Rosa Luxemburg

The National Question

(1909)

First Published: In a series of articles on The national question and autonomy which appeared in Luxemburgs Cracow magazine, Przeglad socialdemokrat czn , 1 !"#1 ! $ %ource: The National Question ! "elected #ritings b Rosa Luxemburg, edited and introduced b& the late 'orace ($ )a*is, +onthl& ,e*iew Press, 1 -.$ /ranslated: 0from the Polish1$

/he ,ight of 2ations to %elf#)etermination /he 2ation#%tate and the Proletariat Federation, Centralization, and Particularism Centralization and 3utonom& /he 2ational 4uestion and 3utonom&

Publisher$s Notes ,osa Luxemburg published a series of articles under the general title, The Problem of Nationality and Autonomy, in her theoretical 5ournal, Przeglad "ozialdemokrat czn 06ra7ow1, in nos$.#1!, 18, and 19#1:, 1 !" and 1 ! $ /he paging was as follows: 3rticle 1 pps$9"8#:1:; 8, : -#.18; <, .1<#.<1; 9, ."-#-1!; :, - :#"1"; . 0Special Problems of Poland1, pp$1<.#.<, <:1#-.$ /he first fi*e articles 0but not the sixth1 are included in the present collection$ /he 2otes are somewhat confusing$ /he& ha*e been renumbered and those that were b& ,osa Luxemburg or her publisher attributed while the others are b& the editor 'orace ($ )a*is in the +onthl& ,e*iew edition$

%ditor$s Note
&b 'orace ( )a*ies+ /he theses here presented are the wor7 of ,ade7, %tein#6ra5ews7i, and +$ (rons7i, who were then located in %witzerland; before the draft was published, it was submitted also to 'anec7i in Copenhagen$ /his was the so#called ,ostamowc& fraction of the old %)6PiL$ 2ationalism was not an issue between this group and the =arzadowc& faction to which ,osa Luxemburg belonged, so these theses are intended as an expression and continuation of ,osa Luxemburgs position on the national >uestion$ ?f course, ,osa Luxemburg herself had b& this time modified her position slightl&, as will be e*ident from a stud& of the @AuniusB pamphlet, published at the same time as these theses; her position two &ears later, in the pamphlet, The Russian Re*olution 0a chapter of which is included in the present collection1, is again not precisel& the same$ 'owe*er, the theses do express her general point of *iew$

1, The Right o- Nations to "el-!)etermination

3mong other problems, the 1 !: ,e*olution in ,ussia has brought into focus the nationalit& >uestion$ Cntil now, this problem has been urgent onl& in 3ustria#'ungar&$ 3t present, howe*er, it has become crucial also in ,ussia, because the re*olutionar& de*elopment made all classes and all political parties acutel& aware of the need to sol*e the nationalit& >uestion as a matter of practical politics$ 3ll the newl& formed or forming parties in ,ussia, be the& radical, liberal or reactionar&, ha*e been forced to include in their programs some sort of a position on the nationalit& >uestion, which is closel& connected with the entire complex of the states internal and external policies$ For a wor7ers part&, nationalit& is a >uestion both of program and of class organization$ /he position a wor7ers part& assumes on the nationalit& >uestion, as on e*er& other >uestion, must differ in method and basic approach from the positions of e*en the most radical bourgeois parties, and from the positions of the Pseudo#socialistic, petit bourgeois parties$ %ocial )emocrac&, whose political program is based on the scientific method of historical materialism and the class struggle, cannot ma7e an exception with respect to the nationalit& >uestion$ +oreo*er, it is onl& b& approaching the problem from the standpoint of scientific socialism that the politics of %ocial )emocrac& will offer a solution which is essentially uniform, e*en though the program must ta7e into account the wide *ariet& of forms of the nationalit& >uestion arising from the social, historical, and ethnic di*ersit& of the ,ussian empire$ In the program of the %ocial )emocratic Labor Part& 0,%)LP1 of ,ussia, such a formula, containing a general solution of the nationalit& >uestion in all its particular manifestations, is pro*ided b& the ninth point; this sa&s that the part& demands a democratic republic whose constitution would insure, among other things, @that all nationalities forming the state have the right to self-determination.B /his program includes two more extremel& important propositions on the same matter$ /hese are the se*enth point, which demands the abolition of classes and the full legal e>ualit& of all citizens without distinction of sex, religion, race or nationality, and the eighth point, which sa&s that the se*eral ethnic groups of the state should ha*e the right to schools conducted in their respecti*e national languages at state expense, and the right to use their languages at assemblies and on an e>ual le*el with the state language in all state and public functions$ Closel& connected to the nationalit& >uestion is the third point of the program, which formulates the demand for wide self# go*ernment on the local and pro*incial le*el in areas which are characterized b& special li*ing conditions and b& the special composition of their populations$ ?b*iousl&, howe*er, the authors of the program felt that the e>ualit& of all citizens before the law, linguistic rights, and local self# go*ernment were not enough to sol*e the nationalit& problem, since the& found it necessar& to add a special paragraph granting each nationalit& the @right to self#determination$B Dhat is especiall& stri7ing about this formula is the fact that it doesnt represent an&thing specificall& connected with socialism nor with the politics of the wor7ing class$ @/he right of nations to self#determinationB is at first glance a paraphrase of the old slogan of bourgeois nationalism put forth in all countries at all times: @the right of nations to freedom and independence$B In Poland, the @innate right of nationsB to freedom has been the classic formula of nationalists from the )emocratic %ociet& to Limanows7is Pobudka, and from the national socialist Pobudka to the anti#socialist 2ational LeagueB before it renounced its program of independence$E8F %imilarl&, a resolution on the

@e>ual rights of all nationsB to freedom was the onl& tangible result of the famous pan#%la* congress held in Prague, which was bro7en up in 1"9" b& the pan#%la*ic ba&onets of Dindischgraetz$ ?n the other hand, its generalit& and wide scope, despite the principle of @the right of nations to self# determinationB which ob*iousl& can be applied not onl& to the peoples li*ing in ,ussia but also to the nationalities li*ing in German& and 3ustria, %witzerland and %weden, 3merica H strangel& enough is not to be found in an& of the programs of toda&s socialist parties$ /his principle is not e*en included in the program of 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac&, which exists in a state with an extremel& mixed population, where the nationalit& >uestion is of crucial importance$ /he 3ustrian part& would sol*e the nationalit& >uestion not b& a metaph&sical formula which lea*es the determination of the nationalit& >uestion up to each of the nationalities according to their whims, but onl& b& means of a well#defined plan$ 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& demands the elimination of the existing state structure of 3ustria, which is a collection of @7ingdoms and princel& statesB patched together during the +iddle 3ges b& the d&nastic politics of the 'apsburgs, and includes *arious nationalities mixed together territoriall& in a hodgepodge manner$ /he part& rather demands that these 7ingdoms and states should be di*ided into territories on the basis of nationalit&, and that these national territories be 5oined into a state union$ (ut because the nationalities are to some extent 5umbled together through almost the entire area of 3ustria, the program of %ocial )emocrac& ma7es pro*ision for a special law to protect the smaller minorities in the newl& created national territories$ I*er&one is free to ha*e a different opinion on this plan$ 6arl 6auts7&, one of the most 7nowledgeable experts on 3ustrian conditions and one of the spiritual fathers of 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac&, shows in his latest pamphlet, Nationalit and .nternationalism, that such a plan, e*en if it could be put into effect, would b& no means completel& eliminate the conflicts and difficulties among the nationalities$ 2onetheless, it does represent an attempt to pro*ide a practical solution of these difficulties b& the part& of the proletariat, and because of the importance of the nationalit& >uestion in 3ustria, we shall >uote it in full$ /he nationalit& program of the 3ustrian part&, adopted at the (rJnn Congress in 1" , sa&s:

(ecause national conflicts in 3ustria are obstructing all political progress and the cultural de*elopment of the nationalities, because these conflicts result primaril& from the bac7wardness of our public institutions and because the prolongation of these conflicts is one of the methods b& which the ruling classes insure their domination and pre*ent measures in the true interests of the people, the congress declares that: /he final settlement of the nationalit& and language >uestion in 3ustria in the spirit of e>ualit& and reason is primaril& a cultural demand, and therefore is one of the *ital interests of the proletariat$ /his is possible onl& under a trul& democratic regime based on uni*ersal, e>ual, and direct elections, a regime in which all feudal pri*ileges in the state and the principalities will ha*e been abrogated$ ?nl& under such a regime will the wor7ing classes, the elements which reall& support the state and societ&, be able to express their demands$ /he nurturing and de*elopment of the national peculiarities of all peoples in 3ustria are possible onl& on the basis of e>ual rights and the remo*al of oppression$ /herefore, state#bureaucratic centralism and the feudal pri*ileges of the principalities must be opposed$

?nl& under such conditions will it be possible to create harmon& among the nationalities in 3ustria in place of the >uarrelling that ta7es place now, namel&, through the recognition of the following guiding principles: 3ustria is to be transformed into a democratic federation of nationalities (Nationalit tenbundesstaat!. /he historic Crown lands are to be replaced b& nationall& homogeneous self#ruling bodies, whose legislation and administration shall be in the hands of national chambers, elected on the basis of uni*ersal, e>ual, and direct franchise$ 3ll self#go*erning regions of one and the same nation are to form together a nationall& distinct union, which shall ta7e care of this unions affairs autonomousl&$ E/hat is, linguistic and cultural, according to the explanation gi*en in the draft b& the part&s leadership$F 3 special law should be adopted b& the parliament to safeguard the rights of national minorities$ De do not recognize an& national pri*ilege; therefore we re5ect the demand for a state language$ Dhether a common language is needed, a federal parliament can decide$ /he part& congress, as the organ of international social democrac& in 3ustria, expresses its con*iction that on the basis of these guiding principles, understanding among peoples is possible$ It solemnl& declares that it recognizes the right of each nationalit& to national existence and national de*elopment$ Peoples can ad*ance their culture onl& in close solidarit& with one another, not in pett& >uarrels; particularl& the wor7ing class of all nations must, in the interest of the indi*idual nationalities and in the general interest, maintain international cooperation and fraternit& in its struggle and must conduct its political and economic struggle in closel& united ran7s$ In the ran7s of international socialism, the ,ussian Dor7ers Part& is the onl& one whose program includes the demand that @nationalities be granted the right to self#determination$B 3part from ,ussian %ocial )emocrac&, we find this formula onl& in the program of the ,ussian %ocial ,e*olutionaries, where it goes hand in hand with the principle of state federalism$ /he rele*ant section of the political declaration of the %ocial ,e*olutionar& Part& states that @the wide application of the principle of federalism in the relations between indi*idual nationalities is possible,B and stresses the @recognition of their unlimited right to self#determination$B It is true that the abo*e formula exists in another connection with international socialism: namel&, it is a paraphrase of one section of the resolution on the nationalit& problem adopted in 1" . b& the International %ocialist Congress in London$ 'owe*er, the circumstances which led to the adoption of that resolution, and the wa& in which the resolution was formulated, show clearl& that if the ninth paragraph in the program of the ,ussian part& is ta7en as an application of the London ,esolution, it is based on a misunderstanding$ /he London resolution was not at all the result of the intention or need to ma7e a statement at an international congress on the nationalit& >uestion in general, nor was it presented or adopted b& the Congress as a formula for the practical resolution of that question b& the wor7ers parties of the

*arious countries$ Indeed, 5ust the opposite was true$ /he London ,esolution was adopted on the basis of a motion presented to the Congress b& the social#patriotic faction of the Polish mo*ement, or the Polish %ocialist Part& 0PP%1, a motion which demanded that the reconstruction of an independent Poland be recognized as one of the most urgent demands of international socialism$E<F Influenced b& the criticism raised at the Congress b& Polish %ocial )emocrac& and the discussion concerning this in the socialist press, as well as b& the first mass demonstration of the wor7ers mo*ement in ,ussia the memorable stri7e of fort& thousand textile wor7ers in Petersburg in +a& 1" . the International Congress did not consider the Polish motion, which was directed in its arguments and in its entire character against the ,ussian re*olutionar& mo*ement$ Instead, it adopted the London ,esolution alread& mentioned, which signified a re5ection of the motion for the reconstruction of Poland$ /he Congress H the resolution states H declares itself in fa*or of the complete right of all nations to self#determination, and expresses its s&mpath& for the wor7ers of e*er& countr& now suffering under the &o7e of militar&, national, or other despotism; the Congress calls on the wor7ers of all these countries to 5oin the ran7s of the class#conscious wor7ers of the whole world in order to fight together with them for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achie*ement of the aims of international %ocial )emocrac&$ 3s we can see, in its content, the London ,esolution replaces the exclusi*e consideration of the Polish >uestion b& the generalization of the >uestion of all suppressed nationalities, transferring the >uestion from a national basis onto an inter#national one, and instead of a definite, completel& concrete demand of practical politics, which the motion of the PP% demanded the reconstruction of independent Poland#the resolution expresses a general socialist principle: s&mpath& for the proletariat of all suppressed nationalities and the recognition of their right to self#determination$ /here can be no doubt that this principle was not formulated b& the Congress in order to gi*e the international wor7ers mo*ement a practical solution to the nationalit& problem$ ?n the contrar&, a practical guideline for socialist politics is contained not in the first part of the London ,esolution >uoted abo*e, but in the second part, which @calls upon the wor7ers of all countries suffering national oppression to enter the ran7s of international %ocial )emocrac& and to wor7 for the realization of its principles and goals$B It is an unambiguous wa& of emphasizing that the principle formulated in the first part H the right of nations to self#determination can be put into effect onl& in one wa&: *iz$, b& first realizing the principles of international socialism and b& attaining its ultimate goals$ Indeed, none of the socialist parties too7 the London ,esolution to be a practical solution of the nationalit& >uestion, and the& did not include it in their programs$ I*en 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac&, for which the solution of the nationalit& problem was a >uestion in*ol*ing its *er& existence, did not do this; instead, in 1" , it created for itself independentl& the practical @nationalit& programB >uoted abo*e$ Dhat is most characteristic, e*en the PP% did not do this, because, despite its efforts to spread the tale that the London ,esolution was a formula in Bthe spiritB of socialism, it was ob*ious that this ,esolution meant rather a re5ection of its motion for the reconstruction of Poland, or at the *er& least, a dilution of it into a general formula without an& practical character$E9F In point of fact, the political programs of the modern wor7ers parties do not aim at stating abstract principles of a social ideal, but onl& at the formulation of those practical social and political reforms which the class#conscious proletariat needs and demands in the framewor7 of bourgeois societ& to facilitate the class struggle and their ultimate *ictor&$ /he elements of a political program are formulated with definite aims in mind: to pro*ide a direct, practical, and feasible solution to the crucial problems of political and social life, which are in the area of the class struggle of the proletariat; to ser*e as a guideline for e*er&da& politics and its needs; to initiate the political action of the wor7ers part& and

to lead it in the right direction; and finall&, to separate the re*olutionar& politics of the proletariat from the politics of the bourgeois and petit bourgeois parties$ /he formula, @the right of nations to self#determination,B of course doesnt ha*e such a character at all$ It gi*es no practical guidelines for the da& to da& politics of the proletariat, nor an& practical solution of nationalit& problems$ For example, this formula does not indicate to the ,ussian proletariat in what wa& it should demand a solution of the Polish national problem, the Finnish >uestion, the Caucasian >uestion, the Aewish, etc$ It offers instead onl& an unlimited authorization to all interested @nationsB to settle their national problems in an& wa& the& li7e$ /he onl& practical conclusion for the da& to da& politics of the wor7ing class which can be drawn from the abo*e formula is the guideline that it is the dut& of that class to struggle against all manifestations of national oppression$ If we recognize the right of each nation to self#determination, it is ob*iousl& a logical conclusion that we must condemn e*er& attempt to place one nation o*er another, or for one nation to force upon another an& form of national existence$ 'owe*er, the dut& of the class part& of the proletariat to protest and resist national oppression arises not from an& special @right of nations,B 5ust as, for example, its stri*ing for the social and political e>ualit& of sexes does not at all result from an& special @rights of womenB which the mo*ement of bourgeois emancipationists refers to$ /his dut& arises solel& from the general opposition to the class regime and to e*er& form of social ine>ualit& and social domination, in a word, from the basic position of socialism$ (ut lea*ing this point aside, the onl& guideline gi*en for practical politics is of a purel& negati*e character$ /he dut& to resist all forms of national oppression does not include an& explanation of what conditions and political forms the class#conscious proletariat in ,ussia at the present time should recommen d as a solution for the nationalit& problems of Poland, Lat*ia, the Aews, etc$, or what program it should present to match the *arious programs of the bourgeois, nationalist, and pseudo#socialist parties in the present class struggle$ In a word, the formula, @the right of nations to self#determination,B is essentiall& not a political and problematic guideline in the nationalit& >uestion, but onl& a means of avoiding that question.

..
/he general and clichK#li7e character of the ninth point in the program of the %ocial )emocratic Labor Part& of ,ussia shows that this wa& of sol*ing the >uestion is foreign to the position of +arxian socialism$ 3 @right of nationsB which is *alid for all countries and all times is nothing more than a metaph&sical clichK of the t&pe of Brights of manB and @rights of the citizen$B )ialectic materialism, which is the basis of scientific socialism, has bro7en once and for all with this t&pe of @eternalB formula$ For the historical dialectic has shown that there are no @eternalB truths and that there are no @rights$B $$$ In the words of Ingels, @Dhat is good in the here and now, is an e*il somewhere else, and *ice *ersaB H or, what is right and reasonable under some circumstances becomes nonsense and absurdit& under others$ 'istorical materialism has taught us that the real content of these @eternalB truths, rights, and formulae is determined onl& b& the material social conditions of the en*ironment in a gi*en historical epoch$ ?n this basis, scientific socialism has re*ised the entire store of democratic clichKs and ideological metaph&sics inherited from the bourgeoisie$ Present#da& %ocial )emocrac& long since stopped regarding such phrases as @democrac&,B @national freedom,B @e>ualit&,B and other such beautiful things as eternal truths and laws transcending particular nations and times$ ?n the contrar&, +arxism regards and treats them onl& as expressions of certain definite historical conditions, as categories which, in terms of their material content and therefore their political *alue, are sub5ect to constant change, which is the only @eternalB truth$

Dhen 2apoleon or an& other despot of his il7 uses a plebiscite, the extreme form of political democrac&, for the goals of Caesarism, ta7ing ad*antage of the political ignorance and economic sub5ection of the masses, we do not hesitate for a moment to come out wholeheartedl& against that @democrac&,B and are not put off for a moment b& the ma5est& or the omnipotence of the people, which, for the metaph&sicians of bourgeois democrac&, is something li7e a sacrosanct idol$ Dhen a German li7e /assendorf or a tsarist gendarme, or a @trul& PolishB 2ational )emocrat defends the @personal freedomB of stri7ebrea7ers, protecting them against the moral and material pressure of organized labor, we dont hesitate a minute to support the latter, granting them the fullest moral and historical right to force the unenlightened ri*als into solidarit&, although from the point of *iew of formal liberalism, those @willing to wor7B ha*e on their side the right of @a free indi*idualB to do what reason, or unreason, tells them$ Dhen, finall&, liberals of the +anchester %chool demand that the wage wor7er be left completel& to his fate in the struggle with capital in the name of @the e>ualit& of citizens,B we unmas7 that metaph&sical clichK which conceals the most glaring economic ine>ualit&, and we demand, point# blan7, the legal protection of the class of wage wor7ers, thereb& clearl& brea7ing with formal @e>ualit& before the law$B /he nationalit& >uestion cannot be an exception among all the political, social, and moral >uestions examined in this wa& b& modern socialism$ It cannot be settled b& the use of some *ague clichK, e*en such a fine#sounding formula as @the right of all nations to self#determination$B For such a formula expresses either absolutel& nothing, so that it is an empt&, noncommittal phrase, or else it expresses the unconditional dut& of socialists to support all national aspirations, in which case it is simpl& false$ ?n the basis of the general assumptions of historical materialism, the position of socialists with respect to nationalit& problems depends primaril& on the concrete circumstances of each case, which differ significantl& among countries, and also change in the course of time in each countr&$ I*en a superficial 7nowledge of the facts enables one to see that the >uestion of the nationalit& struggles under the ?ttoman Porte in the (al7ans has a completel& different aspect, a different economic and historical basis, a different degree of international importance, and different prospects for the future, from the >uestion of the struggle of the Irish against the domination of Ingland$ %imilarl&, the complications in the relations among the nationalities which ma7e up 3ustria are completel& different from the conditions which influence the Polish >uestion$ +oreo*er, the nationalit& >uestion in each countr& changes its character with time, and this means that new and different e*aluations must be made about it$ I*en our three national mo*ements beginning from the time of the 6osciusz7o Insurrection could be seen as a triple, stereot&ped repetition of the same historical pla& 0that is, @the struggle of a sub5ugated nationalit& for independenceB1 onl& in the e&es of either a metaph&sician of the upper#class Catholic ideolog& such as %zu5s7i, who belie*ed that Poland had historical mission to be the @Christ of nations,B or in the e&es of an ignoramus of the present#da& social#patriotic @school$B Dhoe*er cuts deeper with the scalpel of the researcher more precisel&, of the historical#materialist researcher H will see beneath the surface of our three national uprisings three completel& different socio#political mo*ements, which too7 on an identical form of struggle with the in*ader in each case onl& because of external circumstances$ /o measure the 6osciusz7o Insurrection and the 2o*ember and Aanuar& insurrections b& one and the same &ardstic7 H b& the sacred laws of the @sub5ugated nationB H actuall& re*eals a lac7 of all 5udgment and the complete absence of an& historical and political discrimination$E.F

3 glaring example of how the change of historical conditions influences the e*aluation and the position of socialists with respect to the nationalit& >uestion is the so#called Iastern >uestion$ )uring the Crimean war in 1"::, the s&mpathies of all democratic and socialist Iurope were on the side of the /ur7s and against the %outh %la*s who were see7ing their libert&$ /he @rightB of all nations to freedom did not pre*ent +arx, Ingels, and Lieb7necht from spea7ing against the (al7an %la*s and from resolutel& supporting the integrit& of the /ur7s$ For the& 5udged the national mo*ements of the %la*ic peoples in the /ur7ish empire not from the standpoint of the @eternalB sentimental formulae of liberalism, but from the standpoint of the material conditions which determined the content of these national mo*ements, according to their *iews of the time$ +arx and Ingels saw in the freedom mo*ement of the sociall& bac7ward %outh %la*s onl& the machinations of ,ussian tsardom tr&ing to irritate the /ur7s, and thus, without an& second thoughts, the& subordinated the >uestion of the national freedom of the %la*s to the interests of Iuropean democrac&, insisting on the integrit& of /ur7e& as a bulwar7 of defense against ,ussian reaction$ /his political position was maintained in German %ocial )emocrac& as late as the second half of the 1" !s, when the gra&#haired Dilhelm Lieb7necht, on the occasion of the struggle of the ?rmian /ur7s, still spo7e in that spirit$ (ut b& this time the position of German and international %ocial )emocrac& on the Iastern >uestion had changed$ %ocial )emocrac& began to support openl& the aspirations of the suppressed nationalities in /ur7e& to a separate cultural existence, and abandoned all concern for the artificial preser*ation of /ur7e& as a whole$ 3nd at this time it was guided not b& a feeling of dut& toward the ?rmians or the +acedonians as sub5ugated nationalities, but b& the anal&sis of the material base of conditions in the Iast in the second half of the last centur&$ (& this anal&sis, the %ocial )emocrats became con*inced that the political disintegration of /ur7e& would result from its economic#political de*elopment in the second half of the nineteenth centur&, and that the temporar& preser*ation of /ur7e& would ser*e the interests of the reactionar& diplomac& of ,ussian absolutism$ 'ere, as in all other >uestions, %ocial )emocrac& was not contrar& to the current of ob5ecti*e de*elopment, but with it, and, profiting from its conclusions, it defended the interests of Iuropean ci*ilization b& supporting the national mo*ements within /ur7e&$ It also supported all attempts to renew and reform /ur7e& from within, howe*er wea7 the social basis for such a mo*ement ma& ha*e been$ 3 second example of the same thing is pro*ided b& the diametricall& opposite attitudes of +arx and Ingels during the re*olution of 1"9" with respect to the national aspirations of the Czechs and the Poles$ /here is no doubt that from the point of *iew of the @right of nations to self#determinationB the Czechs deser*ed the support of the Iuropean socialists and democrats no less than the Poles$ +arx, howe*er, did not pa& an& attention to that abstract formula, and hurled thunderbolts at the heads of the Czechs and their aspirations for freedom, aspirations which he regarded as a harmful complication of the re*olutionar& situation, all the more deser*ing of se*ere condemnation, since, to +arx, the Czechs were a d&ing nationalit&, doomed to disappear soon$ /he creators of The /ommunist 0ani-esto put forth these *iews at the same time that the& were defending the nationalist mo*ement of the Poles with all their strength, calling upon all re*olutionar& and progressi*e forces to help our patriots$ /he sober realism, alien to all sentimentalism, with which +arx examined the national problems during the re*olution itself, is shown b& the wa& he treated the Polish and Czech >uestions: @/he ,e*olution of 1"9",B wrote +arx in his articles on the re*olution which appeared in Februar& 1":8 in the 3merican paper, )ail Tribune, calling forth at once the claim of all oppressed nations to an independent existence, and to the right to settle their own affairs for themsel*es, it was >uite natural that the Poles should at once demand the restoration of their countr& within the frontiers of the old Polish ,epublic before 1--8$ It is true,

this frontier, e*en at that time, had become obsolete, if ta7en as the delimitation of German and Polish nationalit&; it had become more so e*er& &ear since b& the progress of Germanization; but then, the Germans had proclaimed such an enthusiasm for the restoration of Poland, that the& must expect to be as7ed, as a first proof of the realit& of their s&mpathies, to gi*e up their share of the plunder$ ?n the other hand, should whole tracts of land, inhabited chiefl& b& Germans, should large towns, entirel& German, be gi*en up to a people that as &et had ne*er gi*en an& proofs of its capabilit& of progressing be&ond a state of feudalism based upon agricultural serfdomL /he >uestion was intricate enough$ /he onl& possible solution was in a war with ,ussia$ /he >uestion of delimitation between the different re*olutionized nations would ha*e been made a secondar& one to that of first establishing a safe frontier against the common enem&$ /he Poles, b& recei*ing extended territories in the east, would ha*e become more tractable and reasonable in the west; and ,iga and +ilan would ha*e been deemed, after all, >uite as important to them as )anzig and Ilbing$ Thus the advanced party in "ermany# deeming a $ar $ith %ussia necessary to keep up the &ontinental movement# and considering that the national reestablishment even of a part of Poland $ould inevitably lead to such a $ar# supported the Poles' while the reigning, middle#class part& clearl& foresaw its downfall from an& national war against ,ussia, which would ha*e called more acti*e and energetic men to the helm, and, therefore, with a feigned enthusiasm for the extension of German nationalit&, the& declared Prussian Poland, the chief seat of Polish re*olutionar& agitation, to be part and parcel of the German Impire that was to be$E-F +arx treated the Czech >uestion with no less political realism: /he >uestion of nationalit& ga*e rise to another struggle in (ohemia$ /his countr&, inhabited b& two millions of Germans, and three millions of %la*onians of the Czechian tongue, had great historical recollections, almost all connected with the former supremac& of the Czechs$ (ut then the force of this branch of the %la*onic famil& had been bro7en e*er since the wars of the 'ussites in the fifteenth centur&$ /he pro*ince spea7ing the Czechian tongue was di*ided, one part forming the 7ingdom of (ohemia, another the principalit& of +ora*ia, a third the Carpathian hill countr& of the %lo*a7s, being part of 'ungar&$ /he +ora*ians and %lo*a7s had long since lost e*er& *estige of national feeling, and *italit&, although mostl& preser*ing their language$ (ohemia was surrounded b& thoroughl& German countries on three sides out of four$ /he German element had made great progress on her own territor&; e*en in the capital, in Prague, the two nationalities were prett& e>uall& matched; and e*er&where capital, trade, industr&, and mental culture were in the hands of the Germans$ /he chief champion of the Czechian nationalit&, Professor Palac7&, is himself nothing but a learned German run mad, who e*en now cannot spea7 the Czechian language correctl& and without foreign accent$ (ut, as it often happens, d&ing Czechian nationalit&, d&ing according to e*er& fact 7nown in histor& for the last four hundred &ears, made in 1"9" a last effort to regain its former *italit& an effort whose failure, independentl& of all re*olutionar& considerations, was to pro*e that (ohemia could onl& exist, henceforth, as a portion of German&, although part of her inhabitants might &et, for some centuries, continue to spea7 a non#German language$ ERe*olution and 1onterre*olution in )eutschland, pp$:-#.8F De >uote the abo*e passages in order to stress the methods which +arx and Ingels used with respect to the nationalit& >uestion, methods not dealing in abstract formulae, but onl& in the real issues of each indi*idual case$ /hat method did not, though, 7eep them from ma7ing a fault& e*aluation of the situation, or from ta7ing a wrong, position in certain cases$ /he present state of affairs shows how deepl& +arx was in error in predicting, sixt& &ears ago, the disappearance of the Czech nationalit&, whose *italit& the 3ustrians toda& find so troublesome$ Con*ersel&, he o*erestimated the international importance of Polish nationalism: this was doomed to deca& b& the internal de*elopment of Poland, a deca& which had alread& set in at that time$ (ut these historical

errors do not detract an ounce from the *alue of +arxs method, for there are in general no methods of research which are, a priori, protected against a wrong application in indi*idual cases$ +arx ne*er claimed to be infallible, and nothing, in the last resort, is so contrar& to the spirit of his science as @infallibleB historical 5udgments$ It was possible for +arx to be mista7en in his position with respect to certain national mo*ements, and the author of the present wor7 tried to show in 1" . and 1" that +arxs *iews on the Polish >uestion, as on the Iastern >uestion, were outdated and mista7en$ (ut it is this former position of +arx and Ingels on the >uestion of /ur7e& and the %outh %la*s, as well as on the national mo*ement of the Czechs and Poles, that shows emphaticall& how far the founders of scientific socialism were from sol*ing all nationalit& >uestions in one manner onl&, on the basis of one slogan adopted a priori$ It also shows how little the& were concerned with the @metaph&sicalB rights of nations when it was a matter of the tangible material problems of Iuropean de*elopment$ Finall&, an e*en more stri7ing example of how the creators of modern socialist politics treated the national >uestion is their e*aluation of the freedom mo*ement of the %wiss in the fourteenth centur&$ /his is part of histor&, therefore free from the influence of all the expectations and passions of da& to da& politics$ /he uprising of the %wiss cantons against the blood& oppression of the 'apsburg despotism 0which, in the form of the historical m&th of Dilliam /ell, is the ob5ect of absolute worship b& the liberal#bourgeois romantic idealist1 was appraised b& Friedrich Ingels in 1"9- in the following wa&: /he struggle of the earl& %wiss against 3ustria, the famous oath at ,&tli, the heroic shot of /ell, the immortal *ictor& at +orgarten H all this represented the struggle of restless shepherds against the thrust of historical de*elopment, a struggle of hidebound, conser*ati*e, local interests against the interests of the entire nation, a struggle of primiti*ism against enlightenment, barbarism against ci*ilization$ /he& won their *ictor& o*er the ci*ilization of that period, but as punishment the& were cut off from the whole later progress of ci*ilization$E"F /o this e*aluation 6auts7& adds the following commentar&: 3 >uestion mar7 could be added to the abo*e concerning the ci*ilizing mission which the 'apsburgs were carr&ing out in %witzerland in the fourteenth centur&$ ?n the other hand it is correct that the preser*ation of the independence of the cantons was an e*ent which was conser*ati*e to the nth degree, and in no wa& re*olutionar&, and that thenceforth the freedom of those cantons ser*ed as a means of preser*ing an element of blac7est reaction in the center of Iurope$ It was those forest cantons which defeated =wingli and his arm& in 1:<1 at the battle of 6appel, and thereb& put a stop to the spread of Protestantism in %witzerland$ /he& pro*ided armies to all the despots of Iurope, and it was the %wiss of the forest cantons who were the staunchest supporters of Louis MNl against the re*olution$ For this the republic raised a magnificent monument to them in Lucerne$ E)ie Neue 2eit, 1 !9#1 !:, Nol$II, p$19.$F From the point of *iew of the Bright of nations to self#determination,B the %wiss uprising ob*iousl& deser*es the s&mpath& of socialists on all scores$ /here is no doubt that the aspirations of the %wiss to free themsel*es from the 'apsburg &o7e were an essential expression of the will of the @peopleB or a huge ma5orit& of them$ /he national mo*ement of the %wiss had a purel& defensi*e character, and was not informed b& the desire to oppress other nationalities$ It was intended onl& to throw off the oppression of a foreign and purel& d&nastic in*ader$ Finall&, this national mo*ement formall& bore all the external characteristics of democratism, and e*en re*olutionism, since the people were rebelling against absolute rule under the slogan of a popular republic$

In complete contrast to this mo*ement is the national uprising in 'ungar& in 1"9"$ It is eas& to see what would ha*e been the historical outcome of the *ictor& of the 'ungarians because the social and national conditions of that countr& insured the absolute domination of the +ag&ar minorit& o*er the mixed ma5orit& of the other, sub5ugated nationalities$ 3 comparison of these two struggles for national independence # the 'ungarian in 1"9" and the %wiss fi*e centuries earlier H is all the more significant since both were directed against the same enem&: the absolutism of the 3ustrian 'apsburgs$ /he method and the *iewpoint on national politics of +arx and Ingels are brought into high relief b& this comparison$ )espite all the external e*idences of re*olutionism in the %wiss mo*ement, and despite the indisputable two#edged character of the +ag&ar mo*ement, ob*ious in the flun7e&ism with which the 'ungarian re*olutionaries helped the Nienna go*ernment to suppress the Italian re*olution, the creators of scientific socialism sharpl& criticized the %wiss uprising as a reactionar& e*ent, while the& supported fer*entl& the 'ungarian uprising in 1"9"$ In both cases the& were guided not b& the formula of @the right of nations to self#determination,B which ob*iousl& was much more applicable to the %wiss than to the +ag&ars, but onl& b& a realistic anal&sis of the mo*ements from a historical and political standpoint$ /he uprising of the fragmented peasant cantons, with their regionalism against the centralist power of the 'apsburgs, was, in the e&es of Ingels, a sign of historical reaction, 5ust as the absolutism of the princel& power, mo*ing toward centralism, was at that time an element of historical progress$ From a similar standpoint, we note in passing, Lassalle regarded the peasant wars, and the parallel rebellion of the minor 7nights of the nobilit& in German& in the sixteenth centur& against the rising princel& power, as signs of reaction$ ?n the other hand, in 1"9", 'apsburg absolutism was alread& a reactionar& relic of the +iddle 3ges, and the national uprising of the 'ungarians H a natural all& of the internal German re*olution H directed against the 'apsburgs naturall& had to be regarded as an element of historical progress$

...
Dhat is more, in ta7ing such a stand +arx and Ingels were not at all indulging in part& or class egoism, and were not sacrificing entire nations to the needs and perspecti*es of Destern Iuropean democrac&, as it might ha*e appeared$ It is true that it sounds much more generous, and is more flattering to the o*eracti*e imagination of the &oung @intellectual,B when the socialists announce a general and uni*ersal introduction of freedom for all existing suppressed nations$ (ut the tendenc& to grant all peoples, countries, groups, and all human creatures the right to freedom, e>ualit&, and other such 5o&s b& one sweeping stro7e of the pen, is characteristic onl& of the &outhful period of the socialist mo*ement, and most of all of the phraseological bra*ado of anarchism$ /he socialism of the modern wor7ing class, that is, scientific socialism, ta7es no delight in the radical and wonderful#sounding solutions of social and national >uestions, but examines primaril& the real issues in*ol*ed in these problems, /he solutions of the problems of %ocial )emocrac& are not in general characterized b& @magnanimit&,B and in this respect the& are alwa&s outdone b& socialist parties which are not hampered b& scientific @doctrines,B and which therefore alwa&s ha*e their poc7ets full of the most beautiful gifts for e*er&one$ /hus, for example, in ,ussia, the %ocial ,e*olutionar& Part& lea*es %ocial )emocrac& far behind in the agricultural >uestion; it has for the peasants a recipe for the immediate partial introduction of socialism in the *illage, without the need of a boring period of waiting for the conditions of such a transformation in the sphere of industrial de*elopment$ In comparison with such parties, %ocial )emocrac& is and alwa&s will be a poor part&, 5ust as +arx in

his time was poor in comparison with the expansi*e and magnanimous (a7unin, 5ust as +arx and Ingels were both poor in comparison with the representati*es of @realB or rather @philosophicalB socialism$ (ut the secret of the magnanimit& of all socialists with an anarchist coloration and of the po*ert& of %ocial )emocrac&, is that anarchistic re*olutionism measures @strength b& intentions, not intentions according to strengthB; that is, it measures its aspirations onl& b& what its speculati*e reason, fumbling with an empt& utopia, regards as goodB and @necessar&B for the sal*ation of humanit&$ %ocial )emocrac&, on the other hand, stands firml& on historical ground in its aspirations, and therefore rec7ons with historical possibilities$ +arxian socialism differs from all the other brands of socialism because, among other things, it has no pretensions to 7eeping patches in its poc7et to mend all the holes made b& historical de*elopment$ 3ctuall&, e*en if as socialists we recognized the immediate right of all nations to independence, the fates of nations would not change an iota because of this$ /he @rightB of a nation to freedom as well as the @rightB of the wor7er to economic independence are, under existing social conditions, onl& worth as much as the @rightB of each man to eat off gold plates, which, as 2icolaus Chern&she*s7i wrote, he would be read& to sell at an& moment for a ruble$ In the 1"9!s the @right to wor7B was a fa*orite postulate of the Ctopian %ocialists in France, and appeared as an immediate and radical wa& of sol*ing the social >uestion$ 'owe*er, in the ,e*olution of 1"9" that @rightB ended, after a *er& short attempt to put it into effect, in a terrible fiasco, which could not ha*e been a*oided e*en if the famous @national wor7#shopsB had been organized differentl&$ 3n anal&sis of the real conditions of the contemporar& econom&, as gi*en b& +arx in his /a3ital, must lead to the con*iction that e*en if present#da& go*ernments were forced to declare a uni*ersal @right to wor7,B it would remain onl& a fine#sounding phrase, and not one member of the ran7 and file of the reser*e arm& of labor waiting on the sidewal7 would be able to ma7e a bowl of soup for his hungr& children from that right$ /oda&, %ocial )emocrac& understands that the @right to wor7B will stop being an empt& sound onl& when the capitalist regime is abolished, for in that regime the chronic unemplo&ment of a certain part of the industrial proletariat is a necessar& condition of production$ /hus, %ocial )emocrac& does not demand a declaration of that imaginar& @rightB on the basis of the existing s&stem, but rather stri*es for the abolition of the s&stem itself b& the class struggle, regarding labor organizations, unemplo&ment insurance, etc$, onl& as temporar& means of help$ In the same wa&, hopes of sol*ing all nationalit& >uestions within the capitalist framewor7 b& insuring to all nations, races, and ethnic groups the possibilit& of @self#determinationB is a complete utopia$ 3nd it is a utopia from the point of *iew that the ob5ecti*e s&stem of political and class forces condemns man& a demand in the political program of %ocial )emocrac& to be unfeasible in practice$ For example, important *oices in the ran7s of the international wor7ers mo*ement ha*e expressed the con*iction that a demand for the uni*ersal introduction of the eight#hour da& b& legal enactment has no chance of being realized in bourgeois societ& because of the growing social reaction of the ruling classes, the general stagnation of social reforms, the rise of powerful organizations of businessmen, etc$ 2onetheless, no one would dare call the demand for the eight#hour da& a utopia, because it is in complete accordance with the progressi*e de*elopment of bourgeois societ&$ 'owe*er, to resume: the actual possibilit& of @self#determinationB for all ethnic groups or otherwise defined nationalities is a utopia precisel& because of the trend of historical de*elopment of contemporar& societies$ Dithout examining those distant times at the dawn of histor& when the nationalities of modern states were constantl& mo*ing about geographicall&, when the& were 5oining, merging, fragmenting, and trampling one another, the fact is that all the ancient states without exception are, as a result of that long histor& of political and ethnic uphea*als, extremel& mixed with respect to nationalities$ /oda&, in each state, ethnic relics bear witness to the uphea*als and

intermixtures which characterized the march of historical de*elopment in the past$ I*en in his time, +arx maintained that these national sur*i*als had no other function but to ser*e as bastions of the counter#re*olution, until the& should be completel& swept from the face of the earth b& the great hurricane of re*olution or world war$ @/here is no countr& in Iurope,B he wrote in the Neue Rheinische 2eitung: which doesnt ha*e in some corner one or more of these ruins of nations, the remains of an ancient people displaced and con>uered b& a nation which later became a standard#bearer of historical de*elopment$ /hese remains of nationalities, mercilessl& trampled on b& histor& # as 'egel sa&s H these national left#o*ers will all become and will remain until their final extermination or denationalization fanatic partisans of the counter#re*olution, since their entire existence is in general a protest against the great historical re*olution$ For ex#ample, in %cotland the Gaels were the mainsta&s of the %tuarts from 1.9! to 1-9:; in France, it was the (retons who were the mainsta&s of the (ourbons from 1- 8 to 1"!!; while in %pain, the (as>ues were the supporters of )on Carlos$ In 3ustria, to ta7e another example, the pan#%la*ic %outh %la*s are nothing more than the national left# o*ers of a highl& confused thousand#&ear#long de*elopment$ E4us dem literarischen Nachlass *on 1arl 0arx5 6riedrich %ngels und 6erdinand Lasalle, Nol$III, p$891F In another article, treating the pan#%la*s stri*ings for the independence of all %la*ic nations, +arx writes, /he Germans and 'ungarians, during the times when great monarchies were a historical necessit& in Iurope, forged all those pett&, crippled, powerless little nations into one big state, thereb& allowing them to participate in the de*elopment of histor& which, if left to themsel*es, the& would ha*e completel& missed$ /oda&, because of the huge progress of industr&, trade, and communications, political centralization has become an e*en more pressing need than it was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries$ Dhat is not &et centralized is being centralized$ E.bid,, p$8::$F De abandoned +arxs *iews on the %outh %la*s a long time ago: but the general fact is that historical de*elopment, especiall& the modern de*elopment of capitalism, does not tend to return to each nationalit& its independent existence, but mo*es rather in the opposite direction, and this is as well 7nown toda& as during the time of the Neue Rheinische 2eitung$ In his most recent paper, Nationalit and .nternationalism, 6arl 6auts7& ma7es the following s7etch of the historical fates of nationalities: De ha*e seen that language is the most important means of social intercourse$ 3s that intercourse grows with economic de*elopment, so the circle of people using the same language must grow as well$ From this arises the tendenc& of unified nations to expand, to swallow up other nations, which lose their language and adopt the language of the dominant nation or a mixture$ 3ccording to 6auts7&, three great cultural communities of humanit& de*eloped simultaneousl&: the Christian, the +uslim, and the (uddhist$ Iach of these three cultural groupings includes the most *ariegated languages and nationalities$ Dithin each one most of the culture is not national but international$ (ut uni*ersal communication has further effects$ It expands e*en more and e*er&where establishes the domination of the same capitalist production $$$ Dhene*er a closel& 7nit communit& of communication and culture exists for a fairl& long time among a large number of nations, then one or a few nations gain ascendanc& o*er the go*ernment, the militar&, the scientific and artistic heights$ /heir language becomes

indispensable for e*er& merchant and educated man in that international cultural communit&$ /heir culture H in econom&, art, and literature H lends its character to the whole ci*ilization$ %uch a role was pla&ed in the +editerranean basin until the end of ancient times b& Gree7 and Latin$ In the +ohammedan world it is pla&ed b& 3rabic; in the Christian, including Aews and atheists, German, Inglish, and French ha*e become uni*ersal languages $$$ Perhaps economic and political de*elopment will add ,ussian to these three languages$ (ut it is e>uall& possible that one of them, Inglish, will become the onl& common language $$$ /he 5oining of nations to the international cultural communit& will be reflected in the growth of uni*ersal languages among merchants and educated people$ 3nd this union was ne*er as closel& 7nit as it is now; ne*er was a purel& national culture less possible$ /herefore it stri7es us as *er& strange when people tal7 alwa&s of onl& a national culture and when a goal of socialism is considered to be the endowing of the masses with a national culture $$$ Dhen socialist societ& pro*ides the masses with an education, it also gi*es them the abilit& to spea7 se*eral languages, the uni*ersal languages, and therefore to ta7e part in the entire international ci*ilization and not onl& in the separate culture of a certain linguistic communit&$ Dhen we ha*e got to the point where the masses in our ci*ilized states can master one or more of the uni*ersal languages besides their nati*e language, this will be a basis for the gradual withdrawal and ultimatel& the complete disappearance of the languages of the smaller nations, and for the union of all ci*ilized humanit& into one language and one nationalit&, 5ust as the peoples in the eastern basin of the +editerranean were united in 'ellenism after 3lexander the Great, and the peoples of the western area later merged into the ,oman nationalit&$ /he *ariet& of languages within our circle of ci*ilization ma7es understanding among members of the *arious nations difficult and is an obstacle to their ci*ilized progress$ EImphasis in the following paragraph is ,$L$sF (ut onl& socialism will o*ercome that obstacle, and much wor7 will be needed before it can succeed in educating entire masses of people to obtain *isible results$ 3nd we must 7eep in mind alread& toda& that our internationalism is not a special type of nationalism differs from bourgeois nationalism only in that it does not behave aggressively ( that it leaves to each nation the same right $hich it demands for its o$n nation, and thereb& recognizes the complete so*ereignt& 0Sover nit t1 of each nation$ Such a vie$# $hich transforms the position of anarchism concerning individuals onto nations# does not correspond to the close cultural community e)isting bet$een nations of contemporary civilisation$ /hese last, in fact, in regard to econom& and ci*ilization, form one single social bod& whose welfare depends on the harmon& of the cooperation of the parts, possible onl& b& the subordination of all the parts to the whole$ The Socialist *nternational is not a conglomerate of autocratic nations# each doing $hat it likes# as long as it does not interfere $ith the equality of rights of the others' but rather an organism $herein the better it $orks# the easier it is for its parts to come to agreement and the more they $ork together according to a common plan. %uch is the historical scheme as described b& 6auts7&$ /o be sure, he presents the matter from a different point of *iew than +arx does, emphasizing mainl& the side of cultural, peaceful de*elopment, whereas +arx accents its political side, an external armed con>uest$ (oth, howe*er, characterize the fate of nationalities in the course of e*ents, not as tending to separate themsel*es and become independent, but completel& *ice#*ersa$ 6auts7& formulates H as far as we 7now, for the first time in socialistic literature of recent times H the historical tendenc& to remo*e completel& all national distinctions within the socialist s&stem and to fuse all of ci*ilized humanit& into one nationalit&$ E6$ 6auts7&, Nationalit7t und .nternationali7t, pp$18#1- O p$8<$F 'owe*er H that theoretician belie*es H at the present time capitalist de*elopment gi*es rise to phenomena which seem to wor7 in the opposite direction: the awa7ening and intensification of

national consciousness as well as the need for a national state which is the state form @best corresponding to modern conditions, the form in which it can most easil& fulfil its tas7s$B Eibid,F /he @best national state is onl& an abstraction which can be easil& described and defined theoreticall&, but which doesnt correspond to realit&$ 'istorical de*elopment toward a uni*ersal communit& of ci*ilization will, li7e all social de*elopment, ta7e place in the midst of a contradiction, but this contradiction, with respect to the consolidating growth of international ci*ilization, lies in another area than where 6auts7& see7s it, not in the tendenc& toward the idea of a @national state,B but rather where +arx indicates it to be, in the deadl& struggle among nations, in the tendenc& to create H alongside the great areas of ci*ilization and despite them H great capitalist states$ /he de*elopment of $orld po$ers, a characteristic feature of our times growing in importance along with the progress of capitalism, from the *er& outset condemns all small nations to political impotence$ 3part from a few of the most powerful nations, the leaders in capitalist de*elopment, which possess the spiritual and material resources necessar& to maintain their political and economic independence, @self#determination,B the independent existence of smaller and pett& nations, is an illusion, and will become e*en more so$ /he return of all, or e*en the ma5orit& of the nations which are toda& oppressed, to independence would onl& be possible if the existence of small states in the era of capitalism had an& chances or hopes for the future$ (esides, the big#power econom& and politics H a condition of sur*i*al for the capitalist states H turn the politicall& independent, formall& e>ual, small Iuropean states into mutes on the Iuropean stage and more often into scapegoats$ Can one spea7 with an& seriousness of the @self#determinationB of peoples which are formall& independent, such as +ontenegrins, (ulgarians, ,umanians, the %erbs, the Gree7s, and, as far as that goes, e*en the %wiss, whose *er& independence is the product of the political struggles and diplomatic game of the @Concert of IuropeBL From this point of *iew, the idea of insuring all @nationsB the possibilit& of self#determination is e>ui*alent to re*erting from Great#Capitalist de*elopment to the small medie*al states, far earlier than the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries$ /he other principal feature of modern de*elopment, which stamps such an idea as utopian, is capitalist imperialism$ /he example of Ingland and 'olland indicates that under certain conditions a capitalist countr& can e*en completel& s7ip the transition phase of @national stateB and create at once, in its manufacturing phase, a colon&#holding state$ /he example of Ingland and 'olland, which, at the beginning of the se*enteenth centur&, had begun to ac>uire colonies, was followed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries b& all the great capitalist states$ /he fruit of that trend is the continuous destruction of the independence of more and more new countries and peoples, of entire continents$ /he *er& de*elopment of international trade in the capitalist period brings with it the ine*itable, though at times slow ruin of all the more primiti*e societies, destro&s their historicall& existing means of @self#determination,B and ma7es them dependent on the crushing wheel of capitalist de*elopment and world politics$ ?nl& complete formalist blindness could lead one to maintain that, for example, the Chinese nation 0whether we regard the people of that state as one or se*eral nations1 is toda& reall& @determining itself$B /he destructi*e action of world trade is followed b& outright partition or b& the political dependence of colonial countries in *arious degrees and forms$ 3nd if %ocial )emocrac& struggles with all its strength against colonial polic& in all its manifestations, tr&ing to hinder its progress, then it will at the same time realize that this de*elopment, as well as the roots of colonial politics, lies at the *er& foundations of capitalist production, that colonialism will ine*itabl& accompan& the future progress of capitalism, and that onl& the innocuous bourgeois apostles of @peaceB can belie*e in the possibilit& of toda&s states a*oiding that path$ /he struggle to sta& in the world mar7et, to pla& international politics, and to ha*e o*erseas territories is both a necessit& and a condition of de*elopment for capitalist world powers$ /he form that best ser*es the

interests of exploitation in the contemporar& world is not the @nationalB state, as 6auts7& thin7s, but a state bent on con>uest$ Dhen we compare the different states from the point of *iew of the degree to which the& approach this ideal, we see that it is not the French state which best fits the model, at least not in its Iuropean part which is homogeneous with respect to nationalit&$ %till less does the %panish state fit the model; since it lost its colonies, it has shed its imperialist character and is purel& @nationalB in composition$ ,ather do we loo7 to the (ritish and German states as models, for the& are based on national oppression in Iurope and the world at large H and to the Cnited %tates of 3merica, a state which 7eeps in its bosom li7e a gaping wound the oppression of the 2egro people, and see7s to con>uer the 3siatic peoples$ /he following table illustrates the imperialist tendenc& of national con>uest$ /he figures refer to the number of oppressed people in colonies belonging to each countr&$ /he huge figures >uoted, which include around fi*e hundred million people, should be increased b& the colossal addition of the countries which do not figure as colonies, but are actuall& completel& dependent on Iuropean states, and then we should brea7 these totals down into countless nationalities and ethnic groups to con*e& an idea of the effects to date of capitalist imperialism on the fates of nations and their abilit& to @determine themsel*es$B .n 4sia Great (ritain France German& 'olland (elgium )enmar7 %pain Portugal C%3 <.1,99:,!!! 1",!-<,!!! 18!,!91 <-,-<9,!!! P P P "1!,!!! -,.<:,98. .n 4-rica 9!,!8",!!! <1,:!!,!!! 11,99-,!!! P 1 ,!!!,!!! P 8 1,!!! .,9.!,!!! P .n 4merica -,::-,<!! 98","1 P 198,!!! P 98,988 P P :<,89< .n 4ustralasia :,"11,!!! " ,!!! 99",!!! P P P P P 1<,!!!

?f course, the histor& of the colonial expansion of capitalism displa&s to some extent the contradictor& tendenc& of the legal, and then political gaining of independence of the colonial countries$ /he histor& of the brea7ing awa& of the Cnited %tates from Ingland at the end of the eighteenth centur&, of the countries of %outh 3merica from %pain and Portugal in the twenties and thirties of the last centur&, as well as the winning of autonom& b& the 3ustralian states from Ingland, are the most ob*ious illustrations of this tendenc&$ 'owe*er, a more careful examination of these e*ents will point at once to the special conditions of their origins$ (oth %outh and 2orth 3merica, until the nineteenth centur&, were the *ictims of a still primiti*e s&stem of colonial administration, based more on the plundering of the countr& and its natural resources for the benefit of the treasures of Iuropean states than on a rational exploitation for the benefit of capitalist production$ In these cases, it was a matter of an entire countr&, which possessed all the conditions for the independent de*elopment of capitalism, ma7ing its own wa& b& brea7ing the rotting fetters of political dependence$ /he force of that capitalist thrust was stronger in 2orth 3merica, which was dependent on Ingland, while %outh 3merica, until then predominantl& agricultural, met a much wea7er resistance from %pain and Portugal, which were economicall& bac7ward$ ?b*iousl&, such an exceptional wealth of natural resources is not the rule in all colonies$ ?n the other hand, the contemporar& s&stem of colonization has created a dependence which is much less superficial than

the pre*ious one$ (ut the winning of independence b& the 3merican colonies did not remo*e national dependence, it onl& transferred it to another nationalit& H onl& changed its role$ /a7e first the Cnited %tates: the element freeing itself from the scepter of Ingland was not a foreign nation but onl& the same Inglish emigrants who had settled in 3merica on the ruins and corpses of the reds7in nati*es H which is true also of the 3ustralian colonies of Ingland, in which the Inglish constitute ! percent of the population$ /he Cnited %tates is toda& in the *anguard of those nations practicing imperialist con>uest$ In the same wa&, (razil, 3rgentina, and the other former colonies whose leading element is immigrants H Portuguese and %panish # won independence from the Iuropean states primaril& in order to exercise control o*er the trade in 2egroes and their use on the plantations, and to annex all the wea7er colonies in the area$ +ost li7el& the same conditions pre*ail in India, where latel& there has appeared a rather serious @nationalB mo*ement against Ingland$ /he *er& existence in India of a huge number of nationalities at different degrees of social and ci*ilized de*elopment, as well as their mutual dependence, should warn against too hast& e*aluation of the Indian mo*ement under the simple heading of @the rights of the nation$B 3pparent exceptions onl& confirm on closer anal&sis the conclusion that the modern de*elopment of capitalism cannot reconciled with the true independence of all nationalities$ It is true the problem appears much simpler if, when discussing nationalit&, we exclude the >uestion of colonial partitions$ %uch a techni>ue is often applied, consciousl& or unconsciousl&, b& the defenders of the @rights of nationsB; it also corresponds to the position with respect to colonial politics ta7en, for example, b& Iduard )a*id in the German %ocial )emocrac& or *an 6ol in the )utch$ /his point of *iew considers colonialism in general as the expression of the ci*ilizing mission of Iuropean peoples, ine*itable e*en in a socialist regime$ /his *iew can be briefl& described as the @IuropeanB application of the philosophical principle of Fichte in the well 7nown paraphrase of Ludwig (rone: @*ch bin ich ( $as ausser mir ist +ebensmittelB 0BI am m&self H what is outside of me is the means of lifeB1$ If onl& the Iuropean peoples are regarded as nations proper, while colonial peoples are loo7ed on as @suppl& depots,B then we ma& use the term @nation#stateB in Iurope for countries li7e France, )enmar7, or Ital&, and the problem of nationalit& can be limited to intra# Iuropean dimensions$ (ut in this case, @the right of nations to self#determinationB becomes a theor& of the ruling races and betra&s clearl& its origin in the ideologies of bourgeois liberalism together with its @IuropeanB cretinism$ In the approach of socialists, such a right must, b& the nature of things, ha*e a uni*ersal character$ /he awareness of this necessit& is enough to indicate that the hope of realizing this @rightB on the basis of the existing setup is a utopia; it is in direct contradiction to the tendenc& of capitalist de*elopment on which %ocial )emocrac& has based its existence$ 3 general attempt to di*ide all existing states into national units and to re#tailor them on the model of national states and statelets is a completel& hopeless, and historicall& spea7ing, reactionar& underta7ing$E F

.8
/he formula of the @right of nationsB is inade>uate to 5ustif& the position of socialists on the nationalit& >uestion, not onl& because it fails to ta7e into account the wide range of historical conditions 0place and time1 existing in each gi*en case and does not rec7on with the general current of the de*elopment of global conditions, but also because it ignores completel& the fundamental theor& of modern socialists # the theor& of social classes$ Dhen we spea7 of the @right of nations to self#determination, @ we are using the concept of the @nationB as a homogeneous social and political entit&$ (ut actuall&, such a concept of the @nationB is

one of those categories of bourgeois ideolog& which +arxist theor& submitted to a radical re#*ision, showing how that mist& *eil, li7e the concepts of the @freedom of citizens,B @e>ualit& before the law,B etc$, conceals in e*er& case a definite historical content$ In a class societ&, @the nationB as a homogeneous socio#political entit& does not exist$ ,ather, there exist within each nation, classes with antagonistic interests and @rights$B /here literall& is not one social area, from the coarsest material relationships to the most subtle moral ones, in which the possessing class and the class#conscious proletariat hold the same attitude, and in which the& appear as a consolidated @nationalB entit&$ In the sphere of economic relations, the bourgeois classes represent the interests of exploitation H the proletariat the interests of wor7$ In the sphere of legal relations, the cornerstone of bourgeois societ& is pri*ate propert&; the interest of the proletariat demands the emancipation of the propert&less man from the domination of propert&$ In the area of the 5udiciar&, bourgeois societ& represents class @5ustice,B the 5ustice of the well#fed and the rulers; the proletariat defends the principle of ta7ing into account social influences on the indi*idual, of humaneness$ In international relations, the bourgeoisie represent the politics of war and partition, and at the present stage, a s&stem of trade war; the proletariat demands a politics of uni*ersal peace and free trade$ In the sphere of the social sciences and philosoph&, bourgeois schools of thought and the school representing the proletariat stand in diametric opposition to each other$ /he possessing classes ha*e their world *iew; it is represented b& idealism, metaph&sics, m&sticism, eclecticism; the modern proletariat has its theor& H dialectic materialism$ I*en in the sphere of so#called @uni*ersalB conditions H in ethics, *iews on art, on beha*ior H the interests, world *iew, and ideals of the bourgeoisie and those of the enlightened proletariat represent two camps, separated from each other b& an ab&ss$ 3nd whene*er the formal stri*ings and the interests of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie 0as a whole or in its most progressi*e part1 seem identical H for example, in the field of democratic aspirations # there, under the identit& of forms and slogans, is hidden the most complete di*ergence of contents and essential politics$ /here can be no tal7 of a collecti*e and uniform will, of the self#determination of the @nationB in a societ& formed in such a manner$ If we find in the histor& of modern societies @nationalB mo*ements, and struggles for @national interests,B these are usuall& class mo*ements of the ruling strata of the bourgeoisie, which can in an& gi*en case represent the interest of the other strata of the population onl& insofar as under the form of @national interestsB it defends progressi*e forms of historical de*elopment, and insofar as the wor7ing class has not &et distinguished itself from the mass of the @nationB 0led b& the bourgeoisie1 into an independent, enlightened political class$ In this sense, the French bourgeoisie had the right to come forth as the third estate in the Great ,e*olution in the name of the French people, and e*en the German bourgeoisie in 1"9" could still regard themsel*es, to a certain degree, as the representati*es of the German @nationB H although The /ommunist 0ani-esto and, in part, the Neue Rheinische 2eitung were alread& the indicators of a distinct class politics of the proletariat in German&$ In both cases this meant onl& that the re*olutionar& class concern of the bourgeoisie was, at that stage of social de*elopment, the concern of the class of people who still formed, with the bourgeoisie, a politicall& uniform mass in relation to reigning feudalism$ /his circumstance shows that the Brights of nationsB cannot be a &ardstic7 for the position of the %ocialist Part& on the nationalit& >uestion$ /he *er& existence of such a part& is proof that the bourgeoisie has stopped being the representati*e of the entire mass of the people, that the class of the proletariat is no longer hidden in the s7irts of the bourgeoisie, but has separated itself off as an independent class with its own social and political aspirations$ (ecause the concepts of @nations,B of @rights,B and the @will of the peopleB as a uniform whole are, as we ha*e said, remnants from the

times of immature and unconscious antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the application of that idea b& the class#conscious and independentl& organized proletariat would be a stri7ing contradiction H not a contradiction against academic logic, but a historical contradiction$ Dith respect to the nationalit& >uestion in contemporar& societ&, a socialist part& must ta7e class antagonism into account$ /he Czech nationalit& >uestion has one form for the &oung Czech petite bourgeoisie and another for the Czech proletariat$ 2or can we see7 a single solution of the Polish national >uestion for 6osciels7i and his stable bo& in +iroslawie, for the Darsaw and Lodz bourgeoisie and for class#conscious Polish wor7ers all at the same time; while the Aewish >uestion is formulated in one wa& in the minds of the Aewish bourgeoisie, and in another for the enlightened Aewish proletariat$ For %ocial )emocrac&, the nationalit& >uestion is, li7e all other social and political >uestions, primaril& a question of class interests$ In the German& of the 1"9!s there existed a 7ind of m&stical#sentimental socialism, that of the @true socialistsB 6arl GrJn and +oses 'ess; this 7ind of socialism was represented later in Poland b& Limanows7i$ 3fter the 1"9!s there appeared in Poland a %partan edition of the same H see the Lud Polski EPolish Peo3leF in the earl& 1"-!s and Pobudka ERe*eilleF at the end of that decade$ /his socialism stro*e for e*er&thing good and beautiful$ 3nd on that basis, Limanows7i, later the leader of the PP%, tried to weld together Polish socialism and the tas7 of reconstructing Poland, with the obser*ation that socialism is an idea that is ob*iousl& beautiful, and patriotism is a no less beautiful idea, and so @Dh& shouldnt two such beautiful ideas be 5oined togetherLB /he onl& health& thing in this sentimental socialism is that it is a utopian parod& of the correct idea that a socialist regime has, as the final goal of the proletariats aspirations, ta7en the pledge that b& abolishing the domination of classes, for the first time in histor& it will guarantee the realization of the highest ideals of humanit&$ 3nd this is reall& the content and the essential meaning of the principle presented to the International Congress at London Ein 1" .F in the resolution >uoted$ @/he right of 2ations to self#determinationB stops being a clichK onl& in a social regime where the @right to wor7B has stopped being an empt& phrase$ 3 socialist regime, which eliminates not onl& the domination of one class o*er another, but also the *er& existence of social classes and their opposition, the *er& di*ision of societ& into classes with different interests and desires, will bring about a societ& which is the sum total indi*iduals tied together b& the harmon& and solidarit& their interests, a uniform whole with a common, organized will and the abilit& to satisf& it$ /he socialist regime will realize directl& the @nationB as a uniform will H insofar as the nations within that regime in general will constitute separate social organisms or, as 6auts7& states, will 5oin into one H and the material conditions for its free self#determination$ In a word, societ& will win the abilit& to freel& determine its national existence when it has the abilit& to determine its political being and the conditions of its creation$ @2ationsB will control their historical existence when human societ& controls its social processes$ /herefore, the analog& which is drawn b& partisans of the @right of nations to self#determinationB between that @rightB and all democratic demands, li7e the right of free speech, free press, freedom of association and of assembl&, is completel& incongruous$ /hese people point out that we support the freedom of association because we are the part& of political freedom; but we still fight against hostile bourgeois parties$ %imilarl&, the& sa&, we ha*e the democratic dut& to support the self#determination of nations, but this fact does not commit us to support e*er& indi*idual tactic of those who fight for self#determination$

/he abo*e *iew completel& o*erloo7s the fact that these @rights,B which ha*e a certain superficial similarit&, lie on completel& different historical le*els$ /he rights of association and assembl&, free speech, the free press$ etc$, are the legal forms of existence of a mature bourgeois societ&$ (ut @the right of nations to self#determinationB is onl& a metaph&sical formulation of an idea which in bourgeois societ& is completel& non#existent and can be realized onl& on the basis of a socialist regime$ 'owe*er, as it is practiced toda&, socialism is not at all a collection of all these m&stical @nobleB and @beautifulB desires, but onl& a political expression of well#defined conditions, that is, the fight of the class of the modern proletariat against the domination of the bourgeoisie$ %ocialism means the stri*ing of the proletariat to bring about the dictatorship of its class in order to get rid of the present form of production$ /his tas7 is the main and guiding one for the %ocialist Part& as the part& of the proletariat: it determines the position of that part& with respect to all the se*eral problems of social life$ %ocial )emocrac& is the class part& of the proletariat$ Its historical tas7 is to express the class interests of the proletariat and also the re*olutionar& interests of the de*elopment of capitalist societ& toward realizing socialism$ /hus, %ocial )emocrac& is called upon to realize not the right of nations to self#determination but onl& the right of the wor7ing class, which is exploited and oppressed, of the proletariat, to self#determination$ From that position %ocial )emocrac& examines all social and political >uestions without exception, and from that standpoint it formulates its programmatic demands$ 2either in the >uestion of the political forms which we demand in the state, nor in the >uestion of the states internal or external policies, nor in the >uestions of law or education, of taxes or the militar&, does %ocial )emocrac& allow the @nationB to decide its fate according to its own *ision of self#determination$ 3ll of these >uestions affect the class interests of the proletariat in a wa& that >uestions of national#political and national#cultural existence do not$ (ut between those >uestions and the national#political and national#cultural >uestions, exist usuall& the closest ties of mutual dependence and causalit&$ 3s a result, %ocial )emocrac& cannot here escape the necessit& of formulating these demands indi*iduall&, and demanding acti*el& the forms of national#political and national#cultural existence which best correspond to the interests of the proletariat and its class struggle at a gi*en time and place, as well as to the interests of the re*olutionar& de*elopment of societ&$ %ocial )emocrac& cannot lea*e these >uestions to be sol*ed b& @nations$B /his becomes perfectl& ob*ious as soon as we bring the >uestion down from the clouds of abstraction to the firm ground of concrete conditions$ /he @nationB should ha*e the @rightB to self#determination$ (ut who is that @nationB and who has the authorit& and the @rightB to spea7 for the @nationB and express its willL 'ow can we find out what the @nationB actuall& wantsL )oes there exist e*en one political part& which would not claim that it alone, among all others, trul& expresses the will of the @nation,B whereas all other parties gi*e onl& per*erted and false expressions of the national willL 3ll the bourgeois, liberal parties consider themsel*es the incarnation of the will of the people and claim the exclusi*e monopol& to represent the @nation$B (ut conser*ati*e and reactionar& parties refer no less to the will and interests of the nation, and within certain limits, ha*e no less of a right to do so$ /he Great French ,e*olution was indubitabl& an expression of the will of the French nation, but 2apoleon, who 5uggled awa& the wor7 of the ,e*olution in his coup of the 1"th (rumaire, based his entire state reform on the principle of @la volont, generaleB Ethe general willF$ In 1"9", the will of the @nationB produced first the republic and the pro*isional go*ernment, then the 2ational 3ssembl&, and finall& Louis (onaparte, who cashiered the ,epublic, the pro*isional

go*ernment, and the national assembl&$ )uring the E1 !:F ,e*olution in ,ussia, liberalism demanded in the name of the people a @cadetB ministr&; absolutism, in the name of the same people, arranged the pogroms of the Aews, while the re*olutionar& peasants expressed their national will b& sending the estates of the gentr& up in smo7e$ In Poland, the part& of the (lac7 'undreds, 2ational )emocrac&, had a claim to be the will of the people, and in the name of @the self#determination of the nationB incited @nationalB wor7ers to assassinate socialist wor7ers$ /hus the same thing happens to the @trueB will of the nation as to the true ring in Lessings stor& of 2athan the Dise: it has been lost and it seems almost impossible to find it and to tell it from the false and counterfeit ones$ ?n the surface, the principle of democrac& pro*ides a wa& of distinguishing the true will of the people b& determining the opinion of the ma5orit&$ /he nation wants what the ma5orit& of the people want$ (ut woe to the %ocial )emocratic Part& which would e*er ta7e that principle as its own &ardstic7: that would condemn to death %ocial )emocrac& itself as the re*olutionar& part&$ %ocial )emocrac& b& its *er& nature is a part& representing the interests of a huge ma5orit& of the nation$ (ut it is also for the time being in bourgeois societ&, insofar as it is a matter of expressing the conscious will of the nation, the part& of a minorit& which onl& see7s to become the ma5orit&$ In its aspirations and its political program it see7s to reflect not the will of a ma5orit& of the nation, but on the contrar&, the embodiment of the conscious will of the proletariat alone$ 3nd e*en within that class, %ocial )emocrac& is not and does not claim to be the embodiment of the will of the ma5orit&$ It expresses onl& the will and the consciousness of the most ad*anced and most re*olutionar& section of the urban#industrial proletariat$ It tries to expand that will and to clear a wa& for a ma5orit& of the wor7ers b& ma7ing them conscious of their own interests$ @/he will of the nationB or its ma5orit& is not therefore an idol for %ocial )emocrac& before which it humbl& prostrates itself$ ?n the contrar&, the historical mission of %ocial )emocrac& is based abo*e all on re*olutionizing and forming the will of the @nationB; that is, its wor7ing#class ma5orit&$ For the traditional forms of consciousness which the ma5orit& of the nation, and therefore the wor7ing classes, displa& in bourgeois societ& are the usual forms of bourgeois consciousness, hostile to the ideals and aspirations of socialism$ I*en in German&, where %ocial )emocrac& is the most powerful political part&, it is still toda&, with its three and a >uarter million *oters, a minorit& compared to the eight million *oters for bourgeois parties and the thirt& million who ha*e the right to *ote$ /he statistics on parliamentar& electors gi*e, admittedl&, onl& a rough idea of the relation of forces in times of peace$ /he German nation then @determines itselfB b& electing a ma5orit& of conser*ati*es, clerics, and freethin7ers, and puts its political fate in their hands$ 3nd the same thing is happening, to an e*en greater degree, in all other countries$

8
Let us ta7e a concrete example in an attempt to appl& the principle that the @nationB should @determine itself$B Dith respect to Poland at the present stage of the re*olution, one of the ,ussian %ocial )emocrats belonging to the editorial committee of the now defunct paper, .skra, in 1 !. explained the concept of the indispensable Darsaw constituent assembl& in the following wa&: if we start from the assumption that the political organization of ,ussia is the decisi*e factor determining the current oppression of the nationalities, then we must conclude that the proletariat of

the oppressed nationalities and the annexed countries should be extremel& acti*e in the organization of an all#,ussian constituent assembl&$ /his assembl& could, if it wished, carr& out its re*olutionar& mission, and brea7 the fetters of force with which tsardom binds to itself the oppressed nationalities$ 3nd there is no other satisfactor&, that is, re*olutionar& wa& of sol*ing that >uestion than b& implementing the rights of the nationalities to determine their own fate$ EImphasis in the entire citation is ,Ls$F /he tas7 of a united proletarian part& of all nationalities in the assembl& will be to bring about such a solution of the nationalit& >uestion, and this tas7 can be realized b& the Part& onl& insofar as it is based on the mo*ement of the masses, on the pressure the& put on the constituent assembl&$ (ut in what concrete form should the admitted right to self#determination be realizedL Dhere the nationalit& >uestion can be more or less identified with the existence of a legal state H as is the case in Poland H then the organ which can realize the nations right to self#determination can and should be a national constituent assembly $hose special task is to determine the relation of a given -borderland country. to the state as a $hole# to decide $hether it should belong to the state or break a$ay from it# to decide its internal set-up and its future connection $ith the state as a $hole. 3nd therefore the constituent assembl& of Poland should decide whether Poland will become part of a new ,ussia and what its constitution should be$ And the Polish proletariat should use all its strength to insure that its class makes its mark on the decision of that organ of national selfgovernment. If we should as7 the all#,ussian assembl& to hand the solution of the Polish national >uestion o*er to the Darsaw se5m, I do not belie*e that there is an& need to put off calling that se5m until the Petersburg constituents should ta7e up the nationalit& >uestion$ ?n the contrar&, I thin7 that the slogan of a constituent assembl& in Darsaw should be put forth now, at the same time as the slogan for an all#,ussian constituent assembl&$ /he go*ernment which finall& calls a constituent assembl& for all ,ussia should also call 0or sanction the calling of1 a special constituent se5m for Poland$ The /ob of the all-%ussian assembly $ill be to sanction the $ork of the 0arsa$ se/m, and in the light of the different social forces in*ol*ed in the Petersburg constituent assembl&, the more this is gi*en on the basis of the real principles of democrac& the more decisi*el& and clearl& will the Polish nation express its national will$ It will do this most clearl& in the elections to the se5m especiall& called to decide the future fate of Poland$ ?n the basis of this se5ms decisions, the representati*es of the Polish and ,ussian proletariat in the all#,ussian assembl& will be able to energeticall& defend the real recognition of the right to self#determination$ /hus, the simultaneous calling of all#,ussian and all#Polish constituent assemblies: this should be our slogan$ /he presentation b& the proletariat of the demand for a constituent assembl& for Poland should not be ta7en to mean that the Polish nation would be represented in the all#,ussian assembl& b& an& delegation of the Darsaw se5m$

I thin7 that such representation in the all#,ussian assembl& would not correspond to the interests of re*olutionar& de*elopment$ It would 5oin the proletariat and bourgeois elements of the Polish se5m b& bonds of mutual solidarit& and responsibilit&, in contradiction to the real mutual relations of their interests$ In the all#,ussian assembl&, the proletariat and bourgeoisie of Poland should not be represented b& one delegation$ (ut this would occur e*en if a delegation were sent from the se5m to an assembl& which included representati*es of all the parties of the se5m proportionall& to their numbers$ In this case, the direct and independent representation of the Polish proletariat in the assembl& would disappear, and the *er& creation of real political parties in Poland would be made difficult$ /hen the elections to the Polish se5m, whose main tas7 is to define the political relations between Poland and ,ussia, would not show the political and social faces of the leading parties, as elections to an all# ,ussian assembl& could do; for the latter t&pe of elections would ad*ance, besides the local, partial, historicall& temporar& and specificall& national >uestions, the general questions of politics and socialism# $hich really divide contemporary societies$ 0'ere as e*er&where I spea7 of a definite manner of sol*ing the nationalit& >uestion for Poland, not touching those changes which ma& pro*e themsel*es indispensable while resol*ing this >uestion for other nations$ H Note of the author of the cited article.1 E/he abo*e article appeared in Robotnik, the organ of the PP%, no$-:, Februar& -, 1 !.$# Note of the editorial board of Przeglad Sozial-demokratycznyF /his article gi*es a moral sanction on the part of the opportunist wing of ,ussian %ocial )emocrac& to the slogan put forth b& the PP% in the first period of the re*olution: that is, to the Darsaw constituent assembl&$ 'owe*er, it had no practical result$ 3fter the dissolution of the PP%, the so# called left wing of that part&, ha*ing publicl& re5ected the program of rebuilding Poland, found itself forced to abandon its partial program of nationalism in the form of the slogan of a Darsaw constituent assembl&$ (ut the article remains a characteristic attempt to gi*e practical effect to the principle of @the right of nations to self#determination$B In the abo*e argument, which we >uoted in full in order to be able to examine it from all aspects, se*eral points stri7e the reader$ 3bo*e all, according to the author, on the one hand @a constituent assembl& of Poland should decide whether Poland should enter the formation of a new ,ussia and what 7ind of constitution it should ha*e$B ?n the other, @the Polish proletariat should use its strength to insure that its class will ma7e the greatest mar7 on the decisions of that organ of national self# go*ernment$ @ 'ere the class will of the Polish proletariat is expressl& opposed to the passi*e will of the Polish @nation$B /he class will of the proletariat can ob*iousl& lea*e @its mar7B on the decisions of the Darsaw constituent assembl& onl& if it is clearl& and expressl& formulated; in other words, the class part& of the Polish proletariat, the %ocialist Part&, must ha*e a well#defined program with respect to the national >uestion, which it can introduce in the Darsaw constituent assembl& a program which corresponds not to the will of @the nationB but onl& to the will and interests of the Polish proletariat$ /hen, in the constituent assembl&, in the national >uestion, one will, or @the self# determination of the proletariatB will come out against the will or @the self#determination of the nation$B For Polish %ocialists, the @nations right to self#determinationB as an obligator& principle in fact disappears, and is replaced b& a clearl& defined political program on the national >uestion$ /he result is rather strange$ /he ,ussian %ocial )emocratic Labor Part& lea*es the solution of the Polish >uestion up to the Polish @nation$B /he Polish %ocialists should not pic7 it up but tr&, as hard as the& can, to sol*e this >uestion according to the interests and will of the proletariat$ 'owe*er, the part& of the Polish proletariat is organizationall& tied to the all#state part&, for instance, the %ocial )emocrac& of the 6ingdom of Poland and Lithuania is a part of the ,ussian %ocial )emocratic Labor Part&$ /hus, %ocial )emocrac& of all of ,ussia, united both in ideas and factuall&, has two

different positions$ 3s a whole, it stands for the @nations in its constituent parts, it stands for the separate proletariat of each nation$ (ut these positions can be >uite different and ma& e*en be completel& opposed to each other$ /he sharpened class antagonism in all of ,ussia ma7es it a general rule that in the national#political >uestion, as in >uestions of internal politics, the proletarian parties ta7e completel& different positions from the bourgeois and petit bourgeois parties of the separate nationalities$ Dhat position should the Labor Part& of ,ussia then ta7e in the case of such a collisionL Let us suppose for the sa7e of argument, that in the federal constituent assembl&, two contradictor& programs are put forth from Poland: the autonomous program of 2ational )emocrac& and the autonomous program of Polish %ocial )emocrac&, which are >uite at odds with respect to internal tendenc& as well as to political formulation$ Dhat will the position of ,ussian %ocial )emocrac& be with regard to themL Dhich of the programs will it recognize as an expression of the will and @self# determinationB of the Polish @nationBL Polish %ocial )emocrac& ne*er had an& pretensions to be spea7ing in the name of the @nation$B 2ational )emocrac& comes forth as the expresser of the @nationalB will$ Let us also assume for a moment that this part& wins a ma5orit& at the elections to the constituent assembl& b& ta7ing ad*antage of the ignorance of the petit bourgeois elements as well as certain sections of the proletariat$ In this case, will the representati*es of the all#,ussian proletariat, compl&ing with the re>uirements of the formula of their program, come out in fa*or of the proposals of 2ational )emocrac& and go against their own comrades from PolandL ?r will the& associate themsel*es with the program of the Polish proletariat, lea*ing the @right of nationsB to one side as a phrase which binds them to nothingL ?r will the Polish %ocial )emocrats be forced, in order to reconcile these contradictions in their program, to come out in the Darsaw constituent assembl&, as well as in their own agitation in Poland, in fa*or of their own autonomous program, but to the federal constituent assembl&, as members well aware of the discipline of the %ocial )emocratic Part& of ,ussia, for the program of 2ational )emocrac&, that is, against their own programL Let us ta7e &et another example$ Ixamining the >uestion in a purel& abstract form, since the author has put the problem on that basis, let us suppose, to illustrate the principle, that in the national assembl& of the Aewish population of ,ussia for wh& should the right to create separate constituent assemblies be limited to Poland, as the author wantsL H the =ionist Part& somehow wins a ma5orit& and demands that the all#,ussian constituent assembl& *ote funds for the emigration of the entire Aewish communit&$ ?n the other hand, the class representati*es of the Aewish proletariat firml& resist the position of the =ionists as a harmful and reactionar& utopia$ Dhat position will ,ussian %ocial )emocrac& ta7e in this conflictL It will ha*e two choices$ /he @right of nations to self#determinationB might be essentiall& identical with the determination of the national >uestion b& the proletariat in >uestion that is, with the nationalit& program of the concerned %ocial )emocratic parties$ In such a case, howe*er, the formula of the @right of nationsB in the program of the ,ussian part& is onl& a m&stif&ing paraphrase of the class position$ ?r, alternati*el&, the ,ussian proletariat as such could recognize and honor onl& the will of the national ma/orities of the nationalities under ,ussian sub5ugation, e*en though the proletariat of the respecti*e @nationsB should come out against this ma5orit& with their own class program$ 3nd in this case, it is a political dualism of a special t&pe; it gi*es dramatic expression to the discord between the @nationalB and class positions: it points up the conflict between the position of the federal wor7ers part& and that of the parties of the particular nationalities which ma7e it up$ 3 special Polish constituent assembl& is to be the organ of realizing the right of the nation to self# determination$ (ut that right is, in realit&, se*erel& limited b& the author, and in two directions$ First,

the competence of the Darsaw constituent assembl& is reduced to the special >uestion of the relation of Poland to ,ussia and to the constitution for Poland$ /hen, e*en within this domain, the decisions of the @Polish nationB are subordinated to the sanction of an all#,ussian constituent assembl&$ /he assembl&, howe*er H if this reser*ation is to ha*e an& meaning at all H can either grant or den& these sanctions$ Cnder such conditions the unlimited @right of the nation to self#determinationB becomes rather problematic$ /he national partisans of the slogan of a separate Darsaw constituent assembl& would not at all agree to the reduction of their competence to the narrow area of relations between Poland and ,ussia$ /he& wanted to gi*e the assembl& the power o*er all the internal and external relations of the social life of Poland$ 3nd from the standpoint of the @right of nations to self# determination,B the& would undoubtedl& ha*e right and logic on their side$ For there seems to be no reason wh& @self#determinationB should mean onl& the solution of the external fate of the nation and of its constitution, and not of all social and political matters$ (esides, the separation of the relation of Poland to ,ussia and the constitution of Poland from the @general problems of politics and socialismB is a construction which is artificial to the highest degree$ If the @constitution of PolandB is to determine H as it e*identl& must H the electoral law, the law of unions and meetings, the law of the press, etc$, etc$, for Poland, then it is not clear what political >uestions remain for the federal constituent assembl& to sol*e with respect to Poland$ From this point of *iew, onl& one of two points of *iew is possible: either the Darsaw constituent assembl& is to be the essential organ for the self# determination of the Polish nation, and in this case it can be onl& an organ on the same le*el as the Petersburg constituent assembl&; or, the constituent assembl& of Darsaw pla&s onl& the role of a national se5m in a position of dependence on and subordination to the federal constituent assembl&, and in this case, @the right of the nation to self#determination,B dependent on the sanction of the ,ussian @nation,B reminds one of the German concept: @1ie %epublik mit dem "rossher2og an der Spit2eB E@/he ,epublic with the Grand )u7e at the 'eadBF $ /he author himself helps us to guess how, in his understanding, the @right of the nation,B proclaimed in the introduction so charmingl& in the form of a Darsaw constituent assembl&, is finall& canceled out b& the competence and right of sanction of the Petersburg constituent assembl&$ In this matter, the +enshe*i7 5ournalist adopts the *iew that the Darsaw constituent assembl& will be the organ of national interests, whereas the federal assembl& will be the organ of the class and general social interests, the terrain of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie$ /hus, the author shows so much mistrust of the Darsaw organ of the @national willB that he opposes the representation of that national se5m in the Petersburg constituent assembl&, for which he demands direct elections from Poland to insure the best representation of the interests of the Polish proletariat$ /he defender of two constituent assemblies feels instincti*el& that e*en with uni*ersal and e>ual elections to the Darsaw assembl&, its *er& indi*idual nature would wea7en the position of the Polish proletariat, while the combined entr& of the Polish proletariat with the proletariat of the entire state in a general constituent assembl& would strengthen the class position and its defense$ 'ence arises his *acillation between one and the other position and his desire to subordinate the organ of the @nationalB will to the organ of the class struggle$ /his is, then, again an e>ui*ocal political position, in which the collision between the @nationalB point of *iew and the class point of *iew ta7es the form of the opposition between the Darsaw and the Petersburg constituent assemblies$ ?nl& one >uestion remains: since the representation in a federal constituent assembl& is more useful for the defense of the Polish proletariat, then wh& cannot that bod& resol*e the Polish national >uestion, in order to insure the preponderance of the will and interests of the Polish proletariatL %o man& hesitations and contradictions show how desirable it would be for the @nationB and the wor7ing class to de*elop a common position$

3part from this, we must add that the entire construction of the Darsaw constituent assembl& as the organ of national @self#determinationB is onl& a house of cards: the dependence or independence of nation#states is determined not b& the *ote of ma5orities in parliamentar& representations, but onl& b& socio#economic de*elopment, b& material class interests, and as regards the external political affairs, b& armed struggle, war, or insurrection$ /he Darsaw assembl& could onl& reall& determine the fate of Poland if Poland had first, b& means of a successful uprising, won factual independence from ,ussia$ In other words, the Polish people can realize its @rightB to self#determination onl& when it has the actual abilit&, the necessar& force for this, and then it will realize it not on the basis of its @rightsB but on the basis of its power$ /he present re*olution did not call forth an independence mo*ement in Poland; it did not show the least tendenc& to separate Poland from ,ussia$ ?n the contrar&, it buried the remains of these tendencies b& forcing the national part& 02ational )emocrac&1 to renounce the program of the reconstruction of Poland, while the other part& 0the PP%1 was smashed to bits and also, midwa& in the struggle, was forced to renounce this program explicitl&$ /hus, the @rightB of the Polish nation to self#determination remains H the right to eat off gold plates$ /he demand for a Darsaw constituent assembl& is therefore ob*iousl& depri*ed of all political or theoretical importance and represents onl& a momentar& tentati*e impro*isation of deteriorated Polish nationalism, li7e a soap bubble which bursts immediatel& after appearing$ /his demand is useful onl& as an illustration of the application of @the right of a nation to self#determinationB in practice$ /his illustration is a new proof that b& recognizing the @right of nations to self# determinationB in the framewor7 of the present regime, %ocial )emocrac& is offering the @nationsB either the cheap blessing to do what the& 0the @nationsB1 are in a position to do b& *irtue of their strength, or else an empt& phrase with no force at all$ ?n the other hand, this position brings %ocial )emocrac& into conflict with its true calling, the protection of the class interests of the proletariat and the re*olutionar& de*elopment of societ&, which the creators of scientific socialism used as the basis of their *iew on the nationalit& >uestion$ /he preser*ation of that metaph&sical phrase in the program of the %ocial )emocratic Part& of ,ussia would be a betra&al of the strictl& class position which the part& has tried to obser*e in all points of its program$ /he ninth paragraph should be replaced b& a concrete formula, howe*er general, which would pro*ide a solution of the nationalit& >uestion in accordance with the interests of the proletariat of the particular nationalities$ /hat does not in the least mean that the program of the %ocial )emocratic organization of the respecti*e nationalities should become, eo ipso, the program of the all#,ussian part&$ 3 fundamental critical appraisal of each of these programs b& the whole of the wor7ers part& of the state is necessar&, but this appraisal should be made from the point of *iew of the actual social conditions, from the point of *iew of a scientific anal&sis of the general tendencies of capitalist de*elopment, as well as the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat$ /his alone can indicate a uniform and consistent position of the part& as a whole and in its constituent parts$
E8F

To$ar2yst$o 1emokratyc2ne Polskie 0)emocratic %ociet&QPolish1, 1"<8#1".8, was the biggest organization of Polish emigrants in France and in Ingland, professing re*olutionar& and democratic *iews$ 3fter 1"9!, it was in*ol*ed in preparing an insurrection in the three parts of partitioned Poland$ Pobudka 0Re*eille1, also called La )iane, was a 5ournal of the Polish 2ational %ocialist Part& published in Paris, 1"" #1" <$

+iga Narod$a 02ational League1, founded 1" < as a successor of the @Polish League,B was a secret political organization in ,ussian, German, and 3ustrian Poland$ It promoted class solidarit& and nationalism; it represented the interests of the propertied classes$ In 1" ., it founded the Part& of 2ational )emocrats 03ndec/a1, which was considered bourgeois, with strong nationalist tendencies$
E<F

/he abo*e motion read: BDhereas, the sub5ugation of one nation b& another can ser*e onl& the interests of capitalists and despots, while for wor7ing people in both oppressed and oppressor nation it is e>uall& pernicious; and whereas, in particular, the ,ussian tsardom, which owes its internal strength and its external significance to the sub5ugation and partition of Poland, constitutes a permanent threat to the de*elopment of the international wor7ers mo*ement, the Congress hereb& resol*es: that the independence of Poland represents an imperati*e political demand both for the Polish proletariat and for the international labor mo*ement as a whole$B EApparently note by %.+.F
E9F

?nl& the German branch of the Polish %ocialist Part& thought it rele*ant to include the London ,esolution in its program during its struggles with German %ocial )emocrac&$ 3fter it 5oined the German Part& again, the PP% adopted the Irfurt program as its own without reser*ations$E:F EApparently note by %.+.F EConfusingl& the note below is noted in the note abo*e$ 2ote b& transcriberF
E:F

/he three partitions 01--8, 1- <, 1- :1 had left Poland di*ided among ,ussia, Prussia, and 3ustria 0.8 percent, 8! percent, and 1" percent of Polish territor& respecti*el&1$ /he Polish %ocialists in each of the occupied areas cooperated in one or another fashion with the %ocialist parties of the partitioning powers, more closel& though with the German %ocial )emocratic Part& and the 3ustrian %ocial )emocratic Part& 0until 1" " there was no ,ussian %ocialist Part&1$ Proletariat, founded in 1""8 b& Ludwi7 Dar&Rs7i, was called the first Polish %ocialist Part&$ It signed an agreement with the ,ussian Narodnaya 4olya 0Peoples Dill1$ 3fter the destruction of Proletariat in the late 1""!s, three small groups continued to function, the so#called @%econd Proletariat,B 0+artin 6asprza71, the 5nion of Polish 0orkers 0Aulian +archlews7i, 3dolf Darszaws7i, (ronislaw Desolows7i1, and the Association of 0orkers$ %imultaneousl& with the Proletariat$ the Polish People was organized b& (ronislaw Limanows7i in Portsmouth in 1""1$ In 1" 8, the leaders of the Polish %ocialist groups of 3ustrian Galicia and German %ilesia formed distinct and separate Polish parties in their territories$ In 2o*ember 1" 8, a congress of all Polish %ocialists in exile created the united Polish %ocialist Part& 0PP%1$ PP% co*ered the ,ussian territories of Poland and was closel& related to the German#Polish %ocialist Part& and to the Polish %ocial )emocratic Part& in 3ustrian Galicia$ Cntil the foundation of the %ocial )emocrac& of the 6ingdom of Poland 0%)6P1 b& ,osa Luxemburg, Aulian +archlews7i, 3dolf Darszaws7i, and Leo Aogiches in 1" <, the Poles appeared as one unit at international congresses$ /he %)6P saw itself as the direct successor to Proletariat$ Its immediate aim was a liberal constitution for the entire ,ussian empire with territorial autonom& for Poland; Polish independence was specificall& re5ected$ Cp to the First Dorld Dar, the Polish %ocialist mo*ement remained sharpl& di*ided on the issue of Polish independence$ 3fter the fusion of %)6P and the Lithuanian %ocial )emocrats 01" 1, the new part& too7 the name of %ocial )emocrac& of the 6ingdom of Poland and Lithuania 0%)6PiL1$ In 1 11, the %)6PiL split into two factions: the =arzadowc& faction included ,osa Luxemburg, Leo Aogiches#/&sz7a, +archlews7i, and Felix )zherzh&ns7i, while the ,oslamowc& faction had as

members 'anec7i, ,ade7, the (rothers %tein, and (rons7i$ (oth factions passed out of existence with the formation of the Polish Communist Part& in 1 1"$ /his part& was shortl& declared illegal; it was almost totall& purged b& %talin in 1 <-$ /he direct successor of the Polish Communist Part& was the Polish Dor7ers Part& 0Polska Partia %obotnic2a1, founded in 1 98$ /he PP% ceased to exist in 1 9" when it was united with the PP,$ /he fusion of these two ga*e birth to the present Polish Cnited Dor7ers Part& 0P=P,1, the ruling part& in the Polish Peoples ,epublic$
E.F

Aosef %zu5s7i 01"<:#1""<1, Polish historian and statesman, spo7esman for a conciliator&, pro# 3ustrian polic&, co#author of Teka "tancz ka H a political pamphlet opposing the independence mo*ement in Poland$ /adeusz 6osciusz7o 01-9.#1"1-1, Polish general, supreme commander of the so#called 6osciusz7o Insurrection of 1- 9$ )irected against ,ussia and Prussia H the main beneficiaries of Polands partitions of 1--. and 1- < H the aborti*e insurrection was followed b& the third partition in 1- :, which wiped Poland from the map of Iurope until she regained independence in 1 1"$ /he 2o*ember Insurrection, 1"<!#<1, in ,ussia#occupied Poland, was caused b& an intensified ,ussianizing polic&$ /he pro#,ussian Polish nobilit& and upper militar& class were opposed b& re*olutionar& intellectuals and the lower#ran7ing arm& officers$ Dhen the se5m dethroned the tsar, an armed conflict erupted which ended in ,ussias ultimatel& li>uidating the so*ereignt& of the rump 6ingdom of Poland$ /he Aanuar& Insurrection; 1".<#.9, was directl& caused b& the draft of Poles into the tsarist arm&$ %upported b& peasants and ci*ilians, the insurrection spread to the Prussia# and 3ustria#occupied territories of Poland$ It ended in defeat, and the commander in chief, ,omuald /raugutt, was hanged b& the ,ussians$
E-F

3ctuall&, the articles were written b& Ingels$ (ut +arx submitted them, and it is perfectl& correct for ,osa Luxemburg to cite them as illustrating +arxs techni>ue of anal&sis$
E"F

Friedrich Ingels, 1er Sch$ei2er 67rgerkrieg, in Nachlass, II, 99"$

E F

In the minds of legal formalists and professors, this de*elopment appears in the form of the @degeneration of the national idea$B /he other stream of nationalist trends appears in the stri*ings of nations which ha*e alread& gained political independence, to assert their superiorit& and ascendanc& o*er other nations$ /hese stri*ings are expressed on the one hand in the glorification of their past historical *irtues or the present features of their national character, the @soul,B or finall& as completel& undefined hopes for a future cultural role, for some 7ind of a mission of destin& gi*en to certain nations, stri*ings which are now christened with the name of nationalism$ ?n the other hand, these political tendencies bring about the expansion of the territorial boundaries of a gi*en nation, the strengthening of its global position b& partitioning *arious other countries and b& increasing its colonial possessionsPthat is, the politics of imperialism$ /hese mo*ements embod& the further de*elopment of the national idea, but the& represent a contradiction of the original contents of that idea, and in its fatal results, so degrading for ci*ilization, it is impossible not to see the degeneration of that idea and its death$ It is ob*ious that the centur& of nationalities has finished$ De must await a new age, colored b& new

trends$ H D$+$ Cstinow, .d e u Nats onalno*o 9osudarst*a 06har7o*: 1 !.1$ EApparently note by %.+.F

:, The Nation!"tate and the Proletariat

/he >uestion of nationalit& cannot be sol*ed merel& b& presuming that socialists must approach it from the point of *iew of the class interests of the proletariat$ /he influence of theoretical socialism has been felt indirectl& b& the wor7ers mo*ement as a whole, to such an extent that at present there is not a socialist or wor7ers part& which does not use at least the +arxist terminolog&, if not the entire +arxist wa& of thin7ing$ 3 famous example of this is the present %ocial ,e*olutionar& Part& of ,ussia, in whose theor& H as far as one can spea7 of such H there are at least as man& elements borrowed from the +arxist %chool as there are elements inherited from the Narodniki and the Peoples Dill$ In li7e manner, all socialist groups of the petit bourgeois and nationalistic t&pe in ,ussia ha*e their own fancies which are solel& @in the interest of the proletariat and socialism$B /he Polish %ocial )emocrac&, now in decline, had especiall& distinguished itself in comparison with the nai*e, patriarchal H let us sa& H national socialism of +r$ Limanows7i, particularl& in that the Bgood# heartedB +r$ Limanows7i ne*er e*en used the name of 6arl +arx, while social patriotism, from the beginning, sought to legitimize its program with +arxist terminolog& as a @class interest of the proletariat$B (ut it is ob*ious that the class character of an& particular demand is not established b& merel& incorporating it mechanicall& into the program of a socialist part&$ Dhat this or an& other part& considers a Bclass interestB of the proletariat can onl& be an imputed interest, concocted b& sub5ecti*e reasoning$ It is *er& eas&, for instance, to state that the wor7ers class interest demands the establishment of a minimum#wage law$ %uch a law would protect the wor7ers against the pressures of competition, which might come from a less de*eloped localit&$ It would assure them of a certain minimum standard of li*ing, etc$ %uch demands ha*e been presented repeatedl& b& socialist circles; howe*er, the principle has not &et been accepted b& the socialist parties in general, for the *alid reason that the uni*ersal regulation of wages b& means of legislation is but a utopian dream under toda&s anarchistic conditions of pri*ate econom&$ /his is because wor7ers wages, li7e the prices of an& 7ind of commodit&, are set up in the capitalistic s&stem under the operation of @free competitionB and the spontaneous mo*ement of capital$ /herefore, the legal regulation of wages can be achie*ed onl& in exceptional, clearl& defined areas, e$g$, in small communities$ 3nd since the general establishment of a minimum#wage law clashes with the current conditions of capitalism, we must admit that it is not a true proletarian interest, but rather a fabricated or imputed one, in spite of the fact that it can be supported b& a completel& logical argument$ Li7ewise, one can, in a purel& abstract wa&, figure out *arious @class interestsB for the proletariat, which, howe*er, would ha*e to remain as mere clichKs in the socialist program$ /his is especiall& so, as, the more that other social elements attach themsel*es to the wor7ers mo*ement, the stronger is the tendenc& to suggest *arious sincere but unrealistic demands of these foreign elements as class interests of the proletariat$ /he other social elements referred to here include those members of societ& who ha*e been depri*ed of political shelter b& the failure of the bourgeois parties; in this categor& are the bourgeois and petit bourgeois intelligentsia$ If the socialist parties had no ob5ecti*e criterion b& which to establish 5ust what fits the class interests of the proletariat, but were onl& directed b& what certain people might thin7 would be good or useful for the wor7ers, then socialist programs would be a motle& collection of sub5ecti*e, and often completel& utopian, desires$ (asing itself on historical foundations H on the foundations of the de*elopment of capitalist societ& H toda&s %ocial )emocrac& deri*es its immediate interests 0the demands of toda&s proletariat1 as

well as its long#range goals, not merel& from sub5ecti*e reasoning about what would be @goodB or @usefulB for the proletariat, but from examining the ob5ecti*e de*elopment of societ& for a *erification of its actual interests, as well as for material means for their realization$ It is from this standpoint that the main alternati*es for a practical solution to the >uestion of nationalit& should be examined H those which are suggested b& historical examples as well as those which correspond to the slogans popular in socialist circles$ De should first consider the idea of a nation-state$ In order to e*aluate this concept accuratel&, it is first necessar& to search for historical substance in the idea, to see what is actuall& hiding behind the mas7$ In his article on the struggles of nationalities and the social#democratic program in 3ustria, published o*er ten &ears ago, 6auts7& enumerates three factors, which, according to him, ma7e up the @roots of the modern national idea,B as found in the rise of the modern state in all of Iurope$ /hese factors are: the desire of the bourgeoisie to assure for itself an internal or domestic mar7et for its own commodit& production; second, the desire for political freedom H democrac&; and finall&, expansion of the national literature and culture to the populace$E1F In 6auts7&s theor& one can see, abo*e all, his basic position, his own *iew of nationalit& as a historical category$ 3ccording to his reasoning, the idea of the nation is intimatel& connected with a definite era of modern de*elopment$ /he mar7et interests of the bourgeoisie, democratic currents, culture of the people H these are t&pical aspects of a bourgeois societ&$ 2aturall&, we are not spea7ing here of a nationalit& as a specific ethnic or cultural group$ %uch nationalit& is, of course, separate and distinct from the bourgeois aspect; national peculiarities had alread& existed for centuries$ (ut here we are concerned with national mo*ements as an element of political life, with the aspirations of establishing a so#called nation#state; then the connection between those mo*ements and the bourgeois era is un>uestionable$ /he histor& of the national unification of German& is a t&pical example of this connection, as the nucleus around which the later German ,eich cr&stallized was the German 8ollverein and 8ollparlament$ /heir sponsor, Friedrich List, with his tri*ial theor& of @national econom&,B can be more 5ustifiabl& considered the real messiah of the national unit& of German& than the idealist Fichte, mentioned usuall& as the first apostle of German national rebirth$ /his @nationalB mo*ement, which captured the imagination of the German @people and princesB during Fichtes time, and which the pseudo#re*olutionar& 6urschenschaften loudl& ushered in 0in spite of Fichtes ardent s&mpath& for the Great French ,e*olution1, basicall& represented onl& a medie*al reaction against the seeds of the ,e*olution, which were brought to German& b& 2apoleon, and against the elements of the modern bourgeois s&stem$ /he sultr&, romantic wind of @national rebirthB finall& died out after the *ictorious return of German& to feudal subdi*ision and to pre#+arch reaction$ (& contrast, the gospel of that *ulgar agent of German industr&, List, in the thirties and forties based the @national rebirthB on the elements of bourgeois de*elopment, on industr& and trade, on the theor& of the @domestic mar7et$B /he material basis for this patriotic mo*ement, which in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth centur& aroused such strong political, educational, philosophical, and literar& currents in German&, was abo*e all, the need to unif& all the German territories 0which were di*ided into se*eral dozen feudal statelets and were criss#crossed b& customs and tax barriers1 into one great, integrated, capitalistic Bfatherland,B establishing a broad foundation for mechanized manufacturing and big industr&$ /he histor& of the industrial and commercial unification of German& is so completel& intertwined with the fate of German&s political unification, that the histor& of the Customs Cnion E=oll*ereinF, which reflected all the political de*elopments and happenings in German&, passes o*er, with perfect

continuit&, into the histor& of the birth of the present German ,eich$ In 1"<9, the Customs Cnion was born, grouping se*enteen minor states around Prussia; and graduall&, one after another, the remaining states also 5oined this Cnion$ 'owe*er, 3ustria remained altogether separate from the Cnion, and the %chleswig#'olstein Dar finall& decided the matter in fa*or of Prussia$ In 1".-, the last renewal of the Customs Cnion became superfluous in the presence of the new national union; and the 2orth German Cnion, after the Franco#Prussian Dar, transferred its customs rights and duties b& inheritance to the newl& formed ,eich$ In the place of the 8ollbundesrat and the 8ollparlament there were now the (undesrat and ,eichstag$ In this example from modern histor&, German& excellentl& demonstrates the true economic foundation of modern nation#states$ 3lthough the bourgeois appetite for mar7ets for @its ownB commodities is so elastic and extensi*e that it alwa&s has the natural tendenc& to include the entire globe, the *er& essence of the modern bourgeois @national ideaB is based on the premise that in the e&es of the bourgeoisie of e*er& countr&, its own nation H their @fatherlandB H is called and destined b& nature to ser*e it Ethe bourgeoisieF as a field for the sale of products$ It is as if this were an exclusi*e patrimon& determined b& the god +ercur&$ 3t least this is how the national >uestion appears where the de*elopment of capitalism ta7es place @normall&,B without abrupt fluctuations, i$e$, where production for the domestic mar7et exceeds production for export$ /his is exactl& what happened in German& and in Ital&$ 'owe*er, it would be wrong to ta7e 6auts7&s formulation literall&; we cannot assume that the material foundation of modern national mo*ements is onl& the *aguel& understood appetite of the industrial bourgeoisie for a @nati*eB mar7et for its commodities$ +oreo*er, a capitalistic bourgeoisie needs man& other conditions for its proper de*elopment: a strong militar&, as a guarantee of the in*iolabilit& of this @fatherland,B as well as a tool to clear a path for itself in the world mar7et; furthermore, it needs a suitable customs polic&, suitable forms of administration in regard to communications, 5urisdiction, school s&stems, and financial polic&$ In a word, capitalism demands for its proper de*elopment not onl& mar7ets, but also the whole apparatus of a modern capitalistic state$ /he bourgeoisie needs for its normal existence not onl& strictl& economic conditions for production, but also, in e>ual measure, political conditions for its class rule$ From all this it follows that the specific form of national aspirations, the true class interest of the bourgeoisie, is state independence$ /he nation#state is also simultaneousl& that indispensable historical form in which the bourgeoisie passes o*er from the national defensi*e to an offensi*e position, from protection and concentration of its own nationalit& to political con>uest and domination o*er other nationalities$ Dithout exception, all of toda&s Bnation#statesB fit this description, annexing neighbors or colonies, and completel& oppressing the con>uered nationalities$ /his phenomenon becomes understandable onl& when one ta7es into consideration the fact that, according to the bourgeois wa& of thin7ing, it is possible to ha*e a national mo*ement for unification and defense of ones own nationalit&, and at the same time, to oppress another nationalit& 0which is, of course, contrar& to the *er& ideolog& of the @nation#stateB1$ /he German bourgeoisie in 1"9" presents a stri7ing example of this phenomenon in its attitude toward the Polish >uestion$ 3s is 7nown, during the re*olution Eof 1"9"F, when German national patriotism was most e*ident, 6arl +arx and his circle ad*ocated Polish independence; howe*er, he pro*ed to be but a prophet cr&ing in the wilderness$ /he German @nation#state,B from its first stages of de*elopment, did not conform at all with the accepted understanding of a nation#state in regard to nationalities$ /he borders of the ,eich actuall& split the German nation, di*iding it between 3ustria and the new @nationalB state of German&, and putting together the Germans and the raciall& distinct peoples in territories annexed from Poland, )enmar7, and France$

3n e*en more stri7ing example is 'ungar&, whose struggle for national independence was so much admired in its time$ I*en our own Polish re*olutionar& leaders H (em, D&soc7i, and )embic7i H had @tilted their lancesB to assist them$ (ut when examined from the *iewpoint of nationalit&, this struggle was nothing more than an attempt to assure class rule of the +ag&ar minorit& o*er a countr& of nine nationalities, with the +ag&ars oppressing the other nationalities$ /he national @independenceB of the 'ungarians was bought b& se*ering the Carpathian %lo*a7s from their brothers, the %udeten Czechs; separating the Germans of (ratisla*a, /emes*ar, and /rans&l*ania from the 3ustrian Germans; and the Croats and )almatian %erbs from Croatia and the %lo*enians$E8F /he aspirations of the Czechs are characterized b& the same dichotom&$ /hese aspirations arouse distrust among the Germans because, among other things, the& are directed clearl& at separating the German population of %udetenland from the Germans of the 3lpine countries$ /he primar& ob5ecti*e of the Czechs was to force the Germans, as minorit& group under the crown of Denceslaus 0Nacla*1, into complete dependence on the Czechs in matters of culture and administration$ 3s if this were not enough, the di*ision of the Czech lands created a nationalit& di*ision for the Czechs themsel*es b& uniting fi*e and one#third million Czechs with three million Germans and nearl& two hundred thousand Poles$ %till separated from this @nationalB Czech state were two million Carpathian %lo*a7s, a group closel& related to the Czechs and left at the merc& of the +ag&ars$ /herefore, these %lo*a7s are also loudl& ad*ocating their cause, which has been completel& neglected b& the Czech nationalists$E<F Finall&, and we do not ha*e to go far for an example, Polish bourgeois nationalism is directed as much against the ,uthenians as against the Lithuanians$ /he *er& nationalit& which had to endure the bitter polic& of extermination b& the partitioning powers H Prussia and ,ussia H now refuses the right of independent existence to other nationalities$ 3ccording to the %tancz&7E9F polic& in Galicia, the Poles oppressed the ,uthenians, whose struggle for nationalit& runs li7e a red thread through the political histor& of the de*elopment of Galicia in the second half of the last centur&$ /he recent mo*ement for national rebirth of the Lithuanians was met with similar hostilit& in Polish nationalistic circles$E:F /his strange double#edged character of bourgeois patriotism, which is essentiall& based on the conflicting interests of *arious nationalities rather than on harmon& becomes understandable onl& when one ta7es into consideration the fact that the historical basis of the modern national mo*ements of the bourgeoisie is nothing more than its aspirations to class rule, and a specific social form in whose aspirations this expression is found: the modern capitalistic state H Bnational,B in the sense of the dominance of the bourgeoisie of a certain nationalit& o*er the entire mixed population of the state$ 3 democratic organization, together with general education of the people H these distinctl& ideological elements of the nation mentioned b& 6auts7& H are merel& details of a modern bourgeois state, easil& attainable b& the bourgeoisie within the framewor7 and spirit of the state$ /herefore, independence and state unification constitute the real axis around which the national mo*ements of the bourgeoisie rotate$E.F /his matter appears >uite different from the point of *iew of the interests of the proletariat$ /he contemporar& proletariat, as a social class, is the offspring of the capitalist econom& and the bourgeois state$ /he capitalist societ& and bourgeois state H ta7ing them not as an abstract idea, but in tangible form as histor& has created them in each countr& H were alread&, from the *er& beginning, a frame of acti*it& for the proletariat$ 3 bourgeois state H national or not national H is 5ust that foundation, together with capitalistic production as the ruling form of social econom&, on which the wor7ing class grows and thri*es$ In this respect, there is a basic historical difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat$ /he bourgeoisie de*elops and is carried in the womb of the feudal

class s&stem$ 3spiring to assure triumph for capitalism as the form of production, and for itself as the ruling class, the bourgeoisie creates the modern state on the ruins of the feudal s&stem$ Dithin the bounds of the de*elopment of capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat is next to ma7e itself heard politicall& H still as part of the bourgeois state$ (ut the state was alread& from the beginning its natural womb, 5ust as the shell of an egg is for the chic7en$ /herefore, historicall& spea7ing, the idea that the modern proletariat could do nothing as a separate and conscious class without first creating a new nation#state, is the same as sa&ing that the bourgeoisie in an& countr& should first of all establish a feudal s&stem, if b& some chance it did not come about normall& b& itself, or had ta7en on particular forms, as for instance in ,ussia$ /he historical mission of the bourgeoisie is the creation of a modern @nationalB state; but the historical tas7 of the proletariat is the abolition of this state as a political form of capitalism, in which the& themsel*es, as a conscious class, come into existence to establish the socialist s&stem$ /he proletariat, as part of the whole societ&, can ta7e part in national mo*ements of the bourgeoisie, where the bourgeois de*elopment demands the creation of a @nation#state,B as was the case, for example, in German&$ (ut then it follows the lead of the bourgeoisie, and does not act as an independent class with a separate political program$ /he national program of the German socialists in the forties ad*anced two ideas, directl& opposing the national program of the bourgeoisie: unification with borders which would be based strictl& on di*isions of nationalities, and a republican form of go*ernment$ /he interests of the proletariat on the nationalit& >uestion are 5ust the opposite of those of the bourgeoisie$ /he concern about guaranteeing an internal mar7et for the industrialists of the @fatherland,B and of ac>uiring new mar7ets b& means of conquest# b& colonial or militar& policies#all these, which are the intentions of the bourgeoisie in creating a @nationalB state, cannot be the aims of a conscious proletariat$ /he proletariat, as a legitimate child of capitalistic de*elopment, ta7es this de*elopment into account as a necessar& historical bac7ground of its own growth and political maturation$ %ocial )emocrac& itself reflects onl& the e*olutionar& side of capitalist de*elopment, whereas the ruling bourgeoisie loo7s after this de*elopment on behalf of reaction$ %ocial )emocrac& nowhere considers its tas7 to be the acti*e support of industr& or trade; rather it struggles against militar&, colonial, and customs protection, 5ust as it combats the whole basic apparatus of the existing class statePits administration, legislature, school s&stems, etc$E-F /he national polic& of the proletariat, therefore, basicall& clashes with the bourgeois polic& to the extent that in its essence it is onl& defensi*e, ne*er offensi*e; it depends on the harmon& of interests of all nationalities, not on con>uest and sub5ugation of one b& another$ /he conscious proletariat of e*er& countr& needs for its proper de*elopment peaceful existence and cultural de*elopment of its own nationalit&, but b& no means does it need the dominance of its nationalit& o*er others$ /herefore, considering the matter from this point of *iew, the @nationB-state# as an apparatus of the domination and con>uest of foreign nationalities, while it is indispensable for the bourgeoisie, has no meaning for the class interests of the proletariat$ /herefore, of these @three roots of the modern national idea,B which 6auts7& enumerated, for the proletariat as a class onl& the last two are important: democratic organization, and education of the populace$ Nital for the wor7ing class as conditions of its political and spiritual maturit&, are the freedom of using its own nati*e language, and the unchec7ed and unwarped de*elopment of national culture 0learning, literature, the arts1 and normal education of the masses, unimpaired b& the pressures of the nationalists H so far as these can be @normalB in the bourgeois s&stem$ It is indispensable for the wor7ing class to ha*e the same e>ual national rights as other nationalities in the

state en5o&$E"F Political discrimination against a particular nationalit& is the strongest tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is eager to mas7 class conflicts and m&stif& its own proletariat$ /he ad*ocates Polish nationalists1 of the @*er& bestB social condition state at this point that, whate*er the situation$ the surest guarantee of cultural de*elopment and of the rights of e*er& nationalit& is precisel& the independence of the state, their own nation#state, and that therefore the nation#state is finall& also an indispensable class interest of the proletariat$ De are hardl& concerned with determining what is or would be @the bestB for the proletariat$ %uch obser*ations ha*e no practical *alue$ +oreo*er, once the sub5ect of @what would be the bestB from the standpoint of the proletariat is approached in an abstract wa&, we would ha*e to conclude that @the bestB cure for national pressure, as well as for all t&pes of disorders of a social nature, is undoubtedl& the socialist s&stem$ 3 utopian argument must alwa&s lead to a utopian solution, if onl& b& leaping to the @state of the future,B whereas actuall& the problem should be sol*ed within the framewor7 of existing bourgeois realit&$ +oreo*er, from the point of *iew of methods, the abo*e reasoning contains still another historical misunderstanding$ /he argument that an independent nation#state is, after all @the bestB guarantee of national existence and de*elopment in*ol*es operating with a conception of a nation#state as a completel& abstract thing$ /he nation#state as seen onl& from a national point of *iew, onl& as a pledge and embodiment of freedom and independence, is simpl& a remnant of the deca&ing ideolog& of the petite bourgeoisie of German&, Ital&, 'ungar& H all of Central Iurope in the first half of the nineteenth centur&$ It is a phrase from the treasur& of disintegrated bourgeois liberalism$ %ince then, the de*elopment of the bourgeoisie has pro*ed une>ui*ocall& that a modern nation#state is more real and tangible than the *ague idea of @freedomB or national @independenceB; that it is indeed a definite historical realit&, neither *er& alluring nor *er& pure$ /he substance and essence of the modern state comprise not freedom and independence of the @nation,B but onl& the class dominance of the bourgeoisie, protectionist polic&, indirect taxation, militarism, war, and con>uest$ /he bourgeoisie used to use the ob*ious techni>ue of tr&ing to co*er up this brutal historical truth with a light ideological gauze, b& offering the purel& negati*e happiness of @independence and national freedom$B For a time this techni>ue paid off$ (ut toda& it is onl& necessar& to recall the circumstances under which this contention was ad*anced, to understand that it is simpl& opposed to what can and should be the class position of the proletariat$ In this case, as in man& others, anarchism, the supposed antagonist of bourgeois liberalism, pro*ed to be its worth& child$ 3narchism, with characteristic @re*olutionar&B seriousness, accepted at face *alue the phraseolog& of the liberal ideolog& and, li7e the latter, showed onl& contempt for the historical and social content of the nation#state, which it set down as nothing else than an embodiment of @freedom,B of the @will of the people,B and of similar empt& words$ (a7unin, for example, wrote in 1"9 about the national mo*ements of Central Iurope: /he first sign of life in the ,e*olution Eof 1"9"F was the cr& of hatred toward the old oppression, a cr& of s&mpath& and lo*e for all oppressed nationalities $$$ @3wa& with the oppressorsSB re*erberated as if from one breast; @%al*ation for the oppressed Poles, Italians, and allS 2o more wars of con>uest; 5ust one more war should be carried through to its end H a glorious re*olutionar& struggle with the purpose of e*entual liberation for all peoplesS )own with the artificial boundaries which ha*e been forcibl& erected b& despotic congresses according to so#called historical, geographical, strategic necessitiesS /here should no longer be an& other barriers between the nations but those corresponding to nature, to 5ustice, and those drawn in a democratic sense which the so*ereign will of the people themsel*es traces on the basis of their national characteristicsSB %uch was the cr& which rang out among all the peoples$E F

/o these dith&rambics on the sub5ect of national independence and @the will of the peopleB +arx answered: 'ere there is no mention of realit&, or insofar as it is considered at all, it is represented as something falsel&, artificiall& established b& @despotsB and @diplomats$B 3gainst this wic7ed realit& is pitted the alleged will of the people with its categorical imperati*e of an absolute demand for @freedom,B @5ustice,B and @humanit&$B $$$ /he& can demand @freedomB of this or that a thousand times; if the thing is impossible, it will not ta7e place, and in spite of e*er&thing it will remain an @empt& dream$B $$$ Aust a word about the @uni*ersal brotherhood of peoplesB and the establishment of boundaries which are traced b& @the so*ereign will of the people themsel*es on the basis of their national characteristics$B /he Cnited %tates and +exico are two republics; in both of them the people are so*ereign$ /hen how did it happen that between these republics, which, according to the moralistic theor& should be @brotherl&B and @federated,B a war bro7e out o*er /exas: that the @so*ereign willB of the 3merican people, supported b& the bra*er& of 3merican *olunteers, mo*ed the 3merican borders 0established b& nature itself1 a few hundred miles further south, claiming this action to be from @geographic, commercial, and strategic necessitiesBLE1!F +arxs answer to this ironic >uestion is clear$ @2ation#states,B e*en in the form of republics, are not products or expressions of the @will of the people,B as the liberal phraseolog& goes and the anarchist repeats$ @2ation#statesB are toda& the *er& same tools and forms of class rule of the bourgeoisie as the earlier, non#national states, and li7e them the& are bent on con>uest$ /he nation#states ha*e the same tendencies toward con>uest, war, and oppression H in other words, the tendencies to become @not#national$B /herefore, among the @nationalB states there de*elop constant scuffles and conflicts of interests, and e*en if toda&, b& some miracle, all states should be transformed to @national,B then the next da& the& would alread& present the same common picture of war, con>uest, and oppression$ /he example gi*en b& +arx is t&pical in this regard$ Dh& and o*er what did the war between the Cnited %tates and +exico ariseLE11F California was indispensable for the capitalistic de*elopment of the Cnited %tates, first, as a gold treasur& in the literal sense, second, as a gatewa& to the Pacific ?cean$ ?nl& b& the ac>uisition of this land could the capitalism of the Cnited %tates extend from ocean to ocean, entrenching itself and opening for itself an outlet to the Dest as well as to the Iast$ For the bac7ward +exicans, California was 5ust a simple territorial possession$ /he interests of the bourgeoisie were decisi*e$ /he @nation#state,B worshiped and idealized b& the anarchists as the @will of the people,B ser*ed as an efficient tool of con>uest in the interests of capitalism$ (ut e*en more stri7ing examples of this 7ind are produced b& the histor& of modern %outh 3merica$ De ha*e alread& mentioned the double#edged character of the @nationalB liberation of the %panish and Portuguese colonies at the dawn of the nineteenth centur&$ 'ere their further political histor&, alread& as independent @nation#states,B interests us as a colorful illustration of anarchistic phrases of @national freedomB and the @will of the people$B (razil gained her freedom from Portugal after a hard struggle in 1"8:$ In that same &ear a war bro7e out between (razil and 3rgentina 0which had 5ust been liberated from under the scepter of %pain1 o*er the pro*ince of (anda ?riental$ (oth of these new @nationB#states wanted to scoop up this pro*ince, which finall& won independence itself as the ,epublic of Crugua&, but than7s onl& to the armed inter*ention of Iuropean states which had colonial interests in %outh 3merica$ France and other Iuropean countries issued an ultimatum to 3rgentina, which obstinatel& refused to recognize the independence of Crugua& and Paragua&$ 3s a conse>uence, in 1"9: another war bro7e out with the participation of Paragua&, Crugua&, and (razil$ In 1":!, again a war was unleashed between (razil and 3rgentina, in which (razil, with the help of Paragua& and Crugua&, first defeated 3rgentina and then actuall& con>uered Crugua&$ In 1".9, she formall& forced this @independentB

Crugua& to submission b& armed action$ Paragua& rose up against this action and declared war on (razil, which was 5oined b& 3rgentina and Crugua&$ /his war, lasting from 1".: to 1"-!, finall& assured (razil, where there ruled not so much Bthe will of the peopleB as the will and interests of the coffee plantation owners, the position of a dominant Great Power in %outh 3merica$ 'istor& does not touch upon the rule of the whites in (razil 0who ma7e up less than one#third of the population1 o*er the 2egroes and the mixed population, ?nl& after internal struggles was the emancipation of the sla*es announced in 1"-1, but with compensation to be paid to their owners from state funds$ Parliament, howe*er, being the instrument of the plantation owners, did not *ote these funds and sla*er& was still practiced$ In 1"". the freeing of sla*es o*er se*ent& &ears of age was declared; the rest were supposed to wait another se*enteen &ears for freedom$ (ut in 1""" the d&nastic part&, struggling to hold the throne, forced through parliament the general abolition of sla*er& without compensation, and this was decisi*e for the future of the republican mo*ement$ /he plantation owners stood behind the republican banner en masse, and in the militar& coup of 1"" , (razil was declared a republic$E18F /his is how id&llic the internal conditions and e*ents in %outh 3merica loo7 since the time of the rising of the Bnation#statesB and the establishment of the @will of the people$B 3 beautiful complement to this picture is offered b& the Cnited %tates of 3ustralia$ 'ardl& had these states emerged from the position of Inglish colonies and gained their freedom H the republican form of go*ernment or the federal s&stem, the *er& ideal of (a7uninist phraseolog& H when the& began an offensi*e polic& in regard to 2ew 'ebrides, next door to 2ew Guinea, and in s7illful imitation of the Cnited %tates of 3merica, declared their own particular national doctrine: that @3ustralia should belong to the 3ustralians$B 3t the same time, the growing na*& of the 3ustralian Cnion is an emphatic commentar& on this doctrine$ If, on the one hand, political independence, i$e$, the nation#state, is necessar& for capitalism and the class interest of the bourgeoisie 5ust because a nation#state is a tool of domination 0or control1 and con>uest, on the other hand, the wor7ing class is interested in the cultural and democratic content of nationalism, which is to sa& that the wor7ers are interested in such political s&stems as assure a free de*elopment of culture and democrac& in national life b& means of defense, not con>uest, and in the spirit of solidarit& and cooperation of *arious nationalities which belong historicall& in the same bourgeois state$ I>ualit& before the law for nationalities and political organizations, and the assurance of national cultural de*elopment H such are the general forms of the program of the proletariat, a natural program resulting from its class position, in contrast to the nationalism of the bourgeoisie$

..
/he classical confirmation and proof of these general principles is the most famous nationalit& problem within the framewor7 of the ,ussian state H the Polish >uestion$ In Poland, the national mo*ement, right from the beginning, too7 on a completel& different character from that of Destern Iurope$ /hose who search for a historical analog& for the Polish national idea in the histor& of toda&s German& and Ital&, betra& their own misunderstanding of the true historical substance of the national mo*ements in German& and Ital& as well as in Poland$ Dith us Poles the national idea was a class idea of the nobilit&, ne*er of the bourgeoisie$ /he material base of Polish national aspirations was determined not as in Central Iurope in the nineteenth centur&, b& modern capitalist de*elopment, but, on the contrar&, b& the nobilit&s idea of its social standing, rooted in the natural#feudal econom&$

/he national mo*ements of Poland *anished together with these feudal relations; whereas the bourgeoisie, as the historical spo7esman of capitalistic de*elopment, was with us, from the *er& beginning, a clearl& anti#national factor$ /his was due not onl& to the specific origin of the nineteenth#centur& bourgeoisie, alien and heterogeneous, a product of colonization, an alien bod& transplanted into the Polish soil$ 3lso decisi*e was the fact that Polish industr& from its beginning, alread& in the 1"8!s and 1"<!s, was an export industr&, e*en before it managed to control or e*en to create a domestic mar7et within Poland$ De will not >uote here all the statistics of the industrial de*elopment of our countr&, but rather refer the reader to our treatise, )ie .ndustrielle %nt;icklung Polens EThe .ndustrial )e*elo3ment o- PolandF 0published also in ,ussian1, as well as to the wor7 1;est<a 3olska a ruch soc<alist czn EThe Polish Question and the "ocialist 0o*ementF, Cracow 1 !:$ 'ere we shall recall onl& the most important outlines of this de*elopment$ Ixport to ,ussia, especiall& of the basic branches of capitalist industr&, i$e$, the production of textiles, became the basis for the existence and de*elopment of Polish capitalism from its beginnings, and furthermore, also the basis of the Polish bourgeoisie$ 3s a conse>uence, our bourgeoisie from the first showed political leanings, not toward the west, to the national unification of Galicia with the Crown, but toward the east: toward ,ussia$ /hese leanings, after the withdrawal of the customs barrier between the Impire and the Polish 6ingdom, increased with the development of big industry$ 'owe*er, the real rule of the bourgeois class in societ& began after the aborti*e Aanuar& Insurrection E1".<F$ /he new rule was inaugurated b& the @program of organic wor7BE1<F which meant a renunciation of national independence$ +oreo*er, the class rule of the bourgeoisie in Poland not onl& did not demand the creation of a united nation#state, as in German& and Ital&, but, on the contrar&, it arose on the foundations of the con>uest and di*ision of Poland$ /he idea of unification and national independence did not draw its *ital 5uices from capitalism; on the contrar&, as capitalism de*eloped, this idea became historicall& outli*ed$ 3nd that *er& circumstance, that particular historical relationship of the capitalistic bourgeoisie to the national idea in our countr&, became decisi*e also for the fate of that idea and defined its social character$ In German&, in Ital&, as one half#centur& before in %outh 3merica, the @national rebirthB carried with it all the traits of a re*olutionar&, progressi*e spirit$ Capitalistic de*elopment embraced this national idea, and historicall& spea7ing, ele*ated it with the political ideals of the re*olutionar& bourgeoisie: democrac& and liberalism$ Ixactl& in this historical sense, the national idea was onl& a detail of the general class program of the bourgeoisie H of the modern bourgeois state$ In Poland there arose an opposition between the national idea and the bourgeois de*elopment, which ga*e the former not onl& a utopian but also a reactionar& character$ /his opposition is reflected in the three phases of the histor& of the idea of Polish national independence$ /he first is the failure of the armed struggle of the Polish nobilit&$ 2ot e*en the most ardent ad*ocates of the theor& of @*iolence and forceB in the philosoph& of histor& will explain the defeat of Polish insurrectionist mo*ements as mere superiorit& of the ,ussian ba&onets$ Dhoe*er 7nows an&thing about the modern economic and social histor& of Poland 7nows that the defeat of the militar& insurectionists was prepared b& the same capitalistic mar7et interest which elsewhere, in the words of 6auts7&, comprised one of the main elements of the modern national idea$ /he endea*ors of the bourgeoisie to secure for themsel*es conditions of large#scale capitalistic production did not in*ol*e the demand for a nation#state; on the contrar&, the bourgeoisie sought to exploit the annexation, and to paral&ze the national mo*ement of the nobilit&$ /hus Ein PolandF, the idea of a nation#state, an idea essentiall& bourgeois, was sabotaged b& the bourgeoisie, and met defeat in the Aanuar& E1".<F uprising$ /he second phase was the inheritance of the Polish national idea b& the petite bourgeoisie$ In this incarnation, the national idea changed from an armed struggle to a polic& of neutralit&, and at the

same time, began to show its wea7ness$ 3fter *egetating for twent& &ears awa& from societ& H in the eighties and nineties petit bourgeois nationalism lingered in emigration in the form of a half#dozen @all#Polish patriotsB H finall&, with the opening of the present re*olutionar& era, it has emerged as an acti*e part& on the political scene$ /he 2ational )emocrac& proclaimed its entrance into a politicall& acti*e phase with a public renunciation of the program of national independence as an unrealizable utopia, and with writing into its program instead the double slogan of autonom& of the countr& and counter#re*olution$ 2ow, after throwing off the ballast of the traditional national program, @2ational )emocrac&B >uic7l& becomes the true political force in the societ&$ 'a*ing failed in its second petit bourgeois form, the program of the nation#state is replaced b& a program which is practical and realizable on the basis of a bourgeois Poland H a program of autonom&$ Finall&, the third and last phase in the histor& of the Polish national idea is its attempt to 5oin the class mo*ement of the proletariat$ /he twent&#&ear, social#patriotic experiment of the PP% was the onl& case in the histor& of the international wor7ers mo*ement where the slogan of the nation#state was made part of a socialist program$ 3nd this singular experiment ended after twent& &ears in exactl& the same 7ind of crisis and in the same manner as the petit bourgeois experiment$ 3t the time of the outbrea7 of the Dor7ers ,e*olution E1 !:F in ,ussia, the PP%, so as to secure for itself a part in acti*e politics and in the life of the societ&, publicl& renounced the program of rebuilding Poland$ /he 2ational )emocrac& renounced this program so as to ta7e an acti*e part in the middle#class counter#re*olution; the PP% did so to exert pressure for the proletarian re*olution$ /he crisis, decline, and fall of the PP%, brought on b& this renunciation, constituted the third and last ban7ruptc& of the idea of the Polish nation#state H this time wearing the mantle of the proletariat$ /he current re*olution, that mightiest social uphea*al of modern times, which is calling all embr&os of life to growth and maturit&, and simultaneousl& tearing up the entire foundation of societ& with a giant plow, re5ected the last trace of the idea of the Polish nation#state, as if it were an empt& shell from which historical de*elopment had remo*ed all content, and which could onl& roll about among the rubble of social traditions during the troubles of a period of reaction$ /he historical career of Polish nationalism, howe*er, has not &et come to an end$ Indeed, it has ended its life as the idea of the nation#state, but it has simultaneousl& transformed itself from a utopian specter to a realistic factor of social life$ /he Polish bourgeois#capitalistic de*elopment fettered Poland to ,ussia and condemned the idea of national independence to utopianism and to defeat$ (ut the other side of this bourgeois process is the re*olutionar& de*elopment of Polish societ&$ 3ll the manifestations and factors of social progress in Poland, abo*e all its principal factor, the Polish position proletariat and its part in the general re*olution in the /sarist Impire, ha*e grown out of the foundations of this same bourgeois#capitalistic de*elopment$ /he social progress and de*elopment of Poland are in this wa& united with the capitalistic process b& unbrea7able historical ties, which united Poland and ,ussia, and which buried the Polish national idea$ Conse>uentl&, all separatist aspirations directed at raising an artificial barrier between Poland and ,ussia, are b& nature directed against the interests of social progress and re*olutionar& de*elopment; or in other words, the& are manifestations of reaction$ (ut at the same time, the national idea, after the final failure of the program of the nation#state and national independence, was reduced to a general and undefined idea of national separation, and, as such, Polish nationalism became a form of social reaction blessed b& tradition$ /he national idea became a collecti*e ideological shield for the reactionar& aspirations of the whole camp of bourgeois classes, nobilit&, middle class, and petite bourgeoisie$ 'istorical dialectics also pro*ed to be far more imaginati*e, supple, and inclined to *ariet& than the minds of the politicians, caught in the grip of stereot&pes, and speculating in the abstract wilderness of the

@rights of nations$B %o man& ,ussian, German, and other re*olutionaries were, and still are, inclined to regard @national traditionB as a historic *essel, destined b& nature for all times, to absorb and carr& all sorts of re*olutionar& currents, as a sea conch, which, according to legend, when carried ashore and lifeless, will alwa&s repeat the distant roar of the sea wa*es when placed close to the ear$ /his @national tradition,B in these concrete historical and social conditions which created toda&s Poland, becomes 5ust the opposite: a *essel for all t&pes of reaction, a natural shield for counter#re*olution$ Cnder the slogan of @national traditionB there too7 place the elections of the 2ational )emocrac& to the first )uma, protected b& the Cossac7s from the criticisms and protests of the Polish proletariat$ In the name of the @national ideaB the 2ational )emocrats used bullets to chase awa& the %ocial )emocratic wor7ers from the pre#election meetings, and e*en 7illed se*eral dozen wor7ers in Darsaw, Lodz, and Pabianice$E19F Cnder the national slogan, wor7ers @national unionsB were organized b& the 2ational )emocrac& for counteraction against the economic struggle and the re*olutionar& action of the proletariat$ Cnder the national slogan, 2ational )emocratic railroad wor7ers bro7e the railroad stri7e, which had been started in )ecember 1 !: in Poland, forcing the stri7ing wor7ers to return to wor7 at gun point$ Cnder the national slogan$ the 2ational )emocrac& began a crusade against the general stri7e and other forms of stri7es, claiming the& were ruining the @countr&s industr& and the national wealth$B Cnder the national slogan, the Polish Circle in the )uma renounced participation in the N&borg +anifesto deliberations, and in the declaration of the N&borg +anifesto itself, after the dispersion of the )uma$ Cnder the national slogan, the 2ational )emocrac& organized so#called @Polish Falcons,BE1:F or, rather, armed fighting s>uads destined for murdering socialists, ma7ing stri7es impossible, and so on$ +r$ )mows7i, the leader of the 2ational )emocrac&, declared in its official organ that @socialists are outsidersB and are thus @foreign enemies,B thereb& 5ustif&ing in ad*ance the @nationalB murders of the socialists$ 3nd finall&, in the name of the national idea, the future of the nation, and national defense, the Polish bourgeoisie, with the 2ational )emocrac& at the head, publicl& stood behind the banner of @neo#pan#%la*ism,B in the ran7s of the hirelings of absolutism and the ,ussian @national idea,B @with no reser*ations$B /he last *estige of the political @nationalB program H Polands autonom& H was thus gi*en up on the altar of counter#re*olution$ +istreated b& histor&, the Polish national idea mo*ed through all stages of decline and fall$ 'a*ing started its political career as a romantic, noble insurgent, glorified b& international re*olution, it now ends as a national hooligan H a *olunteer of the (lac7 'undreds of ,ussian absolutism and imperialism$

Notes
E1F

)ie Neue 2eit, 1" -#1" ", Nol$ I, p$:1-$ /he numerical relationship of nationalities in 'ungar& at that time was more or less as follows: 'ungarians ,umanians Germans Croats %erbs ,uthenians :,!!!,!!! 8,<!!,!!! 1,:!!,!!! !!,!!! "<!,!!! 99<,!!!

E8F

E<F

3t a press con*ention of %la*ic 5ournalists in Aune 1" ", the %lo*a7 delegate, 9arol Salva, from Lipto*, called to the Czechs: @If harmon& is to exist between us, then not onl& do we ha*e to bestir oursel*es, but &ou alsoS I 7now the reason for &our lac7 of interest in us, up to this time$ /he region of the %lo*a7s has been up to now 0with a few glorious exceptions1 regarded as a foreign country b& the Czech peopleSB :riginal note by %-+.
E9F

%tancz&7 was a nic7name for conser*ati*es in Galicia$

E:F

For example, prompted b& such an innocent underta7ing as the establishment of an association for the restoration of the right to use the Lithuanian language in the Catholic Church in Lithuania, the Nilna Lithuanian /ourier wrote in the summer of 1 !.: 'ow man& times alread& ha*e the groundless accusations against the Poles of forced Polonization of Lithuanian lands been refutedS 'ow man& times were claims of Lithuanians against Poles pro*en to ha*e no sound basis H claims that historical de*elopments happened to ta7e one course and not anotherS /he Poles are not to be accused of Polonization tendencies, but, on the contrar&, the Lithuanians should be accused of attempts at Lithuanization$ If the perspecti*es, reached b& wa& of mutual concessions and peaceful con*entions, of li*ing side b& side peacefull& do not please the Lithuanians, if the& insist on ta7ing ad*antage of e*er& means of harassing and annihilating the Poles, then let them remember that the& were the first to cast down the gauntlet before the Poles and that on them will fall the responsibilit& for this$ /his reference to the Bhistorical de*elopment,B which insured the superiorit& of one nationalit& o*er another 0accusing of chau*inism those who are fighting for the existence of their own nationalit&1, along with the obscure threats against the other, call to mind the Prussian '6/ which defended the threatened Germans against the @attempts of Polonization,B of Count %tanislaw /arnows7i, who derided the ,uthenes as being concerned primaril& with the malicious @harassmentB of Poles$ :riginal note by %.+. /he '6/, or 'a7ata, were German chau*inists, organized in 1" 9 for the purpose of eradicating the Polish elements in Poznan pro*ince$ /he leaders of the group were 'ahnemann, 6ennemann, and /iedemann$ H 3d.
E.F

/he ma5orit& of the bourgeois legal theorists, therefore, recognize the independent existence of a state as an indispensable attribute of the @national idea$B +essrs$ (luntschli and Co$, the ideologists of their own class, achie*e nothing else b& using abstract definitions and sub#di*isions, than what has been alread& achie*ed b& the power#hungr& bourgeoisie in the course of histor&$ :riginal note by %.+.
E-F

@It is correct,B sa&s 6auts7&, @that %ocial )emocrac& is the part& of social de*elopment; its aim is the de*elopment of societ& be&ond the capitalist stage$ I*olution, as is 7nown, does not exclude re*olution, which is but an episode of e*olution$ /he ultimate goal of %ocial )emocrac& is the destruction of the proletariat in such a wa& that the proletariat will ta7e o*er and control social production, as a result of which the wor7ers will cease being proletarians and constituting a separate class of societ&$ /his outcome depends on certain economic and political preconditions$ It presupposes a certain le*el of capitalist de*elopment$ /herefore, the proletariat has for its tas7 the support of economic de*elopment; but its tas7 is hardl& to acti*el& support the expansion of capitalism H in other words, it is not to support the growth of capitalist profits$ /his latter is the historic tas7 of the capitalist class, to which it is lo&all& attending$ De ha*e no need to help them in this and we can help them the less, the more we fight against capitalist methods of de*elopment $$$

De do not need to ta7e a position in fa*or of replacement of wor7ers b& machines, nor of the expropriation of handwor7ers b& factories, etc$ ?ur tas7 in economic de*elopment is organization and support of the proletariat in its class struggle$B H )ie Neue 2eit, 1" "#1" , Nol$I, pp$8 8# <$ 3nd this same argument, 6auts7& adds, applies in an e*en great er degree to the field of political relations$ :riginal note by %.+.
E"F

/he wor7ing class in Poland was composed of *arious nationalities intermingled with each other, whereas the ruling class was >uite solidl& Polish 0or German1$ /he author is ad*ocating for the wor7ing class H presumabl& for each of its nationalities H the same rights as nationalities that were en5o&ed b& the @otherB nationalities, of the ruling class, that is$
E F

+i7hail (a7unin, Aufruf an die Sla$en, 6Tthen, 1"9", in 2;ei "chri-ten aus den =0er >ahren des ?.?, >ahrhunderts, Internationale (ibliothe7 fJr Philosophie, (d$II, nos$11#18 0Prague: 1 <.1, p$8-$
E1!F

It was Ingels, not +arx, who penned this answer, in the Neue Rheinische 2eitung, Februar& 1:, 1"9 , no$888$ %ee +arx#Ingels, #erke, NI, 8-1$
E11F

In the original the author has put @/exasB for @+exico,B which is ob*iousl& a slip$

E18F

/he extent of the influence of the @coffeeB interests on the @national willB in this @nationalB republic, e*en after the formal abolition of sla*er& 0which is, moreo*er, still practiced to this *er& da&1, is pro*ed b& this next incident$ Dhen the coffee plantations caused a great crisis last &ear E1 !-F b& releasing unlimited amounts of coffee on the international coffee mar7et, thereb& causing a drastic fall in prices, the (razilian plantation owners forced the go*ernment to purchase the entire surplus of coffee with state funds$ 2aturall&, a *iolent sha7e#up of the finances and entire material existence of the whole population has resulted from this original experiment$
E1<F

@,eturn to organic wor7B H a slogan coined in the 1".!s 0after the aborti*e 1".<#.9 Aanuar& Insurrection1 b& the so#called positi*ists in the 6ingdom of Poland, and the Galicia conser*ati*es$ ,e5ecting romanticism and its loft& notions of insurgenc& and conspirac&, it called for a scientific approach in education, industr&, trade, and agriculture as the onl& means for Polands sur*i*al$
E19F

Pabianice H an industrial cit& about 1! miles south#west of Lodz$

E1:F

/he Falcons 0%o7ol1 were a &outh association in Galicia, founded in 1".- under the political guidance of the 2ational )emocrac&$

@, 6ederation5 /entralization5 and Particularism

De must turn next to another proposed form of the solution of the nationalit& >uestion, i$e$, federation$ Federalism has long been the fa*orite idea of re*olutionaries of anarchic hue$ )uring the 1"9" re*olution (a7unin wrote in his manifesto: B/he re*olution proclaimed b& its own power the dissolution of despotic states, the dissolution of the Prussian state $$$ 3ustria $$$ /ur7e& $$$ the dissolution of the last stronghold of the despots, the ,ussian state $$$ and as a final goal H a uni*ersal federation of Iuropean ,epublics$B From then on, federation has remained an ideal settlement of an& nationalit& difficulties in the programs of socialist parties of a more or less utopian, petit bourgeois character; that is, parties which do not, li7e %ocial )emocrac&, ta7e a historical approach but which traffic in sub5ecti*e Bideals$B %uch, for example, is the part& of %ocial ,e*olutionaries in ,ussia$ %uch was the PP% in its transitional phase, when it had ceased to demand the creation of a national state and was on the wa& to abandoning an& philosophical approach$ %uch, finall&, are a number of socialist groups in the ,ussian Impire, with which we will become ac>uainted more closel& at the end of the present chapter$ If we as7 wh& the slogan of federation en5o&s such wide popularit& among all re*olutionaries of anarchistic coloring, the answer is not difficult to find: @FederationB combines # at least in the re*olutionar& imagination of these socialists H @independenceB and Be>ualit&B of nations with @fraternit&$B Conse>uentl&, there is alread& a certain concession from the standpoint of the law of nations and the nation#state in fa*or of hard realit&, it is a sui generis, ideological, ta7ing into account the circumstance, which cannot be o*erloo7ed that nations cannot li*e in the *acuum of their @rightsB as separate and perfectl& self#sufficient Bnation#states,B but that there exist between them some lin7s$ 'istoricall& de*eloped connections between *arious nationalities, the material de*elopment which welded whole areas, irrespecti*e of national differences, the centralization of bourgeois de*elopment H all this is reflected in the heads of those re*olutionar& impro*isers; in place of Bbrute forceB the& place @*oluntarismB in relations between nations$ 3nd since republicanism is self#e*ident in this because the *er& same @will of the peopleB which restores independence and e>ualit& to all nations ob*iousl& has so much good taste as to throw simultaneousl& with contempt to the dump of histor& all remnants of monarchism, conse>uentl& the existing bourgeois world is transformed at one stro7e into a *oluntar& union of independent republics, i$e$, federation$ 'ere we ha*e a sample of the same @re*olutionar&B historical caricature of realit& b& means of which the appetite of /sarist ,ussia for the southern %la&s was transformed, in (a7unins phraseolog&, into the pan#%la*ic ideal of anarchism, @a federation of %la*ic Peoples$B ?n a smaller scale, an application of this method of @re*olutionar&B alterations of realit& was the program of the PP% adopted at its Iighth Congress in 1 !.: a republican federation of Poland with ,ussia$ 3s long as the social#patriotic standpoint H in the pre#re*olutionar& period H was maintained in all its purit& and consistenc&, the PP% recognized onl& the program of nation#states, and re5ected with contempt and hatred the idea of federation offered, for instance, b& the ,ussian %ocial ,e*olutionaries$ Dhen the outbrea7 of re*olution all at once demolished its presuppositions, and the PP% saw itself forced to follow the road of concessions in fa*or of realit& which could no longer be denied, in *iew of the ob*ious fact that Poland and ,ussia form one social entit&, a manifestation of which was precisel& the common re*olution, the program of federation of Poland with ,ussia, pre*iousl& held in contempt, became the form of that concession$ 3t the same time, the PP%, as is usual with Bre*olutionariesB of this t&pe, did not notice the following fact: when %ocial )emocrac& too7 for the historical basis of its program and tactics the 5oint capitalistic de*elopment of Poland and ,ussia, it merel& stated an

ob5ecti*e, historical fact, not depending on the will of the socialists$ From this fact, the re*olutionar& conclusion should ha*e been drawn in the form of a united class struggle of the Polish and ,ussian proletariat$ /he PP%, howe*er, putting forward the program of federation of Poland with ,ussia, went much further: in place of the passi*e recognition of historical fate, it itself acti*el& proposed a union of Poland with ,ussia and assumed responsibilit& for the union, and in lieu of the ob5ecti*e historical de*elopment, it placed the sub5ecti*e consent of socialists in Bre*olutionar&B form$ (ut federalism as a form of political organization has, li7e the @nation#stateB itself, its definite historical content, >uite different from, and independent of, the sub5ecti*e ideolog& attached to that form$ /herefore, the idea of federation can be e*aluated from the class standpoint of the proletariat onl& when we examine the fate and role of that idea in modern socialist de*elopment$

..
3n outstanding tendenc& of capitalistic de*elopment in all countries is indisputabl& an internal, economic, and capitalist centralization, i$e$, an endea*or to concentrate and weld into one entit& the state territor& from the economic, legislati*e, administrati*e, 5udicial, militar&, etc$ *iewpoints$ In the +iddle 3ges, when feudalism pre*ailed, the lin7 between the parts and regions of one and the same state was extremel& loose$ /hus, each ma5or cit& with its en*irons, itself produced the ma5orit& of ob5ects of dail& use to satisf& its needs; it also had its own legislation, its own go*ernment, its arm&; the bigger and wealthier cities in the Dest often waged wars on their own and concluded treaties with foreign powers$ In the same wa&, bigger communities li*ed their own closed and isolated life, and each area of land of a feudal lord or e*en each area of 7nightl& estates constituted in itself a small, almost independent state$ /he conditions of the time were characterized b& a diminution and loosening of all state norms$ Iach town, each *illage, each region had different laws, different taxes: one and the same state was filled with legal and customs barriers separating one fragment of a state from another$ /his decentralization was a specific feature of the natural econom& and the nascent artisan production of the time$ Dithin the framewor7 of the pul*erization of public life, connected with the natural econom&, and of the wea7 cohesion between the parts of the state organism, territories and whole countries passed incessantl& from hand to hand in Central and Destern Iurope throughout the +iddle 3ges$ De note also the patching together of states b& wa& of purchase, exchange, pawnings, inheritance, and marriage; the classical example is the 'apsburg monarch&$ /he re*olution in production and trade relations at the close of the +iddle 3ges, the increase of goods production and mone&ed econom&, together with the de*elopment of international trade and the simultaneous re*olution in the militar& s&stem, the decline of 7nighthood and the rise of standing armies, all these were factors that, in political relations, brought about the increase of monarchical power and the rise of absolutism$ /he main tendenc& of absolutism was the creation of a centralized state apparatus$ /he sixteenth and se*enteenth centuries are a period of incessant struggle of the centralist tendenc& of absolutism against the remnants of feudalist particularism$ 3bsolutism de*eloped in two directions: absorbing the functions and attributes of the diets and pro*incial assemblies as well as of the self#go*erning munici palities, and standardizing administration in the whole area of the state b& creating new central authorities in the administration and the 5udiciar&, as well as a ci*il, penal, and commercial code$ In the se*enteenth centur&, centralism triumphed full& in Iurope in the form of so#called @enlightened despotism,B which soon passed into unenlightened, police#bureaucratic despotism$

3s a result of the historical circumstance that absolutism was the first and principal promoter of modern state centralism, a superficial tendenc& de*eloped to identif& centralism in general with absolutism, i$e$, with reaction$ In realit&, absolutism, insofar as, at the close of the +iddle 3ges, it combated feudal dispersion and particularism, was undoubtedl& a manifestation of historical progress$ /his was perfectl& well understood b& %taszic, who pointed out that the EPolishF gentr& commonwealth could not sur*i*e @in the midst of autocracies$B ?n the other hand, absolutism itself pla&ed onl& the role of a @stirrup drin7B Eparting good wishesF with regard to the modern bourgeois societ& for which, politicall& and sociall&, it pa*ed the wa& b& toppling feudalism and founding a modern, uniform, great state on its ruins$ Indeed, independent of absolutism, and after its historical demise, bourgeois societ& continued to carr& through with undiminished force and consistenc& the centralist tendenc&$ /he present centralism of France as a political area is the wor7 of the Great ,e*olution$ /he *er& name, @Great ,e*olution,B exerted, e*er&where its influence reached in Iurope, a centralizing influence$ %uch a product of the ,e*olutions centralism was the @,Kpubli>ue 'el*Kti>ue,B in which, in 1- ", suddenl& the pre*iousl& loosel& confederated %wiss cantons were compressed$ /he first spontaneous action of the +arch E1"9"F re*olution in German& was the destruction b& the popular masses of the so#called customs houses E+authUuserF, the s&mbols of medie*al particularism$ Capitalism, with its large#scale machine production, whose *ital principle is concentration, swept awa& and continues to sweep awa& completel& an& sur*i*als of medie*al economic, political, and legal discrimination$ (ig industr& needs mar7ets and freedom of untrammeled trade in big areas$ Industr& and trade, geared to big areas, re>uire uniform administration, uniform arrangement of roads and communications, uniform legislation and 5udiciar&, as far as possible in the entire international mar7et, but abo*e all in the whole area inside each respecti*e state$ /he abolition of the customs, and tax autonom& of the separate municipalities and gentr& holdings, as well as of their autonom& in administering courts and law, were the first achie*ements of the modern bourgeoisie$ /ogether with this went the creation of one big state machiner& that would combine all functions: the administration in the hands of one central go*ernment; legislation in the hands of a legislati*e bod& H the parliament; the armed forces in the form of one centralized arm& sub5ect to a central go*ernment; customs arrangements in the form of one tariff encompassing the entire state externall&; a uniform currenc& in the whole state, etc$ In accordance with this, the modern state also introduced in the area of spiritual life, as far as possible, a uniformit& in education and schools, ecclesiastical conditions, etc$, organized on the same principles in the entire state$ In a word, as comprehensi*e a centralization as possible in all areas of social life is a prominent trend of capitalism$ 3s capitalism de*elops, centralization increasingl& pierces all obstacles and leads to a series of uniform institutions, not onl& within each ma5or state, but in the entire capitalistic world, b& means of international legislation$ Postal and telegraphic ser*ices as well as railwa& communication ha*e been for decades the ob5ect of international con*entions$ /his centralist tendenc& of capitalistic de*elopment is one of the main bases of the future socialist s&stem, because through the highest concentration of production and exchange, the ground is prepared for a socialized econom& conducted on a world#wide scale according to a uniform plan$ ?n the other hand, onl& through consolidating and centralizing both the state power and the wor7ing class as a militant force does it e*entuall& become possible for the proletariat to grasp the state power in order to introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat, a socialist re*olution$ Conse>uentl&, the proper political framewor7 in which the modern class struggle of the proletariat operates and can con>uer is the big capitalistic state$ Csuall&, in the socialist ran7s, especiall& of the utopian trend, attention is paid onl& to the economic aspect of capitalistic de*elopment, and its categories H industr&, exploitation, the proletariat, depressions H are regarded as indispensable

prere>uisites for socialism$ In the political sphere, usuall& onl& democratic state institutions, parliamentarianism, and *arious @freedomsB are regarded as indispensable conditions of this mo*ement$ 'owe*er, it is often o*erloo7ed that the modern big state is also an indispensable prere>uisite for the de*elopment of the modern class struggle and a guarantee of the *ictor& of socialism$ /he historical mission of the proletariat is not BsocialismB applicable on e*er& inch of ground separatel&, not dictatorship, but world re*olution, whose point of departure is big#state de*elopment$ /herefore, the modern socialist mo*ement, legitimate child of capitalist de*elopment, possesses the same eminentl& centralist characteristic as the bourgeois societ& and state$ Conse>uentl&, %ocial )emocrac& is, in all countries, a determined opponent of particularism as well as of federalism$ In German&, (a*arian or Prussian particularism, i$e$, a tendenc& to preser*e (a*arias or Prussias political distincti*eness, their independence from the ,eich in one respect or another, is alwa&s a screen for gentr& or petit bourgeois reaction$ German %ocial )emocrac& also combats, with full energies, the efforts, for instance, of %outh German particularists to preser*e a separate railroad polic& in (a*aria, (aden, DJrttemberg; it also energeticall& combats particularism in the con>uered pro*inces of 3lsace#Lorraine, where the petite bourgeoisie tries to separate itself, b& its French nationalism, from political and spiritual communit& with the entire German ,eich$ %ocial )emocrac& in German& is also a decided opponent of those sur*i*als of the federal relationship among the German states inside the ,eich which ha*e still been preser*ed$ /he general trend of capitalist de*elopment tends not onl& toward the political union of the separate pro*inces within each state, but also toward the abolition of an& state federations and the welding of loose state combinations into homogeneous, uniform states; or, where*er this is impossible, to their complete brea7#up$ 3n expression of this is the modern histor& of the %wiss Confederac&, as well as of the 3merican Cnion; of the German ,eich, as well as of 3ustria#'ungar&$

...
/he first centralist constitution of the integrated republic of %witzerland, created b& the great re*olution, was obliterated without a trace b& the time of the ,estoration, and reaction, which triumphed in %witzerland under the protection of the 'ol& 3lliance, >uic7l& returned to the independence of the cantons, to particularism and onl& a loose confederation$ )omesticall&, this implementation of the ideal @of *oluntar& union of independent groups and state unitsB in the spirit of anarchists and other worshipers of @federation$B in*ol*ed the adoption of an aristocratic constitution 0with the exclusion of the broad wor7ing masses1 as well as the rule of Catholic clericalism$ 3 new opposition trend, toward the democratization and the centralization of the %wiss federation, was born in the period of re*olutionar& seething between the Aul& E1"<!F and +arch E1"9"F re*olutions, which was manifested in %witzerland in the form of a tendenc& to create a close state union in place of federation, and to abolish the political rule of noble families and of the Catholic clerg&$ 'ere, centralism and democrac& initiall& went hand in hand, and encountered the opposition of the reaction which fought under the slogan of federation and particularism$ /he first constitution of the present %wiss Confederation of 1"9" was born out of a bitter struggle against the so#called @%onderbund,B i$e$, a federation of se*en Catholic cantons which, in 1"9-, undertoo7 a re*olt against the general confederation in the name of sa*ing the independence of the

cantons and their old aristocratic s&stem, and clericalism$ 3lthough the rebels proudl& wa*ed the banner of @freedom and independenceB of the cantons against the @despotismB of the Confederac&, in particular of @freedom of conscienceB against Protestant intolerance 0the ostensible cause of the conflict was the closing of the con*ents b& the )emocratic ,adical parties1, democratic and re*olutionar& Iurope, undecei*ed b& this, applauded wholeheartedl& when the Confederac&, b& brutal armed force, i$e$, b& @*iolence,B forced the ad*ocates of federalism to bow and surrender to the Confederate authorit&$ 3nd when Freiligrath, the bard of the Neue Rheinische 2eitung, triumphantl& celebrated the *ictor& of the ba&onets of %wiss centralism as a re*eille to the +arch re*olution H @In the highlands the first shot was fired, in the highlands against the parsonsB it was the absolutist go*ernment of German&, the pillar of +etternichs reaction, that too7 up the cause of the federalists and the defenders of the old independence of the cantons$ /he later de*elopment of %witzerland up until the present has been mar7ed b& constant, progressi*e, legal and political centralization under the impact of the growth of big industr& and international trade, railroads, and Iuropean militarism$ 3lread& the second Constitution of 1"-9 extended considerabl& the attributes of the central legislation, the central go*ernment authorit&, and particularl& of a centralized 5udiciar& in comparison with the Constitution of 1"9"$ %ince the Constitution was thoroughl& re*ised in 1"-9, centralization has progressed continuousl& b& the addition of e*er new indi*idual articles, enlarging the competence of the central institutions of the Confederac&$ Dhile the actual political life of %witzerland, with its de*elopment toward a modern capitalist state, is increasingl& concentrated in the federal institutions, the autonomous life of the canton declines and becomes increasingl& sterile$ +atters ha*e gone e*en further$ Dhen the federal organs of legislation and uniform go*ernment, originating from direct elections b& the people 0the so#called 2azionalrat and the so#called (undesrat1, assume increasingl& more prestige and power, the organ of the federal representation, i$e$, of the cantons 0the so#called %tUnderat1, becomes more and more a sur*i*al, a form without content, condemned b& the de*elopment of life to slow death$E1F 3t the same time, this process of centralization is supplemented b& another parallel process of ma7ing the cantonal constitutions uniform b& means of constant re*isions in the legislatures of the respecti*e cantons and the mutual imitation and borrowing among them$ 3s a result, the former *ariet& of cantonal particularisms rapidl& disappears$ Cntil now, the main safeguard of this political separateness and independence of the cantons was their local ci*il and penal law which preser*ed the entire medle& of its historical origin, tradition, and cantonal particularism$ 3t present, e*en this stubbornl& defended fortress of the cantons independence has had to &ield under the pressure of %witzerlands capitalist de*elopment H industr&, trade, railroads and telegraphs, international relations H which passed li7e a le*eling wa*e o*er the legal conditions of the cantons$ 3s a result, the pro5ect of one common ci*il and penal code for the entire confederation has been alread& elaborated, while portions of the ci*il code ha*e alread& been appro*ed and implemented$ /hese parallel currents of centralization and standardization, wor7ing from abo*e and below and mutuall& supplementing each other, encounter, almost at e*er& step, the opposition of the sociall& and economicall& most bac7ward, most petit bourgeois French and Italian cantons$ In a significant manner, the opposition of the %wiss decentralists and federalists e*en assumes the forms and colors of a nationalit& struggle for the French %wiss: the expansion of the power of the Confederac& at the expense of cantonal particularism is tantamount to the increase of the preponderance of the German element, and as such the&, the French %wiss, openl& combat it$ 2o less characteristic is another circumstance, *iz$, the same French cantons which, in the name of federation and independence, combat state centralism, ha*e internall& the least de*eloped communal self#go*ernment, while the most democratic self# go*erning institutions, a true rule of the people, pre*ail in those communes of the German cantons which ad*ocate centralization of the Confederation$ In this wa&, both at the *er& bottom and at the top of state institutions, both in the latest results of the de*elopment of present#da& %witzerland and at its point of departure, centralism goes hand in hand with democrac& and progress, while federalism and particularism are lin7ed with reaction and bac7wardness$

In another form the same phenomena are repeated in the histor& of the Cnited %tates of 3merica$ /he first nucleus of the Cnion of the Inglish colonies in 2orth 3merica, which until then had been independent, which differed greatl& from one another sociall& and politicall&, and which in man& respects had di*ergent interests, was also created b& re*olution$ /he re*olution was the ad*ocate and creator of the process of political centralization which has ne*er stopped up to the present da&$ 3lso, here, as in %witzerland, the initial, most immature form of de*elopment, was the same B*oluntar& federationB which, according to the conscious and unconscious adherents of anarchistic ideas, stands at the apex of modern social de*elopment as the crowning summit of democrac&$ In the first Constitution of the Cnited %tates, elaborated in the period 1---#1-"1, there triumphed completel& the Bfreedom and independence of the se*eral colonies, their complete right of self# determination$B /he union was loose and *oluntar& to such an extent that it practicall& did not possess an& central executi*e and made possible, almost on the morrow of its establishment, a fratricidal customs war among its Bfree and e>ualB members, 2ew Vor7, 2ew Aerse&, Nirginia, and +ar&land, while in +assachusetts, under the blessing of complete @independenceB and @self# determination,B a ci*il war, an uprising of debt#encumbered farmers bro7e out, which aroused in the wealth& bourgeoisie of the states a *i*id &earning for a strong central authorit&$ /his bourgeoisie was forcibl& reminded that in a bourgeois societ& the most beautiful Bnational independenceB has real substance and @*alueB onl& when it ser*es the independent utilization of the fruits of @internal order,B i$e$, the undisturbed rule of pri*ate propert& and exploitation$ /he second Constitution of 1-"- alread& created, in place of federation, a unified state with a central legislati*e authorit& and a central executi*e$ 'owe*er, centralism had still, for a long time, to combat the separatist tendencies of the states righters which finall& erupted in the form of an open re*olt of the %outhern states, the famous 1".1 war of secession 'ere we also see a stri7ing repetition of the 1"9- %wiss situation$ 3s ad*ocates of centralism, the 2orthern states acted representing the modern, big#capital de*elopment, machine industr&, personal freedom and e>ualit& before the law, the true corollaries of the s&stem of hired labor, bourgeois democrac&, and bourgeois progress$ ?n the other hand, the banner of separatism, federation, and particularism, the banner of each hamlets @independenceB and @right of self#determinationB was raised b& the plantation owners of the %outh, who represented the primiti*e exploitation of sla*e labor$ In %witzerland as in 3merica, centralism struggled against the separatist tendencies of federalism b& means of armed force and ph&sical coercion, to the unanimous acclaim of all progressi*e and democratic elements of Iurope$ It is significant that the last manifestation of sla*er& in modern societ& tried to sa*e itself, as reaction alwa&s does, under the banner of particularism, and the abolition of sla*er& was the ob*erse of the *ictor& of centralist capitalism$ 3fter the *ictorious war against the secessionists, the Constitution of the 3merican Cnion underwent a new re*ision in the direction of centralism; the remainder was, from then on, achie*ed b& big capital, big power, imperialist de*elopment: railroads, world trade, trusts, finall&, in recent times, customs protectionism, imperialist wars, the colonial s&stem, and the resulting re#organization of the militar&, of taxation, and so on$ 3t present, the central executi*e in the person of the President of the Cnion possesses more extensi*e power, and the administration and 5udiciar& are more centralized than in the ma5orit& of the monarchies of Destern Iurope$ Dhile in %witzerland the gradual expansion of the central functions at the expense of federalism ta7es place b& means of amendments to the constitution, in 3merica this ta7es place in a wa& of its own without an& constitutional changes, through a liberal interpretation of the constitution b& the 5udicial authorities$ /he histor& of modern 3ustria presents a picture of incessant struggle between a centralist and federalist trend$ /he starting point of this histor&, the 1"9" re*olution, shows the following di*ision

of roles: the ad*ocates of centralism are the German liberals and democrats, the then leaders of the re*olution, while the obstruction under the banner of federalism is represented b& the %la*ic counter# re*olutionar& parties: the Galician nobilit&; the Czech, +ora*ian and )almatian diets; the pan# %la*ists and, the admirers of (a7unin, that prophet and phrasema7er of the anarchist Bautonom& of free peoples$B +arx characterized the polic& and role of the Czech federalists in the 1"9" re*olution as follows: /he Czech and Croat pan#%la*ists wor7ed, some deliberatel& and some un7nowingl&, in accordance with the clear interests of ,ussia$ /he& betra&ed the cause of re*olution for the shadow of a nationalit& which, in the best case, would ha*e shared the fate of the Polish one$ /he Czech, +ora*ian, )almatian, and a part of the Polish delegates 0the aristocrac&1 conducted a s&stematic struggle against the German element$ /he Germans and a part of the Poles 0the impo*erished gentr&1 were the main adherents of re*olutionar& progress; fighting against them, the mass of the %la*ic delegates was not content to demonstrate in this wa& the reactionar& tendencies of their entire mo*ement, but e*en debased itself b& scheming and plotting with the *er& same 3ustrian go*ernment which had dispersed their Prague congress$ /he& recei*ed a well#deser*ed reward for their disgraceful beha*ior$ /he& had supported the go*ernment during the ?ctober uprising, the outcome of which finall& assured a ma5orit& to the %la*s$ /his now almost exclusi*el& %la*ic assembl& was dispersed b& the 3ustrian soldier& exactl& as the Prague congress had been and the pan#%la*ists were threatened with imprisonment if the& dared to complain$ /he& achie*ed onl& this: that the %la*ic nationalit& is now e*er&where threatened b& 3ustrian centralism$E8F +arx wrote this in 1":8 during the re*i*al of absolutist rule in 3ustria after the final collapse of the re*olution and of the first era of constitutionalism H @a result which the& owe to their own fanaticism and blindness$B %uch was the first appearance of federalism in the modern histor& of 3ustria$ In no state did the socio#historical content of the federalist program and the fallac& of the anarchist fantasies concerning the democratic or e*en re*olutionar& character of that slogan appear so emphaticall& also in later times, and, so to spea7, s&mbolicall&, as in 3ustria$ /he progress of political centralization can be directl& measured here b& the program of the right to *ote for the Nienna parliament, which, passing successi*el& through four phases of gradual democratization, was increasingl& becoming the main cement binding together the state structure of the 'apsburg monarch&$ /he ?ctober Patent of 1".!, which inaugurated the second constitutional era in 3ustria, had created in the spirit of federalism a wea7 central legislati*e organ, and gi*en the right of electing the delegations to it not to the people, but to the diets of the respecti*e crownlands$ 'owe*er, alread& in 1"-<, it pro*ed indispensable for brea7ing the opposition of the %la*ic federalists, to introduce *oting rights not b& the diets, but b& the people themsel*es, to the Central Parliament E,eichsratF H although it was a class, une>ual, and indirect *oting s&stem$ %ubse>uentl&, the nationalit& struggle and the decentralist opposition of the Czechs, which threatened the *er& existence and integrit& of the 'apsburg monarch&, forced, in 1" ., the replacement of their class *oting right b& a uni*ersal one, through the addition of a fifth curia 0the so#called uni*ersal election curia1$ ,ecentl& we witnessed the final reform of the electoral law in 3ustria in the direction of uni*ersal and e>ual *oting rights as the onl& means of consolidating the state and brea7ing the centrifugal tendencies of the %la*ic federalists$ Ispeciall& characteristic in this respect is the role of Galicia$ 3lread& from the first session of the Niennese ,eichsrat and the Galician )iet in 3pril 1".1, the Galician nobilit& came forward as an extreme opposition against the liberal cabinet of %chmerling, *iolentl& opposing the liberal reforms in the name of @national autonom&B and the right of nations to @self#determination,B i$e$, in the name of the autonomous rights of the Pro*incial )iet$

%oon the polic& became cr&stallized in the %tancz&7 program of the so#called Cracow part&, the part& of such men as /arnows7i, Popiel, Dodzic7i, and 6ozmian, and found its expression in the notorious @resolutionB of the Galician )iet of %eptember 8", 1".", which is a 7ind of ;agna &arta of the @separation of Galicia$B /he resolution demanded such a broadening of the competence of the Pro*incial )iet that for the Central Parliament there remained onl& the most important all#monarch& matters; it completel& abolished the central administration, handing it o*er exclusi*el& to the crown land authorities, and in the end completel& separating also the crown land 5udiciar&$ /he state connection of Galicia with 3ustria was reduced here to such a flims& shadow that sanguine minds, who did not &et 7now the flexibilit& of Polish nationalism, would be read& to see in this ideal program of federalism, @almostB national independence or at least a bold stri*ing toward it$ 'owe*er, to pre*ent an& such illusions, the %tancz&7 part& had announced its political credo and begun its public career in 3ustria not with the abo*e program of federation but with the notorious address of the )iet of )ecember 1!, 1".., in which it proclaimed its classical formula: @Dithout fear of deserting the national idea and with faith in the mission of 3ustria we declare from the bottom of our hearts that we stand and wish to stand b& Vour +a5est&$B /his was onl& a concise aphoristic formulation of the sanguinar& crusade which the nobilit& part& around Przeglad Polski 0Polish Re*ie;1 waged, after the Aanuar& uprising, against the insurrection and the insurgents against the @conspirac&,B @illusions,B @criminal attemptsB, @foreign re*olutionar& influences,B @the excesses of social anarch&,B li>uidating with c&nical haste the last period of our national mo*ements under the slogan of @organic wor7B and public renunciation of an& solidarit& with ,ussian# dominated Poland$ Federalism and political separatism were not in realit& an expression of national aspirations but were, rather, their simple negation and their public renunciation$ /he other harmonious complement of the %tancz&7 program of federation 0read: separation1 was opposition and obstruction in coalition with Czech and +ora*ian federalists and the German clerical# reactionar& part& against an& liberal reforms in 3ustria: against the liberal communal law, against the liberal law concerning elementar& schools, against the introduction of the law concerning direct elections b& the people to the Central Parliament; on the other hand it supported the go*ernment in all reactionar& pro5ects, e$g$, support of the militar& laws starting with /aaffes Law, etc$ /his de*elopment has been coupled with extreme reaction also in pro*incial policies, the most glaring expression of which is the adamant opposition against the reform of elections to the Pro*incial )iet$ Finall&, the third component of Galician federalism is the polic& of the Polish nobilit& toward the ,uthenians$ 4uite analogous to the French federalists of %witzerland, the Galician ad*ocates of a potential decentralization of the 3ustrian state ha*e been strict centralists internall& in relation to the ,uthenian population$ /he Galician nobilit& has from the beginning stubbornl& combated the demand of autonom& for the ,uthenians, the administrati*e di*ision of Galicia into Iastern and Destern, and the granting of e>ual status to the ,uthenian language and script along with the Polish language$ /he program of BseparationB and federalism suffered a decisi*e defeat in 3ustria as earl& as 1"-<, when direct elections to the Central Parliament were introduced, and from then on the %tancz&7 part&, in 7eeping with its opportunistic principles, abandoned the polic& of obstruction and ac>uiesced in 3ustrian centralism$ 'owe*er, Galician federalism from then on appears on the stage if not as a program of realistic politics then as a means of parliamentar& maneu*ers each time that serious democratic reforms are considered$ /he last memorable appearance of the program of BseparatingB Galicia in the public arena is connected with the struggle of the Galician nobilit& against the most recent electoral reform, against the introduction of uni*ersal and e>ual *oting rights for the Nienna Parliament$ 3nd as if to put stronger emphasis on the reactionar& content of the federalist program, the deputies of 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac&, in 3pril 1 !., *oted unanimousl& against the motion concerning the separation of Galicia$ 3t their head in his character as representati*e of the 3ustrian Dor7ers Part&, a representati*e of the all#monarch& proletarian polic& spo7e and *oted against the separation of Galicia: this was +r$ Ignac& )asz&ns7i, who, as a

leader in the three parts of the patriotic PP%, considers the separation of the 6ingdom of Poland from ,ussia as his political program$ /he 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& is a determined and open ad*ocate of centralism, a conscious adherent of the state consolidation of 3ustria and conse>uentl& a conscious opponent of an& separatist tendencies$ @/he future of the 3ustrian stateB sa&s 6auts7& H @depends on the strength and influence of %ocial )emocrac&$ Precisel& because it is re*olutionar&, it is in this case a part& upholding the state Eeine staatserltaltende ParteiF in this sense; although this sounds strange, one ma& appl& to the ,ed re*olutionar& %ocial )emocrac& the words which half a centur& ago Grillparzer addressed to the hero of the ,ed Vellow reaction, General ,adetz7&: WIn &our camp is 3ustria$B E@*n deinen +ager ist :sterreichBFE<F is 5ust as in the matter of the @separationB of Galicia 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& decisi*el& re5ects the program of the Czech Federalists, that is, the separation of (ohemia$ 6auts7& writes: /he growth of the idea of autonom& for (ohemia is onl& a partial +anifestation of the general growth of reaction in all big states of the Continent$ /he program of @autonom&B would not &et ma7e (ohemia an autonomous state$ It would still remain a part of 3ustria$ /he Central Parliament would not be abolished b& this$ /he most important matters 0militar& affairs, customs, etc$1 would remain in its competence$ 'owe*er, the separation of (ohemia would brea7 the power of the Central Parliament, which toda& is *er& wea7$ It would brea7 it not onl& in relation to the diets of the se*eral nations but also in relation to the central go*ernment, on the model of the delegations$ E/he reference here is to delegations of 3ustria and 'ungar& which were elected b& the Nienna and (udapest parliament and had as their tas7 the arrangement of the so#called 3ustro#'ungarian compromise, that is, the mutual relationship or proportion contributed b& both countries for the common expenses of the state and the settlement of certain matters affecting both$F /he state council, that is, the Central Parliament of 3ustria, would ha*e to be reduced to a miserable idol nodding its head to e*er&thing$ /he power of the central go*ernment in militar& and customs affairs, as well as foreign polic&, would then become unrestricted$ /he separation of (ohemia would signif& the strengthening of the rule of bourgeois peasant clericalism in the 3lpine lands of the nobilit& and in Galicia; also that of the capitalist magnates in (ohemia$ 3s long as these three strata must exercise their authorit& in the Central Parliament 5ointl&, the& cannot de*elop all their power because their interests are not identical; holding them together is no eas& matter$ /heir strength will be increased if each of these strata can concentrate on a certain defined area$ /he clericals in Innsbruc7 and Linz, the Galician nobilit& in Cracow and Lemberg, the (ohemian /ories in Prague are more powerful separatel& than all together in Nienna$ Aust as in German&, the reaction draws its strength from the particularism and wea7ness of the Central Parliament; here, 5ust as there, gi*ing ones moral support to particularism means wor7ing in fa*or of reaction$ 'ere, 5ust as there, we are obligated to resist strongl& the present current tending to the wea7ening of the Central Parliament$ E6auts7& ends with these words:F De must combat (ohemian states rights Ethe program of separating off (ohemiaF as a product of reaction and a means of its support$ De must combat it since it means splitting the proletariat of 3ustria$ /he road from capitalism to socialism does not lead through feudalism$ /he program of separating off (ohemia is 5ust as little a preliminar& to the autonom& of peoples as anti#%emitism 0that is, a unilateral struggle against Aewish capital1 is a preliminar& to %ocial )emocrac&$ E9F Dhere the remnants of feudalism ha*e been preser*ed to this da& in Iurope, the& are e*er&where a protection of monarch&$ In German&, a stri7ing manifestation of this is the fact that the unit& of the ,eich is based on a uni*ersal e>ual *oting right to Parliament, while all German states ta7en indi*iduall& ha*e much more reactionar& state constitutions, from Prussia, with its 0as (ismarc7

expressed it1 Bmost monstrousB tri#class electoral law, up to +ec7lenburg, which is still in general a medie*al state with a purel& class constitution$ /he cit& of 'amburg itself is an e*en more stri7ing example if we belie*e that progress and democrac& are connected with centralism, and reaction with particularism and federalism$ /he cit& of 'amburg, which forms three electoral districts of the German ,eich, is represented in Parliament on the basis of a uni*ersal *oting right, exclusi*el& b& social )emocratic deputies$ ?n the basis of the Constitution of the ,eich as a whole, the Dor7ers Part& is, therefore, in 'amburg, the uni>ue ruling part&$ (ut the *er& same cit& of 'amburg, as a separate little state, on the basis of its distinction, separateness, introduced for itself a new electoral law e*en more reactionar& than the one in force until now, which ma7es it almost impossible to elect %ocial )emocrats to the 'amburg )iet$ In 3ustria#'ungar& we see the same$ ?n the one hand, a federal relationship between 'ungar& and 3ustria is an expression not of freedom and progress but of monarchical reaction because it is 7nown that the 3ustro#'ungarian dualism is maintained onl& b& the d&nastic interest of the 'apsburgs, and 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& clearl& declared itself in fa*or of the complete dissolution of that federation and the complete separation of 'ungar& from 3ustria$ 'owe*er, this position resulted b& no means from the inclinations of 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& for decentralization in general, but 5ust the re*erse: it resulted from the fact that a federal connection between 'ungar& and 3ustria is an obstacle to an e*en greater political centralization inside 3ustria for the purpose of restoring and consolidating the latter, and here the *er& same %ocial )emocratic Part& is an ad*ocate of as close a union of the crownlands as possible, and an opponent of an& tendencies to the separation of Galicia, (ohemia, /rieste, the /rentino, and so on$ In fact, the onl& center of political and democratic progress in 3ustria is her central polic&, a Central Parliament in Nienna which, in its de*elopment, reached a uni*ersal e>ual#*oting right, while the autonomous )iets Galician, Lower 3ustrian, (ohemian H are strongholds of the most sa*age reaction on the part of the nobilit& or bourgeoisie$ Finall&, the last e*ent in the histor& of federal relationships, the separation of 2orwa& from %weden, ta7en up in its time eagerl& b& the Polish social#patriotic parties 0see the Cracow Na3rzod E6or;ardF1 as a 5o&ous manifestation of strength and the progressi*eness of separatist tendencies, soon changed into a new stri7ing proof that federalism and state separations resulting from it are b& no means an expression of progress or democrac&$ 3fter the so#called 2orwegian @re*olutions,B which consisted in the dethronement and the expulsion from 2orwa& of the 6ing of %weden, the 2orwegians >uietl& elected another 7ing for themsel*es, ha*ing e*en formall&, in a popular ballot, re5ected the pro5ect of introducing a republic$ /hat which superficial admirers of all national mo*ements and all semblances of independence proclaimed as a @re*olutionB was a simple manifestation of peasant and bourgeois particularism, a desire to possess for their own mone& a @7ing of their ownB instead of one imposed b& the %wedish aristocrac&, and, therefore, a mo*ement which had nothing in common whate*er with a re*olutionar& spirit$ 3t the same time, the histor& of the disintegration of the %wedish#2orwegian union again pro*ed how far, e*en here, the federation had been an expression of purel& d&nastic interests, that is, a form of monarchism and reaction$

.8
/he idea of federalism as a solution of the nationalit& >uestion, and in general, an @idealB of the political s&stem in international relations, raised sixt& &ears ago b& (a7unin and other anarchists, finds at present refuge with a number of socialist groups in ,ussia$ 3 stri7ing illustration of that

idea, as well as of its relation to the class struggle of the proletariat at the present time, is gi*en b& the congress of those federalist groups of all ,ussia held during the recent E1 !:F re*olution and whose deliberations ha*e been published in a detailed report$ E%ee the Proceedings o- the Russian National "ocialist Parties, 3pril 1.#8!, 1 !-, 6nigoi Izdatielst*o, %e5m 0%t$ Petersburg: 1 !"1$F First of all, a characterization of the political comple)ion and of the @socialismB of these groups is interesting$ In the Congress, there participated Georgian, 3rmenian, (&elo#,ussian, Aewish, Polish, and ,ussian federalists$ /he Georgian %ocialist Federalist Part& operates mainl& H according to its own report H not among the urban population but in the countr&side, because onl& there does there exist in a compact mass the national Georgian element; these number about 1$8 million and are concentrated in the gubernias of /iflis, 6utai, and partiall&, (atum$ /his part& is almost completel& recruited from peasants and pett& gentr&$ @In its stri*ing for an independent regulation of its lifeB H declares the delegate of the Georgian %ocialist Federalist Part& H @without counting on the centralist bureaucrac&, whether this be absolutistic or constitutional or e*en social#democratic 0S1, the Georgian peasantr& will probabl& find s&mpath& and help on the part of that pett& Georgian gentr& which li*es on the land and b& the size of its possessions and also its wa& of life differs little from the peasantr&$B /herefore, the part& considers that @e*en independentl& of considerations of a basic 0S1 nature, merel& the practical conditions of Georgian agriculture demand the treatment of the agrarian >uestion as a class >uestion, peasant or gentr& onl& as an o*er#all national >uestion, as a social 0S1 problem, as a problem of wor70S1$B %tarting with these assumptions, the Georgian Federalists, in harmon& with the ,ussian %ocial ,e*olutionaries, stri*e for the @socialization of land which is to be achie*ed under the rule of the capitalistic or bourgeois s&stem$B 3 beautiful addition to this program is the reser*ation that @socializationB cannot be extended to orchards, *ine&ards and other @special culti*ations,B or to farms, because these are areas @demanding a certain contribution of wor7 and material means which cannot be returned in one &ear or in se*eral &earsB and which would be difficult for a Georgian peasant to renounce$B Conse>uentl&, there remains pri*ate propert& for @culti*ationsB and @socialismB for grain#planting # of which there is little in the Caucasus H as well as for dunes, marginal lands, bogs, and forests$ /he main thing on which the %ocialist Federalists put emphasis is the reser*ation that the agricultural >uestion in Georgia should be decided not in a constituent assembl& nor in a central parliament, but onl& in autonomous national institutions, because @howe*er life will decide this >uestion, in principle, onl& this is un>uestionable, that the land in a Georgian territor& should belong first of all to the Georgian people$B /he >uestion, how it happens that the @socialistB part& is 5oined, en masse, b& the pett& gentr& and bourgeoisie, the delegates of the Georgian Federalists explained b& sa&ing that this happens onl& because @there is no other part& which would formulate the demands of these strata$B /he 3rmenian ,e*olutionar& Federation, that is, )ashna7tsut&un, founded at the beginning of the 1" !s for the purpose of liberating the 3rmenians from /ur7e&, was exclusi*el& concerned with @militarizing the people,B i$e$, the preparation of fighting detachments and armed expeditions into /ur7e&, the import of weapons, the direction of attac7s on /ur7ish troops, etc$ ?nl& recentl&, at the beginning of the current centur&, the 3rmenian ,e*olutionar& Federation expanded its acti*it& into the Caucasus and assumed at the same time a social aspect$ /he cause for the re*olutionar& outburst of the mo*ement and the terroristic action in the Caucasus was the confiscation of the estates of the 3rmenian clerg& for the EtsaristF treasur& in 1 !<$ (esides its main combatB action, the part& began, against the bac7ground of those e*ents, a propaganda among the rural population in the Caucasus as well as a struggle against tsardom$ /he agrarian program of )ashna7tsut&un demands the expropriation of gentr& estates without compensation, and surrendering there to the communes for e>ual distribution$ /his reform is to be based on the still rather general communal propert& in the

central part of the /ranscaucasus$ ,ecentl&, there arose a @&oungB trend among the 3rmenian Federalists maintaining that the )ashna7tsut&un part& is simpl& a bourgeois, nationalistic organization of a rather doubtful socialistic aspect H an organization lin7ing within itself completel& heterogeneous social elements, and in its acti*it& and action on completel& heterogeneous socio# political territor&, such as /ur7e& on the one side and the Caucasus on the other$ /his part& recognizes, according to its own report, the principle of federalism both as a basis of nation#wide relations and the basis on which should be thoroughl& reconstructed the conditions in the Caucasus, and finall&, as an organizing principle for the part&$ 3 (&elorussian organization was formed in 1 !< under the name of the (&elorussian ,e*olutionar& 'romada$ Its cardinal programmatic demand was separation from ,ussia, and in the sphere of economics, the nationalization of the land$ In 1 !., this program underwent a re*ision and from then on the part& has been demanding a federal republic in ,ussia, with territorial autonom& for Lithuania and a diet in Nilna, as well as a non#territorial national cultural autonom& for the remaining nationalities inhabiting Lithuania, while on the agrarian >uestion the following demands were adopted: lands held b& the treasur&, b& the church, and b& the monasteries, as well as big landed propert& abo*e eight& to one hundred dessiatins are to be confiscated and turned into a land fund out of which, first of all, the landless and small peasants should be supplied on the basis of hereditar& propert&, with the aim of eliminating pauperism as well as de*eloping the producti*e forces of the countr&$ /he socialization of land cannot &et be mentioned because of the low intellectual le*el of the (&elorussian peasant$ /hus, the tas7 of the part& is the creation and maintenance of a peasant farm in a normal size of eight dessiatins, as well as the consolidation of lands$ Furthermore, forests, bodies of water, and bogs are to be nationalized$ 'ronmada carries on its acti*it& among the (&elorussian peasants who inhabit, to the number of about se*en millions, the gubernias of Nilna, +ins7, Grodno, and part of Ditebs7$ /he Aewish Federalist group, @%ierpB E@/he %ic7leBF, organized onl& a few &ears ago b& Aewish dissidents from the ,ussian %ocial ,e*olutionar& Part&, demands non#territorial autonom& for all nationalities in the ,ussian state; out of them would be created *oluntar& state political associations combining together into a state federation, in order to stri*e in that wa& for its ultimate goal, territorial 0S1 autonom& for the Aews$ It directs its acti*it& mainl& to the organizing of Aewish wor7ers in Ditebs7, I7aterinosla*, 6ie*, etc$, and it expects the implementation of its program to arise from the *ictor& of the socialist parties in the ,ussian state$ It is superfluous to characterize the remaining two organizations, the PP% @re*olutionar& faction,B and the ,ussian Part& of %ocial ,e*olutionaries, since the& are sufficientl& 7nown b& origin and character$ /hus appears that )iet of Federalists culti*ating at present that anti>uated idea of federation re5ected b& the class mo*ement of the proletariat$ It is a collection of onl& petit bourgeois parties for whom the nationalist program is the main concern and the socialist program an addition; it is a collection of parties mainl& representing H with the exception of the re*olutionar& fraction of the Polish %ocialist Part& and the Aewish Federalists H the chaotic aspirations of a peasantr& in opposition, and the respecti*e class proletarian parties that came into being with the re*olutionar& storm, in clear opposition to the bourgeois parties$ In this collection of petit bourgeois elements, the part& of the ,ussian terrorists is a trend, not onl& the oldest one, but also the one furthest left$ /he others manifest, much more clearl&, that the& ha*e in common with the class struggle of the proletariat$ /he onl& common ground which lin7s this *ariegated collection of nationalists has been the idea of federation, which all of them recognize as a basis of state and political, as well as part&, relations$

'owe*er, out of this strange harmon&, antagonism arises immediatel& from all sides the moment the >uestion turns to practical pro5ects of realizing that common ideal$ /he Aewish Federalists bitterl& complain of the @haughtinessB of the nations endowed b& fate with a @territor&B of their own, particularl& the egoism of the Polish %ocial Patriots, who presented the greatest opposition to the pro5ect of non#territorial autonom&; at the *er& same time, these Aewish nationalists >uestioned in a melanchol& wa& whether the Georgian Federalists would admit an& other nationalit& to their territor&, which the& claimed as the exclusi*e possession of the Georgian nationalit&$ /he ,ussian Federalists, on the other hand, accuse the Aewish ones, sa&ing that, from the standpoint of their exceptional situation, the& want to impose on all nationalities a non#territorial autonom&$ /he Caucasian, 3rmenian, and Georgian Federalists cannot agree concerning the relationship of the nationalities in a future federal s&stem, specificall& on the >uestion of whether other nationalities are to participate in the Georgian territorial autonom&, @or whether such counties as 37hal7ala7, inhabited mainl& b& 3rmenians, or (archabin, with a mixture of population, will form indi*idual autonomous territories, or will create an autonom& for themsel*es according to the composition of their population$B /he 3rmenian Federalists, on their part, demand the exclusion of the cit& of /iflis from the autonomous Georgian territor&, inasmuch as it is a center primaril& inhabited b& 3rmenians$ ?n the other hand, all the Georgian and 3rmenian Federalists recognize that at present, since the /atar#3rmenian slaughter, the /atars must be excluded from the federation of autonomous Caucasian peoples as @a nationalit& immature from the cultural point of *iewBS /hus, the conglomeration of nationalists agreeing unanimousl& to the idea of federation changes into as man& contradictor& interests and tendencies; and the @idealB of federalism, which constitutes in the theoretical and super#historical abstraction of anarchism, the most perfect solution of all nationalit& difficulties, on the first attempt at its implementation appears as a source of new contradictions and antagonisms$ 'ere it is stri7ingl& pro*ed that the idea of federalism allegedl& reconciling all nationalities is onl& an empt& phrase, and that, among the *arious national groups, 5ust because the& dont stand on a historical basis, there is no essentiall& unif&ing idea which would create a common ground for the settlement of contradictor& interests$ (ut the same federalism separated from the historical bac7ground demonstrates its absolute wea7ness and helplessness not onl& in *iew of the nationalit& antagonisms in practice but also in *iew of the nationalit& >uestion in general$ /he ,ussian Congress had as its main theme an e*aluation and elucidation of the nationalit& >uestion and undertoo7 it unrestricted b& an& @dogmasB or formulae of the @narrow doctrine of +arxism$B Dhat elucidation did it gi*e to one of the most burning >uestions of present political lifeL @?*er the whole histor& of man7ind before the appearance of socialismB H proclaimed the representati*e of the %ocial ,e*olutionar& Part& in his speech at the opening of the Congress H @one ma& place as a motto the following words from the 'ol& %cripture: W3nd the& ordered him to sa& @shibbolethB and he said BsibbolethB and the& massacred him at the ford of the ri*er$ Indeed, the greatest amount of blood spilled in international struggle was spilled because of the fact that one nation pronounced Wshibboleth and the other Wsibboleth$B 3fter this profound introduction from the philosoph& of histor&, there followed a series of speeches maintained at the same le*el, and the debates about the nationalit& >uestions culminated in the memorandum of the Georgian Federalists which proclaimed: Bin primiti*e times, when the main tas7 of people was hunting wild animals as well as creatures li7e themsel*es there were neither masters nor sla*es$ I>ualit& in social relations was not *iolated; but later, when people came to 7now the culti*ation of the soil, rather than 7illing and eating their capti*es the& began to 7eep them in capti*it&$ Dhat, therefore, was the reason out of which sla*er& aroseL ?b*iousl& not onl& material interests as such, but also this circumstance: that man was b& his ph&sical nature a hunter and a warrior0S1$ 3nd despite the fact that man has alread& long since become an industrial animal, he is to this *er& da& a predator, capable of tearing apart his neighbor

for minor material considerations$ /his is the source of unending wars and the domination of classes$ 2aturall& the origin of class domination was influenced also b& other causes, for instance, mans abilit& to become accustomed to dependence$ (ut undoubtedl& if man were not a warrior, there would be no sla*er&$B /here follows a blood& picture of the fate of the nationalities sub5ect to tsardom and then again a theoretical elucidation: @%omebod& ma& tell us that bureaucratic rule rages not onl& in the borderlands but in ,ussia itself$ From our point of *iew this is completel& understandable$ 3 nation sub5ugating other nations e*entuall& falls into sla*er& itself$ For instance, the more ,ome expanded its domination, the more the plebeians were losing their freedom$ 3nother example: during the great French ,e*olution the militar& *ictories of the ,epublican 3rm& annihilated the fruit of the re*olution H the ,epublic 0S1$ /he ,ussians themsel*es en5o&ed incomparabl& greater freedom before the& united in one powerful state, that is, at the time of the rule of die separate princes$B /hus, the memorandum ends its historio# philosophical lecture; freedom does not agree with the clatter of arms$ Con>uest was the main cause which brought into being both sla*er& as well as the rule of some social classes o*er others$ /hat is all that the Federalists of the present time are able to sa& about the nationalit& >uestion$ It is literall& the same phraseolog& from the standpoint of @5usticeB, @fraternit&B, @moralit&B and similar beautiful things which alread&, sixt& &ears ago, was proclaimed b& (a7unin$ 3nd 5ust as the father of anarchism was blind to the ,e*olution of 1"9", its inner springs, its historical tas7s, the present last of the +ohicans of federalism in ,ussia stand helpless and powerless before the re*olution in the tsarist s&stem$ /he idea of federation, b& its nature and historical substance reactionar&, is toda& a pseudo# re*olutionar& sign of petit bourgeois nationalism, which constitutes a reaction against the united re*olutionar& class struggle of the proletariat in the entire Impire$
E1F

Characteristic is the antipath&, general among the %wiss population, against the %tUnderat as a @do# nothingB institution$ /his is onl& a sub5ecti*e expression of the fact that this organ of federalism has been depri*ed of its functions b& the ob5ecti*e course of historical de*elopment$ :riginal note by %.+.
E8F

Friedrich Ingels and 6arl +arx, Re*olution and 1onterre*olution in )eutschland 0Deimar: 1 9 1, pp$--, -"#- $
E<F

)ie Neue 2eit, 1" -#1" ", Nol$1, p$:.9$ )ie Neue 2eit, 1" "#1" , pp$8 <, 8 ., 8 -, <!1$

E9F

=, /entralization and 4utonom

De ha*e noted the general centralizing tendenc& of capitalism in the bourgeois states$ (ut local autonom& also grows simultaneousl& out of the ob5ecti*e de*elopment and out of the needs of bourgeois societ&$ (ourgeois econom& re>uires as great a uniformit& as possible in legislation, the 5udiciar&, administration, the school s&stem, etc$, in the entire area of the state, and as far as possible, e*en in international relations$ (ut the same bourgeois econom&, in carr&ing out all these functions, demands accurac& and efficienc& >uite as much as uniformit&$ /he centralism of the modern states is of necessit& connected with a bureaucratic s&stem$ In the medie*al state, in a serf econom&, public functions were connected with landed propert&; these were the @concrete rights,B a 7ind of land tax$ /he feudal lord of estates was at the same time and b& the same to7en a ci*il and criminal 5udge, the head of the police administration, the chief of militar& forces in a certain territor&, and collector of taxes$ /hese functions connected with owning real estate were, li7e the land itself, the ob5ect of transactions, gift, sale, inheritance, and so on$ 3bsolutism, which increased toward the end of the +iddle 3ges, pa*ing the wa& for capitalism b& its struggle against feudal dispersal of state authorit&, separated public functions from land ownership and created a new social categor& for the execution of these functions, namel& crown officials$ Dith the de*elopment of modern capitalistic states, the performance of public functions passed completel& into the hands of paid hirelings$ /his social group increased numericall& and created the modern state bureaucrac&$ ?n the one hand, the transfer of public functions to hired personnel H completel& de*oted to their wor7 and directed b& one powerful political center H corresponds with the spirit of bourgeois econom&, which is based on specialization, di*ision of labor, and a complete subordination of manpower to the purpose of maintaining the social mechanism: on the other hand, howe*er, the centralist bureaucrac& has serious drawbac7s hampering the econom&$ Capitalist production and exchange are characterized b& the highest sensiti*it& and elasticit&, b& the capacit&, and e*en the inclination for constant changes in connection with thousands of social influences which cause constant fluctuations and undulations in mar7et conditions, and in the conditions of production themsel*es$ 3s a result of these fluctuations, the bourgeois econom& re>uires subtle, percepti*e administration of public ser*ices such as the centralized bureaucrac&, with its rigidit& and routine, is not able to afford$ 'ence, alread& as a correcti*e to the centralism of the modern state, there de*elops, in bourgeois societ&, along with legislation b& representati*e assemblies, a natural tendenc& toward local autonom&, gi*ing the possibilit& of a better ad5ustment of the state apparatus to social needs$ For local autonom& ta7es into account the manifold *ariet& of local conditions and also brings about a direct influence and cooperation of societ& through its public functions$ 'owe*er, more important than the deficiencies inseparable from the rule of bureaucrac&, b& which the theor& of bourgeois liberalism usuall& explains the necessit& for autonom&, there is another circumstance$ /he capitalist econom& brought forth, from the moment of the inception of mass factor& production, a whole series of entirel& new social needs imperiousl& demanding satisfaction$ 3bo*e all the penetration of big capital and the s&stem of hired labor, ha*ing undermined and ruined the entire traditional social structure, created a plague un7nown before, namel& mass unemplo&ment and pauperization for the proletariat$ %ince capital needs a reser*e labor force and since public securit& must be preser*ed, societ&, in order to hold in chec7 the proletarian masses depri*ed of

means of li*elihood and emplo&ment, cannot but ta7e care of them$ In this wa&, modern public welfare comes into being as a social function within the framewor7 of capitalistic production$ /he agglomeration of big masses of industrial proletarians in the worst material conditions in the modern industrial centers created for the ad5acent bourgeois classes a threat of infectious diseases and brought about another urgent social need: public concern for health, and in connection with this, the whole management of the sewage s&stem and suppl& of water as well as public regulation of building construction$ /he re>uirements of capitalist production and of bourgeois societ& brought about for the first time the problem of popular education$ /he s&stem of schools accessible to broad masses, not onl& in the big cities but also in the pro*inces and among the rural population, brought the idea that the creation and regulation of schools was a public function$ /he mo*ement of goods and persons in the whole area of the state as a normal phenomenon and a condition of the existence of capitalist production brought forth the need for constant public concern about roads and means of communication, not onl& in the form of trun7#line railroads and maritime traffic, important from the point of *iew of militar& strateg& and world trade, but also of *ehicular roads, highwa&s, bridges, ri*er na*igation, and subsidiar& railroads$ /he creation and maintenance of these indispensable conditions of internal communication became one of the most urgent economic needs of bourgeois societ&$ Finall&, public safet& of persons and propert& as a matter of general concern and social need is also a clearl& modern product, connected with the re>uirements of capitalist econom&$ In medie*al societ&, safet& was guaranteed b& some special areas of legal protection: for the rural population, the area of the respecti*e feudal dominion, for the burghers, the protecti*e walls of the cit& and the statutes and @freedomsB of each cit& separatel&$ /he 7nights were supposed to guarantee their own safet&$ +odern societ&, based on the production of goods, needs safet& of persons and propert& as a uni*ersal social guarantee for e*er&bod& in the entire territor& of the state without discrimination$ /he central go*ernment cannot satisf& all these needs$ /here are some the go*ernment cannot ta7e care of at all, li7e the local affairs in the remote parts of the countr&; understandabl&, the go*ernment tends to transmit the expenses of managing such affairs to the local population$ Local autonom&, therefore, originates in all modern states *er& earl&, abo*e all in the form of transferring the material burden of a series of social functions to the population itself$ ?n the other hand, capitalism stratifies and lin7s into one economic and social organism the biggest state areas, and, to a certain extent, the entire world$ 3t the same time, howe*er, in order to promote its interests, to perfect and integrate the bourgeois econom&, capitalism splits the EautonomousF states and creates new centers, new social organisms, as, for instance, big cities and pro*incial regions, etc$ 3 contemporar& modern cit& is tied b& numberless economic and political bonds not onl& to the state but to the entire world$ /he accumulation of people, the de*elopment of municipal transportation and econom&, turns the cit& into a separate small organism; its needs and public functions are more numerous and *aried than were those of a medie*al cit&, which with its handicraft production, was almost entirel& independent both economicall& and politicall&$ /he creation of different states and of new urban areas pro*ided the framewor7 for the modern municipal go*ernment H a product of new social needs$ 3 municipal or pro*incial go*ernment is necessar& in order to compl& with the needs of these specific social organisms into which capitalism, following the economic principle of the contradictor& interests of the cit& and the *illage,

transformed the cit& on the one hand and the *illage on the other$ Dithin the framewor7 of the special capitalistic connection between industr& and agriculture, that is, between cit& and *illage, within the framewor7 of the close mutual dependence of their production and exchange, a thousand threads lin7ing the dail& interests of the population of each ma5or cit& with the existence of the population of the neighboring *illages there goes, in a natural wa&, a pro*incial autonom& as in France H departmental, cantonal, or communal$ +odern autonom& in all these forms is b& no means the abolition of state centralism but onl& its supplementation; together the& constitute the characteristic form of the bourgeois state$ (esides political unification, state so*ereignt&, uniform legislation, and centralized state go*ernment, local autonom& became, in all these countries, one of the basic polic& issues both of the liberals and of the bourgeois democrac&$ Local autonom&, growing out of the modern bourgeois s&stem in the manner indicated, has nothing in common with federalism or particularism handed down from the medie*al past$ It is e*en its exact opposite$ Dhile the medie*al particularism or federalism constitutes a separation of the political functions of the state, modern autonom& constitutes onl& an adaptation of the concentrated state functions to local needs and the participation in them of the people$ Dhile, therefore, communal particularism or federalism in the spirit of (a7unins ideal is a plan for splitting the territor& of a big state into small areas partl& or completel& independent of each other, modern autonom& is onl& a form of democratization of a centralized big state$ /he clearest illustration of this point of modern autonom& which grew in the chief modern states on the gra*e the former particularism and in clear opposition to it$

..
%tate administrati*e and bureaucratic centralism was initiated in France b& absolutism during the ancien r,gime$ (& the suppression of communal independence in the cities, especiall& in Paris, b& sub5ugating the largest feudal possessions and incorporating them into the crownlands, finall& b& concentrating administration in the hands of the state council and ro&al super*isors, there was created alread& in the time of ,ichelieu a powerful apparatus of state centralism$ /he former independent feudal fiefs were reduced to the condition of pro*inces; some of them were go*erned b& assemblies whose power, howe*er, was more and more of an illusion$ /he Great ,e*olution undertoo7 its wor7 in two directions$ ?n the one hand, continuing the tendenc& toward political centralization, it completel& abolished the territorial remnants of feudalism; on the other, in place of the pro*incial administration of bureaucrats assigned b& the go*ernment, it created a local administration with representati*es elected b& the people$ /he Constituent 3ssembl& wiped from the map of France the historical di*ision of the countr& into pro*inces, as well as the medie*al di*ision into administrati*el& di*erse cities and *illages$ ?n the tabula rasa which was thus left the Constituent 3ssembl&, following the idea of %iK&Xs, introduced a new, simple, geometrical di*ision into s>uare departments$ /he departments, in turn, are subdi*ided into arrondissements, cantons, and communes, each go*erned b& a bod& elected b& public *ote$ /he constitution of the )irector& of the Vear III made certain changes in details, maintaining howe*er, the foundations of the great reform effected b& the Constituent 3ssembl&; it was this reform which had gi*en to modern histor& an epoch#ma7ing model of modern autonom&, which grew up on the gra*e of feudal decentralization and was imbued with an entirel& new idea, namel&, democratic representation b& election$

/here followed a hundred &ears of change in the histor& of autonom& in France$ /his histor& and the whole political fate of democrac& in the countr& oscillated, in a characteristic manner, between two poles$ /he slogan of the aristocratic, monarchical reaction is, throughout this time, decentralization, in the sense of returning to the independence of the former historical pro*inces, while the slogan of liberalism and democrac& is close adherence to political centralism and at the same time, the rights of representation of the local population, especiall& in the commune$ /he first blow to the wor7 of the ,e*olution in that field was dealt b& 2apoleon, who was crowned b& the so#called %tatute of Plu*ois 8" of the &ear NIII 0Feb$ 1-, 1"!!1, his coup d<,tat of 1"th (rumaire$ /his statute, ta7ing ad*antage of the general confusion and chaos caused especiall& in the pro*inces b& the counter# re*olution during the time of the )irector&, for which the democratic autonom& was blamed, hastil& compressed the wor7 of the ,e*olution into the framewor7 of bureaucrac&$ +aintaining the new territorial di*ision of France in line with political centralism, 2apoleon abolished, b& one stro7e of the pen, an& participation of the people in local autonom& and ga*e o*er the entire power into the hands of officials assigned b& the central go*ernment: prefect, sub#prefect, and ma&or$ In the department, the 2apoleonic prefect was, in a considerable measure, a resurrection of the super*isor from the happ& times of the ancien r,gime$ 2apoleon expressed this re*ersion with characteristic fran7ness when he said, @Avec mes pr,fets# mes gens d<armes et mes pr=tres# /e ferai tout ce que /e voudrai$B E@Dith the help of m& prefects, police, and priests I will do whate*er I li7e$BF /he ,estoration 7ept the s&stem of its predecessor in general, according to a current expression$ @/he (ourbons slept on a bed that had been made b& 2apoleon$B 'owe*er, as soon as the aristocratic emigration returned home its battle cr& was decentralization, a return to the s&stem of the pro*inces$ /he notorious chambre introuvable had scarcel& assembled when one of the extreme ,o&alists, (arthe Lebastrie, at a meeting of Aanuar& 1<, 1"1., solemnl& announced the indispensabilit& of decentralization$ ?n man& later occasions the leaders of the right, CorbiXre, )e (onald, La (ourdonna&e, de NillXle, )u*ergier de 'auranne, argued @the impossibilit& of reconciling the monarch& with republican uniformit& and e>ualit&$B Cnder this standard, the aristocrac& fought simpl& for a return to its former position in the pro*inces from the economic and political point of *iew$ 3t the same time, it denounced political centralism as @a gre:nid for re*olution, a hotbed of inno*ations and agitation$B 'ere we alread& hear literall& the same arguments under co*er of which the right, half a centur& later, tried to mobilize the pro*incial reaction against the re*olutionar& Paris Commune$ /herefore, the first timid attempt at the reform of the local administration with application of the principle of election, that is, the pro5ect of +artigna>ue, called forth a storm in the honorable pre# Aul& assembl& and was re5ected clearl& as the @beginning of re*olution$B /he enraged representati*es of the landed aristocrac& demanded onl& the broadening of the competence of the prefect and sub# prefect and ma7ing them dependent on the central authorit&$ 'owe*er, the da&s of the ,estoration were alread& numbered and the defeat of +artigna>ues pro5ect became the prologue of the Aul& ,e*olution$ /he Aul& +onarch&, which was onl& an impro*ed edition of the ,estoration in the spirit of the rule of the richest bourgeoisie, introduced insignificant changes in local autonom&; it pro*ided a shadow of the s&stem of election$ /he law of 1"<1 on the communes and the law of 1"<< on the departments ga*e the right of suffrage for municipal and departmental councils to a small minorit& of the most highl& taxed as well as to the bureaucrac& and bourgeois intelligentsia, without, howe*er, an& broadening of the attributes of these councils$ /he re*olution of 1"9" restored the wor7 of its great predecessor, introduced uni*ersal suffrage for departmental councils, and made the meetings of the councils public$ 3fter the Aune da&s, the part& of the aristocratic#clerical right *iolentl& demanded the return to decentralization as a weapon against the h&dra of socialism$ In 1"9 #1":1, the departmental councils unanimousl& demanded the

extension of their competence and extraordinar& powers in case of ci*il war, for use against Paris$ /hiers, at that time still a liberal, on the contrar&, insisted on centralism as the most certain pre*enti*e means against socialism$ 0/he *er& same /hiers, it is true, in 1"-1, himself wa*ed the banner of federalism and decentralization to mobilize the pro*inces against the Paris Commune$1 /he %econd ,epublic, in li>uidating the wor7 of the Februar& ,e*olution, prepared in 1":1 a pro5ect for the reform of local administration which restored completel& the s&stem of 2apoleon I, with an all#powerful prefect, and in this wa& built here, as in general, a bridge on which 2apoleon III entered$ /he latter undertoo7 an e*en more thorough re*ision of the Februar& achie*ements, put local administration e*en further bac7 than the reforms of 2apoleon I, and abolished the openness of the meetings of the departmental councils and their right to elect their own cabinet; from then on the go*ernment appointed ma&ors >uite arbitraril&, i$e$, not from within the communal council$ Finall&, 2apoleon III expanded the power of the prefects 0b& the laws of 1":8 and 1".11 to such an extent that he made them completel& independent of the go*ernment$ /hese omnipresent departmental satraps, dependent directl& on Louis 2apoleon, became, b& *irtue of their function of @directorsB of elections to Parliament, the main pillars of the %econd Impire$ /he course of the abo*e histor& until the beginning of the %econd Impire was characterized b& +arx in broad stro7es in his The %ighteenth (rumaire o- Louis (ona3arte in the following wa&: /his executi*e power with its enormous bureaucratic and militar& organization, with its ingenious state machiner&, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an arm& of another half#million, this appalling parasitic bod&, which enmeshes the bod& of French societ& li7e a net and cho7es all its pores, sprang up in the da&s of the absolute monarch&, with the deca& of the feudal s&stem, which it helped to hasten$ /he seignorial pri*ileges of the landowners and towns became transformed into so man& attributes of the state power, the feudal dignitaries into paid officials, and the motle& pattern of conflicting medie*al plenar& powers into the regulated plan of a state authorit& whose wor7 is di*ided and centralized as in a factor&$ /he first French ,e*olution, with its tas7 of brea7ing all separate local, territorial, urban, and pro*incial powers in order to create the ci*il unit& of the nation, was bound to de*elop what the absolute monarch& had begun: centralization, but at the same time the extent, the attributes, and the agents of go*ernmental power$ 2apoleon perfected this state machiner&$ /he Legitimist +onarch& and the Aul& +onarch& added nothing but a greater di*ision of labor, growing in the same measure as the di*ision of labor within bourgeois societ& created new groups of interests, and, therefore, new material for state administration$ I*er& common interest was straightawa& se*ered from societ&, counterposed to it as a higher general interest, snatched from the acti*it& of societ&s members themsel*es and made an ob5ect of go*ernmental acti*it&, from a bridge, a schoolhouse, and the communal propert& of a *illage communit& to the railwa&s, the national wealth, and the national uni*ersit& of France$ Finall&, in its struggle against the re*olution, the parliamentar& republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with the repressi*e measures, the resources and centralization of go*ernmental power$ 3ll re*olutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it$ /he parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the *ictor$ (ut under the absolute monarch&, during the first ,e*olution, under 2apoleon, bureaucrac& was onl& the means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie$ Cnder the ,estoration, under Louis Philippe, under the parliamentar& republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class, howe*er much it stro*e for power of its own$ ?nl& under the second (onaparte does the state seem to ha*e made itself completel& independent$ 3s against ci*il societ&, the state machine has consolidated its position so thoroughl& that the chief

of the %ociet& of )ecember 1! suffices for its head, an ad*enturer blown in from abroad, raised on the shield b& a drun7en soldier&, which he has bought with li>uor and sausages, and which he must continuall& pl& with sausage anew$E1F /he bureaucratic s&stem of 2apoleon III stirred up, especiall& toward the end of his reign, a strong opposition; this opposition comes through clearl& in the statements of certain local administrations$ /he most stri7ing example was the famous @2anc& +anifesto,B which demanded extreme decentralization and under whose banner there rallied, in 1".:, the whole legitimist#clerical opposition of the last phase of the Impire$ In the name of @freedom and orderB the +anifesto demanded the liberation of the Commune from the super#*ision of the prefect, the appointment of the ma&or from among the communal councilors, and the complete elimination of the arrondissement councils$ ?n the other hand, the +anifesto demanded establishing cantonal councils and assigning to them the distribution of taxes, and finall&, re*ising the boundaries between departments in the spirit of returning to the historical boundaries of the pro*inces and ma7ing the departments so re*ised independent concerning budget and the entire administration$ /his program, which aimed @to create pre*enti*e measures against re*olutions,B to sa*e @freedom compromised b& three re*olutions,B was accepted b& all liberal conser*ati*es of the ?dilon (arrot t&pe, and its ad*ocates were headed b& all the leaders of legitimism, i$e$, the (ourbon part&: (Kchard, Falioux, Count +ontalembert, and finall&, the Pretender to the crown himself, Count Chambord, who, in his +anifesto of 1"-1 raised @administrati*e decentralizationB to the role of a leading programmatic demand on the banner of the white lilies$ /he 2anc& program pro*o7ed sharp resistance from two sides H from the Impire and from the extreme Left, ,epublicans, )emocrats, and %ocialists$ /he latter, condemning the counter# re*olutionar& tendenc& of legitimist @decentralization,B said, in the words of Nictor 'ugo: @Gentlemen, &ou are forging a chain and &ou sa&: W/his is freedom$B @/herefore,B the& exclaimed, @we do not want &our departmental councils as a legislati*e authorit&, nor &our permanent departmental commissions as administrati*e authorit& in which a triple feudalism would pre*ail: the landed interest, the church, and industr&, interested in 7eeping the people in ignorance and miser&$BE8F Cnder the pretext of freedom, France was to be handed o*er as pre& to bishops, landed aristocrac&, and factor& owners H this is the opinion of contemporar& democrac& and socialists about the 1".: program$ Louis (lanc was an especiall& inflexible opponent of decentralization, e*en to the departments, which he considered an artificial creation, though he fer*entl& encouraged the widest self#go*ernment of the Commune as the natural historical organization and the foundation of the state$ In the re*olutionar& camp the ad*ocates of decentralization, who indeed went further than the legitimists, were onl& adherents of Proudhon, such as )esmaret, who distinctl& proclaimed the slogan of federalism both in application to @the Cnited %tates of IuropeB and to communes and districts within the state, as an ideal solution of the social >uestion because it was a wa& of @annihilating power b& di*iding it$B /hat the adherents of this anarchistic manner of disposing of the bourgeois state ha*e not &et died out in France is pro*ed b& the boo7 which appeared in 1" , Le 3rinci3e sau*eur 3ar un girondin ECited b& 3*alo*, p$88"F, in which the author sharpl& polemicizes against the centralism and homogeneit& of the modern state, ad*ocating, instead of departmental autonom&, the complete dissolution of the state in the spirit of federation$ 2ew *oices in the same spirit ha*e been heard e*en in later &ears H and enthusiasts for @historicalB decentralization still crop up from the camp of the ,o&alists, as is demonstrated b& the legitimist pamphlet from the time of the )re&fus affair, La decentralization et la monarchie nationale$

/he opposition between the *iews of the contemporar& socialists and the anarchistic Proudhon was formulated as earl& as 1":1 b& Louis (lanc in his pamphlet, La RA3ubliBue une et indi*isible, in which in a thunderous *oice he warned the republic against the danger of federalism, opposing to the antagonisms of thirt&#se*en thousand tin& parliaments @la grande tradition montagnarde en fait de centrali2ation politiqueB and @une administration surveill,eB$ 3s a matter of fact, France at that moment was less threatened b& the danger of federalism than b& its opposite: the coup d<etat of Louis (onaparte and the absolute rule of his prefects$ /he same grouping of parties with regard to local administration was also reflected in the notorious national assembl& in (ordeaux after the fall of the Impire$ 3fter the destruction of the Paris Commune the main >uestion concerning decentralization was whether it could ser*e as a pre*entiti*e against the re*olutionar& mo*ements of the proletariat$ First of all, the /hird ,epublic hastened to expand the competence of the departments, e>uipping them H in accordance with the leading idea of reaction since the time of the ,estoration H with special powers against the re*olution$ /he so#called @Loi /rK*eneucB of Februar& 1:, 1"-8, bears the significant title @Loi relati*e au rYle e*entuel des conseils gKnKraux dans des circonstances exceptionnelles$B ?n the other hand, the powers of the communes were, after a temporar& expansion, again restricted: whereas in 1"-1 the communal councils had recei*ed the power of electing their ma&or, after three &ears the& were again depri*ed of this right, and the go*ernment of the /hird ,epublic appointed thirt&#se*en thousand ma&ors through its prefects, thus showing itself a faithful exponent of the monarchical traditions$ 'owe*er, in the foundation of the /hird ,epublic there occurred certain social changes which, despite all external obstacles, pushed the matter of local autonom& on to completel& new paths$ 3lthough the independence of the urban and rural communes might ha*e been abhorrent to the bourgeois reaction, intimidated b& the great traditions of the Paris Commune from 1- < to 1"-1, it e*entuall& became an indispensable need, especiall& since the inception of big industr& under the wings of the %econd Impire$ It was then that railroads began to be built on a large scale$ /he artificiall& fostered and protected big industr& not onl& flourished in Paris but in the fifties and sixties it spread into the pro*inces and suburban areas where capitalism sought cheap factor& sites and cheap labor$ Interprises, industrial centers, financial fortunes mushroomed in the hothouse temperature of the Impire, suppressing small industr& and introducing mass factor& labor of women and children$ /he Paris %toc7 Ixchange occupied second place in Iurope$ /ogether with this explosion of @original accumulation,B as &et unbridled b& an& protecti*e law H there was still no factor& inspection H or b& labor organization and struggle, there too7 place in France an unparalleled accumulation of mass po*ert&, disease, and death$ %uffice it to mention that there were cases when female factor& wor7ers were paid one sou, i$e$, fi*e centimes per da&, in a period of general unparalleled high prices of the prime necessities of life$E<F /he short period of this exploiting econom& made bourgeois societ& painfull& aware of the lac7 of an& public acti*it& to pre*ent glaring po*ert&, infectious diseases, danger to life and propert& on public roads, etc$ 3s earl& as 1":., much was written and spo7en about the necessit& of an official in>uir& concerning pauperism in France$ In 1":", such an in>uir& @confidentiall&B ordered b& the go*ernment predictabl& came to naught$ /he state of public education corresponded more or less with these economic conditions$ %chool courses for adults, subsidized b& the go*ernment under Louis Philippe b& the tin& sum of 9-" francs on the a*erage annuall&, were, during the Impire, depri*ed of this subsid& and neglected$ 3 certain historian described the state of elementar& schools in 1".< as follows: /housands of communes are without schools for girls; *illages are depri*ed of an& schools at all; a large number of others sta& briefl& in school and do not learn an&thing useful; there are no schools

for adults and not a single librar& in the *illages; the annual figures show that there is more than 8percent illiterac&; that li*ing conditions of the male and female teachers are miserable; that :,!!! female teachers recei*e less than 9!! francs annual wages, some recei*e se*ent&#fi*e francs per &ear$ 2ot a single one is entitled to retirement pa&$ 2ot a single male teacher en5o&s a retirement pa& which would assure him of one franc dail& subsistence$E9F 3mong the wor7ers in Paris, the in>uir& ordered b& the Chamber of Commerce in 1".! ascertained that fift& thousand, i$e$, about 1< percent of the wor7ing population, was completel& illiterate$ /he /hird ,epublic, whose mission it was to build a durable home for the bourgeoisie and first of all to li>uidate the ban7rupt estate ta7en o*er from the Impire, found itself faced with a number of new tas7s: militar& reform, and in connection with this, a health reform; also a reform, or rather creation of public education; reform of transportation, completel& neglected b& the Impire, which was solel& occupied with decorating and reforming Paris to turn it into a model capital of the +onarch&$ +oreo*er, the /hird ,epublic faced the tas7 of ac>uiring means for these reforms$ /his meant an increase of taxes$ 'owe*er, these went primaril& for militar& expenditures, for colonial polic&, and especiall& for the maintenance of the bureaucratic apparatus$ Dithout the participation of the local population, abo*e all of the communes, the /hird ,epublic would ne*er ha*e been able to sol*e these tas7s$ 3t the same time, big industr&s re*olutionizing of conditions under the Impire completel& changed the role of the department$ Dhen Louis (lanc, in the national assembl& in 1"-1, declared that the department is an artificial product of administrati*e geometr&, this was doubtless an anachronistic *iew$ Indeed, in their beginning, emerging from the hands of the constituent assembl&, the departments were an entirel& @free impro*isationB of the genius of the ,e*olution, a simple networ7 of s&mmetrical figures on the map of France; and it was exactl& in this abolition of all historical boundaries of the pro*inces that the powerful inno*ating thought, that great @tradition montagnarde@ consisted, which, on the ruins of the medie*al s&stem, created a politicall& unified modern France$ For decades, during the ,estoration and later, the departments did not ha*e an& life of their own; the& were used b& the central go*ernment onl& as branch offices, as the sphere of action of the cler7# prefect whose onl& palpable expression was the obligator& @h>tels de pr,fectureB$ 'owe*er, in modern France, new local needs ha*e brought, in the course of time, new institutions surrounding these fortresses of the central bureaucrac&$ /he new @departmental interestsB which ha*e gained increasing recognition are centered around shelters, hospitals, schools, local roads, and the procurement of @additional centimesB necessar& to meet the costs$ /he originall& empt& framewor7 of the departments, drawn on the gra*e of the medie*al particularism of the pro*inces, became in the course of time, through the de*elopment of bourgeois France, filled with new social content: the local interests of capitalism$ /he local administration of France b& all#powerful prefects could suffice in the second half of the nineteenth centur& onl& for the artificial maintenance of the Impire$ /he /hird ,epublic was e*entuall& forced, in its own interests, to admit the local population to participation in this administration and to change the communes and departments from exclusi*e instruments of the central go*ernment into organs of democratic autonom&$ 'owe*er, this shift could be effected onl& within the /hird ,epublic$ In the same wa& that the republican form of go*ernment was consolidated in France ultimatel& than7s onl& to circumstances which permitted the social nucleus of this clearl& bourgeois political form to be hus7ed from its ideological cocoon, from the illusion of @social republicB created b& three re*olutions in the course of almost half a centur&, so the local self#go*ernment had first to be liberated from the traditional ideolog& hostile to it$ 3s late as the 1"-1 2ational 3ssembl&, some ad*ocates of liberalism abhorred

the @reactionar&B idea of autonom& which the& persistentl& identified with feudal decentralization$ /he +onarchist, d'ausson*ille, warned his part&, reminding it that alread& during the Great ,e*olution the appearance of adhering to federalism was sufficient to send people to the guillotine, while )u*ergier de 'auranne declared that France was faced with a dilemma: either uniform administration represented in each department b& a prefect, or a federation of autonomous departments$ /hese were the last re*erberations of an opinion which weighed on peoples minds for three#>uarters of a centur&$ ?nl& when, with the fall of the %econd Impire and the triumph of the /hird ,epublic, the attempts of the aristocratic clerical reaction were defeated once and for all and the phantom of the federalism of the @historic pro*incesB was relegated to the realm of disembodied spirits did the idea of the relati*e independence of the departments cease to gi*e an impression of federalism which frightened awa& bourgeois liberalism and democrac&$ 3nd onl& when the last flic7er of the Paris Commune re*olutionar& tradition died out in the cinders of the 1"-1 Commune and under the withered lawn of the @Confederates DallB E@+ur des FKdKrKsBF at PXre Lachaise, where the corpses and half#dead bodies of the Communes heroes were dumped, onl& then did the idea of communal self#go*ernment cease to be s&non&mous with social uphea*al in the minds of the bourgeoisie, and the Phr&gian cap cease to be the s&mbol of the Cit& 'all$ In a word, onl& when both departmental and communal autonom& were able to demonstrate their proper historical social *alue as genuinel& modern institutions of the bourgeois state, growing out of its own needs and ser*ing its interests, did the progressi*e de*elopment of local autonom& in France become possible$ /he organic statute of 1"-1, supplemented b& the law of 1" , at last authorized representati*es of departments chosen b& general elections of the people to participate in the administration with a determining *oice, and the statute of 1""9 ga*e a similar right to the communal councils, returning to them the power of choosing their own ma&or$ %lowl& and reluctantl&, and onl& in recent times, the modern autonom& of France has liberated itself from the iron bonds of bureaucrac&$ /he histor& of self#go*ernment in Ingland followed entirel& different paths$ Instead of the re*olutionar& change#o*er from medie*al to modern societ&, we sec here, on the contrar&, an earl& compromise which has preser*ed to this da& the old remnants of feudalism$ 2ot so much b& the shattering of old forms as b& graduall& filling them with new content, bourgeois Ingland has car*ed out a place for itself in medie*al Ingland$ 3nd perhaps in no other area is this process so t&pical and interesting as in the area of local self#go*ernment$ 3t first glance, and according to a commonplace expression, Ingland appears as the countr& with the oldest local self#go*ernment, na&, as the cradle, the classical homeland of self#go*ernment, on which the liberalism of the continent sought to model itself$ In realit&, that age#old self#go*ernment of Ingland belongs to the realm of m&ths, and the famous old Inglish self#go*ernment has nothing in common with self#go*ernment in the modern sense$ %elf#go*ernment was simpl& a special s&stem of local administration which originated at the time of the flowering of feudalism and bears all the hallmar7s of its origin$ /he centers of that s&stem are the count&, a product of the feudal conditions after the 2orman Con>uest, and the parish, a product of medie*al, ecclesiastical conditions; while the main person, the soul of the whole count& administration, is the 5ustice of the peace, an office created in the fourteenth centur& along with the three other count& offices: the sheriff, conducting the elections to parliament, administering 5udgments in ci*il lawsuits, etc$; the coroner, conducting in>uests in cases of *iolent death; and finall&, the commander of the count& militia$ 3mong these officials onl& the secondar& figure of the coroner is electi*e; all other officers are appointed b& the Crown from among the local landed aristocrac&$ ?nl& landed proprietors with a specified income could be appointed to the office of 5ustice of the peace$ 3ll these officers fulfilled their duties without remuneration, and the purel& medie*al aspect is further indicated b& the fact that in their competence the& combined 5udicial and executi*e power$ /he 5ustice of the peace did e*er&thing in the count& as well as in the parish, as we shall presentl& see$ 'e ran the courts, assigned taxes, issued administrati*e ordinances, in a word, he represented in his person the whole competence of public authorit& entirel& in accordance with the

feudal attributions of the landed proprietor; the onl& difference here was his appointment b& the Crown$ /he 5ustice of the peace, once appointed, became an omnipotent holder of public power: 5ustices of the peace were entirel& independent of the central go*ernment, and in general, not responsible, because the old s&stem of Inglish self#go*ernment ob*iousl& 7nows nothing of another basic feature of modern administration: the 5udicial responsibilit& of officials and the super*ision b& the central authorit& o*er local offices$ 3n& participation of the local population in this administration was out of the >uestion$ If, therefore, the ancient Inglish self#go*ernment ma& be regarded as a 7ind of autonom&, this can be done onl& in the sense that it was a s&stem of unrestricted autonom& of the landed aristocrac&, who held in their hands the complete public power in the count&$ /he first undermining of this medie*al s&stem of administration coincides with the reign of Ilizabeth, i$e$, the period of that shattering re*olution in rural propert& relations which inaugurated the capitalistic era in Ingland$ Niolent expropriations of the peasantr& b& the aristocrac& on the broadest scale, the supersession of agriculture b& sheep#herding, the secularization of church estates which were appropriated b& the aristocrac&, all this suddenl& created an immense rural proletariat, and in conse>uence, po*ert&, beggar&, and public robber&$ /he first triumphal steps of capital shoo7 the foundations of the whole societ& and Ingland was forced to face a new threat H pauperism$ /here began a crusade against *agranc&, beggar&, and looting, which extends in a bloodstained strea7 until the middle of the nineteenth centur&$ %ince, howe*er, prisons, branding with hot irons, and e*en the gallows pro*ed an entirel& insufficient medicine against the new plague, summar& con*ictions came into being in Ingland and also @public philanthrop&B; next to the gallows at the cross#roads arose the parish wor7house$ /he modern phenomenon of mass pauperism was the first problem transcending the powers and means of the medie*al s&stem of administration as carried out b& the self# go*ernment of the aristocrac&$ /he solution adopted was to shift the new burden to new shoulders of the middle classes, the wealth& bourgeoisie$ 2ow the mold#co*ered church parish was called to a new role H care of the poor$ In the peculiar Inglish administration, the parish is not onl& a rural but also an urban organization, so that to this da& the parish s&stem o*erlaps the modern administrati*e networ7 in the big cities, creating a great chaos of competences$ 3t the end of the sixteenth centur&, a tax for the poor was introduced in the parish, and this tax graduall& became the cornerstone of the tax s&stem of the commune$ /he poor rates grew from Z !!,!!! sterling at the end of the se*enteenth centur& to Z-,"-!,"!1 sterling in 1""1$ /he collection and administration of these funds, the organization of assistance and wor7houses, called forth a new organization of the communal office: and to it there also fell presentl& another important public function which was li7ewise caused b the needs of the nascent capitalist econom&: super*ision of roads$ /his organization also comprised, from then on, besides the rector who was at the head and two church wardens elected b& the commune, two o*erseers of the poor, designated b& the 5ustice of the peace, and one sur*e&or of the highwa&s, also designated b& the 5ustice of the peace$ 3s we see, this was still the use of the old self#go*ernment apparatus for modern purposes$ /he landed aristocrac& in the persons of the 5ustices of the peace preser*ed power in their hands; onl& the material burden fell on the bourgeoisie$ /he commune had to carr& the burden of the poor tax; howe*er, it didnt ha*e an& *oice in the apportionment of the tax$ /he latter function was an attribute of the 5ustice of the peace and of the communal o*erseers sub5ect to him$ In such a state the local administration sur*i*ed until the nineteenth centur&$ 3 few attempts at admitting the population to participation in this administration were underta7en at the beginning of that centur& but came to nothing$

In the meantime, capitalism in Ingland entered new paths: big machine industr& celebrated its triumphal entr& and undertoo7 an assault on the old fortress of self#go*ernment, which the crumbling structure could not withstand$ /he *iolent growth of factor& industr& at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centur& caused a complete uphea*al in the conditions of Inglands social life$ /he immense influx of the rural proletariat to the cities soon brought about such a concentration of people and such a housing shortage in the industrial cities that the wor7ers districts became abhorrent slums, dar7, stin7ing, filth&, plague#ridden$ %ic7ness among the population assumed terrif&ing proportions$ In %cotland and Ireland an outbrea7 of t&phoid too7 place regularl& after each price increase and each industrial crisis$ In Idinburgh and Glasgow, for instance as stated b& Ingels in his classic wor7, The /ondition o- the #orking /lass in %ngland in 1C==, in the &ear 1"1-, .,!!! persons fell ill; in 1"8. and 1"<-, 1!,!!! each; in 1"98, in Glasgow alone, <8,!!!, i$e$, 18 percent of the entire population$ In Ireland, in 1"1-, < ,!!! persons fell ill with t&phoid, in 1"1 , .!,!!!; in the main industrial cities of counties Cor7 and Limeric7, one#se*enth and one#fourth respecti*el& of the entire population fell *ictim in those &ears to the epidemic$ In London and +anchester, malaria was endemic$ In the latter cit&, it was officiall& stated that three#>uarters of the population needed medical help e*er& &ear, and mortalit& among children up to fi*e reached, in the industrial cit& of Leeds in 1"<8, the terrif&ing figure of :,8". out of a population of 1!!,!!!$ /he lac7 of hospitals and medical help, housing shortages, and undernourishment of the proletariat became a public threat$ In no less a degree, the intellectual neglect of the mass of the people became a public plague when big industr&, ha*ing concentrated immense crowds of the proletariat under its command, made them a pre& of spiritual sa*ages$ /he textile industr& especiall&, which was the first to introduce mass labor of women and children at the lowest age and which made impossible an& home education, howe*er rudimentar&, made the filling of this gap, i$e$, the creation of elementar& schools, a public need$ 'owe*er, the state performed these tas7s to a minimal degree$ 3t the beginning of the fourth decade Eof the centur&F, out of the budget of Ingland amounting to Z:: million, public education is allotted the ridiculous sum of Z9!,!!!$ Iducation was left mainl& to pri*ate initiati*e, especiall& of the church, and became mostl& an instrument of bigotr& and a weapon of sectarian struggle$ In %unda& schools, the onl& ones accessible to wor7ing#class children, the latter were often not e*en taught reading and writing, as occupations unworth& of %unda&; while in the pri*ate schools, as was demonstrated b& a parliamentar& in>uir&, the teachers themsel*es often did not 7now how to read or write$ In general, the picture re*ealed b& the famous Children Implo&ment Commission showed the new capitalistic Ingland as a scene of ruin and destruction, a wrec7age of the entire anti>uated, traditional, social structure$ /he great social reform was accomplished for the purpose of establishing tolerable li*ing conditions for the new host, i$e$, for the capitalistic bourgeoisie$ /he elimination of the most threatening s&mptoms of pauperism, the pro*ision of public h&giene, elementar& education, etc$ became an urgent tas7$ 'owe*er, this tas7 could be achie*ed onl& when both in state polic& and in the entire administration the exclusi*e rule of the landed aristocrac& was abolished and &ielded to the rule of the industrial bourgeoisie$ /he election reform of 1"<8, which bro7e the political power of the /ories, is also the date from which begins self#go*ernment in Ingland in the modern sense, i$e$, self#go*ernment based on the participation of the population in the local administration, and on paid, responsible officials in the role of executor of its will under the super*ision and control of the central authorit&$ /he medie*al di*ision of the state into counties and parishes corresponded to the new grouping of the population and local needs and interests as little as the medie*al offices of the 5ustice of the peace and parish councils$ (ut while the re*olutionar& French liberalism swept from the countr& the historic pro*inces and in their place erected a homogeneous France with new administrati*e di*isions, the conser*ati*e Inglish liberalism created

onl& a new administrati*e networ7 H inside, beside, and through the old di*isions, without formall& abolishing them$ /he peculiarit& of Inglish self#go*ernment consists in the fact that, unable to utilize the completel& in ade>uate framewor7 of traditional self#go*ernment, it created a new 7ind of base: special communal associations of the population for each of the basic functions of self go*ernment$ /hus, the law of 1"<9 establishes new @poor law unionsB, comprising se*eral parishes whose population 5ointl& elects, on the basis of a six#class electoral law, in accordance with the taxes paid, a separate board of guardians for each union$ /his bod& decides the whole matter of welfare, building of wor7houses, issuing doles, etc$; it also hires and pa&s the officials who carr& out its decisions$ /he old office of the parish o*erseer of the poor changed from an honorar& to a paid one, and was reduced to the function of imposing and collecting taxes assigned b& the board$ 3ccording to the same model, but >uite independentl&, the law of 1"9- created a new, broad organization to ta7e care of public health and super*ision of buildings, cleanliness of streets and houses, water suppl&, and food mar7eting$ 3lso for this purpose new associations of the local population with representati*es elected b& it were established$ ?n the basis of the Public 'ealth 3ct of 1"-:, Ingland H with the exception of the capital H is di*ided into urban and rural sanitar& districts$ /he organ of representation is, in the urban districts, the cit& council; in the boroughs, special local boards of health; and in the rural districts health is super*ised b& the board of guardians$ 3ll these boards decide all matters pertaining to health and hire salaried officers who carr& out the resolutions of the board$ /he administration of local transportation also followed the same lines but independentl& of the two bodies mentioned abo*e$ For this purpose, highwa& districts were created, composed of se*eral parishes whose population elects separate highwa& boards$ In man& rural districts, transportation is the concern of the local board of health, or the board of guardians which administers both transportation and poor relief$ /he highwa& boards or the boards of guardians decide about transportation enterprises and hire a paid district#sur*e&or as the official carr&ing out their orders$ 3nd so the office of the former honorar& highwa& sur*e&or *anished$ Finall&, education was also entrusted to a specail self#go*erning organization$ Indi*idual parishes, cities and the capital form as man& school districts$ 'owe*er, the board of education of the council of state has the right to combine se*eral urban parishes into one district$ I*er& district elects a school board entrusted with super*ision of elementar& education: it ma7es decisions concerning tuition#free schooling and the hiring of officials and teachers$ In this wa& there came into being, >uite independentl& from the old organization of self#go*ernment, new, multiple, autonomous organizations which, precisel& because the& originated not b& wa& of a bold re*olutionar& reform but as discrete patchwor7, formed an extremel& complex and in*ol*ed s&stem of often o*erlapping areas of competence$ 'owe*er, it is characteristic for the classic countr& of capitalist econom& that the axis around which this modern self#go*ernment was cr&stallized H so far clearl& on the lowest le*el in the rural commune H was the organization of public welfare, the organization for combating pauperism: the @poorB was, in Ingland, to the middle of the nineteenth centur&, the official s&non&m for the wor7er, 5ust as in a later time of orderl& and modernized conditions, the sober expression @handsB became such a s&non&m$ (eside this new organization of self#go*ernment, the old counties with their 5ustices of the peace became a relic$ /he 5ustice of the peace fell to the subordinate role of participant in the local council, and super*ision of administration was left him onl& to a certain extent in matters of highwa&s$ Dhen, howe*er, the local administration passed from the hands of the 5ustice appointed b& the Crown to the elected

representati*es of the local population, the administrati*e decentralization b& no means increased, but on the contrar&, was eliminated$ If, in the old da&s, the 5ustice of the peace was an all#powerful master in the council, entirel& independent of the central go*ernment, at present, the local go*ernment is sub5ect on the one hand to the uniform parliamentar& legislation, and on the other to strict control b& the central administrati*e authorities$ /he Local Go*ernment (oard speciall& created for this purpose controls the acti*it& of the local boards of guardians and boards of health through *isiting inspectors, while the school boards are sub5ect to the board of education of the state council$ 3lso, urban self#go*ernment in Ingland is a product of most recent times$ ?nl& slight traces sur*i*ed to modern times of the communal independence of the medie*al cit&$ /he modern cit&, an outcome of the capitalist econom& of the nineteenth centur&, made a new urban organization indispensable: initiated b& the law of 1"<:, it was not finall& established until 1""8$ /he histor& of self#go*ernment in German& and 3ustria lac7s such distincti*e features as that of France or Ingland; howe*er, it generall& followed the same lines$ In both countries, the di*ision into cities and rural communes resulting from the medie*al de*elopment brought about a highl& de*eloped self#go*ernment of the cities and their political independence, and also created the political split, perhaps the greatest in Iurope, of the state territor& into independent feudal areas$ 3fter the sixteenth centur&, and especiall& in the eighteenth centur&, during the time of enlightened absolutism, the cities completel& lost their independence and fell under the authorit& of the state$ 3t the same time, the rural communes lost their traditional self#go*erning institutions, ha*ing completel& fallen, through the growth of serfdom, under the authorit& of landowners$ 3lthough much later than in France, absolutism ne*ertheless, as the creator of a unified state authorit& and territor&, triumphed in German& in the eighteenth centur&$ 3t the beginning of the nineteenth centur&, bureaucratic centralism is e*er&where *ictorious$ 'owe*er, before long, in connection with the rising big#industrial production and the aspiration of the bourgeoisie to introduce modern conditions into the state, the de*elopment of local self# go*ernment on new principles begins$ /he first general law of this 7ind originated in 3ustria during the +arch ,e*olution$ 3ctuall&, howe*er, the foundations of the present self#go*ernment were laid in 3ustria b& the statute of 1".8; in the respecti*e crownlands, particular communal laws came into being later through legislation of the )iet$ In German&, there pre*ails French law, partl& deri*ed from 2apoleonic times, which does not distinguish between the urban and rural commune: for instance, in the ,hineland, in the (a*arian Palatinate, 'esse, /huringia, etc$ ?n the other hind, the Prussian model pre*ailing in western and eastern German& is an independent product$ 3lthough the Prussian urban law dates alread& from 1"!", the actual period of the de*elopment of the present self#go*ernment in Prussia fell in the sixties and the main reforms in the se*enties and eighties$ 3mong the main areas of urban administration H pro*ince, district 09reis1, and commune H onl& the last has well#de*eloped, self# go*erning institutions, i$e$, extensi*e power of the representati*es elected b& the population; in the remaining ones, representati*e bodies 09reistag, Provin2allandtag1 exist but the& are rather modernized, medie*al class diets and their competence is extremel& limited b& the competence of officials appointed b& the Crown, such as %egierungspr sident in the pro*ince, and +andrat in the district$ Local self#go*ernment in ,ussia constitutes one of the most outstanding attempts of absolutism which, in the famous @liberal reformsB after the %ebastopol catastrophe, aimed at ad5usting the institutions of oriental despotism to the social needs of modern capitalist econom&$ (etween the

peasant reform and the reform of the courts at the threshold of the @renewedB ,ussia of 3lexander II, stands the law which created the territorial institutions$ +odeled on the newl& established self# go*erning institutions of Prussia, the s&stem of the ,ussian @2emstvoB is a parod& of Inglish self# go*ernment; it entrusts the entire local administration to the wealth& nobilit&, and at the same time sub5ects this self#go*ernment of the nobilit& to strict police super*ision and the decisi*e authorit& of tsarist bureaucrac&$ /he law go*erning elections to the count& and gubernial territorial councils happil& combines, in the tri#curial s&stem and indirect elections, the class principle with the census principle$ It ma7es the count& marshal of the nobilit& the ex#officio chairman in the district council, and securing in it to the nobilit& curia half of the seats suspends o*er all resolutions of the council, li7e a )amocles sword, the threatening *eto of the go*ernor$ 3s a result of this peculiarit& of ,ussias social de*elopment, which, in the period before 1 !: made not the urban bourgeoisie, but certain strata of the nobilit& the ad*ocates of @liberal dreamsB howe*er pale, e*en this parod& of self#go*erning institutions represented b& the ,ussian 2emstvos has become, in the hands of the nobilit&, a framewor7 for serious social and cultural acti*it&$ 'owe*er, the sharp clash that immediatel& arose between liberalism, nestling in the territorial administration, on the one hand, and the bureaucrac& and go*ernment on the other, glaringl& illuminated the genuine contradiction between modern self#go*ernment and the medie*al state apparatus of absolutisni$ (eginning a few &ears after the introduction of the 2emstvos, the collision with the power of the go*ernors extends li7e a red thread through the histor& of self#go*ernment in ,ussia, oscillating between the deportation of recalcitrant council chairmen to more or less distant regions; and the boldest dreams of ,ussian liberals in the form of an all#,ussian Congress of 2emstvos which was supposed to be transformed into a constituent assembl& that would abolish absolutism in a peaceful manner$ /he few &ears of the action of the E1 !:F re*olution sol*ed this historical collision, *iolentl& mo*ing the ,ussian nobilit& to the side of reaction and depri*ing the parod& of territorial self#go*ernment of an& m&stif&ing resemblances to liberalism$ /hus was clearl& demonstrated the impossibilit& of reconciling the democratic self#go*ernment indispensable In a bourgeois societ& with the rule of absolutism, as well as the impossibilit& of grafting modern bourgeois democrac& onto the class action of the territorial nobilit& and its institutions$ Local self#go*ernment in the modern sense in onl& one of the details of the general political program whose implementation in the entire state constitutes the tas7 of the re*olution$ In particular, the 6ingdom of Poland and Lithuania must participate in this political reform$ /his 6ingdom is at sent a uni>ue example of a countr& with a highl& de*eloped bourgeois econom& which, howe*er, is depri*ed of an& traces of local self#go*ernment$ In ancient Poland, a countr& of natural econom& and gentr& rule, there ob*iousl& was no local self# go*ernment$ Polish district and pro*incial councils possessed onl& functions connected with elections to the se5m$ 3lthough cities possessed their +agdeburg laws, imported from German& and standing outside the national law, in the se*enteenth and eighteenth centuries, with the complete decline of cities, the ma5orit& of them fell under the law of serfdom or regressed to the status of rural settlements and communes, and in conse>uence urban self#go*ernment disappeared$ /he )uch& of Darsaw, which was an experiment of 2apoleon, was endowed with a s&stem of self# go*ernment bodil& transferred from France, not the one which was the product of re*olution, but a self#go*ernment s>ueezed in the clamps of the %tatute of Plu*ois 8"$ /he )uch& was di*ided into

departments, counties, and communes with @municipalB self#go*ernments and @prefectsB who appointed municipal councillors from a list of candidates elected at count& diets, which was a sla*ish cop& of the 2apoleonic @listes de confianceB in the department$ /hese bodies, destined mainl& to impose state taxes, had onl& ad*isor& functions otherwise, and lac7ed an& executi*e organs$ In the Congress 6ingdom, the French apparatus was completel& abolished; onl& the departments remained, renamed @*o&*odship$B 'owe*er, the& still had no self#go*erning functions, onl& a certain influence on the election of 5udges and administrati*e officials$ 3fter the 2o*ember Insurrection E1"<!F, e*en this remnant of self#go*erning forms was abolished, and with the exception of the short period of Dielopols7is experiment in 1".1, when pro*incial and count& as well as urban councils were created on the basis of indirect, multile*el elections and without an& executi*e organs, the countr& to this da& remains without an& form of self#go*ernment$ 3 wea7 class commune crippled b& the go*ernment is the onl& relic in this field$ Conse>uentl&, the 6ingdom of Poland represents at present, after a hundred &ears of the operation of ,ussian absolutism, some analog& to that tabula rasa which the Great ,e*olution created in France in order to erect on this ground a radical and democratic reform of self#go*ernment unrestricted b& an& historical sur*i*als$

...
6arl 6auts7& characterizes the basic attitude of %ocial )emocrac& to the >uestion of autonom& as follows: /he centralization of the legislati*e process did not b& an& means in*ol*e the complete centralization of administration$ ?n the contrar&$ /he same classes which needed unification of the laws were obliged thereafter to bring the state power under their control$ 'owe*er, this too7 place onl& incompletel& under the parliamentar& form of go*ernment, in which the go*ernment is dependent on the legislature$ /he administration, with the whole bureaucratic apparatus at its disposal, was nominall& subordinate to the central legislature, but the executi*e often turned out to be stronger in practice$ /he administration influences the *oters in the legislature through its bureaucrac& and through its power in local matters; it corrupts the legislators through its power to do them fa*ors$ 'owe*er, the strongl& centralized bureaucrac& shows itself less and less able to cope with the increasing tas7s of the state administration$ It is o*ercome b& them$ /he results are: fumbling, dela&s, postponing the most important matters, complete misunderstanding of the rapidl& changing needs of practical life, massi*e waste of time and labor in superfluous pencil wor7$ /hese are the rapidl& increasing shortcomings of bureaucratic centralism$ /hus there arises, along with the stri*ing for uniformit& of legislation, after the se*eral pro*incial legislatures ha*e been superseded b& a central parliament, a stri*ing for decentralization of administration, for local administration of the pro*inces and communes$ /he one and the other are characteristic of the modern state$ @/his self#go*ernment does not mean the restoration of medie*al particularism$ /he commune EGemeindeF and li7ewise the pro*ince1 does not become a self#sufficient entit& as it once was$ It remains a component part of the great whole, the nation, E'ere used as s&non&mous with @state$B H 9autskyF and has to wor7 for it and within the limits that it sets$ /he rights and duties of the indi*idual communes as against the state are not laid down in special treaties$ /he& are a product of the general s&stem of laws, determined for all b& the central power of the state; the& are determined b& the interests of the whole state or the nation, not b& those of the se*eral communes$B H 6$ 6auts7&, )er Parlamentarismus5 die 8olksgesetzgebung und die "ozialdemokratie , p$9"$

If Comrade %tampfer will 7eep separate the centralization of administration and the centralization of the legislati*e process, he will find that the paths being followed b& German and 3ustrian %ocial )emocrac& respecti*el& are not di*erging at all, but are going in the same direction as the whole of modern democrac&$ ?pposition to all special pri*ileges in the countr&, strengthening of the central legislature at the expense of the pro*incial parliaments as well as of the go*ernment administration; wea7ening of the central administration both through the strengthening of the central legislature and through the de*olution of self#administration to the communes and pro*inces H this latter process ta7ing, in 3ustria, in accordance with its own local conditions, the form of self#administration of the nationalities H but a self#administration regulated for the whole countr& b& the central legislature along uniform lines: that is, in spite of all historical and other social differences, in German& and 3ustria the position of %ocial )emocrac& on the >uestion of centralism and particularism$E:F De ha*e >uoted the abo*e extensi*e argument of 6auts7& on the >uestion we are examining but not because we unreser*edl& share his *iews$ /he leading idea of this argument: the di*ision of modern state centralism into administrati*e and legislati*e, the re5ection of the former and the absolute reognition of the latter, appears to us somewhat too formalistic and not >uite precise$ Local autonom& H pro*incial, municipal, and communal H does not at all do awa& with administrati*e centralism: autonom& co*ers onl& strictl& local matters, while the administration of the state as a whole #mains in the hands of the central authorit&, which, e*en in such democratic states as %witzerland, shows a constant tendenc& to extend its competence$ 3n outstanding feature of modern administration in contradistinction to medie*al particularism is precisel& the strict super*ision b& central institutions and the subordination of the local administration to the uniform direction and control the state authorities$ 3 t&pical illustration of this arrangement is the dependence of the modern self#go*erning officials in Ingland on the central offices and e*en the special creation o*er them of a central Local Go*ernment (oard which eliminates genuine administrati*e decentralization represented b& the old s&stem in which, it will be recalled, the all#powerful 5ustices of the peace were entirel& independent of the central go*ernment$ In the same wa&, the most recent de*elopment of self#go*ernment in France pa*es anew the wa& to democratization, and at the same time graduall& eliminates the independence of the prefect from the central ministries, a s&stem that had characterized the go*ernment of the %econd Impire$ /he abo*e phenomenon also completel& corresponds to the general direction of political de*elopment$ 3 strong central go*ernment is an institution peculiar not onl& to the epoch of absolutism at the dawn of bourgeois de*elopment but also to bourgeois societ& itself in its highest stage, flowering, and decline$ /he more external polic& H commercial, aggressi*e, colonial H becomes the axis of the life of capitalism, the more we enter into the period of imperialistic @globalB polic&, which is a normal phase of the de*elopment of bourgeois econom&, and the more capitalism needs a strong authorit&, a powerful central go*ernment which concentrates in its hands all the resources of the state for the protection of its interests outside$ 'ence, modern autonom&, e*en in its widest application, finds definite barriers in all those attributes of power which are related to the foreign polic& of a state$ ?n the other hand, autonom& itself puts up barriers to legislati*e centralization, because without certain legislati*e competences, e*en narrowl& outlined and purel& local, no self#go*ernment is possible$ /he power of issuing within a certain sphere, on its own initiati*e, laws binding for the population, and not merel& super*ising the execution of laws issued b& the central legislati*e bod&, constitutes precisel& the soul and core of self#go*ernment in the modern democratic sense H it forms the basic function of municipal and communal councils as well as of pro*incial diets or departmental councils$ ?nl& when the latter in France ac>uired the right of deciding in the last instance about their

problems instead of submitting their opinions in a consultati*e capacit&, and particularl& when the& ac>uired the right of drafting their independent budget, onl& from that time dates the real beginning of the autonom& of the departments$ In the same wa&, the foundation of urban self#go*ernment in German& is the right of establishing the budget of the towns, and in connection with this the independent fixing of supplements to the state taxes and also the introduction of new communal taxes 0although within limits fixed b& state law1$ Further, when, for instance, the cit& council of (erlin or Paris issues binding regulations concerning the building code, insurance duties for home industr&, emplo&ment and unemplo&ment aid, the cit& sewage#disposal s&stem, communications, etc$, all these are legislati*e acti*ities$ /he axis of the incessant struggle between local representati*es and organs of the central administration is the democratic tendenc& constantl& to expand the legislati*e competence of the elected organs and to reduce the administrati*e competence of the appointed organs$ /he attitude to local autonom& H its legislati*e and administrati*e functions H constitutes the theoretical basis of the political fight which has been going on for a long time between %ocial )emocrac& on the one hand and the go*ernment and the bourgeois parties on the other$ /he latter hold a uniform *iew on the matter in >uestion except for a small group of extreme#left progressi*es$ Dhile the theor& of bourgeois reaction maintains that local self#go*ernment is, b& its nature, onl& a localization of state administrations, that the commune, district, or pro*ince as a financial unit is called to administer the state propert&, %ocial )emocrac& defends the *iew that a commune, district, or pro*ince is a social bod& called upon to ta7e care H in a local sphere H of a number of social matters and not onl& financial ones$ /he practical conclusion of these two theories is that the bourgeois parties insist that electoral rights to self#go*erning bodies should be limited b& a propert& >ualification, while %ocial )emocrac& calls for a uni*ersal and e>ual electoral right for the whole population$ Generall& spea7ing, the progress of modern self go*ernment toward democrac& can be measured b& the expansion of the groups of population which participate in self#go*ernment b& wa& of elections, as well as b& the degree to which their representati*e bodies extend their competence$ /he transfer of some acti*ities from the administration to the legislati*e, representati*e bodies is a measure extending the latters competence$ It seems therefore that the centralized state apparatus can be separated from local self#go*ernment, and modern self#go*ernment from feudal and petit bourgeois particularism$ /his can be done, in our opinion, not b& a formalistic approach, whereb& the legislati*e and the administrati*e powers are separated, but b& separating some spheres of social life H namel& those which constitute the core of a capitalist econom& and of a big bourgeois state H from the sphere of local interests$ In particular, 6auts7&s formula including national autonom& under the general heading of local self#go*ernment would, in *iew of his theor& about legislati*e centralization lead %ocial )emocrac& to refuse to recognize regional diets on the ground that the& were a manifestation of legislati*e decentralization, i$e$, medie*al particularism$ 6auts7&s arguments are in their essence extremel& *aluable as an indication concerning the general tendenc& in %ocial )emocratic polic&, concerning its basic standpoint toward centralism and big power polic& on the one hand and particularistic tendencies on the other$ (ut precisel& from the same foundations from which, in all capitalistic states, grows local self#go*ernment, there also grows in certain conditions national autonom&, with local legislation as an independent manifestation of modern social de*elopment, which has as little in common with medie*al particularism as the present#da& cit& council has with a parliament of the ancient 'anseatic republic$
E1F

6arl +arx, The %ighteenth (rumaire o- Louis (ona3arte 02ew Vor7: International Publishers, 1 . 1, pp$181#8<$

E8F

4uoted in 3*alo*, )ecentralization and "el-!go*ernment in 6rance5 )e3artmental /ouncils -rom the Re-orm o- (ona3arte to Dur )a s, p$89.$ :riginal note by %.+.
E<F

/his fact is >uoted b& G$ Deill, 'istoire du mou*ement social en 6rance 01 !91, p$18$ :riginal note by %.+.
E9F

.bid,, p$11$ :riginal note by %.+. , Nol$I,

E:F

6arl 6auts7&, Partikularismus and So2ialdemokratie, in )ie Neue 2eit, 1" "#1" pp$:!:#!.$

E, The National Question and 4utonom

Capitalism transforms social life from the material foundations up to the top H the cultural aspects$ It has produced a whole series of entirel& new economic phenomena: big industr&, machine production, proletarization, concentration of propert&, industrial crises, capitalist monopolies, modern industr&, labor of women and children, etc$ Capitalism has produced a new center of social life: the big cit&, as well as a new social class: the professional intelligentsia$ Capitalist econom& with its highl& de*eloped di*ision of labor and constant progress of technolog& needs a large specialized staff of emplo&ees with technical training: engineers, chemists, architects, electricians, etc$ Capitalist industr& and commerce need a whole arm& of law&ers: attorne&s, notaries, 5udges, etc$ (ourgeois management, especiall& in big cities, has made health a public matter and de*eloped for its ser*ice large numbers of ph&sicians, pharmacists, midwi*es, dentists, as well as public hospitals with appropriate staffs$ Capitalist production re>uires not onl& speciall& trained production managers but uni*ersal, elementar&, popular education, both to raise the general cultural le*el of the people which creates e*er growing needs, and conse>uentl& demand for mass articles, and to de*elop a properl& educated and intelligent wor7er capable of operating large#scale industr&$ 'ence, bourgeois societ& e*er&where, popular education and *ocational training are indispensable$ Conse>uentl& we see public schools and numerous elementar&, secondar&, and college teachers, libraries, reading rooms, etc$ Capitalistic production and participation in the world mar7et are impossible without appropriatel& extensi*e, speed&, and constant communication H both material and cultural$ (ourgeois societ& has thus created on the one hand railroads and modern postal and telegraph ser*ices, and on the other based on these material foundations H a periodical press, a social phenomenon which before was entirel& un7nown$ /o wor7 for the press there has come into being in bourgeois societ& a numerous categor& of professional 5ournalists and publicists$ Capitalism has made an& manifestation of human energ&, including artistic creati*it&, an ob5ect of commerce, while on the other hand, b& ma7ing art ob5ects accessible to the broad masses of the people through mass production, it has made art an e*er&da& need of at least urban societ&$ /heater, music, painting, sculpture, which, in the period of natural econom& had been a monopol& and pri*ate luxur& of indi*idual, powerful sponsors, are in bourgeois societ& a public institution and part and parcel of the normal dail& life of the urban population$ /he wor7ers cultural needs are met in the ta*erns or beer gardens and b& cheap boo7 illustrations and 5un7& ornaments; he adorns his person and his lodging with artistic tawdriness, while the bourgeoisie has at its disposal philharmonics, first#rate theaters, wor7s of genius, and ob5ects of elegance$ 'owe*er, the one and the other 7ind of consumption calls forth a numerous class of artists and artistic producers$ In this wa& capitalism creates a whole new culture: public education, de*elopment of science, the flowering of learning, 5ournalism, a specificall& geared art$ 'owe*er, these are not 5ust mechanical appendages to the bare process of production or mechanicall& separated lifeless parts$ /he culture of bourgeois societ& itself constitutes a li*ing and to some extent autonomous entit&$ In order to exist or de*elop, this societ& not onl& needs certain relationships of production, exchange, a nd communication, but it also creates a certain set of intellectual relations within the framewor7 of contradictor& class interests$ If the class struggle is a natural product of the capitalist econom& then its natural needs are the conditions that mi7e this class struggle possible; hence not onl& modern political forms, democrac&, parliamentarianism, but also open public life, with an open exchange of *iews and conflicting con*ictions, an intense intellectual life, which alone ma7es the struggle of classes and parties possible$ Popular education, 5ournalism, science, art H growing at first within the framewor7 of capitalist production H become in themsel*es an indispensable need and condition of existence of modern societ&$ %chools, libraries, newspapers, theaters, public lectures, public

discussions grow into the normal conditions of life, into the indispensable intellectual atmosphere of each member of the modern, particularl& urban societ&, e*en outside the connection of these phenomena with economic conditions$ In a word, the *ulgar material process of capitalism creates a whole new ideological @superstructureB with an existence and de*elopment which are to some extent autonomous$ 'owe*er, capitalism does not create that intellectual spirit in the air or in the theoretical *oid of abstraction, but in a definite territor&, a definite social en*ironment, a definite language, within the framewor7 of certain traditions, in a word, within definite national forms$ Conse>uentl&, b& that *er& culture it sets apart a certain territor& and a certain population as a cultural national entit& in which it creates a special, closer cohesion and connection of intellectual interests$ 3n& ideolog& is basicall& onl& a superstructure of the material and class conditions of a gi*en epoch$ 'owe*er, at the same time, the ideolog& of each epoch har7s bac7 to the ideological results of the preceding epochs, while on the other hand it has its own logical de*elopment in a certain area$ /his is illustrated b& the sciences as well as b& religion, philosoph&, and art$ /he cultural and aesthetic *alues created b& capitalism in a gi*en en*ironment not onl& assume a certain national >ualit& through the main organ of cultural production, i$e$, the language, but merge with the traditional culture of societ&, whose histor& becomes saturated with its distinct cultural characteristics; in a word, this culture turns into a national culture with an existence and de*elopment of its own$ /he basic features and foundations of modern culture in all bourgeois countries are common, international, and the tendenc& of contemporar& de*elopment is doubtless toward an e*er greater communit& of international culture$ 'owe*er, within the framewor7 of this highl& cosmopolitan, bourgeois culture, French is clearl& distinguished from Inglish culture, German from )utch, Polish from ,ussian, as so man& separate t&pes$ /he borderlines of historical stages and the historical @seamsB are least detectable in the de*elopment of an ideolog&$E1F (ecause the modern capitalist culture is an heir to and continuator of earlier cultures, what de*elops is the continuit& and monolithic >ualit& of a national culture which, on the surface, shows no connection with the period of capitalist econom& and bourgeois rule$ For the phrasemonger of the @2ational )emocrac&,B or mindless @sociologistB of social patriotism, the culture of present#da& Poland is, in its core, the same unchanged @culture of the Polish nationB as at the time of (ator& or %tanislas 3ugustus, while %traszewicz, %wiatochows7i, and %ien7iewicz are direct#line spiritual heirs of ,e& of 2agtowice, Pase7, and +ic7iewicz$ In fact, howe*er, the literature and the press in modern, bourgeois Poland are appallingl& tri*ial; Polish science and the entire Polish culture are appallingl& poor: the& belong in a new historical stage completel& alien in spirit and content to the old culture of feudal Poland, mirrored in its last monumental wor7, Pan Tadeus2$ Present#da& Polish culture, in all its destitution, is a modern product of the same capitalist de*elopment that chained Poland to ,ussia and placed at the head of societ&, in the role of ruling class, a rabble of heterogeneous mone&#ma7ers without a past, without a re*olutionar& tradition, and professional traitors to the national cause$ /he present#da& bourgeois learning, art, and 5ournalism of Poland are in spirit and content ideological hierogl&phs from which a materialist historian reads the histor& of the fall of gentr& Poland, the histor& of @organic wor7,B conciliation, 2ational )emocrac&, deputations, memoranda, up to the @nationalB elections to the tsarist )uma under a state of emergenc&, and @nationalB teens to murder Polish %ocialist wor7ers$ Capitalism created modern Polish national culture, annihilating in the same process Polish national independence$ Capitalism annihilated Polish national independence but at the same time created modern Polish national culture$ /his national culture is a product indispensable within the frame#wor7 of bourgeois

Poland; its existence and de*elopment are a historical necessit&, connected with the capitalistic de*elopment itself$ /he de*elopment of capitalism, which chained Poland to ,ussia b& socio# economic ties, undermined ,ussian absolutism, united and re*olutionized the ,ussian and Polish proletariat as a class called upon to o*erthrow absolutism, and in this wa& created, under the /sars, the indispensable preconditions for achie*ing political freedom$ (ut within the framewor7 and against the bac7ground of this general tendenc& toward the democratization of the state, capitalism at the same time 7nit more closel& the socio#economic and cultural#national life of the Polish 7ingdom, thus preparing the ob5ecti*e conditions for the realization of Polish national autonom&$ 3s we ha*e seen, the re>uirements of the capitalist s&stem lead with historic necessit& in all modern states to the de*elopment of local self#go*ernment through the participation of the people in carr&ing out socio#political functions on all le*els, from the commune to the district and pro*ince$ Dhere, howe*er, inside a modern state there exist distinct nationalit& districts constituting at the same time territories with certain economic and social distinctions, the same re>uirements of the bourgeois econom& ma7e self#go*ernment on the highest, countr&#wide le*el, indispensable$ ?n this le*el, local self#go*ernment is also transformed, as a result of a new factor, national#cultural distinctness, into a special t&pe of democratic institution applicable onl& in >uite specific conditions$ /he +oscow#Nladimir industrial district, with its economic achie*ements, local specific interests, and concentration of population, differs certainl& as much from the *ast ,ussian space surrounding it as does the 6ingdom of Poland$ 'owe*er, the factor distinguishing our countr& from the central district of ,ussia in a decisi*e wa&, is the distinctness of the cultural#national existence, which creates a whole sphere of separate common interests besides purel& economic and social ones$ Aust as an urban or *illage commune, district, department or gubernia, pro*ince or region must possess, in 7eeping with the spirit of modern self#go*ernment, a certain range of local legislation contained within the framewor7 of state laws, national self#go*ernment, in the spirit of democrac&, must be based on the representation of the people and their power of local legislation within the framewor7 of state laws, to satisf& the national socio#economic and cultural#national needs$ /he entire modern culture is, abo*e all, a class, bourgeois culture$ Learning and art, school and theater, professional intelligentsia, the press H all primaril& ser*e the bourgeois societ&, are imbued with its principles, its spirit, its tendenc&$ (ut the institutions of the bourgeois s&stem, li7e the capitalist de*elopment itself, are, in the spirit of the historical dialectic, twofold, double#edged phenomena: the means of class de*elopment and rule are at the same time so man& means for the rise of the proletariat as a class to the struggle for emancipation, for the abolition of bourgeois rule$ Political freedom, parliamentarianism are, in all present#da& states, tools for building up capitalism and the interests of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class$ 'owe*er, the same democratic institutions and bourgeois parliamentarianism are, at a certain le*el, an indispensable school of the proletariats political and class maturit&, a condition of organizing it into a %ocial )emocratic part&, of training it in open class struggle$ /he same applies to the sphere of the intellect$ /he basic school, elementar& education, is necessar& for bourgeois societ& in order to create appropriate mass consumption as well as an appropriate contingent of able wor7ing hands$ (ut the same school and education become the basic tools of the proletariat as a re*olutionar& class$ /he social, historical, philosophical, and natural sciences are toda& the ideological products of the bourgeoisie and expressions of its needs and class tendencies$ (ut on a certain le*el of its de*elopment the wor7ing class recognizes that for it also @7nowledge is powerB H not in the tasteless sense of bourgeois indi*idualism and its preachings of @industriousness and diligenceB as a means of achie*ing @happiness,B but in the sense of 7nowledge as a le*er of class struggle, as the re*olutionar& consciousness of the wor7ing masses$ Finall&, socialism, which lin7s

the interest of the wor7ers as a class with the de*elopment and future of man7ind as a great cultural brotherhood, produces a particular affinit& of the proletarian struggle with the interests of culture as a whole, and causes the seemingl& contradictor& and paradoxical phenomenon that the conscious proletariat is toda& in all countries the most ardent and idealistic ad*ocate of the interests of learning and art, the same bourgeois culture of which it is toda& the disinherited stepchild$ /he national autonom& of the 6ingdom of Poland is primaril& necessar& for the Polish bourgeoisie to strengthen its class rule and to de*elop its institutions in order to exploit and oppress with no restrictions whatsoe*er$ In the same wa& as the modern state#political parliamentar& institutions, and, as their corollar&, the institutions of local self#go*ernment are on a certain le*el an indispensable tool of bourgeois rule and a close harmonization of all state and social functions with the interests of the bourgeoisie, in a narrower sense, national autonom& is an indispensable tool of the strict application of the social functions in a certain territor& to the special bourgeois interests of that territor&$ 3bsolutism, which safe#guarded the crudest although the most important *ital interest of the ruling classes, *iz$, the limitless exploitation of the wor7ing strata, naturall&, at the same time, sacrificed to its own interests and wor7ing methods all subtle interests and forms of bourgeois rule, i$e$, treated them with 3siatic ruthlessness$ Political libert& and self#go*ernment will e*entuall& gi*e the Polish bourgeoisie the possibilit& of utilizing a number of presentl& neglected social functions H schools, religious worship, and the entire cultural#spiritual life of the countr& H for its own class interests$ (& manning all offices of the administration, 5udiciar&, and politics, the bourgeoisie will be able to assimilate genuinel& these natural organs of class rule with the spirit and home needs of bourgeois societ&, and so turn them into flexible, accurate, and subtle tools of the Polish ruling classes$ 2ational autonom&, as a part of all#state political freedom, is, in a word, the most mature political form of bourgeois rule in Poland$ 'owe*er, precisel& for this reason, autonom& is an indispensable class need of the Polish proletariat$ /he riper the bourgeois institutions grow, the deeper the& penetrate the social functions, the more ground the& co*er within the *ariegated intellectual and aesthetic sphere, the broader grows the battlefield and the bigger the number of firing lines wherefrom the proletariat conducts the class struggle$ /he more unrestrictedl& and efficientl& the de*elopment of bourgeois societ& proceeds, the more courageousl& and surel& ad*ances the consciousness, political maturit&, and unification of the proletariat as a class$ /he Polish proletariat needs for its class struggle all the components of which a spiritual culture is made; primaril&, its interests, essentiall& based on the solidarit& of nations and stri*ing toward it, re>uire the elimination of national oppression, and guarantees against such oppression wor7ed out in the course of social de*elopment$ +oreo*er, a normal, broad, and unrestricted cultural life of the countr& is 5ust as indispensable for the de*elopment of the proletariats class struggle as for the existence of bourgeois societ& itself$ 2ational autonom& has the same aims as are contained in the political program of the Polish proletariat: the o*erthrow of absolutism and the achie*ement of political freedom in the countr& at large; this is but a part of the program resulting both from the progressi*e trends of capitalist de*elopment and from the class interests of$ the proletariat$

..
/he national separateness of a certain territor& in a modern state is not b& itself a sufficient basis for autonom&; the relationship between nationalit& and political life is precisel& what calls for closer

examination$ /heoreticians of nationalism usuall& consider nationalit& in general as a natural, unchangeable phenomenon, outside social de*elopment, a conser*ati*e phenomenon resisting all historical *icissitudes, In accordance with this *iew bourgeois nationalism finds the main sources of national *italit& and strength not in the modern historical formation, i$e$, urban, bourgeois culture, but, on the contrar&, in the traditional forms of life of the rural population$ /he peasant mass with its social conser*atism appears to the romantics of nationalism as the onl& genuine mainsta& of the national culture, an unsha7able fortress of national distinctness, the stronghold of the proper national genius and spirit$ Dhen, in the middle of the last centur&, there began to flourish, in connection with the nationalist trend in the politics of Central Iurope, so#called fol7lorism, it turned abo*e all to the traditional forms of peasant culture as to the treasur& in which e*er& nation deposits @the threads of its thoughts and the flowers of its feelings$B In the same wa& at present, the recentl& awa7ened Lithuanian, (&elorussian, and C7rainian nationalism bases itself entirel& on the rural population and its conser*ati*e forms of existence, significantl& starting the culti*ation of this age#old and *irgin national field with spreading primers and the 'ol& %cripture in the national language and national orthograph&$ 3lread&, in the 1""!s, when the pseudo#socialistic and pseudo#re*olutionar& "los E4oiceF was published in Darsaw, the Polish 2ational )emocrac& too, following its infallible reactionar& instinct, turned its peculiar national sentiments, happil& married to the anti#%emitism of the urban bourgeoisie, toward the rural population$ Finall&, in the same wa&, the most re#cent @nationalistB current in ,ussia, the part& of +r$ 6orfant& and Compan&, is based mainl& on the conser*atism of the rural population of Cpper %ilesia, exploited as a foundation for economic and political success b& the reactionar& Polish petite bourgeoisie$ ?n the other hand, the problem of which social strata constitute the proper guardians of national culture has recentl& caused an interesting exchange of *iews in the %ocial )emocratic camp$ In the stud& of the @nationalit& >uestion, @ >uoted b& us se*eral times, 6arl 6auts7&, criticizing the wor7 of the 3ustrian part& publicist ?tto (auer on the same sub5ect, sa&s: Class differences lead (auer to the paradoxical opinion that onl& those portions of a nation constitute a nation which participate in the culture: conse>uentl&, until now, onl& the ruling and exploiting classes$ BIn the period of the %taufersB H writes (auer H @the nation existed onl& in the cultural communit& of 7nighthood $$$ 3 homogeneous national character produced b& the homogeneit& of cultural influences, was onl& the character of one class of the nation $$$ /he peasant did not share in an&thing that united the nation$ /herefore the German peasants do not at all constitute the nation; the& are the ?intersassen of the nation$ In a societ& based on the pri*ate ownership of the means of production, the ruling classes constitute the nation H formerl& the 7nighthood, toda& the educated people, as a communit& of people in whom uniform education de*eloped b& the nations histor&, with the help of a common language and national education, de*elops an affinit& of characters$ ?n the other hand the broad popular masses do not constitute the nation$BE8F 3ccording to (auer onl& the socialist s&stem, b& ma7ing the masses of the wor7ing people participants in the entiret& of the culture, will turn these masses into a nation$ 6auts7& replies to these arguments as follows: /his is a *er& subtle thought with a *er& right core but in the nationalit& >uestion it leads to a false road, for it treats the concept of nation in such a wa& as to ma7e simpl& impossible the understanding of the force of the national thought in all classes in the present, and the bases of the present national contradictions of entire nations$ (auer conflicts here with the obser*ation made b&

,ennerE<F that it is precisel& the peasant who is the preser*er of nationalit&$ ,enner demonstrates that in 3ustria 0including 'ungar&1, during the last centur&, a number of cities changed their nationalit&, becoming 'ungarian or Czech rather than German$ ?n the other hand German cities, specificall& Nienna, absorbed an immense influx of foreign nationalities and assimilated them to the German nation$ 'owe*er, in the countr&side the linguistic boundaries ha*e practicall& not shifted$ 3ctuall&, in 3ustrias ma5or cities, the process of Germanization has achie*ed its goal; at the beginning of the nineteenth centur& the& had all been German cities, with the exception at the most of Galicia, Croatia, and the Italian towns$ (& contrast, the peasant population is the one that remained national; the tendencies toward ma7ing 3ustria a national state shattered against the peasantr&$ /he peasant firml& adheres to his nationalit& as to an& tradition, while the cit& dweller, especiall& the educated one, assimilates much more easil&$ E9F In the course of his stud&, 6auts7& is forced to considerabl& re*ise his reasoning$ Ixamining more closel& the foundations of modern national mo*ements, he points out that precisel& the bourgeois de*elopment calling into existence a new social class, the professional intelligentsia, creates in this form the main fact of the contemporar& national idea and a pillar of national life$ It is true that the same de*elopment simultaneousl& leads the social and cultural life of present#da& nationalities, and particularl& of the intelligentsia to international paths, and from this standpoint 6auts7& rightl& re*erses the perspecti*e outlined b& (auer, b& explaining that the tas7 of the great socialist reform in the future will not be the nationalization, i$e$, the national separation of the wor7ing masses, but, on the contrar&, blazing the trail for one uni*ersal, international culture in which distinct nationalities will disappear$ 'owe*er, in present#da& conditions, the role of the urban, or strictl& spea7ing, bourgeois element, is decisi*e for the fate of nationalities$ If 6auts7& in agreement with ,enner points to a whole series of %la*ic critics Germanized at the beginning of the nineteenth centur& in the 'apsburg monarch& as an example of the national non#resistance of the urban element, these facts ma& actuall& ser*e onl& as an illustration of the petit bourgeois conditions of the pre#capitalist era b& which doubtless the urban life in the %la*ic lands of 3ustria was characterized at the beginning of the nineteenth centur&$ /he further de*elopment of e*ents, a definite swing of the same t&pe of critics to their own nationalit& in the last few decades, which is confirmed b& 6auts7& and ,enner, is, on the other hand, a stri7ing example of how far the rise of its own bourgeois de*elopment in a countr&, its own industr&, its own big cit& life, its own @nationalB bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, as it occurred for example in (ohemia, can form the basis for a resistant national polic& and for an acti*e political life connected with it$ /he emphasis on the peasant element in connection with the fate of nationalit& is correct so far as the >uite passi*e preser*ation of national peculiarities in the ethnic group is concerned: speech, mores, dress, and also, usuall& in close connection with this, a certain religion$ /he conser*atism of peasant life ma7es possible the preser*ation of nationalit& within these narrow bounds and explains the resistance for centuries to an& denationalization polic&, regardless of either the ruthlessness of the methods or the cultural superiorit& of the aggressi*e foreign nationalit&$ /his is pro*ed b& the preser*ation of speech and national t&pe among the %outh %la*ic tribes of /ur7e& and 'ungar&, the preser*ation of the peculiarities of the (&elorussians, ,uthenians, Lithuanians in the ,ussian empire, of the +asurians and Lithuanians in Iast Prussia, or the Poles in Cpper %ilesia, etc$ 'owe*er, a national culture preser*ed in this traditional#peasant manner is incapable of pla&ing the role of an acti*e element in contemporar& political#social life, precisel& because it is entirel& a product of tradition, is rooted in past conditions, because H to use the words of +arx H the peasant class stands in toda&s bourgeois societ& outside of culture, constituting rather a @piece of barbarismB sur*i*ing in that culture$ /he peasant, as a national @outpost,B is alwa&s and a priori a culture of social barbarism, a basis of political reaction, doomed b& historical e*olution$ 2o serious

political#national mo*ement in present#da& conditions is possible solel& on a national peasant foundation$ 3nd onl& when the present urban classes#bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and bourgeois# intelligentsia H become the promoters of the national mo*ement, will it be possible to de*elop, in certain defined circumstances, the seeming phenomenon of the national contradictions and national aspirations of @entire nations,B referred to b& 6auts7&$ /hus, local autonom& in the sense of the self#go*ernment of a certain nationalit& territor& is onl& possible where the respecti*e nationalit& possesses its own bourgeois de*elopment, urban life, intelligentsia, its own literar& and scholarl& life$ /he Congress 6ingdom demonstrates all these conditions$ Its population is nationall& homogeneous because the Polish element has a decisi*e preponderance o*er other nationalities in the countr&s whole area, with the exception of the %uwal7i gubernia in which the Lithuanians pre*ail$ ?ut of the o*erall population of ,9!8,8:< the Poles constitute .,-::,:!<, while of the remaining nationalities the Aews and Germans are mainl& concentrated in the cities where, howe*er, the& do not represent a foreign bourgeois intelligentsia, but, on the contrar&, are considerabl& assimilated b& Polish cultural life, while the ,ussians, except in the Lublin and %iedlce regions, represent mainl& the influx of bureaucratic elements alien to Polish societ&$ /he percentage of total population of these nationalities in the respecti*e pro*inces, with the exception of %uwal7i, appears, according to the census of 1" -, as follows: Gubernia 6alisz 6ielce Lublin Lomza Piotro7ow Ploc7 ,adom %iedlce Darsaw Poles "<$ [ "-$. .1$< --$9 -1$ "!$9 "<$" ..$1 -<$. Aews -$. 1!$ 18$1:$" 1:$8 $. 1<$" 1:$: 1.$9 Germans ,ussians -$< P !$8 !$" 1!$. .$1$1 1$9 9$! 1$1 1$8 81$! :$: 1$. <$< 1$9 1.$: :$9

/hus, in all the gubernias except two, and in the countr& as a whole, the Polish element constitutes more than -! percent of the population; it is, moreo*er, the decisi*e element in the socio#cultural de*elopment of the countr&$ 'owe*er, the situation loo7s different when we turn to the Aewish nationalit&$ Aewish national autonom&, not in the sense of freedom of school, religion, place of residence, and e>ual ci*ic rights, but in the sense of the political self#go*ernment of the Aewish population with its own legislation and administration, as it were parallel to the autonom& of the Congress 6ingdom, is an entirel& utopian idea$ %trangel&, this con*iction pre*ails also in the camp of extreme Polish nationalists, e$g$, in the so#called @,e*olutionar& FactionB of the PP%, where it is based on the simple circumstance that the Aewish nationalit& does not possess a @territor& of its ownB within the ,ussian empire$ (ut national autonom& concei*ed in accordance with that groups own standpoint, i$e$, as the sum of freedoms and rights to self#determination of a certain group of people lin7ed b& language, tradition, and ps&cholog&, is in itself a construction l&ing be&ond historical conditions, fluttering in mid#air, and therefore one that can be easil& concei*ed, as it were, @in the air,B i$e$, without an& definite territor&$ ?n the other hand, an autonom& that grows historicall& together with

local self#go*ernment, on the basis of modern bourgeois#democratic de*elopment, is actuall& as inseparable from a certain territor& as the bourgeois state itself, and cannot be imagined without it to the same extent as @non#territorialB communal or urban self#go*ernment$ It is true that the Aewish population was completel& under the influence of modern capitalistic de*elopment in the ,ussian empire and shares the economic, political, and spiritual interests of particular groups in that societ&$ (ut on the one hand, these interests were ne*er territoriall& separated so as to become specificall& Aewish capitalist interests; rather, the& are common interests of the Aewish and other people in the countr& at large$ ?n the other hand, this capitalist de*elopment does not lead to a separation of bourgeois Aewish culture, but acts in an exactl& opposite direction, leading to the assimilation of the Aewish bourgeois, urban intelligentsia, to their absorption b& the Polish or ,ussian people$ If the national distinctness of the Lithuanians or (&elorussians is based on the bac7ward peasant people, the Aewish national distinctness in ,ussia and Poland is based on the sociall& bac7ward petite bourgeoisie, on small production, small trade, small#town life, and H let us add parentheticall& H on the close relation of the nationalit& in >uestion to religion$ In *iew of the abo*e, the national distinctness of the Aews, which is supposed to be the basis of non#territorial Aewish autonom&, is manifested not in the form of metropolitan bourgeois culture, but in the form of small#town lac7 of culture$ ?b*iousl& an& efforts toward @de*eloping Aewish cultureB at the initiati*e of a handful of Viddish publicists and translators cannot be ta7en seriousl&$ /he onl& manifestation of genuine modern culture in the ,ussian framewor7 is the %ocial )emocratic mo*ement of the ,ussian proletariat which, because of its nature, can best replace the historical lac7 of bourgeois national culture of the Aews, since it is itself a phase of genuinel& international and proletarian culture$ )ifferent, though no less complicated, is the >uestion of autonom& in Lithuania$ For nationalist utopians, ob*iousl& the existence of a certain territor& inhabited b& a population of distinct nationalit& is a sufficient reason to demand for the nationalit& in >uestion, in the name of the right of all nationalities to self#determination, either an independent republic, or one federated with ,ussia, or the @broadest autonom&$B Iach of these programs was ad*anced in turn b& the former @Lithuanian %ocial )emocrac&,B then b& the PP% in its federati*e phase, and finall& b& the recentl& organized @(&elorussian %ocialist CommuneB which, at its %econd Congress in 1 !., adopted a somewhat *ague program of a @federal republic in ,ussia with a territorial#autonomous diet in Nilna for the territor& of the Destern countr&$BE:F Dhether the @(&elorussian CommuneB demands the proclamation of the @Destern countr&B as one of the republics into which the ,ussian Impire is to be split, or a @territorial autonom&B for that @Destern countr&B is difficult to figure out; since an @autonomousB diet is demanded for Nilna, it would seem that the latter *ersion is intended, or else, what is in complete harmon& with the whole utopian#abstract treatment of the >uestion, no basic distinctions are made between an independent republic, a federal s&stem, and autonom&, but onl& >ualitati*e distinctions$ Let us examine the matter from the standpoint of territorial autonom&$ /he @Destern countr&,B according to the terminolog& in the ,ussian administrati*e di*ision, is a preponderantl& agrarian and small#industr& district comprising areas with considerable *ariations in conditions$ 3part from the local interests of the rural, municipal, and pro*incial self#go*ernments, this territor& is much less of as distinct production and trading district, with a less distincti*e character and a less distinct grouping of interests, than the 6ingdom of Poland or the industrial +oscow district$ ?n the other hand it is a distinct nationalit& district$ (ut it is precisel& with regard to this >uestion of nationalit& that the greatest difficulties arise from the standpoint of potential autonom&$ /he @Destern countr&,B i$e$, the territor& of former Lithuania, is an area occupied b& se*eral different nationalities, and the first >uestion that arises is: which nationalit& is to be ser*ed b& the territorial#national autonom& that is at sta7e, which language, which nationalit& is to be decisi*e in the schools, cultural institutions, the 5udiciar&, legislation, and in filling local officesL

/he Lithuanian nationalists ob*iousl& demand autonom& for the Lithuanian nationalit&$ Let us loo7 at the actual conditions of that nationalit&$ 3ccording to the census of 1" - H the last one that has ta7en place and whose results in the area of nationalit& relations ha*e been a*ailable to the public since 1 !: H the genuine Lithuanian nationalit& in the ,ussian empire numbers 1,81!,:1! people$ /his population inhabits mainl& the Nilna, 6o*no, Grodno, and %uwal7i gubernias$ (esides, there li*e almost exclusi*el& in the 6o*no gubernia, 99",!!! persons of %amogitian nationalit&, who b& no means identif& with the Lithuanians$ If we were to outline the territor& that might ser*e as a basis for an autonomous Lithuania, we would ha*e to eliminate part of the present @Destern countr&,B and on the other hand go be&ond its borders and include the %uwal7i gubernia which toda& belongs to the Congress 6ingdom$ De would obtain a territor& approximatel& corresponding to the *o&*odship of Nilna and /ro7i which, in pre#partition Poland, constituted @Lithuania proper$B /he Lithuanian population is distributed in that territor& as follows: out of the sum total of 1,8!!,!!! Lithuanians almost half, i$e$, :-9,":<, are concentrated in the 6o*no gubernia$ /he second place with regard to the concentration of Lithuanians is occupied b& the %uwal7i gubernia, where <!:,:9" li*e; somewhat fewer are to be found in the Nilna gubernia, *iz$, 8 -,-8! persons; finall&, an insignificant number of Lithuanians, about <,:!!, inhabit the northern portion of the Grodno gubernia$ 3ctuall&, the Lithuanian population is doubtless more numerous, because in the census the language used b& the respecti*e populations was the main point ta7en into consideration, while a sizable proportion of Lithuanians use the Polish language in e*er&da& life$ 'owe*er, in the present case, from the standpoint of nationalit& as a basis of national autonom&, ob*iousl& onl& the population wherein national distinctness is expressed in a distinct nati*e language can be ta7en into account$ /he distribution of the Lithuanian population becomes apparent onl& when we ascertain its numerical ratio to the remaining population in the same territor&$ /he o*er#all population figure in the gubernias mentioned 0alwa&s according to the 1" - census1 is as follows:
Percent Lithuanians

In the 6o*no gubernia In the Nilna gubernia In the Grodno gubernia In the %uwal7i gubernia

1,:99,:. 1,: 1,8!1,.!<,9! :"8, 1<

<-$! 1-$! !$8 :8$!

?ut of a total population of :,<88,! < in that territor&, the Lithuanians constitute less than 8< percent$ I*en if we were to include, as do the Lithuanian nationalists, the entire %amogitian population with the Lithuanians, we would obtain the ratio of <1 percent, i$e$, less than a third of the total population$ ?b*iousl&, setting up the former @Lithuania properB as the area of the Lithuanian nationalit& is, in present#da& conditions, an entirel& arbitrar& and artificial construction$ /he total population of the four @north#westernB gubernias included because of the (&elorussian nationalit& is as follows: +ins7 gubernia +ogile* gubernia Ditebs7 gubernia 8,19-,.81 1,.".,-.9 1,9" ,89.

%molens7 gubernia

1,:8:,8-

/ogether with the population of the four gubernias inhabited b& Lithuanians, this adds up to the considerable figure of 18,1-1,!!-$ 'owe*er, among this population, the (&elorussians constitute less than half, i$e$, about :$": million 0:,"::,:9-1$ I*en considering onl& the figures, the idea of fitting Lithuanias autonom& to the (&elorussian nationalit& seems >uestionable$ 'owe*er, this difficult& becomes much greater if we ta7e into consideration the socio#economic conditions of the respecti*e nationalities$ In the territor& inhabited b& them the (&elorussians constitute an exclusi*el& rural, agrarian element$ /heir cultural le*el is extremel& low$ Illiterac& is so widespread that the @(&elorussian CommuneB was forced to establish an @Iducation )epartmentB to spread elementar& education among the (&elorussian peasants$ /he complete lac7 of a (&elorussian bourgeoisie, an urban intelligentsia, and an independent scholarl& and literar& life in the (&elorussian language, renders the idea of a national (&elorussian autonom& simpl& impractical$ /he social conditions among the Lithuanian nationals are similar$ /o a preponderant degree farming is the occupation of the Lithuanians$ In the cultural heart of Lithuania, the Nilna gubernia, the Lithuanians constitute 1 $" percent of the total population, and <$1 percent of the urban population$ In the %uwal7i gubernia, the next with regard to Lithuanian concentration, the Lithuanians constitute as much as :8$8 percent of the gubernia population, but onl& $8 per#cent of the urban population$ It is true that the cultural conditions among the Lithuanians are >uite different from those in (&elorussia$ /he education of the Lithuanian population is on a relati*el& high le*el, and the percentage of illiterates is almost the lowest in the ,ussian Impire$ (ut the education of Lithuanians is preponderantl& a Polish education, and the Polish language, not the Lithuanian, is here the instrument of culture, which fact is closel& connected with the fact that the possessing classes, the rural landed gentr&, and the urban intelligentsia are genuinel& Polish or Polonized to a high degree$ /he same situation pre*ails to a considerable degree in ,uthenia$ Indeed, in Lithuania and ,uthenia the onl& nationalit& culturall& fit to manage national autonom& is the Polish, with its urban population and its intelligentsia$ /herefore, if the national autonom& of the @Destern countr&B were to be considered, it would ha*e to be neither a Lithuanian nor a (&elorussian autonom&, but a Polish one: the Polish language, the Polish school, Poles in public offices would be the natural expression of the autonomous institutions of the countr&$ Gi*en this situation, culturall& and nationall&, Lithuania and ,uthenia would constitute onl& an extension of the 6ingdom, not a separate autonomous region; the& would form, with the 6ingdom, a natural and historical region, with Polish autonom& o*er the 6ingdom plus Lithuania$ %uch a solution of the >uestion is opposed b& se*eral decisi*e considerations$ First of all, from the purel& national point of *iew, this would be the rule of a small Polish minorit& o*er a ma5orit& of Lithuanians, (&elorussians, Aews, and others$ In Lithuania and ,uthenia, the Aews and the Poles ma7e up most of the urban population; together the& occup& what would be the natural social centers of autonomous institutions$ (ut the Aewish population decisi*el& outnumbers the Polish, whereas in the Congress 6ingdom there are .,""!,!!! Poles 0according to the 1" - census1 and onl& 1,<!!,!!! Aews$ /he percentage of each in the four gubernias of Lithuania proper in terms of the o*er#all population is as follows: Gubernia %uwal7i Poles 88$ Aews 1!$19

6o*no Nilna Grodno

$!9 "$11!$!"

1<$-< 18$-8 1-$<-

?nl& in the %uwal7i gubernia is the Aewish population smaller than the Polish, but e*en here this ratio is >uite different when we ta7e the towns into consideration: then the Poles constitute 8percent, the Aews 9! percent of the urban population$ It should also be ta7en into consideration that Aews in the 6ingdom, if assimilated H more so in the urban areas H reinforce the Polish nationalit&; whereas in Lithuania the assimilation process, which is an&wa& much slower, occurs H when it does at all H among Aews who belong to the ,ussian culture; in both cases confusion among nationalities grows and the >uestion of autonom& becomes more and more entangled$ %uffice it to sa& that in the heart of Lithuania and the seat of the planned autonomous diet, Nilna, out of the 88- schools counted in 1 !!, 1"8 are AewishS 3nother consideration no less important is the circumstance that the Polish nationalit& is in Lithuania and ,uthenia precisel& the nationalit& of the ruling strata: the gentr& landowners and the bourgeoisie; while the Lithuanian and particularl& the (&elorussian nationalit& is represented mostl& b& landless peasantr&$ /herefore, the nationalit& relationship is here H generall& spea7ing H a relationship of social classes$ 'anding o*er the countr&s autonomous institutions to the Polish nationalit& would here mean the creation of a new powerful instrument of class domination without a corresponding strengthening of the position of the exploited classes, and would cause conditions of the 7ind that would be brought about b& the proposed autonom& of Galicia for the ,uthenians$ Conse>uentl&, both for nationalit& and for social reasons the 5oining of Lithuania to the autonomous territor& of the 6ingdom or the separation of Lithuania and ,uthenia into an autonomous region with an una*oidable preponderance of the Polish element is a pro5ect which %ocial )emocrac& must combat in principle$ In this form, the pro5ect of Lithuanias national autonom& altogether falls through as utopian, in *iew of the numerical and social relations of the nationalities in*ol*ed$

...
3nother outstanding example of the difficulties encountered b& the problem of nationalit& autonom& in practice is to be found in the Caucasus$ 2o corner of the earth presents such a picture of nationalit& intermixture in one territor& as the Caucasus, the ancient historical trail of the great migrations of peoples between 3sia and Iurope, strewn with fragments and splinters of those peoples$ /hat territor&s population of o*er nine million is composed 0according to the 1" - census1 of the following racial and nationalit& groups:
In /housands

,ussians Germans Gree7s 3rmenians ?ssetians 6urds

8,1 8$< 81$: :-$< -:$! 1:-$1 1!!$!

Chechens Circassians 3b7haz Lezgins Georgians, Imeretins, +ingrels, etc$ Aews /atars 6um&7s /ur7s 2oga&s 6araches 6almu7s Istonians +ord*inians /urco#/atars 6art*elian

89<$9 111$: -8$9 .1<$" 1,8!1$8 9<$9 1,1< $. 1!!$" -!$8 ::$9 88$! 11$" 1$9

/he territorial distribution of the largest nationalities in*ol*ed is as follows: /he ,ussians, who constitute the most numerous group in the whole Caucasus, are concentrated in the north, in the 6uban and (lac7 %ea districts and in the northwest part of /ers7$ +o*ing southward, in the western part of the Caucasus the 6art*elians are located; the& occup& the 6utai and the south#eastern part of the /iflis gubernias$ %till further south, the central territor& is occupied b& the 3rmenians in the southern portion of the /iflis, the eastern portion of the 6ars and the northern portion of the Iri*an gubernias, s>ueezed between the Georgians in the north, the /ur7s in the west and the /atars in the east and south, in the (a7u, Ilizabetpol and Iri*an gubernias$ In the east and in the mountains are located mountain tribes, while other minor groups such as Aews and Germans li*e, intermingled with the autochthonous population, mainl& in the cities$ /he complexit& of the nationalit& problem appears particularl& in the linguistic conditions because in the Caucasus there exist, besides ,ussian, ?ssetian, and 3rmenian, about a half#dozen languages, four Lezgin dialects, se*eral Chechen, se*eral Circassian, +ingrel, Georgian, %udanese, and a number of others$ 3nd these are b& no means dialects, but mostl& independent languages incomprehensible to the rest of the population$ From the standpoint of the problem of autonom&, ob*iousl& onl& three nationalities enter into consideration: Georgians, 3rmenians, and /atars, because the ,ussians inhabiting the northern part of the Caucasus constitute, with regard to nationalit&, a continuation of the state territor& of the purel& ,ussian population$ /he relati*el& most numerous nationalit& group besides the ,ussians are the Georgians, if we include among them all *arieties of 6art*elians$ /he historical territor& of the Georgians is represented b& the gubernias of /iflis and 6utai and the districts of %u7hum and %a7atali, with a population of 8,11!,9 !$ 'owe*er, the Georgian nationalit& constitutes onl& slightl& more than half of that number, i$e$, 1,8!!,!!!; the remainder is composed of 3rmenians to the number of about 88!,!!!, concentrated mainl& in the 37hal7alats count& of the /iflis gubernia, where the& constitute o*er -! percent of the population; /atars to the number of 1!!,!!!; ?ssetians, o*er -!,!!!; Lezgins represent half of the population in the %a7atali district; and 3b7hazes are preponderant in the %u7ham district; while in the (orchalin count& of the /iflis gubernia a mixture of *arious nationalities holds a ma5orit& o*er the Georgian population$

In *iew of these figures the pro5ect of Georgian nationalit& autonom& presents manifold difficulties$ Georgias historical territor&, ta7en as a whole, represents such a numericall& insignificant population H scarcel& 1,8!!,!!! H that it seems insufficient as a basis of independent autonomous life in the modern sense, with its cultural needs and socio#economic functions$ In an autonomous Georgia, with its historical boundaries, a nationalit& that comprises onl& slightl& more than half of the entire population would be called on to dominate in public institutions, schools, and political life$ /he impossibilit& of this situation is felt so well b& the Georgian nationalists of re*olutionar& hue that the&, a priori, relin>uish the historical boundaries and plan to curtail the autonomous territor& to an area corresponding to the actual preponderance of the Georgian nationalit&$ 3ccording to that plan, onl& sixteen of Georgias counties would be the basis of the Georgian autonom&, while the fate of the four remaining ones with a preponderance of other nationalities would be decided b& a @plebisciteB of those nationalities$ /his plan loo7s highl& democratic and re*olutionar&; but li7e most anarchist#inspired plans which see7 to sol*e all historic difficulties b& means of the @will of nationsB it has a defect, which is that in practice the plebiscite plan is e*en more difficult to implement than the autonom& of historical Georgia$ /he area specified in the Georgian plan would include scarcel& 1,9!!,!!! people, i$e$, a figure corresponding to the population of a big modern cit&$ /his area, cut out >uite arbitraril& from Georgias traditional framewor7 and present socio#economic status, is not onl& an extremel& small basis for autonomous life but moreo*er does not represent an& organic entit&, an& sphere of material life and economic and cultural interests, besides the abstract interests of the Georgian nationalit&$ 'owe*er, e*en in this area, the Georgians nationalit& claims cannot be interpreted as an acti*e expression of autonomous life, in *iew of the circumstance that their numerical preponderance is lin7ed with their pre#eminentl& agrarian character$ In the *er& heart of Georgia, the former capital, /iflis, and a number of smaller cities ha*e an eminentl& international character, with the 3rmenians, who represent the bourgeois stratum, as the preponderant element$ ?ut of /ifliss population of 1.!,!!! the 3rmenians constitute ::,!!!, the Georgians and ,ussians 8!,!!! each; the balance is composed of /atars, Persians, Aews, Gree7s, etc$ /he natural centers of political and administrati*e life as well as of education and spiritual culture are here, as in Lithuania, seats of foreign nationalities$ /his circumstance, which ma7es Georgias nationalit& autonom& an insoluble problem, impinges simultaneousl& on another Caucasian problem: the >uestion of the autonom& of the 3rmenians$ /he exclusion of /iflis and other cities from the autonomous Georgian territor& is as impossible from the standpoint of Georgias socio#economic conditions as is their inclusion into that territor& from the standpoint of the 3rmenian nationalit&$ If we too7 as a basis the numerical preponderance of 3rmenians in the population, we would obtain a territor& artificiall& patched together from a few fragments: two southern counties of /iflis gubernia, the northern part of Iri*an gubernia, and the north#eastern part of 6ars gubernia, i$e$, a territor& cut off from the main cities inhabited b& the 3rmenians, which is senseless both from the historical standpoint and from the standpoint of the present economic conditions, while the size of the putati*e autonomous area would be limited to some "!!,!!!$ If we went be&ond the counties ha*ing a numerical preponderance of 3rmenians we would find the 3rmenians inextricabl& mixed in the north with the Georgians; in the south H in the (a7u and Ilizabetpol gubernias H with the /atars; and in the west, in the 6ars gubernia, with the /ur7s$ /he 3rmenians pla&, in relation to the mostl& agrarian /atar population which li*es in rather bac7ward conditions, partl& the role of a bourgeois element$

/hus, the drawing of a boundar& between the main nationalities of the Caucasus is an insoluble tas7$ (ut e*en more difficult is the problem of autonom& in relation to the remaining multiple nationalities of the Caucasian mountaineers$ (oth their territorial intermingling and the small numerical size of the respecti*e nationalities, and finall& the socio#economic conditions which remain mostl& on the le*el of largel& nomadic pastoralism, or primiti*e farming, without an urban life of their own and with no intellectual creati*it& in their nati*e language, ma7e the functioning of modern autonom& entirel& inapplicable$ Aust as in Lithuania, the onl& method of settling the nationalit& >uestion in the Caucasus, in the democratic spirit, securing to all nationalities freedom of cultural existence without an& among them dominating the remaining ones, and at the same time meeting the recognized need for modern de*elopment, is to disregard ethnographic boundaries, and to introduce broad local self#go*ernment H communal, urban, district, and pro*incial H without a definite nationalit& character, that is, gi*ing no pri*ileges to an& nationalit&$ ?nl& such a self#go*ernment will ma7e it possible to unite *arious nationalities to 5ointl& ta7e care of the local economic and social interests, and on the other hand, to ta7e into consideration in a natural wa& the different proportions of the nationalities in each count& and each commune$ Communal, district, pro*incial self#go*ernment will ma7e it possible for each nationalit&, b& means of a ma5orit& decision in the organs of local administration, to establish its schools and cultural institutions in those districts or communes where it possesses numerical preponderance$ 3t the same time a separate, empire#wide, linguistic law guarding the interests of the minorit& can establish a norm in *irtue of which national minorities, beginning with a certain numerical minimum, can constitute a basis for the compulsor& founding of schools in their national languages in the commune, district, or pro*ince; and their language can be established in local public and administrati*e institutions, courts, etc$, at the side of the language of the preponderant nationalit& 0the official language1$ %uch a solution would be wor7able, if indeed an& solution is possible within the framewor7 of capitalism, and gi*en the historical conditions$ /his solution would combine the general principle of local self#go*ernment with special legislati*e measures to guarantee cultural de*elopment and e>ualit& of rights of the nationalities through their close co#operation, and not their mutual separation b& barriers of national autonom&$

.8
3n interesting example of a purel& formalistic settlement of the nationalit& >uestion for the entire ,ussian empire is pro*ided b& the pro5ect of a certain 6$ Fortunato* published b& the group @/rud i (orbaB EDor7 and %truggleF, an attempt at a practical solution of the problem in accordance with the principles of the ,ussian re*olutionar& socialists$E.F ?n the basis of the census, the author first arranges a map of the empire according to nationalities, ta7ing as a basis the numerical preponderance of each nationalit& in the respecti*e gubernias and counties$ /he numericall& strongest nationalit& is the Great ,ussians who are preponderant in thirt& gubernias of Iuropean ,ussia$ /he& are followed b& the Little ,ussians who ha*e a ma5orit& in the C7raine in the gubernias of Poltawa, Podolia, 6har7o*, 6ie*, and Nolh&nia, and are represented also in the gubernias of I7aterinosla*, Chernigo*, 6herson, 6uban, and /aurida, while in (essarabia the +olda*ians and in the Crimea the /atars are preponderant$ 3part from the Poles, the third nationalit& is the (&elorussians, who ha*e a ma5orit& in fi*e gubernias: +ogile*, +ins7, Nilna, Ditebs7, and Grodno, with the exception of eight counties 0(ial&sto7, inhabited mainl& b& Poles; (iels7, (rzesc, and 6obr&n, in which the Little ,ussians are preponderant; the )zwins7, ,ez&ca, and Lucin counties, where the Lat*ians are in the ma5orit&; and finall& /ro7i, in which the Lithuanians pre*ail1$ ?n the

other hand, the 6rasne count& of %molens7 gubernia has to be included in (&elorussia because of the preponderance of that nationalit&$ /he Lithuanians and %amogitians pre*ail in the 6o*no and %uwal7i gubernias, with the exception of the %uwal7i and 3ugustow counties in which the Poles are in the ma5orit&$ /he Lat*ians in Courland and the Istonians in Istonia ha*e a decisi*e ma5orit&, and between them the& di*ide Li*onia into practicall& two e>ual parts, southern and northern$ Including the Congress 6ingdom, with the exception of the %uwal7i gubernia, we obtain, in sixt&#two gubernias of Iuropean ,ussia, the following picture of nationalit& relations: Great ,ussians preponderant in <! gubernias Little ,ussians (&elorussians Poles Lithuanians Lat*ians Istonians +olda*ians /atars 1! gubernias : gubernias gubernias 8 gubernias 8 gubernias 1 gubernia 1 gubernia 8 gubernias

'a*ing examined the territorial distribution of nationalities in the Caucasus according to gubernias and counties, the author in turn mo*es to 3siatic ,ussia$ In %iberia, the ,ussian element is in a decisi*e ma5orit&, forming "!$ percent of the population besides the (uriats, : percent; Va7uts, 9 per#cent; /atars, <$. percent; other nationalities, .$: percent$ ?nl& in the Va7ut gubernia do the ,ussians constitute a minorit& of 11$: percent while the Va7uts form "8$8 percent of the whole$ In Central 3sia, the most numerous nationalities are the 6irgis, who are in a ma5orit& in all gubernias with the exception of the three southern ones: /rans#Caspia, in which the /ur7omans number .: percent, %amar7ana, inhabited b& the Czbe7hs 0:"$" percent1 and /adzi7hs 08.$ percent1, and the Fergan Nalle&, in which the %arts form half, the Czbe7hs $- percent, the 6irgis 18$" percent of the population$ /hus, ta7ing as a basis the gubernias and counties with a preponderance of one nationalit& or another, +r$ Fortunato* ranges the following scheme of nationalit& districts in the whole empire, as shown in the appendix below$ In this scheme we are struc7 b& great numerical differences, e$g$, between the tremendous Great ,ussian and Little ,ussian districts and such tin& ones as the Lithuanian, Istonian, or indi*idual Caucasian, let alone the Va7ut$ /his circumstance apparentl& offends the sense of s&mmetr& of the admirers of the principle of @Federation$B It also e*o7es in them some doubts as to whether nationalities so une>ual in strength and size could enter into id&llic coexistence as autonomous districts possessing e>ual rights$ /herefore, our statistician, without much thought, ob*iates the e*il with scissors and glue b& combining se*eral small districts into one and simultaneousl& dismembering two big ones into smaller ones$ 3pparentl& ta7ing a population of six to nine million as a normal measure of a nationalit& district H although it is un7nown on what basis H he considers that it is @eas&B to split the Little ,ussian district into three and the Great ,ussian into se*en, separating for instance the )on, 3stra7hazan, 6uban, %ta*ropol, and (lac7 %ea gubernias and two counties of /ers7 with a population of .$- million as a @Cossac7B district, and the 6azan, Cfa, ?renburg, %amar gubernias and two counties of %&mbir gubernia with nine million population as a /atar (ash7ir district, finall& simpl& di*iding the remaining territor& of twent&#fi*e gubernias with

fort&#two million people into fi*e more or less s&mmetrical parts with eight million people, with no regard to the nationalit& principle$ In this wa& we obtain the plan of the di*ision of the whole of ,ussia into the following sixteen @statesB or autonomous districts on the basis of nationalities: 1 Poland with a population of 1 (&elorussia with a population of 1 (altic with a population of < Little ,ussia with a population of ",. .,!!! -,<8",!!! :,!9.,!!! 8-,88",!!!

a$ %outh#western 0Podolia, Nolh&nia and 6ie*, and < counties of Grodno1 with a population of 1!,1<<,!!! b$ Little ,ussia Proper 0Poltawa, 6har7o*, Chernigo* without the northern counties as well as the Little ,ussian counties of 6urs7 and Noronezh gubernia1 with a population of ",9:1,!!! c$ 2ew ,ussia 0(essarabia, 6herson, /aurida, I7aternosla* and /aganrog count&1 with a population of l Caucasus 0without the ,ussian counties1

",.99,!!! .,1:-,!!!

1 6irgis in Central 3sia 0without 8 counties of 37molin pro*ince1 with a population of -,9 !,!!! 1 %iberia 0with 8 counties of 37molin pro*ince1 with a population of - Great ,ussia with a population of

.,!1:,!!! :-,."!,!!!

In setting up the abo*e scheme the author was ob*iousl& not restrained b& an& historical or economic considerations, or b& the di*isions of production or commercial communication created b& modern de*elopment and natural conditions$ It is well 7nown that such pedestrian considerations can onl& hamper the political concoctions of people professing the @+arxistB doctrine and a materialistic world *iew$ /he& do not exist for the theorists and politicians of @trul& re*olutionar& socialism,B who ha*e in mind onl& the @rightsB of nations, freedom, e>ualit&, and other such loft& matters$ /he separation of two Lithuanian gubernias H 6o*no and %uwal7i H with the exclusion of the Polish counties H from the historico#cultural heart of Lithuania, the Nilna gubernia and other neighboring regions with which economic relations were of long standing, and on the other hand the 5oining of these two curtailed gubernias with Li*onia, Courland, and Istonia, with which the historical lin7s, as well as present#da& economic ones, are >uite loose, clearl& demonstrates this point$ 3lthough the cutting up of the C7raine for the sa7e of s&mmetr& into *arious di*isions, despite the continuit& of its natural and economic character, and on the other hand, combining into one autonomous region of %iberia a countr& comprising 18$: million s>uare 7ilometers, i$e$, b& one#third bigger than the whole

of Iurope, a countr& representing the greatest natural economic and cultural contrasts, is a demonstration that that method is free of an& @dogmas$B 3t the same time, the nationalit& autonom& in this scheme is treated free of an& connection with the economic and social structure of the gi*en nationalit&$ From this standpoint other peoples are e>uall& prepared for regional autonom& H that is, the& e*ince a certain permanent territor& and administration, legislation, and cultural life centralized in that territor&$ /here are, on the one hand, the Poles, and on the other the 6irgis, the Va7uts, and the (uriats, who are still partl& nomadic and are still li*ing according to the traditions of tribal organization, thwarting to this *er& da& the efforts of the territorial administration of ,ussian absolutism$ /he autonomous regional construction, in accordance with the @socialist#re*olutionar&B *iews, is thus entirel& @free,B unconnected with an& real bases in time and space, and all the existing historical, economic, and cultural conditions pla& onl& the role of material out of which, b& means of @re*olutionar&B scissors, artful nationalit& plots are to be cut out$ Dhat is the result of this solel& and exclusi*el& ethnographic method of the political dismemberment of ,ussiaL +r$ Fortunato*s scheme reduces the principle of nationalit& to an absurdit&$ 3lthough the Lithuanians are cut off from the Polish nationalit& with which the& coalesce culturall&, still the& are lin7ed on the basis of ethnographic affinit& into one @(alticB nationalit& with the Lat*ians and the Istonians with whom the& identif& as little as with the Poles: thus the& gra*itate toward the completel& Germanized cultural centers of Li*onia and Istonia$ Combining the Georgians, 3rmenians, /atars, and a few dozen other tribes of the Caucasus into one @CaucasianB nationalit& smac7s of a malicious satire against national autonomous aspirations$ 2o greater regard for these aspirations is e*idenced b& the inclusion of the +olda*ians, situated in (essarabia, in the Little ,ussian nationalit&, of the Crimean /atars in the *er& same nationalit&, and finall& b& the combining of %amo&eds, ?stia7s, /unguz, (uriats, Va7uts, Chuc7chees, 6amchadals, and man& other tribes, each li*ing an entirel& separate life, differing among themsel*es in the le*el of cultural de*elopment, language, religion, e*en partl& race, with the ,ussian population of %iberia into one m&sterious @%iberianB nationalit& with common legislati*e, administrati*e, and cultural institutions$ Fortunato*s scheme is basicall& a simple negation of the nationalit& principle$ It is also interesting as an example of the anarchistic approach to nationalism, unrestricted as it is b& an& considerations of ob5ecti*e social de*elopment$ 'a*ing thrown its weight around in that *alle& of tears, it e*entuall& returns to the results, *er& much resembling the same ugl& histor& of realit& which it had underta7en @to correct,B i$e$, the s&stematic *iolations of the @nationalit& rightsB and their e>ualit&$ /he whole difference consists in the fact that the trampling of the @rightsB of nationalities imagined b& the ideolog& of liberalism and anarchism is, in realit&, the result of the process of historical de*elopment which has its inner sense and what is more important H its re*olutionar& dialectic, while re*olutionar&#nationalistic bungling tends, in its zealous cutting up of what had grown together sociall&, and in its gluing of what sociall& cannot be glued together, to trample e*entuall& the nationalit& @rightsB celebrated b& it, merel& for the sa7e of schematic pedantr& depri*ed of an& sense and blown up with political buffooner&$

Notes b Rosa Luxemburg

E1F

Incidentall&, this is the onl& reason wh& histories of philosoph& such as those of =eller or 6uno Fischer are possible, in which the de*elopment of @ideasB ta7es place in a *oid, with no relation to the prosaic histor& of societ&$ :riginal note by %.+.
E8F

?tto (auer, )ie Nationalit7ten-rage und die "ozialdemokratie 0Nienna 1 !-1, pp$9 #:!, 1<.$ :riginal note by %.+.

E<F

3nother 3ustrian %ocial )emocratic publicist who, under the pseudon&m %pringer, wrote a number of wor7s on the nationalit& >uestion in 3ustria: )er 1am3- der Fsterreichischen Nationen um den "taat 01 !81; 9rundlagen und %nt;icklungsziele der Fsterreichisch!ungarischen 0onarchie 01 !.1$ :riginal note by %.+.
E9F

6auts7&, Nationalit7t and .nternationalit7t, pp$<, 9$ :riginal note by %.+.

E:F

Proceedings o- the Russian National "ocialist Parties 0%t$ Petersburg: 1 !"1, p$ 8$ :riginal note by %.+.
E.F

6$ Fortunato*, Natsonalniia Dblasti Rossii 0%t$ Petersburg: 6nigoizdatelst*o /rud i (orba, 1 !.1$ /he author is not the well#7nown statistician, Professor 3$ Fortunato*, as was erroneousl& surmised b& the re*iewer in 'umanit , nos$-. and --, 1 !-$ :riginal note by %.+.

433endix
Population of gubernia forming part of district $ith preponderance of given nationality Population of all counties $ith a ma/ority of a given nationality In /housands :verall figure of persons in a given nationality in the empire

1istricts 1$ Great ,ussian 8$ Little ,ussian <$ (&elorussian 9$ Polish :$ Lithuanian#Lat*ian .$ Istonian -$ +olda*ian "$ 6art*elian $ 3rmenian 1!$ Caucasian +ountaineers 11$ Caucasian /atars 18$ ?ther Caucasians 1<$ Chu*ashes, (ash7irs, /atars, +ord*inians 19$ 6iris#/ur7oman 1:$ %arts, Czbe7hs, and /atchi7s 0/adzi7hs1 1.$ Va7uts 1-$ ?thers Total@

:-,.18:,<9",:1","1 9,1!1 91< 1, <:

:-,8:! 8.,:"-,<8" ",. . 9,!"" :" 1,<:8 1,:!< 9.

::,.-< 88,91: :,"". -, <1 <,! 9 1,!!< 1,188 1,<:8 1,1-< 1,! 8 1,:<<

.,9 -

1,1! 1, "8 :8-

9,<.:,:1: 8,8<8 8-! 18:,.9!

<,.-< :,.98 8,8<8 8<9 1,1-< 18:,.9! 9,<.: 8,!9. 88-