Decision of the cases which are reffered for The preparation of arguments of petitioner and the respondents

Kesavananda Bharati and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr AIR 1973 SC 1461) AIR 1973 SC 1461
The 13-judge Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court deliberated on the limitations, if any, of the powers of the elected representatives of the people and the nature of fundamental rights of an individual. In a sharply divided verdict, by a margin of 7-6, the court held that the while the Parliament has "wide" powers, it did not have the power to destroy or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features. Article 368, on a plain reading, did not contain any limitation on the power of Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution. There was nothing that prevented Parliament from taking away a citizens right to freedom of speech or his religious freedom. But the repeated amendments made to the Constitution raised a doubt: was there any inherent or implied limitation on the amending power of Parliament? The 703-page judgment revealed a sharply divided court and, by a wafer-thin majority of 7:6, it was held that Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution so long as it did not alter or amend the basic structure or essential features of the Constitution. This was the inherent and implied limitation on the amending power of Parliament. This basic structure doctrine, as future events showed, saved Indian democracy and Kesavananda Bharati will always occupy a hallowed place in our history

"There are certain principles within the framework of Indian Constitution which are inviolable and hence cannot be amended by the Parliament. These principles were commonly termed as Basic Structure.

Joginder Kumar vs State Of U.PAIR 1349, 1994 SCC (4) 260

Justice MN VENKATACHALLIAH gave the judgment stating:No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police lock-up of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person.

It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the persons complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do.

Pramatha Nath Taluqdar vs Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 876, 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 297
SK Jain in judgment gave an order dated April 10, 1961 this Court granted special leave asked for by the two appellants herein, Pramatha Nath Talukdar and Saurindra Mohan Basu, to appeal to this Court from two orders made by the High Court of Calcutta, one dated December 22/23, 1960 and the other dated March 17, 1961. By the first order a Special 301 Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissed two applications in revision which the appellants had made to the said High Court against an order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta dated April 11, 1959 by which the said Magistrate issued processes against the two appellants for offences alleged to have been committed by them under ss. 467 and 471 read with s. 109 of the Indian penal Code on a complaint made by Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, respondent herein. By the second order a Division Bench of the said High Court refused the prayer of the appellants for a certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution of India that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. This refusal was based primarily on the ground that the order sought to be appealed from was not a final order within the meaning of the Article aforesaid. In pursuance of the special leave granted by this Court four appeals were filed, two against the order dated December 22/23, 1960 and the other two against the order dated March 17, 1961. The two appeals numbered 76 and 78 of 1961 from the order dated March 17, 1961 were withdrawn on the ground that special leave having been granted against the order of the Special Bench dated December 22/23, 1960, the appellants did not wish to press the appeals from the later order dated March, 17, 1961. Therefore, the present judgment relates to the two appeals numbered 75 and 77 of 1961 which are from the judgment and order of the Special Bench dated December 22/23, 1960. The principal question which arises for decision in these two appeals is whether a second complaint can be entertained by a Magistrate who or whose predecessor

had, on the same or similar allegation, dismissed a previous complaint, and if so in what circumstances should such a second complaint be entertained.

Naz foundation vs Union of India CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2009

The Delhi High Court has read down s. 377 to exclude consensual sex between adults in private in its judgment in Naz Foundation v. Union of India (2009). Aspects of the case will surely be discussed in detail.

The Court has given a new lease of life to Article 15: it read sexual orientation as an analogous ground in Article 15(1), insisted that Article 15 pohibits horizontal discrimination between citizens as well, and applied strict scrutiny! (Paras 105-115) On the latter, it harmoniously read Anuj Garg and Ashoka Thakur to suggest that strict scrutiny will be applied to Article 15 violations, except for affirmative action provisions (paras 109-111).

And thus further stated that popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. Popular morality, as distinct from a constitutional morality derived from constitutional values, is based on shifting and subjecting notions of right and wrong.

If there is any type of morality that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must be constitutional morality and not public morality. This aspect of constitutional morality was strongly insisted upon by Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly.

Veena Sethi vs state of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 339)

In veena sethi vs state of Bihar the Bench: D Desai, P Bhagwati stated that how long that the fundamental rights of a person can be withheld with the court and ordered that no person shall be deprived of his /her fundamental right of equality and right to be free .

And court also laid down the guidelines for the groundless arrest of the person and it effect on the fundamental rights and it says that the person in the case the respondent if found guilty of imposing wrong charges or found the arrest done then they should be charged of the act of the defamation and proper charges and fines should be applicable as stated in section 358 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The court also states that the fundamental rights cannot be deprived from any citizen of India and it can be deprived only in the times of emergency the rules regarding to which are stated in article 352 of the Constitution of India.

The bench also referred to other judgment and provided that the fundamental rights of a people should not be taken off from them no matter what the situation is. The bench states the example of the people of unsound mind who are put in the asylum for 2-3 decades because of which there fundamental rights are affected so proper care should be taken so that fundamental rights should not be deprived

Chennai textile Chemicals VS. State of Tamil Nadu & others ( AIR 2002 125 SCC 107 MAD)

The decision given by Bench: M S Liberhan, Raju state sabot the nature of writ petition which can be filled in different cases. The bench states that one of the cases relating to the very same batch, which were not included in the initial batch of cases, came up before the first Bench itself and on the representations of the counsel appearing in the second-listed batch of cases that the arguments submitted in the earlier batch may be taken as the same for the said second listed batch of cases also and as the learned counsel appearing on either side represented that the second listed cases also can be disposed of along with the initially listed batch of cases, the entire batch of writ petitions are dealt with together. The bench also states that there are slight variations in the cases but the nature of the writ has changed. And it further states:-

No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.

(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.'

Naz foundation vs Union of India CIVIL APPEAL NO.10972 OF 2013

The Supreme Court has read down s. 377 to exclude consensual sex between adults in private in its judgment in Naz Foundation v. Union of India (2013). Aspects of the case will surely be discussed in detail. And reversed the landmark decision given on june 2009. And again making it an unlawful act The Court has given a new lease of life to Article 15: it read sexual orientation as an analogous ground in Article 15(1), insisted that Article 15 pohibits horizontal discrimination between citizens as well, and applied strict scrutiny! (Paras 105-115) On the latter, it harmoniously read Anuj Garg and Ashoka Thakur to suggest that strict scrutiny will be applied to Article 15 violations, except for affirmative action provisions (paras 109-111). And thus further stated that popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. Popular morality, as distinct from a constitutional morality derived from constitutional values, is based on shifting and subjecting notions of right and wrong. If there is any type of morality that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must be constitutional morality and not public morality. This aspect of constitutional morality was strongly insisted upon by Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly.