THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ADULFO TERROBIAS, defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes convicting the accused, Adulfo Terrobias, of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to acknowledge the offspring of Delia Bonion as his natural child with all the rights granted her by law; and to indemnify the victim, Delia C. Bonion, in the sum of P10,000.00 as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. 1 To the charge of rape, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He does not, therefore, deny the truth of the testimony of the complainant, the 17year old Delia C. Bonion, as to her sexual experience except only to disclaim any participation therein with his assertion of never having had sexual intercourse with her. The testimony of the complainant on how she was sexually assaulted, and the events that intervened thereafter, may, therefore, be quoted from the appealed decision which set forth the said testimony as follows: ... Complainant Delia C. Bonion narrated how on the night of February 17, 1977 as she was fast asleep because of the days work, she woke up to find Adulfo Terrobias already on top of her holding her hands and when she resisted was told not to shout under threats of harm. As Delia continued to struggle, Adulfo covered her mouth with a wad of cotton soaked with medicine which smell weakened her and caused her to lose consciousness. When she came to, Delia still saw Adulfo getting his pants and went out the room. Still laboring under the fear of harm because Adulfo warned her that nobody should know what he did, Delia continued her usual household work, awaiting the arrival of her parents. Adulfo did not take breakfast at the table the following morning, Delia's mother visited her February 27 and she confided to her what Adulfo did. Florencia Terrobias was informed by Dolores C. Bonion

same day within the hearing of Delia, and after condemning Adulfo as a salvaje her Lola Insay asked the two to wait for the arrival of Gregorio Terrobias who was in Naga City. The defense miserably failed to present Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias to rebut the claim of Delia and Dolores about the report of the RAPE to both of them. Neither did the defense deny that Gregorio after knowing his son's perfidy told complainant and her mother Dolores to have the child removed or aborted thru the help of an 'arbulario'. The proposal of abortion refused, Dolores demanded that Adulfo marry her daughter which the Terrobias Fay scorned. Delia was thereafter taken away by her own parents. The case went to Court. In retaliation, Dolores and her husband were summarily removed as tenant-encargado. 2 The assault took place in the house of appellant's parents, Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias, at Bato, Catanduanes, where complainant was a house helper, her parents being the "encargado" 3 of the properties of the aforesaid spouses, whom Delia called "Lolo Goyong" and "Lola Insay", 4 and treated as her foster parents. Appellant, then single and thirty-three years of age, was living with his parents in the same house. Delia's room was between appellant's room and that of the latter's mother. 5 It is in complainant's room that the rape took place. From her plain and straightforward testimony, We have no doubt as to complainant's candor and sincerity. A 17-year old girl at the time, she could not have merely concocted the story she narrated in court, directed against a thirty-three-year-old son of her masters. Only truth and a feeling of deep grievance could have impelled her to charge appellant with the grave offense committed against her, even at a price she has to pay in terms of her honor being exposed or even tarnished not to mention the discharge of her parents as "encargados" of appellant's parents. The circumstances as duly established following the sexual assault could not but strengthen belief in complainant's honesty and truthfulness. As soon as she had the chance to report the offense done her to someone of her fullest confidence and who could look at her plight with sympathy and understanding, she did so. This was on February 27, 1977 on her mother's first visit to her after the incident when she told her mother about the

harrowing experience. 6 The mother, in turn, told appellant's mother what the latter's son did to her daughter. Right after hearing the daughter's whole story, appellant's mother, instead of expressing disbelief in what was told her, reproached her son for the act, calling him "salvage", and suggested that Delia remain until the matter is reported to her husband who was then in Naga City. 7 When the father of appellant heard of the incident as narrated to him by complainant's mother, he told the latter to return on April 2 to afford him time to investigate the matter. On her return as agreed, Delia's mother told appellant's father that Delia was on the family way. Thus informed, appellant's father suggested abortion by an "arbulario", 8 to which Delia's mother disagreed, and instead demanded that appellant marry Delia who was with her. Appellant's father answered in Bicol: "Carabaos should be with carabaos and cows with cows." 9 On the same date, April 2, 1977, Mrs. Bonion took her daughter Delia to Virac to seek advice of her aunt who suggested that a medical certificate be secured as to the condition of Delia. Dr. Masagca who examined Delia found her one and one-half month pregnant, her last menstruation being on January 29, 1977. Because of the complaint filed by Delia and her parents who forthwith reported what happened to their daughter to the PC at Virac the Terrobias spouses discharged Delia's parents as their "encargado". 10 Delia later gave birth to a baby girl on October 28, 1977. 11 With the complainant pointing to appellant as the person who ravished her in her room in appellant's residence on the night of February 17, 1977 the latter's alibi of not being in his house on said time and day because he attended the birthday part of Teodulo dela Providencia in San Andres, Catanduanes, some 25 kilometers from Bato where he had to spend the night Teodulos house because he had drunk too much is unavailing. No motive was given why the complainant should falsely charge appellant with so grave an offense, considering that she had treated appellant s parents with so much affection that she called their, "Lolo" and "Lola". Complainant might have incurred in some inconsistencies, in her testimony during the trial in relation to statements she gave before the trial as appellant tried graphically to demonstrate in his brief (p. 11). They refer, however, to minor details that do not detract from the truth of the central fact of rape having been committed by appellant on the complainant. They arise from or are caused by, the natural weakness, or even fickleness, of

memory and rather strengthen credibility, as they erase suspicion of coaching or of a rehearsed testimony. On the important and decisive details, however, she was consistent in all the statements she made, such as appellant's being already on top of her when she woke up, how she resisted his action despite appellant's threat, which was followed by the latter pressing a wad of cotton soaked with medicine in her mouth and nose which rendered her unconscious, her feeling pain in, and the bleeding of, her private parts, her "bra" being torn and her skirt, rolled up. On the other hand, complainant's mother's testimony that on her first visit to her daughter at her masters' residence after the incident, Delia reported to her the outrage committed on her, and appellant's mother called her son a savage on being informed of what he did, while the father advised the removal of the fetus by an "arbulario," were not rebutted by appellant's parents. They did not take the witness stand despite that the aforesaid testimony against them lent full credence to complainant's story. The acts of appellant's parents as aforestated would show that they had no reason to disbelieve said story, specially considering that the father had all the time he asked for to investigate the matter. Indeed, a young simple barrio girl like Delia could not have fabricated a charge of rape against a man twice her age, the son of her masters at that, for whom she had none but affectionate respect. Appellant claims of having been denied his constitutional right by the mere fact that the trial of the case took only four days is entirely without basis. He had presented all his evidence which was duly submitted by his counsel who never asked for more time to do so. His right to cross-examine the witnesses against him was exercised to the fullest. Neither is his claim of lack of authority of the trial judge to decide the instant case with any legal support to stand on. While by the Resolution of the Supreme Court 12 the authority of the trial judge to try criminal cases in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes was up to March 2, 1978, it does not preclude submission of memoranda even after such date, as long as the trial was completed, and the order to file memorandum given, before the expiration of his authority to try the case. Much less was the trial judge divested of the authority to decide the case which he can do anytime after the trial of the case, under Section 51 of the Judiciary Act, the filing of memoranda not being a part of the trial, nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less an indispensable, pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. It is intended primarily to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in

accordance with law and the evidence, and should not, therefore, be the cause for the loss of the authority of the judge who heard the case to decide it. WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs. T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., AccusedAppellant. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: On appeal is the dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00114, which affirmed with modification the Decision2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, convicting appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. of the crime of parricide in Criminal Case No. 2002-587. Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information3] dated June 7, 2002, as follows: That on or about the 10th day of January, 2002, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, at Lanis[i] Patrol Base, Lanis[i], Municipality of Claveria, Province of Misamis Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, choked and strangled the neck of his legitimate wife Betty Angus, thereby causing her instantaneous death. CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty4 to the offense charged. The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-trial, to wit: 1. That the accused and the victim were legally married. Decision1]

2. That the incident happened on January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. 3. That T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo A. Padulla, Staff Sergeant Romeo Rhea, Dr. Alex R. Uy, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at, and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members Romeo I. Malaran, Leoncio P. Jintapa and Alejo O. Carpio. Their testimonies may be synthesized into the following narration of events: The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on January 9, 2002. Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later, CAFGU members Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing about appellants relationship with another woman. Appellant was also seen go out of his bunker around midnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables for dinner.6 The following day, January 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had breakfast at the mess hall with Jintapa, Malaran and Carpio. As appellant was not with his wife, Jintapa reminded appellant to call her. When appellant returned, he told them that he would just leave some food for his wife because she was still sleeping. After eating, Malaran and Jintapa asked for permission to fetch water near the barangay elementary school about a kilometer away. While they were gone, Carpio went to the outpost and started cleaning his firearm. Appellant went to the comfort room then decided to join Carpio at the outpost. On his way to the outpost, appellant passed by his bunker and peeped through the door which was open by about 1 inches.7 Carpio was able to see the door because it was facing the outpost.8 A few minutes later, Malaran and Jintapa returned and joined appellant and Carpio at the outpost. The four (4) shared funny stories and joked for a while, after which Carpio went to the mess hall while Jintapa went to his bunker. Malaran and appellant decided to continue their conversation at the mess hall.9 On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not able to open the door at

once because something was blocking it from the inside. When appellant pushed the door, Malaran saw the back of the victim in a slanting position and leaning at the door. Appellant went inside and almost immediately shouted for help. Malaran and Carpio saw appellant embracing his wife. They helped appellant carry Bettys body to the bed. Malaran observed that her skin below the jaw was reddish and her knees were covered with mud.10 There was food on the table and a multicolored tubao11 was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a meter away from the victim. The lower tip of the tubao was in a circular form and was hanging about four (4) feet from the ground. They heard appellant repeatedly say, "Why did you do this? How can I explain this to our children?"12 Carpio called Jintapa and told him that something had happened to Betty. This was around 10:00 a.m. When Jintapa entered appellants bunker, he noticed that the tubao was still hanging from the roof. He also saw appellant embracing his wife and crying hard. Appellant exerted effort to revive his wife by pumping her chest. Malaran tried to help by massaging Bettys hands, feet, and legs. W hen Carpio and Malaran left to look for a vehicle, Jintapa took Malarans place and also massaged Bettys hands and feet which were already cold. Appellant, who continued to cry very hard, covered Bettys neck with his tubao and draped a blanket over her body. The tubao that was hanging on the roof was not removed until Corporal Teodoro Guibone ordered a meat collector to remove it. 13 At the Claveria Municipal Hospital, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at concluded that Betty was already dead upon arrival for she no longer had a pulse. She asked appellant as to the cause of her death, and after two (2) minutes, he replied that maybe she suffered a heart attack as she had a history of heart ailment. Dr. At-at wanted to thoroughly examine Bettys body but she was not able to do so because appellant was crying very hard. A commotion also took place at the hospital when a soldier, later identified as Sgt. Romeo Rhea, tried to box appellant, saying that appellants crying was only an act.14 Rhea and appellant were companions at Bravo Company, while Betty was Rheas neighbor in Basilan. Appellant is also the godfather of Rheas child. According to Rhea, he knew about appellants illicit relationship with a certain Jennifer Abao, with whom appellant had been sweethearts for about three (3) years prior to the incident on January 10, 2002.15 when they could not bring the cadaver to Basilan.the buriaer granmother led herself. and backbiting. Cheryl Angus, MhDr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory of Patag, Cagayan de

Oro City, conducted the autopsy. His examination revealed the following findings: HEAD AND NECK 1. Abrasion: Right Mandibular Region: measuring 4 x 2 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior midline. 2. Ligature mark: extending bilaterally around the neck at the level below the hyoid bone, measuring 42 x 1 cm., bisected by the anterior midline, directed horizontally and posteriorward. Larynx and Trachea are markedly congested and hemorrhagic.16 Dr. Uy stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking her last meal due to the presence of partially digested food inside the stomach.17 He believed that the cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation and not by hanging, as the victim did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone and there was no hemorrhage above the trachea and larynx. He explained that the sudden gravitational force would usually cause a fractured bone. Dr. Uy clarified that the absence of a fractured bone would only happen if the person hangs herself very slowly without a sudden force or if she was in a kneeling position.18 For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Angeles S. Ociones, Senior Police Officer 1 Victorino Busalla, Cheryl Ann A. Siarez, Master Sergeant Benedicto Palma, Emeliano Bolonias, Bobby Padilla Lopez and appellant. Taken together, their testimonies present the following narrative: Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only daughter of Betty and appellant. In the afternoon of January 9, 2002, at around 1:30 p.m., Betty went inside Cheryl Anns bedroom and told her to be serious in her studies. Betty also intimated to Cheryl Ann that she wanted to go to a far place where there would be no more rumors, no backbiting, and nobody would recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City. Betty disembarked at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental to transfer to a passenger jeepney going to Claveria.19 From Villanueva to Claveria, Betty sat beside Angeles Ociones, an old friend, in the front seat of the jeepney. She confided to Ociones about her jealousy towards her husband. She also mentioned that she was angry that she was not able to catch him and his mistress. Ociones advised Betty to confront her husband regarding the rumors she

had heard, as it was common to hear such rumors every time a soldier is assigned to a place away from home. Betty revealed that she planned to commit suicide because of the many stories she had heard about her husband. This was the third time she shared thoughts of suicide. Betty further said she wanted to go to a far place where nobody would recognize her. At around 7:00 p.m., Betty arrived at Lanisi Patrol Base.20 Appellant met his wife at the gate and went with her to his bunker. Appellant testified that they talked about only three (3) things: his whereabouts on January 7, 2002, the conference in Mat-i, Claveria, and whether he was able to borrow money for the renovation of their house. He later admitted, however, that Betty also confronted him about his relationship with another woman. At around 11:00 p.m. they went to bed. He asked Betty if she has eaten dinner but she said she did not want to eat. Nonetheless, he brought her some food then went back to sleep. He woke up the following day at around 6:00 a.m. and heard Emiliano Bolonias knocking at his door. Bolonias confirmed that when the door was opened, he saw Betty sleeping on the bed. Since Betty was still asleep, appellant suggested that they proceed to the mess hall to talk about their financial dealings. He did not lock the door to his bunker when they left. At around 8:00 a.m. appellant went back to his bunker to invite his wife to have breakfast with them.21 After having breakfast, appellant, Malaran, Carpio and Jintapa went to the outpost while Bolonias left the patrol base. Malaran and Jintapa asked permission to fetch water but later arrived and stayed at the outpost. Appellant went to his bunker and found the same locked from inside. He knocked and called his wife, but there was no response. He forcibly opened the door and saw his wife hanging with the use of a tubao which was tied at the purlins of the roof. Her body was hanging and almost in a kneeling position. He shouted for help as he untied the knot around Bettys neck but was not able to carry her since she was heavy. The other CAFGU members helped appellant put Betty on the bed. Malaran massaged Bettys feet while appellant massaged her chest and even did a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When the vehicle appellant had requested arrived, Betty was brought to the hospital. The tubao that was used by the victim was left hanging at the purlins.22 That same day, Cheryl Ann was informed that her mother was in serious condition. She was fetched and brought to Claveria, Misamis Oriental, where she saw her father crying. Appellant told Cheryl Ann that her mother had committed suicide. The

burial was originally scheduled on January 16, 2002 so her grandmother could attend. Bettys relatives who attended the wake did not attend the burial because they got angry when appellant did not allow them to bring Bettys body to Basilan. Her grandfather, SPO4 Cesar Ocay, told Cheryl Ann to bury her mothers body in Basilan so that they will not file a case against appellant. Cheryl Ann believes her mother committed suicide.23 M/Sgt. Benedicto Palma testified that on January 15, 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., he was at the funeral parlor of Poblacion, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, assisting Dr. Alex Uy, who was conducting the autopsy on Bettys body. When he asked Dr. Uy regarding his findings, the doctor replied that appellant had nothing to do with the death of his wife, and that she indeed committed suicide.24 Aside from appellant, his brothers-inlaw, Edgardo De Vera and Mariano De Vera, Sgt. Rhea, and appellants sister-in-law, Jerry, were also present at the funeral parlor when Dr. Uy announced his findings that Betty committed suicide.25 On May 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding accused T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Parricide, punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, including its accessory penalties. He is also directed to pay FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as indemnity, to the heirs of the victim. SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, May 20, 2003.26 Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,27 which modified Rules 122, 124 and 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the CA for intermediate review. On December 5, 2006, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads: FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision convicting T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS,

JR. of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is additionally ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and P50,000 as moral damages on top of the decreed indemnity. Costs de officio. SO ORDERED.28 Hence, this appeal. In his brief,29 appellant raises a lone assignment of error: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and how she was killed. He asserts that the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen Betty alive on the night of January 9, 2002. Thereafter, they heard the couple arguing about a woman. The following morning Betty was found dead. Although there was more than one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that the combination thereof leads to the inevitable conclusion that he killed his wife. We find merit in appellants contentions. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. 30 And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.31 We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.32 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,

consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.33] The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.34 After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of the assailed judgment of conviction. The crime of parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit: Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.351avvphi1 The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latters illicit relationship with another woman. The following day, appellant went out of his bunker at around 6:00 oclock in the morning. He had breakfast at the mess area with his companions, but went back to his bunker at around 8:00 oclock to ask his wife to join them for breakfast. When he returned, he told his men that his wife could not join them for breakfast because she was still asleep. At around 10:00 a.m., appellant returned to his bunker

followed by Malaran who saw the dead body of the victim. The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latters illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of appellants responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.36 In the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.37 Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a person hangs herself, most of the time there will be a fracture on the bone of the neck because of the pressure caused by gravity that pulls the rope. However, he also testified that if the person hangs herself slowly, there will be no fracture on her neck or hyoid bone. Thus, the fact that Betty did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone, as the doctor observed, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that appellant strangled the victim. Given the evidence that the victim had intimated her wish to commit suicide a day before the incident, it is not farfetched to conclude that she indeed chose to take her life. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one (1) of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. That which is favorable to the accused should be considered.38 After all, mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.39 Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten (10) men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one (1) innocent man for a crime he did not commit.40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless detained for some other lawful reasons, appellant is hereby ordered released immediately ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecutions evidence. The evidence must be such that the constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown and guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutorial burden is not met when the circumstances can yield to different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a lack of moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction. This Petition for Review1 assails the March 16, 2004 Decision2 and the July 9, 2004 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of Six (6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional minimum. SO ORDERED.4 Factual Antecedents Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990. 5 On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution 6 of MFI for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth.7 The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged among others:

3. At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be prepared a Secretarys Certificate which states: That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the directors present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and adopted: RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay, Bian, Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the corporation worth or valued at P370,000.00 by way of a "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct". xxxx 4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize. xxxx 5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another fictitious document known as the "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct". The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay is void. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states: "Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. xxxx (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

xxxx These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all. Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI. x x x x8 The case remains pending to date.9 Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the Board held on December 5, 1992 and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a complaint for perjury10 against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is primarily an intra-corporate controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant to Section 6 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758. He also insisted that there was a prejudicial question because the truth of the allegations contained in his petition for involuntary dissolution has yet to be determined by the SEC. These defenses were sustained by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the complaint for perjury was dismissed for lack of merit. 11 It was however reinstated upon petition for review12 before the Department of Justice.13 Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia held that the petition for involuntary dissolution is an administrative case only and thus cannot possibly constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also rejected the claim that the SEC has exclusive authority over the case. The Chief State Prosecutor explained that the prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has jurisdiction only over criminal and civil cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is not within the SECs authority.14 Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which eventually resulted in the filing of the following information:

That sometime in the month of December 1992,15 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of perjury in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of Megatel Factors, Inc. based on violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel Factors, Inc., Cesar Masangkay, Jr. and Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a notary authorized to receive and administer oath and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a material matter when he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated September 1, 1993, proposed by Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated because the alleged December 5, 1992, meeting never took place; and, b) the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious document, whereby the respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, by exchanging the childs 3,014 square meters lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the corporation, when in fact no consideration for the transfer was made as Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay or his guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been a stockholder of the Corporation at any point in time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same statements he made in his petition and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his evidence in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are false. 16 The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59. Eriberto filed a motion to quash, 17 insisting that it is the SEC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. He also argued that the truth of the allegations contained in the information is still pending resolution in SEC Case No. 12-93-4650, thereby constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury case. The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.18 It held that the fact that the parties to the criminal case are mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not automatically make the case an intra-corporate dispute that is within the SEC jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the parties are stockholders is merely incidental and that the subject of the case is a criminal act and hence within the general jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of prejudicial question, the MeTC ruled that the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth of the statements for which he is being indicted is a

matter of defense which the defendant may raise in the criminal case. Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to assail the denial of his motion to quash. The denial was affirmed.19 He then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.20 Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment.21 He then waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference.22 During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole witness. 23 He testified that on December 5, 1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 oclock in the morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. He presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details contained therein indicating that the Board unanimously approved Magdalenas proposal to exchange her sons (Gilberto Masangkay [Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of stock.24 The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes belongs to Eriberto.25 This allegedly belies Eribertos statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize," and shows that he knew his statement to be false because he had attended the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The prosecution also pointed out that in the proceedings before the guardianship court to obtain approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified in support of the exchange.26 The guardianship court subsequently approved the proposed transaction.27 The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eribertos signature as first party.28 As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution disputed this by again using the minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of Gilberto will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares. For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually take place. While he admitted signing, reading and understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he explained that the minutes were only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house for signing, but there was no actual meeting.29 To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented Elizabeth, the MFI corporate secretary, who could not remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the

December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any copy thereof. The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called for the MFI boards initial meeting "since its business operations started," to be held on November 9, 1993. Emphasizing the words "initial meeting," Eriberto argued that this proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the December 5, 1992 meeting) had ever taken place. As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious and simulated for lack of consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock certificates in favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders. 30 While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the guardianship court, Eriberto maintained that he did so because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar that the exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He however reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received any consideration for the exchange. On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eribertos claim that the board had its first actual meeting only on November 9, 1993. It explained that the November 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting "since business operations began", because MFI obtained permit to conduct business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first meeting ever held by the board of directors. The prosecution presented the secretarys certificates of board meetings held on April 6, 199231 and September 5, 199232 -- both before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto.33 At this time, business operations have not yet begun because the companys hotel building was still under construction. The said secretarys certificates in fact show that MFI was still sourcing additional funds for the construction of its hotel.34 Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment35 holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and execution of the document, as well as his avowals before the

guardianship court regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged and sentenced to imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and medium, as minimum, to one year and one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as maximum.36 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Eriberto appealed37 his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which eventually affirmed the appealed judgment.38 The fallo of the Decision states that: WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.39 Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eribertos signatures on the two allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in the December 5, 1992 meeting. Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition.40 The CA rejected petitioners argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that they were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary dissolution.41 The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the result of the petition for involuntary dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal case, which can be resolved independently.42 The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was imprecise in its application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and one day of prision correccional minimum.43

Petitioner moved for reconsideration44 which was denied.45 Hence, this petition.46 Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for review: I Whether there was deliberate assertion of falsehood II Whether the TRUTHFUL allegation in the petition for involuntary dissolution that there was no meeting is material to the petition III Whether perjury could prosper while the main case remains pending47 Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to whether the prosecution was able to prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our Ruling We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt. Article 183 of the RPC provides: False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a material matter.48 The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are indeed present in the instant case. The sworn statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the petition for involuntary dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.1avvphi1 The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public49an officer duly authorized by law to administer oaths. This verification was done in compliance with Section 121 of the Corporation Code.50 It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution which are contested. On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.51 Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the Corporate Code, which states: Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. In addition and without prejudice to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this Title, any stockholder of a close corporation may, for any reason, compel the said corporation to purchase his shares at their fair value, which shall not be less than their par or issued value, when the corporation has sufficient assets in his books to cover its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock: Provided, That any stockholder of a close corporation may, by written petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission, compel the dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the directors, officers or those in control of the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:

xxxx 4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize. xxxx 5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct. xxxx The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all. xxxx 8. The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and in conspiracy with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegal because they constitute estafa through falsification of documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code. 9. Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of MFI, including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted. 10. MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this Honorable Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New Corporation Code x x x.52 The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied upon in his petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these statements are material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present. The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.

The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioners statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize." In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place, i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time and conferred with each other. To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the petitioners statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to his house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the prosecutions burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the petition for dissolution) is the false one. We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.53 The rationale for requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is explained thus: x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused. 54

In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness.55 The prosecution did not present the testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly notified that such a meeting would be taking place? The insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence is particularly glaring considering that the petitioner had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he believed that the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court. Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that the petitioners statement denying the same was a deliberate falsehood. The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious reads: 5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Masangkay is void. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states: Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: xxxx (2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; (3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction; xxxx These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all. Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI. In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that the deed of exchange is fictitious. To support the accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to the said Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and his participation in procuring the guardianship courts approval of the transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious and that Eriberto knew it. We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioners imputation of fictitiousness to the Deed of Exchange should not be taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5 of his petition for involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange is simulated and fictitious pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto Masangkay of his property without any consideration at all. To justify his allegation that Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange, he stated in the same paragraph that Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be the consideration for

Gilbertos land). This fact was subsequently proven by the petitioner through the corporate secretary Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in favor of the stockholders. This testimony was never explained or rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, petitioners statement that the exchange was "simulated and fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own property without any consideration at all" cannot be considered a deliberate falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not receive consideration for the exchange of his land. As importantly, petitioners statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary dissolution about the nature of the Deed of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are susceptible of truth or falsity. They are his opinion regarding the legal character of the Deed of Exchange. He opined that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious or simulated under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because MFI supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue stocks to Gilberto in exchange for his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure of consideration does not make a contract simulated or fictitious),56 but it is an opinion or legal conclusion nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an intentional false statement of facts.57 We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not.58 However, it is also at the heart of every criminal proceeding that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the propriety of proceeding with the perjury case while the civil case for corporate dissolution is pending. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay is ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG,

AMADEO VIERNES* AND SALVADOR BAMBILLA, accused-appellants. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: Appeal interposed by the appellants from the decision, dated March 23, 1992, of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City, finding them guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. On August 28, 1990, Estela Eng y Ulalan lodged her criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape against Ninoy Malbog, Amado Viernes and an unnamed suspect (John Doe). Filed by on August 29, 1990 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Daniel Terrado, the Original Complaint alleged: "That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, NINOY MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and JOHN DOE, with violence and intimidation against persons, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside, with the use of force, accused JOHN DOE have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter."1 Upon arraignment thereunder on December 28, 1990, with the assistance of counsel de parte, Atty. Santiago Marcella, Ninoy Malbog @ Saturnino Malbog and Amado Viernes entered negative pleas. Appellant Salvador Bambilla, who was a member of the Philippine National Police (then known as Integrated National Police) and whose case was first referred to the office of the Judge Advocate General (JAGO), was included in the charge in the Amended Complaint, dated January 10, 1991, alleging: "That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and SALVADOR BAMBILLA, with violence and intimidation against

persons, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside with the use of force, accused SALVADOR BAMBILLA have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter."2 With Bambilla pleading not guilty upon arraignment on June 17, 1991, trial proceeded. Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Estela Eng y Ulalan, and Dr. Rico Reyes, the examining physician. Estela Eng y Ulalan, who was 19 years old at the time of the incident and a nursing student at Lyceum Northwestern University in Dagupan City, testified that at about six o clock in the morni ng of January 30, 1990, she boarded a BalbinFernandez bus bound for Dagupan City to attend her classes at Northwestern University. Appellant Salvador Bambilla also boarded the same bus and sat beside her. Upon reaching Dagupan, the bus stopped in front of the Post Office. She was about to alight from the vehicle when Bambilla held her hand and threatened her. Bambilla continued to hold her hand tightly even after they had alighted. While standing in front of the Post Office, he told her that he would kill her if she shouted or made noise. Then, a blue car stopped in front of them and Bambilla opened the door of the car, pushed her inside and also boarded. Once inside the vehicle, she recognized appellant Ninoy Malbog as the driver. Seated beside him on the front seat was Amado Viernes. She recognized Malbog because he was their former family driver, and she recognized Viernes only by face until he was later identified. She shouted for help but kept quiet when Bambilla threatened her and poked his gun at her waist. Upon the order of Bambilla, Malbog drove the car to Calasiao and stopped in front of what she later came to know as Inawa Lodge-Inn. Malbog drove the car into a garage, and a man immediately closed the gate after which Viernes and Malbog went out of the car and left while Bambilla pushed her (victim) out and forced her to go up a staircase. Upon reaching the door of a room, Bambilla pushed her inside, followed her and locked the door. She screamed and when nobody heard her, she kneeled in front of Bambilla and pleaded to him not to do anything to her. Bambilla pushed her to the bed, instead, went on top of her, and began kissing her cheeks, neck and lips. Then, he pulled her white uniform up to her waist and removed her underwear, after which he (Bambilla)

took off his pants and brief. She struggled and fought against him but he was stronger. Thereafter, he tried to insert his penis into her vagina while making an up and down movement but she closed her legs. Later, she felt hot fluid on her thighs. According to her (victim), she did not know if Bambilla was able to penetrate her private parts because she was too tired and lost consciousness. When she recovered, she went to the comfort room to wash her private parts. She looked for a window through which to escape but she found none. When she went out of the comfort room, Bambilla told her that he was leaving to buy for her a shirt because her uniform was all wet and dirty. When Bambilla returned, he brought a skirt and Tshirt and ordered her to change her clothes, after which he told her that he was bringing her to Manila. When she had dressed up they left the Inawa Lodge and rode on the same blue car driven by Malbog earlier but this time, it was Bambilla who drove the car. On the way, she gypped Bambilla by telling him that she would go with him to Manila but he should first take her home to Pozorrubio to get some clothes. When they reached Pozorrubio at around 12:00 noon, she alighted at Barangay Talogtog and took a tricycle. Upon reaching their house, she told her brother Cesar what happened. The following day, January 31, 1990, she submitted herself for medical examination by Dr. Rico Reyes, at the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital. Two days after the incident, or on February 1, 1990 to be precise, she reported the incident to the Pozorrubio Police and also to the Dagupan City Police.3 The victim-complainant denied the theory of appellant Salvador Bambilla that he was her boyfriend and she voluntarily went with him to Inawa Lodge-Inn on January 30, 1990. The second prosecution witness, Dr. Rico Reyes, recounted that on January 31, 1990, the victimcomplainant, Estela Eng, went to the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital for physical examination, which examination revealed that there was: "erythema on left labia minora xxx; hymenal laceration, healed at 6:00 o clock and 10:00 o clock position; vaginal introitus admits 1 finger; cervix closed; uterus was small; adnexae-free; vaginal smear was done for detection of presence of spermatozoa and the findings was negative for spermatozoa." Aside from the said findings, there was no other sign of physical injury. Dr. Reyes explained that "erythema on left labia minora" meant that there

was reddening on the left labia which might be an irritation caused by tight underwears; and that the healed hymenal laceration at six o clock and ten o clock positions could have been sustained more than seven days prior to examination. 4 Evidence for the defense consisted mainly of the testimonies of all the three appellants, Ninoy Malbog @ Saturnino, Amadeo Viernes and Salvador Bambilla. According to appellant Bambilla, he and the complainant were sweethearts. He first met her in February 1988, when he was assigned as traffic policeman near complainants bakery in Barangay Poblacion, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Since then, he began courting her and after she answered him on March 14, 1988, they began going out and he would take her to and from the school. On January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, as he was already off-duty, he boarded a Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City, to go home to Amagbagan. The bus was already half full when he boarded it. Upon seeing the complainant, Estela Eng, inside the bus, he sat beside her. They reached Dagupan at around seven oclock a.m. and they alighted together in front of the Post Office. As Estela Eng was already late for her class, he invited her for a date and she acceded on condition that she was to be brought back to her school at 12:00 noon to attend her afternoon classes. He then told her that he was going to bring her to Inawa Lodge in Calasiao. She was reluctant at first, asking him if there was no other place where they could go to but later on she agreed to go with him but asked him not to touch her ("Anggapoy galawan"). They were about to board a tricycle for Calasiao when an oncoming blue car blew its horn. He recognized the driver as Ninoy Malbog who used to drive a passenger mini-bus he usually rode on. He then approached the car and talked to Malbog. When he found out that Malbog was going to Dagupan City to buy materials for his employer, he requested him (Malbog) to take him and Estela to Calasiao. When Malbog agreed, he and Estela sat in the backseat. As they were leaving, they saw Amado Viernes, waving at them and asking them where they were going. Malbog told Viernes that he would first bring Bambilla and his companion to Calasiao, buy spare parts for his employer and then go back to Pozorrubio. Viernes asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride back to Pozorrubio. After asking permission from his mother, Amado also boarded the car and sat beside him (Malbog). While they were on their way to Calasiao, Estela Eng was worried that Malbog and Viernes might

tell her brother that she went with them to Calasiao. When they reached Inawa Lodge, he instructed Malbog to bring the car inside the compound. A man directed them towards a garage where they parked the car. He asked Estela to go ahead upstairs because he had to tell the two not to report to her brother. When Estela left, he asked Malbog to leave the car so people would not see him (Bambilla) and Estela when they leave the place. He assured Malbog that his employer, Rocky Cancino, was his good friend and he would explain to Cancino when he brings back the car to him. With such assurance, Malbog agreed to leave the car and he and Viernes left Inawa Lodge. After the two left, Bambilla proceeded to pay the motel bills after which a roomboy accompanied him to Room B, handing him a towel and pitcher of cold water. When he went inside the room, he saw Estela sitting on the bed. When he asked her why she was quiet, she told him that she was worried that Malbog and Viernes might report to her brother. He told her not to worry and began to kiss her until both of them were lying on the bed. He then removed her dress, her bra and her panty and continued kissing her. Then he stood up to remove his clothes while Estela covered her body with her clothes because she was ashamed of his seeing her naked. When he was already undressed, he laid on top of her but Estela kept her legs closed. When he tried to open her legs, she told him "not today because we have pregnancy test next week."5 Thus, he simply inserted his penis in between her thighs just above her knees because she continued to clutch her dress and covered her body from the knee up. He ejaculated on her thighs. Afterwards, Estela got up and went to the comfort room. After a few minutes, she went out of the comfort room, lied on the bed beside him, embraced him and told him "Do not abandon me." After assuring her that he will not because he loves her, he suggested that they leave Inawa Lodge as he was already hungry. While Estela was putting on her clothes, she noticed that they were all crumpled and told him that she needed new clothes. As he could not convince her to go with him, he went out alone. Using the same car driven by Malbog, he went to Ang Ka Tong Store in Dagupan City and bought a shirt and a blouse. He went back to Inawa Lodge after about 45 minutes. The door to Room B was locked when he arrived so he knocked and called out to Estela. When Estela opened the door, he gave her the shirt and blouse he bought and asked her to change. However, she did not immediately put on the clothes; instead, she sat on the bed and told him, "If you truly love me, do not abandon me. I will go with you." It was at that point that they

agreed to elope and go to Manila. After Estela was dressed, they checked out of Inawa Lodge riding in the same car that he (Bambilla) borrowed from Malbog. They agreed to go home first to Pozorrubio so they could get some clothes and money. They arrived in Pozorrubio around noontime and upon reaching Barangay Talogtog, Estela suggested that it would be better if she would get off there and take a tricycle home so nobody would see them together. They agreed to meet at one o clock in the afternoon of the same day at the Pantranco bus terminal near the Pozorrubio town plaza. While Estela took a tricycle and proceeded to her house, he also went home to Amagbagan to get money and some clothes. He was two minutes late when he arrived at their meeting place and he did not find Estela there. He waited for her for fortyfive (45) minutes but she did not arrive. Thinking that she probably changed her mind, he went to her school, Northwestern University, in Dagupan City. He waited for her until 4:30 but he did not find her. He then went back to Pozorrubio and returned his clothes in his house, after which he drove to the house of Rocky Cancino to return the car. He (Bambilla) reached the house of Cancino at around six thirty. While he was in the house of Cancino, two policemen, Patrolmen Mina and Perez, arrived and informed Bambilla that he was to go immediately to the police station because the family of Estela was there. They also instructed Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Cancino to go with him. Thus, he, together with Malbog and Cancino, went to the police station in Pozorrubio. Upon arrival at the station, he saw Estela Eng, her two brothers, her sister and their family maid inside the station. Outside the municipal hall, the Chief of Police P/Capt. Conrado Rosete asked him what happened and why he tried to elope with Eng (angipatik) and he told him that nothing happened between him and Estela. Bambilla also claimed that he tried to talk to Estela after the incident to ask her about the problem but to no avail. Later, he learned that Estela filed a criminal complaint against him.6 Appellant Amado Viernes, a fish vendor, testified that in the morning of January 30, 1990, his mother Maria Viernes asked him to accompany her to get the fish she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City. They boarded the Balbin-Fernandez mini bus in front of their house in Barangay Talogtog, Pozorrubio. Inside the bus, he saw Salvador Bambilla, whom he knew to be a policeman, and Estela Eng, his townmate, seated together and talking to each other. He and his mother alighted in front of the Meles Restaurant in Dagupan City. They found out, however, that the fish they left was already sent to Pozorrubio so

they immediately walked back towards the bus stop to get a ride home. After waiting for some time and no bus arrived, they walked towards the Post Office. Upon reaching the said spot, he saw Bambilla and Eng talking. As he knew Bambilla to be a policeman, he greeted the latter by saying "Sir". Bambilla replied by asking him, "Where are you going?" and he told him that they were going back to Pozorrubio. Fifteen more minutes passed but no bus arrived. When Eng and Bambilla were about to board a tricycle, a car arrived and Bambilla waved at the car, approached the same and talked to the driver whom he recognized as Ninoy Malbog. Thereafter, he saw Bambilla and Eng board the car. He (Viernes) also approached the car to ask Malbog where he was going. When he found out that he would be going back to Pozorrubio, he asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride back and when the latter agreed, he went back to his mother to inform her that he would be hitching a ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog. When she agreed, he immediately boarded the car, on the front seat beside Malbog. He learned that Malbog would first take Bambilla and Eng to Calasiao, buy spare parts for Rocky Cancinos truck, and then go back to Pozorrubio. When they reached Calasiao, they took the left route towards the place called Inawa Lodge Inn. Upon reaching the said place, Bambilla instructed him to leave and asked Malbog to leave the car, promising that he would be responsible for explaining what they did to Cancino. Afterwards, he and Malbog left Inawa Lodge together and took a ride back to Dagupan. Malbog told him that had he known that Bambilla would be asking him to leave the car, he would not have brought the two to Calasiao. When they reached Dagupan, Malbog walked towards Perez Boulevard to buy spare parts while he alighted in front of Carried Lumber to get a ride back to Pozorrubio.7 Amado Viernes allegations were corroborated by his mother, Maria Viernes, who attested to the fact that she was with him on January 30, 1990; that her son went to Dagupan because she asked him to accompany her to get the fish they were supposed to sell which she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City; that while waiting for the bus to take them back to Pozorrubio, Malbog arrived in a blue car; that his son approached the car and talked to Malbog; that after a few minutes his son told her that he would be hitching a ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog. 8 Appellant Ninoy Malbog narrated his version of the incident as follows: In the early morning of January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, he was sent by

his employer, Rocky Cancino, to buy spare parts for their delivery truck in Dagupan City. When he reached Dagupan City, he saw Bambilla with Estela Eng about to board a tricycle. Since he knew Bambilla, he honked the horn to get the latters attention and Bambilla approached and asked him if he could take him and Estela to Calasiao. As it was early and the shop where he was supposed to buy the spare parts was still closed, he agreed. They met Amado Viernes on the way and the latter also hitched a ride. When they reached the Inawa Lodge, Bambilla asked him to leave the car because he did not want anybody to see him and Estela checking out of the motel. He was reluctant at first but when Bambilla assured him that he was a good friend of Cancino and he (Bambilla) would explain to Cancino when he returns the car later in the day, he (Malbog) agreed. He and Viernes then went back to Dagupan City and parted ways at the junction of Perez Boulevard and del Pilar Street. He proceeded towards Sampaguita Auto Supply to buy the spare parts while Viernes went to the Carried Lumber. After buying the spare parts, he took a ride back to Pozorrubio.9 Rocky Cancino, employer of Malbog confirmed that in the early morning of January 30, 1990, he sent the latter to Dagupan City to buy spare parts of a delivery truck and allowed him to use his blue car because he wanted the delivery truck repaired immediately. When Malbog went back around ten a.m., he was told that he (Malbog) lent his car to Bambilla so that he got angry; that around six o clock in the evening of the same day, Bambilla arrived and explained to him what happened; that while he and Bambilla were still talking, two policemen came looking for Bambilla and the policemen told Bambilla to go with them to the police station such that he and Malbog went with Bambilla to the police station. Cancino further testified that he was of the belief that Bambilla and complainant Eng were sweethearts because on several occasions since the year 1988, he had seen the two together on dates.10 Willy Napacena, roomboy of Inawa Lodge Inn, testified that he was on duty in the morning of January 30, 1990; that about seven thirty a.m., Bambilla, with three companions, two males and one female, arrived in a blue car and he was the one who let them enter the garage; that upon getting out of the car, the two male companions of Bambilla left while the latter and his female companion went up to Room B; that after 30 minutes, Bambilla went out of the room alone and boarded the same blue car; that during the time Bambilla was out, he did not hear any call or

buzzer from Room B, and neither did he hear any noise coming therefrom; that Bambilla returned at around nine a.m.; and about an hour after Bambilla was back, he and the lady checked out of the lodge.11 On March 23, 1992, the trial court found all the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced them accordingly. In finding for the prosecution, it ratiocinated: "xxx xxx xxx

2. It is very unnatural for two lovers to have a date early in the morning, especially in the case of Estela who had to attend her classes. 3. It is also unnatural that Estela would voluntarily go with him for a date in the company of the other two (2) accused, Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes. 4. There were no pictures, cards and letters allegedly given to him by Estela which he allegedly surrendered to her on January 31, 1990, because he was not foolish enough to return them to her considering that he was invited to the police station, together with Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Bell Cancino, to shed light on what happened between him and Estela in the early morning of January 30, 1990, and that on the same night he saw Estela, together with her brothers and sister and their maid, being interrogated by Pat. Credo, and considering that he appeared to be smart as borne out by the way he concocted his defense and the manner he answered questions; and considering further that the pictures, cards and letters were very important pieces of evidence. 5. Estela Eng immediately reported what the accused, Pat. Salvador Bambilla, and his companions did to her. For it is hard to believe that she would sacrifice her honor, being a good looking girl, to tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter present herself to be the subject of a public trial. xxx xxx xxx

And the circumstances which negated his claim that Estela voluntarily went with him and made the Court to rule that there is evidence of forcible abduction, are:

1. The testimony of Estela Eng is clear and convincing, the complainant declaring that she and the accused Bambilla were never sweethearts; that when the mini-bus which she rode from Pozorrubio to Dagupan City stopped in front of the Post Office and she was about to alight, Bambilla held her hand and threatened her with bodily harm; that upon alighting from the mini-bus Bambilla again held her right hand with his left hand tightly and told her that he will kill her if she will shout or will make some struggle or noise; that just as the mini-bus moved forward, a car suddenly stopped in front of them and Bambilla pushed Estela inside; that she asked for help by shouting, but Bambilla immediately poked his gun to her waist and because of fear, she stopped and just cried. On the way to Calasiao she even awked (sic) help from Ninoy Malbog, but the latter ignored her. 2. And the fact that Bambilla at that time was armed with a hand gun. xxx xxx xxx

and dirtied? The Court believes that the foregoing circumstances are indications of the criminal intent of Pat. Bambilla to lie and have sex with Estela Eng, without the latters consent and against her will. c] There is consummated crime of Rape. This conclusion is evidenced by the findings of Dr. Rico Reyes who was the one who attended to and examined Estela Eng."12 The lower court disposed thus: "WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Salvador Bambilla, Ninoy Malbog, alias Saturnino Malbog, and Amado Viernes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the offended party Estela Eng the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay proportionate costs. SO ORDERED."13 Hence, this appeal. In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence.14 Conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence;15 otherwise, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Under the criminal justice system in this country, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.16 Speculation, conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway judgment.17 In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.18

The Court believes that the following circumstances have sufficiently established the commission of the crime of Rape: a] The threat, which is continuing, by Salvador Bambilla, who is a policeman and at that time armed with a hand gun, against the life of Estela Eng from the time the latter was abducted in front of the Post Office up to the time said Salvador Bambilla satisfied his desire in having sex with Estela Eng, which threat put her to crouch in fear, keep silent and obey his orders. b] There is resistance or struggle put up by Estela Eng against the intention of Bambilla to lie and have sex with her. This resistance or struggle is evidenced by the fact that once they entered the garage of the Inawa Lodge Inn, in Calasiao, Pangasinan, and after accused Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes have left upon instruction of Bambilla, the latter pushed Estela out of the car and into the room of the hotel and, thereupon, pursued his intention. Such resistance or struggle by private complainant is also evidenced by the fact that her white nursing uniform dress was, as testified by accused Bambilla, crumpled , got wet and dirtied. If really Estela Eng did not put up a resistance or struggle when Bambilla went on to satisfy his carnal designs, why was her dress crumpled, wet

The lone testimony of the victim of rape, if it meets the test of credibility, may be made the basis of conviction.19 It is therefore incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the testimony of the victim and to carefully sift through her allegations because such testimony, standing alone, if it passes the test of credibility, may lead to a finding of guilt. As a general rule, the factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of the case.20 A judicious review of the case under scrutiny, however, shows that the trial court did overlook some facts and circumstances of weight and substance which cast doubt on the truth and credibility of complainants accusations. The complainant alleged that while they (she and Bambilla) were still on the bus, the latter poked his gun at her and threatened to kill her if she shouts. She further claimed that she did, in fact, shout but the other passengers were probably frightened. 21 Such allegation by the complainant cannot be given credence by the Court. It is belied by her very own testimony with respect to the time and place where the alleged forcible abduction took place. She herself admitted that the bus was already full when they left Pozorrubio.22 Most of the passengers were her townmates from Pozorrubio and schoolmates from Lyceum Northwestern University. Moreover, the alleged threat happened in broad daylight. Given all these circumstances, the Court finds the testimony of the complainant incredible. If indeed Bambilla threatened her by poking his gun, it was impossible that nobody noticed if she put up a struggle against him. Then too, if she tried to shout as she claimed, somebody could have heard her and responded to her shouts. At the very least, if she shouted, as she theorized, a commotion inside the bus would inevitably occurred. If Bambilla carried a gun that day, it was sufficiently explained by his being a policeman, and at the time of the incident, he just got off from his duty and was on his way home. Complainant likewise averred that Bambilla continued to poke his gun at her and to threaten her when they alighted from the bus in front of the Post Office. Again, such allegation is unworthy of belief. Complainant herself admitted that the bus regularly stops in front of the Post Office, 23 where she and Bambilla alighted because students of Lyceum usually get off thereat. The said testimony

of complainant makes her allegations of "threat" unlikely because it would be impossible for anyone not to notice Bambilla poking a gun at her and threatening her. Not only that, a few meters across the Post Office was the Dagupan City Police Station. If there was truth to the allegation that she was forcibly abducted by Bambilla, her normal reaction would have been to resist and struggle against her abductor. And considering the circumstances of time and place where complainant was supposedly abducted, there was every opportunity for her to seek help by the simple expedient of shouting. As earlier mentioned, the road in front of the Post Office is a major bus stop and a lot of people alighted thereat, as it was already seven oclock in the morning.24 The police station was only a few meters from the Post Office and there were passenger jeepneys parked right in front of the Post Office.25 All the aforesaid circumstances taken together negate the plausibility of the forcible abduction complained of. Another significant circumstance overlooked below was the fact that Bambilla went out of the motel, left the complainant alone and was out for more than thirty (30) minutes. This fact was testified to by Bambilla,26corroborated by the testimony of Willy Napacena, the roomboy of the motel,27 and admitted by the complainant herself.28 What is more, Napacena attested to the fact that the doors to the rooms of Inawa Lodge did not have outside locks and could only be locked from inside.29 Complainant cannot therefore claim that Bambilla locked her up. Said roomboy also testified that inside each room was a buzzer which could be used by customers calling for room service.30 Napacena, declared under oath that he did not hear any call from the buzzer nor any shout for help coming from Room B where the complainant was left alone for at least half an hour.31 It is thus decisively evident that Estela Eng had ample opportunity to escape or, at least, to shout for help if she was really brought to the motel against her will and raped, as complained of. But she never tried to escape nor asked for help, something unnatural for a woman who had been forcibly abducted and raped. It would have been different if the complainant was physically unable to get up and escape, because she was beaten up and rendered unconscious. Then, it would have been understandable why she could not escape even if there was an opportunity to do so. In the case under scrutiny, there were no signs that complainant Eng was too weakened to even get up and walk. Unacceptable is complainants explanation why she did not try to go out of the room and escape, to wit:

"Q You also mentioned in your previous testimony that the accused Salvador Bambilla went out for about 30 minutes? A Yes, sir. Q When he was out, do you mean to say that he left you from the room? A Yes, sir. Q And for that 30 minutes what did you do in order to escape? A I was trying to open the door by turning the knob but I could not and how could I also escape since my clothes were wet and dirty and the jalousies because there are also jalousies, there is still a screen covering the said window, so how could I go out , sir."32 It is simply unlikely for a woman who has just been robbed of her honor and chastity to still think of wet and dirty clothes instead of seizing upon every opportunity to escape from her malefactor. In the case under consideration, the complainant admitted that she waited for Bambilla to return: "Q Do you mean to say that you waited for Salvador Bambilla to return? A It is like this, before he left he told me to stay because according to him he will buy me a skirt and a t-shirt, sir. xxx xxx xxx

A He tried to insert his erect penis into my vagina but I dont know if it was inserted because I lost consciousness, sir."34 "Q You also stated that he ejaculated on your thigh? A Yes, sir. Q Do you mean to say that his penis was not able to penetrate your vagina? A Thats what I dont know anymore because I was already tired and had lost my consciousness, sir."35 Then too, the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant indicated the probability that no rape was committed. The medical certificate stated that there was no sign of external physical injuries on the whole body of the complainant, no spermatozoa was found but there were erythema and healed lacerations.36 When asked to explain, the medico-legal officer opined that the erythema or reddening on the left labia could have been caused by tight underwears and the hymenal lacerations could have been sustained more than seven days prior to examination or several days before the alleged rape happened.37 In light of the foregoing circumstances coupled with complainants admission that her legs were closed all the time she was inside the motel,38 the fact that she did not try to escape although a second assault was very likely, did not try to shout for help and instead, waited for Bambilla to return, effectively contradict the protestation of complainant that she was raped. If there was sexual intercourse, evidence is utterly wanting to show that the same was against her will.1wphi1 Equally unaffirmable is the lower courts finding that all the three appellants conspired together to forcibly abduct complainant Eng against her will and to bring her to Inawa Lodge so that Bambilla could have carnal knowledge with her. As sufficiently shown in the testimonies of the appellants, the fact that they were together on January 31, 1990 was a mere coincidence. Malbogs presence in Dagupan City that morning was duly explained by Rocky Cancino, his employer, who attested under oath that he sent Malbog to Dagupan City on that day to buy spare parts for his delivery truck. The presence of Viernes in the same place was likewise adequately explained by his mother, Maria Viernes, who recounted that her said son accompanied her to Dagupan City upon her request.

Q In other words, you want to tell the Honorable Court that it was Salvador Bambilla who suggested to buy you skirt and t-shirt? A Yes, sir. Q And you trusted him to still come back and give you the skirt and t-shirt, am I correct? A Yes, sir."33 As to the accusation of rape, the trial court did not consider the fact that complainant herself did not know if Bambilla was able to insert his penis into her vagina: "Q Did he ever make any movement while on your top and his penis reached your vagina?

While the Court has, time and again, stressed that if a woman states that she was raped, she in effect says all there is to show that she was indeed raped, experience has also shown that it is not at all impossible that unfounded charges of rape may be proffered by women who are actuated by some sinister, ulterior or undisclosed motive.39 And as held by this Court in the case of People vs. Alvario,40 judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.41 Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction. 42 In the case under review, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellants Salvador Bambilla, Amado Viernes and Ninoy Malbog forcibly abducted complainant Estela Eng y Ulalan, brought her to the Inawa Lodge and had carnal knowledge with her. With the inability of the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellants prevails and therefore, pursuant to law all the three appellants are entitled to acquittal. Once again, the Court has occasion to quote what Alfonso El Sabio was reputed to have said a long time ago43 "[m]as vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente". 44 WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED, and on the ground of reasonable doubt, appellants Saturnino Malbog, Amado Viernes* and Salvador Bambilla are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of Prisons, National Bureau of Prison, Muntinlupa City, is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants unless there be any other legal ground for their continued detention, and to report to this Court within ten (10) days the action taken under the premises. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO, Appellant. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about how the credibility of the rape victims identification of her attacker often depends on her spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape. The Facts and the Case The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. DK,1 the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousins rented room. She was startled when somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK recognized him as the same person who passed by her cousins room several times in the afternoon of the previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist. On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals. Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employers house that night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape. On June 27, 2006 the RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to indemnify DK ofP50,000.00 and pay her P50,000.00 as moral damages.

On November 12, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 the decision of the RTC in its entirety, prompting Tumambing to appeal to this Court. The Issue Presented The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in finding that accused Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned. The Ruling of the Court A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offenders identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.2 Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DKs testimony. They maintained that DK categorically and positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v. Reyes3 where the Court ruled that it would be easy for a person who has once gained familiarity with the appearance of another to identify the latter even from a considerable distance.4 Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial court and the CAs findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses.5 But the courts mentioned appear to have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical evidence in the case. This compels the Court to take a look at the same. 6 DKs identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The Courts reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DKs uncertainties regarding the rapists identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. PO2 Crispulo Frondozo, one of the apprehending officers, testified as follows: Q: Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant pinpointed accused as the person who abused her person? A: No, Sir. Q: What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant positively identified the accused?

A: No, Sir.7 Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident testified: Q: When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next? A: Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence. Q: Then what happened? A: He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was " akala ko pakukunan niyo ako ng dugo." Q: What was the reaction of the accused? A: As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't be afraid. Tell me. I will protect you. I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to turn left, right and backways. Q: After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next? A: The suspect told the complainant "huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako." So she could not pinpoint the suspect. I said, "Iha, [i]to ba?" But she cannot point to.8 (Underscoring supplied) DKs above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousins rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairmans assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value.9 The barangay chairman continued: Q: As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came to know that there were other suspect, what did you do?

A: I invited the suspect. Q: Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect? A: His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And confrontation ensued between her and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect? Q: What was her answer? A: She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s] "makunan ng cells." The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya. Q: Presumably to get some sperm? A: Yes, Sir. Q: What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]? A: I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do. Q: After that what happened? A: So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect. She could not pinpoint.10(Underscoring supplied) That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and presumably compared with that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the possibility that it was Quiatcho, rather than accused Tumambing, who raped her. The Court cannot thus accept DKs testimony that she had been familiar with the looks of the man who violated her and that she could not possibly be mistaken in identifying him as Tumambing. Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated the barangay chairmans testimony: Q: So what was the question? A: The question was that, "Is this the person you saw and who rape you?" Court: Referring to? Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing.

Q: What was the reply of the victim, if any? A: She did not answer, Sir. Q: What happen next when [DK] did not answer? A: And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped her and point to him. Q: What was the reply of [DK] if any? A: She did not reply, Sir. Q: Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]? A: Four times, Sir.11 The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually attacked her. They pointed out her insistence at the police precinct that it was Tumambing who really raped her and that she positively identified him in open court. But this came about much later. The fact is that she did not refute the testimonies given by neutral witnesses that she could not point to accused Tumambing as her rapist during their initial confrontation at the barangay chairmans residence. These witnesses had no motive or reason to fabricate a story for the defense. By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the victim.lawphi1 For this reason, the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot afford to overlook details that are essential to an understanding of the truth.12 Here, as shown above, DKs testimony is anything but believable and consistent. Although she categorically said on crossexamination that she saw her attacker enter the room,13 she did not shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape.14 She just lay in bed.15 In fact, she maintained that position in bed even when her attacker was standing before her and removing his clothes.16 She did not shout nor struggle when he penetrated her.17 There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt.18 But this is inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, "bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin."19 Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time,

she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt? With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing. WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 04-227897, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision forthwith and to inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, vs. JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, Accused. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, Appellant. DECISION PEREZ, J.: On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02610 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099 and 3100 finding appellant Vicente Bongat y Tariman (Vicente) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, in barangay [XXX],3 municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA],4 a minor 16 years of age, against her will and without her consent. That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused.5 Appellant Vicente, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested while Larry remained at large. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. The alleged rape victim, AAA, her mother, BBB,6 the medico-legal officer, Dr. Elmer Tatad (Dr. Tatad), Barangay Kagawad Fernando Tajan (Fernando) and Barangay Tanod Eddie Tajan (Eddie) testified for the prosecution. AAA narrated that on 29 August 2002 at around 9:45 p.m., she attended a wake in Barangay YYY,7 Virac, Catanduanes. Upon leaving the wake to go to her grandmothers house in Barangay XXX, she noticed that Jerwin was following her. AAA recognized Jerwin because they go to the same school. When she was about to enter the house of her grandmother, Jerwin and Felipe, who were with a certain Maria, approached AAA and invited her to attend a birthday party. AAA acceded and went with the trio towards Barangay ZZZ.8 They went inside a dark nipa hut near a rice field and AAA saw Vicente and Larry thereat. AAA was then made to sit on a bench by Felipe and the four accused went to converse with each other outside the nipa hut. When the accused came back, they covered her mouth with a handkerchief, and tied her hands and feet to the posts with a nylon string. The accused watched in delight while each of them took turns in raping her. Jerwin ravished her twice while the rest of the accused raped her once. After they finished with AAA, Jerwin untied her hands and feet. Vicente and Larry went home while Jerwin and Felipe accompanied AAA to her grandmothers house. 9 Two days later, AAA told BBB about the incident only after the latter noticed and asked her why she could not walk properly. They went to Fernando, who is a Barangay Kagawad and later to Eddie, a Barangay Tanod to report the incident. Fernando

summoned the accused and they were made to sign a document containing their statement regarding the incident.10 Eddie testified that on 1 September 2002, Jerwins parents came to him and expressed their intention for their son, Jerwin to marry AAA. Appellant Vicente, Jerwin, Larry, Fernando, and BBB were also present at the meeting. Eddie saw Fernando prepare a one and a half sheet of yellow paper containing the admissions made by the accused that they raped AAA.11 BBB fetched Fernando and brought him to the house of Eddie to talk about a marriage proposal by Jerwin. BBB asked Fernando to put into writing all the conversations that transpired inside the house. He did so while BBB was dictating to him what to write. He stated that the accused admitted the crime.12 AAA and BBB then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. On 2 September 2002, they went to the medico-legal and AAA was examined by Dr. Tatad, who later issued a medico-legal certificate stating his findings as follow: Abrasion Labia Minora Round the Clock.13 For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of Jerwin, Felipe, appellant Vicente, Maria Talan (Maria), Ricardo Rin (Ricardo), and Federico Rey (Federico) to prove that there was no crime committed. Jerwin, Felipe and Maria attended the wake of Federicos nephew in Barangay YYY on 29 August 2002 at around 7:00 p.m. While they were playing cards, AAA approached their table and sat beside Jerwin.14 Federico saw AAA play with Jerwins group on the table.15 They stayed at the wake until 11:00 p.m. As Marias group was about to leave, AAA asked Jerwin if she could go with him. Jerwin then introduced AAA to Maria as his girlfriend. While on their way home, Jerwin and AAA were trailing behind Maria and Felipe. At that juncture, both Maria and Felipe saw Jerwin place his arm around the shoulders of AAA, while AAAs arm was wrapped around the waist of Jerwin. Thereafter, AAA invited Maria to go to the dance with her and Jerwin in another barangay. Maria turned down the invitation and went home. While Felipe was about to enter his house, Jerwin called him and asked if he likes to go to the dance, but Felipe declined because he needed to drive his pedicab on the following morning.16

Jerwin claimed that AAA was his girlfriend; that they had been together since 31 December 2001; and that they had sexual intercourse for three (3) or four (4) times to date. He admitted that coming from the dance, it was around 1 a.m. when they proceeded to a nipa hut in Barangay ZZZ where they had sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they went to sleep. When Jerwin woke up the following morning, AAA had already left.17 On 30 August 2002, Jerwin saw AAA crying at the house of Maria. AAA told her that she was scolded by her mother and grandmother when she arrived home in the morning. Jerwin suggested that he would talk to BBB and let her know that he wants to marry AAA.18 Ricardo, who lives just a few meters away from the nipa hut where the alleged rape was committed, stated that he did not notice any untoward incident that transpired in the nipa hut. He however admitted that he went to sleep at around 10:30 p.m.19 Jerwin and Felipe went to the house of Eddie on 1 September 2002 when they were summoned by the latter. Felipe saw the mother of Jerwin and AAA talking about marriage, but BBB did not consent to the wedding. His co-accused were also present at Eddies house. Felipe denied raping AAA when he was asked. Jerwin also denied raping AAA and replied that AAA was his girlfriend.20 After a while, they all went home. In 2004, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested for the crime of rape. 21 While Jerwin was detained, AAA visited her several times. Appellant Vicente came to know AAA when she was introduced to him by Jerwin as his girlfriend sometime in January 2002. On 29 August 2002, appellant was harvesting rice at the back of Catanduanes National High School from 7:00 a.m. until 4:45 p.m. He got home at 4:50 p.m. and slept at 8:00 p.m. He woke up the following day at 6:30 a.m. On 30 August 2002, he was summoned to go to the house of Eddie. Upon reaching the house, he saw the parents of Jerwin and AAA conversing about the wedding of Jerwin and AAA. He was asked by Fernando if she raped AAA, but Vicente answered in the negative. He was made to sign his name on a blank sheet of yellow paper by Fernando.22 While in detention, Vicente saw AAA visiting the jail house once.23 The defense also presented the entries in the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) logbook, certified by Jail Officer Bernardo Azansa to show that AAA visited Jerwin six (6) times in jail.24

On 16 November 2006, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds VICENTE T. BONGAT, JERWIN B. QUINTAL AND FELIPE A. QUINTAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099, 3100 and hereby sentences them as follows: 1) Vicente T. Bongat is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime. 2) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Jerwin B. Quintal is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime. 3) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Felipe A. Quintal is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime. Vicente T. Bongat, Jerwin B. Quintal and Felipe A. Quintal are ordered to individually pay the private complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each crime. Pursuant to R.A. No. 9344, the judgment of conviction against Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal is suspended. The parents or guardians of Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal; the Social Worker of this Court, Nonita Manlangit; the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes Josefina T. Ramirez, the Provincial Social Welfare Officer of Catanduanes Priscilla T. Navar, the Director of Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or his duly authorized representative; and the Head of the Social Services and Counseling Division of DSWD or his duly authorized representative are enjoined to attend the disposition conference on November 28, 2006 at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon.25 Jerwin and Felipe were both confined at the Home for Boys in Naga City for rehabilitation pursuant to the ruling of the RTC. The RTC found AAAs testimony as credible and rejected the "sweetheart theory" and alibi of the

defense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 29 September 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Appellant manifested that he would merely adopt their appellant's brief before the Court of Appeals.26 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation stating that it would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt its appellee's brief filed on 31 August 2007.27 On 27 November 2009, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the cases against Jerwin and Felipe. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and upon the recommendation of the DSWD, the cases against JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal, whose sentence have been suspended, are hereby DISMISSED. Finding that the objective of the disposition measures has been fulfilled, the Court orders the final discharge of the said JICL. Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Regional Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Baraguis, Legaspi City and Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Home for Boys, Naga City, for them to cause the discharge of JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal and their return to their respective families. The Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes is ordered to submit a periodic report on both JICL within one (1) year after their discharge.28 In the main, appellant assails the credibility of AAAs testimony. He insists that it was impossible for AAA to have clearly and positively identified him as one of the perpetrators considering that AAA claimed that it was very dark inside the nipa hut where she was supposedly raped. Appellant assails the testimony of AAA that she went with Jerwin to a place unknown to her, despite not personally knowing him. Appellant claims this incredibility in her testimony created serious doubt as to the reliability of her allegations. Appellant argues that contrary to AAAs allegations, there was no clear intent on her part to resist the alleged sexual acts. AAA failed to shout for help. Neither did she present any proof of body injuries to clearly prove that she resisted the alleged rape. Moreover, AAA told her mother about the incident only because the latter noticed her to have been walking in an unusual manner. Appellant asserts that he should

have been convicted only of simple seduction as conspiracy was not proven among the accused.29 The OSG maintains that AAA positively identified appellant as one of the four rapists. It counters that the visibility inside the nipa hut was not that poor as to render AAA incapable of seeing her rapists faces. AAA had a good view of appellants face because the moonlight illuminated the surroundings. It contends that there is nothing unusual when AAA voluntarily went with Jerwin and Felipe before she was raped. According to the OSG, AAA had a false sense of security because the two accused were minors like her and were even accompanied by another girl. The OSG avers that force and intimidation were employed against AAA because her hands and feet were tied to the nipa huts posts during her ordeal. There is likewise no basis for the claim that AAA did not immediately report the incident. When AAA saw her mother, she informed her at the earliest possible opportunity. Finally, the OSG asserts that there is conspiracy among the accused in committing rape considering their actions before, during and after raping AAA. The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.30Hence, the elements necessary to sustain a conviction in the crime of rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. 31 The prosecution, with whom the burden of proof rests, seeks to establish these elements through the testimonies of its witnesses, particularly that of the victims. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.32 A dangerous precedent as it may seem, there is however a guideline provided also by jurisprudence in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim, namely: (a) while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be

allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.33 Guided by these principles and upon a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court is not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, as well as the other accused, committed the crime of rape against AAA. The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the inconclusive medical finding, tends to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped. The RTC and the Court of Appeals relied largely on the testimony of AAA that she was raped. This Court is well aware of the rule that findings of trial court relative to the credibility of the rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, more so, if they are affirmed by the appellate court. It is only in exceptional circumstances that this rule is brushed aside, such as when the courts evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case.34 And one of these exceptions obtains in this case. This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAAs testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents relating to the case. First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico. Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Incidentally, it was unclear how AAA was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never asked, not by the prosecution nor the defense, on how she came to know the two accused. Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a "round-the-clock abrasion in the labia minora." This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse. We find the medical finding lacking in relation to the testimony of AAA on how she was ravished by four men. Although a medical

examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution of rape, it could have corroborated an otherwise vague and dubious testimony of the victim. In fact, Dr. Tatad admitted that he only examined AAAs private parts based on her statement that she was raped, thus: Q: Do you remember Doctor, the date when the examination was conducted? A: 9/2/02, sir. Q: That was on September 2, 2002? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, when the person of [AAA] came to you, what did you do? A: She consulted me and told me that she was raped, sir. Q: And after informing that she was raped, what did you do? A: I told her to lie down as if she was to deliver a child and I examined the vagina. There was abrasion in the labia minora round the clock, sir. Q: How about laceration? A: There was an abrasion, sir. Q: What might have caused that abrasion round the clock? A: It could be that something was inserted, sir. Q: What kind of object might have been inserted? A: According to the patient, penis was inserted in her vagina. Q: Did she tell you as to the number of penis which were inserted in her vagina? A: According to the patient the penis inserted to her was pushed and pulled, sir.35 Furthermore, in her sworn statement before the police, AAA related that her mouth was injured.36She also testified in court that her hands and feet were tied to a post by a nylon string.37 Naturally, AAA would have sustained

injuries in her hands and feet. But all these injuries were never examined by the medico-legal officer nor did AAA allege the existence of those injuries. Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner. AAA stated: Q: You said a while ago that your mother discovered your unusual movement in the morning of the following day of August 29, 2002, is that correct? A: It was after two days when my mother noticed my unusual movement during the birthday of my brother, sir. Q: Did you not go out of the house of your grandmother on August 30, 2002? A: No, sir. Q: When your mother noticed your movement, what did she do? A: She asked me, sir. Q: After she asked you, what did she do? A: She asked me why I was walking that way and I told her that I was raped, sir.38 Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin, to report the rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they were initially informed by BBB about a marriage proposal by Jerwins parents. It was only during the meeting that they learned about the alleged rape. Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB never bothered to ask AAA about the whole incident.39 She accepted AAAs testimony h ook, line and sinker. In the same breadth, it can be recalled that Eddie, the Barangay Tanod, testified that BBB dictated to him what was written in the yellow paper which contained the supposed admissions of rape by the accused. Eddie did not appear to have asked or interrogated the accused about the incident. Likewise, Dr. Tatad merely examined AAAs private parts on the basis of her claim that she was raped.

Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the prosecution. The combination of all these circumstances are more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether first, rape was actually committed and second, whether the accused were the perpetrators. It is thus unnecessary to belabor the issues raised by the defense for it must be reiterated that conviction always rests on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. For the reasons cited above, we are constrained to entertain reasonable doubt. Hence, we acquit. WHEREFORE, appellant Vicente Bongat y TARIMAN is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause. SO ORDERED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Raul T. Montesino for accused-appellant.

The complainant is Anita Ibaez, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. She says that on the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-appellant to a bushy place on the seashore where she was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because he was threatening her with a scythe he was carrying. In the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then forcibly took her. She could not cry out because she was afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother because the accused-appellant bad warned her he would kill her if she did. 6 The accused-appellant has a different version. He does not deny he had sexual intercourse with Anita, but he insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it was the complainant who enticed him into the bushes, where she wantonly opened herself to him. He was unable at first to have an erection because of his age. But Anita herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus stimulated, he succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards, noticing some people nearby who might have seen them, the girl put back her panty on and left. He followed a few minutes later. 7 As the medical examination of the complainant was made more than two months afterwards, there naturally could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that usually attend forcible rape. But there was the tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the accused-appellant could not dispute. 8 Given the choice between the separate accounts of the complainant and the accused-appellant, the court inclines in favor of the latter. It is in our view more believable. Anita never spoke of any difficulty on the part of Pailano in violating her. She simply said he removed her panty and entered her. No effort was mentioned; it seemed she was talking of a vigorous stud. Yet, the accused-appellant was not a teenager or even only in the prime of his life at the time of their sexual encounter. He was all of sixty-nine years old. Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the moment, we doubt if Pailano could have accomplished the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution has not offered any proof of his sexual prowess, and under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant did not hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride, that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with Anita and that it took some fondling from her before his organ could respond. This was a hard and humiliating fact but it had to be admitted. We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita

CRUZ, J.: At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine years old. 1 The prosecution will have to contend not only with the presumption of innocence but also of impotence. The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971 in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of Bago. 2 It was reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and the corresponding criminal complaint was filed on July 10, 1972. 4Judgment was rendered on January 30, 1976, sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the costs. 5 He now wants this decision reversed.

coupling on the day in question, 9 but not on the other previous occasions claimed by him. His presence in all of these meetings seems too much of a coincidence to be credible. However, Pailano is also corroborated by Natividad Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and Pailano caressing each other, with the girl in fact assuming the more aggressive role. 10 There is no reason not to believe this witness. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded. If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age, against her will." No mention was made of the second circumstance. Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 11 This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.

In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People v. Montes, 13 the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of and acquitted was not homicide but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines,14 where the accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights. It may be argued that although initially deficient, the criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has not been adequately establish established. In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita reported that he saw no evidence of insanity in her family history nor was there any indication of such condition in the complainant herself. 15 He did observe that she had the mentality of a thirteenyear old, 16 which was not that serious an impediment as her age at the time was only fifteen. Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not proved that during that encounter in the bushes, Anita's mental condition was so weakened that she could not resist Pailano's supposed advances. The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not been overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno reported the incident in the bushes on the same day to Anita's mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, for reasons not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half months later that she decided to complain to the authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The only possible explanation for her delay is that the liaison between her daughter and Pailano had already become a scandal by that time and she must have thought she could redeem Anita's honor by initiating the criminal complaint. The delay, however, blunts the charge of rape. What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last lustful fling and a young girl with a rather

weak mind and a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his youth. We do not mean to romanticize this sordid affair. It is wrong and is not here excused, made light of, or dismissed. It is disdained for what it is an unseemly seduction where it is not clear who the tempter and the tempted are although neither can really claim to be blameless. But, in our view, it is definitely not rape. WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No costs. SO ORDERED. JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution 3 dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch 525 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug. The antecedent facts follow. On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic

sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,7 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads: That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] "shabu" with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing "shabu" residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same. CONTRARY TO LAW.8 Petitioner entered a negative plea.9 At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses. Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner.10 On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner's mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.11 Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found "behind" the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. 12 On

cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;13 that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a "true inventory," then to the trial court14 and thereafter to the laboratory.15 Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance.16 She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.17 The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner's wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila's body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheila's body. 18 Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.19 Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him came from a pillow on the bed.20 Petitioner's account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store

to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.21 Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.22 On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.23 The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.24 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 25 In his Appeal Brief26 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.27 On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum.28 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court.29Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same issues. In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the search.31 It points to petitioner's incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licup's presence. It likewise notes that petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to

overcome theprima facie existence of animus possidendi. This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records. Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.32 In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.33 Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. 34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.35 As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.36 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.37

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.38 The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination39 and even substitution and exchange.40 In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.41 Graham vs. State42 positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.43 A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been

exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabuallegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence? The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis. The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu. Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers from the commencement of the search of petitioner's house until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets

petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away. It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheila's body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioner's household away from the search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternon's suspicious presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise of duty. Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of petitioner's house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt

therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternon's course of action. Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same,45 as required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of Court. People v. Go47characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties.48 Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo49 declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency.50 Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment. 51 Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.52 Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 53 In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt. In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is

shown.54 In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez isACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED. People of the Philippines vs. De los Santos PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 131588 March 27, 2001 DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: FACTS: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenns truck, hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple attempted murders, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415 (ENDURANCE RUN FROM Camp Danglay in Fortich, Bukidnon, to CAMP ALAGAR CDO THE PNP TRAINEES WERE BUMPED BY THE ACCUSED---12 DIED, 11 SERIOUSLY INJURED AND 10 MINOR INJURIES--Murder? If susceptible to two interpretations, it should only be reckless imprudence resulting to homicide)

of firearm namely: pistolized caliber .22 without serial number and a caliber 22 Magnum Smith and Wesson revolver, with Serial No. 88463, the persons of Rodelito Valdez, Florencio Bulatao, Protacio Pasalusdos and Jose Lopez, Jr., hitting them on the different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them fatal wounds which directly caused their instantaneous deaths." The trial court arraigned the accused separately. Accused Servando Saturno was arraigned on July 7, 1989. He pleaded not guilty. Accused Delfin Gregorio, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres were arraigned on August 11, 1989. They pleaded not guilty. Accused Arman Soliman remains at large. Trial ensued. The facts are as follows:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERVANDO SATURNO, ARMAN SOLIMAN, ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ, BENIGNO ANDRES and DELFIN GREGORIO, accused. SERVANDO SATURNO, ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ and BENIGNO ANDRES, accused-appellants. PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal interposed by accused Servando Saturno, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple murder and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the victims, and to pay costs. On July 4, 1989 the provincial prosecutor of Nueva Ecija filed with the Regional Trial Court an information charging accused as follows: "That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1989, in Barangay Agupalo Este, Municipality of Lupao, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and aiding one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery, in that they perpetrated their crime upon their victims without the latter having any means to defend themselves, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and for and in consideration of the sum of P2,000.00 given by accused Delfin Gregorio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault and shoot, with the use

On June 23, 1989, at around 7:00 in the morning, Rodelito Valdez, Benigno Andres, Jose Lopez, Jr., Protacio Pasalusdos, Florencio Bulatao and Matias Andres were having a drinking spree at Rodelito Valdez's house at Agupalo Este, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Matias Andres only had a few drinks and proceeded to the farm. Benigno Andres left around lunchtime. Lucila Valdez, Rodelito's wife, heard Benigno say that he was going to Muoz, so she asked him to buy her a kilo of pinapaitan (cow meat) and oil. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, all the others were already dead drunk and went to sleep.2 At around 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Lucila heard a tricycle park near their house. There were four passengers, and the last one to alight was Benigno Andres. Thinking that he was delivering her pinapaitan, she went down to meet him. However, one of the men (wearing a light brown jacket and a fatigue cap) met her downstairs and asked for her husband Rodelito. She told him that Rodelito was dead drunk and could not be awakened. The man did not heed her and went straight to their house. Lucila followed him inside. He woke up Rodelito, who was sleeping in the bedroom, and asked for his gun. When Rodelito answered that he did not have a gun, the man shot him. Lucila, who was carrying her one-year old child, started to cry for help but the man ordered her to be quiet and to stay in the corner of the room. 3 The man's companions brought Jose Lopez, Jr. and Protacio Pasalusdos to the bedroom and hogtied them. Florencio Bulatao arrived later and was also hog-tied. Lucila, who was covering her face and trembling in fear, sensed that those who were

hog-tied were separately brought downstairs. Every time a body was brought downstairs, she would hear gunshots. When she tried to open her eyes again, she saw that the man in light brown jacket was still there and was pointing his gun at her. She closed her eyes and heard two gunshots. When she looked again, the man was no longer there. She realized that the two shots were aimed at her husband.4 A few hours after the incident, the police authorities interrogated Lucila and others who may have knowledge about the crime. Lucila repeatedly stated that she could not identify the assailants.5 Five (5) empty shells of cal. 22 and two (2) deformed slugs were recovered from the cadavers of Rodelito Valdez and Florencio Bulatao. 6 After investigation, constables from the 182nd PC Company apprehended accused-appellants. Sgts. Romeo Pillonar and Anastacio Apostol and other policemen invited accused Servando Saturno, a fireman, on June 28, 1989. He went with the police officers after having been told that their Commanding Officer Capt. Undan wanted to talk to him. He brought his tricycle so he would have a ride home later that evening. He was not able to bring it home because it would be identified by the widow of Rodelito Valdez. The police officers asked him to return to the camp the following day.7 On June 29, 1989, Lucila arrived at the camp in the morning. Sgt. Pillonar escorted her. He pointed at Saturno and told Lucila, "Mrs., this is the suspect". Lucila answered that she does not know Saturno, and that Saturno's tricycle was not the same as the one used by her husband's assailants. Sgt. Pillonar brought her inside the office. Later, Saturno was asked to go inside the office as well. In the afternoon of that same day, pictures were taken which showed Lucila pointing at Saturno, a gun, a light brown jacket and a fatigue cap which were later identified as belonging to Saturno.8 Lucila's testimony also revealed, however, that she initially pointed at a fatigue cap and a jacket inside the camp office, but the soldier on duty laughed at because those belonged to him.9 The other accused were arrested later. On July 1, 1989, they executed affidavits admitting their participation in the crime and implicating Delfin Gregorio as the one who gave P2,000.00 for them to kill Rodelito Valdez.10 All the accused denied the charges against them. Servando Saturno, a native of Sapang Cawayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, claimed that he was at home from June 22 to 25, 1989, because he was sick.

His immediate supervisors, Capt. Peter Torres and Jose Gania also testified that they asked Saturno to go home on June 22 because he looked sick. Saturno reported back to work on June 25. He claimed that he had not been to Agupalo Este, Lupao in his entire life.11 Saturno testified that when he was apprehended, he was asked about his participation in the killing. When he insisted that he was innocent, he was repeatedly maltreated and tortured at the back of the PC barracks. He was made to lie upside down, nude, and water was poured on his mouth and nose, which directly went to his forehead. He was coerced into admitting that he killed the victims as he could no longer endure the pain.12 A few minutes after he was maltreated, accused Saturno was asked to write a letter to his wife asking for his gun, one of his brown jackets and one of his fatigue caps. His first letter was badly written because his hands were shaking. He wrote a second letter, but it was lost, so Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol asked him to write a third letter. The prosecution presented the third letter as its evidence. Saturno's wife testified that she never saw this letter. It was Saturno's mother-in-law who was at home when the police officers came to their house and got Saturno's belongings.13 When accused Saturno realized that he was being implicated in the crime, he requested the police officers who maltreated him to subject his gun to ballistic examination and to give him a paraffin test. They did not heed his request and they retorted that he acted as if he knew better. On July 1, 1989, Sgt. Apostol fire-tested Saturno's gun. On July 3, 1989, the day before the information was filed, they brought the gun to Manila for ballistic examination, after asking accused Saturno for P100.00, to buy new bullets. Accused Saturno was given a paraffin test, and the result was negative. 14 Lt. Peter Torres, accused Saturno's immediate supervisor at the Muoz Fire Station, testified that the gun used in the killing was with him prior to June 22, 1989. He never gave it back to accused Saturno because he was supposed to have it licensed. However, on June 28, 1989, Sgt. Pillonar took it from him upon Capt. Undan's orders.15 Delfin Gregorio, who was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, testified that he accompanied Lucila Valdez to the PC headquarters on June 29, 1989. After Lucila talked to the police officers, she told him that Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol had asked her to point at accused Saturno and at his tricycle.16 When she was first asked upon her arrival whether she recognized accused Saturno, she did not say anything.17

At that same day, Delfin Gregorio was left behind at the stockade. Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol maltreated him. He was undressed and made to lie down with his head downward and was repeatedly asked whether he knew accused Servando Saturno. Every time he answered that he did not know accused Saturno, they would pour water on his nose. They also applied a lighted cigarette butt on his private part, and when he could no longer endure the pain, he said that he knew accused Saturno. Later, they brought him to the office and called in a photographer. He was ordered to point at accused Saturno and his jacket.18 Gregorio testified, however, that it was the first time that he saw accused Saturno. On June 30, 1989, Gregorio was again brought to the back of the barracks and asked to undress himself and was maltreated again. They asked him if he knew Abraham Rodriguez from Muoz. He answered that Rodriguez was an acquaintance who visited him on June 18, 1989, because he (Rodriguez) bought a dog. They also asked him who were Rodelito Valdez's drinking companions in the morning of June 23, 1989. When he was mentioning their names, the police officers stopped him and said that "there are too many already and that would already be in excess." Afterwards, Sgt. Pillonar stated that the four of them (Delfin Gregorio Servando Saturno, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres) would be included in the case.19 Later that day, the same PC soldiers maltreated accused Gregorio and Abraham Rodriguez. While he was blindfolded, he was instructed that his story should be that he saw accused Saturno, Andres and Rodriguez come out of Rodelito Valdez's house immediately after the killing on June 23, 1989.20 Accused Abraham Rodriguez was apprehended on June 30, 1989. He denied the charges against him. He testified that he was at home in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, at the time the incident took place. Aside from Delfin Gregorio, he did not know the victims and his other co-accused. He only came to know accused Saturno and Andres when they were in jail.21 He was shown to Lucila Valdez, and the latter told the police officers to release him because he had nothing to do with the killing.22 Instead of releasing him, Sgts. Pillonar, Apostol and other PC men brought him to the back portion of the barracks and repeatedly tortured him for about half an hour. They interrogated him whether he had any participation in the killing. He insisted he was innocent. He was again severely maltreated. He

was coerced into admitting that he was involved in the killing.23 Afterwards, the police officers brought him inside the office and his affidavit was purportedly taken. Rodriguez testified that aside from a few immaterial questions, he was not asked any other questions but the police officers continued typing. A few days later, he and his co-accused were brought to a certain Atty. Evangelista and were sternly ordered to answer "yes" to every question Atty. Evangelista may ask. He and the other accused were not allowed to read the contents of their affidavits.24 Accused Benigno Andres denied any participation in the killing. He testified that he had not known accused Saturno and Rodriguez prior to June 23, 1989, and that he only met them at the PC Company compound on July 1, 1989. He admitted that Rodelito Valdez asked him to drink gin with him in the morning of June 23, 1989, but he only stayed for a few minutes because he had to go to Muoz. He arrived at Muoz early in the afternoon. His tricycle broke down and he stayed there overnight in the house of Florencio Bulatao's (one of the victims) distant relative. The following day, he learned about the killing and he immediately went to Agupalo Este together with Florencio Bulatao's sister and her husband.25 Florencio Bulatao's sister did not testify in court. Accused Andres testified that when he was apprehended on July 1, 1989, he was brought to the back of the barracks of the 182nd PC Company compound, was maltreated, and was coerced to admit his participation in the killing. He was also forced to sign a document purportedly his affidavit admitting his guilt. He testified that he had no participation in the preparation of the document and was never informed of his constitutional rights.26 The trial court found accused-appellants guilty of multiple murder. The trial court acquitted accused Delfin Gregorio for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this appeal.27 In their brief, appellants raise as issue the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They contended that prosecution witness Lucila Valdez was not able to positively identify them. They claim an alibi, that is, it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time the incident occurred. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimony of Lucila

Valdez and that the defense of alibi is weak; He maintains that appellants' alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by witness Lucila that they were the perpetrators of the crime as it is an entrenched jurisprudential doctrine that positive identification prevails over denial and alibi.28 We find the appeal meritorious. It is a basic rule that the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.29 Before he is convicted, there must be moral certainty of guilt a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it that he is guilty of the crime charged. 30 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.31 The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime has been committed, and second, that the accused is the person responsible therefor. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence with evidence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. 32 The fatigue cap and the light brown jacket (and the bloodstains found on it) were the basis for implicating accused Saturno. These were not identified during the trial nor formally offered in evidence. As a matter of fact, the jacket was never seen after it was submitted for examination. The chemist who examined the bloodstains in the jacket was not presented to identify the report and the jacket. There was also no convincing proof that the slugs, which were presented during the trial were the same slugs recovered from the scene of the crime. Barangay Chairman Jaime Collado admitted that after he removed the slugs from the cadavers, he did not immediately give them to the police officers. The slugs, which were submitted for ballistic examination, could have been those used when Sgt. Apostol fire-tested the gun on July 1, 1989. There was no sufficient proof that they were fired from accused Saturno's gun. The ballistician, after testifying that there is no margin of error in his report, could not estimate when the gun was last fired. The other homemade gun also alleged to have been used in the killing was tested in court and it was shown that it could not be operated easily. Using the court's own words, the gun was " pasumpong-sumpong."33 Witness Lucila Valdez hesitated at first to point at accused Saturno's tricycle because it looked

different from the one used by the assailants which was color red and with a tail.34 She did not also recognize the inscription "SATURNO FAMILY" at the back of the tricycle.35 Witness Lucila Valdez was covering her face during the incident. She claimed that the man who was wearing a light brown jacket had a well-chiseled or occidental nose and his face was oblong; that the gun used in killing her husband appeared to have a circular object in the middle; that the man who hog-tied the other victims was of medium height, a well-built man, dark skinned and the other who helped him was also well-built and faircomplexioned and a little bit handsome. 36 She stated that the person who dumped Florencio Bulatao in front of the other victims "was wearing a belt which was borrowed from my husband", and she assumed that it was Benigno Andres because she remembered the latter borrowing her husband's belt.37 Witness Lucila's testimony regarding the identity of the accused, however, is too general to deserve consideration. On the other hand, accusedappellants were able to present convincing evidence that they could not possibly be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Bgy. Chairman Collado and Mayor George Castaeda testified that Lucila Valdez told them that she was not able to recognize the assailants.38 It is inconceivable for Lucila not to tell the barangay officials that her longtimecompadre Benigno Andres assisted in the killing. On rebuttal, she said that she had not seen accused Saturno and Andres prior to June 23, 1989.39 Witness Lucila testified that she was afraid and trembling after she saw that her husband was shot,40 yet she also testified that she was composed and normal all throughout the incident.41Her conflicting testimony as to her disposition at that time creates a reasonable doubt on her capability to positively identify the killers. The identification of appellants as the assailants could in no way be considered as positive and credible. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of the killing; however, it failed to prove that appellants perpetrated the crime. Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a pronouncement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused will result in acquittal.42 Accused-appellants testified that they were somewhere else when the killing occurred, and

that it was impossible for them to have committed the crime. The court a quo gave weight to the affidavits executed by the accused wherein they admitted their participation in the killing.43 However, they were able to prove that their affidavits were solely prepared by the police investigators, that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights, and that they were forced to sign the affidavits lest they be maltreated again. True, the settled rule is that alibi is a weak defense. It has been held that courts will not at once look with disfavor on the defense of alibi. Alibi may be considered in light of all the evidence for it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.44 Appellants' alibi and denial gain considerable strength in view of the unreliable identification of the perpetrators of the crime.45 Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.46 The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. 47 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case No. L15 (89). The Court ACQUITS accused-appellants SERVANDO SATURNO, ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ and BENIGNO ANDRES for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellants unless they are lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court of their release within ten (10) days from notice. No costs. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY BERNARDINO y MOLINA, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:p The informant's telephone tip was terse: a certain Rey Bernardino was selling marijuana at Malaya St., Malanday, Marikina. 1 The police acted promptly. A team consisting of Patrolmen Roberto Jocson, Isidro Mariano, Romeo Caviso and Mateo Garcia proceeded to the said place to look for their quarry. They brought with them a ten peso bill previously marked on its four corners with the initials of Pat. Wilson Balauitan. 2 Upon arrival in Malaya St., Jocson sought Bernardino, whom the informer pointed to. The other members of the team positioned themselves in various unobtrusive places where they could watch Jocson and Bernardino. Jocson approached Bernardino and asked if he could "score," meaning if he could buy marijuana. Bernardino left and returned after a while, bringing with him three sticks of marijuana, which he gave to Jocson. Jocson paid him the marked bill and scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal. The other policemen then moved in and arrested Bernardino. 3 They took from him the marked ten-peso bill and a black wallet containing some residue of marijuana leaves and personal identification papers. Bernardino was taken to the Eastern Police District Headquarters, where, after being apprised of his constitutional rights, he refused to give any written statement. The three sticks of marijuana and the residue found in his wallet were turned over to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. 4 The following information was then filed against Bernardino: That on or about the 25th day of August, 1987, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to another person three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, which is a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law. All the members of the team testified on the incident as above narrated. 5 Pat. Balauitan related his investigation of Bernardino. 6 The prosecution also presented Capt. Lina Sarmiento, the PC forensic chemist, who declared under oath that the

cigarette sticks and the leaves found in Bernardino's wallet were positive for marijuana. 7 These were offered as exhibits, together with the marked money. 8 Bernardino was the only witness for the defense. He denied the charge against him, claiming he was digging a "pozo negro" when he was arrested and was not at all involved in the sale of marijuana. 9 In his decision dated May 13, 1988, Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, plus the costs. Bernardino is now before us asking for a reversal of his conviction. He claims the trial court should not have given credence to the prosecution's evidence nor should it have presumed that the policemen had regularly performed their functions. His contention is that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor. In questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the accused-appellant points to certain discrepancies in their respective testimonies that he avers prove they were not telling the truth when they testified. Among these are the inconsistencies on why they commenced the operation in the first place, who bought and who sold the marijuana, and who among them actually frisked him upon his arrest. These are minor matters that do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor do they reflect on the witnesses' honesty. Differences in the recollection of details relating to the same incident may be expected from the several persons testifying thereon; but as long as there is basic agreement on the main points of the incident, their respective declarations may not be rejected as totally untrue. As for the statements of Mariano and Balauitan, referring to Bernardino as the buyer rather than the seller, these were rectified later when, on further questioning, they declared that the buyer was Jocson. These statements are in the record and cannot be denied. 10 The argument that the accused-appellant would not have sold marijuana to a total stranger is at best conjectural and in any case not convincing. Drug pushers have become increasingly casual about their activities and less cautious about isolated transactions like the one at bar.

Bernardino evidently considered the sale an ordinary transaction and Jocson an ordinary user. Pat. Balauitan's testimony that the accusedappellant verbally admitted the sale of the marijuana to Jocson is, of course, inadmissible as violative of the constitutional rights of the accused, who was not properly informed thereof. Nevertheless, even if that testimony were discarded, the rest of the prosecution evidence would still suffice to sustain his conviction. Street pushers like the accused-appellant have contributed immensely to the aggravation of drug abuse, and it is only just that they be punished severely in accordance with the Dangerous Drugs Act. But it is hoped that the government will exert more efforts against the big and powerful drug syndicates that have so far evaded the clutches of the law. These are the real culprits that, for evil gain, are sapping the strength and morality of the nation with the terrible poison they are spreading. They must be stopped. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. It is so ordered. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ERNESTO FLORES, defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Jose C. Espinas counsel de oficio for defendantappellant.

CORTES, J.: Ernesto FLORES appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, finding him guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to life imprisonment as well as to pay a fine of P20,000 and the costs. The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information against FLORES as follows: That on or about the 21st day of August, 1980, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, a person not authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, without authority, sell and deliver fifteen (15) dried marijuana stalks to a poseur-buyer

in the amount of ten pesos (Pl0.00) along E. de los Santos Avenue, Balintawak, Quezon City, in violation of the aforesaid Republic Act No. 6425. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 4.) On arraignment, FLORES entered a plea of not guilty. After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 17 October 1983, finding him guilty as charged, the decision's fallo reading as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ernesto Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana described and penalized under Article II, Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended. He is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Costs against accused. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46.) In arriving at its conclusion, the court relied on the prosecution's version of the incident, culled from the testimony of Sgt. Angel Nieves as follows: On 20 August 1980, at about 5:00 p.m., Sgt. Angel Nieves and CIC Godofredo Fider, both of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit, (CANU for short) conducted a "test-buy" operation in Balintawak, Quezon City in connection with the government drive against violators of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. They were assisted by Annalisa Santos, a confidential informer who acted as the buyer. After Santos was given P10.00 to buy marijuana, they all went to an alley in the vicinity of the squatters' area near the Cloverleaf interchange. The CANU agents waited out of sight as Santos bought five sticks of the illegal drug. The CANU agents then left with the informer, but did not arrest the pusher. The next day, the agents planned a "buy-bust' operation in order to nab the culprit. Sgt. Nieves, with CIC Fider and Pfc. Wilfredo Tamondong, again gave two P5.00 bills to the confidential informer to purchase marijuana in the same place. From a distance, Sgt. Nieves followed the confidential informer into the interior of the squatter's area. He saw her talking to a young boy. The boy left, and the confidential informer, Annalisa Santos, waited beside a store. Sgt. Nieves approached the store

and talked to the storeowner in the pretext of looking for a boarding house. While there, he saw the accused arrive and give the marijuana stalks to Santos, who in turn gave the two P5.00 bills to him. Sgt. Nieves then introduced himself as a CANU agent and then arrested the accused. He confiscated the two (2) five peso bins and the 15 marijuana stalks which were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination and were later confirmed to be marijuana as attested to by NBI Forensic Chemist Nelly Carriaga. On that same day, Sgt. Nieves and his fellow agents submitted a joint affidavit giving their account of the event (Exh. "A".) Refuting the prosecution's version, the accused presented his own testimony corroborated by his witnesses, Quintin Carpio and Benita Cleofas. He alleged that in the moming of 21 August 1980 he worked as a painter in the residence of barangay councilman Quintin Carpio. At noontime, he passed by the store of Benita Cleofas to buy viand as he usually did. Suddenly, without warning, somebody, poked a gun at him and hit him in the breast and at the back. A man then placed a plastic packet in his right hip pocket. He was forced to board a car and brought to a building, which he found out later, was the CANU headquarters in Malabon. He was frisked, and the plastic packet, taken from him. He was tortured and beaten, and then forced to sign a written confession. He vehemently denied selling marijuana to the buyer-poseur. From the decision, FLORES interposed this appeal, and contends that the trial court erred: FIRSTLY IN ADMITTING THE "CONFESSION" OF THE ACCUSED GIVEN DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHOUT BEING SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND WITHOUT AN EXPRESS WAIVER OF SUCH RIGHT. SECONDLY IN GIVING "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT' TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, SGT. ANGEL NIEVES DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL INCONSISTENCIES THEREIN WITH RESPECT TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY AS TO THE TIME OF THE APPREHENSION, THE ALLEGED MARKED MONEY USED TO ENTRAP THE ACCUSED, HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED, THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF OTHER WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES TO NEGATE SUCH BLANKET FAITH IN THE ARRESTING OFFICER.

THIRDLY IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING THAT HE WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING THAT THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS, THE BUYER POSER WAS NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESS, AND THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, NEGATE A CONVICTION. (Rollo, p. 71.) The principal issues here are: 1) whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible in evidence against him, and 2) whether from the evidence presented, the guilt of FLORES has been proved to a moral certainty. Anent the question of the inadmissibility of his confession, FLORES's statement reveals the following: PASUBALI: Ikaw ginoong Emesto Flores ay nasa ilalim ng pagsi siyasat sa kasalanang paglabag sa ipinagbabawal na gamot gaya ng marijuana, ngunit bago kita tanungin ay nais kung (sic) ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, ng gaya ng mga sumusunod: Na ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag sumagot sa mga itatanong sa iyo." Na sa anumang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring gamiting evidensiya laban pabor sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman dito sa ating Bansa." Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng manananggol upang sumubaybay sa iyo at kung hindi mo kaya ang humirang ng isa ang

tanggapang ito ang bahalang humirang ng isa para sa iyo. TAGASIYASAT: Naunawaan at naintindihan mo bang lahat ang mga ipinaliwanag ko sa iyo? SINISIYASAT: Opo. TANONG: Matapos mong maunawaan ang iyong mga karapatan nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng malaya at kusang loob na salaysay, na ikaw ay hindi pinipilit, tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng anumang bagay ? SAGOT: Opo sir. (Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.) Precedents abound showing that this kind of "advice" given to the accused does not satisfy the constitutional guarantees accorded a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. This protection given under the 1973 Constitution is further expanded by the 1987 Constitution [Article III, Sec. 12 (l)-(4).] In People v. Jara[G.R. Nos. 6135657, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 5161], this Court had the opportunity to assail the kind of recitation of rights similar to the one in the present case: This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and

unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. This Court has observed that the long question of the investigator informing appellant of his right to remain silent and to counsel followed by a monosyllabic answer, does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution [People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 74655, January 20, 1988, citing People v. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465.] The questioned confession shows that while the accused was informed of his right to counsel, he was not definitely asked whether he wanted to avail of such right, contrary to our ruling in the case of People v. Velasco [G.R. No. 54335, December 14, 1981, 110 SCRA 319 (1981).] Furthermore, he was not made to understand that, if at any time during the interogation he would wish to have the assistance of counsel, the interrogation would cease until an attorney is present [People v. Lasac G.R. No. 64508, March 19, 1987,148 SCRA 624, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).] With the manifest failure to comply with this constitutional sine qua non, the confession must be held inadmissible. In People v. Nicandro [G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986, 141 SCRA 289], this Court explained the essence of the right of the accused to the apprised of his constitutional rights, thus: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2. In other words, the right of a Person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on

the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed' implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered. This was reiterated in People v. Duhan [G.R. No. 65189, May 28, 1986, 142 SCRA 100] and recently in People v. Albofera [G.R. No. 69377, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 123] and People v. Taruc [G.R. No. 74655, January 20,1988.] Without the extrajudicial confession, the resolution of the question of whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt hinges on the credibility of the apprehending officer who allegedly witnessed the sale, Sgt. Angel Nieves. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that the trial court's findings on credibility of witnesses are, as a rule not disturbed on appeal except where certain facts of substance and value are overlooked, which if considered would affect the result of the case [U.S. v. Estrada, 24 Phil. 401 (1913), People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927), People v. Caboverde G.R. No. 66646, April 15, 1988, and People v. Capulong, G.R. No. 65674, April 15, 1988.] The testimony of Sgt. Nieves is vital, because it is the only evidence left to support the conclusion that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana when arrested, since Annalisa Santos, the alleged buyerposeur, did not testify nor did she appear before the investigating fiscal or, even execute a statement. Considering the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, the testimony of Sgt. Nieves must be subjected to close and careful scrutiny. After a close and painstaking examination of the record, the Court finds that standing alone, the testimony of Sgt. Nieves fails to satisfy the quantum of proof necessary to support a judgment of conviction. The inconsistencies and material discrepancies, in his testimony engender serious doubt as to its reliability and veracity.

In the sworn statement that he and the other CANU officers executed on 21 August 1980, the time of the apprehension in flagrante was indicated as 12:10 p.m. When he first took the witness stand however on 19 June 1981, Nieves testified that they conducted the "buy-bust" operation at 8:30 p.m. When he next testified on 22 July 1981, still on direct examination, he reversed himself and said that the incident indeed happened at 12:10 p.m. On 27 November 1981 on cross examination, he again reverted to his original answer, stating that it was really at 9:30 p.m. when the arrest took place. The record reveals this series of conflicting answers of Sgt. Nieves. When he first testified on 19 June 1981., he said: xxx xxx xxx Q Now you said that on the following day you continued yo ur operation, about what time was that when you started that operation the following day? A 8:30 p.m. Q And who were your companions? A CIC Tamondong and confidential informer and myself. [tsn, p. 6, June 19,1981] Later, during the continuation of the direct examination on 22 July 1981, Sgt. Nieves reversed himself. Q Sgt. Nieves, this operation that you conducted on August 21, 1980 where you apprehended accused Emesto Flores concerning fifteen sticks of marijuana what time of the day did this happen? ATTY. MARTINEZ We object because earlier the witness testified that the

apprehension was 8:30 p.m. FISCAL That is why the witness is going to explain that. COURT May answer. A Noontime of August 21. [tsn, p. 10, July 22, 1981] When cross examined on 27 November 1981, he went back to his original stance that the arrest took place at 9:30 P.M., thus: xxx xxx xxx Q So, let us make this clear. On your oath, you will say that on August 21, 1980 at 9:30 p.m., your CI bought from the person you call Nestor Flores these 15 marijuana stalks, which is the same testimony you gave on June 19,1981? A What I know is that our CI bought the 15 stalks at 9:30 p.m. of August 21, and I was there. I was the one who poked him. Q You are sure now of the date, August 21, and the time, 9:30 p.m., that your CI bought from the person of Nestor Flores these 15 stalks of marijuana? A Yes sir. Q You are sure of that? A Yes sir.

Q So, it is not August 21, at 12:00 noon? A No, it was 9:30 p.m. Q On July 22, 1981, you remember you testified here? A Yes sir. Q And on that date you also declared that you had an operation on August 21, 1980, and you apprehended Nestor Flores as you claimed his name was, at 12.00 noon? A No sir, the question of the fiscal at the time was wrong. The truth is that as I will now affirm is 9:30 p.m. Q But is it not true when I asked you to clarify whether it was 12:00 noon or 9:30 when you made the apprehension, you said it was noontime and you were changing your testimony of June 18? A No sir, that is not correct. The truth is that it is at 9:30 in the evening. If ever there was a mistake before, the truth is that it is 9:30 p.m. xxx xxx xxx Q I am showing you Exhibit A, will you inform the Court whether this is the joint affidavit the three of you executed?

A Yes sir. Q And I will quote to you this paragraph "that on or about 12:10 p.m. August 21, 1980, we arrived in the target area and placed ourselves in strategic positions so that we can arrange signals from our CI-" (counsel reading entire paragraph) you remember having said that in your affidavit? A Yes sir. Q And the time is 12:10 p.m., August 21, 1980? A Yes sir. Q And this is your declaration as the date and time when you apprehended the accused in this case? A That is a clerical error, sir. The truth is it was 9:30 in the evening. Q What is this 12:10 p.m. stated in you affidavit ? A There must be a mistake when the affidavit was typed. Q Why did you not correct that before signing it? A Sometimes we overlook some things sir. Q Is it not true that you swore to the contents of this affidavit before Capt. Gutani?

A Yes, but there were portions I overlooked. Q May we ask that the paragraph be encircled and marked as Exhibit 1. And it was only July 22, 1981, on direct examination by counsel that you sought to change the date and time from your earlier testimony of June 19, 1981 that your apprehension was 9:30 as you are now insisting today and changed it to 12:00 noon when you testified on July 22, 1981, when this particular affidavit was shaown to you? A Did I not say before that that is only a clerical error. It is true that I was the one who apprehended that person and he has long been selling marijuana, and it was at 9:30 p.m.. Q Did you not declare on July 22, 1981 that your apprehension was August 21, at twelve noon? A I did not understand the fiscal's question before, but now I understand it very well and I'm trying to explain it because my mind is clear. [tsn, p. 6, November 27, 1981]. The trial court attached little importance to this discrepancy in the testimony of Sgt. Nieves. According to the court, the mistake was due to the numerous CANU operations Nieves had participated in. [Rollo, p. 44.] This is untenable. It is precisely because of these numerous operations that the witness must be sure that what he is testifying to is the same incident and not any

other. Furthermore, he had no reason at all to mistake that arrest for some other apprehension as he in fact was allowed by the Court to refer to certain notes to refresh his memory while testifying [tsn, p. 5, June 19,1981.] As a lingering doubt remains as to whether Nieves was testifying to the same incident, or whether it was some other, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Due to the harshness of the penalty imposed by law and specially where a person's liberty for the rest of his life is at stake, the time of the incident becomes material to prove to a moral certainty, that when arrested, the person charged was indeed committing a crime. Thus, the contradictory testimony of Sgt. Nieves, on the vital matter of the time the apprehension took place casts a grave doubt, nay, destroys his credibility. If, as Sgt. Nieves insists, he arrested FLORES at night, in the act of selling marijuana, his testimony is discredited by other evidence tending to show that FLORES was arrested at noontime. After the arrest, the CANU officers executed a statement (Exh. "A") indicating the time of the arrest as 12:10 p.m. Sgt. Tamondong, one of the arresting officers, also testified that the arrest took place at 12:10 p.m. (tsn, p. 5, February 26, 1982) and that he investigated FLORES that same afternoon. FLORES himself admitted that he was arrested while buying viand for his lunch from Benita Cleofas's store, and the latter confirmed this fact. In the light of this contradictory evidence, the detailed account by Sgt. Nieves of the nighttime arrest cannot be taken as basis to establish that at noontime, on 21 August 1980, FLORES was arrested in flagrante. The record further reveals certain traces of prevarication which cast serious doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Nieves. He testified that during the "test buy" operation, the day prior to the arrest, he was with both CIC Fider and Sgt. Tamondong and that the latter was waiting inside the car while they waited for the informer [tsn, p. 1,19 July 1981.] Sgt. Tamondong however testified that he was not with Nieves and Fider during that day. Secondly, Sgt. Nieves stated that the accused had long been selling marijuana. On cross-examination however, he admitted that he came to know the accused only after apprehending him. Furthermore, Nieves testified that the two five peso bills he gave to the buyer-poseur were marked, and that these same bills were the ones taken from

FLORES. The evidence on record however shows that only one bill was marked (Exh. "B") and that the other bill had no markings at all. While Courts generally give credence to testimonies of police officers, as it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed [Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), Rules of Court] this presumption cannot by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. The testimony of Sgt. Nieves being highly suspect, the prosecution is left with no evidence to establish that when apprehended at 12:10 p.m., FLORES was indeed selling marijuana, the act which is the essence of the offense sought to be punished. This fact could have been established by other evidence. But not even the testimony of Annalisa Santos, the alleged buyer-poseur was presented. Even as this Court is aware of the principle that it is the prosecution's prerogative to weigh and determine the evidence to be presented, we consider the non-presentation of Santos as witness to be fatal to the prosecution's case. Being the only alleged eyewitness other than Nieves, Santos could have corrected the material inconsistencies in the latter's testimony and, more importantly, could have positively testified on the fact necessary for conviction: that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana to her when apprehended. As has been oft repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction [People v. Ramos, G.R No. 76744, June 28, 1988, citing People v. Bania G.R No. L-46524, January 31, 1985, 134 SCRA 347]. In a fairly recent case, the Court had occasion to pass upon the competing interests of waging a determined campaign against drug addiction and respecting constitutionally protected rights of the accused, thus: The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions and the Bill of Rights for the protection of

the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble paint." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself [People v. Aminnudin G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988]. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and judgment is entered ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the offense charged. SO ORDERED. LIWANAG AGUIRRE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), respondents.

CORTES, J: Petitioner Liwanag Aguirre seeks a review of a Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty of the crime of direct bribery which is punishable under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information filed against him reads: THAT on or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an Acting Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and obtain from

one Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of the business firm Guardsman Security Agency, the sum of FIFTY (P50.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as a consideration for the said accused refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately implementing a Writ of Execution of a final judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Branch XI against said security agency in NLRC Case No. 905-MCXI-78 that the accused, in the performance of his office as such Deputy Sheriff, should have immediately implemented the said writ of execution by then and there immediately seizing personal property of the judgment-debtor Guardsman Security Agency, to satisfy the judgment. (Rollo, pp. 3334) After petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the charge, the case proceeded to trial. Thereafter, on the basis of the aforequoted Information and the evidence adduced during the trial the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as principal of the crime charged. The lower court appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance, in favor of the petitioner and sentenced him to: . . .Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of Arresto mayor; with the accessories provided by law: to suffer special temporary disqualification for Six (6) Years and One (1) Day; to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465; to indemnify Hermogenes Hanginon in the same amount of Fifty Pesos (P50.00); and, to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 50) Petitioner in this case assails the judgment of conviction upon the ground that the evidence presented failed to prove his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The main thrust of the Petition is that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the uncorroborated testimony of the lone prosecution witness. In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well as its

conclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before the Court being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable weight, since said court is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial [People v. Refuerzo, 82 Phil. 576 (1949); People v. Gumahin 128 Phil. 728 (1967), 21 SCRA 729; People v. Mercado, L-39511, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 2321]. However, this court may choose to pass upon the credibility of a witness if it appears from the decision under review that the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case [People v. Alban, L-15203, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 931; People v. Espejo, L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400, People v. Garcia, L-44364, April 27, 1979; People vs. Mercado, supra People v. Dagangon, G.R. No. 62654-58, November 13,1986,145 SCRA 464]. In the instant case, the conviction is anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of a single prosecution witness. The Sandiganbayan justifies its reliance upon said testimony, thus: . . . (E)ven as witness Hanginon's version stands sans corroboration, the same is sufficiently impeccable and carries the ring of truth. He could not have been mistaken as to the time and circumstances of the visit of the accused to the office of the Agency and nothing in his demeanor and reactions during his sojourn on the witness stand tends to suggest that the story he threshed exit in open Court was a fabrication . . . The forthright and spontaneous manner with which the version of the prosecution witness, as advanced by Hanginon, was diclosed and recorded speaks well of the veracity thereof. More importantly, no sufficient and compelling motive had been pointed to which could have impelled witness Hanginon to deliberately perjure himself and consciously impute the commission of a nefarious offense to an innocent man and thus railroad him to a stretch in jail . . . (Rollo, pp. 40-41). The constitutional presumption of innocence imposes upon this Court the duty to ascertain in every case that no person is made to answer for a crime without proof of his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt [Constitution, Article III, Sec. 14 (2)]. To overcome this constitutional presumption and to justify a criminal conviction, there must exist in the record, "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" [Rule 133, Sec. 2; Rule 131, Sec. 2]. That the prosecution evidence consists of the testimony of a single witness does not necessarily indicate insufficiency of evidence to convict. It is settled that the testimony of only one witness may be sufficient to support a conviction if it convinces the court beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged [U.S. v. Dacotan 1 Phil. 669 (1903); U.S. v. Olais, 36 Phil. 828 (1917); People v. Argana 119 Phil. 573 (1964), 10 SCRA 311; People v. Salazar, G.R. No. L-32858, Aug. 19, 1974, 58 SCRA 467; People v. Tan, Jr., G.R. No. 53834, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 614]. However, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness in this case that do not inspire belief. It appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from him, a mere employee of the security agency, without authority to accept any writ or legal paper and without money. It is also doubtful if said employee could have voluntarily parted with his personal funds without any expectation of refund. Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in this situation where it could have been quite easy to catch the petitioner red-handed with the bribe money. As testified to by Hanginon, petitioner allegedly told him that the balance of the P200 Pesos bribe money was to be delivered at the Davao Famous Restaurant upon the arrival of the owner of the agency (Rollo, pp. 206-207). If, according to this witness the owner had decided to press charges and had gone to his legal counsel the day after his (the owner's) arrival (Rollo, p. 207), why was the police not called in to entrap the petitioner at the place indicated by him? That would have been a more logical and usual procedure in preparing for the prosecution of a bribery case which almost always suffers from a dearth of witnesses. The petitioner, in his defense, asserts that there is serious dispute as to the fact of the commission of the offense; that the uncorroborated testimony of Hermogenes Hanginon fails to prove its commission and the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and that notice of garnishment had been served upon the bank for satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment against the Guardsman Security Agency before the alleged bribery took place After careful examination of the decision under review, the pleadings filed and the evidence relied

on, the nagging doubt remains as to whether the testimony of Hanginon, the sole witness for the prosecution, proves the petitioner's guilt. As aptly observed in People v. Opida, "The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact should be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence." [G. R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986, 142 SCRA 295, 303]. This Court finds that in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction under review must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is REVERSED. Liwanag Aguirre is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED. HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. EMMANUEL GUINTO and FEDERICO VALENCIA, accused-appellants.

CRUZ, J.: As counsel for the prosecution in criminal cases on appeal, the Solicitor General usually supports the decision of the trial court and asks for its affirmance. In the rare case now before us, he instead questions the conviction of the accusedappellants and moves for their acquittal. 1 Emmanuel Guinto and Federico Valencia were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having sold 28.83 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. 2 After trial, they were found guilty by Judge Eutropio Migrio of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 3 The trial court found that on October 7, 1986, a team of the Narcotics Command conducted a "buybust" operation against the two accused-appellants at Hulo, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The team leader was Sgt. Salvador Aladano, who acted as the poseur-buyer and dealt directly with Guinto, to whom he gave the marked money for the marijuana he was pretending to buy. Guinto left to get the narcotic and returned with Valencia. Upon receipt of the marijuana, Aladano gave the prearranged signal and the rest of the team then arrested the two accused-appellants. 4

The above findings were based on the sworn narration of Pat. Benjamin Vitug, whom the trial court found to be "positive, clear and convincing in his testimony" and without any motive for framing the accused-appellants, and the exhibits submitted by the prosecution. Among these were a receipt for the seized marijuana, signed by Valencia; 5 the dried marijuana, fruiting tops themselves; 6 and the chemistry report thereon 7 by Capt. Nelly Cariaga of the PC Crime Laboratory who explained and confirmed her findings when she testified at the trial. Both Guinto and Valencia denied the charge against them and were corroborated by Socorro Valencia, the latter's wife. Guinto claimed that in the evening of October 7, 1986, while he was cooking, Sgt. Aladano and Pat. Vitug entered his yard and arrested him after their companion, Boni Sapatero, pointed to him as a marijuana seller. 8There was no warrant of arrest. He was handcuffed and taken to a waiting vehicle and they then proceeded to look for Valencia, whom the agents also arrested in his house. 9 Valencia said his house was searched without warrant, but the peace officers found nothing. 10 The two were later taken to Camp Crame, where they were investigated without the assistance of counsel and detained. 11 Guinto and Valencia were forced to sign a paper they were not allowed to read, which turned out to be the receipt for the marijuana later offered as Exhibit "A." 12 The trial judge expressed disbelief, pointing out that while Valencia and his wife swore that they had visitors when the Narcom agents entered their house, none of the visitors was presented at the trial for corroboration. He noted that while the wife testified that the officers knocked on their door, the husband disagreed, saying they just "barged in" The couple also differed on the number of Narcom agents composing the team, the husband saying there were five while the wife said there were six of them. 13 These claimed defects were considered substantial enough by the trial court to justify rejection of the evidence for the defense. There seems to be a misconception here. The trial court apparently believed it was for the defense to prove that the accused-appellants were innocent, not for the prosecution to prove that they were guilty. Settled is the rule that innocence is presumed; it is guilt that must be proved. Yet the decision emphasized the supposed shortcomings of the defense (as trivial as they were) while accepting in one brief paragraph the testimony of Pat. Vitug as the correct account of the commission of the crime.

The decision did not observe that the case for the prosecution had its own flaws too, and more serious at that than those it noted in the defense evidence. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office specifies many of these defects in its well-prepared brief for the accused-appellants. The Office of the Solicitor General adds its own criticism of the prosecution evidence and also prays for the reversal of the judgment. It is significant that the principal protagonist from the Narcom team in the buy-bust operation, the agent who posed as the buyer and allegedly dealt directly with Guinto and Valencia, was not presented at all at the trial. This was Sgt. Salvador Aladano, whose silence is not a little intriguing. One may well ask why he did not testify when he was the person on top of the operation, so to speak, and actually negotiated with the accusedappellants. He was the logical witness, but he was never called to the stand. In People v. Rojo, 14 decided only last year, this Court held that the failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer of the marijuana was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused. The rest of the team, including Pat. Vitug, merely watched surreptitiously as the negotiation was going on and had at best only a peripheral view of the transaction. Like the other team members who were waiting to make the arrest, Vitug could only observe covertly, and from a distance, as Aladano transacted with Guinto and Valencia. The poseurbuyer was Aladano, not Vitug. Yet it was Vitug and not Aladano whom the prosecution chose to testify on the details of the alleged sale. No wonder Vitug's testimony was conflicting and confusing if not concocted. As the Solicitor General notes, this witness offered no less than four inconsistent versions of how the crime was committed by the accused-appellants, all of which, analyzed together, reflected on his credibility. In the first version, Vitug said they arrested Guinto after he received the marked money but there was no mention at all of the delivery of the marijuana to him or of the presence of Valencia. 15 In the second version, Vitug had a change of mind and said there was a simultaneous exchange of the money and the marijuana between Aladano and Guinto, but again made no mention of Valencia's participation. 16 In the third version, Vitug, becoming more complicated, said Aladano delivered the money to Guinto, who then left to get the marijuana, after which the team arrested Guinto, who then led them to Valencia. 17 There was still a fourth version, where Vitug contradicted

himself again and said the team arrested the two accused-appellants not separately but together when they all returned to Guinto's house after the supposed sale. 18 In addition to these inconsistencies, the Court notes that Guinto had not known Aladano earlier when they met, apparently for the first time, at the appointed place on October 7, 1987. 19 There was therefore no reason for the two to trust each other, more so since they were negotiating an illegal transaction. Yet, in one of Vitug's four versions of the crime, Aladano willingly gave the marked money to Guinto and then naively allowed him to leave (with the money) to get the marijuana. It would have been more believable if Aladano had waited for the marijuana first before paying for it, as befitted a cautious buyer who had not met the seller until then. Curiously, the marked money was not offered in evidence, and for the quaint reason that it was delivered to some unknown and mysterious person. 20 It is not explained why this was done. Not even the serial numbers of this alleged payment were given at the trial although Vitug claimed he had carefully noted them down before the buy-bust operation. 21 The prosecution did present the supposed receipt for the marijuana allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants, 22 but both Guinto and Valencia claim they were forced to sign the paper without being allowed to read it, and in the absence of counsel. 23 This has not been refuted. The receipt is completely worthless and should not have even been admitted, much less considered by the trial court. In the recent case of People v. Turla 24 Justice Teodoro Padilla wrote thus of a similar matter: The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the Receipt for Custody (Exh. B) is inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel of his choice and without having been first informed of his constitutional right to silence and to counsel. The said Receipt is a declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the came charged, since mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as extrajudicial confessions outlawed by the Constitution.

Coming back to the decision, we find the following perplexing observation: Emmanuel Guinto testified that the Narcom team did not find anything when they searched the house of the accused Federico Valencia. Yet, the defense did not explain where the Narcom team was able to let the 28.83 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, Exhibit E. This is nothing if not amazing. The trial court was actually asking the defense where the narcotics agents got the marijuana if it was not from Valencia's house. By some strange process of reasoning, the judge was saying that because of their denials, the accused-appellants were now under obligation to explain where else the narcotics team might have gotten the marijuana. This is really incredible. Even this Court is nonplused. Illogically, the trial court was in effect asking the accused-appellants: "Where did the agents get the marijuana if it was not from Valencia's house?" The only logical and common sense answer to such a queer question would be: "How should we know?" The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has repeatedly declared that even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker, for the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence. In People v. Tempongko 25 this Court, applying the above principles, declared: The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this appeal. The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant.

The appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty. So too must it be in the case before us. The accused-appellants have been condemned for life by an improvident sentence based on uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt and not their innocence that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their guilt that should have been pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the Constitution is to be observed and justice is to be served: Guinto and Valencia must be released at once. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and the accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. It is directed that the accusedappellants must be released IMMEDIATELY. No costs. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY SOLIS, accused-appellant.y1 December 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City Branch 43, presided over by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo, found accused Rey Solis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Since the sentence pronounced on him was the capital penalty of death, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The accused was earlier charged by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor with murder in an information that read: That on or about October 12, 1994 at public Market, at Poblacion, municipality of Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife with intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously embrace and stab EDUARDO ULIGAN y CAOILE inflicting upon him mortal wound

which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659. Dagupan City, November 22, 1994. With the assistance of Attorney Aurora E. Valle of the Public Attorney's Office ("PAO"), the accused entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned. The pre-trial conference was waived; forthwith, trial on the case ensued. The prosecution submitted its case with a presentation of an eyewitness account of the incident, the medical findings on the victim by the attending physician, the autopsy report of the examining doctor and the findings of police officers who conducted an investigation of the crime and later apprehended the accused. Flora Cera, an eyewitness, testified that on 12 October 1994 at around six o'clock in the afternoon, just after alighting from a tricycle at the Public Market of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, she saw Eduardo Uligan buying something from an ambulant vendor. Moments later, she beheld, from a distance of only around one and a half meters, accused-appellant Ray Solis come from behind Eduardo Uligan, then make a strangle hold on the latter and with his free right hand stab the victim with a "29" balisong (also commonly known as a "Batangas knife"). 2Accused-appellant hurriedly left the scene and lost himself inside the public market. The victim was still able to walk some distance away until somebody came to his succor. The victim was rushed to Dagupan City and brought to the emergency room of Medical City Dagupan, Inc., where he was promptly attended to by Dr. Eugenio De Leon. It was too late, however, for Eduardo Uligan. He expired soon after arriving at the hospital and before any medical treatment could be administered to him. Dr. De Leon testified that the wound sustained by the victim was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp and pointed instrument like a Batangas knife. 3 Dra. Ophelia T. Rivera conducted an autopsy on the cadaver. She found the victim to have sustained a single lacerated wound at the left chest that fractured ribs, penetrated the lungs and caused a partial perforation of the heart. 4 The wound must have been caused by either a sharp single or double-bladed weapon. The injury sustained was fatal and death was inevitable. Dra. Rivera concurred with Dr. De Leon in concluding
1

that it was possible for the assailant to have been in front or on the left side of or behind, the victim when the fatal blow was delivered. SPO4 Antonio Zabala testified that after receiving the report on the stabbing incident, he promptly proceeded to the Medical City Dagupan, Inc., to conduct an investigation. He attempted to interview the victim but he was unable to get any response from the dying man. He took, instead, the sworn statements of Flora Cera, Warlito Junio, Jr., and Delia Uligan. SPO4 Salvador Samson, an intelligence officer of the Mangaldan Police, declared that on 22 October 1994 he was on duty at the police station when he received a report that accused-appellant was in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. SPO4 Samson, together with a fellow officer, Mario Espiritu, proceeded to Gapan, Nueva Ecija, where accused-appellant was apprehended and brought to the Mangaldan Police Station. The police officers were later able to recover the weapon used in the stabbing incident buried under one of the stalls in the public market of Mangaldan. The victim's widow, Delia Uligan, testified that the family spent P68,000.00 by way of actual expenses 5 occasioned by the death of the victim. The defense presented its lone witness, accusedappellant Rey Solis, to negate the charge of murder against him. He admitted having killed the victim but he interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In his testimony, accused-appellant, a vegetable vendor, denied having personally known the victim. According to him, at about six o'clock in the afternoon of 12 October 1994, he was at the Mangaldan Public Market when he "accidentally bumped" the victim causing the latter to fall or the pavement. Still showing strong resentment despite accused-appellant's apology, the victim slapped accused-appellant on the face and then pulled out a knife. The two grappled for possession of the knife until accused-appellant was able to wrest it away from the victim and, holding the latter by the neck, stabbed him on the chest. After the incident, he left the crime scene and proceeded to Rosario, La Union, by tricycle. Two days later, he went to the house of one Leopoldo Visperas in Sta. Maria, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, to seek the latter's assistance on his intention to surrender to the authorities. He was brought to a certain Col. Lomibao in San Fernando, La Union. The trial court found for the prosecution; it concluded:

WHEREFORE, the COURT finds accused Rey Solis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of MURDER qualified by treachery defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7859 and pursuant to law, the Court sentences him the capital penalty of DEATH and to pay Delia Q. Uligan the following to wit: 1. P68,000.00 as actual damages; 2. P50,000.00 as indemnify; 3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 4. And costs. The fan knife "balisong" (Exh. I) of the accused is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. SO ORDERED.
6

In his appeal to this Court, accused-appellant sought to ascribe to the trial court the following "errors;" viz: 1. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery (Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659). 2. The Court a quo gravely erred in sentencing the accused-appellant to death and in not taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 7 Accused-appellant, invoking self-defense, has admitted responsibility for the killing of the victim. In cases, such as here, where an accused owns up to the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an extenuating circumstance and that he has incurred no liability therefor. 8 This time, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the case submitted by the prosecution. 9 The justifying circumstance of self-defense may exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, viz: That (1) there has

been an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending himself has not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression. 10 Unlawful aggression by the victim presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, and there must exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense. 11 Along with it, there must be a reasonable necessity both in the action taken, as well as in the means used, to ward off the attack. The Court has carefully examined the records and, unfortunately for accused-appellant, his plea of self-defense must fail. The debilitating factor, more than anything else, against the self-defense theory was the testimony of Flora Cera, a 38-year old housewife, who positively identified accused-appellant and narrated in detail the incident she had witnessed. Flora Cera testified: PROS. MARATA: Q Do you know personally Rey Solis Madam Witness? A Yes, sir. Q If he is inside the courtroom would you be in the position to identify him? A Yes, sir. Q Will you please stand up and point to accused Rey Solis? A Witness pointed to a person seated inside the courtroom and when asked his name he answered Rey Solis. Q Do you likewise know Eduardo Uligan? A No, sir but I have seen him during the incident.

Q Where is Eduardo Uligan now? A He is already dead, sir. Q On October 12, 1994 at 6:00 p.m. where were you Madam Witness? A I was in the market at that time, sir. Q What market are you referring to? A Mangaldan Public Market, sir. Q While you were at the Public market of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, did you see Eduardo Uligan? A Yes, sir. Q Where did you see him? A He was buying ingredients, sir. Q Where was he buying ingredients? A Outside of the public market, sir. Q Do you know the stall where he was buying ingredients? A It is not a stall but he is just buying from an ambulant vendor, sir. Q While he was buying ingredients from an ambulant vendor, do you know what happened? A When I alighted from a tricycle and while Eduardo Uligan

was buying the items I saw that he was stabbed by him, sir. Q Whom are you referring to who stabbed Eduardo Uligan while he was buying ingredients? A The person who was wearing green tshirt. Witness pointed to Rey Solis. Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court what was the position of Eduardo Uligan before he was stabbed by Rey Solis? A He was standing, sir. Q What was he doing before he was stabbed by Rey Solis? A He was buying the items, sir. Q And where did Rey Solis come from when he stabbed Eduardo Uligan? A He came from behind, sir. Q And when Rey Solis got near Eduardo Uligan coming from behind, what did Rey Solis do if any? A He did it like this. Witness demonstrating how Rey Solis attacked Eduardo Uligan by strangling him on his neck and his right hand stabbing the victim. Q Where was Rey Solis when he

strangled the neck of Eduardo Uligan? A He was behind Eduardo Uligan, sir. Q What did Ray Solis use in stabbing Eduardo Uligan? A 29, sir. COURT: Q You are referring to a knife or locally known as "balisong"? A Yes, sir. COURT: Proceed. PROS. MARATA: Q And how long is the balisong which was used by Rey Solis in stabbing Eduardo Uligan? A WITNESS is showing the length of the balisong estimated by counsel to be 6 inches. Q What you demonstrated is 6 inches, are you referring to the length of the blade of the balisong or the entire length of the balisong? A The handle is already included, sir. Q What part of the body of Eduardo Uligan was hit when he was stabbed by Rey Solis? A Witness is pointing to his left chest.

Q And how many times if you know did Rey Solis stab Eduardo Uligan? A Only one, sir. Q After Rey Solis stabbed Eduardo Uligan, what did Rey Solis do next if you know? A No more, he already left by going inside the public market, sir. Q And how about Eduardo Uligan, what did he do after he was stabbed by Rey Soils? A He was asking help from the persons who are having drinking spree but he was not helped and so he went on walking until somebody helped him proceeding outside the market, sir. Q How about you when you saw Eduardo Uligan asking help from persons nearby, what did you do if you did any? A I already run away but I am watching, sir. COURT: Q When accused stabbed Eduardo Uligan, how far were you from them? A Witness showing a distance estimated by counsel to be 11/2 meters. Q It was already 6:00 p.m., is it not that it

is quite dark at that time? A It is not yet too dark, sir. Q What do you mean when it was not yet too dark? A There is still daylight at that time, sir. 12 Where there is no evidence to indicate that the witness against the accused has been actuated by any improper motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony given is ordinarily accorded full faith and credit 13 for it is inconceivable for such a witness to openly concoct a story that would send an innocent man to jail 14 or, let alone, to the gallows. From all that can be gathered, Flora Cera is a disinterested eyewitness to the stabbing incident against whom no malice or sinister motive has been imputed. Surprisingly, accused-appellant himself testified that he already had overpowered the victim by the time the fatal thrust was delivered. Also noteworthy was that accused-appellant went into hiding in La Union immediately after the incident. The flight of an accused, when unexplained, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be drawn. 15 It would appear that appellant did not bother to tell his version of the incident, but remained silent, even when brought to the Mangaldan Police Station. A truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence over a crime imputed against him. Again, the Court might stress the rule that when the real issue is a clash of credibility in the testimony of witnesses, an appellate court would ordinarily defer to, even rely on, the assessment and judgment made by the trial court which concededly has better vantage points than the former in the determination of that issue. The Court, nevertheless, finds the crime committed by appellant to be one of homicide rather than of murder. In order to qualify a killing to murder, the circumstance invoked therefor by the prosecution must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from mere inference. 16 Here, the Court believes that the trial court has erred in appreciating treachery to have qualified the killing to murder. During crossexamination, witness Flora Cera has declared that

she did not see anything prior to the stabbing incident; thus: ATTY. VALLE: Q Madam Witness, when you alighted from that tricycle was your attention directed to Eduardo Uligan at once? A Right after I alighted from the tricycle I saw at once Rey Solis stabbed the victim, sir. Q You only saw that incident, that stabbing incident and nothing more? A No more, sir. Q You do not know what happened prior to that stabbing incident but it was only the stabbing? A I did not see any prior incident, sir. Q Madam Witness, right after you saw Rey Solis stabbed Eduardo Uligan you said you just went away, did I get you right? A Yes, sir. COURT: Q Why did you run? A Yes because I was frightened of what I witnessed, sir. 17 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an assailant without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression has commenced or how the story resulting in

the death of the victim has unfolded, treachery cannot be reasonably appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. 18 Neither can abuse of superior strength against accused-appellant be used to qualify the crime to murder, the same not having been so alleged in the information, 19 nor appreciable even as a generic aggravating circumstance for, whether as a qualifying circumstance or as an aggravating circumstance, abuse of superior strength requires, at base, a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof. While abuse of superior strength may be considered when there is an inequality of comparative force between the victim and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless, be a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of by the latter in the commission of the crime. 20 Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender was not sufficiently substantiated. The evidence would indicate, in fact, that appellant was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued against him. On this score, SPO4 Antonio Zabala and SPO4 Salvador Samson testified: Testimony of SPO4 Antonio Zabala: COURT: Q Do you know when was Rey Solis arrested? A October 22, 1994, sir. Q How was he arrested, was he arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan? A He has a standing warrant of arrest, he was arrested in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, sir. Q So, he was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Maramba of the Municipal Trial Court

of Mangaldan, Pangasinan? A Yes, sir.

He would be incompetent, Your Honor. COURT:

ATTY. VALLE: Answer. Q When was he arrested in Gapan, Nueva Ecija? A According to the apprehending officer, he was arrested by a certain barangay captain, sir. Q Who arrested him in Gapan, Nueva Ecija? A Brgy. Captain, Alfredo Ocampo, sir. Q When was the time Rey Solis was taken into their custody? PROS. MARATA: Already answered, he said October 22, 1994. COURT: Q After the arrest of Rey Soils sometime October 22, 1994 he was committed to your detention cell? A Yes, sir. COURT: Proceed. ATTY. VALLE: Q Was he arrested in Gapan or was he surrendered by a certain barangay captain Ocampo? PROS. MARATA: WITNESS: He was arrested in Gapan Nueva Ecija and the arresting Brgy. Captain surrendered him to our office, sir. 21 Testimony of SPO4 Salvador Samson: Q Were you able to arrive at Gapan Nueva Ecija on the same date? A Yes, sir. Q When you arrived at Gapan, Nueva Ecija what happened there? A The accused was turned over to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo, sir. Q Who turned over to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo the person of the suspect? A I could not remember, sir. Q In what particular place in Gapan Nueva Ecija the accused was surrendered? A I could not also remember, sir. Q Do you know the person who turned over the person of the accused to Brgy.

Captain Wilfredo Ocampo? ATTY. FRANCISCO: Already answered. COURT: Sustained. Q You are mentioning of Gapan Nueva Ecija, why is it that you cannot mention the place where the accused was turned over to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo? A Because when we went there, they immediately turned over the person of the accused, sir. Q Who is that person, is he a civilian or a military? A Civilian, sir. Q Do you know the Poblacion of Gapan, Nueva Ecija? A I am aware of the Poblacion of Gapan Nueva Ecija but I am not aware of that particular barangay, sir. Q That place where the person of accused was turned over by a certain civilian to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo, how far is that barangay to Poblacion? A Quite far to the Poblacion, sir. COURT:

Proceed. PROS. MARATA: Q Being the police officer who went with Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo in Gapan Nueva Ecija did you ask the person who turned over the accused to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo under what authority he was in custody of the accused? A I and my companion Mario Espiritu only went there and it was only Mr. Wilfredo Ocampo who talked with him, sir. COURT: Q The truth of the matter is that the accused did not surrender to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo, to you as well as your companion but he was turned over by a civilian to Brgy. Captain Wilfredo Ocampo? A Yes, sir.
22

Given the above testimony, the least accusedappellant could have done was to present Brgy. Captain Ocampo to attest to the fact of surrender, if truly he did. The failure to present a witness in a position to establish a party's thesis could give rise to the implication that his testimony, if produced, would be adverse. Relative to the claim for damages by the victim's widow, only the following expenses duly substantiated can be awarded by way of actual damages: 1. tomb P 2,500.00 2. funeral mass. 600.00

3. materials and labor of tomb 3,300.00 P 6,400.00 In order to justify a grant of actual damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on good evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss. 23 The award by the trial court of moral damages is appropriate pursuant to Article 2219, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. Now to the penalty. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that can aptly be appreciated, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, the range of which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty that can be imposed could be anywhere within the range of prision mayor, the next lower degree than reclusion temporal, of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Rey Solis for the killing of Eduardo Uligan is MODIFIED. Accusedappellant Rey Solis is hereby found guilty of homicide, instead of murder, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is, accordingly, sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment term of from Nine (9) years and Four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to Sixteen (16) years, Five (5) months and Nine (9) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. He shall, pursuant to current jurisprudence, pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity for the killing, Six Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P6,40000) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. The forfeiture ordered by the trial court of the fan knife used in the killing is sustained. Cost against appellant. SO ORDERED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. GORGONIO CAPILITAN, accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiffappellee. Francisco M. Villamor, for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.: On the one hand is the constitutional presumption of innocence to which every person accused of a criminal offense, including the appellant in this case, is entitled. On the other hand is the positive Identification by the complaining witness of the appellant as the man who raped her, together with the medical evidence of her violation. The trial court opted in favor of the latter consideration and convicted the accused, sentencing him to life imprisonment. 1 The appellant now asks us to reverse his conviction, contending that it is not supported by the evidence of record. The offense allegedly occurred on June 30, 1981, at about ten o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Laray, Javier, in the province of Leyte. The complaining witness is Emma Segales, at that time fourteen years old and living with her aunt Grace Navarete and her husband Rogelio. Emma was then with the couple's two children, who were asleep. Grace had left the day before for Tacloban City and Rogelio was drinking with a neighbor in the latter's house. According to Emma, appellant Gorgonio Capilitan entered their room and turned off the fluorescent lights. Then she felt his weight on her and a knife at her throat with which Gorgonio threatened her. He pulled off her panty and his own shorts and then forcibly mounted her. She felt pain and blood in her vagina as he penetrated her. She could not resist or cry out because of the weapon he was holding. After ejaculating, Gorgonio touched her breast and kissed her. Then he crawled away even as she reached for her flashlight and beamed it on him. 2 As soon as he had escaped, Emma says she sounded an alarm and shouted for help, saying she had been raped by Gorgonio. There were four persons who awakened at her call whom she identified by name at the trial. Rogelio Navarete arrived about midnight, but she did not report the rape to him because he was drunk. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the following day, she went to the police. 3 Grace arrived after an hour or so and upon being informed of the rape took her niece to the Leyte Provincial Hospital. Emma had earlier been examined by Dr. Lydia Perez of the Abuyog General Hospital, where she was taken by

her uncle Rogelio. Explaining her medical certificate, 4 Dr. Perez later testified that she found semen and blood in Emma's vagina. The presence of semen led her to conclude that the girl was no longer a virgin although there was no laceration but only a distension of her hymen. 5 Grace Navarete testified that it was she who accompanied Emma when she filed her formal complaint with the police. Her testimony about the details of the rape as related to her by Emma was validly objected to as hearsay and should not have been allowed at all by the trial court. 6 For his defense, Gorgonio invoked alibi and sore eyes. He testified that at the time of the alleged rape, he was in his house with his family and never went out that night because his eyes were swollen. 7 One of his witnesses, Iluminado Sabalsa, was presented for corroboration. This witness declared that he visited the appellant at about nine o'clock of that night and advised Gorgonio to apply his own urine on his eyes to cure them. 8 Sgt. Ignacio Rellen also testified that Gorgonio had swollen eyes when he was arrested on July 1, 1981. 9 The defense seems to be suggesting that because he had sore eyes Gorgonio could not have committed the rape imputed to him. That is a non sequitur. Sabalsa's testimony does not help at all because he said he visited Gorgonio at nine o'clock in the evening of June 30, 1981, one hour before the rape was committed. The distance between Gorgonio's house and the house where Emma was allegedly raped was only about two to three hundred meters 10 and could have been easily negotiated in less than that time. Yet, for all the feebleness of this defense, the Court is not persuaded that it should affirm the appellant's conviction. The reason is that he can rely on the constitutional rule that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. We have repeatedly stressed that in this jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt 11 and that this has still to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That strict standard is not deemed satisfied simply because the accused has submitted an implausible defense. It is true that in rape cases the court usually has to rely on the testimony alone of the complaining witness; indeed, corroboration by supposed eyewitnesses might even make the charge less believable. Furthermore, it is presumed that a woman would not, unless she was really telling the truth, voluntarily visit the stigma of rape upon her and thereby ostracize herself from a society that considers chastity a prized possession and a precondition for a lasting marriage.

Still, for all this, it should not follow that a mere charge of rape should automatically result in the conviction of the accused. The accusation must be supported with convincing evidence that will definitely prove the alleged rapist's guilt. The Court has studied the briefs for the appellant and the appellee and find both of them to be inadequate. It seems to us that the counsel for both parties were merely making the motions, so to speak, instead of arguing vigorously for their respective clients. We have therefore seen fit to consult the record of the trial to ascertain what exactly happened in this case, focusing especially on the testimony of the complaining witness. We realized that at the time of her testimony, Emma Segales was only fifteen years old and had never before appeared in a court proceeding. This might explain certain minor inaccuracies that we may dismiss outright as not impairing the essential credibility of her narration. At the same time, however, we must bear in mind that she was testifying on a traumatic and unusual experience that she is not likely to forget easily. Hence, we must also be on guard against those inconsistencies that may reasonably suggest that the narration is fabricated or untrue. What are some of these contradictions? At one point in her testimony, Emma said she was sleepy when Gorgonio entered the house and turned off the lights. 12 In another part of the transcript, we find her saying she was asleep at the time the appellant came into the house and it was only when he was already on top of her that she awakened. 13 Elsewhere in her narration, she said that she saw Gorgonio peep into the room and that he was apparently looking for her. 14 Yet when he turned off the lights, she did not reach for the flashlights which she said she had beside her and made no move whatsoever until he raped her. 15 She also testified that she was lying under the bed when Gorgonio approached and ravished her, 16 but given the standard height of a bed, one can only wonder how the rape could have been committed underneath in such a cramped space. Emma also said he pointed a knife at her throat and could even describe the weapon by name (pisao) and length (about 8 inches) 17 although it was pitch dark under the bed, with the lights turned off. According to her, she suffered profuse bleeding as a result of the rape and her panty was also bloodied, 18 (although she said this had been removed earlier). 19 Yet, after the rape, she wore her panty again, blood and all. 20 Incidentally, that panty was never presented in evidence to bolster her testimony, and neither for that matter was any of the four persons to whom she allegedly reported

the rape after Gorgonio's escape. Finally, the Court is also intrigued by Emma's statement on crossexamination that she had a "premonition that somebody would come up" 21 and that "I was feeling afraid and I was then thinking what would happen, but I did not expect I would be raped."22 This appears to be a fertile imagination at work that could reflect on the rest of her testimony. In People v. Quintal, Justice Guerrero:
23

In Villapana, the Court declared: Additionally, we have to take note that in this case, the judge who heard the evidence for the prosecution is not the same judge who decided the case. It was Judge Serafin Salvador who heard the testimonies of complainant and her witness before Ms retirement. Whereas, it was Judge Romulo Quimbo who decided the case relying solely on the transcripts of stenographic notes in appreciating Macaranas' and her witness' testimonies. Even as this Court has consistently been guided by the precept that findings of trial courts on credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and must not be disturbed as it was the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying, this case should be an exception in view of the fact that the judge who decided the case is NOT the same judge who heard the evidence (see People v. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L-37147, August 22, 1984, 131 SCRA 237.) Thus, the Court should all the more exercise utmost care in evaluating the evidence presented in the instant case so as to render justice not only to the accused, but also to the complainant and the State as well. It is possible that the accused-appellant really raped the complaining witness, but the Court is not persuaded to the point of moral certainty, which is the high standard of proof required for conviction. The defense may be weak, but the prosecution is even weaker; and the rule is that conviction must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. So often has it been said that it is better for one hundred criminals to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted. That is the reason why we require the constitutional presumption of innocence to be offset only by the most persuasive of proofs that will establish the guilt of the accused beyond the whisper of a doubt. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-appellant ACQUITTED, without costs. It is so ordered. Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

this Court declared through

There are three (3) well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape and these are: (1) that an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove it but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. And earlier, we stressed in several cases evidentiary rule that
24

the

... in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with precipitate credulity and when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from suspicion. No less significant is the circumstance that, as in the case of People v. Villapaa 25 the trial was conducted by a judge other than the one who subsequently replaced him and rendered the decision. In the case at bar, it was Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy who presided at the trial and it was Judge Sergio D. Mabunay who ultimately convicted the accused-appellant on the basis of the records before him. Judge Mabunay did not have the opportunity of observing the witnesses on the stand and so could not directly gauge their credibility by their demeanor when they were testifying.

GUTIERREZ. JR., J.: Separate Opinions Upon an information which reads: That on or about this 30th day of October, 1974, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, (petitioner herein) being then the personnel officer of the Fire Department of Olongapo City and entrusted with the preparation, follow up and payments of payrolls, vouchers, and other papers and documents relative to the salary of the personnel and members of the Olongapo City Fire Department, with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause the preparation of an official voucher which is a public document pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the period covering from October 1-31, 1974, for a total of P166.67 and wrote, imitated, forged, falsified the signature and signed for Wilfredo Cadua without the latter's knowledge, permission and consent, and thereafter presented the said voucher for payment and received the amount of P166.67 thus making it appear and attributing that the complaining witness Wilfredo Cadua had signed the said voucher and received the amount stated therein when in fact and in truth, as said accused well knew that he forged and falsified the signature of Wilfredo Cadua and once in possession of the said amount (P166.67), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate. misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite repeated demands, the accused refused and continue to refuse to remit the above-mentioned amount, to the damage and prejudice of Wilfredo Cadua in the aforementioned amount, Philippine Currency. However, the abovenamed accused subsequently remitted to the complaining witness, Wilfredo Cadua the amount of

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting I am constrained to dissent from the ponencia as I find no reason to disbelieve the 15-year old complainant. The fact is she was raped and she Identified the rapist as a neighbor she had known for six years and who lived only 80 meters away. No motive has been shown why a young girl like her would falsely incriminate the accused. Her statement that she was raped "under the bed" could have been a result of faulty translation from the vernacular. She disclosed that she and two children, aged 2 years and 1 year old, slept on the floor near the bed. "Under the bed" probably meant not on the bed or on the floor beside the bed. I am inclined to go along with the decision of the judge in the place as local judges usually know about these cases. Narvasa, J., concurring.

Separate Opinions GRIO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting I am constrained to dissent from the ponencia as I find no reason to disbelieve the 15-year old complainant. The fact is she was raped and she Identified the rapist as a neighbor she had known for six years and who lived only 80 meters away. No motive has been shown why a young girl like her would falsely incriminate the accused. Her statement that she was raped "under the bed" could have been a result of faulty translation from the vernacular. She disclosed that she and two children, aged 2 years and 1 year old, slept on the floor near the bed. "Under the bed" probably meant not on the bed or on the floor beside the bed. I am inclined to go along with the decision of the judge in the place as local judges usually know about these cases. BARTOLOME ALONZO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

P100.00, Philippine Currency. (p. 12, Rollo). the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Third Judicial District, Branch XXX, Olongapo City found the petitioner guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law. Costs against accused. (p. 7, Rollo). From this judgment, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with a recommendation for executive clemency with respect to the duration of the penalty, considering that the amount involved is only P166.67. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition was filed on the submission that: (a) The former Court of Appeals decided the case contrary to law, the evidence and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court (Rule 45, Sec. 4a, Rules of Court). (b) Granting but without admitting that the accused Bartolome Alonzo, signed the name of the complainant Wilfredo Cadua in the voucher, the crime committed is simple Estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and not a complex crime under Art. 171 as ruled by the trial court and the respondent Court. (c) The respondent Court (Intermediate Appellate Court) gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial court convicting

the accused, the herein petitioner of the crime charged in the information when the prosecution failed to prove any crime against the accused, the herein petitioner. (p. 11, Rollo) The following constitute the facts of the case from the viewpoint of the accused: The accused Bartolome G. Alonzo, was appointed as Clerk-typist in the Fire Department of Olongapo City, designated as Personnel Officer in charge of Finance. Some of his duties was (sic) to prepare payrolls, vouchers and others which are relevant to his position. Sometime on October, 1974, the accused prepared the voucher for the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the month of October, 1974, who was employed as Firefighter in the Olongapo City Fire Department. After preparing said voucher, the accused placed the same on his table in the outgoing box as a usual practice in his office. It is the duty of the messenger-clerk Rogelio Pangilinan to see to it that all the vouchers prepared by the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo and placed in the outgoing box will be signed by those concerned and to follow it up until the vouchers will be paid. In the afternoon of October 30, 1974, Rogelio Pangilinan informed the accused that he has already converted the voucher into cash and handed to the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo the amount of P166.67 appearing in the voucher of Wilfredo Cadua informing him (Alonzo) that he was in a hurry. Some of his (Alonzo) officemates including the Administrative Officer was (sic) present when Rogelio Pangilinan handed to him the P166.67 and because Wilfredo Cadua was not around at the time, he looked for him in the office and when he saw Cadua, he handed to him the full amount appearing in the voucher in the amount of P166.67. The accused informed Wilfredo Cadua that he is badly in need for money for his Xray and asked a loan of P66.00 from Cadua which the latter consented. No receipt was signed for the loan

since they worked in the office "through trust and confidence." The following morning, Cadua and the accused had a confrontation in the presence of the Fire Chief. The Fire Chief inquired from Alonzo why Cadua received less than what he expected to receive and after the accused explained the circumstances about the loan, the Fire Chief advised the accused to return the amount loaned (t.s.n., pp. 2-12, hearing of December 7, 1977; Decision, Crim. Case No. 2526, p. 35 hereof). A week after or on November 10, 1974, the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo returned the amount of P66.00 which he loaned from Wilfredo Cadua in the presence of their Fire Chief but the accused did not ask Cadua to issue receipt for the return of his loan since it was in the presence of their Fire Chief. (t.s.n., p. 114, Id) Sometime on March 1975, or four months after payment of the loan of P66.00, Wilfredo Cadua filed a criminal complaint against Bartolome G. Alonzo as a consequence of the loan of P66.00 but which was already paid on November 10, 1974. And as a result, an Information for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents was filed against the accused, and the lower court convicted the accused of the crime charged in the information. In short, these were in synthesis, the basic facts of this unfortunate case of the herein accused Bartolome G. Alonzo which were clearly and conclusively established during the brief trial of this criminal case. And this Honorable Court shall have that opportunity now to fathom the noble dignity of our proofs tested in this regard for we are confident that there is no room to hold the memory of "Wrong Judgment" in the hall of this Honorable Court, presided by jurists whose appointments were a real credit to the Philippine judiciary.

(Appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals, pp. 4-8; Rollo, pp. 31-33). On the other hand, the prosecution's version is as follows: Appellant was a clerk-typist in the Olongapo Fire Department. He was designated as its finance officer. Among his duties was the preparation of vouchers and payrolls. Complainant Wilfredo Cadua was employed as a fireman from March 1, 1973 to July 31, 1975 with a monthly salary of P250.00. Sometime in October 1974, appellant prepared a voucher (Exh. A) for the salary of complainant for that month. He gave it to the office messenger, Rogelio Pangilinan, for the signature of those whose approval of the voucher is required. When Pangilinan first received the voucher from appellant, Certification No. 1 bore a signature (Exh. A-6), purportedly that of complainant. Certification No. 2 also was already signed by the Fire Department Chief and was correspondingly initialed by complainant. After taking the voucher to the city treasurer and city auditor for their signatures, Pangilinan returned the voucher to appellant. A few minutes later, appellant called for Pangilinan, gave him back the voucher and told him to get the money at the treasurer's office. This time, a signature (Exh. A-8) purportedly that of complainant appeared on the receipt of payment portion of the voucher. On October 30, 1974, Pangilinan presented the voucher to the treasurer's office. The paymaster, Aida Clark-Pineda, upon noting the signatures of the auditor and the complainant, gave the proceeds of P166.67 to Pangilinan, whom she knew to be a messenger in the fire department. Pangilinan signed the voucher as a witness. Pangilinan returned to the fire department and gave the amount to appellant. At about 4:45 p.m., that same day, appellant gave complainant only P100.00. Complainant inquired

about his voucher and appellant showed him a voucher which amounted only to P100.00. Wondering how appellant was able to cash his voucher without his signing it, complainant immediately went to the treasurer's office. He discovered that his signature had been forged on the voucher and that the amount he was entitled to receive was P166.67, not P100.00. He then realized that the voucher shown him by appellant was different. Complainant then demanded the return of the balance. Since appellant refused, complainant reported the matter to the fire department chief who formed a factfinding committee to look into the case. However, the committee failed to render any report. Appellant paid back the amount he withheld from complainant three weeks later. He had used the money to pay for his xray. On August 4, 1975, complainant submitted an Affidavit (Exh. D) as basis for his charge of estafa through falfisication of a public document against appellant. After preliminary investigation was conducted a prima facie case was established, and so an information was filed on February 20, 1976 charging appellant of the aforementioned offense. (tsn., pp. 428, October 11, 1976; pp. 2-12, November 9, 1977; p. 13, December 7, 1977; pp. 12-13, May 17, 1978). (Emphasis supplied; pp. 26-28, Rollo). The question is whether or not the petitioner misappropriated P66.67 by forging another person's signature on the salary voucher. The information alleges that accused Bartolome G. Alonzo (l) with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause the preparation of an official voucher pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for a total of P166.67; (2) that he wrote, imitated, forged, falsified the signature, and signed for Wilfredo Cadua without the latter's knowledge, permission and consent; (3) that he presented the said voucher for payment and received the amount of P166.67; (4) once in possession of the said amount

(P166.67), that he then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said amount; and (5) that, despite repeated demands, the accused refused and continued to refuse to remit the above-mentioned amount. On the other hand, the prosecution evidence tends to show that (l) the accused was designated as finance officer of the Olongapo City Fire Department and among his duties was the preparation of vouchers and payrolls; (2) on a date not specified in the records, the accused gave their office messenger, Rogelio Pangilinan, a voucher for the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the month of October, 1974 so that the messenger could have it signed by all those having a hand in the approval of vouchers; (3) after the voucher was approved, Pangilinan returned the voucher to the accused who instructed him to encash the voucher; (4) Paymaster Aida Pineda of Olongapo City paid the proceeds of the voucher to Pangilinan who presented the voucher for payment after she required Pangilinan to sign as witness to the payment; (6) Aida Pineda gave Pangilinan the full amount of P166.67; (7) after he received the proceeds of the voucher from the paymaster, Pangilinan gave the entire amount of P166.67 to the accused in the presence of his co-employees in the afternoon of October 30, 1974 (Decision of the trial court, pp. 30-32, appellant's brief). From the above, it can be seen that the petitioner could not possibly be guilty of wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously preparing the complainant's voucher, considering that it was his official duty to do so. He prepared the voucher of Wilfredo Cadua in the amount of P166.67 for the month of October. There was no alteration made in the amount stated in the voucher because the stated amount is the correct salary of the complainant for that period. It was not the petitioner who presented the voucher for payment but their office messenger, Pangilinan. The appellant did not misappropriate the full amount of P166.67 nor did he refuse or continue to refuse to remit the amount. In fact, he handed to Wilfredo Cadua the amount of P100.00 on that same day while, at the same time informing Cadua that he was borrowing the amount of P66.67 for his x-ray expense. On November 10, 1974, the appellant paid the complaining witness the amount of P66.67 upon the advise of the chief of the Olongapo City Fire Department. The evidence adduced by the prosecution is, therefore, entirely different from what the information alleges.

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence showing that Bartolome G. Alonzo himself forged Cadua's signature on the original voucher. Nobody actually saw him affix the alleged signature (See Ranon v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 495; and Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105). Even Rogelio Pangilinan. who was responsible for routing the voucher to all those who had a hand in approving the same could not categorically state that he saw the accused forge complainant's signature. We quote Pangilinan's testimony: Q When he gave this voucher, was Exhibit A-6 already present? A Yes, sir. Q How about Exhibit A-8 (Fiscal referring to the signature of Wilfredo Cadua)? A None yet sir, because this voucher cannot be released if that is already signed. (t.s.n., page 4, hearing of Nov. 9, 1977). Q When he gave it back to you, was the receipt portion already signed, referring to Exhibit AB, was this already signed? A Yes, sir. Q Do you know who signed this particular portion? A No, sir. (t.s.n., page 5 Id). Q How about A-8, when it was affixed, were you present? A No, sir. (t.s.n. p. 8, Id). (p. 40, Rollo). More important, from the facts of the case as stated in the People's brief below, the forgery is supposed to be on a voucher showing the amount of P100. 00. I t was this voucher which was

allegedly shown to the complainant. This second voucher had nothing to do with the original voucher used to collect the salary. If there was such a second voucher, it was a non-official voucher used to lull the complainant into believing his salary was only P100.00. However, this story of a supposed forged document does not explain how the complainant could have been hoodwinked because the original voucher for P166.67 carried his correct salary. The fact that the petitioner prepared the voucher, considering it was his official duty to prepare the payroll, vouchers, and other documents assigned to him is not a sufficient reason for the respondent court to conclude that "there is no doubt that the forgery or falsification was effected by the appellant." Unfortunately, the respondent court mistakenly applied the rule that: "one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, is guilty of falsification (See Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 688). The accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence especially where the evidence on the alleged forged voucher is extremely doubtful. As held in the case of People v. Clores, (125 SCRA 67): xxx xxx xxx ... Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence is not only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created that is, his innocence; that conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, "a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it" may the presumption of innocence be overcome. (People v. Inguito, 117 SCRA 641, 649). (at p. 75).

Furthermore, Cadua's intention in filing a complaint against the petitioner was to get even against the chief of their Fire Department. The records disclose that at around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 30, 1974, Wilfredo Cadua approached the Fire Chief and complained that he received less than what appeared in the voucher. He actually never complained why his signature was falsified nor did he complain that the accused falsified his signature. Much less was any mention made about another voucher with only P100.00 entered as the amount. The next morning, Cadua and the accused had a confrontation in the presence of the Fire Chief. After explaining the circumstances of the loan, the Fire Chief advised the accused to return the amount loaned. On November 10, 1974, the accused returned the amount to Cadua in the presence of the Fire Chief. It was only four months after this incident that Wilfredo Cadua filed a complaint against the accused. The reason why he filed the case is clearly manifested in his cross-examination which we quote hereunder: ATTY. DANTE: Q When you filed this case in the Fiscal's Office was the P66.67 already paid? A Yes, sir. Q Why did you still file if you were already paid? A Because I wanted to file a case against him. Q Or you want to file a case because you were dismissed and the accused is related to Chief Magbutay? A Yes. (t.s.n., p. 39, testimony of Wilfredo Cadua, hearing of October 11, 1976). Emphasis supplied. (Appellant's brief, p. 16). With the above admission, it is clear that the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought arising from the non-renewal of the complainant's

appointment by the Fire Chief who is related to the accused. When the accused informed the complainant that he had nothing to do with the non-renewal of the latter's appointment, the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance. It is true that an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as to the liability of the accused (Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620). In this particular case, it corroborates the appellant's explanation about the filing of the criminal charges. Considering all the foregoing, we are constrained to rule that the evidence on record cannot sustain a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED. people vs lopez 74 scra 205 Salvacion Pablo (15yo) seated on a bed alone, sewing her shorts with only her partines and blouse on was approached by the accused Ernesto Lopez. He then sat near her. SHe did not ask him to leave beca she saw nothing unusual. Shortly thereafter he pushed her down, touching her breasts in the process. Then he placed himself on top of her, with one of his hands being pressed against her throat, thus rendering ineffectual her resistance to his efforts to have sexual intercourse.6 The act of coition then took place . According to her, coital action took time. On crossexamination, in what could have been an unguarded moment, there was an admission by her that the urgencies of the flesh on the part of both of them did find release and satisfaction. [People vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205(1976)] She was, from her own account, equally serene, no tears shed, not even a word of recrimination.9 [People vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205(1976)] She got pregnant. Marriage was opposed by the mother of the accused because they were first cousins despite of the willingness on both of them.

ISSUE: WON the guilt of accused was established based on the testimony of the rape victim herself HELD: NO. Presumption of innocence; Necessity of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence. That is a mandate of the fundamental law. It may be noted that ever, when the previous Organic Act did not so provide, a defendant, according to the early case of United States vs. Asiao, decided in 1902, with Justice Torres as ponente, must be presumed to be innocent until [his] guilt is proven by satisfactory testimony and even in case there is a reasonable doubt as to [his] innocence [he is ] entitled to acquittal. Criminal law: Rape; Necessity of allowing compulsion resorted to or coercion, being employed.Where the offense charged is rape through force, there must be a showing of compulsion being resorted to and coercion being employed. The element of voluntariness must be lacking. If there be an indication of willingness, even if half hearted, the complaint must be dismissed. [People vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205(1976)] 1. Salvacion's act runs counter to the usual behavior of a rape victim. --> she did not tell her father immediately the incident nor reported the same to the police authorities. she only did so after 4 months, only when her aunt noticed her being pregnant. 2. Though in rape case, the single testimony of the rape victim is the strongest evidence, it should be corroborated by physical acts: ex. finger grips, contusions on her throat, face, body, arms and thighs as well as thorn in her garments particularly the panties worn by the victim to prove force and violence. In the case at bar, non of such acts were introduced. note: no torn on her panties because she removed it freely -- meaning she did not resist 3. She did not object when he saw him inside her room with just her panties and blouses on. - no sign of apprehension, no covering of the lower part of her body.

4. did not make any outcry for succour. 5. Act was not in hurry - appellant first removed his pants instead of just unbottoning the same WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of October 9, 1975, convicting the accused Ernesto Lopez of the crime of rape is reversed, without prejudice to the appropriate action for support of the child that was the result of the sexual act committed on January 14, 1972. No costs. [People vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205(1976)] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendantsappellants. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiffappellee. Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose. Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendantappellant Basilio Pineda, Jr. Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino. Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.

PER CURIAM: The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows: The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code. That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense. That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances: 1. Use of a motor vehicle. 2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult; 3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and 5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused. Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the

confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation. This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants. The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows. So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her. The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag

Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running. When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind. The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Caal and Jose. The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel. Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and

Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor. The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one. Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room. The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in

forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her. Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their presence. After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others. Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept

asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative. It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do. On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer. During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal

identification of Jose and related the role played by him. At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant. After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino. After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang." Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other

three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him. In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and forearms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself. The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense: Their story is that they and their coaccused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so

that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the redbodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him. Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll

pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them. Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work. Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay,

Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas. The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this point: As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money,

and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure. Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly downpayment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do. Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch,

desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt. Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception! All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault. The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for

Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation? A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor. In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood

alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530). We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs. 1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the

least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis. 2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix. 3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of theres gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a position

to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress. 4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of

the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's wellconsidered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two. The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the termcriminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the

United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. 5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that . I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him for three times and his decision was still the same. Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penaltyconsidering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated

that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra. 6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial." We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter. What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows: ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed. Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a

circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.) In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants. We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death

penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus: The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties. The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of

executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law. Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service. The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf. Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical

effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises. Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez. On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate. Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin

because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case. During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied. On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct. Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the

commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993. Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs. Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JOSAN POBLADOR, defendant-appellant.

Jose Poblador for appellant. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Ramon A. Barcelona for appellee.

as the further sum of P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, must be reversed. The established facts about which there can be no conflict were set forth in the Manifestation of the Solicitor General thus: "On the night of August 29, 1972, defendant [Josan Poblador] and [Jason Mateus] were riding on a jeep driven by the latter on their way to the house of the former's second cousin, Abdon Bedro to [get] fertilizer. However, the jeep went out of order about half a kilometer from their aforesaid destination and finally stalled near the house of the spouses Dominador Baylon and Angelina Baylon at the barrio of Aglosong, Concepcion, Iloilo, where at the time said spouses and their five children were asleep ... . As the jeep could not be started and it was then about 10 o'clock, Poblador and Mateus were constrained to seek shelter and pass the night in the aforestated house, where they were allowed to sleep in a room, the door of which had no shutter ..., Poblador and Mateus left the house at about 5 o'clock the next morning but could not proceed to their destination until 8 o'clock when they were able to start the jeep after pushing it to a distance of around 150 meters with the help of Dominador Baylon and three others, namely, Floro, Trinidad, Junior Balida and Eliseo Obillos ... ." 7 After which the Manifestation discussed the conflicting versions as to what transpired. First came the summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The facts testified to were set forth in a detailed and objective manner. It was narrated that "Poblador and Mateus, both armed with guns, called on the house of the Baylons and on entering it, Poblador asked where the latter's daughter Nenet was because he would marry her: that Angelina Baylon replied that Nenet was in Iloilo City and that in any event he could not marry her as he was already "married" or had a concubine, one Trining Piosca; that on hearing this remark of Angelina, Poblador [was engaged], ordered the spouses Baylons to put out the light in the house and said, "Now that you sent Nenet to Iloilo City, you sleep with me till morning" and, poking a gun on her chest, told her, Angelina, to come inside the room, where Poblador and Mateus were to sleep, which she did out of fear ... ; that once Angelina was inside the room, Poblador, without as much as kissing her or touching her breasts or any part of her body, pushed her to the edge of a bed therein; that he ordered her to take off her shorts and panties, which she also did; that thereafter Poblador ordered her to lie down on the bed, which she likewise complied with; that he then raised her duster, placed himself on top of her and ravished her without any struggle on her part to defend her honor, much less make any outcry for help, not only to her husband but also to the neighbors

FERNANDO, J.: A rather unique feature of this prosecution for rape was the fact that the accused, a young man in his early twenties, was alleged to have assaulted a woman in her middle forties, with eleven children, some of them young girls above the age of puberty, right at a room in her house likewise occupied by another man, with her husband and other members of the family in the immediate vicinity. It may be recalled that it was partly on the basis of disparity in age that in People v. Mirasol, 1 Justice Recto acquitted a youth of twenty-four prosecuted at the instance of a widow of thirty-six, her claim being that there was an attempt to have forcible intercourse with her. That distinguished jurist found it "inexplicable why he had to set his eyes precisely on the complainant and not on [the daughter] who, by reason of her youth and virginity, should excel her mother in point of exciting the lust ... . " 2 Appellant Josan Poblador's fate was different, having been convicted of the crime of rape. He could not quite convince the lower court that he was entitled to acquital, notwithstanding the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, the attendant circumstances moreover militating against his culpability. He could therefore rely on the presumption of innocence. 3 It is understandable why that constitutional mandate would be vigorously stressed in the Brief submitted by his counsel. Thereafter, on April 19 of this month, a Manifestation in lieu of Brief was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza4 on behalf of the People of the Philippines recommending "the reversal of the decision appealed from and the acquittal of the appellant on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio." 5 He was quite emphatic about the matter too: "Much as it is to be desired that the author of the alleged abominable offense, were it committed, be penalized and given the corresponding punishment he deserves, punishing appellant herein, who may be really innocent thereof, will not serve the ends of justice but rather subvert it, which is worse than the crime itself." 6 A careful study of the evidence of record yields the same conclusion. We accept such recommendation. The judgment of conviction, which moreover is tainted with unorthodoxy, appellant being ordered to pay damages for defamation in the amount of P20,000.00, as well

whose houses surrounded the Baylons' house, because of fear as he had a gun ...; that having felt the urge to urinate, she stood up and urinated; that thereafter, she turned to the bed and Poblador again [had intercourse with her]; that she stayed the whole night with [him], save the time when her eight-month old still breast-fed baby cried, and [he] told her to attend to the child ...; that Angelina's husband, who was in the sala near the door of the room which had no shutter, did not do anything during the time his wife was being raped, which he was witnessing, because Mateus was pointing his gun at him ...; that when his wife came out of the room to attend to the child, he asked her if Poblador succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her ...; that although she replied in the affirmative, he did not as much try to avenge the outrage to his wife's honor when Poblador and Mateus finally fell asleep, because of fear that they might be just pretending ...; that Poblador, before leaving the house, warned the spouses Baylons not to report the incident to the authorities, otherwise he would kill all of them; that although Dominador Baylon, did not believe said threat, he did not report on the following day, the nefarious crime to the barrio captain of Aglosong ...; that they reported the incident to Mayor Nerio Salcedo of Concepcion, Iloilo, but he merely advised them to relax as it would not happen again ...; that Angelina Baylon's complaint was not filed with the Court a quo by the Provincial Fiscal until August 26, 1974, or almost two (2) years after, the commission of the offense." 8 Solicitor General Mendoza in his manifestation recommending acquittal stated that the evidence for the defense is substantially "a denial of the charge of rape by defendant Poblador, a 24-year old bachelor, who testified that he could not have embarrassed himself by having sexual intercourse with Angelina Baylon, an old woman of about 45 years of age whom he respected, much less do it in the presence of her husband, Dominador Baylon ...; that he could not have forced her to have coition with him at the point of a gun, because he did not own a gun; that he was taken aback by the instant charge, which he later learned from Angelina herself that did so at the instigation and pressure made to bear on her by the CIS and one Conte Baldoza who suspected him of having been the one who killed the latter's son, so that he, Poblador, could be jailed; that had he desired to have sexual intercourse, he would have gone to Iloilo City for the said purpose: and that Teodorico Piosca, the father of his common-law wife, Ofelia, likewise urged her, Angelina, to prosecute this unfounded charged for spite, because Teodorico was mad at him as he did not approve of his cohabiting with his daughter Ofelia Piosca. ...." 9

It is thus easily understandable why counsel for appellant in the able brief 10 he submitted was quite vehement in his denunciation of the decision rendered by the lower court. It is a fair appraisal that the guilt of his client was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence was thus not overcome. The Solicitor General, after a thorough study of the record, reached the same conclusion. It could not be otherwise. He had to recommend the acquittal of appellant. As mentioned at the outset, we are in agreement. 1. The evidence for the prosecution, to put it at its mildest, leaves much to be desired. There was a failure to live up to the moral certainty as to the guilt of an accused being shown to justify his conviction. As stated in People v. Dramayo: 11 "The proof against him survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment." 12 It would appear that the lower court did not pay due heed to such admonition, which is merely a reiteration of a host of decisions with a similar approach. That is as it should be. To view it differently would result in rendering illusory the constitutional mandate that an accused is presumed innocent. There must be proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failing that, he must be acquitted. "Accusation," to quote from Dramayo anew, "is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies." 13 The lower court, in considering the version of the prosecution, failed to exhibit that requisite measure of objectivity and detachment. It could be that the natural sympathy for a woman claiming to have been the victim of a man's lustful desires and the abhorrence such as an act provokes led him astray. Not so the Solicitor General, who is in his Manifestation took pains to point out the lack of credibility of the version for the prosecution, which he characterized as "fantastic" as well sa the contradictions and inconsistencies that vitiated it. 14 He did not stop there. He went further. He mentioned other circumstances, the fact that the previous relationship between the appellant and the Baylons was characterized by respect and deference on the part of the former; that if it were a case of the former's wanting to satisfy his carnal desire, he could have, as he testified, gone to Iloilo City, and there indulged such proclivity; that if he had committed an outrage on the Baylons, the husband certainly would have refrained from helping appellant push his jeep to make it start; that it was rather strange that the Baylons failed to report such occurrence at the earliest possible opportunity, the complaint being filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo City on August 26, 1974, or almost two years after the perpetration of the alleged offense. 15 The recommendation, considering the above, had to be one acquittal.

2. On a specific level, to refer to our decisions where the offense charged is rape, it is not amiss to recall People v. Delfinado, 16 the opinion being penned by Justice Recto. After a careful examination of previous cases starting from United States v. Flores, 17 promulgated as early as 1906, he stated that it could be laid down as a general rule that a judgment of conviction for the crime of rape cannot be based on the testimony of the offended party unless such testimony is "clear, positive and convincing, or supported by other undisputed facts and strong circumstantial evidence disclosed by the record."18 In support of such a holding, he cited in addition to Flores, United States v. De la Paz; 19 United States v. Magsisi; 20United States v. Tan Teng; 21 and United States v. Ramos. 22 He did affirm that in the above decisions, "the accused were acquitted because the only evidence of their guilt was the uncorroborated, contradictory, and unconvincing testimony of the alleged victims." 23 Then came this citation from the United States v. Ramos: "The mere apparent improbability that the alleged crime could have been committed in the manner and form described by the witnesses for the prosecution does not necessarily justify an acquittal if the evidence submitted by the prosecution is otherwise clear, satisfactory and convincing, unless the degree of improbability is such as to amount to a practical impossibility but in the absence of a clear, satisfactory and convincing testimony in support of the charge, a judgment of conviction will not be sustained in the face of the apparent improbability that the crime could have been committed as charged." 24 There is no need to reiterate that appellant's position is much stronger considering the strain on human credulity posed by the testimony of complainant. What is undoubted is the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence against appellant. In recommending acquittal, the Solicitor General's position has the clear support of authoritative doctrines. Moreover, it is bolstered by decisions of the past three years where the constitution presumption of innocence sufficed to call for acquittal in rape prosecutions. Mention may be made of People v. Alvarez; 25 People v. Barbo; 26 People v. Castro; 27 People v. Reyes;28 People v. Joven; 29 People v. Ilagan; 30 People v. Ramirez; 31 People v. Godoy;32 People v. Lopez; 33 and People v. Omega.34 3. The tenor of this opinion is not to be misinterpreted. It goes no further than to accept the plea of the Solicitor General after a careful study of the record that the accused is entitled to acquittal, his guilt not having been shown beyond reasonable doubt. He is thus entitled to the protection afforded by the constitutional presumption of innocence. The motivation that led the Baylons to testify as they did is immaterial. It

suffices to state that what they said could not be given credence. There are indications that appellant had displeased one or more individuals of influence. That could have led, as he asserted, to the filing of this complaint. The matter, however, need not be pursued. It could be that there are puzzles still unresolved. That may very well be, but for the disposition of this appeal, the inquiry is necessarily limited to the quantum of proof that must exist. That is all that is relevant to the decision reached. WHEREFORE, the decision of January 24, 1976 finding the accused Josan Poblador guilty of the crime of rape is reversed and he is acquitted of such a charge. This decision is immediately executory. Costs de oficio. dumlao vs comelec Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation

would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 [Presumption of innocence makes a law prohibiting all those who are charged of crimes of rebellion and other political crimes from running for public office UNCONSTITUTIONAL.