Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-30642 April 30, 1985 PER ECTO S. LORESCA, i! "i# o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( *"& +i!or# ROMULO '!) NESTOR S. LORESCA, '!) ERL-N.A LORESCA-GA/U0O, PE.RO S. LORESCA, 1R., CELSO S. LORESCA, MEL/A S. LORESCA, 1U.-T2 S. LORESCA '!) CARMEN S. LORESCA, L0.-A CARAMAT 3.A. .E MART-NE4 i! "&r o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( "&r +i!or 5"il)r&! L-N.A, ROMEO, ANTON-O 1EAN '!) EL0, 'll #6r!'+&) M'r*i!&7, '!) .AN-EL MART-NE4 '!) TOMAS MART-NE4, SALUST-ANA ASP-RAS 3.A. .E O/RA, i! "&r o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( "&r +i!or 5"il)r&! 1OSE, ESTELA, 1UL-TA SALU. '!) .AN-LO, 'll #6r!'+&) O/RA, L0.-A CUL/ENGAN 3.A. .E 3-LLAR, i! "&r o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( "&r +i!or 5"il)r&! E.NA, GEORGE '!) LARR0 ---, 'll #6r!'+&) 3-LLAR, .OLORES LOL-TA A.ER 3.A. .E LANU4A, i! "&r o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( "&r +i!or 5"il)r&! E.-T2A, EL-4A/ET2, .-3-NA, RA0MUN.O, NESTOR '!) AUREL-O, 1R. 'll #6r!'+&) LANU4A, EMERENC-ANA 1OSE 3.A. .E -SLA, i! "&r o$! %&"'l( '!) o! %&"'l( o( "&r +i!or 5"il)r&! 1OSE, LOREN4O, 1R., MAR-A, 3ENUS '!) EL-8, 'll #6r!'+&) -SLA, petitioners, vs. P2-LE8 M-N-NG CORPORAT-ON '!) 2ON. 1ESUS P. MOR E, Pr&#i)i!9 16)9& o( /r'!5" 8---, Co6r* o( ir#* -!#*'!5& o( M'!il', respondents. Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners. Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MA:AS-AR, J.: This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of irst !nstance of Manila, Branch "!!!, dated #ecember $%, $&%' dismissin( petitioners) complaint for dama(es on the (round of lac* of +urisdiction. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased emplo,ees of Phile- Minin( Corporation .hereinafter referred to as Phile-/, who, while wor*in( at its copper mines under(round operations at Tuba, Ben(uet on 0une 1', $&%2, died as a result of the cave3in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. 4pecificall,, the complaint alle(es that Phile-, in violation of (overnment rules and re(ulations, ne(li(entl, and deliberatel, failed to ta*e the re5uired precautions for the protection of the lives of its men wor*in( under(round. Portion of the complaint reads6

--- --- --&. That for sometime prior and up to 0une 1',$&%2, the defendant P7!8E", with (ross and rec*less ne(li(ence and imprudence and deliberate failure to ta*e the re5uired precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men wor*in( under(round at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and re(ulations dul, promul(ated b, the 9overnment pursuant thereto, allowed (reat amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Bloc* :;343$ which seeped throu(h and saturated the %<< ft. column of bro*en ore and roc* below it, thereb, e-ertin( tremendous pressure on the wor*in( spaces at its :;<< level, with the result that, on the said date, at about : o)cloc* in the afternoon, with the collapse of all under(round supports due to such enormous pressure, appro-imatel, =<<,<<< cubic feet of bro*en ores roc*s, mud and water, accompanied b, surface boulders, blasted throu(h the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of appro-imatel, five .=/ minutes, the under(round wor*in(s, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and e5uipment which bloc*ed all avenues of e-it, thereb, trappin( within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, includin( those named in the ne-t precedin( para(raph, represented b, the plaintiffs herein> $<. That out of the :' mine wor*ers who were then wor*in( at defendant P7!8E")s mine on the said date, five .=/ were able to escape from the terrif,in( holocaust> 11 were rescued within the ne-t 2 da,s> and the rest, 1$ in number, includin( those referred to in para(raph 2 hereinabove, were left mercilessl, to their fate, notwithstandin( the fact that up to then, a (reat man, of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant P7!8E")s decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disre(ard of its bounden le(al and moral duties in the premises> --- --- --$;. That defendant P7!8E" not onl, violated the law and the rules and re(ulations dul, promul(ated b, the dul, constituted authorities as set out b, the 4pecial Committee above referred to, in their Report of investi(ation, pa(es 23$;, Anne- )B) hereof, but also failed completel, to provide its men wor*in( under(round the necessar, securit, for the protection of their lives notwithstandin( the fact that it had vast financial resources, it havin( made, durin( the ,ear $&%% alone, a total operatin( income of P ;',11<,1=:.<<, or net earnin(s, after ta-es of P$&,$$2,;&:.<<, as per its llth Annual Report for the ,ear ended #ecember ;$, $&%%, and with a((re(ate assets totallin( P :=,2&:,$<;.<< as of #ecember ;$, $&%%> --- --- --.pp. :13::, rec./ A motion to dismiss dated Ma, $:, $&%' was filed b, Phile- alle(in( that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered b, the provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act .Act ;:1', as amended b, RA 221/ and that the former Court of irst !nstance has no +urisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated Ma, 12, $&%' to the said motion to dismiss claimin( that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowin( the award of actual, moral and e-emplar, dama(es, particularl,6

Art. 1$2%. ?hoever b, act or omission causes dama(e to another, there bein( fault or ne(li(ence, is obli(ed to pa, for the dama(e done. 4uch fault or ne(li(ence, if there is no pre3 e-istin( contractual relation between the parties, is called a 5uasi3 delict and is (overned b, the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 1$2'. The provisions of articles $$21 to $$2: are also applicable to a 5uasi3 delict. .b/ Art. $$2;@The fault or ne(li(ence of the obli(or consists in the omission of that dili(ence which is re5uired b, the nature of the obli(ation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. ?hen ne(li(ence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles $$2$ and 11<$, para(raph 1 shall appl,. Art. 11<$. - - - - - - - - !n case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obli(or shall be responsible for all dama(es which ma, be reasonabl, attributed to the non3performance of the obli(ation. Art. 11;$. !n 5uasi3delicts, e-emplar, dama(es ma, be (ranted if the defendant acted with (ross ne(li(ence. After a repl, and a re+oinder thereto were filed, respondent 0ud(e issued an order dated 0une 12, $&%' dismissin( the case on the (round that it falls within the e-clusive +urisdiction of the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission. An petitioners) motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent 0ud(e, on 4eptember 1;, $&%', reconsidered and set aside his order of 0une 12, $&%' and allowed Phile- to file an answer to the complaint. Phile- moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed b, petitioners. An #ecember $%, $&%', respondent 0ud(e dismissed the case for lac* of +urisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established +urisprudence, the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission has e-clusive ori(inal +urisdiction over dama(e or compensation claims for wor*3connected deaths or in+uries of wor*men or emplo,ees, irrespective of whether or not the emplo,er was ne(li(ent, addin( that if the emplo,er)s ne(li(ence results in wor*3connected deaths or in+uries, the emplo,er shall, pursuant to 4ection :3A of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, pa, additional compensation e5ual to =<B of the compensation fi-ed in the Act. Petitioners thus filed the present petition. !n their brief, petitioners raised the followin( assi(nment of errors6 ! T7E 8A?ER CACRT ERRE# !N #!4M!44!N9 T7E P8A!NT! CAMP8A!NT AR 8ACD A 0CR!4#!CT!AN. !! T7E 8A?ER CACRT ERRE# !N A!8!N9 TA CAN4!#ER T7E C8EAR #!4T!NCT!AN BET?EEN C8A!M4 AR #AMA9E4 CN#ER T7E C!E!8 CA#E 43 PET!T!ANER4)

AN# C8A!M4 AR CAMPEN4AT!AN CN#ER T7E ?ARDMEN)4 CAMPEN4AT!AN ACT. A !n the first assi(nment of error, petitioners ar(ue that the lower court has +urisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on dama(es, particularl, Articles 1$2%, 1$2', $$2;, 11<$ and 11;$, and not on the provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act. The, point out that the complaint alle(es (ross and braFen ne(li(ence on the part of Phile- in failin( to ta*e the necessar, securit, for the protection of the lives of its emplo,ees wor*in( under(round. The, also assert that since Phile- opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the alle(ations in their complaint includin( those contained in the anne-es are deemed admitted. !n the second assi(nment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent 0ud(e failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and the claims for dama(es based on (ross ne(li(ence of Phile- under the Civil Code. The, point out that wor*men)s compensation refers to liabilit, for compensation for loss resultin( from in+ur,, disabilit, or death of the wor*in( man throu(h industrial accident or disease, without re(ard to the fault or ne(li(ence of the emplo,er, while the claim for dama(es under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the re(ular court, refers to the emplo,er)s liabilit, for rec*less and wanton ne(li(ence resultin( in the death of the emplo,ees and for which the re(ular court has +urisdiction to ad+udicate the same. An the other hand, Phile- asserts that wor*3connected in+uries are compensable e-clusivel, under the provisions of 4ections = and :% of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, which read6 4EC. =. Exclusive right to compensation.@The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws because of said in+ur, ... 4EC. :%. Jurisdiction.@ The ?or*men)s Compensation Commissioner shall have e-clusive +urisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, sub+ect to appeal to the 4upreme Court, ... Phile- cites the case of Manalo vs. oster ?heeler .&' Phil. '== G$&=%H/ where it was held that Iall claims of wor*men a(ainst their emplo,er for dama(es due to accident suffered in the course of emplo,ment shall be investi(ated and ad+udicated b, the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission,I sub+ect to appeal to the 4upreme Court. Phile- maintains that the fact that an emplo,er was ne(li(ent, does not remove the case from the e-clusive character of recoveries under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act> because 4ection :3A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the emplo,er fails to compl, with the re5uirements of safet, as imposed b, law to prevent accidents. !n fact, it points out that Philevoluntaril, paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the pa,ments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, e-cept the heirs of NaFarito loresca who insisted that the, are entitled to a (reater amount of dama(es under the Civil Code. !n the hearin( of this case, then Cndersecretar, of 8abor !srael Bocobo, then Att,. Ed(ardo An(ara, now President of the Cniversit, of the Philippines, 0ustice Manuel 8aFaro, as corporate counsel and

Assistant 9eneral Mana(er of the 94!4 8e(al Affairs #epartment, and Commissioner on Elections, formerl, CP 8aw Center #irector roilan Bacun(an, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda. The issue to be resolved as ?E stated in the resolution of November 1%, $&2%, is6 ?hether the action of an in+ured emplo,ee or wor*er or that of his heirs in case of his death under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act is e-clusive, selective or cumulative, that is to sa,, whether his or his heirs) action is e-clusivel, restricted to see*in( the limited compensation provided under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act or whether the, have a ri(ht of selection or choice of action between availin( of the wor*er)s ri(ht under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and suin( in the re(ular courts under the Civil Code for hi(her dama(es .actual, moral andJor e-emplar,/ from the emplo,er b, virtue of ne(li(ence .or fault/ of the emplo,er or of his other emplo,ees or whether the, ma, avail cumulativel, of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and sue in addition for dama(es in the re(ular courts. There are diver(ent opinions in this case. 0ustice 8aFaro is of the opinion that an in+ured emplo,ee or wor*er, or the heirs in case of his death, ma, initiate a complaint to recover dama(es .not compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act/ with the re(ular court on the basis of ne(li(ence of an emplo,er pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Att,. An(ara believes otherwise. 7e submits that the remed, of an in+ured emplo,ee for wor*3connected in+ur, or accident is e-clusive in accordance with 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, while Att,. Bacun(an)s position is that the action is selective. 7e opines that the heirs of the emplo,ee in case of his death have a ri(ht of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act or to sue in the re(ular court under the Civil Code for hi(her dama(es from the emplo,er b, virtue of ne(li(ence of the latter. Att,. Bocobo)s stand is the same as that of Att,. Bacun(an and adds that once the heirs elect the remed, provided for under the Act, the, are no lon(er entitled to avail themselves of the remed, provided for under the Civil Code b, filin( an action for hi(her dama(es in the re(ular court, and vice versa. An Au(ust ;, $&2', petitioners3heirs of deceased emplo,ee NaFarito loresca filed a motion to dismiss on the (round that the, have amicabl, settled their claim with respondent Phile-. !n the resolution of 4eptember 2, $&2', ?E dismissed the petition onl, insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearin( that there are other petitioners in this case. ?E hold that the former Court of irst !nstance has +urisdiction to tr, the case, !t should be underscored that petitioners) complaint is not for compensation based on the ?or*men)s Compensation Act but a complaint for dama(es .actual, e-emplar, and moral/ in the total amount of ei(ht hundred twent,3five thousand .P'1=,<<<.<</ pesos. Petitioners did not invo*e the provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. !n fact, no alle(ation appeared in the complaint that the emplo,ees died from accident arisin( out of and in the course of their emplo,ments. The complaint instead alle(es (ross and rec*less ne(li(ence and deliberate failure on the part of Phile- to protect the lives of its wor*ers as a conse5uence of which a cave3in occurred resultin( in the death of the emplo,ees wor*in( under(round. 4ettled is the rule that in ascertainin( whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of wor*men)s compensation claim or a claim for dama(es pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or alle(ations in the complaint .Belandres vs. 8opeF 4u(ar Mill, Co., !nc., &2 Phil. $<</.

!n the present case, there e-ists between Phile- and the deceased emplo,ees a contractual relationship. The alle(ed (ross and rec*less ne(li(ence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Phile-, constitute a breach of contract for which it ma, be held liable for dama(es. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read6 Art. 11;1. !n contracts and 5uasi3contracts, the court ma, award e-emplar, dama(es if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec*less, oppressive or malevolent manner. Art. 11<$. !n contracts and 5uasi3contracts, the dama(es for which the obli(or who acted in (ood faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable conse5uences of the breach of the obli(ation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonabl, foreseen at the time the obli(ation was constituted. !n cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obli(or shall be responsible for all dama(es which ma, be reasonabl, attributed to the non3 performance of the obli(ation. urthermore, Articles 11$% et seq., Civil Code, allow the pa,ment of all *inds of dama(es, as assessed b, the court. The rationale in awardin( compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act differs from that in (ivin( dama(es under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theor, of compensation distinct from the e-istin( theories of dama(es, pa,ments under the acts bein( made as compensation and not as dama(es .&& C.0.4. =;/. Compensation is (iven to miti(ate the harshness and insecurit, of industrial life for the wor*man and his famil,. 7ence, an emplo,er is liable whether ne(li(ence e-ists or not since liabilit, is created b, law. Recover, under the Act is not based on an, theor, of actionable wron( on the part of the emplo,er .&& C.0.4. ;%/. !n other words, under the compensation acts, the emplo,er is liable to pa, compensation benefits for loss of income, as lon( as the death, sic*ness or in+ur, is wor*3connected or wor*3a((ravated, even if the death or in+ur, is not due to the fault of the emplo,er .Murillo vs. MendoFa, %% Phil. %'&/. An the other hand, dama(es are awarded to one as a vindication of the wron(ful invasion of his ri(hts. !t is the indemnit, recoverable b, a person who has sustained in+ur, either in his person, propert, or relative ri(hts, throu(h the act or default of another .1= C.0.4. :=1/. The claimant for dama(es under the Civil Code has the burden of provin( the causal relation between the defendant)s ne(li(ence and the resultin( in+ur, as well as the dama(es suffered. ?hile under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or in+ured emplo,ee that the death or in+ur, is wor*3connected or wor*3a((ravated> and the emplo,er has the burden to prove otherwise .#e los An(eles vs. 94!4, &: 4CRA ;<'> Carino vs. ?CC, &; 4CRA ==$> Maria Cristina ertiliFer Corp. vs. ?CC, %< 4CRA 11'/. The claim of petitioners that the case is not co(niFable b, the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission then, now Emplo,ees Compensation Commission, is stren(thened b, the fact that unli*e in the Civil Code, the ?or*men)s Compensation Act did not contain an, provision for an award of actual, moral and e-emplar, dama(es. ?hat the Act provided was merel, the ri(ht of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of si- thousand .P%,<<<.<</ pesos plus burial e-penses of two hundred .P1<<.<</ pesos, and medical e-penses when incurred .4ections ', $1 and $;, ?or*men)s Compensation Act/, and an additional compensation of onl, =<B if the complaint alle(es failure on the part of the emplo,er to Iinstall and maintain safet, appliances

or to ta*e other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational diseaseI .4ection :3A, !bid./. !n the case at bar, the amount sou(ht to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and which cannot be (ranted b, the Commission. Moreover, under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an emplo,ee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lac* of facilities in the industr, of his emplo,er but caused b, factors outside the industrial plant of his emplo,er. Cnder the Civil Code, the liabilit, of the emplo,er, depends on breach of contract or tort. The ?or*men)s Compensation Act was specificall, enacted to afford protection to the emplo,ees or wor*men. !t is a social le(islation desi(ned to (ive relief to the wor*man who has been the victim of an accident causin( his death or ailment or in+ur, in the pursuit of his emplo,ment .Abon( vs. ?CC, =: 4CRA ;2&/. ?E now come to the 5uer, as to whether or not the in+ured emplo,ee or his heirs in case of death have a ri(ht of selection or choice of action between availin( themselves of the wor*er)s ri(ht under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and suin( in the re(ular courts under the Civil Code for hi(her dama(es .actual, moral and e-emplar,/ from the emplo,ers b, virtue of that ne(li(ence or fault of the emplo,ers or whether the, ma, avail themselves cumulativel, of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and sue in addition for dama(es in the re(ular courts. !n disposin( of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Compan,, ;1 4CRA ::1, ruled that an in+ured wor*er has a choice of either to recover from the emplo,er the fi-ed amounts set b, the ?or*men)s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinar, civil action a(ainst the tortfeasor for hi(her dama(es but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneousl,. !n PacaKa ?E said6 !n the analo(ous case of Es(uerra vs. MunoF Palma, involvin( the application of 4ection % of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act on the in+ured wor*ers) ri(ht to sue third3 part, tortfeasors in the re(ular courts, Mr. 0ustice 0.B.8. Re,es, a(ain spea*in( for the Court, pointed out that the in+ured wor*er has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneousl, and thus balanced the relative advanta(e of recourse under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act as a(ainst an ordinar, action. As applied to this case, petitioner Es(uerra cannot maintain his action for dama(es a(ainst the respondents .defendants below/, because he has elected to see* compensation under the ?or*men)s Compensation 8aw, and his claim .case No. ::=:& of the Compensation Commission/ was bein( processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of irst !nstance. !t is ar(ued for petitioner that as the dama(es recoverable under the Civil Code are much more e-tensive than the amounts that ma, be awarded under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, the, should not be deemed incompatible. As alread, indicated, the in+ured laborer was initiall, free to choose either to recover from the emplo,er the fi-ed amounts set b, the Compensation 8aw or else, to prosecute an ordinar, civil action a(ainst the tortfeasor for hi(her dama(es. ?hile perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnit, obtainable b, the first course is balanced b, the claimant)s bein( relieved of the burden of provin( the causal connection between the defendant)s ne(li(ence and the resultin( in+ur,, and of havin( to establish the e-tent of the dama(e suffered> issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactoril,. 7avin( sta*ed his fortunes on a particular remed,, petitioner is precluded from pursuin( the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is re+ected b, the Compensation Commission. An,wa,,

under the proviso of 4ection % afore5uoted, if the emplo,er ran*lin Ba*er Compan, recovers, b, derivative action a(ainst the alle(ed tortfeasors, a sum (reater than the compensation he ma, have paid the herein petitioner, the e-cess accrues to the latter. Althou(h the doctrine in the case of Es(uerra vs. MunoF Palma .$<: Phil. ='1/, applies to third3part, tortfeasor, said rule should li*ewise appl, to the emplo,er3tortfeasor. !nsofar as the heirs of NaFarito loresca are concerned, as alread, stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of 4eptember 2, $&2' in view of the amicable settlement reached b, Phile- and the said heirs. ?ith re(ard to the other petitioners, it was alle(ed b, Phile- in its motion to dismiss dated Ma, $:, $&%' before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased emplo,ees, namel, Emerito Abra, 8arr, Eillar, 0r., Aurelio 8anuFa, 8orenFo !sla and 4aturnino MartineF submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Re(ional Affice No. $ of the then #epartment of 8abor and all of them have been paid in full as of Au(ust 1=, $&%2, e-cept 4aturnino MartineF whose heirs decided that the, be paid in installments .pp. $<%3$<2, rec./. 4uch alle(ation was admitted b, herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated Ma, 12, $&%' .pp. $1$3$11, rec./ in the lower court, but the, set up the defense that the claims were filed under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act before the, learned of the official report of the committee created to investi(ate the accident which established the criminal ne(li(ence and violation of law b, Phile-, and which report was forwarded b, the #irector of Mines to the then E-ecutive 4ecretar, Rafael 4alas in a letter dated Actober $&, $&%2 onl, .p. 2%, rec./. ?E hold that althou(h the other petitioners had received the benefits under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, such ma, not preclude them from brin(in( an action before the re(ular court because the, became co(niFant of the fact that Phile- has been remiss in its contractual obli(ations with the deceased miners onl, after receivin( compensation under the Act. 7ad petitioners been aware of said violation of (overnment rules and re(ulations b, Phile-, and of its ne(li(ence, the, would not have sou(ht redress under the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remed, was based on i(norance or a mista*e of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelli(ent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedin(s. 7owever, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the pa,ments made under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act should be deducted from the dama(es that ma, be decreed in their favor. B Contrar, to the perception of the dissentin( opinion, the Court does not le(islate in the instant case. The Court merel, applies and (ives effect to the constitutional (uarantees of social +ustice then secured b, 4ection = of Article $$ and 4ection % of Article "!E of the $&;= Constitution, and now b, 4ections %, 2, and & of Article $$ of the #EC8ARAT!AN A PR!NC!P8E4 AN# 4TATE PA8!C!E4 of the $&2; Constitution, as amended, and as implemented b, Articles 1$2%, 1$22, 1$2', $$2;, 11<$, 11$%, 11;$ and 11;1 of the New Civil Code of $&=<. To emphasiFe, the $&;= Constitution declares that6 4ec. =. The promotion of social +ustice to insure the well3bein( and economic securit, of all the people should be the concern of the 4tate .Art. !!/.

4ec. %. The 4tate shall afford protection to labor, especiall, to wor*in( women, and minors, and shall re(ulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industr, and in a(riculture. The 4tate ma, provide for compulsor, arbitration .Art. "!E/. The $&2; Constitution li*ewise commands the 4tate to Ipromote social +ustice to insure the dignity !elfare and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equita#ly diffuse property o!nership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health, housin(, employment !elfare and social security to guarantee the en$oyment #y the people of a decent standard of living" .4ections % and 2, Art. !!, $&2; Constitution/> I... afford protection to la#or ... and regulate the relations #et!een !or%ers and employers ... and assure the rights of !or%ers to ... $ust and humane conditions of !or%" .4ec. &, Art. !!, $&2; Constitution, emphasis supplied/. The fore(oin( constitutional (uarantees in favor of labor institutionaliFed in 4ection & of Article $$ of the $&2; Constitution and re3stated as a declaration of basic polic, in Article ; of the New 8abor Code, thus6 Art. ;. &eclaration of #asic policy.@The 4tate shall afford protection to la#or promote full employment ensure e5ual wor* opportunities re(ardless of se-, race or creed, and regulate the relations #et!een !or%ers and employers. The 4tate shall assure the rights of !or%ers to self3or(aniFation, collective bar(ainin(, securit, of tenure, and $ust and humane conditions of !or%. .emphasis supplied/. The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented b, the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedl, repealed b, the restrictive provisions of Article $2; of the New 8abor Code. 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act .before it was amended #y R.'. (o. ))* on June *+ ,-.*/, predecessor of Article $2; of the New 8abor Code, has been superseded b, the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subse5uent law, which too* effect on Au(ust ;<, $&=<, which obe, the constitutional mandates of social +ustice enhancin( as the, do the ri(hts of the wor*ers as a(ainst their emplo,ers. Article $2; of the New 8abor Code seems to diminish the ri(hts of the wor*ers and therefore collides with the social +ustice (uarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code. The (uarantees of social +ustice embodied in 4ections %, 2 and & of Article !! of the $&2; Constitution are statements of le(al principles to be applied and enforced b, the courts. Mr. 0ustice Robert 0ac*son in the case of ?est Eir(inia 4tate Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic elo5uence, enunciated6 The ver, purpose of a Bill of Ri(hts was to withdraw certain sub+ects from the vicissitudes of political controvers,, to place them be,ond the reach of ma+orities and officials and to establish them as le(al principles to be applied b, the courts. Ane)s ri(ht to life, libert,, and propert,, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembl,, and other fundamental ri(hts ma, not be submitted to vote> the, depend on the outcome of no elections .;$& C.4. %1=, %;', '2 8.ed. $%;', emphasis supplied/. !n case of an, doubt which ma, be en(endered b, Article $2; of the New 8abor Code, both the New 8abor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the wor*ers and emplo,ees.

Thus, Article : of the New 8abor Code, otherwise *nown as Presidential #ecree No. ::1, as amended, promul(ated on Ma, $, $&2:, but which too* effect si- months thereafter, provides that Iall doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, includin( its implementin( rules and re(ulations, shall be resolved in favor of laborI .Art. 1, 8abor Code/. Article $< of the New Civil Code states6 I!n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma*in( bod, intended ri(ht and +ustice to prevail. I More specificall,, Article $2<1 of the New Civil Code li*ewise directs that. I!n case of doubt, all labor le(islation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safet, and decent livin( of the laborer.I Before it was amended b, Commonwealth Act No. 221 on 0une 1<, $&=1, 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act provided6 4ec. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3 The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said in+ur, .emphasis supplied/. Emplo,ers contractin( laborecsrs in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same ma, stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, e-clusivel, to in+uries received outside the !slands throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment> and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such a(reement. Anl, the second para(raph of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act No. ;:1', was amended b, Commonwealth Act No. 221 on 0une 1<, $&=1, thus6 4ec. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3 The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said in+ur,. Emplo,ers contractin( laborers in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, to in+uries received outside the !sland throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment. 4uch stipulation shall not pre+udice the ri(ht of the laborers to the benefits of the ?or*men)s Compensation 8aw of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them .As amended b, section = of Republic Act No. 221/. Article $2; of the New 8abor Code does not repeal e-pressl, nor impliedl, the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article $2; provides6 Art. $2;. E-clusiveness of liabilit,.3 Cnless otherwise provided, the liabilit, of the 4tate !nsurance und under this Title shall be e-clusive and in place of all other liabilities of the emplo,er to the emplo,ee, his dependents or an,one otherwise

entitled to receive dama(es on behalf of the emplo,ee or his dependents. The pa,ment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recover, of benefits as provided for in 4ection %&& of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred si-t,3one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Ane hundred ei(ht,3 si-, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered 4i- hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered ort,3ei(ht hundred 4i-t,3four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered b, the 4,stem durin( the period of such pa,ment for the same disabilit, or death, and conversel, .emphasis supplied/. As above35uoted, Article $2; of the New 8abor Code e-pressl, repealed onl, 4ection %&& of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. $$%$, as amended, C.A. No. $'%, as amended, R.A. No. %$<, as amended, R.A. No. :'%:, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered b, the 4,stem .referrin( to the 94!4 or 444/. Cnli*e 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act as afore5uoted, Article $2; of the New 8abor Code does not even remotel,, much less e-pressl,, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore 5uoted. !t is patent, therefore, that recover, under the New Civil Code for dama(es arisin( from ne(li(ence, is not barred b, Article $2; of the New 8abor Code. And the dama(es recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered b, the 4,stem provided for b, the New 8abor Code, which defines the I4,stemI as referrin( to the 9overnment 4ervice !nsurance 4,stem or the 4ocial 4ecurit, 4,stem .Art. $%2 GcH, GdH and GeH of the New 8abor Code/. urthermore, under Article ' of the New Civil Code, decisions of the 4upreme Court form part of the law of the land. Article ' of the New Civil Code provides6 Art. '. 0udicial decisions appl,in( or interpretin( the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the le(al s,stem of the Philippines. The Court, throu(h the late Chief 0ustice red RuiF Castro, in People vs. 8icera ruled6 Article ' of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that +udicial decisions appl,in( or interpretin( the laws or the Constitution form part of this +urisdiction)s le(al s,stem. These decisions, althou(h in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed b, the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court)s application or interpretation merel, establishes the contemporaneous le(islative intent that the construed law purports to carr, into effectI .%= 4CRA 12<, 121312; G$&2=H/. ?E ruled that +udicial decisions of the 4upreme Court assume the same authorit, as the statute itself .Calte- vs. Palomer, $' 4CRA 1:2> $1: Phil. 2%;/. The afore5uoted provisions of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, before and after it was amended b, Commonwealth Act No. 221 on 0une 1<, $&=1, limited the ri(ht of recover, in favor of the deceased, ailin( or in+ured emplo,ee to the compensation provided for therein. 4aid 4ection = was not accorded controllin( application b, the 4upreme Court in the $&2< case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Compan, .;1 4CRA ::1/ when ?E ruled that an in+ured wor*er has a choice of either to

recover from the emplo,er the fi-ed amount set b, the ?or*men)s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinar, civil action a(ainst the tortfeasor for (reater dama(es> but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneousl,. 4aid Pacana case penned b, Mr. 0ustice Teehan*ee, applied Article $2$$ of the Civil Code as a(ainst the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, reiteratin( the $&%& rulin( in the case of Ealencia vs. Manila Lacht Club .1' 4CRA 21:, 0une ;<,$&%&/ and the $&=' case of Es(uerra vs. MunoF Palma .$<: Phil. ='1/, both penned b, 0ustice 0.B.8. Re,es. 4aid Pacana case was concurred in b, 0ustices 0.B.8. Re,es, #iFon, Ma*alintal, Maldivar, Castro, ernando and Eillamor. 4ince the first sentence of Article $2; of the New 8abor Code is merel, a re3statement of the first para(raph of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither e-pressl, nor impliedl,, to the Civil Code as 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act did, with (reater reason said Article $2; must be sub+ect to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Ealencia and Es(uerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three .;/ cases is faithful to and advances the social +ustice (uarantees enshrined in both the $&;= and $&2; Constitutions. !t should be stressed li*ewise that there is no similar provision on social +ustice in the American ederal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Cnion. Conse5uentl,, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the ?or*men)s Compensation Act cannot limit the ran(e and compass of ACR interpretation of our own laws, especiall, Article $2$$ of the New Civil Code, vis3a3vis Article $2; of the New 8abor Code, in relation to 4ection = of Article !! and 4ection % of Article "!E of the $&;= Constitution then, and now 4ections %, 2 and & of the #eclaration of Principles and 4tate Policies of Article !! of the $&2; Constitution. The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the propert, ri(hts of the emplo,er. The ri(ht to life is (uaranteed specificall, b, the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the emplo,er from liabilit, for the death of his wor*ers arisin( from his (ross or wanton fault or failure to provide safet, devices for the protection of his emplo,ees or wor*ers a(ainst the dan(ers which are inherent in under(round minin(, is to deprive the deceased wor*er and his heirs of the ri(ht to recover indemnit, for the loss of the life of the wor*er and the conse5uent loss to his famil, without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encoura(es such (ross or wanton ne(lect on the part of the emplo,er to compl, with his le(al obli(ation to provide safet, measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his wor*er. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un3Christian. !t is therefore patent that (ivin( effect to the social +ustice (uarantees of the Constitution, as implemented b, the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an e-ercise of the power of law3ma*in(, but is renderin( obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementin( le(islation aforementioned. The Court, to repeat, is not le(islatin( in the instant case. !t is a-iomatic that no ordinar, statute can override a constitutional provision. The words of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and of Article $2; of the New 8abor Code subvert the ri(hts of the petitioners as survivin( heirs of the deceased minin( emplo,ees. 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act and Article $2; of the New 8abor Code are retro(ressive> because the, are a throwbac* to the obsolete laisseF3faire doctrine of Adam 4mith enunciated in $22% in his treatise ?ealth of Nations .Collier)s Enc,clopedia, Eol. 1$, p. &;, $&%:/, which has been discarded soon after the close of the $'th centur, due to the !ndustrial Revolution that (enerated the machines and other mechanical devices .be(innin( with Eli ?hitne,)s cotton (in

of $2&; and Robert ulton)s steamboat of $'<2/ for production and transportation which are dan(erous to life, limb and health. The old socio3political3economic philosoph, of live3and3let3live is now superdesed b, the beni(n Christian shibboleth of live3and3help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain)s selfish affirmation that he is not his brother)s *eeper. !n this our civiliFation, each one of us is our brother)s *eeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante3deluvian as the $';2 case of Prisle, vs. owler .; MN $,$=< reprint $<;</ invo*ed b, the dissent, The Prisle, case was decided in $';2 durin( the era of economic ro,alists and robber barons of America. Anl, ruthless, unfeelin( capitalistics and e(oistic reactionaries continue to pa, obeisance to such un3Christian doctrine. The Prisle, rule humiliates man and debases him> because the decision derisivel, refers to the lowl, wor*er as IservantI and utiliFes with aristocratic arro(ance ImasterI for Iemplo,er.I !t robs man of his inherent di(nit, and dehumaniFes him. To stress this affront to human di(nit,, ?E onl, have to restate the 5uotation from Prisle,, thus6 IThe mere relation of the master and the servant never can impl, an obli(ation on the part of the master to ta*e more care of the servant than he ma, reasonabl, be e-pected to do himself.I This is the ver, selfish doctrine that provo*ed the American Civil ?ar which (enerated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valle,s from $'%$ to $'%:. I!dolatrous reverenceI for the letter of the law sacrifices the human bein(. The spirit of the law insures man)s survival and ennobles him. !n the words of 4ha*espeare, Ithe letter of the law *illeth> its spirit (iveth life.I C !t is curious that the dissentin( opinion clin(s to the m,th that the courts cannot le(islate. That m,th had been e-ploded b, Article & of the New Civil Code, which provides that INo +ud(e or court shall decline to render +ud(ment b, reason of the silence, obscurit, or insufficienc, of the laws. I 7ence, even the le(islator himself, throu(h Article & of the New Civil Code, reco(niFes that in certain instances, the court, in the lan(ua(e of 0ustice 7olmes, Ido and must le(islateI to fill in the (aps in the law> because the mind of the le(islator, li*e all human bein(s, is finite and therefore cannot envisa(e all possible cases to which the law ma, appl, Nor has the human mind the infinite capacit, to anticipate all situations. But about two centuries before Article & of the New Civil Code, the foundin( fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and reco(niFed the eventualit, that the courts ma, have to le(islate to suppl, the omissions or to clarif, the ambi(uities in the American Constitution and the statutes. )Thus, Ale-ander 7amilton pra(maticall, admits that +udicial le(islation ma, be +ustified but denies that the power of the 0udiciar, to nullif, statutes ma, (ive rise to 0udicial t,rann, .The ederalist, Modern 8ibrar,, pp. =<;3=$$, $&;2 ed./. Thomas 0efferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself .A. .8. vs. American 4ash Compan,, $&:& ;;= C4 =;'/. Man, of the (reat e-pounders of the American Constitution li*ewise share the same view. Chief 0ustice Marshall pronounced6 I!t is emphaticall, the province and dut, of the 0udicial department to sa, what the law is .Marbur, vs. Madison ! Cranch $12 $'<;/, which was re3stated b, Chief 0ustice 7u(hes when he said that Ithe Constitution is what the +ud(e sa,s it is .Address on Ma, ;, $&<2, 5uoted b, President ran*lin #elano Roosevelt on March &, $&;2/. This was reiterated b, 0ustice CardoFo who pronounced that INo doubt the limits for the +ud(e are narrower. 7e le(islates onl, between (aps. 7e fills the open spaces in the law. I .The Nature of the 0udicial Process, p. $$;/. !n the lan(ua(e of Chief 0ustice 7arlan . 4tone, IThe onl, limit to the +udicial le(islation is the restraint

of the +ud(eI .C.4. vs. Butler 1&2 C.4. $ #issentin( Apinion, p. 2&/, which view is also entertained b, 0ustice ran*furter and 0ustice Robert 0ac*son. !n the rhetoric of 0ustice ran*furter, Ithe courts breathe life, feeble or stron(, into the inert pa(es of the Constitution and all statute boo*s.I !t should be stressed that the liabilit, of the emplo,er under 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act or Article $2; of the New 8abor Code is limited to death, ailment or in+ur, caused b, the nature of the wor*, without an, fault on the part of the emplo,ers. !t is correctl, termed no fault liabilit,. 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, as amended, or Article $2; of the New 8abor Code, does not cover the tortious liabilit, of the emplo,er occasioned b, his fault or culpable ne(li(ence in failin( to provide the safet, devices re5uired b, the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the wor*ers. Cnder either 4ection = or Article $2;, the emplo,er remains liable to pa, compensation benefits to the emplo,ee whose death, ailment or in+ur, is wor*3connected, even if the emplo,er has faithfull, and dili(entl, furnished all the safet, measures and contrivances decreed b, the law to protect the emplo,ee. The written word is no lon(er the Isoverei(n talisman.I !n the epi(rammatic lan(ua(e of Mr. 0ustice CardoFo, Ithe law has out(rown its primitive sta(e of formalism when the precise word was the soverei(n talisman, and ever, slip was fatalI .?ood vs. #uff 9ordon 111 N? ''> CardoFo, The Nature of the 0udicial Process $<</. 0ustice CardoFo warned that6 I4ometimes the conservatism of +ud(es has threatened for an interval to rob the le(islation of its efficac,. ... Precedents established in those items e-ert an unhapp, influence even nowI .citin( Pound, Common 8aw and 8e(islation 1$ 7arvard 8aw Review ;';, ;'2/. inall,, 0ustice 7olmes delivered the coup de (race when he pra(maticall, admitted, althou(h with a cautionar, undertone6 Ithat +ud(es do and must le(islate, but the, can do so onl, interstitiall, the, are confined from molar to molecular motionsI .4outhern Pacific Compan, vs. 0ensen, 1:: C4 1<: $&$2/. And in the subse5uent case of 4prin(er vs. 9overnment .122 C4 $'', 1$<31$1, 21 8.ed. ':=, '=13 '=;/, 0ustice 7olmes pronounced6 The (reat ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of blac* and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shadin( (raduall, from one e-treme to the other. - - -. ?hen we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that the, must be received with a certain latitude or our (overnment could not (o on. To ma%e a rule of conduct applica#le to an individual !ho #ut for such action !ould #e free from it is to legislate yet it is !hat the $udges do !henever they determine !hich of t!o competing principles of policy shall prevail. --- --- --!t does not seem to need ar(ument to show that however we ma, dis(uise it b, veilin( words we do not and cannot carr, out the distinction between le(islative and e-ecutive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterli(ht compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which ! am far from believin( that it is, or that the Constitution re5uires. True, there are +urists and le(al writers who affirm that +ud(es should not le(islate, but (rud(in(l, concede that in certain cases +ud(es do le(islate. The, criticiFe the assumption b, the courts of such law3ma*in( power as dan(erous for it ma, de(enerate into 0udicial t,rann,. The, include Blac*stone, 0erem, Bentham, 0ustice Blac*, 0ustice 7arlan, 0ustice Roberts, 0ustice #avid Brewer, Ronald #wor*in, Rolf 4artorious, Mac*lin lemin( and Ber,l 7arold 8ev,. But said 0ustices, +urists or

le(al commentators, who either den, the power of the courts to le(islate in3between (aps of the law, or decr, the e-ercise of such power, have not pointed to e-amples of the e-ercise b, the courts of such law3ma*in( authorit, in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that (ave rise to +udicial t,rann, or oppression or that such +udicial le(islation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularl, the lowl, wor*ers or the underprivile(ed. An the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpretin( the Bill of Ri(hts and statutor, enactments e-pandin( the scope of such provisions to protect human ri(hts. oremost amon( them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. AriFona .;': C4 :;% $&%:/, 9ideon vs. ?ainri(ht .;21 C4 ;;=/, Escubedo vs. !llinois .;2' C4 :2'/, which (uaranteed the accused under custodial investi(ation his ri(hts to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such ri(hts as even as it protects him a(ainst the use of force or intimidation to e-tort confession from him. These ri(hts are not found in the American Bill of Ri(hts. These ri(hts are now institutionaliFed in 4ection 1<, Article !E of the $&2; Constitution. Anl, the peace3and3order adherents were critical of the activism of the American 4upreme Court led b, Chief 0ustice Earl ?arren. Even the definition of !dentical offenses for purposes of the double +eopard, provision was developed b, American +udicial decisions, not b, amendment to the Bill of Ri(hts on double +eopard, .see 0ustice 8aurel in People vs. Taro*, 2; Phil. 1%<, 1%$31%'/. And these +udicial decisions have been re3stated in 4ection 2 of Rule $$2 of the $&'= Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in 4ection & of Rule $$2 of the $&%: Revised Rules of Court. !n both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessaril, includes or is necessaril, included in the first offense. The re5uisites of double +eopard, are not spelled out in the Bill of Ri(hts. The, were also developed b, +udicial decisions in the Cnited 4tates and in the Philippines even before people vs. Lla(an .=' Phil. '=$3'=;/. A(ain, the e5ual protection clause was interpreted in the case of Pless, vs. er(uson .$%; C4 =;2/ as securin( to the Ne(roes e5ual but separate facilities, which doctrine was revo*ed in the case of Brown vs. Mar,land Board of Education .;:& C4 1&:/, holdin( that the e5ual protection clause means that the Ne(roes are entitled to attend the same schools attended b, the whites3e5ual facilities in the same school3which was e-tended to public par*s and public buses. #e3se(re(ation, not se(re(ation, is now the (overnin( principle. Amon( other e-amples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar .:% Phil. ::</ b, a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law (rantin( maternit, leave to wor*in( women3accordin( primac, to propert, ri(hts over human ri(hts. The case of People vs. Pomar is no lon(er the rule. As earl, as $&<:, in the case of 8ochner vs. New Lor* .$&' C4 :=, 2%, :& 8. ed. &;2, &:&/, 0ustice 7olmes had been railin( a(ainst the conservatism of 0ud(es pervertin( the (uarantee of due process to protect propert, ri(hts as a(ainst human ri(hts or social +ustice for the wor*in( man. The law fi-in( ma-imum hours of labor was invalidated. 0ustice 7olmes was vindicated finall, in $&;% in the case of ?est Coast 7otel vs. Parish .;<< C4 ;2232&> '$ 8. ed. 2<;/ where the American 4upreme Court upheld the ri(hts of wor*ers to social +ustice in the form of (uaranteed minimum wa(e for women and minors, wor*in( hours not e-ceedin( ei(ht .'/ dail,, and maternit, leave for women emplo,ees. The power of +udicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political 5uestions have been evolved and (rafted into the American Constitution b, +udicial decisions

.Marbur, vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, ;<2 C4 :;;, '; 8. ed. $;'=> 4prin(er vs. 9overnment, 122 C4 1$<31$1, 21 8. ed. '=1, '=;/. !t is noteworth, that 0ustice Blac*, who seems to be a(ainst +udicial le(islation, penned a separate concurrin( opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirmin( the doctrine of political 5uestion as be,ond the ambit of +udicial review. There is nothin( in both the American and Philippine Constitutions e-pressl, providin( that the power of the courts is limited b, the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political 5uestions. There are numerous cases in Philippine +urisprudence appl,in( the doctrines of separation of powers and political 5uestions and invo*in( American precedents. Cnli*e the American Constitution, both the $&;= and $&2; Philippine Constitutions e-pressl, vest in the 4upreme Court the power to review the validit, or constitutionalit, of an, le(islative enactment or e-ecutive act. ?7ERE ARE, T7E TR!A8 CACRT)4 AR#ER A #!4M!44A8 !4 7EREBL REEER4E# AN# 4ET A4!#E AN# T7E CA4E !4 REMAN#E# TA !T AR CRT7ER PRACEE#!N94. 47AC8# A 9REATER AMACNT A #AMA9E4 BE #ECREE# !N AEAR A 7ERE!N PET!T!ANER4, T7E PALMENT4 A8REA#L MA#E TA T7EM PCR4CANT TA T7E ?ARDMEN)4 CAMPEN4AT!AN ACT 47A88 BE #E#CCTE#. NA CA4T4. 4A AR#ERE#. /ernando C.J. Teehan%ee Plana Escolin &e la /uente Cuevas and 'lampay JJ. concur. Concepcion Jr. J. is on leave. '#ad 0antos and Relova JJ. too% no part.

S&p'r'*& Opi!io!#

MELENC-O-2ERRERA, J., dissentin(6 A This case involves a complaint for dama(es for the death of five emplo,ees of P7!8E" Minin( Corporation under the (eneral provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non3applicabilit, to the complaint. !t is specificall, provided in Article 1$&% of the Code, found in Title "E!!!3#ama(es that6 CAMPEN4AT!AN AR ?ARDMEN AN# AT7ER EMP8ALEE4 !N CA4E A #EAT7, !N0CRL AR !88NE44 10 RE234'TE& 56 0PEC1'4 4'70. Compensation and dama(es are s,non,mous. !n Esguerra vs. Mu8o9 Palma, etc., et al., $<: Phil. ='1, ='%, 0ustice 0.B.8. Re,es had said6

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not dama(es. This ar(ument is but a pla, on words. The term compensation) is used in the law .Act ;'$1 and Republic Act 221/ in the sense of indemnit, for dama(es suffered, bein( awarded for a personal in+ur, caused or a((ravated b, or in the course of emplo,ment. ... B, the ver, provisions of the Civil Code, it is a Ispecial lawI, not the Code itself, which has to appl, to the complaint involved in the instant case. That Ispecial lawI, in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the ?or*men)s Compensation Even assumin(, without concedin(, that an emplo,ee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the ma+orit, rules, both options cannot be e-ercised simultaneousl,, and the e-ercise of one will preclude the e-ercise of the other. The petitioners had alread, e-ercised their option to come under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, and the, have alread, received compensation pa,able to them under that Act. 4tated differentl,, the remed, under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act had alread, become a Ifinished transactionI. There are two considerations wh, it is believed petitioners should no lon(er be allowed to e-ercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. !n the first place, the proceedin(s under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act have alread, become the law in re(ards toI the Ielection of remediesI, because those proceedin(s had become a Ifinished transactionI. !n the second place, it should be plainl, e5uitable that, if a person entitled to an Ielection of remediesI ma*es a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no lon(er be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the ver, least, if he wants to ma*e a second election, in disre(ard of the first election he has made, when he ma*es the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court. B. )There is full concurrence on m, part with the dissentin( opinion of Mr. 0ustice 9utierreF upholdin( Ithe e-clusor, provision of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act.I ! ma, further add6 $. The ?or*men)s Compensation Act .Act No. ;:1'/ was approved on #ecember $<, $&12 and too* effect on 0une $<, $&1'. !t was patterned from Minnesota and 7awaii statutes. Act No. ;:1' was adopted b, the Philippine le(islature, in 4panish and some sections of the law were ta*en from the statutes of Minnesota and 7awaii, .Chapter 1<& of the Revised 8aws of 7awaii, $&1=/. GMorabe N !nton, ?or*men)s Compensation Act, p. 1H Cnder the ?or*men)s Compensation Act of 7awaii, when the Act is applicable, the remed, under the Act is e-clusive The followin( is stated in $ 4chneider ?or*men)s Compensation Te-t, pp. 1%%, 1%2. 4ec. $$1. 7awaii 4tatutor, 4,nopsis. The act is compulsor, as to emplo,ees in )all industrial emplo,ment) and emplo,ees of the territor, and its political subdivisions. .4ections 2:'<32:'$, 4.4., Eol. $, p. 2$;./

Compensation is not pa,able when in+ur, is due to emplo,ee)s willful intention to in+ure himself or another or to his into-ication. .4ec. 2:'1, 4.4., p. 2$;./ ?hen the act is applicable the remed, thereunder is e-clusive .4ec. 2:';, 4.4., p. 2$:./ 1. !n providin( for e-clusiveness of the remed, under our ?or*men)s Compensation Act, the Philippine 8e(islature worded the first para(raph of 4ection = of the Act as follows6 4EC. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said in+ur, .Para(raphin( and emphasis supplied/ !n re(ards to the intent of the 8e(islature under the fore(oin( provision6 A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meanin( and intention of the law3ma*in( bod, must be sou(ht, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinar,, commonl,3accepted and most obvious si(nifications, accordin( to (ood and approved usa(e and without resortin( to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law3 ma*in( bod, does not *now the meanin( of words and the rules of (rammar. Conse5uentl,, the (rammatical readin( of a statute must be presumed to ,ield its correct sense. .Espino vs. Cleofe =1 4CRA &1, &'/ G!talics suppliedH ;. The ori(inal second para(raph of 4ection = provided6 Emplo,ers contractin( laborers in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, e-clusivel, to in+uries received outside the !slands throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment. .!talics supplied/ The use of the word Ie-clusivel, is a further confirmation of the e-clusor, provision of the Act, sub+ect onl, to e-ceptions which ma, be provided in the Act itself. :. !t mi(ht be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus, 4ection %, in part, provides6 4EC. %. 8iabilit, of third parties.3!n case an emplo,ee suffers an in+ur, for which compensation is due under this Act b, an, other person besides his emplo,er, it shall be optional with such in+ured emplo,ee either to claim compensation from his emplo,er, under this Act, or sue such other person for dama(es, in accordance with law> ... .Emphasis supplied/

!f the le(islative intent under the first para(raph of 4ection = were to allow the in+ured emplo,ee to sue his emplo,er under the Civil Code, the le(islator could ver, easil, have formulated the said first para(raph of 4ection = accordin( to the pattern of 4ection %. That that was not done shows the le(islative intent not to allow an, option to an emplo,ee to sue the emplo,er under the Civil Code for in+uries compensable under the Act. =. There should be no 5uestion but that the ori(inal first para(raph of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, formulated in $&12, provided that an in+ured wor*er or emplo,ee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to an, other law relative to the liabilit, of the emplo,er. After $&12, there were occasions when the le(islator had the opportunit, to amend the first para(raph of 4ection = such that the remedies under the Act would not be e-clusive> ,et, the le(islator refrained from doin( so. That shows the le(islatives continuin( intent to maintain the e-clusor, provision of the first para(raph of 4ection = unless otherwise provided in the Act itself. .a/ The ori(inal second para(raph of 4ection = provided6 Emplo,ers contractin( laborers in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, .e-clusivel,/ to in+uries received outside the !slands throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment .and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such a(reement/. An 0une 1<, $&=1, throu(h RA 221, the fore(oin( second para(raph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the para(raph6 4uch stipulation shall not pre+udice the ri(ht of the laborers to the benefits of the ?or*men)s Compensation 8aw of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them. .Emphasis supplied/ !t will be seen that, within the Act itself, the e-clusor, character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the le(islator could have amended the first para(raph of 4ection = so that the emplo,ee would have the option to sue the emplo,er under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him. .b/ The ?or*men)s Compensation Act, which too* effect in $&12, (rants compensation to an in+ured emplo,ee without re(ard to the presence or absence of ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er. The compensation is deemed an e-pense char(eable to the industr, .Murillo vs. MendoFa, %% Phil. %'& G$&;'H/. !n time, it must have been thou(ht that it was ine5uitable to have the amount of compensation, caused b, ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er, to be the same amount pa,able when the emplo,er was not ne(li(ent. Based on that thin*in(, 4ection :3A 1 was included into the Act, on 0une 1<, $&=1, throu(h RA 221. 4aid 4ection :3A increased the compensation pa,able b, =<B in case there was ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er. That additional section evidenced the intent of the le(islator not to (ive an option to an emplo,ee, in+ured with ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.

An 0une 1<, $&%:, 4ection :3A was amended .insubstantiall,/ b, RA :$$&. The le(islator was a(ain (iven the opportunit, to provide, but he did not, the option to an emplo,ee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code. ?hen a Court (ives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law3ma*er, the Court is un+ustifiabl, le(islatin(. !t is in view of the fore(oin( that ! vote for affirmation of the trial Court)s dismissal of the Complaint. GUT-ERRE4, 1R., J., dissentin(6 To (rant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file dama(es suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not onl, contrar, to the e-press provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the lon( histor, of wor*men)s compensation. At the ver, least, it should be the le(islature and not this Court which should remove the e-clusor, provision of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present 8abor Code on emplo,ees) compensation. ?or*men)s compensation evolved to remed, the evils associated with the situation in the earl, ,ears of the industrial revolution when in+ured wor*in(men had to rel, on dama(e suits to (et recompense. Before wor*men)s compensation, an in+ured wor*er see*in( dama(es would have to prove in a tort suit that his emplo,er was either ne(li(ent or in bad faith, that his in+ur, was caused b, the emplo,er and not a fellow wor*er, and that he was not (uilt, of contributor, ne(li(ence. The emplo,er could emplo, not onl, his wealth in defeatin( the claim for dama(es but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The wor*er was supposed to *now what he entered into when he accepted emplo,ment. As stated in the leadin( case of Priestle, u. owler .; M. N ?. $, $=< Reprint $<;</ decided in $';2 Ithe mere relation of the master and the servant never can impl, an obli(ation on the part of the master to ta*e more care of the servant than he ma, reasonabl, be e-pected to do of himself.I B, enterin( into a contract of emplo,ment, the wor*er was deemed to accept the ris*s of emplo,ment that he should discover and (uard a(ainst himself. The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of ris* doctrine, the principle of contributor, ne(li(ence, and the man, other defenses so easil, raised in protracted dama(e suits illustrated the need for a s,stem whereb, wor*ers had onl, to prove the fact of covered emplo,ment and the fact of in+ur, arisin( from emplo,ment in order to be compensated. The need for a compensation scheme where liabilit, is created solel, b, statute and made compulsor, and where the element of fault3either the fault of the emplo,er or the fault of the emplo,ee3disre(arded became obvious. Another ob+ective was to have simplified, e-peditious, ine-pensive, and non3liti(ious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readil,, if not automaticall,, receive compensation for wor*3related in+uries. !nspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim bein( reco(niFed, emplo,ers) liabilit, acts were a ma+or step in the desired direction. 7owever, emplo,ers liabilit, le(islation proved inade5uate. 8e(islative reform led to the wor*men)s compensation. ! cite the above familiar bac*(round because wor*men)s compensation represents a compromise. !n return for the near certaint, of receivin( a sum of mone, fi-ed b, law, the in+ured wor*er (ives up the ri(ht to sub+ect the emplo,er to a tort suit for hu(e amounts of dama(es. Thus, liabilit, not onl, disre(ards the element of fault but it is also a pre3 determined amount based on the wa(es of the

in+ured wor*er and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The wor*er does not receive the total dama(es for his pain and sufferin( which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The emplo,er is re5uired to act swiftl, on compensation claims. An administrative a(enc, supervises the pro(ram. And because the overwhelmin( mass of wor*in(men are benefited b, the compensation s,stem, individual wor*ers who ma, want to sue for bi( amounts of dama(es must ,ield to the interests of their entire wor*in( class. The nature of the compensation principle is e-plained as follows6 An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understandin( of the acts and the cases interpretin( them. B, the turn of the centur, it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variet, had become enormous, and (overnment was faced with the problem of who was to pa, for the human wrec*a(e wrou(ht b, the dan(ers of modern industr,. !f the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the emplo,er, e-istin( tort principles offered some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inade5uac, of the fault principle was manifest. The uncertaint, of the outcome of torts liti(ation in court placed the emplo,ee at a substantial disadvanta(e. 4o lon( as liabilit, depended on fault there could be no recover, until the fin(er of blame had been pointed officiall, at the emplo,er or his a(ents. !n most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usuall, fellow wor*ers of the victim, were torn between friendship or lo,alt, to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal b, the emplo,er, on the other. The e-pense and dela, of liti(ation often prompted the in+ured emplo,ee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were successfull, prosecuted, a lar(e share of the proceeds of the +ud(ment were e-acted as contin(ent fees b, counsel. Thus the emplo,er a(ainst whom +ud(ment was cast often paid a substantial dama(e bill, while onl, a part of this enured to the benefit of the in+ured emplo,ee or his dependents. The emplo,ee)s +ud(ment was nearl, alwa,s too little and too late. --- --- --?or*men)s Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who en+o, the product of a business3 whether it be in the form of (oods or services3 should ultimatel, bear the cost of the in+uries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ... --- --- --Cnder this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirel, or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. The emplo,er absorbs the cost of accident loss onl, initiall,> it is e-pected that this cost will eventuall, pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution amon( the ultimate consumers. 4o lon( as each competin( unit in a (iven industr, is uniforml, affected, no producer can (ain an, substantial competitive advanta(e or suffer an, appreciable loss b, reason of the (eneral adoption of the compensation principle. !n order that the compensation principle ma, operate properl, and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be

fi-ed at a fi(ure that will not disrupt too violentl, the traffic in the product of the industr, affected. Thus predictabilit, and moderateness of cost are necessar, from the broad economic viewpoint. .... Compensation, then, differs from the conventional dama(e suit in two important respects6 ault on the part of either emplo,er or emplo,ee is eliminated> and compensation pa,able accordin( to a definitel, limited schedule is substituted for dama(es. All compensation acts ali*e wor* these two ma+or chan(es, irrespective of how the, ma, differ in other particulars. Compensation, when re(arded from the viewpoint of emplo,er and emplo,ee represents a compromise in which each part, surrenders certain advanta(es in order to (ain others which are of more importance both to him and to societ,. The emplo,er (ives up the immunit, he otherwise would en+o, in cases where he is not at fault, and the emplo,ee surrenders his former ri(ht to full dama(es and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented b, compensation. The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasiFed. The statutes var, a (reat deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of wee*l, compensation pa,ments and the len(th of the period durin( which compensation is to be paid are matters concernin( which the acts differ considerabl,. The interpretation of an, compensation statute will be influenced (reatl, b, the court)s reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. !f the court feels that the basic compromise undul, favors the emplo,er, it will be tempted to restore what it re(ards as a proper balance b, adoptin( an interpretation that favors the wor*er. !n this wa,, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of e-treme conservatism ma, be transformed b, a s,mpathetic court into a fairl, liberal instrument> and conversel,, an act that (reatl, favors the laborer ma, be so interpreted b, the courts that emplo,ers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throu(hout the various +urisdictions must be attributed to this.I .Malone N Plant, ?or*men)s Compensation American Caseboo* 4eries, pp. %;3%=/. The schedule of compensation, the rates of pa,ments, the compensable in+uries and diseases, the premiums paid b, emplo,ers to the present s,stem, the actuarial stabilit, of the trust fund and man, other interrelated parts have all been carefull, studied before the inte(rated scheme was enacted in to law. ?e have a s,stem whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theor, has to be followed. !f this Court disre(ards this totalit, of the scheme and in a spirit of (enerosit, recasts some parts of the s,stem without touchin( the related others, the entire structure is endan(ered. or instance, ! am personall, a(ainst stretchin( the law and allowin( pa,ment of compensation for contin(encies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainl,, onl, harmful results to the principle of wor*men)s compensation can arise if wor*men, whom the law allows to receive emplo,ment compensation, can still elect to file dama(e suits for industrial accidents. !t was precisel, for this reason that 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, which reads6 4EC. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws because of said in+ur,. ...

Article $2; of the labor Code also provides6 ART. $2;. E-clusivenesss of liabilit,.@Cnless otherwise provided, the liabilit, of the 4tate !nsurance und under this Title shall be e-clusive and in place of all other liabilities of the emplo,er to the emplo,ee his dependents or an,one otherwise entitled to receive dama(es on behalf of the emplo,ee or his dependents. ! am a(ainst the Court assumin( the role of le(islator in a matter callin( for actuarial studies and public hearin(s. !f emplo,ers alread, re5uired to contribute to the 4tate !nsurance und will still have to bear the cost of dama(e suits or (et insurance for that purpose, a ma+or stud, will be necessar,. The issue before us is more far reachin( than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All wor*ers covered b, wor*men)s compensation and all emplo,ers who emplo, covered emplo,ees are affected. Even as ! have deepest s,mpathies for the victims, ! re(ret that ! am constrained to dissent from the ma+orit, opinion.

S&p'r'*& Opi!io!#

MELENC-O-2ERRERA, J., dissentin(6 A This case involves a complaint for dama(es for the death of five emplo,ees of P7!8E" Minin( Corporation under the (eneral provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non3applicabilit, to the complaint. !t is specificall, provided in Article 1$&% of the Code, found in Title "E!!!3#ama(es that6 CAMPEN4AT!AN AR ?ARDMEN AN# AT7ER EMP8ALEE4 !N CA4E A #EAT7, !N0CRL AR !88NE44 10 RE234'TE& 56 0PEC1'4 4'70. Compensation and dama(es are s,non,mous. !n Esguerra vs. Mu8o9 Palma, etc., et al., $<: Phil. ='1, ='%, 0ustice 0.B.8. Re,es had said6 Petitioner also avers that compensation is not dama(es. This ar(ument is but a pla, on words. The term compensation) is used in the law .Act ;'$1 and Republic Act 221/ in the sense of indemnit, for dama(es suffered, bein( awarded for a personal in+ur, caused or a((ravated b, or in the course of emplo,ment. ... B, the ver, provisions of the Civil Code, it is a Ispecial lawI, not the Code itself, which has to appl, to the complaint involved in the instant case. That Ispecial lawI, in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the ?or*men)s Compensation Even assumin(, without concedin(, that an emplo,ee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the ma+orit, rules, both options cannot be e-ercised simultaneousl,, and the e-ercise of one will preclude the e-ercise of the other. The petitioners had alread, e-ercised their option to come under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, and the, have alread, received compensation pa,able to them

under that Act. 4tated differentl,, the remed, under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act had alread, become a Ifinished transactionI. There are two considerations wh, it is believed petitioners should no lon(er be allowed to e-ercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. !n the first place, the proceedin(s under the ?or*men)s Compensation Act have alread, become the law in re(ards toI the Ielection of remediesI, because those proceedin(s had become a Ifinished transactionI. !n the second place, it should be plainl, e5uitable that, if a person entitled to an Ielection of remediesI ma*es a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no lon(er be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the ver, least, if he wants to ma*e a second election, in disre(ard of the first election he has made, when he ma*es the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court. B. )There is full concurrence on m, part with the dissentin( opinion of Mr. 0ustice 9utierreF upholdin( Ithe e-clusor, provision of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act.I ! ma, further add6 $. The ?or*men)s Compensation Act .Act No. ;:1'/ was approved on #ecember $<, $&12 and too* effect on 0une $<, $&1'. !t was patterned from Minnesota and 7awaii statutes. Act No. ;:1' was adopted b, the Philippine le(islature, in 4panish and some sections of the law were ta*en from the statutes of Minnesota and 7awaii, .Chapter 1<& of the Revised 8aws of 7awaii, $&1=/. GMorabe N !nton, ?or*men)s Compensation Act, p. 1H Cnder the ?or*men)s Compensation Act of 7awaii, when the Act is applicable, the remed, under the Act is e-clusive The followin( is stated in $ 4chneider ?or*men)s Compensation Te-t, pp. 1%%, 1%2. 4ec. $$1. 7awaii 4tatutor, 4,nopsis. The act is compulsor, as to emplo,ees in )all industrial emplo,ment) and emplo,ees of the territor, and its political subdivisions. .4ections 2:'<32:'$, 4.4., Eol. $, p. 2$;./ Compensation is not pa,able when in+ur, is due to emplo,ee)s willful intention to in+ure himself or another or to his into-ication. .4ec. 2:'1, 4.4., p. 2$;./ ?hen the act is applicable the remed, thereunder is e-clusive .4ec. 2:';, 4.4., p. 2$:./ 1. !n providin( for e-clusiveness of the remed, under our ?or*men)s Compensation Act, the Philippine 8e(islature worded the first para(raph of 4ection = of the Act as follows6 4EC. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation

shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said in+ur, .Para(raphin( and emphasis supplied/ !n re(ards to the intent of the 8e(islature under the fore(oin( provision6 A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meanin( and intention of the law3ma*in( bod, must be sou(ht, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinar,, commonl,3accepted and most obvious si(nifications, accordin( to (ood and approved usa(e and without resortin( to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law3 ma*in( bod, does not *now the meanin( of words and the rules of (rammar. Conse5uentl,, the (rammatical readin( of a statute must be presumed to ,ield its correct sense. .Espino vs. Cleofe =1 4CRA &1, &'/ G!talics suppliedH ;. The ori(inal second para(raph of 4ection = provided6 Emplo,ers contractin( laborers in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, e-clusivel, to in+uries received outside the !slands throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment. .!talics supplied/ The use of the word Ie-clusivel, is a further confirmation of the e-clusor, provision of the Act, sub+ect onl, to e-ceptions which ma, be provided in the Act itself. :. !t mi(ht be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus, 4ection %, in part, provides6 4EC. %. 8iabilit, of third parties.3!n case an emplo,ee suffers an in+ur, for which compensation is due under this Act b, an, other person besides his emplo,er, it shall be optional with such in+ured emplo,ee either to claim compensation from his emplo,er, under this Act, or sue such other person for dama(es, in accordance with law> ... .Emphasis supplied/ !f the le(islative intent under the first para(raph of 4ection = were to allow the in+ured emplo,ee to sue his emplo,er under the Civil Code, the le(islator could ver, easil, have formulated the said first para(raph of 4ection = accordin( to the pattern of 4ection %. That that was not done shows the le(islative intent not to allow an, option to an emplo,ee to sue the emplo,er under the Civil Code for in+uries compensable under the Act. =. There should be no 5uestion but that the ori(inal first para(raph of 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, formulated in $&12, provided that an in+ured wor*er or emplo,ee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to an, other law relative to the liabilit, of the emplo,er. After $&12, there were occasions when the le(islator had the opportunit, to amend the first para(raph of 4ection = such that the remedies under the Act would not be e-clusive> ,et, the le(islator refrained from doin( so. That shows the le(islatives continuin( intent to maintain the e-clusor, provision of the first para(raph of 4ection = unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.

.a/ The ori(inal second para(raph of 4ection = provided6 Emplo,ers contractin( laborers in the Philippine !slands for wor* outside the same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed b, this Act shall appl, .e-clusivel,/ to in+uries received outside the !slands throu(h accidents happenin( in and durin( the performance of the duties of the emplo,ment .and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such a(reement/. An 0une 1<, $&=1, throu(h RA 221, the fore(oin( second para(raph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the para(raph6 4uch stipulation shall not pre+udice the ri(ht of the laborers to the benefits of the ?or*men)s Compensation 8aw of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them. .Emphasis supplied/ !t will be seen that, within the Act itself, the e-clusor, character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the le(islator could have amended the first para(raph of 4ection = so that the emplo,ee would have the option to sue the emplo,er under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him. .b/ The ?or*men)s Compensation Act, which too* effect in $&12, (rants compensation to an in+ured emplo,ee without re(ard to the presence or absence of ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er. The compensation is deemed an e-pense char(eable to the industr, .Murillo vs. MendoFa, %% Phil. %'& G$&;'H/. !n time, it must have been thou(ht that it was ine5uitable to have the amount of compensation, caused b, ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er, to be the same amount pa,able when the emplo,er was not ne(li(ent. Based on that thin*in(, 4ection :3A 1 was included into the Act, on 0une 1<, $&=1, throu(h RA 221. 4aid 4ection :3A increased the compensation pa,able b, =<B in case there was ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er. That additional section evidenced the intent of the le(islator not to (ive an option to an emplo,ee, in+ured with ne(li(ence on the part of the emplo,er, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code. An 0une 1<, $&%:, 4ection :3A was amended .insubstantiall,/ b, RA :$$&. The le(islator was a(ain (iven the opportunit, to provide, but he did not, the option to an emplo,ee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code. ?hen a Court (ives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law3ma*er, the Court is un+ustifiabl, le(islatin(. !t is in view of the fore(oin( that ! vote for affirmation of the trial Court)s dismissal of the Complaint. GUT-ERRE4, 1R., J., dissentin(6 To (rant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file dama(es suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not onl, contrar, to the e-press provisions of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the lon( histor, of wor*men)s compensation. At the ver, least, it should be the le(islature and not this Court which should remove

the e-clusor, provision of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present 8abor Code on emplo,ees) compensation. ?or*men)s compensation evolved to remed, the evils associated with the situation in the earl, ,ears of the industrial revolution when in+ured wor*in(men had to rel, on dama(e suits to (et recompense. Before wor*men)s compensation, an in+ured wor*er see*in( dama(es would have to prove in a tort suit that his emplo,er was either ne(li(ent or in bad faith, that his in+ur, was caused b, the emplo,er and not a fellow wor*er, and that he was not (uilt, of contributor, ne(li(ence. The emplo,er could emplo, not onl, his wealth in defeatin( the claim for dama(es but a host of common law defenses available to him as well. The wor*er was supposed to *now what he entered into when he accepted emplo,ment. As stated in the leadin( case of Priestle, u. owler .; M. N ?. $, $=< Reprint $<;</ decided in $';2 Ithe mere relation of the master and the servant never can impl, an obli(ation on the part of the master to ta*e more care of the servant than he ma, reasonabl, be e-pected to do of himself.I B, enterin( into a contract of emplo,ment, the wor*er was deemed to accept the ris*s of emplo,ment that he should discover and (uard a(ainst himself. The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of ris* doctrine, the principle of contributor, ne(li(ence, and the man, other defenses so easil, raised in protracted dama(e suits illustrated the need for a s,stem whereb, wor*ers had onl, to prove the fact of covered emplo,ment and the fact of in+ur, arisin( from emplo,ment in order to be compensated. The need for a compensation scheme where liabilit, is created solel, b, statute and made compulsor, and where the element of fault3either the fault of the emplo,er or the fault of the emplo,ee3disre(arded became obvious. Another ob+ective was to have simplified, e-peditious, ine-pensive, and non3liti(ious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readil,, if not automaticall,, receive compensation for wor*3related in+uries. !nspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim bein( reco(niFed, emplo,ers) liabilit, acts were a ma+or step in the desired direction. 7owever, emplo,ers liabilit, le(islation proved inade5uate. 8e(islative reform led to the wor*men)s compensation. ! cite the above familiar bac*(round because wor*men)s compensation represents a compromise. !n return for the near certaint, of receivin( a sum of mone, fi-ed b, law, the in+ured wor*er (ives up the ri(ht to sub+ect the emplo,er to a tort suit for hu(e amounts of dama(es. Thus, liabilit, not onl, disre(ards the element of fault but it is also a pre3 determined amount based on the wa(es of the in+ured wor*er and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The wor*er does not receive the total dama(es for his pain and sufferin( which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The emplo,er is re5uired to act swiftl, on compensation claims. An administrative a(enc, supervises the pro(ram. And because the overwhelmin( mass of wor*in(men are benefited b, the compensation s,stem, individual wor*ers who ma, want to sue for bi( amounts of dama(es must ,ield to the interests of their entire wor*in( class. The nature of the compensation principle is e-plained as follows6 An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understandin( of the acts and the cases interpretin( them. B, the turn of the centur, it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and unavoidable variet, had become enormous, and (overnment was faced with the problem of who was to pa, for the human wrec*a(e wrou(ht b, the dan(ers of modern industr,. !f the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to

the carelessness of the emplo,er, e-istin( tort principles offered some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inade5uac, of the fault principle was manifest. The uncertaint, of the outcome of torts liti(ation in court placed the emplo,ee at a substantial disadvanta(e. 4o lon( as liabilit, depended on fault there could be no recover, until the fin(er of blame had been pointed officiall, at the emplo,er or his a(ents. !n most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usuall, fellow wor*ers of the victim, were torn between friendship or lo,alt, to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal b, the emplo,er, on the other. The e-pense and dela, of liti(ation often prompted the in+ured emplo,ee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were successfull, prosecuted, a lar(e share of the proceeds of the +ud(ment were e-acted as contin(ent fees b, counsel. Thus the emplo,er a(ainst whom +ud(ment was cast often paid a substantial dama(e bill, while onl, a part of this enured to the benefit of the in+ured emplo,ee or his dependents. The emplo,ee)s +ud(ment was nearl, alwa,s too little and too late. --- --- --?or*men)s Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who en+o, the product of a business3 whether it be in the form of (oods or services3 should ultimatel, bear the cost of the in+uries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ... --- --- --Cnder this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirel, or is subordinated to broader economic considerations. The emplo,er absorbs the cost of accident loss onl, initiall,> it is e-pected that this cost will eventuall, pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution amon( the ultimate consumers. 4o lon( as each competin( unit in a (iven industr, is uniforml, affected, no producer can (ain an, substantial competitive advanta(e or suffer an, appreciable loss b, reason of the (eneral adoption of the compensation principle. !n order that the compensation principle ma, operate properl, and with fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fi-ed at a fi(ure that will not disrupt too violentl, the traffic in the product of the industr, affected. Thus predictabilit, and moderateness of cost are necessar, from the broad economic viewpoint. .... Compensation, then, differs from the conventional dama(e suit in two important respects6 ault on the part of either emplo,er or emplo,ee is eliminated> and compensation pa,able accordin( to a definitel, limited schedule is substituted for dama(es. All compensation acts ali*e wor* these two ma+or chan(es, irrespective of how the, ma, differ in other particulars. Compensation, when re(arded from the viewpoint of emplo,er and emplo,ee represents a compromise in which each part, surrenders certain advanta(es in order to (ain others which are of more importance both to him and to societ,. The emplo,er (ives up the immunit, he otherwise would en+o, in cases where he is not at fault, and the emplo,ee surrenders his former ri(ht to full dama(es and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented b, compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasiFed. The statutes var, a (reat deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of wee*l, compensation pa,ments and the len(th of the period durin( which compensation is to be paid are matters concernin( which the acts differ considerabl,. The interpretation of an, compensation statute will be influenced (reatl, b, the court)s reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. !f the court feels that the basic compromise undul, favors the emplo,er, it will be tempted to restore what it re(ards as a proper balance b, adoptin( an interpretation that favors the wor*er. !n this wa,, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of e-treme conservatism ma, be transformed b, a s,mpathetic court into a fairl, liberal instrument> and conversel,, an act that (reatl, favors the laborer ma, be so interpreted b, the courts that emplo,ers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throu(hout the various +urisdictions must be attributed to this.I .Malone N Plant, ?or*men)s Compensation American Caseboo* 4eries, pp. %;3%=/. The schedule of compensation, the rates of pa,ments, the compensable in+uries and diseases, the premiums paid b, emplo,ers to the present s,stem, the actuarial stabilit, of the trust fund and man, other interrelated parts have all been carefull, studied before the inte(rated scheme was enacted in to law. ?e have a s,stem whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic theor, has to be followed. !f this Court disre(ards this totalit, of the scheme and in a spirit of (enerosit, recasts some parts of the s,stem without touchin( the related others, the entire structure is endan(ered. or instance, ! am personall, a(ainst stretchin( the law and allowin( pa,ment of compensation for contin(encies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainl,, onl, harmful results to the principle of wor*men)s compensation can arise if wor*men, whom the law allows to receive emplo,ment compensation, can still elect to file dama(e suits for industrial accidents. !t was precisel, for this reason that 4ection = of the ?or*men)s Compensation Act, which reads6 4EC. =. E-clusive ri(ht to compensation.3The ri(hts and remedies (ranted b, this Act to an emplo,ee b, reason of a personal in+ur, entitlin( him to compensation shall e-clude all other ri(hts and remedies accruin( to the emplo,ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of *in a(ainst the emplo,er under the Civil Code and other laws because of said in+ur,. ... Article $2; of the labor Code also provides6 ART. $2;. E-clusivenesss of liabilit,.@Cnless otherwise provided, the liabilit, of the 4tate !nsurance und under this Title shall be e-clusive and in place of all other liabilities of the emplo,er to the emplo,ee his dependents or an,one otherwise entitled to receive dama(es on behalf of the emplo,ee or his dependents. ! am a(ainst the Court assumin( the role of le(islator in a matter callin( for actuarial studies and public hearin(s. !f emplo,ers alread, re5uired to contribute to the 4tate !nsurance und will still have to bear the cost of dama(e suits or (et insurance for that purpose, a ma+or stud, will be necessar,. The issue before us is more far reachin( than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All wor*ers covered b, wor*men)s compensation and all emplo,ers who emplo, covered emplo,ees are affected. Even as ! have deepest s,mpathies for the victims, ! re(ret that ! am constrained to dissent from the ma+orit, opinion.

oo*!o*&# $ 4EC. :3A. Ri(ht to additional compensation.3 !n case of the emplo,ee)s death, in+ur, or sic*ness due to the failure of the to compl, with an, law, or with an, order, rule or re(ulation of the ?or*men)s Compensation Commission or the Bureau of 8abor 4tandards or should the emplo,er violate the provisions of Republic Act Numbered 4i- hundred sevent,3nine and its amendments or fail to install and maintain safet, appliances, or ta*e other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational disease, he shall be liable to pa, an additional compensation e5ual to fift, per centum of the compensation fi-ed in this Act.