form part of one event or transaction are vie:ed in some decisions as part of the res gestae. %pontaneous %tatement 5efined - ( statement or e=clamation made immediately after some e=citing occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. "eason for (dmissibility a- Trust:orthiness ; the statements are made instinctively, :hile the declarantGs mental po:ers for deliberation in concocting matters are controlled and stilled by the shoc?ing influence of a startling occurrence, they are but pure emanation of the occurrence itself.

"es 9estae vs. 5ying 5eclaration - +n dying declaration there is a sense of impending death :hich ta?es the place of an oath and the la: regards the declarant as testifying . - Ahile in res gestae it is the event itself :hich spea?s, the actual facts e=pressing themselves through the mouth of a :itness, :hich may precede, or accompany, or follo:, as events occurring as a part of the principal act. "eason of (dmissibility - +t is a :ell-founded belief that statements made instinctively at the time of a specific transaction or events, :ithout opportunity for formulation of statements favorable to oneGs o:n cause, are li?ely to cast important light upon the matter in issue. as to such statements, the la: creates a presumption of their truthfulness.

b- 6ecessity ; said natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the stand. Elements of the statement or declaration to be admissible as part of res gestae ; orpus /uris %ecumdum a- must relate to the main event and must e=plain, elucidate, or in some manner characteriIe that event b- must be a natural declaration or statement gro:ing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past, completed affair c- must be a statement of fact, and not the mere e=pression of an opinion d- must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance of thought, dominated or evo?ed by the transaction or occurrence itself, and not the product of premeditation, reflection, or design e- the declaration or statement need not be coincident or contemporaneous :ith the occurrence of the event, it must be made at such time and under such circumstances as :ill e=clude the presumption that it is the result of deliberation f- must appear that the declaration or statement :as made by one :ho either participated in the transaction or :itnessed the act or fact concerning :hich the declaration or statement :as made. %tartling 3ccurrence 6ecessary - it is essential that the spontaneous e=clamation should have been caused by something D startling enough to produce nervous e=citementE and Dto ?eep the :ill dormant so far as any deliberation in concocting matters for speech or selecting :ords is concerned. %tatement must relate to the circumstances of the startling occurrence - the range of events must be ?ept in vie: for it is largely the e=planatory and illustrative character of the declaration as applied to the principal transaction that admits them as evidence. +nterval of time bet:een the startling occurrence and the spontaneous statement - %ince startling occurrence may e=tend its e=citing influence over a subse@uent period of time :hich may be long or short, the rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. - Ahat the la: altogether distrusts is not the afterspeech but the afterthought.

Ahen e=pression of opinion admissible as part of the res gestae - Ahen a spontaneous e=clamation of an injured person that it involves the e=pression of an opinion as to the legal or physical effects of his injury, and it has also been held that the opinions or conclusions of competent physicians, stated :hile e=amining a patient, may be admissible as part of the res gestae. !lace Ahere the %tatement :as made - +t is not unreasonable to suppose that a statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the place :here the principal transaction occurred :ill not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as :ould render it admissible. ondition of the 5eclarant at the Time he made the 5eclaration - ( statement :ill ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time :hen it :as made, the condition of declarant :as such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as :here he had just received a serious injury, :as suffering severe pain, or :as just under intense e=citement. !rovince of the ourt to 5etermine Ahether or not %tatement is %pontaneous - +t is for the trial court to decide the preliminary @uestion as to :hether or not the declarations :ere made :ithout deliberation and reflection or :ere the spontaneous utterance of the declarant - Trial courtGs decision of above mention @uestion :ill not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that his conclusion :as arbitrary or unreasonable 5eclarations of 8ystanders and Third !ersons - +f the act of a third party is relevant and is in evidence, his statement accompanying and e=planatory of it, :hich is the natural concomitant of the act, and is prompted by the identical motive should be admitted. - 8ut if the declarations of a third persons are merely narrative and unconnected :ith the relevant act, so that by no proper e=tension of the rule can they be included among the res gestae. (cts and ircumstances :hich are +ncidents of a !articular 2itigated (ct - %tatements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected :ith the main transaction as to form a part of it, and :hich illustrate, elucidate, @ualify, or characteriIe the act, are admissible as part of res gestae

- Aritings may become part of the resgestae and admissible in evidence :here they are incidents of a transaction and a part thereof. 4erbal (cts 5efined - (re utterances :hich accompany some acts has intrinsically no definite legal significance, or only an ambiguous one, its legal purport or tenor may be ascertained by considering the :ords accompanying it, and these utterances thus enter merely as a verbal part of the act. "eason for (dmissibility - The motive, character, and object of an act are fre@uently indicated by :hat :as said by the person engaged in the act, such statement are in the nature of verbal acts and are admissible in evidence :ith the remainder of the transaction :hich they illustrate. "e@uisites for (dmissibility a- The act characteriIed by the verbal acts must be e@uivocal or ambiguous in tenor. b- That the verbal acts must characteriIe or e=plain the e@uivocal or ambiguous act. c- That the e@uivocal or ambiguous act must be material to the issue. and d- That the verbal act must be contemporaneous :ith and accompany the e@uivocal or ambiguous act 4erbal (cts vs. %pontaneous %tatements - +n spontaneous e=clamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence. :hile in verbal acts, the res gestae is the e@uivocal act. - The verbal act must be contemporaneous :ith or must accompany the e@uivocal act to be admissible. :hereas a spontaneous e=clamation may be prior to, simultaneous :ith, or subse@uent to the startling. (ct or 3ccurrence haracteriIed must be E@uivocal - +t is only :hen the thing done is e@uivocal that it is competent to prove declarations accompanying it as falling :ithin the class of res gestae. 4erbal (cts must E@uivocal (ct haracteriIe or E=plain the

it as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous and are admissible in evidence. E@uivocal (ct may over a 2ong !eriod of Time - The e@uivocal act may e=tend over a long period of time, and during that period, those statements that are necessary for an understanding of the meaning of said e@uivocal act, are admissible as verbal acts. %ec. '$ Entries in the )ourse of 0usiness Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to :hich they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, :ho :as in a position to ?no: the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 9eneral "ule - 8oo?s of account of a party or entries therein, are admissible in his favor to sho: the recorded transactions :hen a proper foundation is laid and the re@uisites to admissibility have been met. "eason for (dmissibility a- 6ecessity ; is given as a ground for admitting entries in that they are the best available evidence b- Trust:orthiness "e@uisites for (dmissibility a- Entries must have been made at or near the time of the transaction to :hich they refer - +t is sufficient if they are made :ithin a reasonable time thereafter, in the ordinary course of the business of the party ma?ing them b- Entrant must have been in a position to ?no: the facts stated in the entries - +f the entry is based on reports, oral or :ritten, numerous persons cooperating, :ho had personal ?no:ledge of their o:n items but did not themselves ma?e the entries, the entries may be received, either by calling the entrant alone to the stand or by the testimony of one :ho can verify the method of compiling them. c- Entries must have been made by entrant in his professional capacity or in the performance of his duty

- The statement that are admissible are only those necessary to understand the meaning of the e@uivocal act, other statements not necessary for that purpose are not admissible. E@uivocal (ct &ust be "elevant to the +ssue - The general rule is that a declaration sought to be proved under the res gestae must have been contemporaneous :ith the event established as the principal act. it must spring at a time so near

- To constitute a profession, the employment or vocation must be such as e=acts the use or application of special learning or attainment of some ?ind. - Ahere the entry :as made in the a professional capacity and in the course of professional conduct, or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty, there are three guarantees of their trust:orthiness. i. ii. 0abit and system of ma?ing record :ith regularity result in accuracy. Errors may easily be detected because the entries are made in the regular course of professional conduct, performance of duty, or the ordinary and regular duties of the person ma?ing the entries. and +f the entries are made in pursuance of his duty, legal or to a superior, the additional ris? of censure and disgrace to the entrant ma?es them presumably correct.

la:, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 9eneral "ule The division of documentary evidence embracing public or official records and reports includes acts of the legislature, judicial records, and records and reports of administrative officers. (ny such record or document or a properly authenticated copy or transcript thereof is admissible in the trial of an action, subject to the same re@uirements of relevancy and materiality as apply to private :ritings.

"eason for (dmissibility a- 6ecessity ; consists in the practical impossibility of re@uiring the officialGs attendance as a :itness to testify to the innumerable transactions occurring in the course of his duty and re@uiring to be evidence. b- Trust:orthiness ; i. in the sense of official duty :hich has led to the ma?ing of the statement. ii. in the penalty :hich usually is affi=ed to a breach of that duty. iii. in the routine and disinterested origin of most of such statements. and iv. + the publicity of record, :hich ma?es more li?ely the prior e=posure of such errors as might have occurred "e@uisites for (dmissibility a- That the :ritten statement :as made by public officer or by another person specially enjoined by la: to do so. b- That it :as made by the public officer in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by la:. and c- That the public officer or the other person had sufficient ?no:ledge of the facts by him state, :hich must have been ac@uired by him personally or through official information !ublic 3fficer - +t is not necessary that the record, should be ?ept by the chief public officer himself, it is sufficient if the entries are made under his direction by person authoriIed by him. !erformance of 5uty by !ublic 3fficer - +t is essential that the official statement should have been made by a public officer in the performance of his duty, or by another person in the performance of his duty, specially enjoined by la:. 1navailability of Entrant 6eed not be %ho:n

iii.

d- Entries :ere made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty - 0ence, such entries made constitute only one of a variety of circumstances, sanctioned by judiciary practice, acceptable as presumptive evidence of the accuracy and truthfulness of the entry and as a practical substitute for the conventional test of cross-e=amination. e- Entrant must be deceased or unable to testify - +n order to @ualify an entry, there must be a necessity for its admission as evidence and this is satisfied by proof of the death of the entrant. - Ahen declarant is alive, entries may be used as memorandum to refresh his memory as :itness. &ode of !roving Entries - +t is re@uired that the entries be properly identified or authenticated, and generally, their completeness, and correctness, regularly, and fairly as :ell as the method of ma?ing them, must be established %ec. '' Entries in offi)i(- re)ords Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the !hilippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by

- 0is absence is being e=cused from appearing in court in order that public business be not deranged. !roof of 3fficial Entries - Entries may be proved by the production of the boo?s or records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal ?eeper thereof. (uthentication - The e=traordinary degree of confidence reposed in documents of a public nature is founded principally upon the circumstance that they have been made by authoriIed and accredited agents appointed for the purpose. !robative value - Entries in public records made by a public officer in the performance of the duty specially enjoined by la: are only prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. !EC ION :A/ RULE 17; Commercia" "ists an$ the "i0e @@ Evidence of statements of matters of interest, to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. Re(son for $dmissi0i-it2 The admissibility of commercial lists and the li?e as evidence even though the authors, compilers or publishers thereof cannot be cross-e=amined as :itness is based on necessity and trust:orthiness. necessary to because of the inaccessibility of the authors, computers, or publisher in other jurisdiction but also because the great practical inconvenience in summoning each individual :hose personal ?no:ledge has gone to ma?e up the final result. "(rDet re.orts or 8uot(tions/ tr(de 1ourn(-s/ tr(de )ir)u-(rs/ .ri)e -ists (nd the -iDe (dmissible as evidence. %uch reports, being based upon a general survey of the :hole mar?et and constantly received and acted upon by dealers, are far more satisfactory and reliable than individual entries or individual sales or in@uiries. $uthenti)(tion (s a prere@uisite to the introduction in evidence of a ne:spaper, trade journal, trade circular, or price list, giving the @uotations of the mar?et value of a commodity, that a preliminary foundation be laid for

such evidence, as by sho:ing that such publications have been regularly prepared by a person in touch :ith the mar?et, and that they are generally regarded as trust:orthy and relied upon. !EC ION :</ RULE 17; Learne$ treaties @@ ( published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, la:, science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court ta?es judicial notice, or a :itness e=pert in the subject testifies that the :riter of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recogniIed in his profession or calling as e=pert in the subject. 2earned treaties are admissible in evidence to prove the truth of a matter stated therein, ,a- if the court ta?es judicial notice that the :riter of the statement in the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet, is recogniIed in his profession or calling as e=pert in the subject, ,b- o a :itness, e=pert in the subject testifies that the :riter of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet, is recogniIed in his profession or calling as e=pert in the subject. Re(son for (dmissi0i-it2 6ecessity and Trust:orthiness. 6ecessity because of the unavailability of the e=pert :itness to testify on the matter or if available, because of the tremendous e=pense in hiring them. Trust:orthiness because the learned :itness in :riting his :or? or article has no motive to misrepresent . (nother reason is that the :riter of a learned treatise is more careful of :hat he :rites because he ?no:s that every statement he ma?es :ill be subject to criticism and open to refutation. %till another reason is that :riters of learned treatise :ith no vie: to litigation and not for a free as e=pert :itness. 4istori)(- 5orDs 0istorical facts of general and public notoriety may be proved by reputation. and that reputation may be established by historical :or?s of ?no:n character and accuracy. 8ut evidence of this sort is confined in a measure to ancient facts, the assumption being that better evidence is not in e=istence. !)ientifi) re(tise &uch of the scientific ?no:ledge of e=perts in medicine, surgery, mechanics, chemistry, and other fields of specialiIed learning is derived from scientific boo?s and treatises. their ?no:ledge :ould, in general, be small had they got availed themselves of the fruits of the research and e=perience of their predecessors as taught in boo?s. This opinion of e=pert :itnesses must be founded in some degree upon such boo?s. in fact, they may, as a general rule, in support of their professional opinions, read in evidence from standard scientific

:or?s :hich are recogniIed as such by the profession in :hich they are engaged. 9eneral e=ceptionB Ahen they contain statements of ascertained facts rather than of opinions, or :hich, by long use in the practical affairs of life, have come to be accepted as standard and unvarying authority in determining the action of those :ho use them. L(= Ahen the la: involved in a controversy is a $omestic "a', the court is bound to ta?e judicial notice thereof, and no proof is necessary :hatever. =oreign "a') a distinction as to proof is laid do:n bet:een :ritten and un:ritten la:. <ritten "a' may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested to by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and must be accompanied :ith a certificate that such officer has the custody.+n Un'ritten "a') the oral testimony of e=pert :itnesses is admissible, as are printed and published boo?s of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. 1nder our rules of private international la:, foreign "a' is considered as any other matter of fact, :hich must be properly pleaded and proved. +f not properly proved, the presumption arises that foreign la: is the same as domestic la:. Phi"ippine Court cannot ta0e Cu$icia" notice of foreign "a' =ai"ure to pro%e foreign "a' 'hether un'ritten un$er ru"e *48) sec (, or 'ritten un$er ru"e *45) sec 5() raises the presumption that the "a' is the same as ours ,7ao ?ee v. %y 9onIales, 1>7 % "( 7$>!EC ION :@/ RULE 17; Testimon& or $eposition at a former procee$ing @@ The testimony or deposition of a :itness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party :ho had the opportunity to cross-e=amine him. 9enerally, the mere fact that testimony has been given in the course of a former proceeding bet:een the parties to a case on trial is no ground for its admission in evidence. The la: recogniIes, ho:ever, that it is sometimes impossible to produce a :itness :ho has testified at a former trial, as :here he dies or become insane before the later trial. +n such cases, :here the second action is bet:een the same parties or their privies and involves the same issues, the testimony of the :itness as ta?en at the former hearing or trial is, according to practically all decisions, admissible in later one as one of the e=ceptions to the rule e=cluding hearsay testimony.

Una#"e to testif&! refers to an ina#i"it& procee$ing from a gra%e cause a"most amounting to $eath as 'hen the 'itness is o"$ an$ has "ost the po'er of speech ,Tan v. (, 19>7Re(son for (dmissi0i-it2 6ecessity for the testimony and its Trust:orthiness. +nasmuch as the former :itness could no longer testify, his former testimony having been given in a former action under the solemnity of an oath is admissible to prevent failure of justice. Re8uisites a. The :itness :hose testimony is offered in evidence is dead or unable to testify 1. +nsanity or mental incapacity, or the former :itnessG loss of memory through old age or disease. #. !hysical disability by reason of sic?ness or advanced age. $. The fact that the :itness has been ?ept a:ay by contrivance of the opposite party. and '. The fact that after diligent search the former :itness cannot be found. b. +dentity of parties c. +dentity of issues d. 3pportunity of cross-e=amination of :itness Proof of former testimon2 +f testimony at a former trial is reduced to :riting, such :riting is the primary evidence thereof and should be used. E.g. stenographic note

!EC ION :8/ RULE 1:; Genera" ru"e JThe opinion of a :itness is not admissible, e=cept as indicated in the follo:ing sections. O.inion defined (n inference or conclusion dra:n by a :itness from facts, some of :hich are ?no:n to him and others assumed, or dra:n from facts, :hich although leading probability to the inference, do not evolve it by a process of absolutely necessary reasoning. Ru-e of e3)-usion 1nder ordinary circumstances a :itness in testifying is to be restricted to the facts :ithin his ?no:ledge, and his opinion or conclusion :ith respect to the matters in issue or relevant to the issue may not be received in evidence. 0o:ever, :hen the conclusion to be dra:n from the facts stated depends on scientific ?no:ledge or s?ill, not :ithin the range of ordinary training or intelligence, the conclusion may be stated by @ualified e=pert.

There is no precise re/uirement as to the mo$e in 'hich s0i"" or eAperience sha"" ha%e #een ac/uire$ 2cientific stu$& an$ training are not a"'a&s essentia" to the competenc& of 'itness as an eApert Bno'"e$ge ac/uire$ #& $oing is no "ess %a"ua#"e than that ac/uire$ #& stu$& ,5ilag o. v. &erced, 19'9EApert opinions are not or$inari"& conc"usi%e in the sense that the& must #e accepte$ as true on the su#Crct of their testimon&) #ut are genera""& regar$e$ as pure"& a$%isor&D the courts ma& p"ace 'hate%er 'eight the& choose upon such testimon& an$ ma& reCect it) if the& fin$ that it is inconsistent 'ith the facts in the case or other'ise unreasona#"e Testimon& of han$'riting eApert is not in$ispensi#"e to CO:ELEC 6an$'riting eAperts) 'hi"e pro#a#"& usefu") are not in$ispensi#"e in eAamining or comparing han$'ritingD this can #e $one #& the CO:ELEC itse"f It 'as ru"e$ #& the 2C that e%i$ence a"iun$e is not a""o'e$ to pro%e that a #a""ot is mar0e$) an inspection of the #a""ot itse"f #eing sufficient ,!unIalan v. 3&E2E , et al., 9.". 6o. 1#>>>9-

someone else, is hypothetically submitted to the :itness, and he is as?ed in vie: of those facts, to state :hat his opinion is, :hereas a man s?illed in a particular business, :ho ma?es his o:n observations, and testifies to :hat he has observed and his conclusions therefrom, is regarded as a s?illed :itness. R C-(sses of )(ses in =hi)h o.inion e,iden)e is (dmissi0-e. -- There are t:o distinct classes of cases in :hich e=pert testimony is admissible. 1- +n one class are those cases in :hich conclusions to be dra:n by the judge depend on the e=istence of facts :hich are not common ?no:ledge and :hich are peculiarly :ithin the ?no:ledge of men :hose e=perience or study enables them to spea? :ith authority upon the subjects in @uestion. #- +n the other class are those cases, in :hich the conclusions to be dra:n from the facts stated, as :ell as ?no:ledge of the facts themselves, depend on professional or scientific ?no:ledge not :ithin the range of ordinary training or intelligence. R Lu(-ifi)(tions of e3.erts. ; ( :itness, to @ualify as an e=pert, must have ac@uired such special ?no:ledge of the subject-matter about :hich he is to testify, either by study of the recogniIed authorities on the subject, or by practical e=perience, that he can give the court assistance and guidance in solving a problem to :hich its e@uipment of good judgment and average ?no:ledge is inade@uate. R Determin(tion of 8u(-ifi)(tion of e3.ert to testif2. ; The @uestion of the @ualification of an e=pert :itness rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of @ualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular :itness. R Re8uisites for the (dmissi0i-it2 of e3.ert testimon2. -- Three things must concur to justify the admission of the testimony of an e=pert :itness. ,irst, the subject under e=amination must be one that re@uires that the court has the aid of ?no:ledge or e=perience such as men not especially s?illed do not have, and such therefore as cannot be obtained from the ordinary :itnesses.

!e)6 :9/ Ru-e 17; I6 IN %ENER$L P O.inion e,iden)e defined. ; D3pinion evidence,E as the term is used in la:, means the testimony of a :itness, given in the trial of an action, that the :itness is of the opinion that some facts pertinent to the case e=ist or does not e=ist, offered as proof of the e=istence or non-e=istence of that fact. R E3.ert e,iden)e defined. ; E=pert evidence is the testimony of persons :ho are particularly s?illed, or e=perienced in a particular art, science, trade, business, profession, or vocation, a thorough ?no:ledge of :hich is not possessed by man in general, in regard to matters connected there:ith. R QE3.ertR defined. ; (n e=pert may be defined as a person :ho is so @ualified, either by actual e=perience or by careful study, as to enable him to form a definite opinion of his o:n respecting any decision of science, branch of art, or department of trade about :hich persons having no particular training or special study are incapable of forming accurate opinions or of deducing correct conclusions. R E3.ert =itness distinguished from sDi--ed =itness. -- 3rdinarily, a :itness is said to testify as an e=pert :hen a state of facts, observed by

Second, the :itness called as an e=pert must possess the ?no:ledge, s?ill, or e=perience needed to inform the court in the particular case under consideration. Third, li?e other evidence, e=pert testimony is not admissible as to a matter not in issue. II6 EB$"IN$ ION OF EBPER 5I NE!!E! R 9enerally. ; 8efore an e=pert :itness may be re@uired to give an opinion, the party presenting him must first establish that he is an e=pert on the subject upon :hich he is called to testify. R Dire)t e3(min(tion. ,a- 3pinion based on facts ?no:n personally by the e=pert. - Ahere the e=pert :itness is re@uired to give an opinion based upon facts upon :hich he ?no:s personally, he must first state those facts before giving an opinion thereon. ,b- 3pinion based on facts of :hich he has no personal ?no:ledge. ; +f the e=pert has no personal ?no:ledge of the facts on :hich his opinion is based, they should be given to him hypothetically, that is, they must assume the state of facts upon :hich his opinion is desired. R 42.otheti)(- 8uestion. ; 0ypothetical @uestions must include only facts that are supported by evidence and should embody substantially all facts relating to the particular matter upon :hich an e=pert opinion is sought to be elicited, but they need not include all facts pertinent to the ultimate issue. R Form of h2.otheti)(- 8uestion. ; 9enerally spea?ing a hypothetical @uestion should state all the facts relevant to the formation of an opinion, and then, assuming the facts stated to be true, as? the :itness :hether he is able to form an opinion therefrom, and, if so, to state such opinion. 0ypothetical @uestion involves t:o distinct elements, namely, premise and inference or conclusion based on premise. R 5hen (0str()t 8uestions .ermissi0-e. ; !urely abstract @uestions, assuming facts or theories for :hich there is no foundation in the evidence, are not admissible as a matter of right, although such @uestions may be permitted on cross-e=amination for the purpose of testing the ?no:ledge of the :itness as to the subject on :hich he has testified.

R O.inion of e3.ert 0(sed on he(rs(2 in(dmissi0-e. ; The rule is :ell established that hearsay in the form of information gained from the statements of others outside the courtroom may not be the basis of an e=pert opinion. R O.inion of e3.ert )(nnot 0e 0(sed on other o.inions. ; +t is not proper in as?ing hypothetical @uestions to incorporate in them the opinions of other e=pert :itnesses. (n opinion of an e=pert :itness cannot be based upon opinions e=pressed by other e=perts. R O.inion 0(sed on )on1e)ture in(dmissi0-e . ; E=pert testimony should not be allo:ed to e=tend to the field of baseless conjecture concerning matters not susceptible of reasonable accurate conclusions. R O.inion in,o-,ing 8uestions of -(= in(dmissi0-e. ; +t may be laid do:n as a general rule that a :itness is never permitted to give his opinion on a @uestion of domestic la: or upon matters, :hich involve @uestions of la:. R O.inion on the u-tim(te f()t in issue in(dmissi0-e. ;Ahile an e=pert may be permitted to e=press his opinion, or even his belief, he cannot give his opinion upon the precise or ultimate fact in issue before the court, :hich must be determined by it. R Im.e()hment of e3.ert =itness. ; The :eight to be given the judgment of a s?illed :itness may be impaired by the various methods employed in the case of other testimony. 0e may be contradicted by others in his o:n class or by any competent :itness or by use of e=hibits. or the :eight of his testimony may be impaired by sho:ing that he is interested or biased. that others have at a prior time refused to accept the opinion e=pressed. that he made inconsistent statements at another time, provided a proper foundation is laid therefore. that he formed a different opinion at another time. that he did not e=press the opinion testified to at a time :hen such an e=pression might reasonably have been e=pected, or that he changed sides in the case. P Courts not 0ound 02 testimon2 of e3.ert6 ; E=pert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character. the courts may place :hatever :eight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent :ith the facts in the case or other:ise unreasonable.

2..2 67RIS8R7DENCE 9.". 6o. 1)<897. (pril 11, #<<) T1"(5+3 . 53&+693, !etitioners,

the opinions of hand:riting e=perts, as resort to hand:riting e=perts is not mandatory. R 5eight of e3.ert testimon2. ; 1nder the usual circumstances e=pert opinion evidence is to be considered or :eighed by the court li?e other testimony, in the light of their o:n general ?no:ledge and e=perience in the subject of in@uiry. the court cannot arbitrarily disregard the testimony of e=perts or s?illed :itnesses, and ma?e an unsupported finding contrary to the opinion. III6 !U&CEC ! OF EBPER E! I"ON#

vs. /3%E . 53&+693, 2E363"( 53&+693(%T"3 and her spouse /1(6+T3 (%T"3, 616 +( 53&+693-8(2(8+%, (8E22( 53&+693 4(2E6 E"+6( and the "E9+%TE" 3* 5EE5%, S1EW36 +T7, "espondents. *( T%B * ,father- sold his property to his children (, 8, , and 5 ,e=cluding E, the eldest- due to failing health. +ndeed, a deed of absolute sale :as signed by the former conveying the said property and :as :itnessed by t:o persons and notariIed by a notary public. E learned of such sale :hen an ejectment suit :as filed against him. 1pon the advice of his counsel, he had the documents e=amined by the !6!. (s a result, the !6! came up :ith the conclusion that the signatures :ere :ritten by t:o different people. 0ence, E assailed the contract for being a forgery. +%%1EB A0ET0E" 3" 63T the court is bound to give evidentiary value of the opinion of the !6!. "12+69B 1nder the "ules of ourt, the follo:ing may prove the genuineness of hand:ritingB ,1- ( :itness :ho actually sa: the person :riting the instrument. ,#- ( :itness familiar :ith such hand:riting and :ho can give his opinion thereon, such opinion being an e=ception to the opinion rule. ,$- ( comparison by the court of the @uestioned hand:riting and admitted genuine specimen thereof. and 1(7 EApert e%i$ence 12ec (+ Ru"e *487 @ The la: ma?es no preference, much less distinction among and bet:een the different means stated above in proving the hand:riting of a person. +t is li?e:ise clear from the foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to

R %ener(--26 ; The most common subjects of e=pert testimony are hand:riting, including type:ritten documents, ballistic, mental condition, cause of death or injury and value of real property including mar?et value. %. C%ND:RITIN' R 4(nd=riting e3.ert. ; There is no test by :hich one can determine :ith precision ho: much e=perience or ?no:ledge of hand:riting a :itness must have in order to @ualify as an e=pert for comparison. +t is not essential to @ualify one as an e=pert to testify to comparisons of hand:ritings that he has professional ?no:ledge or that he has made such :or? a specialty. +t is enough that he has been engaged in some business :hich called for fre@uent comparisons of hand:ritings and that he has in fact been in the habit for a length of time of ma?ing such comparisons. RFun)tion of h(nd=riting e3.ert. ; 6o hand:riting e=pert should :ish for his testimony to be received as un@uestionable authority, the idea being rather that it is the function of the e=pert to place before the court data upon :hich the court can form its o:n opinion. (n e=pert on hand:riting may give not only an opinion upon the authenticity of :riting, but also, in his e=amination in chief, the reasons for his opinion. P Court m(2 order e3(min(tion of 8uestioned do)ument 02 N(tion(- &ure(u of In,estig(tion . ; Ahen a party is too poor to pay the fees of a hand:riting e=pert, the court, upon its o:n initiative, may, for the sa?e of justice, re@uire the 6ational 8ureau of +nvestigation to ma?e an e=amination of the signature in a @uestioned document.

R =o .ro0-ems in h(nd=riting identifi)(tion . ; There are t:o main problems in hand:riting identification. 1- To determine :hether a signature, a line of :riting, or a page or more of :riting :as :ritten by the one :ho is alleged to have :ritten it. #- 5etermining :hether a certain :riter :rote an anonymous or other :riting. 8oth of these hand:riting problems must be solved by a study of the inherent @ualities in the :ritings themselves and by a comparison of their elements, @ualities, and characteristics :ith other :riting. R %ener(- (..e(r(n)e or .i)tori(- effe)t. ; The first test applied to a disputed :riting by nearly every e=aminer is the test of general appearance or pictorial effect as compared :ith the genuine standard of :riting. P "ethod of testing genuineness of dis.uted h(nd=riting 02 )om.(rison. ; 3ne of the first steps in the investigation of a suspected or disputed :riting should be the see?ing out of suitable genuine hand:riting :ith :hich it is to be compared. The @ualities and characteristics of any hand:riting as determined and classified in a thorough e=amination are. 1- !ermanent and fi=ed #- 1sual or common $- 3ccasional and, '- E=ceptional or accidental +t therefore follo:s that hand:riting has a certain field of possible and e=pected variation and :ithout a sufficient @uantity of standard :riting significant habits cannot be determined, and the value and force of characteristics cannot be definitely ?no:n. R Proof of genuineness of st(nd(rd h(nd=riting. ; 9enerally, :here :ritings are admitted to serve as a basis for comparison, the genuineness thereof must be proved to the satisfaction of the judge as a preliminary @uestion. 0is decision on such preliminary @uestion is conclusive, unless it appears to have been based on some erroneous vie: of la:, or :as clearly not justified by state of the evidence at that time.

R Use of =ritings other th(n those in issue . ; There is a direct conflict of authority on the @uestion of :hether an e=pert hand:riting :itness may be tested as to the accuracy of his ?no:ledge by the use of :ritings others than those in issue. The majority rule is that submitting to him may not test such a :itness, and eliciting his opinion as to the genuineness of other :ritings not admitted or proved to be genuine. 8ut in at least t:o jurisdictions it has been held that :ritings neither admitted nor proved to be genuine, and even though other:ise irrelevant, may be used to test an e=pert hand:riting :itness. R Ch(r()teristi)s .rin)i.-es6 of h(nd=ritingH gener(-

6o set of infallible rules can be formulated but some general principles can be stated that apply in most cases. 1+dentifying or differentiating characteristics. ; 3ne of the principles by :hich the force and significance of characteristics are measured is that those identifying or differentiating characteristics are of the most force :hich are most divergent from the regular system or national features of a particular hand:riting under e=amination. #+nconspicuous characteristics. ; "epeated characteristics :hich are inconspicuous should first be sought and should be given the most :eight, for these are li?ely to be so unconscious that they :ould not intentionally be omitted :hen an attempt is made to disguise, and :ould not be successfully copied from the :riting of another :hen simulation is attempted. $- 9eneral characteristics or national features and elements are not alone sufficient on :hich to have a judgment of identity of t:o :ritings, although these characteristics necessarily have as evidence of identity, as stated above, if present in sufficient number and in combination :ith individual @ualities and characteristics. R E3()t )oin)iden)e 0et=een t=o sign(tures. ; +t is a first principle in :riting that e=act coincidence bet:een t:o signatures is absolute proof that one or the other is a forgery. There must be some difference before authentically can be admitted. and the general rule is that authenticity reposes upon a general characteristics resemblance, coupled :ith specific differences, such as naturally result from the infinite variety of conditions controlling the muscles

of the :riter at each separate effort in forming his signature. R est for determining identit2 or non-identit2 . ; +n order to reach the conclusion that t:o :ritings are by the same hand there must not only be present general characteristics but also individual characteristics or Xdents and scratches,G in sufficient @uantity to e=clude the theory of accidental coincidence. to reach the conclusion that :ritings are by different hands :e may find numerous li?enesses in general characteristics but divergence in individual characteristics, or :e may find divergences in both, but the divergence must be something more than mere superficial differences. P $ f(,orite defense of forger2 . ; 3ne of the favorite defenses of forgery is the argument that the numerous damaging divergences in a disputed signature, :hich in combination are highly significant as evidence that it is not genuine, can each be found separately in one signature out of a great number of signatures, and that this proves that the disputed signature is genuine. Even if they could be found, this :ould not be proof of genuineness. The incompetent or the insincere :itness, or the advocate, :ho is defending forgery, :ill often laboriously see? out these separated and only partially e=emplified @ualities, and then argue that the disputed signature and the genuine :riting are just ali?e. R Cir)umst(n)es th(t m(2 indu)e e3.ert to gi,e erroneous o.inion. ; +dentity is proved :hen t:o hand:ritings both contain a sufficient number of significant characteristics. @ualities and elements so that it is unreasonable to say that they :ould all accidentally coincide in t:o different hand:ritings. P Errors (re due to: ,1- 8asing opinion on inade@uate amount of disputed :ritings ,#- +nade@uate amount of standard :riting ,$- 8asing conclusion on common @ualities alone ,'- 8asing conclusion on system or national characteristics ,)- 8asing conclusion partly on outside facts or statements of interested party ,>- +gnoring difference in the :ritings ,7- +nterpreting all differences as disguises ,8- (llo:ing prejudice, sympathy or antipathy to affect a conclusion ,9- 0aste or superficial e=amination ,1<- +nability to :eigh and interpret characteristics or @ualities

,11- 8asing opinion on undeveloped :riting from school teachers or pupils or young :riters ,1#- The attempt to identify the actual :riter of a forged signature that is a sim u-(ted or tr()ed =riting P Os0ornNs suggestion in .resenting e3.ert testimon26 > There are certain preliminary details in connection :ith the presentation of testimony of a technical character that deserve some attention. 8efore an e=pert or opinion :itness is allo:ed to testify the la: re@uires that he be D@ualifiedE in a legal :ay to give e=pert testimony. This @ualifying process consists in sho:ing that the :itness has had such preparation and e=perience as to legally @ualify him to give an opinion in court on the subject in dispute. ;. TD8E:RITTEN D1C79ENTS R Identifi)(tion of t2.e=ritten do)uments. ; The principles applicable to hand:riting apply e@ually to type:ritten documents. E=pert testimony identifying type:riting, printing and other mechanical impressions as prepared on a particular machine is no: considered an integral part of the science of @uestioned documents. T:o types of e=perts appear in this field, the e=aminer of documents and the type:riter mechanic or engineer. Sualifications are the same for both, that is anyone may testify, as an e=pert :hose training and e=perience have developed ?no:ledge above that of the average person in the features of a type:riter or printing press, subject to the sound discretion of the court. P 2.e=riting 8uestions. ; Type:riting @uestions are presented in a great variety of :ays. +n the first place, if often is desirable simply to ascertain the date of a type:ritten document. +t may also be a matter of great importance to learn :hether a document :as all :ritten continuously or :ritten at different times on the same machine or at different times on different machines. P !Di--ed t2.ist6 ; %?illed typist may be permitted to state inference that t:o pages of minute boo? of corporation :ere :ritten by different typists using different machines. R Identifi)(tion of o.er(tor. ; The @uestion of identification of the type:riter operator is primarily predicated upon the physical arrangement, the manner of punctuation, the length of line, the depth

of indentation, and the method of spelling, although some authorities discuss the @uestion from the point of vie: that operators of type:riters have different touches. R 4(0its of o.er(tor6 ; 5ifferent habits of touch, spacing, speed, arrangement, punctuation, or incorrect use of any letters, figures, or other characters may also sho: that a document :as not all :ritten by one operator, or may sho: that a collection of documents :as produced by several different operators. P 2.e=riting )h(r()teristi)s6 The first fact to be considered in investigating the date of a type:riting is to find :hen a certain ?ind of machine, the :or? of :hich is in @uestion, first came into use, and then it is important to learn, and to be able to prove, :hen any changes in the machine :ere made that affected the :ritten record. R he most im.ort(nt t2.e=riting in8uir26 ; !erhaps the most important type:riting in@uiry is the determination :hether a type:ritten document is the :or? of a particular individual machine. There usually are t:o steps in an in@uiry of this ?ind. 1- The first being the determination of the fact that the document :as :ritten on a certain particular ?ind of machine, #- (nd the second that it :as :ritten on a certain individual machine of that particular ?ind R Com.(rison of t2.e=riting or .rinting. ; The authorities dealing :ith the @uestion :hether type:ritten instruments can be identified as to genuineness by the peculiarity of the :riting in much the same manner as hand:riting has been identified appear to agree that type:riting possesses such individuality that it can be identified in much the same manner as hand:riting, by comparison :ith other type:riting and by e=pert testimony. The theory underlying this rule is that :here an impression is made on paper y an instrument, :hich possesses a defect or peculiarity, the identity of the instrument may be proved by the similarity of the defects, :hich it impresses on different papers. C. ,IN'ER8RINTS R Finger.rints/ .(-m .rints/ foot.rints/ tr()Ds6 > (uthenticated fingerprints, palm prints or footprints or photographs thereof of any person may be

introduced in evidence and compared :ith other fingerprints, palm prints or footprints found at or near the scene of the crime. This comparison is usually made by e=perts :ho may be permitted to use projectoscopes and photographic enlargements for the purpose of displaying such photographic impression to the court. P Finger.rint e3.erts6 ; 0e must have ?no:ledge of fingerprint from study, training, or e=perience as to ma?e him a specialist in the subject. P $dmissi0i-it2 of finger.rints e3.ert testimon26 ; E=pert testimony as to the identity of thumbmar?s or fingerprints is admissible. 0o:ever, the court is justified in refusing to accept opinions of alleged e=perts :here thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic mar?s far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by e=perts as sho:ing the identity or lac? of identity of the impressions. The court may substitute the opinion of e=perts by its o:n opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects bet:een the admittedly genuine thumbmar? and the @uestioned thumbmar?s is evident. R 5eight of finger.rint. ; The :eight to be given evidence of correspondence of fingerprints, :here offered to prove identity of the accused as the person committing the crime, is for the determination of the court in the light of all surrounding facts and circumstances. To :arrant a conviction, ho:ever, the fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused must have been found in the place :here the crime :as committed, under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time :hen the crime :as committed. Ahen it appears that there :ere fingerprints other than those identified as the defendantGs :ho are neither identified nor e=plained, the proof of the defendantGs prints is not sufficient to support a conviction. D. ;%<<ISTICS R &(--isti)s e3.ert6 > 0e is one :ho is @ualified to give e=pert opinion on firearms and ammunition. 6o :itness should be permitted to testify regarding the identification of firearms and bullets by the use of this science unless he has clearly sho:n that he is @ualified to give such testimony. +n a trial, it is necessary that the instrument, such as a :eapon involved in a crime, be tested and demonstrated. P he .ro0-em of determining =hether or not ( gi,en 0u--et =(s fired from ( sus.e)ted fire(rm6 ; This problem can be solved only if it is possible to

establishB ,a- that the signature on the given bullet :as engraved by a firearm :ith the same class characteristics as those if the suspected firearm. ,bthat the same combination of identifying elements e=ists in the signature on all bullets ,e=cept those undersiIe- fired from the suspected firearms at the time, and all variations found in these signatures can be reconciled. ,c- that the same combination of identifying elements e=ists in the signature on the given bullet. ,d- that all variations e=isting in the signature on the given bullet and the signatures of the suspected firearm can be reconciled. and ,e- that the identifying elements determined from a combination the coe=istence of :hich is highly improbable in the signatures of other firearms :ith the same class characteristics. P he .ro0-em of determining =hether or not ( fired )(rtridge )(se =(s fired in ( sus.e)ted fire(rm6 ; The first step in the solution of this problem is to compare the signature on the given cartridge case :ith the signature on a test cartridge case to determine :hether or not the given cartridge case :as fired in a firearm :ith the same class characteristics as those of the suspected firearm. +f the re@uisite agreement in class characteristics is found to e=ist and the reference point is established on the given cartridge case, the ne=t step is to compare the signature on t:o or more test cartridge cases to determine the identities and to reconcile the diversities. R $dmissi0i-it2 of 0(--isti)s e3.ert testimon2 . ; ( :itness s?illed in ballistics may be permitted to testify to the effect that he identified the pistol from :hich a bullet found at the scene of the homicide :as fired, as a result of comparison of mar?ing on that bullet and on shells also found at the scene of the homicide, :ith those found on bullets and shells fired by the :itness through the pistol, the test upon :hich he passed his observations and formed his opinion being minutely described to the court. R 5eight of 0(--isti)s e3.ertNs o.inion . ; ( ballistics e=pert conclusion that bullets :ere fired from a particular gun does not invade the province of the court. Testimony that he :as convinced, as a result of the test made by him, that a bullet found at the scene of the homicide :as fired through the pistol in evidence, :hich admittedly belonging to defendant, is an e=pression of an opinion based on his observations, and not objectionable as stating a fact, and thus invading the province of the court.

E. 8%R%,,IN 1R NITR%TE TEST R "ethod to determine =hether ( .erson h(s re)ent-2 fired ( gun6 > +t is usual in criminal investigations of cased of murder or homicide to apply nitrate test commonly ?no:n as paraffin test on the hands of the suspected person to determine :hether or not such person has recently fired a gun. ,!eople vs. Timbol, 9.". 6os. '7'71, '7'7# and '7'7$-. ,. C%7SE 1, DE%TC F N%T7RE %ND C%7SE 1, :17NDS R C(use of de(th6 > Ahere a body had been found but the cause of death is un?no:n, opinions of e=perts are generally indispensable to assist the court in determining :hether the death :as caused by accident, disease or violence. The cause of death of a person is considered so :ithin the range of scientific ?no:ledge that medical e=pert testimony is admissible as to such cause. or as to the different :ays in :hich the death might have been caused, that death did or did not result from a given :ound or injury, :hich of several bullet :ounds :as the most fatal :here a person died after being shot several times or ho: long a person had been dead. %uch testimony is not proper to contradict eye:itnesses. P "(nner (nd )(use of de(th6 ; +n all cases :here cause of death is not one common observation or ?no:ledge, physicians and surgeons ; medical e=perts ; may give opinion testimony, derived from their o:n observations of the body of the deceased or from scientific deductions from given facts, as to the probable causes of death, provided there are sufficient facts in evidence upon :hich to base the conclusion. P Ch(r()ter of =e(.on inf-i)ting =ound6 ; ( competent e=pert may testify from the nature of a :ound as to the character of the :eapon :hich caused it, and even non-e=pert testimony is sometimes accepted in this connection. R 5hether =ound or other in1uries =ere se-finf-i)ted. ; The general rule seems to be that opinions as to :hether :ounds and injuries :ere or :ere not self inflicted and not admissible :here the facts are fully presentable to the court and are such that special ?no:ledge or s?ill is not an essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion upon the

@uestion. but :here such ?no:ledge or s?ill is necessary or :here the facts cannot be fully represented, the opinions of :itnesses having such ?no:ledge or s?ill are admissible as an aid to the court. R &(sis of o.inion. ; To be admissible, it must be based on facts observed by the physician in the course of his attendance upon, or e=amination of, the subject. *acts proved in the case by direct testimony overheard by the :itness, or facts hypothetically stated, mere guesses or speculative opinions are inadmissible.

blindly follo:ed, but are to be :eighed by the court and judged in vie: of all testimony in the case and the judge o:n personal ?no:ledge of affairs. R "(rDet ,(-ue. ; The price fi=ed by the buyer and the seller in the open mar?et in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition. the price and value established or sho:n by sale, public or private, in the ordinary course of business. the fair value of the property as bet:een one :ho desires to sell and one :ho desires to purchase. and the general or ordinary price at :hich property may be bought and sold in a given locality. R $ssessed ,(-ue. ; (ssessed value may be admitted as evidence but it is of little value ina judicial investigation to determine the mar?et value of the property. C. 1TCER S7;6ECTS 1, EG8ERT TESTI91ND R !u01e)ts th(t m(2 0e .ro,ed 02 e3.erts6 ; This includes the follo:ingB 1. #. $. '. ). (ge 8loodstains 0air P-ray, pictures haracters in certain :ritings :hich needs to be deciphered >. 2anguage in certain :ritings not understood by the court 7. 1n:ritten la: 8. !roof of un:ritten foreign la:s R Lu(-ifi)(tion of =itness. ; The :itness must be sho:n to the satisfaction of the court to possess sufficient ?no:ledge to render his evidence of value. R O.inions of )ourts of foreign st(tes (nd n(tions. ; /udicial opinions offered as proof of the un:ritten la: of a foreign state or nation have been held admissible in evidence, even in the absence of a statutory provision authoriIing the admission thereof in evidence. 0o:ever, the fact that a purported decision does not appear in the original reports has been held sufficient ground for disregarding it, although it does appear in an unofficial publication. !e)tion A;6Opinion of or$inar& 'itnesses. M The opinion of a :itness for :hich proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding M ,a- the identity of a person about :hom he has ade@uate ?no:ledge. ,b- ( hand:riting :ith :hich he has sufficient familiarity. and

'. S%NITD 1R INS%NITD R %ener(- ru-e6 > &ental incapacity is a field in :hich the opinions of e=perts are fre@uently to for the purpose of aiding the court in dra:ing inferences from facts, :hich have been detailed to it. &edical e=perts and e=perts :ith relation to mental diseases may give an opinion upon the mental condition of the :itness, based upon facts and circumstances :ithin their o:n observations. upon hypothetical @uestions based upon facts and circumstances in evidence. and upon facts detailed by the :itnesses. P E3.ert =itness6 ; 0e should have a general ?no:ledge as a medical man or :ith scientific training upon the subject. Those :ho have had the care of insane persons are generally received as competent including physicians in general practice and trained nurses :ho are accustomed to attend upon the sic?. C. V%<7E 1, 8ERS1N%< 1R RE%< 8R18ERTD P O.inion e,iden)e on the ,(-ue of .erson(- (nd re(- .ro.ert26 ; 3pinion evidence is usually admitted from persons, :ho are not strictly e=perts, but :ho from residing and doing business in the vicinity have familiariIed themselves :ith land values and are more able to form and opinion on the subject at issue. R E3.ert e,iden)e on the ,(-ue of -(nd t(Den 02 eminent dom(in. ; ( person engaged in a business of holding a public office, :hich re@uired the ?no:ledge of real estate values is a competent :itness as to the value of land :ith :hich he is familiar. The opinions of e=perts as to value, ho:ever, are not to be passively received and

,c- The mental sanity of a person :ith :hom he is sufficiently ac@uainted. The :itness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. ,''a1. !our)e6 > This provision is a reproduction of %ection '', "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt. #. In gener(-6 > Aell-settled is the rule that a :itness can testify to those facts only :hich he ?no:s of his o:n ?no:ledge. he should not be allo:ed to state conclusions or inferences :hich are for the court to ma?e. $. Pro.er 0(sis or .redi)(te for =itnessN o.inion6 > 8efore an ordinary :itness may be allo:ed to give his opinion on the identity, hand:riting, the mental sanity of a person, or to give his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person, the proper basis or predicate upon :hich he bases his opinion must first be laid. '. O.inion of ordin(r2 =itness (s to identit2 of ( .erson6 > (n ordinary :itness may give his opinion regarding the identity of a person :hen he has ade@uate ?no:ledge of his identity. 8ecause of the difficulty of describing the circumstances :hich established identity in terms conveying the idea of identification, :itnesses :ho are sho:n to be @ualified by their opportunities for observation are permitted to testify as to the identity of persons or things. The rule applies to criminal prosecutions as :ell as to civil actions. There are, ho:ever, instances in :hich opinions have been e=cluded ; usually, it seems, because of the facts of the particular case. 1nder the present rule, the statements of the :itness as to identity are not to be rejected because he is unable to describe the features of the person in @uestion, or the latterGs clothing or other particulars on :hich the :itnessG conclusion depends. +dentification may be based upon voice alone. and it is obviously impossible for a :itness to describe tones of voice in such a manner that from the description alone the court can arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. ). Ph2si)(- )ondition > ( :itness need not be an e=pert in medical matters in order to be competent to e=press an opinion as to the physical condition of another. (nd it is clear that in describing such a condition the :itness is not re@uired to state all the evidentiary facts on :hich his opinion is based. his statement may parta?e largely of the nature of a summary of, or conclusion from, such facts. ( :itness may

testify that in his judgment the defendant :as about the siIe of one of the robbers. >. O.inion of ordin(r2 =itness (s to the h(nd=riting of ( .erson6 > (n ordinary :itness may give his opinion regarding the hand:riting of a person, :ith :hich he has sufficient familiarity. This subject is :ell covered by "ule 1$#, %ection ## of the "ules of ourt, :hich provides that DThe hand:riting of a person may be proved by any :itness :ho believes it to be the hand:riting of such person because he has seen the person :rite, or has seen :riting purporting to be his upon :hich the :itness has acted or been charged, and has thus ac@uired ?no:ledge of the hand:riting of such person. Evidence respecting the hand:riting may also be given by a comparison, made by the :itness or the court, :ith :ritings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against :hom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.E The evidence fre@uently offered on a @uestion of the authenticity of a disputed :riting or signature is that of persons :ho are familiar :ith the hand:riting of the alleged :riter. the opinion of such a person is universally recogniIed to be admissible, even though he is in no sense a hand:riting e=pert. 6on-e=pert :itnesses may not e=press an opinion on the genuineness of a :riting solely from comparison, but they may e=press an opinion based on the ?no:ledge received from the hand:riting of the party :hom they sa: :rite. The testimony of the notary public, :ho :as not only an instrumental :itness himself but also an officer of the court, and :hose act of notariIation impressed upon the disputed 5eed of (bsolute %ale, the full faith and credit :hich attaches to a public instrument, e=plicitly identifying the signatures of the parties to the instrument and e=pressly and forthrightly stating that both had appeared before him and affi=ed their signatures to the said document, must be held to control and prevail over the opinion or conclusion of petitionerGs e=pert :itness ! ; A"cos) et a" %s Interme$iate Appea""ate Court 7. O.inion of ordin(r2 =itness (s to the ment(s(nit2 or ins(nit2 of ( .erson6 > (n ordinary :itness may give his opinion regarding the mental sanity of the person :ith :hom he is sufficiently ac@uainted. (n ordinary :itness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of an individual, if such opinion is dra:n from the conduct of the latter,

since there can be no doubt that persons of common sense, conversant :ith man?ind, and having a practical ?no:ledge of the :orld, if brought into the presence of a lunatic :ould, in a short time, be enabled to form an accurate and reliable opinion, not, perhaps, of the specific and precise character of the insanity as referable to a particular class of the insane malady, but certainly, in a general :ay, of his mental unsoundness. 8. Re(son for the ru-e6 > "easons for this rule are found in the considerations that the facts sho:ing insanity, in their entirety, fre@uently elude accurate, complete and detailed statement and conse@uently render it difficult to afford a satisfactory basis for the judgment of an e=pert. that many :itnesses can ma?e a correct inference more readily than they can ma?e a detailed statement. that as commonly presented to observation, insanity is really detected, if carried beyond a certain point. that an uns?illed observer may be @uite as able as an e=pert to ma?e a clear mental comparison bet:een the acts and conduct of a sane person and those of one :ho is laboring under mental disability. and that to reject the inference of an observer :ith suitable opportunities and faculty for observation is to refuse to consider evidence :hich is fre@uently of the highest possible value. 9. O.inion of ( su0s)ri0ing =itness to ( =riting (s to the ment(- s(nit2 or ins(nit2 of ( signer6 > +n :ill cases, a special @ualification to testify e=ists on the part of the attesting :itnesses to the :ill. +t is commonly held that they may testify to their opinion of the testatorGs soundness of mind :ithout proof of their having had the opportunity of observing him e=cept at the time of e=ecuting the :ill. &oreover, the rule supported by the over:helming :eight of authority is that no foundation need be laid for receiving the opinion of a subscribing :itness to a :ill as to the soundness of the testatorGs mind at the time of e=ecuting the :ill, other than to sho: his status as a subscribing :itness. &any courts have reached such conclusion on the theory that it may be presumed that the attesting :itness performed his duty to observe the mental condition of the testatorGs mind at the time of e=ecuting the :ill. 1<. Neg(ti,ing test(ment(r2 )(.()it26 > The testimony of an attesting :itness to a :ill tending to sho: that the testator :as of unsound mind or lac?ed testamentary capacity is admissible. %uch is held to be the rule, not:ithstanding the vie: is ta?en that a person re@uested to :itness a :ill should observe the testator and be satisfied of his mental capacity before signing as a :itness. (lthough a person

:ho attaches his name as a :itness to a testamentary instrument impliedly certifies that the testator is of sound mind and competent to ma?e a :ill, he :ill be permitted to contradict the attestation clause and testify as to the actual facts. That the :itness may deserve censure for having attested a :ill of a person :hom he is ready to declare of unsound mind :hen the validity of the instrument is later brought into @uestion is not a sufficient reason for refusing to hear such testimony. 11. Im.ressions (s to emotion/ 0eh(,ior/ )ondition or (..e(r(n)e6 > ( :itness may testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. +t is usually competent for a :itness to state his impression of anotherGs manner or appearance, such as that the latter :as DnervousE or De=citedE, that he :as DmadE. 8ut a :itness cannot testify to uncommunicated motive or intention of a party, such as he thought the deceased intended to ?ill someone or be ?illed, that t:o people :ere DantagonisticE, that defendant laughed because she cut deceased, :hether defendant :as Djo?ingE in :hat he said, that the accused Dloo?ed pretty vigorousE or that one :as DjealousE, as an opinion or impression is a mere guess or speculation and inadmissible. 1#. O.inion -imited to e3.ressions of his o=n im.ressions6 > Ahile one may testify in opinion form as to impression made upon his o:n senses, he cannot go further and testify as to the impression such facts :ould have had upon others. +n a case decided by the %upreme ourt of Aashington, the trial court refused to permit a :itness sho:n to be ac@uainted :ith the locale, to give his opinion as to :hether a stranger driving over a certain street at night :ould reasonably believe he :as on a through street. 1$. 42.otheti)(- 8uestion not .ermissi0-e6 > ( non-e=pert :itness cannot give an opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the accused based in :hole or in part upon an abstract hypothetical @uestion, but must base his opinion solely upon his o:n personal ?no:ledge, observation, ac@uaintance, etc., :ith the accused. 1'. 5itness must gi,e re(son for his o.inion6 > +n giving his opinion, the non-e=pert must state facts upon :hich his opinion :as based. +t is indisputable that it should appear some:here in the testimony of the :itness that he had the testimonial @ualification of previous observation of the person :hose sanity he underta?es to give evidence. +t must appear, as a preliminary to the e=pression of his opinion that he has had the means of observation. 0e must give the facts of his ?no:ledge and ac@uaintanceship

:ith the person concerning :hose sanity he is called to testify. (fter giving these facts, he may e=press his opinion. The :eight of the opinion, or its value, is then developed further by evidence of the particular facts coming under his observation, and on :hich he bases his opinion. 1). E3(min(tion of non-e3.ert =itnesses6 > The general rules as to the e=amination of :itnesses, :ith such modification as the character of the testimony renders necessary, apply to the e=amination of :itnesses giving evidence. ( :itness :ho has stated that he has no opinion should not be pressed to give an opinion. ( @uestion :hich is misleading or indefinite should not be permitted, and a @uestion as to :hether accusedGs demeanor on the :itness stand :as different from that :hen the :itness met him at a certain time has been e=cluded as unfair. 1>. Cross-e3(min(tion of non-e3.ert =itnesses6 > ( :itness testifying as to his opinion may be cross-e=amined as to the facts and grounds upon :hich his opinion is based, and generally cross-e=amination legitimately tending to test the accuracy and truthfulness of the :itness and the value of his testimony should be permitted. The cross-e=amination must be confined to the scope of the e=amination in chief, and a @uestion based on an assumption not :arranted by the evidence is inadmissible. +t has been held that on cross-e=amination of a :itness :ho has testified to sanity or insanity of testator, he may be as?ed as to testatorGs capacity to ma?e a :ill in order to test the :itness, but not to establish the fact. but on the other hand, it has been considered that testimony of attesting :itnesses, that testatri= at the time of the e=ecution of the :ill :as of disposing memory, received :ithout objection, gave contestant no right to as?, on cross-e=amination of a none=pert for proponent, for his opinion :hether testatri= :as of a disposing mind. 1@6 L(test Curis.ruden)e6 Peo.-e of the Phi-i..ines/ ,s6 Efren C(sti--o/ %R No6 18<A77/ $ugust 9/ 2;1; HThe opinion of a #itness for #hich proper basis is iven! ma$ be received in evidence re ardin the mental sanit$ of a person #ith #hom he is sufficientl$ ac0uainted.I (ppellant anchors his argument for ac@uittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish (((Gs mental retardation to ma?e him guilty of rape under (rticle #>>-(, par. 1,b-, of the "evised !enal ode. (ppellant concludes that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable

doubt. The %upreme argument.

ourt rejected the said

%ection )<, "ule 1$< of the "evised "ules on Evidence e=plicitly provides that the opinion of a :itness for :hich proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding the mental sanity of a person :ith :hom he is sufficiently ac@uainted. (ccordingly, it is competent for the ordinary :itness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the :itness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in @uestion. ommonly, it is re@uired that the :itness details the factors and reasons upon :hich he bases his opinion before he can testify as to :hat it is. +n the case at bench, 888 testified that ((( has been suffering from epilepsy since she :as nine years old, :hich is one of the reasons :hy ((( :as not able to finish her 9rade + level. ((( also had to stop schooling because she had difficulties understanding her lessons in school, she cannot :rite :ell, she had poor memory and she had difficulty ans:ering even the simplest @uestion as?ed of her. 888 further stated that ((( is the eldest of her four children. ho:ever, compared to her younger siblings, ((( had a hard time comprehending the instructions given to her at home and in school. +t bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by la: need not be complete. mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that (((Gs impaired learning capacity, lac? of personal hygiene and difficulty in ans:ering simple @uestions, as testified to by her mother and the 9uidance !sychologist :ho had an opportunity to observe her appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that she is truly suffering from some degree of mental retardation. !e)tion A16Character e%i$ence not genera""& a$missi#"e. eAceptionsB M ,a- +n riminal asesB ,1- The accused may prove his good moral character :hich is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. ,#1nless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character :hich is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. ,$- The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

,b- +n ivil asesB Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only :hen pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case. ,c- +n the case provided for in "ule 1$#, %ection 1', ,'>a, '7a16 !our)e6 > This provision is a reproduction of %ections '> and '7, "ule 1$< of the "ules of ourt. $6 IN %ENER$L 26 Ch(r()ter defined6 > haracter is defined to be the possession by a person of certain @ualities of mind or morals, distinguishing him from others. The opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people :ho are ac@uainted :ith him. his reputation. 76 Ch(r()ter distinguished from re.ut(tion6 > Q haracterE strictly spea?ing, means that :hich a person or thing really is, :hile DreputationE means :hat a person is estimated, said, supposed, or thought, to be by others. haracter is internal, reputation is e=ternal. one is the substance, the other is the shado:. :6 %ood mor(- )h(r()ter defined6 > 9ood moral character means a character that measures up as good among the people of the community in :hich the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citiIen. that status :hich attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.

@6 5hen ())used m(2 introdu)e e,iden)e of his good mor(- )h(r()ter6 > +t is al:ays relevant for the defendant to offer affirmative evidence of good moral character, :hen the same is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. 86 ime (nd .-()e of ())used )h(r()ter6 > Evidence of the defendantGs character should be confined to a time not very remote from the date of the commission of the crime. +t should relate to the time of the act in @uestion and before. 9enerally spea?ing, it is the reputation up to the time of the commission of the offense only :hich is admissible.

96 $))used )(nnot .ro,e the good mor()h(r()ter of his )o-())usedH e3)e.tion6 > Though the accused may prove his o:n character, he :ill not be permitted to prove that others conspiring :ith him and jointly indicted, or :ho are suspected of complicity in the crime, are men of good character. This evidence is not in the last relevant to sho: his innocence, as the fact that the friends or ac@uaintances of the accused are men of unimpeachable character, in no :ay proves that he is a person of good character. 1;6 Neg(ti,e e,iden)e of good )h(r()ter or re.ut(tion6 > +t is :ell settled that the testimony of a :itness to the effect that he has never heard anything against the character or reputation of a person is admissible to prove the good character of such person, provided the :itness is sho:n to have been in such position that he :ould have heard anything that :as said concerning the personGs character or reputation. 6egative evidence is vie:ed as the most cogent evidence of a personGs good character and reputation, because in the absence of any discussion about character, it may reasonably be presumed that the personGs reputation is good. 116 No .resum.tion m(2 0e inferred =here defend(nt offers no e,iden)e of his good )h(r()ter6 > +f the defendant offers no evidence of his good character, no legal presumption can be dra:n from such omission prejudicial to the defendant, or that, his character is bad. 0o:ever, if he desires to put his character in issue, he has the right to the benefit of his previous good character or reputation, so far as it is at variance :ith the crime charged. 126 Right of st(te to introdu)e e,iden)e of 0(d mor(- )h(r()ter6 > +t is generally recogniIed that the state cannot, in a criminal prosecution, introduce evidence attac?ing the character of the accused, unless the accused first puts his good character in issue by introducing evidence to

A6 5(2s of .ro,ing good or 0(d )h(r()ter of ( .(rt26 > The rule is that testimony to prove the good or bad character of a party to a civil action or of the defendant in a criminal prosecution must relate and be confined to the general reputation :hich such person sustains in the community or neighborhood in :hich he lives or has lived. &6 C4$R$C ER IN CRI"IN$L C$!E! <6 $))used m(2 .ro,e his good mor()h(r()ter6 > !roof of the good moral character of the accused strengthens the presumption of his innocence. and by establishing good character a presumption is created that the accused did not commit the crime. This vie: proceeds upon the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not li?ely to have committed the act charged against him.

sustain his good character or reputation or has become a :itness in his o:n behalf. 176 E,iden)e of s.e)ifi) ()ts not (dmissi0-e to .ro,e 0(d )h(r()ter6 > Evidence of specific acts or conduct of a person upon particular occasions bearing upon his character, is usually held to be admissible. The admission of such evidence :ould raise collateral issues and divert the mind of the judge from the matter at hand. Thus, the state in rebutting the evidence of the defendantGs good character is confined to evidence sho:ing his general reputation as to having a bad character, and not to specific acts derogatory to his good character. 3ne accused of a crime cannot testify in defense that he has never before been accused of, or arrested for, crime. 1:6 5hen e,iden)e of s.e)ifi) ()ts (dmissi0-e6 > The reasons of practical policy affecting the rule e=cluding proof of specific conduct of a party do not apply :ith the same force :here the character of third persons is involved. 1A6 5hen )h(r()ter is in issue in )rimin(- )(ses6 > haracter may itself be a fact-in-issue. +n numerous offenses against social morality, as defined by the criminal la:, the character of a person may be an element in the offense. Ahether it is actual character or reputed character depends upon the policy and the :ords of the local statute, as interpreted by the courts. 1<6 "or(- )h(r()ter of the offended .(rt26 > The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This rule is applied :ith fre@uency in cases of homicide and se= offenses. 1@6 Ch(r()ter of offended .(rt2 in r(.e (nd sedu)tion )(ses6 > +n any prosecution involving the unchaste act by a man against a :oman, :here the :illingness of the :oman is material, such as rape and acts of lasciviousness, the :omanGs character as to chastity is admissible to sho: :hether or not she consented to the manGs act. Thus, in the prosecution for rape, or for enticement to prostitution, or in an action or prosecution for indecent assault ,acts of lasciviousness-, the :omanGs character as to chastity is admissible. but not in a prosecution for rape under the age of consent. 186 Ch(r()ter of offended .(rt2 in homi)ide )(ses6 > 3n prosecution for homicide, evidence of the bad character of the deceased is irrelevant, for as fre@uently said, the la: protects

everyone from unla:ful violence, regardless of character, and the service done the community in ridding it of a violent and dangerous man is, in the eyes of the la:, no justification of the act. 196 Ch(r()ter of offended .(rt2 in murder )(ses6 > Ahile the good or bad moral character of the victim may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in a crime of murder :here the ?illing is committed :ith treachery or premeditation. C6 C4$R$C ER IN CIVIL C$!E! 2;6 Ch(r()ter e,iden)e in )i,i- )(ses6 > 3f character evidence in ordinary civil actions, even those :herein fraud is imputed, it has been :ell observed that if such evidence is proper, then a person may screen himself from the punishment due to fraudulent conduct till his character becomes bad. Every man must be ans:erable for every improper act, and the character of every transaction must be ascertained by its o:n circumstances, and not by the character of the parties. 216 Distin)tion 0et=een the ru-e on )h(r()ter e,iden)e in )rimin(- (nd )i,i- )(ses6 > +n criminal cases, evidence of the good character of the accused is most properly and :ith good reason admissible in evidence, because there is a fair and just presumption that a person of good character :ould not commit a crime. but in civil cases, such evidence is :ith e@ual good reason not admitted, because no presumption :ould fairly arise, in the very great proportion of such cases, from the good character of the defendant, that he did not commit the breach of contract or of civil duty alleged against him. 226 5here e,iden)e of mor()h(r()ter (dmissi0-e in )i,i- )(ses6 > (s a general rule, the character of a party to a civil action is not a proper subject of in@uiry, for, :hile it is recogniIed that ground for an inference of some logically probative force as to :hether or not a person did a certain act may be furnished by the fact that his character is such as might reasonably be e=pected to predispose him to:ard or against such an act, this consideration is out:eighed by the practical objections to opening the door to this class of evidence. 276 QPutting )h(r()ter in issueR or Q)h(r()ter in,o-,ed in the issueR )onstrued6 > D!utting character in issueE or Dcharacter involved in the issueE is a technical e=pression, :hich does not mean simply that the character may be affected by the result, but that it is of particular importance in the suit itself, as the character of

the plaintiff in an action of slander, or that of a :oman in an action on the case for seduction. 2:6 E,iden)e of mor(- )h(r()ter of ( third .erson6 > (n issue in a civil case sometimes involves a third personGs act having a moral @uality. 3n such an issue, the third personGs moral trait :ould have probative value, and there is no practical policy against it. ourt sometimes admit it, and sometimes e=clude it.

L%E . )1. Character e%i$ence not genera""& a$missi#"e. eAceptions ; ,a- +n riminal asesB ===

===

,$- The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.L +t :ill be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. (nd even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, :e cannot sustain respondentGs posture. 6ot every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. 3nly those :hich :ould establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. +n the present administrative case for se=ual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on &agdalenaGs chastity. Ahat he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust ve=ation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. ertainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. 3bviously, in invo?ing the above provision, :hat respondent :as trying to establish is &agdalenaGs lac? of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. +n this regard, a different provision applies.

2A6 Ch(r()ter in mitig(tion of d(m(ges or in e3)use or defense to the ()tion6 > +n some civil actions, the measure of compensation may be affected by the plaintiffGs character. D6 C4$R$C ER OF 5I NE!! 2<6 E,iden)e of good )h(r()ter of =itness6 > Evidence of the good character of a :itness is not admissible until such character has been impeached. The character or reputation of a :itness must be attac?ed or impeached before testimony sustaining his character or reputation can be admitted, but it is not necessary that character :itnesses for impeachment purposes should first be introduced if the veracity or character of the :itness been substantially impeached in other :ays, especially if he is a stranger in the county :here the trial is being conducted. Evidence in rebuttal to sustain a :itnessG character or reputation has been assailed in order to discredit him, or :hen the opposite party brings out matters, :hich, if true, tend to diminish the credibility of the :itness by disparaging his character. 2@6 L(test 1uris.ruden)e6 Ci,i- !er,i)e Commission ,s6 $--2son &e-(g(n/ %R No6 1721<:/ O)to0er 19/ 2;;: HNot ever$ ood or bad moral character of the offended part$ ma$ be proved under this provision. 1nl$ those #hich #ould establish the probabilit$ or improbabilit$ of the offense char ed. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the t$pe of offense char ed.I 9enerally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. 3ne statutory e=ception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., %ection )1 ,a- $, "ule 1$< of the "evised "ules on Evidence, :hich :e @uote hereB