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RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (COMPILATION)

Hulyo 2, 2012 by foobarph

in Criminal Procedure.

Criminal Procedure

What is the rule on duplicity of offenses? As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law provides only one punishment for various offenses (compound and complex crimes under Art. 48 of the RPC and special complex crimes). A complaint or information that charges more than one offense is considered as defective but it can be the basis of a valid conviction. What is the reason for the rule against duplicitous complaint or information? The reason for the rule is to enable the accused to have the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and to be able to prepare and prove his defense. What is the remedy of the accused against a duplicitous information or complaint? The remedy of the accused is to file a motion to quash pursuant to Section 3 (f) of Rule 117. The information remains valid even if it is duplicitous. It is up to the accused to raise or question the defect by filing the proper motion to quash before he pleads to the charge.

What is the effect of the failure of the accused to object to a duplicitous information? If the accused fails to object before arraignment, the right is deemed waived, and he may be convicted of as many offenses as there are charged if proved by the prosecution. Some situational examples: X fired his gun once, but the bullet killed two persons. He was charged with two counts of homicide in one information.

Can he be convicted under that information? Yes. It falls under the exception to the rule. This is a compound crime in which one act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. The law provides only one penalty for the two offenses. X was charged with both robbery and estafa in one information.

Can he be convicted of both offenses? It depends. If he objects to the duplicitous information before arraignment, he cannot be convicted under the information. But if he fails to object before arraignment, he can be convicted of as many offenses as there are in the information. How does this rule on duplicitous informations affect the rules on continuing offenses (delito continuados)? First lets take a look at the various views on continuing offenses. Delito Continuado or Continuing offense exists if there is a plurality of acts performed during a period of time, unity of penal provision violated, and unity of criminal intent or purpose which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

Delito Continuado or continuing offense consists of several crimes but in reality, there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

Delito Continuado or continuing offense consists of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.

In the above views, since there is only a single criminal intent, even though there is a series of criminal acts, only one information should be filed against the offender. Example: The taking of the accused of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. In American jurisprudence, the applicable principle is the Single Larceny Doctrine which looks at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same transaction or as done on the same occasion.

The above doctrine, which we adopted, abandoned the Separate Larceny Doctrine which views that there is as many larce ny as there are properties taken from the victim or victims. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims.

To stick with the abandoned rules would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense. It has also been observed that the doctrine of Single Larceny is humane since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to jail in perpetuity or for the rest of his life.

The law requires however that where the offense charged in the information is a complex crime as defined by law, every essential element of each of the crimes constituting the complex felony must be stated in the information.

NOTE: The single larceny rule is commonly applied by our courts to malversation and falsification cases but not so in estafa cases.

In what cases is the name of the offended party indispensable? Slander, robbery with violence or intimidation. In what case is the name of the offended party dispensable? In offenses against property, the name of the offended party may be dispensed with as long as the object taken or destroyed is particularly described to property identify the offense. What are the offenses in which the time of the commission of the offense is essential?

o o o

Infanticide Violation of Sunday Statutes (Election Law) Abortion

What are the offenses in which the particular place where the offense was committed is essential?

o o o o

Violation of domicile Penalty on the keeper, watchman, visitor of opium den Trespass to dwelling Violation of election law (prohibiting the carrying of a deadly weapon within a 30-meter radius of polling places)

In what case can an accused not be convicted of a crime different from that designated in the complaint or information even if the recitals allege the commission of the crime?

o o o

a change of the theory of the trial requires of the defendant a different defense surprises the accused in any way

Some situational examples: X was accused of illegal possession of firearms, but the information did not allege that X did not have any license to possess the firearm. Is the information valid? No. The absence of the license is an essential element of the offense. Therefore, it should be alleged in the complaint or information. X was charged with illegal possession of opium. X contends that the information was invalid for failure to allege that he did not have a prescription from a physician.

Is X correct? No. The absence of the prescription is not an essential element of the offense and is only a matter of defense. It need not be alleged in the information.

When should the error in the name or identity be raised by the accused? The error should be raised before arraignment, or else it is deemed waived. When is the error in the name of the accused not fatal to an information? Error in the name of the accused will not nullify the information if it contains sufficient description of the person of the accused. What is a private crime? Private offenses are those which cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a private offense since all offenses are an outrage against the State. They are denominated as private offenses only to give deference to the offended party who may prefer not to file the case instead of going through the scandal of a public trial. What are the crimes that must be prosecuted upon complaint of the offended party?

o o o

Adultery and concubinage Seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness Defamation which consists in the imputation of an offense mentioned above

The above offenses fall under the category of private crimes. They can only be prosecuted at the instance of or upon complaint of the offended or aggrieved party.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that no prosecution for the above offenses can be had unless there is a complaint executed by the aggrieved party. Such execution of the complaint is a condition precedent. Non-compliance with the condition precedent is jurisdictional. It is the complaint of the offended party that starts the prosecutor proceeding. The mere filing of the sworn statement of the complainant upon which information is filed after conduct of preliminary investigation is sufficient compliance with the law and the rules.

NOTE: The death of the offended party during the pendency of the case does not extinguish the criminal liability of the accused.

Adultery and Concubinage The crimes of adultery and concubinage can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended spouse.

If the guilty parties are both alive, the criminal complaint must be instituted against both.

A pardon extended by the offended party in favor of one should be applied to the other party.

In the prosecution of this kind of offenses, the complainant must have the status, capacity, and legal representation at the time of the filing of the complaint. In short, the complainant must have legal capacity to sue locus standi.

Example:

Teves vs Vamenta (December 26, 1984)

An alleged offended spouse obtained a decree of divorce against the alleged offending spouse. The divorce decree was obtained abroad. After obtaining said decree, the alleged offended spouse discovered his spouse with someone else.

Can he still file a criminal action against the offending spouse for adultery? No more. By obtaining the divorce decree, he has lost the legal status or legal capacity to sue. He cannot now be considered as an offended spouse. What if the offended spouse died after filing the complaint? In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not a ground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability, whether partial or total, of the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. The moment the offended party initiates the action, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding. What if one of the accused died in adultery or concubinage cases? The death of one of the accused after a complaint for concubinage or adultery has been filed by the offended spouse does not affect the prosecution against the surviving accused. Seduction, Abduction, Acts of Lasciviousness

The crimes of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness may be prosecuted upon complaint of the offended party or her parents, grandparent, or guardian.

The principle applicable here is parens patriae. (Note that this principle is not applicable to adultery and concubinage cases because in the latter cases, they can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended spouse.) NOTE: If the offended party is already of age, she has the exclusive right to file the complaint unless she becomes incapacitated. The parents, grandparents, and guardian only have exclusive, successive authority to file the case if the offended party is still a minor.

What if the offended party is a minor? In cases of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness where the victim is a minor, the rule is that the minor may still initiate the prosecution of the case independent of her parents, grandparents, or guardian. Where the offended party who is a minor cannot file the complaint by reason of her incapacity other than her minority, the parents, grandparents or guardian may file the complaint. In such case, the right to file the complaint shall be successively and exclusively exercised by said relatives.

In criminal actions where the civil liability includes support for the offspring, the application for support pendente lite may be filed successively by the offended party, her parents, grandparents, or guardian, and even the State in the corresponding criminal case during its pendency.

What if the offended party is incapacitated or incompetent? In cases of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness where the victim is incapacitated or otherwise incompetent, the complaint may be filed in her behalf by her parents, grandparents, or guardian. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the necessary complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.

Defamation involving the imputation of adultery, concubinage, abduction, seduction, or acts of lasciviousness

This may only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. There is no successive or exclusive initiation of criminal complaint in this instance unlike in the other private crimes. The offended party must initiate the complaint herself or himself.

What is the distinction between the control by the prosecution and the control by the court? Before a case is filed in court, the prosecution has control over the following: (WWMR)

o o o o

What case to file Whom to prosecute The manner of prosecution The right to withdraw the case before arraignment even without notice and hearing.

After a case is filed in court, the court has control over the following: (TRPDD)

o o o o o

The suspension of arraignment Reinvestigation Prosecution by the prosecutor Dismissal Downgrading of the offense or dropping of the accused even before plea

May criminal prosecutions be restrained? The general rule is that no criminal prosecution may be restrained or stayed by any injunctive writ, preliminary or final. Public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of the society. Can a prosecutor be compelled to file a particular complaint or information? No. A prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof. Neither an injunction, preliminary or final, nor a writ pf prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

The exercise of such judgment and discretion may generally not be compelled by mandamus, except if the prosecutor shows evident bias in filing the information and refuses to include a co-accused without justification. But before filing for mandamus to compel a fiscal to include another co-accused in the information, the party must first avail himself of other remedies such as the filing of a motion for inclusion.

Instances when an injunctive writ may issue:

o o o o o o o o

To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. If it is necessary to the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of suits. To avoid threatened and unlawful arrest. If there is double jeopardy. If there is clearly no prima facie case. If the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority. When there is a prejudicial question. When the prosecution is under an invalid law.

Instances when a writ of certiorari may be available in criminal actions:

o o o o o o o o o o

When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance, or regulation. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust of vengeance. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

In case of conflict of views between the judge and the prosecutor, whose view should prevail? In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or between the prosecutor and the offended party or the defendant, those of the prosecutors should normally prevail. To whom should you appeal the decision of the prosecutor? The decision of the prosecutor may be modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines.

What is the effect of lack of intervention by the prosecutor in criminal prosecutions? Ordinarily, the proceedings had thereon without the participation of the government prosecutor may be considered a nullity. However, a private prosecutor may be allowed to prosecute the case under the authority, supervision and control of the government prosecutor. And provided all actions, pleadings or motions filed by the private prosecutor is with prior approval of the government prosecutor.

Note that a private prosecutor may be given the authority to prosecute a criminal action in the event that the public prosecutor has been loaded with a heavy work schedule or if there is a lack of public prosecutors. The authorization shall be in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor subject to the approval of the court (Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-207-SC, May 1, 2002).

Is the prosecutor required to be physically present in the trial of a criminal case? According to People v. Beriales (1976 case), he should be present. If he is not physically present, it cannot be said that the prosecution was under his direction and control. But in People v. Malinao and Bravo v. CA, it was held that the proceedings are valid even without the physical presence of the Fiscal who left the prosecution to the private prosecutor under his supervision and control.

Who prosecutes the criminal action in the absence of the prosecutor? In the MTC, when the prosecutor assigned is absent or not available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. Such authority ceases upon the intervention of the prosecutor or when the case is elevated to the RTC. After the case is filed in court, to whom should a motion to dismiss be addressed? Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction. Whatever disposition the prosecutor may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the court, subject only to the limitation that the court should not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the people to due process. Who acts on a motion for reinvestigation of the case after the filing of the information? A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. The Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, or the city prosecutor may not interfere with the judges disposit ion of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused once the information is filed in court, the latter being the sole judge therof. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused rests upon the sound discretion of the court. It does not matter if it is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion is filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice.

Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The manner of terminating the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same.

If, after he has filed the case, the prosecutor thinks that a prima facie case exists, can he refuse to prosecute? No, he cannot refuse to prosecute. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the court. What are the limitations on the control by the Court? (SINNATRa)

o o o o o o

The Court has authority to review the Secretarys recommendation and reject if it there is grave abuse of discretion. To reject or grant a motion to dismiss, the court must make its own Independent assessment of the evidence. Prosecution is entitled to Notice of hearing. Judgment is void if there is No independent assessment and finding of grave abuse of discretion. The Court must Await the result of a petition for review. The ultimate Test of the courts independence is where the prosecutor files a motion to dismiss or withdraw th e information.

The prosecutions stand to maintain prosecution should be Respected by the court.

KEY CODE: SINNATRa

When is a complaint required? A sworn written complaint is required if the offense is

o o

one which cannot be prosecuted de officio, or is private in nature (adultery, concubinage, abduction, seduction, acts of lasciviousness, defamation consisting in the imputation of any of the above offenses), or

where it pertains to those cases which need to be endorsed by specific public authorities (Anti-Dummy Board with respect to the Anti-Dummy Law, National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission with respect to the AntiPollution Law).

What is deemed included in the designation of the offense? It includes all the essential elements composing the offense committed together with the qualifying and aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense. Matters of evidence need not be alleged in the complaint or information. What is the scope of the act or omission subject of the complaint or information? This refers to the cause of accusation. Every person accused of an offense is entitled to be duly informed of the nature and the cause for which he is charged. The actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information constituting the gravamen of the offense for which the accused is apprised of the charge against and not the designation in the title.

This involves, under the new rules, the inclusion in the information not only the essential elements of the offense charged but also the modifying circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense. It is therefore necessary to allege in the information the qualifying and aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense. (Sec 8 & 9, Rule 110)

Is the inclusion of the exact date of the commission of the offense mandatory for the validity of the information? No. Such failure to include the exact date of the commission of the crime does not render defective the information. It remains valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. It is only necessary to state the exact date and time of the commission of the offense when the same is an essential ingredient of the crime charged. It is enough to allege that the crime was committed at any time as near to the actual date on which the crime was committed.

What is the meaning of the term Direction and Control of the prosecutor over the prosecution of criminal actions? It simply means that the institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor, he may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. What is the reason for giving the control and supervision to the prosecutor? The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the prosecutor is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. The prosecution of the criminal action cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of the crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office.

They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

In the Regional Trial Court, the prosecution of cases must be under the direction and control of the government prosecutor.

Is there a limitation on the power of discretion and control? Yes. The power of the prosecutor is not without limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe. The resolution of the prosecutor maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the action or the opinion of the prosecutor. Consequently, the Secretary of Jutice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in court or otherwise, that information be filed in court. The moment the prosecutor files the case in court, any matter relating to the disposition of the case shall be within the sound discretion of the court. Supposed the prosecutor believes that that the evidence is not sufficient yet his superiors think otherwise, can his superiors still compel him to prosecute? The role of the prosecutor is to see to it that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the prosecutor to proceed with the presentation of

evidence of the prosecution to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. May the courts interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of criminal prosecutions? In general the courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the prosecutor to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on the information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither has the court any power to order the prosecutor to prosecute or file the information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the prosecut ors discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. A prosecutor who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and courts that grant the same commit no error. The prosecutor may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS


Hunyo 13, 2012 by foobarph

in Criminal Procedure.

Criminal Procedure

People vs Lagon (185 SCRA 442)

Doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measure by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged firmly settled.

It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the

commission of the offense charged. Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.

Subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.

In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.

Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court.

People vs Magallanes (149 SCRA 212)

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the result of evidence after trial.

Allegation of taking advantage of his position or taking advantage of their respective positions incorp orated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of offenses committed in relation to public office. In Montilla vs. Hilario, such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office, It says:

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that thecriminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975?

Jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.

Buaya vs Polo (169 SCRA 471)

General rule that the denial of a motio to dismiss or to quash being being nterlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).

The averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried.

Jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial.

Fukuzume vs CA (474 SCRA 570)

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the

court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Jimenez vs Nazareno (160 SCRA 1)

Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.

Paderanga vs CA (247 SCRA 471) - Digested Case

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.

A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.

The motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.

Santiago vs Vasquez (Not part of Syllabus but a good reference in Paderanga case)

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail

Bond. Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave that she be considered as h aving placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings. On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court In rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES CASES DOCTRINES


Hunyo 17, 2012 by foobarph

in Case Digest,Criminal Procedure.

Criminal Procedure

Macasaet vs People (453 SCRA 255)

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.

The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.

In Agbayani v. Sayo, we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.

It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts

contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.

The OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.

When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. As explained by our former colleague, JusticeFlorenz Regalado . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.

Agustin vs Pamintuan (467 SCRA 601)

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

The rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.

Mobilia Products Inc vs Umezawa (452 SCRA 736)

All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. When thecivil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.

The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari ormandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and

the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. Crespo vs Mogul (151 SCRA 462)

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.

Pecho vs People (262 SCRA 518)

For double jeopardy to exist, there must be such new information and the accused must be able to show that (1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for the same offense or an attempt to or frustration thereof as that charged in the new information, and that (5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his consent or after he had pleaded to the information but therefore judgment was rendered.

The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of the public and commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some of the said documents.

Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is there evidence of petitioners active participation in the commission of the crime. The con -cordant combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the prosecutions evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be presumed innocent unit proven guilty can be over-thrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.

People vs Ave GR 137274-75 Oct 18, 2008

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[51] is reclusion perpetua to death while the penalty prescribed for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, i.e., the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, under P.D. No. 1866, is death.

On June 6, 1997, however, Congress approved Republic Act No. 8294. It provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.[54] In People v. Molina,[55] we held that where murder or homicide is committed, the separate penalty for illegal possession shall no longer be meted out inasmuch as it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.

The trial court applied R.A. No. 8294 in the murder case at bar and in line with our ruling in Molina held that the use of the unlicensed firearm in the killing of Pedro aggravated the commission of the crime. He then meted the maximum penalty of death to the appellant.

After Molina, however, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated by this Court and became effective on December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the complaint or information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of the offense if they are to be appreciated. In the case at bar, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was not alleged in the informations. The two (2) informations at bar, for

murder and frustrated murder, merely alleged that the appellant used a long firearm. They did not allege that the firearm used was unlicensed. The failure of the prosecution to allege in the Information the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in committing the crime of murder prevents us from imposing the death penalty on the appellant even if the same was proved at the trial. The appellant should, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. People vs Costales, et al, GR 141154-56, Jan 15, 2002

On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the crimes of murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as amended.

We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree and now considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as a separate offense.

As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require the qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.

Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled by both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take into account the following factors which account for the near flawless statements of the prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his

cohort, especially so since the assailants were prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very near each other because of the very limited space of their shanty such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least sensed, by all of them.

In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated murder but was convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that the failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that Crispina would have died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the accuseds conviction for attempted murder only.

We call to mind People v. De La Cruz11 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they would have caused his death. In fa ct, as early as People v. Zaragosa,[12] we enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.

People vs Villar GR 132378 Jan 18, 2000

We find no competent evidence showing that the victim exhibited no unusual behavior during the one-year period that she was being sexually abused by accused-appellant. The lack of concrete evidence of any unusual behavior on record does not prove that there was in fact no such unusual behavior. If accused-appellant wanted the court to consider such an allegation, it was incumbent upon him to prove the same with competent evidence. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. He cannot simply rely on the lack of evidence showing the contrary.

The commission of rape was concededly improbable but not impossible. In People vs. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem a problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more

soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place, and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.

In People vs. Dela Cuesta (G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999), we held: The seven modes of committing rape introduced under R.A. 7659 and R.A. 4111 which warrant the automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty or rape to one degree. As such, this qualifying circumstance, that the child is under eighteen (18) and the offender is a guardian, should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such.

Although the circumstances to qualify simple rape to the heinous crime of rape, namely: (a) victim under 18 years old (the certificate of live birth exhibit A was admitted by the defense), and (b) the offender being a guardian, were duly proven in the present case, these circumstance cannot considered for purposes of imposing the extreme penalty of death unless these were alleged in the information. An examination of the two informations in the present case reveals that only the qualifying circumstance that the child is under 12 was alleged. There was no allegation that the offender was a guardian of the victim. To consider said circumstance as qualifying, would constitute denial of the right of accusedappellant to due process and to be informed of the charges against him. At best, such circumstance may only be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance, which, in the case of simple statutory rape, however, is inconsequential because the imposable penalty is the singular indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People vs Camerino 108 Phil 79

Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash but may not defer it till the trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the motion, the court may order the filing of a new information or may dismiss the case. In the new information, the defects of the previous information may be cured. For instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the ground that more than one offense is charged in the information, the court may order that another information be filed charging only one offense. But the court may or may not issue such order in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the defects found in the first information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the accused, if he is in custody, should not be discharged, unless otherwise, admitted to bail. But if no

such order is made, or, having been made, the prosecuting attorney fails to file another information within the time specified by the court, the accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also in custody for another charge, or if is out on bail, the bail must be exonerated. In such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another criminal proceeding since such ground of objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).

In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more than one offense but only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was not the purpose or intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying different offenses which as a whole, supposedly constitute the crime of sedition. Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.

1ST SET CASES ON SALES BY ATTY GLENN MANGAOIL


Hulyo 18, 2012 by foobarph

in Case Doctrines,Sales.

Sales

1.

Villanueva vs CA 267 SCRA 89

Since sale is a consensual contract, the party who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof, as well as of the essential elements thereof.

2.

De Leon vs Salvador 36 SCRA 567

Judicial Sale But even if the foregoing requisites are shown, a judicial sale will not be set aside by the court when there is a right of redemption, since the more inadequate the winning bid at public sale, the more easily it is for the owner to redeem the property.

3.

Alsua vs CA 92- SCRA 332

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the courts conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account.

4.

Tongoy vs CA 123 SCRA 99

When the mortgages were constituted, respondents Cresenciano Tongoy and Norberto Tongoy were still minors, while respondent Amado Tongoy became of age on August 19, 1931, and Ricardo Tongoy attained majority age on August 12, 1935. Still, considering that such transfer of the properties in the name of Luis D. Tongoy was made in pursuance of the master plan to save them from foreclosure, the said respondents were precluded from doing anything to assert their rights. It was only upon failure of the herein petitioner, as administrator and/or successor-in-interest of Luis D. Tongoy, to return the properties that the prescriptive period should begin to run.

5.

Labagala vs Santiago 371 SCRA 360

MINORS, INSANE OR DEMENTED PERSONS, AND DEAF-MUTES Generally, minors, insane and demented persons, and deafmutes who do not know how to write, have no legal capacity to contract, and therefore are disqualifi ed from being parties to a sale. Nonetheless, contractsentered into by such legally incapacitated persons are not void, but merely voidable, subject to annulment or ratifi cation. The action for annulment cannot be instituted by the person who is capacitated since he is disqualifi ed from alleging the incapacity of the person with whom he contracts.

Contracts entered into during lucid intervals by insane or demented persons are generally valid; whereas, those entered into in a state of drunkenness, or during a hypnotic spell, are merely voidable.

When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution, except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.

6.

Salonga vs Farrales 105 SCRA 359

A lessee of a lot who constructs in good faith thereon a house may remove said house, but cannot compel the lessor to sell to him the lot, unless there be an agreement to this effect.

7.

Sps Buenaventura vs CA 416 SCRA 263

A sale over a subject matter is not a real contract, but a consensual contract, which becomes a valid and binding contract upon the meeting of the minds as to the price. Once there is a meeting of the minds as to the price, the sale is valid, despite the manner of its actual payment, or even when there has been breach thereof. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the sale is valid but subject to reformation; if there is no meeting of the minds as to the price, because the price stipulated is simulated, then the contract is void.

8.

Swedish Matchvs CA 441 SCRA 1

When definite agreement on manner of payment essential? As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.

9.

Montecillo vs Reynes 385 SCRA 244

When definite agreement on manner of payment essential? Although the law does not expressly state that the minds of the parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.

10. Lagrimas Boy vs CA 427 SCRA 196

The finding of the MeTC, sustained by the Court of Appeals, is that the continued occupation by petitioner of said property after the sale, without payment of rent, was by mere tolerance. Private respondents claimed that petitioner requested for time to vacate the premises and they agreed thereto because they did not need the property at that time. However, when private respondents were asked to vacate their rented residence, they demanded that petitioner vacate the subject property, but petitioner refused to do so. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

11. Sampaguita Picturesvs Jalwindor Manufacturers 93 SCRA 420

Ownership of thing transferred by delivery This is true even if the purchase has been made on credit. Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer of ownership, as long as the property sold has been delivered.

12. Union Motor Corp vs CA 361 SCRA 506

In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery, whether actual or constructive, should be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing sold. The act without the intention is insufficient; there is no tradition.

13. Adelfa Properties Inc vs CA GR 111238

Exceptions to the rule (1) Contrary stipulation. The ownership of things is transferred by delivery, and not by mere payment. However, the parties may stipulate that despite the delivery, the ownership of the thing shall remain with the seller until the purchaser has fully paid the price. (see Art. 1503.)

In other words, non-payment of the price, after the thing has been delivered, prevents the transfer of ownership only if such is the stipulation of the parties. This stipulation is usually known as pactum reservati dominii or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan.

A contract which contains this kind of stipulation is considered a contract to sell. The agreement may be implied.

14. Litonjua vs L&R Corp 328 SCRA 796

Nature of option contract. (1) An option is a contract. It is a preparatory contract, separate and distinct from the main contract itself (subject matter of the option) which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. (2) It gives the party granted the option the right to decide, whether or not to enter into a principal contract, while it binds the party who has given the option, not to enter into the principal

15. Ang Yu Asuncion vs CA 238 SCRA 602

There was nothing to execute because a contract over the right of first refusal belongs to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by the law on contracts but by the codal provisions on human relations. This may apply here if the contract is limited to the buying and selling of the real property. However, the obligation of R to first offer the property to E is embodied in a contract. It is Paragraph 8 on the right of first refusal which created the obligation. It should be enforced according to the law on contracts instead of the panoramic and indefinite rule on human relations. The latter remedy encourages multiplicity of suits. There is something to execute and that is for R to comply with its obligation to the property under the right of the first refusal according to the terms at which they should have been offered then to E, at the price when that offer should have been made. Also, E has to accept the offer. This juridical relation is not amorphous nor it is merely preparatory. Subsequently in 1994, in the case of Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals (238 SCRA 602 [1994].), the Court en banc departed from the doctrine laid down in Guzman, Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie and refused to rescind a contract of sale which violated the right of first refusal. The Court held that the so-calledright of first refusal cannot be deemed a perfected contractof sale under Article 1458 of the new Civil Code and, as such, a breach thereof decreed under a final judgment does not entitle the aggrieved party to a writ of execution of the judgment but to an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.

1.

Spouses Reyes vs Salvador

A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.

A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated (cf. Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]). However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller.

In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.

Even in the absence of an express stipulation to such effect, the intention of the parties to execute a contract to sell may be implied from the provisions of the contract. While Article 1478[48] of the Civil Code recognizes the right of the parties

to agree that the ownership of the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price therefore, the same statutory provision does not require that such be expressly stipulated in the contract.

2ND SET CASES ON SALES BY ATTY GLENN MANGAOIL


Hulyo 31, 2012 by foobarph

in Case Doctrines,Sales.

Sales

San Miguel Properties Philippines , Inc vs Huang, 336 SCRA 737, July 31, 2000 Amount given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of thecontract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale.With regard to the alleged payment and acceptance of earnest money, the Court holds that respondents did not give the P1 million as earnest money as provided by Art. 1482 of the Civil Code. They presented the amount merely as a deposit of what would eventually become the earnest money or downpayment should a contract of sale be made by them. The amount was thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale. Respondents in fact described the amount as an earn estdeposit. Option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the properties within the period agreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale which the parties may enter.The first condition for an option period of 30 days sufficiently shows that a sale was never perfected. As petitioner correctly points out, acceptance of this condition did not give rise to a perfected sale but merely to an option or an accepted unilateral promise on the part of respondents to buy the subject properties within 30 days from the date of acceptance of the offer. Such option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the properties within the period

agreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale which the parties may enter. All that respondents had was just the option to buy the properties which privilege was not, however, exercised by them because there was a failure to agree on the terms of payment. No contract of sale may thus be enforced by respondents. Option secured by respondents from petitioner was fatally defective; Consideration in an option contract may be anything of value, unlike in sale where it must be the price certain in money or its equivalent. Even the option secured by respondents from petitioner was fatally defective. Under the second paragraph of Art. 1479, an accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor only if the promise is supported by a distinct consideration. Consideration in an option contract may be anything of value, unlike in sale where it must be the price certain in money or its equivalent. There is no showing here of any consideration for the option. Lacking any proof of such consideration, the option is unenforceable. The manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist. The appellate court opined that the failure to agree on the terms of payment was no bar to the perfection of the sale because Art. 1475 only requires agreement by the parties as to the price of the object. This is error. In Navarro v. Sugar Producers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., we laid down the rule that the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist. Although the Civil Code does not expressly state that the minds of the parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise there is no sale. As held in Toyota Shaw, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, agreement on the manner of payment goes into the price such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. It is not the giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.It is not the giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.

In a later case (Sanchez vs. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368 [1972], infra.), the Supreme Court abandoned the view adhered to in Southwestern Sugar (supra.) which holds that an option to sell can still be withdrawn, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by any consideration, and reaffirmed the doctrine in Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. vs. Cua Hian Tek (102 Phil. 948 [1958], infra.), holding that it ould no longer be withdrawn after acceptance. In other words, if acceptance is made before withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale although the option is given without consideration. Before acceptance, the offer may be withdrawn as a matter of right.20 Be that as it may, the offerer cannot revoke, before the period has expired, in an arbitrary or capricious manner the offer without being liable for damages which the offeree may suffer under Article 19 of the Civil Code. The doctrine laid down in the Atkins case (supra.) is reaffirmed, and, insofar as inconsistent therewith, the view adhered to in Southwestern case should be deemed abandoned or modified. 21 (Sanchez vs. Rigos, supra.)

(3) Offer to sell had been accepted. In the instant case, the option offered by private respondents had been accepted by the petitioner, the promisee, in the same document. The acceptance of an order to sell for a price certain created a bilateral contract to sell and buy and upon acceptance, the offeree ipso facto assumes obligations of a vendee. (see Atkins, Kroll & Co.vs. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948 [1958].) Deman dability may be exercised at any time after the execution of the deed. In Sanchez vs. Rigos (45 SCRA 368 [1972].), We held: In other words, since there may be no valid contract without a cause of consideration, the

promissor is not bound by this promise and may accordingly withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale. Promissor withdrew an option to sell which is not supported by any consideration, after its acceptance by promisee.

Facts: S wrote B making a firm offer for the sale at a definite price of a determinate quantity of sardines. B accepted the offer unconditionally. Issue: Is there a perfected contract of sale?

Held: Yes, as the promise is bilateral, i.e., a promise to buy and sell. Before accepting the promise of S and before exercising his option, B is not bound to buy. Upon accepting Ss offer, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues; B assumes ipso facto the obligations of a purchaser, and not merely the right

(3) When earnest money is given, the buyer is bound to pay the balance, while the would-be buyer who gives option money is not required to buy. (Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 58 SCAD 962, 240 SCRA 565 [1995] and Limson vs. Court 23In this article, it is declared that When earnest money or a pledge had been given to bind a contract of purchase and sale, the contract may be rescinded if the vendee should be willing to forfeit the earnest money or pledge or the vendor to return double the amount. of Appeals, 357 SCRA 209 [2001], quoting De Leon, Comments and Cases on Sales, 1986 rev. ed., p. 67.) But option money may become earnest money if the parties so agree. The option period having expired and acceptance was not effectively made by petitioner, the purchase of subject property by respondent SUNVAR was perfectly valid and entered into in good faith. (Limson vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCAD 887, 357 SCRA 209 [2001].)

On the other hand, the fact that a deed of sale is a notarized document does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the said sale is a true conveyance to which the parties thereto are irrevocably bound. Though its notarization vests in its favor the presumption of regularity and due execution (Manzano vs. Perez, 152 SCAD 473, 362 SCRA 430 [2001].), it is not the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never intended by the parties to have any binding legal effect upon them. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of the contract. (Suntay vs. Court of Appeals, 66 SCAD 711, 251 SCRA 430 [1995]; Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637 [2000].) Where the vendor did not personally appear before the notary public, such fact raises doubt regarding the vendors consent to the sale notwithstanding that the deed states the contrary. (Tan vs. Mandap, 429 SCRA 711 [2004].) -

An invalidly notarized deed of sale must be considered merely as a private document. Even if validly notarized, the deed would still be classified as a private document if it is merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat but was not properly acknowledged. (Tigno vs. Aquino, 444 SCRA 61 [2004].) -

The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts (where no performance, i.e., delivery and payment, has as yet been made by both parties) and not to contracts which are totally (consummated) or partially performed. (see Vda. de Espiritu vs. CFI of Cavite, 47 SCRA 354 [1972].) It does not forbid oral evidence to prove a consummated sale. (Diama vs. Macalebo, 74 Phil. 70 [1942].) -

Applicability of Article 1484.

The law is aimed at those sales of personal property where the price is payable in several installments.

(1) Sale of personal property not payable in installments. Article 1484 does not apply to a sale of personal property on straight term or partly in cash and partly in term. Where the balance, after payment of the initial sum, should be paid in its totality at thetime specified, the transaction is not by installment as contemplated in Article 1484. (Levi Hermanos, Inc. vs. Gervacio, 69 Phil. 52 [1939].) 4. Chattel mortgage covers not only the personal property sold on installment payments but other personal property of the vendee mortgagor.

Facts: B purchased from S two Ford sedans payable in installments. B executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage covering not only the two new cars but also an old car and his certificate of public convenience for the operation of a taxicab fleet. With the conformity of B, S assigned its rights to the note and the mortgage to F. Due to the failure of B to pay the installments, F foreclosed the chattel mortgage extra- judicially. At the public auction, F was the purchaser. Another auction sale was held because Bs obligation was not fully satisfied by the sale of the vehicles. At the second sale, the franchise to operate t he taxicab service was sold to F. B filed an action for annulment of the contract of mortgage. The trial court held the chattel mortgage was null and void insofar as the taxicab franchise and the old car were concerned.

Issue: Is the chattel mortgage valid insofar as the franchise and the subsequent sale thereof are concerned?

Held: The resolution of said issue is unquestionably governed by the provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil Code. Under the article, the vendor of personal property the purchase price of which is payable in installments, has the right, should the vendee default in the payment of two or more of the agreed installments, to exact fulfillment by the purchaser of the obligation, or to cancel the sale, or to foreclose the mortgage on the purchased personal property, if one was constituted. Whichever right the vendor elects, he cannot avail of the other, these remedies being alternative, not cumulative. Furthermore, if the vendor avails

himself of the right to foreclose his mortgage, the law prohibits him from further bringing an action against the vendee for the purpose of recovering whatever balance of the debt secured not satisfied by the foreclosure sale.

Consequently, the lower court rightly declared the nullity of the chattel mortgage in question insofar as the taxicab franchise and the used car of B are concerned. F has to content himself with the proceeds of the sale at the public auction of the two cars which were sold on installment and mortgaged to S, his assignor. To allow the sale of other properties would be equivalent to obtaining a writ of execution against B concerning said properties which are separate and distinct from those which were sold on installment. This would be contrary to public policy and the very spirit and purpose of the law limiting the vendors right t o foreclose the chattel mortgage only on the thing sold. (Ridad vs. Filipinas Investment and Finance Corp., 120 SCRA 246 [1983]; see Levi Hermanos, Inc. vs. Pacific Commercial, 71 Phil. 587 [1941].)

Remedies alternative.

These remedies are alternative and are not to be exercised cumulatively or successively and the election of one is a waiver of the right to resort to the others. (Pacific Commercial Co. vs. De la Rama, 62 Phil. 380 [1935]; Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Flor, [C.A.] 57 O.G. 482; Cruz vs. Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp., 23 SCRA 791 [1968]; Filipinas Invest. & Finance Corp. vs. Ridad, 30 SCRA 564 [1969]; Industrial Finance Corp. vs. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 [1977]; Nonato vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 255 [1985].) (2) Remedy of cancellation. If the vendor chooses rescission or cancellation of the contract upon the vendees failure to pay two or more installments, the latter can demand the return of payments already made unless there is a stipulation about forfeiture. (see Art. 1486.) In a case, for failure of the buyer to pay two or more installments, the vendor-mortgagee (or his assignee) repossessed the car. The receipt issued by the vendors assignee to the vendee when it took possession of the vehicle states that the vehicle could be redeemed within 15 days, meaning that should the vendee fail to redeem within the said period by paying the balance of the purchase price, the assignee would retain permanent possession of the vehicle as it did in fact. It was held that by this act, the vendor exercised its option to cancel the contract of sale, barring it from exacting payment of the balance of the purchase price. It cannot have its cake and eat it too. (Nonato vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 255 [1985]

(3) Remedy of foreclosure. If the vendor has chosen the third remedy of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage if one has been given on the property, he is not obliged to return to the vendee the amount of the installments already paid should there be an agreement to that effect. (Ibid.) But he shall have no further action against the vendee for the recovery of any unpaid balance of the price remaining after the foreclosure and actual sale of the mortgaged chattel, and any agreement to the contrary is void. (Zayas,Jr. vs. Luneta Motor Company, 117 SCRA 726 [1982]; PAMECA Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 281 [1999].) (2) Prohibition not affected by assignment by vendor of his rights. The assignment by the vendor of his rights to the sale of personal property on installment basis covered by Article 1484 of the Civil Code does not change the nature of the transaction

between the parties the vendor and the vendee. It remains the same. Hence, the assignee can have no better rights than the assignor. Accordingly, where the obligation of the vendee had already been discharged by sale at public auction of the property subject of the chattel mortgage, no deficiency amount can be recovered by the assignee. To rule otherwise would pave the way for subverting the policy underlying Article 1484 on the foreclosure of chattel mortgages over personal property sold on installment basis. (Zayas, Jr. vs. Luneta Motor Company, 117 SCRA 726 [1982].)

Execution of a public instrument or document.

(1) Possession transferred to buyer by notarized deed of conveyance. The execution of a public instrument (i.e., an instrument or document attested and certified by a public officer authorized to administer oath, such as a notary public) as a manner of delivery applies to movable as well as immovable property since the law does not make any distinction and it can be clearly inferred by the use of the word also in paragraph 2 of Article 1498. This manner of delivery is symbolic. The buyer may use the document as proof of his ownership of the property sold (Florendo vs. Foz, 20 Phil. 388 [1911]; Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]; see Dy, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 826 [1991].), for purposes, for example, of mortgaging the same. (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180 [1999].) Under Article 1498, possession is transferred to the vendee (or lessee) by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance (Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCAD 619, 239 SCRA 341 [1994].) (o lease) including the incorporeal rights appurtenant thereto, e.g., right to eject tenants or squatters from the property in question. Since the execution of the deed of conveyance is deemed equivalent to delivery, prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of illegal occupants on the subject property, transfer of ownership by symbolic delivery under Article 1498 can still be effected through the execution of the deed of conveyance. The key word is control, not possession, of the property. (Sabio vs. I nternational Corporate Bank, 154 SCAD 377, 364 SCRA 385 [2001].) (5) Option to renew given to lessor. In Cruz and Koh (supra.), the option to renew the lease was given to the lessee. If the option is given to the lessor, the lessee cannot renew the lease against the formers refusal. (Ong Ching vs. Ramolete, 51 SCRA 13 [1973].) The lease is deemed terminated. (De Leon Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 762 [1975]; Tuason, Jr. vs. De Asis, 107 Phil. 131 [1960].)

Sancho vs. Abella, 58 Phil. 728 , November 13, 1933 WILLS; PROBATE; CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL.Neither senile debility, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will.

Neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of a bishop of a diocese, made in her

will by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping in a convent within the aforestated diocese. [Sancho vs. Abella, 58 Phil. 728(1933)]

Source: Original text from Supreme Court and Comments and Cases on Sales and Lease by De Leon, De Leon. Jr.

THE LAW ON SALES QUIZ BY ATTY GLENN MANGAOIL


Hulyo 17, 2012 by foobarph

in Lesson Exercise,Sales.

Sales

1.a. What is a Contract of Sale? 1.b. Distinguish Absolute Sale from a Conditional Sale.

1.c. Distinguish Sale fromm a Contract of Agency to Sell.

2. What are the rules to follow in case the consideration agreed upon in a contract of sale consists of money and property? 3. What happens to a unilateral promise to sell if not withdrawn by the offeror before acceptance? 4. Juan purchased a car from Toyota Alabang on installment basis. As security for the payment of his obligation, Juan executed a chattel mortgage over the Toyota Trius and another car belonging to him, a BMW Speedster. Juan failed to pay his obligation on the 4th month from date of purchase, hence Toyota Alabang foreclosed the BMW. Was the remedy taken by Toyota proper? Why? Why not?

5. Juan sold to Pedro a particular parcel of land covered by TCT #12345 situated inMakati City for a consideration of Php 1.2 million pesos. No formal contract was executed between them. It waws agreed though that payment is to be made five months from July 4, 2008. Pedro immediately started building a two-storey house therein. At the end of the term agreed upon, Pedro refused to pay the consideration agreen upon contending that the contract that they have entered into was unenforceable as it violates the provision on Statute of Frauds. Is Pedros contention correct? 6. Juan and Juanita got married in 2000. In 2003, they entered into a contract of sale over a one hectare agricultural land where Juan is the registered owner and sol the same to Juanita. Joan, an ex-girlfriend of Juan lent money to him 2005. Can Joan question the validity of the sale between the spouses? Why? Why not?

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS CASES ON DEPOSIT


Agosto 3, 2012 by foobarph

in Case Digest,Credit Transactions.

Credit Transactions

BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August 19, 1988 Facts:

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings accountand a peso current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dolarsavings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila bankingcorporation payable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit? Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs First Metro Investment GR 132390, May 21, 2004 Facts:

On August 25, 1989, FMIC, through its Executive Vice President Antonio Ong, opened current account and deposited METROBANK check no. 898679 of P100 million with BPI Family Bank (BPI FB). Ong made the deposit upon request of his friend, Ador de Asis, a close acquaintance of Jaime Sebastian, then Branch Manager of BPI FB San Francisco del Monte Branch. Sebastians aim was to increase the deposit level in his Branch. BPI FB, through Sebastian, guaranteed the payment of P14,667,687.01 representing17% per annum interest of P100 million deposited by FMIC. The latter, in turn, assured BPI FB that it will maintain its deposit of P100 million for a period of one year on condition that the interest of 17% per annum is paid in advance. This agreement between the parties was reached through their communications in writing. Subsequently, BPI FB paid FMIC 17% interest or P14,667,687.01 upon clearance of the latters check deposit.

However, on August 29, 1989, on the basis of an Authority to Debit signed by Ong and Ma. Theresa David, Senior Manager of FMIC, BPI FB transferred P80 million from FMICs current account to the savings account of Tevesteco Arrastre Stevedoring,Inc. FMIC denied having authorized the transfer of its funds to Tevesteco, claiming that the signatures of Ong and David were falsified.

Thereupon, to recover immediately its deposit, FMIC, on September 12, 1989, issued BPI FB check no. 129077 forP86,057,646.72 payable to itself and drawn on its deposit with BPI FB SFDM branch. But upon presentation for payment on September 13, 1989, BPI FB dishonored thecheck as it was dr awn against insufficient funds. Consequently, FMIC filed a complaint against BPI FB.

FMIC filed an Information for estafa against Ong, de Asis, Sebastian and four others. However, the Information was dismissed on the basis of a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.

Issues:

1. Was the transaction between FMIC and BPI, a time deposit or an interest-bearing current account which, under existing bank regulations, was an illegal transaction? 2. Is the bank liable for the unauthorized transfer of respondents funds to Tevesteco?

Decisions:

1.We hold that the parties did not intend the deposit to be treated as a demanddeposit but rather as an interest-earning time deposit not withdrawable anytime. When respondent FMIC invested its money with petitioner BPI FB, they intended the P100 million as a time deposit, to earn 17% per annum interest and to remain intactuntil itsmaturity date one year thereafter. Ordinarily, a time deposit is defined as one the payment of which cannot legally be required within such a specified number of days.In contrast, demand deposits are all those liabilities of the Bangko Sentral and of other banks which are denominated inPhilippine currency and are subject to payment in legal tender upon demand by the presentation of (depositors) checks. While it may be true that barely one month and seven days from the date of deposit, respondent FMIC demanded the withdrawal of P86,057,646.72 through the issuance of a check payable to itself, the same was made as a result of the fraudulent and unauthorized transfer by petitioner BPI FB of its P80 million deposit to Tevestecos savings account. Certainly, such was a normal reaction of respondent as a depositor to petitioners failure in its fiduciary duty to treat its a ccount with the highest degree of care.

Under this circumstance, the withdrawal of deposit by respondent FMIC before the one-year maturity date did not change the nature of its time deposit to one of demand deposit. We have held that if a corporation knowingly permits its officer, or any other agent, to perform acts within the scope of an apparent authority, holding him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any person who has dealt in good faith with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying such authority. Petitioner maintains that respondent should have first inquired whether the deposit of P100 Million and the fixing of the interest rate were pursuant to its (petitioners) internal procedures. Petitioners stance is a futile attempt to evade an obligation clearly established by the intent of the parties. What transpires in the corporate boardroom is entirely an internal matter. Hence, petitioner may not impute negligence on the part of respondents representative in failing to find out the scope of authority of petitioners Branch Manager.

Indeed, the public has the right to rely on the trustworthiness of bank managers and their acts. Obviously, confidence in the banking system, which necessarily includes reliance on bank managers, is vital in the economic life of our society. Significantly, the transaction was actually acknowledged and ratified by petitioner when it paid respondent in advance the interest for one year. Thus, petitioner is estopped from denying that it authorized its Branch Manager to enter into anagreement with respondents Executive Vice President concerning the deposit withthe corresponding 17% interest per annum.

2.Yes. We uphold the finding of both lower courts that petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its obligations to its depositors. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, whether

such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of million of pesos. Here, petitioner cannot claim it exercised such adegree of care required of it and must, therefore, bear the consequence.

Tan vs. CA GR 108555, 20 December 1994 Facts:

Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a Cashiers Check from PhilippineCommercial Industrial Bank (PCIBank) to P30,000 payable to his order to avoid carrying cash while enrouteto Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in itsBinondo Branch. RCBC sent the check for clearing to the Central Bank which was returned for having beenmissent or misrouted. RCBC debited Tans account without informing him. Relying on commonknowledge that a cashiers check was as good as cash, and a month after depositing the check, he issued twopersonal checks in the name of Go Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation. Both checks bounced dueto insufficiency of funds. Tan filed a suit for damages against RCBC.

Issue: Whether a cashiers check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two checks subsequently drawn.

Held: An ordinary check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. There is an element ofcertainty or assurance that it will be paid upon presentation; that is why it is perceived as a convenientsubstitute for currency in commercial and financial transactions. Herein, what is involved is more than anordinary check, but a c ashiers check. A cashiers check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank andaccepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, a cashiers check is a banks order to pay what isdrawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor beyond the check. Herein,PCIB by issuing the check created an unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank. Reliance on thelaymans perception that a cashiers check is as good as cash is not entirely misplaced, as it is rooted inpra ctice, tradition and principle.

Solidbank vs CA, Central Bank GR 120010

Facts:

The Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) was placed under receivership. A Liquidator was designated for the liquidation process. The Central Bank invited several banks to buy the assets and the franchise of the various offices of PBC and to assume its liabilities. The Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) was one of the bidders, and its bid was found to be the most advantageous. PBC and Central Bank on the one hand and FEBTC on the other, signed: (a) Purchase Agreement; and (b) Memorandum of Agreement.

The Solidbank Corporation (a.k.a. the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation, hereafter, Solidbank) through its Senior VicePresident/Comptroller Ms. Corazon R. Dayao, filed its claims with the Liquidator of PBC, Mr. Renan V. Santos, namely:

(1) P8,024,007.27 (excluding interests and surcharges) covering eight (8) receivables (computer machines and other accessories connected with their operations and the right to collect rentals therefrom) due from PBC and assigned to Solidbank by the United Pacific Leasing and Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of PBC, which amount due as of totalled P24,158,263.10;

(2) several deposits (proceeds of collection items evidenced by registers of collection items and balances of the current accounts in the various branches of PBC).

Solidbank filed with the liquidation court a Motion for Summary Judgment in connection with the claims aforementioned, citing the following grounds: there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; there is no substantial controversy in the case; and, it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

FEBTC filed its Comment alleging: FEBTC did not specifically deny the claims of Solidbank in the Motion to Implead; the issues before the liquidation court are not purely legal, but factual, i.e., whether the subject receivables as well as deposit liabilities were included in the Purchase Agreement as among those purchased by FEBTC.

Issues:

Whether or not the deposit liabilities are included in the Purchase Agreement as among those purchased by FEBTC with Solidbank?

Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.

Ruling:

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that the foregoing requisites are present. There is a genuine issue, the resolution of which requires the presentation of evidence, i.e., whether or not Solidbanks claim is included in the purchase agreement as among the properties and items purchased and assumed by FEBTC from Pacific Bank/Central Bank. While the counsel for FEBTC did say that in principle he is not objecting to the motion for summary judgment and that they will have no objection if the Court will just require the parties to submit affidavit and counter-affidavits in support to their respective contentions, this should not be

taken out of context for in the same manifestation, said counsel clearly expressed that he does not agree that there are no material issues raised in the pleadings.

SC: Solidbank lost. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.