TheNationTacklesPollution:TheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyandtheCleanAirandCleanWaterActs

DescriptionofProblem

The problem presented in this case was a social and political disregard for the dangers of air and water
pollution, as well as a lack of an understanding of the interrelatedness of ecological issues and the need for
effective environmental regulations. Following World War II, multiple U.S. cities experienced extremely harmful
events as a result of uncontrolled air pollution. Toxic smog in Pennsylvania killed 20 people and sickened 6,000
othersin1948,followedbysimilareventsinLondonandLosAngelesinthe1950s,andinNewYorkin1962,where
80peoplediedoverfourdaysduetoairpollution.Similarly,waterpollutionwasbecomingalargerconcernasthe
population saw the effects of unmitigated industrial dumping into the nations rivers and lakes. For example, in
1969,anoilslickonCleveland,OhiosCuyahogaRivercaughtfireduetoheavypollutionwithindustrialchemicals.

However,despitethesehighprofileevents,thefederalgovernmenthadtakenlittleactiontoprotectthe
environmentandcurbcausesofairandwaterpollution.WhileCongresspassedaseriesofpollutioncontrollaws
andcreatednewgovernmentagenciestoprotectpublichealthfrompollutioneffectsduringthe1950sand1960s,
political thinking was still dominated by the belief that environmental/pollution regulations were a states
responsibility to govern. Legislation in the 1960s included the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1961, the
CleanAirActof1963,theMotorVehicleAirPollutionControlActin1965,theWaterQualityActof1965,andthe
Air Quality Act in 1967. Many of these acts gave responsibility overseeing states pollution control efforts to the
DepartmentofHealth,Education,andWelfare(HEW),anewunitcreatedwithinthePublicHealthServicetasked
withhelpingstatesandeducationalinstitutionscarryoutresearchandcontrol.Regardlessoftheseefforts,there
were major obstacles limiting the success of these efforts. For one, seeing the environment as a states issues,
manysuchlawslackeddeadlinesandpenalties.Statesownlaws,inthemeantime,sawpollutionnotasapublic
health issue or as a part of larger environmental issues but merely as a public nuisance, and their laws reflected
this.Manymajorcitieshadordinanceslimitingtheemissionofdensesmokefromsmokestackswithinthecity,due
to it being a nuisance, or to prohibit garbage burning, but these laws did little to truly mitigate air pollution,
according to Layzer. Federal initiatives were also hampered by multiple bureaucratic reorganizations that limited
theabilityofthenewwaterpollutioncontrolagency(withinHEW)toexerciseitsauthority.

By the latter half of the 1960s, the environment had become a major national concern in the U.S. From
barelybeingrecognizedasapublicpolicytopicatthestartofthedecade,by1970roughly70%ofthepopulation
believedthatairandwaterpollutionwasaseriousproblemintheirareaversusotherpartsofthecountry.Though
the federal government had been responding to these issues with a series of small, incremental legislative
changes, public fervor was increasing exponentially over the decadeoutweighing the attempts of the
government at controlling pollution. Scholars and wellread journalists were chronicling environmental issues for
the American public, environmental disasters such as oil spills were highly publicized, and the postWWII
population as a whole was younger, wealthier, and better educated than previous generations. With fewer
concernsoverwar,poverty,orrace,thisgenerationbegantoworryaboutthepollutionthataccompaniedrapid
growthandurbanization(Layzer30).ThedecadeendedinamassiveEarthDaydemonstrationin1970,conceived
byasenatorfromWisconsin,whichreachedanestimated20millionpeoplenationwideandservedasafocusing
eventforpublicpolicyontheenvironment.

As a result of overwhelming public opinion in support of pollution control by 1970, the Nixon
administration facedaproblemofhowtoaddressthisfervor.Inthefaceofwidespreadpublicactivism,intense
and favorablemedia coverage, and marked shifts in publicopinionpolls(Layzer26),politiciansneededtocome
upwithamoreradicalchangeinpolicy(versustheincrementalchangesofthe1960s)reflectingnationalpollution
concernsinordertostayinfavorwiththeirconstituency.

FindingSolutions:MajorPlayersandTheirGoals

The Public (but not environmental organizations). This case centers on how public opinion can redefine an
issueandbringitintonationalprominence,despitethefactthattheissuemayhavebeenthereallalong.For
instance, while during the 1960s, the government was already taking steps to address pollution (as seen
through the numerous acts passed and the creation of the HEW), it was not until the public began to be
seriouslyconcernedovertheenvironmentinthelate1960sthatenvironmentalismbecameanationalcause,
andconsequently, a major publicpolicy issue. It is interesting to note that while public activism had a major
roleineffectingnationalpolicychanges,themajorenvironmentalorganizationsof thetime(theSierraClub,
theAudubonSociety,andtheNationalWildlifeFederation)werenotlargelyinvolvedinthisprocess.Theytoo
weresurprisedbytheoutpouringofsupportforEarthDay1970,anddidnothaveamajorroleinredefining
theenvironmentasanationalissue.

Journalists/Scholars. Authors such as Rachel Carson, who published Silent Spring in 1962, and Paul Ehrlich,
who subsequently wrote The Population Bomb, were major players in making the environment a salient
national cause. Their goals were to synthesize research and historical events into a clear depiction of how
publichealth,humanactions,andthedestructionofnaturewereintertwined,withtheobjectiveofconvincing
theAmericanpublicthatchangewasnecessary.

PresidentNixon.AsPresidentin1970andfacingareelectioncampaignfor1972,Nixonwasforcedtoaddress
environmentalconcerns.Hisgoalwasnotactuallytocurbpollutionormakelonglastingchangesthatprotect
theenvironment,butrathertocapitalizeonpublicsupportoftheenvironmentasawaytoearnsupportfor
hispolicies,presidency,andreelectioncampaign.

SenatorMuskie.MuskiewasaU.S.Senatorandaspiringpresidentialcandidatewhosoughttocreatebetter
(as in, more likely to satisfy public fervor) environmental policies. Though he claimed to be Mr. Pollution
Control,hisearlierlegislationinthe1960s(theAirQualityActof1967specifically)hadlittleeffectandcaused
Nixonaswellasenvironmentaladvocatestopubliclychallengehiscommitmenttoenvironmentalprotection.
His goal in the early 1970s was to reestablish his dominance in the environmental area through proposing
strict,radicalenvironmentallegislation.

Industry.Ascanbeexpected,environmentalprotectionstandardsinthe1960sandthosebeingcalledforby
the public as of 1970 were aimed at controlling the air and water pollution being emitted from industrial
sources. The automotive industry was a major target, as was oil and energy generation, manufacturing, etc.
Because of the effectiveness of wellheeled corporations at manipulating the government agencies designed
to regulate them, one of the major goals of the Nixon administration and Congress was to limit the effect
these industries could have at easing environmental controls. Likewise, large corporations sought to gain
extensionsandlessstringentenvironmentalcontrolsinordertoavoidinvestinginnewer,cleanertechnologies
orpermittingprocesses.

Congress. Most all of the politicians in the House and Senate had the same goal in the early 1970s of either
using the environment as a platform for which to gain leadership credit with their constituency, and thus
prepareforreelectionorfuturepoliticalaspirations,orofsimplynotwantingtoappearopposedtoanissue
thathadgarneredsomuchpublicsupport.

MajorDecisionsandDecisionCriteria

In the wake of public activism, environmental protection was newly reshaped as a national priority, not
justastatesconcern.BothCongressandPresidentNixonsadministrationwereforcedtorespondtothis.Oneof
Nixons first major decisions accordingly was to submit a plan to Congress in July 1970 for the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA was intended as a way to consolidate existing federal
environmentalactivitieswithinoneagencythatbetterrepresentedtheinterrelatednessofecologicalissues.Itwas
created as an executive agency, rather than a legislative agency, in order to avoid subjecting the decision of
creating the EPA to congressional politics. It also was created as an independent agency, apart from the existing
natural resources departments, in order to keep environmentalists from having to compete with the better
financed natural resource development interests. In addition to these criteria of streamlining the federal
bureaucracy and creating an agency apartfrom legislative action or natural resource lobbies, another criteria for
creating a consolidated agency that regulates all environmental protection issuesair and water pollution
includedwas to ensure that new environmental problems were not created in the process of controlling for
existingones.NeithertheSenatenortheHouseobjectedtothecreationoftheEPA,andtheagencycommenced
operationsonDecember2,1970.

Alsoduring1970,Nixon,motivatedbyadesiretoappearstrongeronenvironmentalissuesthanSenator
Muskie,sentstringentairpollutioncontrollegislationtotheHouseofRepresentatives.Shortlythereafter,Senator
Muskie introduced his own pollution legislation in the Senate. A common criterion for both pieces of legislation
was to establish national, rather than regional, regulations, though what was regulated varied between the bills
and included things like levels of major pollutants, air quality standards, and emissions standards. Managing
transportationrelated sources of pollution was another major criterion for both bills, which sought to reduce
emissionsofdangerouscarbonmonoxides,hydrocarbons,andnitrousoxidesaswellasreduceautomotiveusein
major cities. Congress debated both Nixons and Muskies proposals for the better part of the year, eventually
passing the final billtermed the Clean Air Act of 1970in December 1970. The Clean Air Act of 1970 was a
major decision that would have ramifications on pollution control for the next decade, but the criteria used in
structuring the bill focused on rigid deadlines and highly ambitious goals beyond what was economically or
technologicallyfeasible.Itwasadramaticpolicyshiftfromtheincrementalchangesbeingmadeduringthe1960s
andwassymbolicofcleanairasafundamentalnationalvalue.

ThenextmajordecisionmadeintermsofenvironmentalprotectionwasthepassageoftheCleanWater
Act of1972.Similarly to thewhocanbethebetterpoliticianbattlebetween NixonandMuskiethat led to the
passageofradicalnewcleanairpoliciesin1970,theissueofcleanwateralsopromptedproposalsfrombothNixon
and Muskie in 1971. Nixons decision was based on criteria of strengthening earlier clean water legislation and
establishing mandatory toxic discharge standards. He requested an increased annual budget for municipal waste
treatment financing and authority for citizens to bring legal actions to enforce water quality standards. Muskie
sought to outdo Nixon by proposing tougher laws. His criteria was again to have radical change regardless of
economic cost or technical feasibilityleading to a price tag of $18 billion for the Senates Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments (Muskies committees proposed legislation) and short deadlines for
compliancewithnewwastedischargestandards.ThoughNixonvetoedCongresssact,Congressoverrodetheveto
inboththeHouseandSenate,choosingtopasstheCleanWaterActof1972.

A common criterion for Congressional politics on the environment in the early 1970s was the need to
circumventagencycapturebywhichfederalagenciesbecomesubservienttotheindustriestheyaredesignedto
monitor.Todoso,boththeCleanAirActandCleanWaterActreflectedstrict,actionforcingstatutesreasoning
that unambiguous laws would limit bureaucrats ability to pander to interest groups (Layzer 39). This was the
motivation behind the strict deadlines, clear goals, and uniform standards (39) employed in these Acts, which
soughttominimizetheEPAsdiscretionandrestrictpollutersflexibility.

AlternativeSolutions

Inthenationsquesttotackletheissueofpollution,thereweremanyalternativeroutesthatcouldhave
beentaken.Tobeginwith,therewereavarietyofdifferentversionsofboththeCleanAirActandtheCleanWater
Actthatcouldhavebeenpassed.Versionswithoutsuchstrictdeadlinesandthatputlesspressureonthefledgling
EPA organization to fulfill massive tasks might have had more success in implementation. As well, rather than
going with a radical change in policy, continued incremental laws could have been passed, which might have
strengthened earlier laws in the field. Additionally, solutions that hinged on statelevel environmental regulation
couldhavebeenimplemented,suchascreatinganEPAequivalentineachstatechargedwithadministratingboth
state and federal regulations for that region. Politicians also could have ignored the activists, attributing
environmentalism to a passing fad that would soon be replaced with more dire public concerns (such as what
wouldfollowinresponsetotheVietnamWar).Thepubliccouldhavedirectedtheireffortsnotatthegovernment,
buttowardtheprominentenvironmentalorganizationsthatwerealreadyinexistenceandwhosecausemayhave
benefited from such widespread interest. The Nixon administration could have decided not to create a new
consolidated agency for environmental protection but rather to just increase funding for the earlierconceived
HEWdepartmentanddedicatenewtaskstoexistingnaturalresourcesagencies.

MyOpinion/Recommendations

My opinion is that the creation of the EPA was necessary and a good decision on behalf of President
Nixon. Creating it as an independent executive agency, apart from the natural resource lobbies and legislative
action,wasalsoagooddecision.However,oncetheEPAbeganoperations,Iwouldhaverecommendedhaltingall
legislative actions on environmental protection until after the EPA had established an effective organizational
structure and clearly defined the major environmental issues that needed addressing nationwide and proposed
solutions itself for solving these concerns in a manner that would not exceed the capabilities of the new
organization. Input from the EPA would likely have been instrumental in creating Clean Air and Water Acts that
weremorefeasibletoimplementandthatcouldhaveahigherrateofsuccess.

Both the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts gave citizens the authority to bring civil suits against the EPA
itselfinfederalcourtwheretheyfelttherewasaproblemwithhowtheEPAwasimplementingtheActs.Asmuch
asIvaluecitizenparticipation,whichisvitaltoademocracy,Iwouldhavedelayedtheenactmentofthisprovision
in both laws. I would have retained the right of citizens to bring lawsuits against corporations and other
governmentagenciesforenvironmentalinfractions,butembroilingtheEPAitselfinnumerouslawsuitswhenthe
organization had just started operating and was immediately tasked with enforcing lofty legislative goals was
counterproductive. I would have recommended a grace period of 5 to 10 years for the EPA to come into full
compliancewithitsmission,goals,androleasenvironmentalauthoritybeforeallowingoutsidecitizensoragencies
tocritiqueorinfluencetheprocess.

Lastly,manyofthecomplaintsagainsttheEPAfromCongress,industry,states,andenvironmentalgroups
centered on the fact that the EPA was making decisions without sufficient technical data or evidence to support
thedecisions.Asaresult,somerequirementsplacedoncities,states,andindustrywereeithernotfeasibleorwere
quicklythrownoutincourtduetoalackofresearch.Myrecommendationwouldhavebeentodedicateaportion
of EPA resources and skilled scientists to the task of collecting and synthesizing technical evidence to support
better decisionmaking within the EPA. This should have been done as soon as the problem of lack of data was
apparent.ThestrictdeadlinesinthelawstowhichtheEPAwastryingtoadherewascausingtheagencytomake
quick,poor,unsubstantiateddecisionsthatgavetheWhiteHouseaswellasotherstakeholdersreasontolimitthe
EPAs authority, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Clean Air and Water Acts. By either A) implementing
lawswithmoreleniencyindeadlines,orB)amendingsaidlawstoaccountforthetimetheEPAneededtogathera
scientificdatabaseonwhichtobasebasicdecisions,CongressmayhaveimprovedthereputationoftheEPAand
thequalityofenvironmentaldecisionsbeingmade.