IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.

REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant. SANCHEZ, J.: Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a member of the Bar deserve disciplinary action. The problem arose because of facts that follow: One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First 1 Instance of Samar, and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. His case came up before this Court on review. On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's counselde oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20day extension (his second). This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a fourth on March 27, also for fifteen days. He moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On April 21, he even sought a special extension of five days. All these motions for extension were granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed. On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.

For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500 payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon further non-compliance with the said resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same period of fifteen days, "more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him." Still, counsel paid no heed. Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney." By express order of this Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution. Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass judgment. 1. By specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed 2 upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his 3 best efforts" in the indigent's behalf. No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death sentence below imposed was upon a plea of guilty. The record of the proceedings leading to the lower court's sentence consists of but 31 pages. Counsel had the record since January 19, 1967. In fact, in his third motion for extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of apellant's brief "is more than half-way through" and that "additional time is needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form and print the said brief." In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated that the preparation of the brief "is almost through" and that "additional time is needed to redraft and

rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text." His motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse that he "suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted his work thereon for sometime." Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and mimeographed.lawphi1.nt In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity. It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party is poor. It has been said that courts should "have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons 4 charged with crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends. Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter of Jose Robles 5 Lahesa. He was counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and the other for homicide. He failed to take any action in behalf of the defendants in both eases. This Court imposed upon him a fine of P200. Significant is the pronouncement we there made that: "This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily result in delays in the prosecution of

criminal cases and the detention of accused persons pending appeal." The validity of the foregoing observation remains to the 6 present day. It applies to the present case. Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966. The effect of this long delay need not be essayed. We, therefore, find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his "knowledge and discretion". 2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted 8 authorities." In People vs. Carillo, this Court's pointed observation was that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's "sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus 9 present for suspension or disbarment. Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring compliance of its orders. To be recalled is that on September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for over a year. To impress upon counsel the gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court's orders, on October 3,1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. He was directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was in that order also required to file his brief in fifteen days. He was warned that more drastic disciplinary action would be taken upon his failure to do either. Still he remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross

misconduct and violation of his oath of office. The Court made it certain that this order would reach him. He personally acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not paid the fine. He has done nothing. This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed. And this, inspite of the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he represented to this Court that all that was needed was to redraft and to rehash some significant portions of the brief which was almost through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text. Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order. Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo 10 Dianala Jo. There, as here, counsel failed to file appellant's brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions of time granted him by this Court. Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause order why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The explanation was considered unsatisfactory. This Court imposed a fine of P50 payable in ten days from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine. Came the subsequent resolution of this Court advising him to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to jam. This warning was not heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Court resolved to give him ten days from notice within which to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice of law. Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour which this Court considered as "consumacy and unwillingness to comply with the lawful orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of office." He was suspended from the practice of law for three months. In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded this Court.

For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record, in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: In a letter-complaint dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests. Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged. Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under
1

undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession. The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 2 (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of suspension to two years. In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating Commissioner opined that: In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the victims family. This was declared by the victims daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her fathers killers. She even admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two accuseds victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients interest. The respondent failed to deny these facts or offer

competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample opportunity given him. Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be sanctioned. We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty. There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in 3 which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their 4 connection. The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyerclient relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be

encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of 5 paramount importance in the administration of justice. To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their confession. The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession. Considering that this is respondents first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case. A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.[2] Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.[3] The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.

The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of selfhagiography. He informs the Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorneys Office with its steady stream of non paying clients in the hundreds or thousands.[5] At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities and reaching the people who need legal advice and assistance.[6] Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help of the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance before.[7] Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case.[8] Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer. Eventually, his desire to help was beyond physical limitations, and he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services.[9] According to Atty. Ortiz, Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report to the Sanggunian office.[10] He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents with only two office personnel.[11]

Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same.[12] The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[13] Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges.[14] Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded that clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients (sic) claim, and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.[15] The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future. The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorneys Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward. Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired.

Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case. CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. ... Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. ... CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ... Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[16] If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being defended.[17] There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the

ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided. That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.[18] Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.[19] Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors,[20] and in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this case.[22] In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services.[23] Still, the severance of the relation of attorneyclient is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24] Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected.[25] Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.

In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Courts attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his office.[26] He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him.[27] The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[28] Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprim and considering that Atty. Ortizs undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint. Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS, JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS, complainants, vs. ATTY. VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL, respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint[1] filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut, Tiburcio B. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesteros against Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio Ballesteros, engaged the services of respondent as counsel in two cadastral cases then pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD RMC No. N-475, Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Pet itioner, v. Faustina Calibo, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant, and Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098, Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Belinda Tagailo-Bariuan, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant; that despite receipt of the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8, 1991, respondent did not inform herein complainants of the same nor file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal to prevent the decision from becoming final; that respondent did not file either a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive for him to do so; and that it took respondent four years from the time complainants father died before he filed a motion to substitute herein complainants in the trial court. The foregoing acts and omissions of respondent are alleged to be in violation of the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Complainants pray that such disciplinary sanctions as may be appropriate be imposed against Atty. Valentin Boncavil. In his answer,[2] respondent alleges that the day before the cadastral court rendered its decision, he met by chance herein complainant Julian Ballesteros, who, after inquiring as to the status of the cadastral cases and learning that the same had already been submitted for resolution, told him You are too busy to attend to our case, it would be better if somebody else would take over, to which, according to respondent, he replied, It is all right with me, it is your privilege; that as a self-respecting legal practitioner, he did not want to continue rendering unwanted legal services to a client who has lost faith in his counsel; that he thus considered himself discharged as counsel in the two cadastral cases and relieved of the obligation either to move for a reconsideration of the decision or to file a notice of appeal and to notify herein complainants of the decision against them; that, contrary to complainants assertion, he did make an offer of evidence, although he reserved the right to submit authenticated copies of the documentary evidence from the Bureau of Lands in Manila; that the delay in the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros with his heirs was because neither the heirs nor the administrator of the intestate estate of Tiburcio Ballesteros informed him of the latters death despite the heirs knowledge that he was the counsel in the two cadastral cases.

On June 8, 1994, complainants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the facts are not in dispute and the respondents answer admits the material allegations of the complaint.[3] On June 13, 1994, IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose required respondent to comment on the foregoing motion within five (5) days from notice.[4] On October 12, 1995, he set the case for hearing on November 17, 1995.[5] On November 17, 1995, however, only complainants Tiburcio Ballesteros, Jr. and Fe Yabut and their counsel appeared. This fact, together with respondents failure to comment on complainants motion submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings, prompted Commissioner Jose to grant complainants motion.[6] On June 21, 1996, Commissioner Jose submitted his report recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-16 approving Commissioner Joses report and recommendation. After due consideration of the records of this case, the Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to be well taken. The facts clearly show that respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. By abandoning complainants cases, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that a lawyer not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. As stated in Santiago v. Fojas:[7]

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Nor can we sustain respondents claim that he did not file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal from the decision in the two cases because he was under the impression from the remark of Julian Ballesteros that complainants no longer wanted to retain his services. As a member of the bar, he ought to know that the only way to be relieved as counsel in a case is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him as counsel. Thus, Rule 138, 26 of the Rules of Court provides: An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

As a matter of fact, Julian Ballesteros, who allegedly made the remarks which became the basis for respondents inaction, denied ever having made those statements, much less having discharged respondent as counsel.[8] Moreover, Julian Ballesteros is only one of the heirs of Tiburcio Ballesteros, and it has not been shown that he was speaking on behalf of the other heirs when he allegedly relieved respondent of his services. In any case, if respondent had really been discharged as counsel, although not in accordance with the Rules of Court, he should have informed the trial court and asked that he be allowed to withdraw from the cases.[9] Until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his clients even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated.[10] He cannot validly claim that, in any case, the decision has not yet become final for want of service on the Solicitor General, for the period within which complainants can file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal is counted from receipt of the decision by their counsel of record. Nor is this the first time that respondent is remiss in his professional obligation toward complainants. In his answer, he practically admits that he was late in moving for the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros by herein complainant heirs. Respondents excuse that he was not immediately informed by complainants of their fathers death is without merit. Four years after the death of complainants father is simply too long a period for him not to ha ve known of his clients death, especially as it appears that he and complainants live in close proximity with each other. During those four years, surely occasions would have arisen where respondent had to confer with Tiburcio Ballesteros regarding the cases. Respondent also, in effect, admits that he failed to file a written offer of evidence as required by the court in its order, dated June 21, 1983. What he actually filed was only a provisional written offer of evidence because the documents offered were not certified true copies. What the Court makes of respondents garbled explanation[11] for this lapse is that he could not bother to go to the Bureau of Lands in Manila to get certified true copies because a check with the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City showed the same documentary evidence to be substantially the same true copies. If

that were the case, respondent did not explain why he did not then go to the Pagadian City branch of the Bureau of Lands to get the certified true copies of his documentary evidence. The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months for respondents gross negligence in the handling of the two cadastral cases is in accordance with our decisions.[12] WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil from the practice of law for six (6) months from notice with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Boncavils personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case. The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein. The facts are as follows: On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address. More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees. Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing. In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration. As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period. Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office. On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8 The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.1awph!l.net10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper. In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11 Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest xxx. It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x12 At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.

As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls. Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them. Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused. Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that

he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.16 We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that: Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes

entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.18 Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount. The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a

profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.21 Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus: A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. xxx Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.

such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25 The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent. SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards of a lawyers conduct set in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtually abandoned his clients cause. This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latters failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case. The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to represent him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the [1] repair of the house of the defendants in the case. The case went its course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of [2] exhibits. Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order the full text of which reads as follows: When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not formally offer ( sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the Court. Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer

the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days within which to comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001. On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give ( sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the defendant. Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not complied with the submission of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further prosecute this case. Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the [3] morning. The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant [4] to file a verified Affidavit-Complaint dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court, wherein he also alleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated the services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals of the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent

finally handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the complainants wife. In a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the respondents comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and [6] recommendation. Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by [7] the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by the complainant, are undisputed. Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the Investigating Commissioner are as follows: Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiffs Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10 of complainants Affidavit) reads: .... It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondents client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant as the latters counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,
[5]

and respondents dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the interests of respondents client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondents obligation to take all measures to protect the interests of his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility but it was respondents negligence or [8] omission which has caused damage to such interests. In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondents disregard of the resolution of this Court directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence and lack of respect for the authority of this Court. The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, an extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3) months and [9] nine (9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits. The respondent did not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his inaction. Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. .... Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. .... Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. .... CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the respondents mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest, adversely

affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to [10] the courts and his clients. This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in representation of their causes. We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat, wit: Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999: Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the [12] community to the legal profession.
[11]

to

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, [13] the courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its [14] importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethar gy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical. The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We find the recommended penalty commensurate with the offense committed. In Aromin v. Boncavil, this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive. The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de [16] Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon constitutes inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the [17] respondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones, Spouses [18] [19] Galen v. Paguinigan, Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
[15]

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent. Facts: In this case, respondent ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Lumot A. Jalandoni, who is the Chairman/President of Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) and owns the biggest shares of stocks in the corporation, was sued which involved the possession of land where Alhambra hotel, the only property owned by PRC, is situated. This is Civil Case No. 97-9865.The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent. Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. Later on, respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion towithdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity The grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena. This is an estafa case filed by the representatives of PRC itself against spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena. It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved. Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality was committed by respondent. Issues:

1. Whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and 2. Whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record of Jalandoni. Held: Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides: Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner: There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his

new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy. The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned. An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest. The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it. The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A.Jalandoni. In his comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.

The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows: The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer. Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads: Canon 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper." Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place. A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to

represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court. The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer d id not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and RICAFORT, complainants, SALUNAT, respondent.

ATTY. FEDERICO vs. ATTY. ERNESTO

D. S.

RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. [1] Ricafort filed an administrative complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA. Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intracorporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 0597-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases. Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule [2] 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases. In his Answer, respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and in
[3]

behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said law firm, he only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in OMB [4] Case No. 0-97-0695. On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-975657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board. Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA. By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred. The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be [5] opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been [6] bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through [7] their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the [8] performance thereof. In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the [9] corporation. Its members have been characterized as trustees or [10] directors clothed with a fiduciary character. It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself. Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to [11] the stockholders. This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the

corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be [12] included as a party in the suit. Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening: The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable [13] of giving valid consent. (underscoring ours) In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by [14] any interest of the individual corporate officials. The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-975657, entitled Philippine Public School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent

Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit. In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his [15] appearance therein. Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation. Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant, versus ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent. Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests. On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorneys fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,[1] 13.01,[2] 15.02,[3] 15.03,[4] 21.01[5] and 21.02.[6] On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.[7]

In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondents brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal ethics. [8] Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondents brother is closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the said cases out of her own free will.[9] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory Conference dated March 1, 2004.[10] On the scheduled conference, only a representative of complainant appeared.[11] Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers.[12]

Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR.[13] Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer. On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding said case.[15] On the said date, only respondent appeared[16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads: SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay nagsasabing: Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat na Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. na kasalukuyang nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.

Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco, gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan. Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco. Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano. Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang kaso. Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad dito.[17] Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory questioning.[18] However, none of the parties appeared.[19] On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for resolution.[20] On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation, portions of which are quoted hereunder:

The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise. It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and reprimanded andadvised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.[21] On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit: RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153 CBD CASE NO. 03-1186 Leticia Gonzales vs. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.[22] Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only

represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.[23] With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.[24] Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyerclient relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[26] One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba, The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are

wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.[30] Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies. As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David: [W]e cannot sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice. The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.[33]

In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.[34] Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing. We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such desistance as the present case involves public interest.[36] Indeed, the Courts exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed. We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his name,[39] without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as show n by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.

Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of fine of P2,000.00. WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS,respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: FACTS: Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos (Romanillos) represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc.(SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI). The suit was for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (PD 957). SJHAI alleged that a certain lot was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands, but no school was ever built, and in fact, the subject lot was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano. While Atty. Robert B. Romanillos (Romanillos) was still counsel for San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI), he represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building in the subject lot, to be purchased from the spouses Durano. This request was denied, and Romanillos applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of the Montealegres. It was at this point that SJHAI terminated his services as counsel, and got another lawyer. When Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI, the latter filed a disbarment case against him. Upon investigation, it was found and recommended that Romanillos failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, representing the Montealegres against SJHAI even when he served as Board Member and counsel of the latter, and even served as counsel for DCI in a suit against SJHAI. Romanillos got off with an admonition but continued to act as DCIs counsel in the latter case, which prompted SJHAI to file a second disbarment case, concerning such representation, and adding that Romanillos has been using the title Judge in his advertisements.

ISSUE: Whether or not Romanillos is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law. It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783. We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. Romanillos did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch

or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of such privileges. Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. THE COMPLAINT In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3] The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).[5] RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11] A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13] On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.[15] RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16] The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor

would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client. Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21] The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.[22] THE COURT'S RULING We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.[24] Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25] Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship

between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 14. xxx The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28] As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also

surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31] Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32] There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35] WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda. The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with 2 violation of Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets. Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
1

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of 3 the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 4 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission. Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice. In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the complaint. In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT, respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read: 5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF
5

INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document. 9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover where she has a child . Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records . Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS. On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with aReport and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED. We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. 6 Magulta, A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by 7 the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer. The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to

condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of. SO ORDERED.

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, complainant, NARAVAL, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.:

vs. Atty.

CAMILO

busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our case; Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latters failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case; My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naravals office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money; Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline; xxx xxx x x x.
[2]

Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or other property coming into the formers possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. The Case and the Facts Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The [1] Affidavit submitted by complainant alleges the following: Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment; After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex A to form part hereof; As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was so

In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same [3] directive was reiterated in the CBDs May 31, 2002 Order issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file [4] any answer despite his receipt of the Orders. Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD [5] proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainants Position Paper 10, 2002.
[6]

on December

Report of the Investigating Commissioner In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows: Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x. In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for filing fee and service fee did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished. xxx xxx xxx

Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainants P8,000. The Courts Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents Administrative Liability Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their [8] client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or [9] competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake [10] the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorneyclient relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client s [11] cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, [12] diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states: CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as [13] they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be

In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus, [7] respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x. IBP Board of Governors Resolution On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted

prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, [14] then they fail their lawyers oath. The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon. Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on [15] the part of lawyers. If they find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the [16] incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe cand or, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his [17] clients. Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong [18] to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.

Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and [19] property that may come into their possession. As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in [20] him. His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal [21] profession. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, [22] legal processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted [23] to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal [24] profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the [25] profession. WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

JAYNE

Y. YU, complainant, BONDAL, respondent.

vs. RENATO

LAZARO

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands charged in a [1] complaint filed by Jayne Y. Yu (complainant) for gross negligence [2] [3] and violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to attend to the five cases she referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him. By complainants allegation, the following spawned the filing of the present administrative complaint: On March 30, 2000, she engaged the services of respondent as counsel in the following cases: (1) Jayne Yu. v. Swire Realty and Development Corp, for Rescission with Damages filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, (2) I.S. No. 00-2208990, Jayne Yu v. Lourdes Fresnoza Boon, for Estafa, (3) I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88, Jayne Yu v. Julie Teh, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, (4) I.S. No. 2000-D-11826, Jayne Yu v. Mona Lisa San Juan for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and (5) I.S. No. 2000-D-11827, Jayne Yu v. Elizabeth Chan Ong, also for [4] violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In the Retainer Agreement dated March 30, 2000, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an Appearance Fee ofP1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Complainant later issued two checks, BPI Family Bank No. 94944 and BPI Family Bank No. 94968, dated February 20, 2001 and April 5, 2001 in the amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, [6] respectively. Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to file [7] a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp; due to respondents negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes
[5]

Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely appealed to the Department of [8] Justice; respondent negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was eventually dismissed by Resolution dated August 14, [9] 2000; and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth [10] Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. Respondent thus demanded from respondent, by letter of June 14, 2001, for the return of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Through complainants counsel (Chavez Laureta and [12] Associates Law Office) which sent a letter to respondent, she reiterated her demand for the return of the records of the cases. Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan. Complainant through counsel thus demanded, by letter of August 8, 2001, the return of the rest of the files, particularly that dealing with Swire Realty and Development Corporation and Julie Teh. In the same letter, complainant also demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI Family Bank Checks amounting to P51,716.54, they being intended to represent payment of filing fees for the case against Swire Realty and Development Corporation which respondent failed to file. As respondent failed and continues to refuse to complainants valid demands in evident bad faith prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging him violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of Responsibility.
[14] [13] [11]

comply with and to her with flagrant Professional

By Resolution of February 4, 2002, this Court directed respondent to file his Comment. Respondent, through his counsel, the Escobido and Pulgar Law Offices, filed a motion for extension for thirty days or up to April 9, 2002, which was granted by Resolution of

May 27, 2002. No copy was, however, furnished respondents [15] counsel. As respondent failed to file his Comment on the present complaint, this Court, by Resolution of July 21, 2003, considered the filing of respondents comment deemed waived and allowed complainant to present her evidence before the Office of the Bar [16] Confidant. At the hearing before the Officer of the Bar Confidant, complainant echoed her allegations in the complaint. As to the other cases referred by complainant to respondent, complainant testified that the case against Julie Enriquez-Teh was dismissed because respondent failed to present the original checks [17] subject of the case; that the estafa case against Ms. Lourdes [18] Boon was dismissed and was never appealed; and that she was prodded by respondent to settle the two cases for B.P. Blg. 22 even if she was not satisfied with the terms thereof, respondent having assured her that he would waive his 10% success fee in the case [19] against Swire Development. And complainant submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Retainer Agreement between her and Atty. Renato [20] Lazaro Bondal; (2) BPI Family Bank Check No. 94944 dated [21] February 20, 2001 for P30,000.00 payable to cash; (3) BPI Family Bank Check No. 94968 dated April 5, 2001 for P21,716.54 payable [22] to cash; (4) Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Makati dated August 18, 2000 on a case between Jayne Yu and Lourdes [23] Fresnoza Boon; (5) Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Makati on [24] a case between her and Julie Enriquez-Teh; (5) her letter to respondent dated June 14, 2001 requesting the return of pertinent [25] records of the cases referred to him; (6) letter of Francisco I. Chavez to respondent dated July 18, 2001 reiterating the request for the return of the records and an accounting of the amount [26] of P51,716.54; (7) letter of Francisco I. Chavez to respondent dated August 8, 2001 confirming the receipt of two folders relative to the cases she filed against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and Mona Lisa San Juan, requesting Atty. Bondal to return the files bearing on Swire Realty and Development Corporation and Julie Teh, and [27] demanding the refund of the amount of P51,716.54.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, by Report and [28] Recommendation, recommends the dismissal of the complaint for failure of complainant to substantiate it. From the records of the case, it is culled that except for the case against Swire Development Corporation, the other 4 cases referred by complainant to respondent were filed in court but were dismissed or terminated for causes not attributable to respondent. The case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon in I.S. No. 00-22089-90 was dismissed by the Makati Prosecutors Office by Resolution dated August 18, 2000 due to lack of probable cause and, in any event, the issues raised therein were in the nature of intra-corporate disputes which are properly cognizable by another forum, viz: After careful examination and evaluation of the evidence adduced bo th by complainant and respondent, undersigned Investigating Prosec utor finds no probable cause to hold respondent for the offense charged of Estafa. Apparently, there was no deceit and/or unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence employed by respondent when complainant agreed to invest her money in the restaurant business under the name and style of La Gondola, Inc. which is owned by respondent. xxx In the present case, though, complainant alleged that respondent immediately upon receipt of the P4,800,000.00 representing her investment in the restaurant business, executed earlier in favor of Philippine Commercial and International Bank whereby La Gondola assumed the loans and credit accommodations obtained by Lucre Export/Import Inc., using the funds of La Gondola, Inc.; respondent being the President and majority owner of the latter corporation. However, outside of the mere allegation of complainant that respondent allegedly assumed the loans and credit accommodations extended to the other company using the funds of La Gondola, Inc., no concrete and real evidence were presented and/or proven to this effect by complainant. xxx Moreover, it is apparent that the issues being raised by complainant appears to be intra-corporate disputes which could be very well [29] settled in another forum. (Underscoring supplied)

Notably, a similar complaint for the same offense, docketed as I.S. No. 99-H-2780, had been previously filed by complainant against Ms. Boon which case was dismissed for insufficiency of [30] evidence. As thus observed by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the filing of an appeal from the prosecutors resolution would have been inutile since the facts and issues raised in the estafa case had already been twice passed upon by the Office of the City Prosecutor, [31] hence, it would likely be dismissed. No fault or negligence can also be attributed to respondent in the dismissal of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 against Julie Teh. By Resolution of August 14, 2000 of the Makati Prosecutors Office, it is clear that it was dismissed, in the main, on the ground that the offense charged did not actually exist and complainant failed to appear and present the original checks, viz: After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the undersigned recommends for the dismissal of the present complaints on the following grounds: 1. Despite reasonable opportunity given to her, complainant failed to appear and present the original copies of the subject checks and other documents attached to the complaint.

As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with the terms dictated by the therein respondents Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong, upon the promise of respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee in the complaint to be filed against Swire Development: Assuming the truthfulness of her allegation that respondent compelled her to settle, what the terms were as alleged to have been dictated by Ms. San Juan and Ms. Chan Ong, and the manner and/or extent of prejudice she suffered, complainant did not establish. Moreover, she failed to show that the promise by respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee was for the purpose of defrauding her or of such nature as to constitute undue influence, thereby depriving her of reasonable freedom of choice. Subsequent to the amicable settlement, it appears that complainant never raised any objection to the terms of the compromise. As an accepted rule, when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be heard [35] to complain about it. As for complainants claim that the amount of P51,716.54, which was the only amount on record that complainant paid for respondents legal services , was intended for the filing fees in the complaint against Swire Development Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the retainer agreement does not so confirm. We would like to thank you for retaining our law firm in the handling and representation of your case. In regard to the five cases you referred to us, our aggregate A cceptance fee is P200,000 Pesos with an Appearance feeof P1,500. 00 Pesos per hearing. As regards the damages to be recovered, we [36] will get 10% thereof by way of Success Fee. (Underscoring supplied) If, admittedly, the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his

2. The subject checks were presented after the 90-day period hence there is no more presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. Accordingly, the burden is shifted upon the complainant to prove that at the time the checks were issued, the drawer knew that he had insufficient funds. There is no allegation much less proof to that effect. The result is that the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit [32] is not present, therefore the crime does not exist. On the alleged failure of respondent to appear during the hearing of I.S. No. 2000-G-22087-88 and his failure to present the original of the checks subject thereof, they being then in the [33] possession of complainant who was abroad at that time: Such failure to present the original of the checks cannot solely be [34] attributed to respondent, for she herself was guilty of neglect.

efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their [37] cause. In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar Confidant that complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The charges [38] against him must thus be dismissed. However, since respondent had been advised by complainant through counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz: Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter, to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his successor. WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all the records in his possession relative to the cases he handled for complainant.

TANU REDDI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO, JR., Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and a practicing endodontist in New York, seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly deceiving her into giving him a total of US$ 3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other things, purchasing several real estate properties for resale. From the records of the case, the following facts are gathered: Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable activities in India, complainant nurtured philanthropic desires of her own consisting primarily in opening a hospital with modern facilities 1 in an underdeveloped part of Asia. Together with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino 2 citizen, who was her assistant of over 10 years, complainant visited the Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the level of poverty in 3 the country and the lack of medical services for the poor, she 4 decided to put up a hospital. Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging in the real estate business in the Philippines in order to speed up the 5 generation of funds. Heeding the suggestion, complainant returned to the Philippines in 2003 to explore opportunities in the real estate 6 business. Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help her acquire real properties for development and/or resale. Since she could not acquire ownership of lands in the Philippines, respondent advised her to use corporate vehicles to effect the purchases. Three

corporations were thus formed Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic 7 Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc. By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying several parcels of land located at Tagaytay City, Las Pias City, Makati City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. She related the details surrounding the intended acquisition of property as follows: Re the Tagaytay City Property Respondent represented to complainant that his client Teresita Monzon (Teresita) owned an untitled 27-hectare property located at Tagaytay City. Through the Tagaytay Twins, Inc., complainant and Teresita executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21, 8 2003 (Tagaytay MOA) prepared by respondent under which she agreed to finance the titling of the property in the total amount of P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property would be offered for sale, the proceeds of which would be divided equally between her and Teresita. Complainant thereupon made staggered payments of 9 US$1,000, P2,000,000, and US$36,360 to Teresita. Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of the 27hectare property had been purchased by Aldio Properties, Inc. in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which sale Teresita challenged in an action for annulment before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay 10 City. In said action, respondent was Teresitas counsel of record. Re the Las Pias City Property Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a house and lot located at Las Pias City, which were encumbered by a mortgage, and which respondent represented as owned and being 11 sold by one Francisca Parales (Francisca) to finance an urgently 12 needed heart surgery of her daughter. On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to operate a Jollibee food outlet, with the agreement that out of the profits that its operation would generate, she would get 50% while respondent 13 and Immaculada would share the remaining 50%. Complainant

thus sent respondent sums of money for the acquisition of both the 14 Las Pias property and a franchise to operate a Jollibee outlet. Re the Makati City Property Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C. Mangco (Mangco), alleged legal officer of the intestate estate of one Faustino Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to be the owner of a real property located at the consular area adjacent to Forbes Park in 15 Makati City. Complainant having been interested in acquiring the property, respondent prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (Makati MOA) which she, together with Mangco, forged on March 20, 16 2004. Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did, release P10,000,000 representing the cost of development and titling of the property, and payment of back taxes; and an additional P2,000,000 for the execution of the Makati MOA. Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither owned by the intestate estate of Ramos nor for sale. Re the Quezon City Property Respondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the land on which SM North Mall in Quezon City stands, he representing that it belongs to his client, purportedly a retired US Navy employee who 17 resides in Mindanao. Complainant assented and transmitted large sums of money to respondent for the purpose of, among other things, filing a petition for injunction against SM North Mall, paying 18 back taxes, and titling of the land. Re the Pasay City Property Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the purchase of a vacant lot located along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda) and Alma Mallari (Alma), but which was mortgaged to one Atty. Go to secure a

loan of P5,000,000. She also defrayed expenses, on the strength of respondents representations, to secure title to the lot, settle the mortgage obligation, relocate squatters on the lot, and bribe a judge 20 to "close the transaction." Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such vacant lot along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City; instead, she found out that the "vacant lot" referred to was titled in the names of Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC) and Banco De Oro Universal Bank 21 (BDO). In light of the foregoing developments, complainants counsel, by 22 letter dated December 19, 2005, demanded from respondent the return of the amount of US$3,000,000, claimed to be part of the total sum of money she had sent to him for all the transactions that did not come about. No amount has been returned to complainant. Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 2006 complaint for disbarment against respondent.
23

19

of the present

By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828 24 from complainant which amount he claims was used not only for the purchase of the Las Pias property and discharge of the mortgage thereon, but also for the setting up of the earlier mentioned corporations, as well as for the downpayment on the Makati 25 property and related expenses. Respondent likewise admits having represented to complainant that 26 the Las Pias City property belonged to one Francisca, certificate of title to which and the corresponding deed of sale signed by Francisca, by his claim, are in his possession; but the title has not been transferred to Tanu, Inc., as agreed, in view of complainants failure to provide the money needed therefor, he adding that he is 27 also exercising his retaining lien over the Las Pias documents. Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent claims having paid P500,000 to Mangco representing initial 28 payment thereof.

Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits that the Tagaytay MOA exists, and avers that it is complainant who wants to get out of a perfected sale in order to recover her partial payment 29 amounting to approximately P4,000,000. With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states that he is willing to surrender all the documents pertaining thereto, but would do so only if complainant is first ordered to pay him his professional 30 fees. As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies complainants claims thereon as mere "preposterous allegations." Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision by Resolution of 31 January 22, 2007. At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on September 13, 2007 before Commissioner Lolita A. 32 Quisumbing (the Commissioner), respondent failed to appear despite notice. He instead sent a representative who sought a resetting as, allegedly, respondent was in Ilocos attending to an 33 important family matter. The Commissioner, finding respondents absence inexcusable, given that he had ample time to file a motion for resetting but he did not, considered respondent to have waived 34 his right to participate in the proceedings. Complainant thereupon 35 presented evidence ex-parte and submitted her position paper. In her Report and Recommendation submitted to the IBP Board of Governors on December 14, 2007, the Commissioner found respondent to have committed fraudulent acts which constitute violations of the lawyers oath and numerous provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), viz: 1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: "A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and for legal processes."
36

Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. With unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, he misappropriated millions of pesos which was [sic] given to him on his misrepresentation that such were needed for the acquisition of the aforementioned properties. Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e., falsification as part of his fraudulent scheme) when he tampered with the Articles of Incorporation of Tanu, Inc.. A perusal of the Articles of Incorporation given by respondent to complainant shows that the incorporators are Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee, Prasuna Reddy, Ahalya Devi, and Robert Juntilla. When complainant obtained a copy of the same in September 2005, she discovered that other names were inserted. The names of respondent, Clarito D. Cardozo, Brian Pellazar, and Michael Angelo Lopez were intercalated. (Exhibit "W") 2. He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he offered properties for sale to complainant on themisrepresentation that complainant was dealing with the true owners thereof. This is very clear from the documents he asked complainant to sign; namely, the Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "D") for the Tagaytay property, Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "U") for the Pasay City property, and Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "M") for the Makati City property. The certificates of title, tax declaration and other documents obtained by complainant from the various government agencies reveal that all these properties aforementioned were eitherfictitious, not susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent. 3. Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR which state: "CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." He failed to account for the sums of money he received from complainant and failed to return the same upon demand. (Copy of demand letter dated 19 December 2005, Exhibit "T") 4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which provides: "A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our judges since, he claims, that it is a common practice in the 37 Philippines. (Underscoring supplied) The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred; that his name be ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys; and that he be ordered to return the total amount of US$3,000,000 to complainant. By Resolution of January 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commissioner, with the modification that respondent was ordered to return only the admitted amount he received from complainant (US$544,828), without prejudice to complainants recovery of the other amounts claimed in the appropriate forum. The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its findings/conclusion that respondent committed estafa and falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine whether he committed these offenses. The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the intended transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is sufficiently established.
38

It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received from complainant at least US$544,828. He claims, however, that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the discharge of the mortgage thereon, the setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the downpayment on the Makati property and related representation expenses therefor. The Court finds that the claim does not lie. All that respondent presented to account for the money is a handwritten acknowledgment of a supposed partial payment of P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one 39 Mangco. By any standard, this document is a mere piece of paper, Mangco not having been presented, if he exists at all, to confirm that he indeed issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon demand, for the money held by him in trust an 40 element of misappropriation complainants claim that respondent employed deceit on her is established. Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of regard for the seriousness of the charges against him. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and 41 overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times 42 is expected of him. This, respondent miserably failed to do. Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any documents to substantiate the so-called property acquisitions that he is exercising his retaining lien over them as, allegedly, his professional fees have not been paid is incredible. If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to practice law is on the line, respondent could have readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a semblance of credibility to his claim. His "retaining lien" claim remains just that. Worse, it only amounts to an admission that he acted as counsel for complainant; yet, he completely failed to show that in his dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before his.

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court finds the same to be in order. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x. To reiterate, by his own admission, respondent received a total of US$544,828 from complainant, which he could not properly account for. The orchestrated manner in which he carried out his fraudulent scheme, in connivance with other persons, and by taking advantage of complainants naivete in the workings of the real estate business in the Philippines, depict a man whose character falls way, way short of the exacting standards required of him as a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Thus, respondent is no longer fit to remain as such. The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a 43 member of the bar. If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should 44 also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the 45 possession of legal learning. The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to return only the amount of US$544,828. While complainant submitted

documents showing her bank remittances involving different sums of money, some of these remittances were not made in the name of 46 respondent. And as complainant herself declares, the amount of 47 US$3,000,000 is a mere estimate of her total claim. Thus, only the return of the admitted amount of US$544,828 is in order. As reflected above, complainant is not precluded from litigating her claim for any balance due her in the proper forum. WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant the amount of US$544,828. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL, Complainant, versus ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the [1] Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation. The Facts On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment [2] against respondent. RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank. In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and grappled with

the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault. Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol. Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies. The Ruling of the IBP On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards [3] expected of him as vanguard of law and justice. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty. According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position papers. On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant [4] a more severe penalty. On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP [5] denied respondents motion. The Ruling of the Court We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey [6] the laws of the land. Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal [7] system. Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of [8] his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and

lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an [9] intentional wrong to their adversaries. We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of [10] justice. A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordi nate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the [11] law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his [12] clients cause, is condemnable and unethical. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO, LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO JR., respondent. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union leadership dispute some seventeen (17) years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for [1] distribution among faculty members of the university. For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mario Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35 million. Instead of creating a harmonious relationship between the contracting parties, the collective bargaining agreement regrettably engendered disputes arising from the interpretation and implementation thereof one of which even reached [2] this Court. The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989 the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16) officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including respondent. The dismissal precipitated anew bitter legal battles which were resolved by this

Court in favor of the dismissed employees by ordering their [3] reinstatement with back wages. In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the terms and conditions of a five (5)-year collective bargaining agreement between UST and the UST Faculty Union retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment of P7,000,000.00 from which P5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union, including herein respondent, who were earlier ordered reinstated by this Court, and the sum of P2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement. It appears from the record that only P5,000,000.00 for the back wages and other claims of respondent Atty. Mario and other concerned union officers and directors was paid immediately by UST while the satisfaction of the balance of P2,000,000.00 was apparently deferred to some unspecified time. In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of agreement to settle the salary increases and other benefits under the collective bargaining agreement effective 1988 for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total of P42,000,000.00. It was agreed that the benefits accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 were to be taken from the sum ofP42,000,000.00 which UST would release directly to the faculty members, while the remainder of the P42,000,000.00 package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty Union which would then disburse the balance to cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993. The memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of P2,000,000.00 agreed upon in the 1990 compromise agreement as well as the attorneys fees of Atty. Mario worth P4,200,000.00 against the P42,000,000.00 outlay. In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took care of the disbursement of P20,226,221.60 from the total commitment of P42,000,000.00 to pay for the following expenses: (a)P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid obligations to faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement;

(b) P13,833,597.96 for the salary increases of faculty members from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992; (c) P192,623.64 for telephone, electricity and water billings; and, (d) P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union as attorneys fees. The expenses left a collectible sum of P21,773,778.40 from the obligation of P42,000,000.00. The university however relinquished only P18,038,939.37 to the UST Faculty Union which was P3,734,839.03 short of the balance of P21,773,778.40. In the meantime, the UST Faculty Union placed P9,766,570.01 of the amount received from UST in the money market to earn as it did make P1,146,381.27 in interest. For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993, the UST Faculty Union charged against the short-changed amount of P18,038,939.37 a total of P16,723,638.27 consisting of the following expenses: (a) P10,521,800.64 as the amount paid for salary increases beginning 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993; (b) P578,296.31 which was refunded to the faculty members whose salaries were reduced as a result of their participation in the 1989 strike; (c) P2,045,192.97 as amount paid to the faculty members representing their December 1992 bonus; and, (d)P3,578,348.35 for reimbursements to the University of Santo Tomas. The expenses left a balance of P5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder of P1,315,301.10 out of the P18,038,939.37 earlier turned over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the deficit amount of P3,734,839.03 which UST later turned over to the UST Faculty Union after previously failing to deliver the amount. To the sum of P5,050,140.13, the UST Faculty Union added the interest earnings of P1,146,381.27 from money market investments as well as the amount of P192,632.64 representing the disallowed amount of expenses earlier deducted by UST from the P42,000,000.00 package. All in all, the money left in the possession of the UST Faculty Union was P6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty members in 1994. Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of transparency among the officers and directors of the union in the management and disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty members. They initiated two (2) complaints with the Office of the Regional Director, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022, and another, on 16 November 1996, docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028. In

both pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their alleged failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to P4,200,000.00 which they deducted from the benefits allotted to [4] faculty members. On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mario accusing him of (a) compromising their entitlements under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement without the knowledge, consent or ratification of the union members, and worse, for only P2,000,000.00 when they could have received more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00 received by him and other officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union under the 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the administration and distribution of the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under the 1992 memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty members although the amount was denominated as attorneys fees. Complainants [5] [6] asserted that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon [7] [8] [9] [10] 1; Rule 15.08 of Canon 15; Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of [11] Canon 16; and Rule 20.04 of Canon 20, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mario filed his comment on the complaint. He alleged that the issues raised therein were the same issues involved in the two (2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and therefore constituted forum-shopping, and further explained that he had adequately accounted for the disbursement of the money demanded by complainants. On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and the comment thereon to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice thereof. On 18 May 1999 we received the Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as well as the Resolution of 30 March 1999 of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving theReport which found the complaint meritorious and suspended respondent Atty.

Mario from the practice of law until such time that the required detailed accounting of the questioned remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty Union] during his incumbency as President and Legal Counsel has been officially submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the IBP. On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the IBP Report and Resolution and alleged the same contentions he previously asserted. On 27 October 1999 we referred the case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and submission of report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice. In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director found merit in the two (2) complaints docketed as Case No. NCROD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9510-028 and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by the management of UST, and their collection of [12] exorbitant and illegal attorneys fees amounting to P4,200,000.00. On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal docketed as BLR-A-TR-52-25-10-99 set aside the Order of the Regional Director. It found that the balance of theP42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union had been fully and adequately accounted for by respondent and the other officers and [13] directors of the union. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the other officers and directors of the union to distribute the attorneys fees of P4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to immediately hold the elections for union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their respective terms of office. On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP [14] No. 60657. The Decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the case is allegedly still pending resolution. On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board of Governors adopting and approving the Report which recommended the lifting of Atty.

Marios suspension from law practice since he had sufficiently accounted for the funds in question. For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition with this Court to review the IBP Resolution exonerating respondent from the accusations against him and lifting his suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise required under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court if the case against respondent could still proceed in this Court. Nevertheless since the IBPResolution is merely recommendatory, and considering further the instructional value of this case to members of the Bench, many of whom are engaged simultaneously in other businesses or professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the instant case once and for all. In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. in the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and theP4,200,000.00 attorneys fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of agreements with the management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorneys fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union. As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance [15] thereof. In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-

interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to [16] his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent of whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity. Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the clients consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able [17] to satisfy both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in [18] behalf of his client. In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of the 1990 compromise agreement, this Court finds fault in respondents omission of that basic sense of fidelity to steer clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his client, the faculty members of UST, open to question. Atty. Mario both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the dismissed employees of UST complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union officers and directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members. The facts would affirm this observation. In brokering the compromise agreement, respondent received P5,000,000.00 as compensation for the dismissed union officials while onlyP2,000,000.00 apparently settled USTs obligations in favor of the faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement when their original claim amounted to at least P9,000,000.00. Worse, the P2,000,000.00 concession for accountabilities demandable long ago in 1986 was paid only in 1992 under the memorandum of

agreement, or a period of more than two (2) years after the execution of the compromise agreement, in contrast to the immediate payment of the P5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mario and the other union officers and directors. Respondent Atty. Mario ought to have disclosed to the members of the UST Faculty Union, if not the entire bargaining unit of faculty members, his interest in the compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages and other forms of damages, and also the reasons for reducing the claim of the faculty members from more than P9,000,000.00 to only P2,000,000.00. As the record shows, the explanations for respondents actions were disclosed only years after the consummation of the compromise agreement, particularly only after the instant complaint for disbarment was filed against him, when the accounting should have been forthcoming either before or during the settlement of the labor case against the management of UST. Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and directors were to get for themselves a lions share of the compromise as they ultimately did, Atty. Mario should have unambiguously divulged and made clear to his client the compelling probability of conflict of interests. He should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal representation to another lawyer who could have acted on the matter with a deep sense of impartiality over the several claims against UST and an unfettered commitment to the cause of the faculty members. Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondents dual role as lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union when he obtained P4,200,000.00 as attorneys fees. Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorneys fees so as not to pre-empt the decision in G.R. No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks as union president comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. The situation of Atty. Mario is not any different from that of an executor or administrator of an estate who may not charge against

the estate any professional fee for legal services rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid for in his capacity as [19] executor or administrator. Indeed, he could have avoided complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorneys fees by spelling out the terms and bases f or the claim of P4,200,000.00 since the compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise covered his legal services as well. Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise agreement or demanding the in explicable attorneys fees, his actions were not transparent enough to allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely and intelligently. Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring every lawyer to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest. As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest. The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mario failed to disclose at crucial moments significant information about the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorneys fees under the memorandum of agreement. A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests.

In light of the irrefragable fact of respondents misdemeanor, a possible mitigation of his actionable conduct was that the attorneys fees and the compromise agreement were negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous circumstances where his leadership and that of his core officers and directors were incessantly challenged by complainants allegedly aided by factions within UST itself. He might also have believed that the settlement achieved immense benefits for his constituents which would not have been otherwise obtained if he had chosen to relinquish the rein of legal representation to some other lawyer. Finally, it was not improbable for him to suppose though wrongly that he could represent and in some manner serve the interests of all of them, including his own, by pushing for and [20] seeking the approval of the agreements himself. We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in [21] accordance with our ruling in Sumangil v. Sta. Romana. Hence, Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness [22] and loyalty in all transactions with his client. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act. SO ORDERED.