~ I .! !lP J Lo. ..

, ne' ,

IS .J.J-" T

In the name of Allah the most

\ Compassionate and Merciful

u. S. S. R.

~OUN""Rv ~,~~n"'HT'ON IS NO~ "LG'S~A"'LY "UT~"~ITOT'H

Iran

Railroad --'''''

6aae50121!73'13

Department of State

Office of the Inspector-General, Foreign Service

Inspection Report

on

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN

August 1976

DISTRIBUTION NOTICE

This Inspection Report is an internal report of the Department of State and a direct part of the deliberative process of the Department. It evaluates the effectiveness of policy and the efficiency of management. It is intended for the Secretary of State and his principal officers and makes recommendations to them concerning changes in policy and management.

No distribution may be made outside of the Department of State, in whole or in part, except to those agencies which are directly involved in the formulation and management of foreign policy and then only with the prior written authorization of the Inspector General, Foreign Service, Department of State~ At missions and posts of the Department of State, appropriate portions of the report may be shown. ~t the discretion of the Principal Offirer, to representatives of other executive agencies or departments of the united States Government if they are directly concerned in the

policy recommendation under consideration.

Personnel Evaluation System

8

UNCIJ\SSIFIED

Memorandum Number

constituent Posts . . .

Consulate Isfahan Consulate Shiraz . Consulate Tabriz .

9.1 9.2 9.3

Other Agencies

u.s. Military Assistance and other

Defense Department activities in Iran 10.la

USIS • . . • . 10.lb

Post Narcotics Control Program. 10.le

Other Activities

d. The American Employees Association

b. Schools ..•••••

ILIa l1.1b

CHECKLIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS (available separately)

•

UNCLASSIFI!!ii

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IAAN

YNCLASSIFIED

Embassy Tehran

LIST OF PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Ambassador DCM

Section' Chie:fs:

Administrative conauj ar Economic/Comme,roial

Political Political/Military Science

,Other Agencies:

Defense Department:

DefRep ARMISH/MAAG Defense Attache

Agriculture

Drug Enforcement USIS

Consulates:

Isfahan

Shiraz

Tabriz

Richard M. Helms Jack C. Miklos

Roger A. Provencher Ward L. Christensen Roger C. Brewin David E, Westley Hawthorne Q. Mills Henry Precht

Albert S. Chapman

Eric von Marbod

Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Miles Col. Frank B. McKenzie', USAF

Paul J. Ferree Jack L. Greene· Gordon Winkler

Gene B. Marshall

Michael R. Arietti

Ronald E. Neumann

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

OYer time, ae the Shah correctly perceives, the· inte~e.t. of Iran and the U.S. in energy matters are not di •• imilar. Both countries will have to econolIi.e in the u.e of petrole\llll and natural gas for fuel and brinq into production alternative facilities for producing energy. The U.S. 'and Iran are currently ne90t1atin9 an agreement on atom1cenergy, as Iran

ia planning to in.tall nuclear power 'plants. It is t.portant, if the U.S. ie not to be cut' out of this near t.n billion dollar business by foreign competitor., for the U.S. to continue to give very high priority to tlle .... negotiation. and to eneure that

the Emba •• y in Tehran is adequately staffed to back, t~ end to deal with the full range of Iranian intereste in snergy, Bcience, and technology.

Iran's ability, through OPEC, to "tax" foreign con.umers of its petroleum and petrole\llll products

~ setting "artificial" prices for them enables Iran to finance its civilian and military development without official aid. The Shah sets his oWn priorities in the expenditure of foreign exchange. He

wants and gets the latest U.S. military equipment,

and he finances U.s. , military and civilian advisers, technicians and instructors. The GOI also contracts fo .. facilitiesand technical assistance and training i~ny civilian fields. The U.S. is a preferred supplier in both the military and the civilian fields. There is considerable-£oncern among Washington agencie. le.t the GOI over~reach itself one way or another and 1eayt the U.S. to share the blame for all sorts

., prob1~e of both macro- and micro-economic nature

( •• q., o~-expenditure on the military forces at

~ expen.e of the civilian sector; production cost over-run. on specific weapons systems).

COHFIDENTIAL

There are, of course, risks of this kinde They can not be avoided. However, they should be minimised by careful study of the costs and impacts of ,the GOI's programs that involve U.S. participation

'.0 that consultation with the Government of Iran could ~roVe its ~1y understandinq of the possible con-.quancesof.thes. programs. The U.S. should see to

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

The U.S.-Iran Joint Commission, established in 1974, was intended to further U.S.-Iranian cooperation in non-military fields. It has not yet led to the execution of projects on the scale expected-partly because Iran's petroleum revenues have not

kept pace with its expenditures and partly for other reasons (including Iran's belief that the U.S. should bear overhead expenditures for some of the reimbursable technical assistance extended to Iran). U.S. interests do not appear to have suffered as a result of the slow pace of Commission activity. The U.S. should stand ready )0 assist the GOI to ge~st U.S. ·goods and serv~ces, at full cost. U:S.-Iranian collaboration rests on Iran's bel~that the U.S.

has the world's best array of production goods and technology. The best is, usually, expensive. The u.S. interest lies in supplying the best; in purveying (on full cost-recovery basis) goods and technology having appeal for a well-funded developing nation anxious to be one up On its neighbors.

Looking to the future, it seems probab1e,that

Iran will continue on the course it took in 1973,

when OPEC took charge of world oil pricing. It is almost inevitable that Iran will continue to rer:r-

on the u.s. as the ma~or source of the extra-req~onal

su rt ~t needs for lts securit and develo ment.

Hence the U.S. presence n Iran wlll almost sure Y increase. There are now an est~mated 22,000-25,000 Amerlcans in Iran. It is believed that the number

may increase to some 30,000 in 1980-S1 and then level off. (Of the 30,000 in 1980-8l, some two thirds will be defense contractors and their dependents.) For this

and other reasons the Inspectors consider that the

u.s. Mission in Iran is more likely to grOW than-to shrink in the coming Years.

11 CONFIDENT""T.

SECRET

-7-

A second, paradoxical element in the situation

that has generated considerable concern amonq some elements of the American public is that Iran's growing economic and military strength, arising in

part out of our arms sales policy, may enable it to

play an independent regional role running counter to

U. S. interests. This concern has not been changed

by U. S. efforts to balance its arms sales to Iran

by similar assistance to other states in the region.

It remains that Iran has either reacHed, or ~on will reach. the point where it coUld pursue a regional policy at cfoSS purposes with that of the U. S., e.g., vis-a-vis its oil-rich Gulf neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, or Israel.

A third factor in the situation is that Iranian oil production 1s important to the U. S. and vital-at least for the time being--to Western Europe, lsra6l and Japan. American policy makers must take this into account in dealing with the Shah. Further, the u. s. - Iranian economic relationship, even the nonmilitary portion of it, is large and expanding. In 1975, the bilateral balance of trade, excluding military sales, amounted to $1.1 billion in favor of the U. S. Iran will doubtless be an important market for the U. S. for the foreseeable future.

Finally, the evolution.of U. S. policy towards Iran has resulted in a very heavy emphaSis on the military and intelligence elements of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

3. U. S. Interests

.Broad U. S. interests call for the continuance of a stable, responsible and friendly Iran. They also require a great deal of practical coop~ration. The United States needs certain militar~intel1igenCe facilities which are essential to t AmerIcan capacity to monitor and analyze Soviet missile developments

and capabilities and Soviet adherence to arms control agreements. The Inspectors were told that there are

no alternative locations to those the U. S. now has

in Iran. The United States also needs overflight

14

SECRET

-8-

4. Key Policies

The U. S. policies that flow from it .• interests

in Iran and the Gulf region have remained fairly consta~t over the past years. Though not embodied in

any single policy document, the U. S. has sought to secure its interests in Iran through a regional policy framework which, of course, gives rise to differences in the specific policies followed in individual countries to achieve the general objectives. Main elements of this policy were reiterated by the Secretary of State as recently as August 1976. The policy framework has been:

ro ress. T ~s as ~nc ude e~ng =re~spo===n~s77.v~e"t~o~t~e~qu~e~s~t~s~~r=o=m~the regional states for advice on military equipment and services they need

to meet their defense and internal security needs as thay perceive them, and being responsive on a CAse

by case basis to requests to purchase equipment or services. A Presidential decision in 1972 specifically affirmed such a policy towards Iran: " ••• in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equ~pment should be left pr1mar11y to the GOvernment of Iran.

15

SECRET -9-

d. To eliIahd the U.S. diplomatic, cultural, technical, conunerCl.A, and fl.nanclai' presence and-&ctl.vitl.esJ and

The U. S. has a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Iran, concluded in a CENTO context in '1959, which commits the U. S. to tak~ mutually agreed upon action to assist Iran "in case of Aggression against Iran" by a Communist country. There is also a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, as well as an Investment Guaranty Agreement.

B. Policy Formulation System'

1. Policy Formulation

• As is true generally of the US foreign policy process, a variety of more or less interlocking systems and interest groups determine US policy towards Iran and the Gulf region. Ha~or decisions are reached by the seventh floor and Wh1te Hou.e. Thi. top level involvement in the USG ml.rrors, to an extent, that

of the Shah in Iran. Effective execution requires,

of course, timely advice" to the us officials con~erned of policy decisions affecting them. In the case of

1 s

SECRET - 10 -

Iran, the Assistant Secretary for NEA, the Ambassador and, to a lesser extent, the Country Director are usually informed and can oversee developments so as

to conform to high level decisions without 'excessive confusion or false-steppinq. In a recent ,case, how-ever, Treasu+y officials stated that theywer~ not informed about the US position on 8 possible Iranian arms-for-oil barter arrangement involving very 5ubstantail sums of money.

The· Embassy and Country Direct.orate contribute actively to the preparation of ongoing policy assesSments which, judging from results, have some impact

on higher level decision makers. other 'agencies can' and do make their input to the policy formulation process by means of Country Team procedures in the field. In Washington this input is achieved through day-to-day contact with the Country Directorate. The ~;ear East Inter-Departmental Group has not played the active role some previous examinations of US Gulf region po l Lcy have concluded would be desir-al:>le.

In a major attempt to illuminate Some of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in US efforts"to pursue an active bilateral relationship with Iran while at the same time not foreclosing advantageous regional policy options, the Political/Military Inter-Departmental Group has produced a study (response to NSSM 238) "US Policy Towards the Persian Gulf". This is a useful compendium of the issues involved. It provides much background information and shows the complicated interaction which~policy initiatives in one area may have

in others. This study reaches no clear "concj us Lons

about the desirability of various policy "mixes" and

its usefulness may remain, in consequence, chiefly

as a r~ference work.

1 7

-11-

Affecting the development of policy, but outside the formal system, are the meetings of US officials

of several agencies with Iranian officials, occasionally including the Shah. Such meetings are necessary for the conduct of much Government business. They

are desirable to the extent that the results fit in with US policy and are known to those principally responsible for the execution of that policy. Inevitably, this is not always the case. There has been at least one instance in which contact with the Shah by high level US military officials resulted in what could

be, and apparently was, regarded as a us commitment

to use certain facilities in the Iranian Indian Ocean port of Chah Bahar if they Were developed. It'was

not an inconsequential matter as tberewas no Iranian need for them (aircraft carrier turnaround basin, large submarine repair facilities) and the Inspectors.were told that they could have added as much a8 several hundred million dollars to the cost of developing the port.

It is not clear, on the basis of information available to the Inspectors, whether this apparent departure from US policy was the result of misunderstanding, ignorance or a lack of awareness of the implications of the specificmeaeures proposed. In any event, had the Shah gone ahead with the development plan, incorporating facilities which could logically only be used by the U. S. Navy, it would have cast doubt on the Administration's publicly declared Indian Oc~an policy, which stresses the limited nature of

U. S. naval deployment plans. It would have had adverse effects on a number of bilateral and reqional relationships, to say nothing of the credibility of the Executive Branch on the Hill at a time when the upgrading of the US naval facility at Diego Garcia

was the subject of some controversy. In the event,

it appears that the case has been handled so that the potential adverse impact may be minimal. Neverthele8S, it would seem that there was either some looseness

in operations or lack of control and understanding

of US policy by those involved.

1 S

~ -12-

Increased Congressional involvement in the

foreign affairs processes. generally has an effect

on the formulation of policy affecting Iran. The country's strategic importance, huge purc:ha'ses of US arms, potential Middle East role, oil pricing policies and authoritaTian form of government have all been

the object of questioning by one or another element

of the Congress. Particular Congressional attention has been focused in the past on the oil price issue, and currently On the long range commitments and possibly dangerous consequences arising from US arms sales to Iran and other Gulf states. The Inspectors consider that the Executive Branch has been attentive to these concerns and has engaged in a.process of consultation --as reflected, especially recently, in the record

of the Hamilton Subcommittee hearings--which has

gone some way to explain and justify official policy. This process has not, of course, reconciled the intractable problems of our policy nOr fully satisfied members of Congress that their concerns have been taken into account adequately. Nevertheless, the process has been a useful and, in the Inspectors'

view, a constructive one.

c. Polie" Effectiveness

US policy towards Iran has been highly effective

in securing most US interests. The Onl*esignificapt

US ob ective not attained has been 1n t area of

o~l pr1C "9 po 1CY. TO e u ye ect~ve, weer

1n a b~laterai or multilateral cpntext, US ·efforts

to achieve lower oil frices will have to be aart of

a nat10nal enerty po11cy, proPerly lnteSiate wlth effect.1.ve multi ateral negotlat.1.ona •. T absence 0,£ such a policy, conversely, makes it unlikely that US repfesentations to the Shah on this subject will achieve desired results.

19

gSRE'r -13-

The US policy of supporting regional efforts to achieve collective security throllgh security assistance, arms sales and other 5uppc)'rt--i.e., the' Nixon Doctrine--would appear to have contributed to a situation in the Gulf region today that is more sat~sfactor from the us v~e ~nt'than 1t his been

or many years. T, e area srelat1ve y peace u •

Iran and Iraq have patched up their relations and Iran has moved to improve its relations with o~her Arab governments. The rebellion in Dhofar'is

under control as a result of Iranian armed intervention. However fragile the foundations of the present. quiet and uncertain the future, it is a fact that there is relative political stability and rapid economic development taking place throughout the region and

that the US benefits in commercial and political terms from this situation.

If U.S. policies may be judged to have been successful in securing key US interests, they have also produced some paradoxical results. One of these, already mentioned, is that Iran is becoming a power-thanks in part to US arms sales policy--capable of playing a regional role opposing, as well as furthering, us interests. Another is that the Iranian desire to purchase US arms and US willingness to go far in permitting these purchases has had the practical and distorting effect of making the roilitaryelementthe key factor in the bilateral relatLonshLp. In the longer run, this may not be the best basis for a constructive relationship. US-policy recognizes this and calls for expanded contact,in the cultural, trade, and other areaSI but this hasrtot altered the facts. Also, in an increasingly nationalistic Iran, the US

has become identified as the principal external support for a ruler who, however enlightened and progressive his aspirations for his people, is nevertheless master of an authoritarian and undemocratic regime. This promises to present the us with future pr~blems.

2~

SECRET

-14-

ness

er ter~a to e ne lots m te. A 0 1.0 a s ap-

pear to agree there must be limits, but where they

are or should be remains a gray area which needs clarification. The traditional distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons are inadequate guides.

Also, the question arises as to the limit which Iran, in its own interest, ~hould place on its use of Scarce resources for militarypurposes--at the expense of

its social and economic development.

21

-15-

CONFIDENTIAL

II. MANAGEMENT

A. Policy Execution

Iran's Government is highly centralized in the person of the Shah. Accordingly, the effective execution of u.s. policy in Iran depends to a remarkable degree upon the acceSs of the Ambassador and ranking members of his Mission staff to the Shah and to the small circle of Iranian o f f-Lc La La who have influence with him. The Ambassador has excellent personal access to the Shah and other key Iranian o~fioia15. There are other high ranking Mission officers who also have this access, which they exercise with the Ambassador'S knowledge and full control, thus assuring adequate and effective communication with the Government of Iran at top levels. In the Ambassador's absence, the OeM has like access to the Shah, the Minister of Court, and other Iranian Ministers and effectively fills the Charg~ role.

B. Bilateral Relations

Since World War II U.S. relations with Iran have been close and have expanded in recent years to cover a broad spectrum of political, military, intelligence, economic/financial/investment, and technical matters. Iran's geographic position and oil resources and the Shah's geopolitical perceptions of Iran's leadership have led Iran to intimate collaboration with the united States on many key issues. The United States has been prepared to reciprocate this.collaboration,

-~s it is u.s. pOlicy under the Guam Doctrine to favor those countries, such as Iran, which are

ready, willing and able to assume regional security responsibilities.

Relations between the Embassy and the Government of Iran reflect the excellent relationship between the two countr~es. Not only do the Ambassador and other des1gnated officials have close and friendly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-16-

relationships with the Shah and other senior officials of the Government of Iran, but other officers of the Mission have good access to Iranian Government off~. cials and to important leaders in the private sec~r. These contacts are not always as useful as they might

be, however, because all .. or deciaiona in Iran ar~ made at the toP. Even relative y sen or of c a a are no

well ~nformed about policies and plana and have little influence on them. The Embassy a180 haa difficulty

in developing information about dissidence and about attitudes among the military because of Iranian sensitivities and the Government of ~;-an'8 disapproval of foreign contacts with these groups.

c. Resources

The nature of the US-Iranian,bilateral relationship, described above, is such that the

pattern of u.S. official resources devoted to Iran responds to Iranian decisions as to what Iran'needs and can afford.

There have been adequate resources--except for physical plant--to carry out the ~lica objectIves

of the MissIon. These resources soul continue to suffice for the time being, pending possible Iranian decisions to request more reimbursable technical aasistance. The Ambassador has sought to keep the official presence in Iran at the minimum consistent with operational effectiveness. Even so, the non-official presence has continued to grow and--given Iran's increased income and its propensity to rely on the United States for military and civilian goods and services--the Amel.'ican presence in Iran will continue to increase. So, too, will the flow of Iranian visitors (especially students, officials and trainees) to the United States. These factors, plus inflationary pressures in Iran, make inevitable some increase in the resources the Embassy will require in the future.

AS the'Mission has grown, the Embassy Chancery building has become grossly inadequate to meet office needs. The efficiency and security of a number of

CONFIDENTIAL

21

-17-

COliFIDEliTIAL

Mission elements (notably those of the Consular Section) are hampered by their having to occupy inconvenient an4 make-shift quarters. Them.jar immediate resource requirement of the Embassy ~8 for suitable off~ces for these elements untl.l such time ¥ the Chancery is expanded. Plans for expansion of the Chancery have been approved; the current need is for budgetary provision to carry them out.

D. Management of the Mission

The authority and responsibility of the Ambassador for all official American activities in Iran are understood and accepted by every subordinate element. His control over the diverse military units in Iran

was strengthened in 1975 by the creation of the position of Senior Defense Representative, who has coordinating authority over the entire military establishment. The Defense Representative reports directly to and

takes policy guidance from the Ambassador, as do all other agency representatives. The Ambassador meets daily with Heads of Section, weekly with the country Team, and whenever required with all other U.S. agencies ,and representatives in the Mission in order to maintain essential communications and coordination.

Many day-to-day management problems are left to the

DeM and to Heads of Section and other Mission elements.

E. Management of State Elements

In general, the Executive Office manages Embassy Sections by direction and delegation. Section Chiefs bring jurisdictional and other operational problems

to the Executive Office for resolution. They, in turn, are expected to manage their sections. This style"of operation has been effective in most areas, but it presents some problems of compartmentalization and lateral communicati0ne that need attention. Also, of course, managerial problems vary from Section to Section and some Heads of Section are better managers than are others. The Political and Political/Military Sections are doing well; however, political officers

COliFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-18-

might do more in-country travel and expanding work requirements of the Political/Military Section may socn call for an additional officer position. The Economic/Commercial Section is also performing wellr however, it could be better integrated, and 'it could work more efficiently if .pace permitted consolidating offices and some functions. The Administrative section has good leadership and i. using effective management methods to get good results. Some major problems (e.g., housing) are on the way to solution. The Embassy has avoided the impact of position ceilings by the use of contract personnel, and. the resulting situation needs to be regularized. The management of the Consular Section needs to be improvedt but improvement in some areas will depend on obt.a Ln.Lnq suitable office and reception space.

F. Constituent Posts

Overall, the Embassy gives the three Consulates adequate administrative support. Certain security measures remain to be taken, however. The Consulates should have ade~uate emergency radio communIcatIons fac1lit1es I1nk1n them to the Ernba... PolIcy gu~dance an general superv~s~on ~s provided by the Embassy's Consular Coordinator, currently the Deputy Head of the Political Section. At some point this responsibility should be transferred to the Counselor for Consular Affairs, whose position should then be upgraded to Consul General. The Consulates would benefit from closer supervision and aoordination of thelr consular and their commercial work. Consulate Tabri~ inal ost and should be closed. Consulate also rnarg na at present, s auld be retained to serve a growing American community. Consulate Isfahan I s offices and consular. residence are bOth insecure and should be relocated.

G. Relations with Washington

The Mission and its senior officers have enerall

satisfactory relat10ns w1th Wash1ngton at severa s.

The Country D1rectorate is ably staffed and 18 the

focal point for back-stopping the Embassy and for the

CONFIDENTIAL

-19-

CONFIDENTIAL

execution of policy in Washin9ton. The Oirectorate has close and effective contacts with the Department of Defense and with the large number of Washington agencies interested in Iran. On certain matters (e.g., long-term energy policy, future exports of nuclear technology and other matters which are under consideration at high levels within the Department and the Administration) the Country Directorate obtains little current information or guidance to pass along to the Mission. When the latter does get guidance on such matters or reports on them the cor- ,

,respondence often is given highly restricted distribution, both in Washington and at the Mission. Other agency representatives believe that they are not receiving in timely fashion all the information that would be of use to them.

A ma~or problem of Mission-Washington relations

is that 0 handling arms sales effect1velt" The Government of Iran has complained of diff culty in obtaining from the Mission (ARMISH/MAAG) firm and accurate data on the costs of weapons systems. This problem is recognized, the Inspectors understand, and steps to cope with it are being taken. In their view, the Mission should be in a position not only to provide valid acquisition cost data but also good estimates of follow-on costs (training, operational, maintenance, etc.) of installing weapons systems. Also

it should have the capability to provide to the Government of Iran useful micro- and macro-economic estimates of effects on the Iranian economy of the Government of Iran's present and projected armaments program. It would serve the interests of both Governments to have such information available. Ill-informed Iranian decisions to purchase costly U.s. weapons systems are likely to backfire on both parties and to sour the relations between them. The Inspectors recommend that the Mission take the initiative in launching a study of the costs, direct and indirect, of Iran's military purchase program and that the Department (NEA/IRN) coordinate inter-agency back-stopping of

the study.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-20-

H. . Recommendations

1. The Department (FBO) should include in its next budget submission funds to enlarge the Chancery of Embassy Tehran and should rigorously defend this position.

2. The Department (M) .should close Consulate Tabriz.

3. u.s. Mission Tehran should. with support from the Department (NEA/IRN~ analyze the impact of the Government of Iran.' sarma purchase pr09ram on the Iranian economy. so. that,. if appropriate, the Government of Iran may be. given not only u.s. estimates of the direct financial cost. of its program but also of its impact on the Iranian economy.

CONFIDENTIAL

2.7

3. Embassy Tehran should, if it is implement Recommendation No. 7.1g-1, use and/or vacant land near the perimeter of rehouse the entire consular operations. 7 .lg-2.)

not possible to existingracilities the compound to ' (Recommendation No.

- 21 -

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN

III. PRECIS OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department (FBO) should include in its next budget submission funds to enlarge the Chancery of Embassy Tehran and should rigorously defend this position. (Recommendation No.1.)

2. Embassy Tehra,n should locate and lease, adequate facilities to house in one location the major elements at the Post that serve the public. (Recommendation No. 7.1g-1.)

4~ Embassy Tehran should give high priority to remodeling and refurbishing the Consular Section. (Recommendation No. 5-1.)

5. The Department (M) should close Consulate Tabriz. (Recvrnmendation No.2.)

6. U.S. Mission Tehra:t:l should analyze the impact of the Government of Iran's arms purchase program on the Iranian economy so that, if appropriate, the Government

of Iran may be given not only U.S. estimates of the direct financial costs of its program but also its impact on the Iranian economy. (Reccmmendation No.1.)

7. Embassy Tehran should, in consultation with NEA/ EX, (a) determine how many of the 40 contract laborer positions represent a valid, high priority requirement~

(b) reprogram the positions recommended by the Inspection team for abolishment; (c) review each remaining local position to determine whether additional positions can be reprogrammed; (d) request additional positions not covered by reprogramming; and (e) discontinue t.he unauthorized contract for laborers. (Recommendation No. 7 .le-ll.)

00 L

.... - .. "W -

Post

(>opt.

Tehran

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Delete

Table 1 - List of All Resource Recommendations

Relocate or Otherwise Adjust

Abolish two of three Budget and Fiscal Officers--PoSition Nos. 53-2115-438, 53- 2115-353, or 530.l(p).

Discontinue paYing transportation costs of servants.

Abolish two C&RAmeri~ can positions. (Nos. 55-2412-104, 55-2412- 168, 55-2412-232, 55-2412-280 or 55-2410-311.) .

Terminate contract for 40 laborers.

Cease improper use of personal service contracts.

Cease housing the cook and driver in the transient apartments.

Add

Re~.st funds (estim#ted at $3 million) for enlarging Chancery

AuthOrize and provide funds for an on-line computer terIllinal for visa clearance ••

Consider use of a word-processing machine and more use of form letter. in Consular Section.

Provide more recreational facilities within the Embassy compound.

Local position

for C&R unclassified processing unit.

Request additi~na1 local positions not covered by reprogramming to replace contract laborers. ,

Locate and lease facilities to hou.e in one location the major .elements at the Post that .erve the public.

Givehig~ priority to remodeling and refurbishing the Consular Section.

Assure that most Consular Officers assigned to Iran speak Farsi.

Regrade to FO~04 the lead position in American Services Branch and reclassify one of the junior officer PQ-' sitions from 3010

to 3045 and the remaining one to 3025.

Provide on a high priority basis improvements to the Student Visa Annex.

Reassess adequacy of !:mbassy re.~rces to monitor Iranian plans and progr~s to acquire military military equipment.

'.hran

Delete

Add

Install adequate wireless communications facilities between th~ Embassy and the constituent posts.

Install facilities in parking lot adjacent to Consular Annex.

one local secretary for Director, Trade

Center. "

One local fiscal assistant and secretary "to the Deputy Director, Trade Center

Relocate or Otherwise Adjust

Redesignate-, at the appropriate time, the Counselor for Consular Affairs as the Coordinator of the Consulates and redesignate the position as FSO-02, Consu.l General.

Make necessary repairs to the Marine house.

Institute a fu11- scale Junior Officer Rotational Program.

Undertake a systr • atic desk-audit ~ all State local positions.

AbOlish and reprogram five of the ten local poSitions assigned to the Voucher Examination UnitPosition Nos. 531.1 (p), 531. 6a (p) , 531.6b(p), 531.5(p), 531.7b(p), 531.12(p~ 531. 9b (p), 534.0 (p) , 533.2(c). or

531.15.

Abolish and reprogram the Chief Cashier position (No. 532.2(p}) and one of two remaining cashiers (Position NOB. 532.2(p) or 531.7&j }

~

Tehran

Delete

Add

Improve the telephone system.

Rehouse the entire consular operations on the compound if lease facilities cannot be found.

convert transient apartments to permanent housing for single personnel.

Modernize and improve the four prefab houses 10- c'ated on the compound.

Expedite construction of staff apartment building and consider increasing the number of units.

Install working counter in reception area.

Implement security survey recommendations.

O.1e PIT pasi ticn for six month period.

Insta'l door with cipher lock to bar entrance to back offices.

•

Relocate or Otherwise Adjust

Abolish and reprogram one of seven positions in Funds Control Unit (Position Nos. 530.6(H 531.2(p). 531.11(p). 532.3. 531.13. 531.14 (p). or 530.3).

Determine optimum size of DEA staff. in MODE context.

Abolish ~nd reprogram four telephone operator positions (Position Nos. 551.4 (p) • 551.10(p). 551.3(p). 551.9. 551.13(p).

551. 7 (p). or 551.8 (p).

Discontinue work on thE garden or charge all costs to representational expenses.

Request additional driver positions if they affect overtime costs.

Continue efforts to find more secure· offices and residential quarters.

•

Tabriz

Cl\ncei oontract for cieaning ,

serviceil. ..

seii addit1ti11ai illlictlonil of th.

eOinliOlirid , '

•

Qp4't:e ci~rcii.i tllitel:til!bli!:Hi:itllti' '

Inatiii ,.ut~atic t.l.~bbne art.werin~ lIeiW:;I!,

Ibilta11 v;;flHh!J ' eoWttet ill hitiepHdh area·"

lmpllli~ent recommendations of latest security itlfrVey.

convert witl!J tlf

I1f.f Lee bUilc1i1l1l

lI .... uaed lily sOhabl ttl' .. tllii!cI~l:. fc:n: vieliConllul.

12

Relocate 0;( ,Otbentiile IIl!1uilt

Abbiish and reprogram to Et\\llas'ay Tehran two qat\lener and one 9" 'rll positions (Noa. T-~'

6, lS'I I T~S-7 (pI, and 'r-S-lb (pI) •

Table 2. Sununary of Recommended Position Changes

Delete ~ ~
FSO/R FSS 1"SI; FSO/R FSS FSL rSO/R FSS FSL
Tehran 0 13 0 0 19 -3 0 +6
Tabriz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3
Isfahan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shiraz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grand Total -3 0 +3 11

Table U.S. Government Refources, IranY
current p.uth. Complement Appropriated $ Fund~
(Nearest Thousands)
~ER ~ F'y-76 zx-zz FY-78£'/
2.TATE
Program 48 30 1,497 1,832 2,125
Shared 34 142 ., ,585 4,020 4,663
Representation 33 49 57
FBO 76 160 162
FSI ~ ~ -----l2
TOTAL STATE 82 172 5,203 6,075 7,024
MARINE GUARDS 13 22 22 23
Q.§ll
General Operations 14 80 1,279 1,535 1,781
ISS 1 11 12 13
Fulhright (25) Grants .-:ill ...-ill. ----ill.
TOTAL USIS 14 81 1,509 1,813 2,225 COIIIIBlICB Trade cuter

1

Faira

'l'O'rAL COMMERCE AGlllCuLTUtU!:

1

Attaohe

'l'O'rAL AGRlCUL'l'URE PEACE CORPS

! 2

! 2

'l'O'rAL PEACE CORPS

.... '"

.1'. C. Phases OUt FY-76

g DAO

Other 000 Personnel, incluainq MAAG, TAFT, etc

'l'O'rAL

1758

,

, 237 288

2!. 556

260 160

..l!

,430

ill 171

127

8638

301 1116 ...ll 499

ill

204

•

146

10121

y

Source, u.S. Embassy, Tehran. Figures on us 000 Personnel; however, are fromOOD figures.

2/

-~!i~l~~g:~. is based on 16\ average'increase factor over FY-77 in State and most agency

! 1

~ S

ill 102

ill.

S14

7

5

102

63411

902

8008

3/

-The GOr ~ill pay for all but 8 HAAG positions under the FY-77 security assiatance/ TAFT contract. That contract totals $75.9 million and covers 100' of the TAFT cost and 70-80% of support unit costs.

Tehran, Iran March 8, 1979

His Excellency

Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi -Deputy Prime Minister Tehran, Iran

Excellency:

The U. S. Embassy would appreciate beinl able'to re,ain acces.' to the MAC T,!rminal ,at Mehrab.d Airport ,in ordel\ to recover various items of cargo, household good., .ail .nd ~.r.onal vehicles which are located in the, cargo yard .Addi~ional1y, we respectfully request your .pproval to enter the NAC Terminal Commander's Office and the Oper.tions Office in

order to re~over contractual records to in.~r. proper paym~t of obligations to Iran Air and t'o recove\" various penonal effects.

We would welcome being .ccomp.nied by ... be,.. of ~he lran.Aii committee. We desire to enter the MAC termin.l .re. on Sunday, March II, for removal of items listed in para,r.pb one.

Sin,c;e$.rel J

-;

1!'Ui , •• ' " Sulliv.n A ... b ...... r

DAO:ColSchaefer

NNNN

00 RUEllC RUSNAAA

m RUQMIlR #3165 0810845 ZNY CCCCC ZZH

o 220837Z MAR 79 :m AMEMlASSY 'll1llRAN

TO RUEHc/SECSTAm WASHLC NIACI IMMEDIAm 0486 INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEllR

·.BT

CON F I D E'N T I A L 'IEffiAN 3165

,E.O. 12065: GOO 3/22/85 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H.) OR-M TAGS:' MILt, IR

SUBJEC'l': IRANIAN FMS PRCX!RAMS

m': STAm 069188

1. (C-Em'IRE TEXT).

2, IXJROO PRIME MINIS'IER'S NCM RUZ RECEPl'ION, I SPOKE TO EmEZAM AND YAZDI SEPARATELY ABOOT POOl MISSI<lI SCHEruLED MEEr WI'lll USG IN WA.SJIDmON MARCH 26. NEI'rnEROOE KNE.W ANY'lllIID ABOOT IT.

3. ENI'EZAM SAID HE FELT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE PRaIJA'lURE SINCE POOl

HAD NaI' YEl' S'lWIED PROBIEI>!.

HE SUGGESTED MEE:l'ING BE FreTPONEIJ. I

SAID INITIATIVE CAME FIDI IRANIANS AND ACTION TO POSTPONE lnJLl) HAVE TO CCJ>lE F'RC.M lliIS END.

SULLIVAN

BT #3163

NNNN

RR RUDKRB

DE RUQMHR #3395 0881315

zm SSSSS 2ZH

R 2912592 MAR 79 liM AMElIlBASSY TEHRAN

W AMElIlBASSY BElGRADE 001 BT

SEC RET TEHRAN 3395

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSAIXlR EAGlEBURGER FIOI SULLIVAN

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/28/85 (SULLIVAN, WIlLIAM "I.) 01'1-"1 TAGS: OOEN

SUBJ: IRANIAN AMBASSAIXlR W YUGOSLAVIA, SALEHI

REF: BElGRADE 2308

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME W GIVE YOO COOENT JUIXlMENI' CONCERNING FATE WHICH MAY POSSmLY AWAIT YOOR FRIEND SALEHI IF HE SHCUID REIURN W TEHRAN. l>IJCH IEPENJ:I3 UPON HIS PERSOOAL BACKGJroND AND AlSO UPON FOLITICAL CLIMATE WHICH MAY EVENl1JALLY EWroE IN IRAN.

3. IF SALEHI HAD CI.aSE PERSOOAL TIES wrru SHAH,

IMPERIAL COORT, OR SAVAK, RE COOID BE IN SERIOOS TROOBIE IF HE REIURNS. IF, AS yOOR MESSAGE SOOGllSTS, RE IS ~ CONI'l\O\'ERSIAL PIiOFESSIOOAL, RE MAY BE ALL RIGHT. nIERE IS LITI'IE f'RECE[!;Nl' ON WHICH W DRAW AND A GmT IlEAL OF VAGAIrf IN '!HE ARBITRARY WAY. lIN WHICH '!HE WIIIillLS OF JUSTICE GRIND.

4. '!HE A-FOLl'l'ICAL F'QRo!E}! UNI:ER S&:RETAIrf FOR Fl:iREIGN AFFAIRS WAS i'El'MITJED W JmWN QUIEl'LY AT JlClo!E AND OONSIDEREU IlIMSEU' AT LmERTY. IICMEVER, WHEN RE WENT

W 'rnE AIRPORT W SEE OFF HIS F'I!EmIl-BORN WIFE 00 A 'IRIP. W PARIS, lIE WAS ARRESTED AND lIAS oor BEEN SEI!N SIJ«:E.

ON 'rnE 0lHER HAND, A LT. GENERAL WHO WAS RETIRED BY '!HE REVOWI'Ioo moPPED IN W HAVE TEA WIlli ME RECENl'LY AND SEEMS AT EASE.

5. I KNCM OF M:l RPT M:l RECAILED ,AMBASSAIXlRS WHO COOID,

39

40

SERVE AS usEFUL GUIDE. SCME PRE.VIaJSLY Rm'IRED ARE STILL

rRAWINJ PENSIONS. WHETIHEll Nl!M.Y RE::rIRED WILL HAVE SAME

PRIVILEXlE !EPENDS rn CAPRICE OF "CCfolMITIEE" AT FUREIGN MINISTRY. FOREIGN MINIS'IER WID ME HE WISHED HETAIN PROFE'SSIrnALS, BUT HE MAY SOON LOSE HIS CMN JOB BECAUSE OF INl'EIllIItCING SQUABBIES.

6. mE '1HING SALaII SHOOLD RECOJNIZE IS '!HAT HIS NAME WILL PROBABLY BE CN LIST OF SENIOR OFFICALS FRCM PAlIIAVI REGlJIIE WHO WILL lOC1I' RPT lOC1I' BE PERIIITIl'D W LEAVE 'IRAN CNCE HE REIURNS. 'lREHEFORE, IF HE HAS lOC1I' MEANS OF LIVELIIIOOD AVAILABlE IN IRAN, HE MAY NOT RPT NOT BE ABLE W SEEK mE EISEWHERE !'DR 'lllE FORESEEABIE FUIURE. SULLIVAN

BT

#3395

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY ccccc ZZH

o 0613322 APR 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

11) SECSTATIl WASHIJC J»!EDIATIl 0735 BT

CON F IDE N TIL L TEHRAN 03632

E.O. 12065: GIS 4/6/85 (NAAS, c.w.) OR-T'

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PINS, IR.

SUBJ: MEEI'ING WI'm FORMIN UNDERSECREl'ARY SALAMATIAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TIlXT)

2. AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, ACCCW'ANIED BY lXlof NAAS, MADE CALL APRIL 5 ON FONMIN UNDERSECRETARY SALAMATIAN WHO WAS RECENI'LY CCIIIFIFi!I!ED AS 'mE SECrnD RANKING MAN IN '!HE

IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. 'mE AMB NOmD 'mAT HE WAS

RE1URNING 11) 'mE UNITED STATIlS ON CON..'lULTATIOOS AND WANl'ED 11) KNCW WHAT MESSAGE 'mE PROVTSIONAL ISLAMIC REVOllJ'I'IOOARY GCJVERNoIENT OF IRAN WISHED PASSED 11) U.S. OFFICIALS. SALAMATIAN SAID 'mE AMB SlIaJLI) lMPRESS UPON 'IHOSE WI'IH WIOI HE COOSULmD 'mE SUCCESS OF 'mE REVOWTIONS AND 'mE IESIRE OF CLOSE FREINDSlUP WI'ffi 'mE U. S. HE ALUll 'mAT HE HAD DISCUSSED 'mIS MATmR PRIOR 11) 'mE Ml!El'INl WI'IH 'mE PRIME MINIim!:R AND 'mE FOREIGN MINISTER SO 'lHAT HIS S'I'Am.1ENl' OF FRIENrBHIP WAS SHARED BY 'mE HIGHEST Cl'FICIALS IN 'mE GOVER!fIll!NI'. 'mE AMB REPLIED 'lHAT HE HAD AIl!EADY 'roUl 'mE U. S. GOVER!fIll!NI' 'lHAT HE BELIEVES F'REINIlSIIIP WI'IH IRAN WIIL ENroRE AND 'lHAT BASIC INI'I!'.REST WIIL BE PRESERVED BUT IT WIIL BE A DIWERENI' . KiND OF REIATIOOSHIP 'mAN WE HAD WI'IH 'mE SIIMI'S 001- EI'!I!l'I!ml'. FUR MANY REASCtiS, 'mE UNI'IElJ STATIlS WISHES IRAN 'ID BE STRlll, FREE,. INlEPENlEiIT AND 11) MAINI'AIN

ITS NATICJIAL INmGRITY. WE LCOK FORWARD, HE SAID, 'ID

A N<HoIAL REIATIOOSHIP WI'lH IRAN:

3. SALAMATIAN, WHO SPEAKS SCFI'LY BUT WI'll! SCME ClIIEI!lttIl!S

OF PASSION, .SAID 'lHAT AMERICANS SIIOOID lJN[lER9TAND 'lHAT 'mE IRANIAN REVOImIcti HAS HAD MAllY a> 'mE SAME CHARAC'lERISTICS AS CUR <liN REVOImIcti IN 1776. 'mE GREAT AMERICAN PRESI~-WASIIING'Jnl, .JEl'ERSOO. LINCOil!-

41

TEHRAN 03632

CLASS: CONFIDEN'l'IIL CIIRGE: STATIl

APPRV: CHG: C'WNAAS DRFTD: CIIG:C'WNAAS ClEAR: NONE

DISTR: CIIG

POL

Nl~~N

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 03632

ARE GREATLY RESPECI'ED HERE. MANY ASPECTS OF 'mE IRANIAN CONSTI'IUTION WERE INSPIRED BY 'mE U.S. CONSTI'IUTION. HE QUOIED LINCOlN: n YOU CAN DECIVE SCl>!E OF 'mE PECPLE SCME OF 'mE TIME •••. , AND AIDED '!HAT A BASIC ERROR OF 'mE SlIAH WAS HIS BELIEF THAT YOU COULD DECEIVE ALL OF 'mE PECPLE

ALL OF 'mE TIME. HE WAS PIEASED, HE SAID, '!HAT 'mE UNITED

STATES WANTS AN INIJEPENDEm' IRAN WHICH fWNTAINS ITS

mREITORIAL INTEGRITY. 'mE IRANIAN REVOWI'ION WAS, HE

EMPHASIZED, PURELY IRANIAN.AND DID NO!' HAVE FOREIGN INSPIRATION •

4. THE AMB RESPONDED '!HAT 'mE usa UNDERSTANnS '!HAT 'mE

REVOrmrON WAS PURELY INl'ERNAL BUT OOE OF 'mE REALITIES ,·IE BOllI MUST FACE IS 'mE CONSTANT STREAM OF PROPAGANDA [.'R(JI) 'mE SOVIET UNION TRYING TO DECEIVE IRANIANS RE 'mE

U.S. ROLE HERE.

WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE HEAVY Fl..CM OF

LIES FOR-l MJSCCW AND 'mEN 'mE. REPETITION OF 'lliESE LIES HERE BY IRANIAN FRIENDS OF 'mE SOVIETS. HE NOIED '!HAT KAYIIAN WAS GUILTY IN PARI'ICULAR OJ" CARRYING SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND HE HOPED '!HAT SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS WOUID RECOGNIZE 'mE LIES. HE ADtED THAT, ON 'mE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS, PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN RECOGNIZED 'mE

DANGER OF THIS· PROPAGANDA. IN RESPONSE SALAMATIAN SAID

ONCE AGAIN THAT HE WAS PlEASED BY THE U. S. CONCERN OVER 'mE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF HIS COUNI'RY •

. roRNING TO 'mE IRANIAN PRESS, SALAMATIAN SAID '!HAT IT WAS NA'IURAL AFTER 25 YEARS OF SUPPRESSION THAT '!"HE PRESS WOUID ON OCCASION GIVE VENT TO ITS mOTIONS; 'mE FREEIXII! OF 'mE PRESS IS VERY IMPORTANT TO 'mE REITOIm'IONAlRES.

5. THE AMB REFFERED TO A RECENT KAYIIAN STORY '!HAT 'mE

u.s. HAD CONSPIRED WI'll! SAVAR TO BLOW UP 'mE HOUSES OF

A NUMBER OF PROMINENT IRANIAN REVOWI'IONARIES SUCH AS AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI. THE ARTICLE IS PURE FABRICATIoN BUT, THE AMB SAID, WE ARE CONCERNED '!HAT SUCH MATERIAL INCITES GTHER:; AND THAT THIS CAH RESUlT IN 'mE HARASSMENT OF PEOPLE ASSOCIA$!) WI'll! 'mE rnBASSY OR U. s. ;;TRMS. THE AMB 'mEN MENTIONED THE CASES OF REZA AMINI OF ICA, . MR. SHEBANI OF AIU AND DCWLATSIIAHI OF MOroROLA (SEnELS). NAAS

BT

#3632

OP 0914532 APR 79 F1" SECSTATE ~'ASH!lC

TO AM£~BASSY TEHR~N PRIORITY 1574-BT

CON I' IDE N T I A L

LII"In:n O""ICIAL USE STATE 1'1884e0 ~~R:!''-NT CHAf'INZL

"OR CH~RGE

_.0. 12065:ADS DiCONTROL l'POI; WHITE HOUSF ANNOUNCEI"fNT

TARS: AP~R (CUTLER, WALTiR L., "SO-I> SU3Jl CT: RENILST "OR AGR::il"C:NT

I. PRlSIDENT DESIRi:S APPOINT WALTER L. CUTLER (FSO-I> AS

AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. PLEAS,: IiEQU'::ST WRITT~N AGREMENT AND

IN"ORM DePARTMENT SOONEST WHEN Ar,R£.,ENT RECElV~D. REr.lUEST GOI OFFICIALS KC~P PROPOSED APPOINTMENT IN COMPLETE - CON"lO~NC~ p,.imING WHIT'; HOUSf. ANNOUNCEi"~NT NOMINATION. BID DATA It. 3IOGRAPHIC R .. GISTEH.

2. PL •. AS~ ElK PER~ISSIOK TO MAK~ AIWOUNCEI"ENT BASIS ORAL

AGRCMi:NT P:NDINQ REC£IPT WRITT~N AGR~MENT AN!l 1<ELEf.P

Jt.PART'1~~iT IN"ORM;:;[l POSSIBLE. TIMING. CHRISTOPHER

PT

'847~

NNNN

43

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE

CHG:CWNAAS CHG:CWNAAS

NONE

NONE

AMENBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASHOC, PRIORITY

AGREMENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: ADS DECONTROL UPON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT TAGS: APER (CUTLER, WALTER L., FSO-1)

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR AGREMENT

REF: STATE 88400

I DELIVERED NOTE TO FOREIGN OFFICE MORNING OF APRIL 11. GOUDARZNIA, HEAD OF FOURTH DEPARTMENT, THOUGHT THAT IRANIAN REPLY WOULD TAKE ABOUT A WEEK. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT TO HAVE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE ON THE BASIS OF ORAL AGREMENT. NAAS##

LINITED OFFICIAL USE

44

CONFIDENTIAL SHTE CHG:CWNAAS POL: J OS TEMPEL NONE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASH DC, IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI AI'IEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BAHRAIN

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEI'IBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

E.O. 12065: GDS 04/12/85(STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT

SUPJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE.)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE OUTLINED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AND SPEA~ FRANKLY ABOUT PROBLEMS. YAZDI, NOTING U.S. INVOLVEMENT WITH PAST REGIME, EMPHASIZED LETTING

PAST GO, COOPERATING IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND" HAVING NEW AMBASSADOR WHO UNDERSTOOD IRAN AND IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING POL CHIEF STEMPEL CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YAZDI AT HIS OFFICE APRIL 12. THIS CABLE COVERS GENERAL PRESENTATION; SEPtELS (NOTAL) WILL DEAL WITH OTHER SPECIFIC MATTERS.

4. CHARGE OPENED BY NOTING HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CONSULTATIONS' AND WOULD BE IN CHARGE UNTIL NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVED. HE EXPRESSED USG DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS

AS CONDITIONS PERMIT AND NOTED THERE WERE SEVERAL SHARED INTERESTS WHICH OFFERED OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S~ AND IRAN TO WORK TOGETHER. U.S. GOALS WERE SIMPLE: WE WANT TO SEE IRAN MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, REMAIN INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL DOMINATION AND DEVELOP ECONOI'IICALLY. TOUCHING ON PROBLEM OF PAST TIES TO OLD REGIME, CHARGE

SAID U.S. HAS NO ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND DOES NOT WISH" TO EMBARASS NEW GOVERNMENT BY PRESSING RECONCILIATION. USG WOULD BE RESPONSIBE TO IRANIAN WISHES. HE SOLICITED ANY

CONFIDENTiAL

4G

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTIONS YAZDI MIGHT HAVE ON STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THIS DI~ECTION, AND URGEQ DEPUTY PM TO BRING TO HIS ATTENT~N ANY PROBLE"S OR CHARGES AGAIN5.T U.S. CHARGE EMPHASIZED IT IS BETTER TO DISCUSS FRANKLY THAW TO'LET PROBLEMS FESTER •

. 5. YAZDI RESPONDED THAT ONE GREAT OBSTACLE TO' NORMALIZING IRANO-US TIES WAS INDEED QUOTE YO~R DEEP INVOLVEMENT WITH PREVlOUS REGI"E UNQUOTE. HE MOVED SWIFTLY TO MORE POSITIVE TACK, NOTING THAT GOVERNMENT IS READY TO NORMALIZE WHEN U.S. QUOTE DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS TO CORRECT PROBLEMS OF PAST UN~UOTE (UNSPECIFIED) WAS CLEAR. PAST IS PAST, HE SAID, AND IRANIANS ARE PRAGMATIC •• THERE ARE MANY AREAS FOR COOPERATION. IRAN WILL IN DUE COURSE NEED U.S. TEC~NOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. NORMAL RELATIONS WOULD BE

BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, YAZDI SAID, APPOINTMENT OF NEW AMBASSADOR WAS A VERY POSITIVE STEP, ES~ECIALLY IF HE IS QUOTE SOMEONE WHO UNDERSTANDS THE NEW GOVERN"ENT AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. UNQUOTE 'CHAItGE ASSURED HIM NEW APPOINTEE WOULD BE THAT KIND OF PERSON. (COMMENT: IF YAZDI HAS BEEN INFORMED OF APRIL 11 REQUiST FOR AGREMENT, HE GAVE NO HINT OF IT.) YAZDI THEN ADDED THAT NEW APPOINTEE SHOULD HAYE HAD QUOTE MINIMUM ANTIREVOLUTIONARY INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE CABINET AND RELIGIOUS LEAOERS,~CLUOING KHOMEINI, AU READY FOR NORMALIZATION AS BASIC STEPS ARE TAKEN:

6. OISCUSSION THEN TURNE~ TO QUESTION OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND OTHER SPECIFIC ITEMS (BEING REPORTED SEPTELS). NAASIIII

CONFIDENTIAL

46

SEC RET

~-)

TEHUN 03877/01

CLASS: SECRE~

CHRGE: STAn

APPRY, CHG:CWNAAS DRrTD: POL,JDSTIMPEL CLJ:AR: NONE

DIST!I POL ECON ICA

ZM! SSSSS ZZH

o 121353Z APi 79

rM AMIMBASS! TIHiAN

TO SEC STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0850 lIT

SIC ! I T SECTION 01 or TEHRAN 03877

J.O. TAGS I SUBJI

12e65: RGDS 4/12/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P PGOV, PINS, SHUM, IR

YAZDI MEETING: REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS

Rlrl A. TEHRAN 3859, B. STATE 90863

1. (C - EN!IRE TEXT -- THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN WITR SUMMARY NATURE or TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. YAZDI ACCEPTED CRITICISM, SAID GOJERNMENT WAS TRYING TO IMPROVE SYSTEM 01 JUSTICE, JU, PUBLIC ANGER WAS SUCH THAT NEW .GOVERNMENT HAD ~I1FI-

CULT! [IEPING REVOLUTIONARIES fROM .

IILLING rORMER OFFICIALS IN STREETS. TO UNDERLINE HIS

~~i:i'r~~E~HO~~Dp~~~~~~ i~~Tg:E;R~~S~~~T~H~~O~vi~~:CEO~~

nu PEOPLS WERE MI.D HOUT. TlIE GOV'SRlItlENT'S PROBLEM 'liAS IN CONVINCING REVOLUTIONARIES TO MA~E EVIDENCE PUBLIC. YAZDI ALSO NOTED TR~T COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES WERE !T WOI1, AND SAID GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY GOT ,HOMEINI ARGEEMENT TO HUMANITARIAN CLEMENCY AND SENTENCING POLICY. IMPLEMENTATION AWAITED RIGHT POLITICAL MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. lITER PRISENTATION OF U.S. VIEWS ON TIES WITH NEW

REGIME (REl A), CHARGE TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS IN SPIRIT OF FRAN( AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS. DRAWING ON REF ! GUID.'NCE, CHA~r.E EXPliESSED CONCERN BEING lELT BY MANY IN U.s., PARTICULARLY THOSf,

WHO HAD SUPPORTED IRANIAN REVOLUTION, AT ACTION OF

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THIS REACTION COULD

SLOW DOWN PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. JUST AS IRA~IAN REVOLUTIONARIES SUSPECT U.S. OF CERTAIN THINGS, AMERICANS AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS ARE DISHEARTED BY THIS APPARENT WARPING OF REVOLUTION AND THIS GENERATES QUESTIONS ABOUT REAL INTENTIONS OF REVOLUTIONARIES. CHARG~ ~XPRESSED USG AND PERSONAL HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS AND FXECUTIONS COULD STOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. u.S. INTEREST WAS HUMANITARIAN AND DID NOT :REFLECT CONCLUSIO"S OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. RECaLLING THAT

DEPUTY PM HAD rLED "IRAN BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SHAB'S REGIME AND LATER RETURNED TO SERVE 1IIS COU,~TRY, CHARGE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY srcsas ss WOULD

NOT BE ALLOWED TO ALIENATE ANOTHER GENERATION FROM PARTIUATION IN NATIONAL LIFE. NOW IS THE TIME, aE SAID,

FO AT10NAL HEALING AND MERCY.

4. AZDI WAS VERY FORTHCOMING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PR EM, MANY PEOPLE HAD EXPRESSED SAME THOUGHTS TO GOVERNMENT. AT THIS POINT HE WENT TO HIS rESK AND WITH-

tEHRAN 03877/01

SEC R E or

TEHUN 0:5877/1111

DREW A FILE CONTAINING 50 OR 60 SREl!:'fS 01 PAPER WITH PICTURES AT'ACHID. YAZDI SAID THESE WERE SAVAK FILES

WHIC! RAD BEEN CAPTURED BY REVOLUTION AND SHOWED BE10REAND-AFT.i RESULTS OF TORTUiE ON MANY INDIVIDUALS. THESE, HE SAID, EXPLAIN WHY GOVERNMENT HAS SUCR DIFFICULTY KEEPING REVOLUTIONARIES lROM lILLING OLD REGIME'S 011ICIALS IN S~REETS. (COMMENt: PROTOS, VRleR SEEMED AUTRENTIC, WERE GRUESOME SET 01 EVIDENCE SHOWING MANGLED AND TORTURED BODIES. YAZDI CLE1RLY HAS EFFECTI'I T1CTIC RlRE.)

YAZDI SAID REVOLUTIONARY COURTS HAD SEEN SUCH PHOTOS AND IT WAS DIF1ICULT TO COUNSEL LENIENCY IN WAKE OF SUCH EV'lDENCE OF ATROCITIES BY OLD REGIME. GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO GET TRIALS INSTITUTIONALIZED TO PREllNT WORST IXCESSES OF REVENGE IN THE STREETS AND HOMES. YAZDI RECOUNTED ONE INCIDENT WHERE II-S1YAK OllICIR IN ISFARAN H1D BEEN TORTURED TO DEATH BY REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS •. WHEN YAZDI SUMMONED SOLDIER TO HIS PRESENCE FOR IIPLAN1- TION; SOLDUR SROVED HIM HIS OWN MAIIRED BODY AND SUD HE HAD JUST DONE TO HIS TORMENTOR WBA! BAD. BIIN DONE TO HIM.

5. ON QUESTION 01 EVIDENCE, YAZDI SAID TRERI WAS AMPLE

~:~~~:iET~I:~l~~L~!~!A~~O~B~~iTRE::g~gNI:~r:O;:C~:~E~~RE

BAZARGAN, ETEZAM lND YAZDI PERSONALLY OBJECTED TO WAY [HOMEIN! COMMIT!E! WAS HANDLING MATTER or SUMMARY JUSTICE. PGOI WAS WORlING TO TRT AND IMPROVE SITUATION. CRARGE IIPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM, BUT SAID IILLING SOMEONE LI1E KRALATBARI WHO WAS MERELY TECHNICIAN WAS NOT ONLY EXCESSIVE BUT GAVE GOVERNMENT NEEDLESS BAD IMAGI ABROiD. YAZDI READILY ADMItTED EXECUTIONS 01 KHALATB~RI,MAJLES SPEAKIR RIAZI AND SENATOR VARIDI ·WERE PERHAPS EXCESSIVE, BUT AS lED ·WHERE DO YOU D~AW THE LINE?" ACTING. POL

CHIEF SUGGESTED THAT PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC TRIAL WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL IN CASES SUCH AS TRESE. YAZDI SAID fHlS WAS CRUX OF GOVERNMENf'S ARGUMENT WIfH KHOMEINI\HIMSELF.

6. DEPUTY PM THEN WENT ON TO NOTE THATTRrALS WERB IN

PART POLITICH -- MM1Y AGENTS AND OFFICIALS OF OLD REGIME. WERE STIRRING UP TROUBLE AND ACTIVELY ATTACUNG REVOLUTIONARY FORCES. GOVERNMENT WAS CERTAIN SUCH FORCES WERE

BT ..

113877

NNNN

SEC RET

TEHRAN 0:5877/111

SEC R t T

TEHRAN 03877/1112

1I'l!

5 E eRE T SECTION 0201 02 TEHRAN 0~e77

IHVOLVED IN ~URDISH AND TUR~OMAN TROUBLES, AND ~RESSURE RAD '0 liE lEPT UP ON SUCR FORCES. TRIALS WERE ONE WAr OF DOING THIS.

7. CHARGE SUGGESTED PERHAPS PROGRAM OF CLEMENCY AND SENTENCES OF LESS THAN DEATH MIGHT IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE. YAZDI SAID THIS WAS ON A~r,NDA AND ALREADY APPROVED BI CABINET AND KHOMEINI, IMPLEMENTATION COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN UI/TIL MOMENT WAS RIGHT AND SECURITY SaUATION WAS A iI'! CALMER. puBLIC OPINION MUST BE PREPARED FOR IT. AYATOLLAH T~LEQANI HAD BEGUN THIS PROCESS TWO DAYS EARLIER IN SPEEC~ to POLICE WijERE HE SPOKE or MERCY AND CLEMENCI.

"-!HERE WAS NO C111, ~,r,N SMALLER ONES, VErCH BAD NOT SEEN e INNOCENT nopu KILLED DURING AND BEFORE R!:VOLDTION.

LIMITS WOUL]) BE DRAWN, HOWEVER. THOSE ENGA'HD I N VIOLENCE HAD TO BE PUNISHED; OTHER WOULD FARE BETTER. DISCUSSION THEN PASSED TO OTHER MATTERS.

! ~!Tli~~E~~~ E;~ig~I~~N~~~~A~!m~U;~ ~~=m~l~~H S ITIlAS ~~~~. ol~:gs§ I ~~A ~{g/m~Jl wguL~~i ~g~~Rm~L IS H~A mG

GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES ARE WORKING TO MI1IGATE RELI~IOUS ATTITUDES. WItHOUT SPELLING OUT OR ASKIN~ DIRECTLY, HE VAS TRIING TO ELICIT SOME UND~~STANDING or SITUA'IOII BE AND HIS COLLEAGUES FACE. -HE UNDERSTANDS BEASON FOR AND PROBLEM 01 FOREIGN CONCERN, HOWEVER, AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY DSING TRIS IN HIS OWN AND GOVERNMENT'S CAMPAIGN TO IHPIOfE SITUAtION. HAAS

If

'3877

11111.

SECRE'r'

TEHRAN 03877/12

." CLASSIFICATIr¥'
CONFIDEN IAL
ROUTING SLIP DATE 4/17/79
,
i"lV: Organ. lrimals o.t.
Name or Title Symbol Room No. Bk!lI.
1. '~ar1es w. Naas, OCM, Amembassy Te ran
2.
3.
4.
5.
Approlllli X For Your Information Note and Return
As Requast.a Initial for C,-,,"oa Per Con __ tion
Coinment In_!gate Pr8pare Reply
File Juatify See Me
For CoflllCtlon Neoas.rv Action SiGnature
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING
This is what, we sent ·to the White House
in the papers seeking agrement on Sadr.
You and others may find it of interest.
-: /i7Jd/
FR~M: (:r:ma and ?~': s~¥ I ROOM NO. & BLDG. ~ PHONE NO.
EA IRN:~ ree :SW 5246A State
1CLAS$IFICATIONctO~OENT IAL I IOUNOI OPTIONA~ FORM 113 'FOIJ.MJiIJ.\-;r"~-RJ

". U.S. GOVERIlf,£NT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976.623-240 STA"f1l'."l(JB-OI(~

sa

'.J,,1';.~,

, 1

v _~

CONFIDENTIAL

/

/

Reza Sadr is the Minister of Commerce in Iran's present

Sazargan Government and has been .nomd na'tied to be Ambassador

to the United States. Sadr has an exceptionally broad edu-

cational background, a number of years of business,experi-

ence in the United States, and close connections with the

pr e se.n t Ira.~ian poli tical and religious leaders.

Sadr was bOrn in Kashan, Iran on February 4, 1933,

and comp~eted secondary school there. He then entered

Tehran University where he eventually received a 'BA and PhD

in philosophy and religion. His interest in those subjects

has continued until now.

Sadr, who had received an Iranian Government scholar-

ship, entered the United States as a student in 1958, 'stu(d.¥ing first at Way-ne University and then at the University of

Miami (Florida). From the latter, he received a BA in

chemistry.

In 1963 Sadr applied for an American i~nigrant visa,

for which his sponsor was the Manifold Supply Compan~ of Brooklyn (manufacturer of business machines and supplieal.

His. visa was approved in 1964 and Sadr became ~ permanent resident of the United States in 1966. In- 1967 he sought an immigrant visa for hi's wife, M.aloo]s. Mohadjane Naraghi,

who apparently joined him in New Yor.k. Sadr in 1971 filed

a Declaration of Intentions to become an American citizen,

CONFIDENTIAL

S 1

CONFIDENTIAL

2

but there is no record ~f his having pursued that request.

During his years in New York, Sadr received an MA in

management studies from New York Unive~sity. After 1968

he changed his place of employment and apparently re-

mained in New York until 1978 or early 1979. Sadr

travelled extensively around this country.

A thorough search of United States Government sources

reveals no"ground for objection to Sadr's nomination as

Iranian Ambassador_~o the United States.

Sources for this report are Tehran's cable 3910 of

April 15, 1979, as well as the files of INR, INS, and FBI.

~4 '

Drafted:NEA/IRNJM~yeene:sw

~~/ iIi L/

" ~

Clear~nce:NEA/IRN:HPrecht

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL STATE ,

CHG: CWNAAS POL:JDSTEMPEL

POL: MMETRINKO, NGARRETT, ECON: CTAYLOR, RBASH

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASHD', IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 04/21/89 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJ: SITTING ON THE CLEFT STICK: THE U.S. IN IRAN

REF: A) TEHRAN 4128 B) TEHRAN 4069 C) TEHRAN 3859

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IRANIANS' VIEWS ,OF U.S. HAVE TAKEN A DISTINCT NEGATIVE TURN. MANY OF OUR FRIENDS ARE DISILLUSIO~ED, MANY ARE AFRAID TO HAVE OPEN CONTACT WITH US. OUR ENEMIES ~RE JUBILANT AND AGGRESSIVELY' ANTI-AMERICAN. EVEN THOUGH APPOINTMENT OF NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR OFFERS A CHANCE TO PUT MUCH BEHIND US, U.S. - IRAN TIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO APPROACH THE INTIMACY OF THE' PAST. WE SHOULD BEGIN o,U'R ADJUSTMENT TO THIS NOW TO MINIMIZE POLICY DISLOCATION AND MAXIMIZE WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO UNDER NEW, MORE LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR CONCERN EXPRESSED BY SECRETARIES VANCE AND NEWSOM AND ASST. SEC. SAUNDERS OVER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, HIGH LEVEL SURPRISE OVER ATTITUDES WHICH HAVE BEEN EVOLVING OVER

SOME TIME HAVE MADE US ACUTELY AWARE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO COMMUNICATE ACCURATELY TO THO'E OUTSIDE THIS RATHER UNUSUAL AND SOMEWHAT ANARCHIC ENVIRONMENT WHAT IS EVOLVING HERE. WE OURSELVES HAVE HAD PROBLEMS ANAt~ZING AND FULLY, COMPREHENDING CH~NGES NOW UNDERWAY HERE. THOSE OF US WHO HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED FROM U.~. VISITATION LEAVE PROBABLY FEEL THIS MOST ACUTELY.

4. IN THE SPIRIT OF TAKING ANOTHER STEP FORWARD TOWARD UNDERSTANDING CHANGE'AN~'DRAWING APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM IT, THE FOLLOWING IS OFFERED AS A'SHORT QUOTE SNAPSHOT UNQUOTE OF WHERE WE ARE. THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY ALL OUR REPORTING OFFICERS W~O HAVE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS (GOING BACK 3 TO 4 YEARS IN SOME CASES.

CONFIDENTIAL

JJ

~ -.' , ~ '--'

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. AS A RESULT OF EVENTS 0F THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, MANY OF OUR FRIENDS ARE VERY DISILLUSIONED BY RECENT EVENTS AND M~NY ARE FRIGHTENED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH US. LONGSTANDING PERSONAL REL~TIONSHIPS ARE'STILL FRIENDLY, BUT ALMOST ALL IRANIANS SUBSCRIBE TO ONE OF THE WI~DER CONSPIRACY THEORIES (OUR CLEVERNESS AT FOMENTING THE KHOMEINI REVOLUTION FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST PURPOSES). OUR ENEMIES AND THOSE HOSTILE TO US (A SOLID MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY) ARE JUBILANT. EGGED

ON BY THOSE WHO T~LY HATE US ON BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT, THEY ARE CREATING A CLIMATE WHERE ASSOCIATION WITH ANYTHING AMERICAN IS TRAITOROUS, ANTI-ISLAMIC, AND EVIL. ISLAMIC ATTEMPTS TO QUOTE PURIFY UNQUOTE IRAN FROM WESTERN CULTURAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL INFULENCE ARE TURNING INTO

A WITCH HUNT WHEREIN GUILT BY ASSOCIATION WITH AMERICANS

IS ENOUGH TO CAST UNDER SUSPICION OR TO CONDEMN. WE ARE GENERALLY VIEWED, EVEN BY OUR FRI.ENDS, AS WEAK AND INEFFEC-

TIVE. IT IS HEARTENING THAT THERE REMAIN PEOPLE WHO, -

DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL HOSTILE PRESSURE, WILL TAKE SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RISKS TO TALK TO LONG-TIME AMERICAN FRIENDS. T~EY DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE AMERICANS IN THEIR OFFICES, OR HAVE EMBASSY CARS PARKED OUTSIDE THEIR HOMES; SOME WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MEET AT RESTAURANTS OR 9N NEUTRAL GROUNDS.

IN MANY CASES SUCH' PEOPLE ARE BEING EASED OUT OF INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS, AND INFORMATION WHICH WAS 'AV,A4LABLE TO US THROUGH A TELEPHONE CALL IS BECOMING UNAVAILABLE TO US

BY ANY MEANS SHORT OF COVERT ACTION. OUR FEW REMAINING PRIVA~E SECTOR COLLEAGUES HAVE EXPERIENCED MUCH THE S.ME TtllNG TO A DEGREE WHI,CH SUGGESTS THE PHENOMENON IS NEARLY UNIVERSAL AND SYSTEMATIC.'

'6. HISTORY IS LIKELY TO TREAT US MORE KINDLY THAN CONTEMPOR~RY OPINION, BUT THE REVOLUTIONARY TRAUMA, DISCRETELY AND ABLY ABETTED BY' HOSTILE PROPAGANDA liAS E"iFECTIVELY 'AND SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED OUR HISTORIC INFLUENCE HERE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE WILL NEVER GET CREDIT FOR REMAININI UNINVOLVED IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. NO PERSIAN TRULY

BELIE~S WE HAVE NOT BEEN, AND IF THEY SAy'THEY -DO,. THEY THEN SAY THEY ARE APPALLED BY WHAT THEY VIEW AS OUR CAVALIER DISREGARD OF OUR (AND THEIR) VITAL INTERESTS. THERE IS ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (HUYSER VISIT, TRIAL TESTIMONY BY THOSE SEEKING TO iAVE THEIR OWN'S~INS, ETC.) TO SUPPORT ALMOST ANY PROPOSITION. EVEN THOSE WHO KNOW OF OUR FOREBEAR~NCE HAVE NO INTEREST IN CLARIFYING TH~ RECORD. THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARIES -- YAZDI~ ENTEZAM, BAZARGAN -- CERTAINLY DO NOT, AND THE KHOMEINI ENTOURA&E

WOULD BE FANATICALLY OPPOSED TO IT. WE BELIEVE ONE OF THE MAIN R,EASO~S FOR KHOMEINI ·s' VENGEFUL HOSTILITY lIS THAT HE HAS, OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS IN IRAN, DISCOVERED JUST

54

CONFIDENTIAL

HOW DEE~ U.S. TIES QITH IRAN REALLY EXTEND -- HIS CARS

ARE AMERICAN, HIS CLOSEiT ASSOCIATES' CHILDREN ARE SCHOOLING IN THE U.S.; HE HAS PROBABLY EVEN BEEN APPROACHED BY CLOSE FRIENDS ASKING HIM TO INTERCEDE WITH THE U.S.

EMBASSY FOR VISAS!. ALL THIS MUST BE PARTICULARLY GALLING.

7. WHAT WE MUST DO IS ROLL WITH THE PUNCH FOR A WHILE •• YAZDI AND ENTEZAM HAVE BOTH SPOKEN TO CHARGE ABOUT THE QUOlE NEW BEGINNING UNQUOTE WHICH THE AMBASSADOR"S ARRIVAL WILL OFFER. OTHER CONTACTS IN THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

HAVE SIMILARLY HINTED TO OTHER EMBOFFS OF THE OPPORTUNITY THIS WILL PROVIpE. ALL HAVE URGED THAT IT OCCUR AS SOON

AS POSSIBLE. IT WILL BE SEEN IN IRAN AS A WATERSHED FROM OLD TO NEW -- NEVER MIND THAT IT WILL BE PART COSMETIC; THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUIRED TO BEGIN THE NORMALIZATION

PROCESS. .

8. WE WILL BE COMMENTING IN THE COMING WEEK ON FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS THIS REGIME OR ANY REGIME IN IRAN FACES. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS ~AVE CHANGED

FROM INTIMATE TO ~ORRECT (IF THATI. THIS WILL ENTAIL CONCEPTUAL RETOOLING, AS WELL AS BUREAUCRATIC READJUSTMENT, TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON OUR POLICY HERE AND IN THE REGION AND TO MAXIMIZE WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO IN NEW, MORE (FOR RIGHT NOW, MUCH MOREl LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

55

LIMITED OF'i'ICJAL USF

o 240605Z APE 79

PM A/ft['JlIBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEfFA/USICA WASHOC IMMEDIATE ! ;,;]i"J '0' ,,::rC!SECSTATE WASPOC 1049 BT

LIMITED OWICIAL USE TEl-IRAN 04260

FOR: i'JEP.

E.O. 12005 :N/A

SUBJECT, r,1EETING vlITII DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION, MEHDI MOMKEN

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3600, TEHRAN 3968, TElIRAN 4093

SUMM~.RY: IN COURmSY CALL ON DEPUTY IUNIlWO MCMKEN PRESS ATTACHE DISCUSSED l'fu"\>J PRESS P.a;ULATIONS AND

FO!JND HIM ANTI CTHERS ASSEMBLED AT MEET HOLIDINC STRONG ANTIPATIJY FDR filiCEN'l' U.S. POLICY IN IHAN. MOMim'l ACCOr,{ODNi'ING RE HIS ~'INIST~'" S ROLE Ac CLEARING HOUSE F'OR COMPLAI~'J'S ABOUT PERSIAN PRESS C8V&'lA;E OF U. S.IRAN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGI1 U. S. POLICY VIS A VIS

IRAN UNFATHGllABLE 'JY"' I10i"KEN E'j' AL BILATErAL

IMPERATIVES f'JlY PROVE TO BE BRIDGE TO FUTURE

RELATIONSHIP. END

1. ON MONDAY APRIL 23, PRESS ATIACHE ROSEN PAID =Y C,1LL ON DR. MEHDI Ma-TI<EN, DEPUTY f1ININHl, LATER JOINED BY ABOLGHASSEM SADEGH, Fo~r"!ER REGIME HOLDOVER IN CHARGE OF !XlIIE:STIC NEilS DEPARIMENT, MUHAMMAD RE?A SHARIF, ACTING jV'Jll'iAClING DIREC'lDR OF PARS, AND MR. ALI MAHANI, CONSULTANr TO MINIS'mY WHO

HAS LIVED IN THE U. S. FUR MANY YEARS. THE MEETING COULD

BE CHARACTERIZED AS FRIENDLY BUT CORRECT AND BUSINESSLIKE WITH ,]}IE IRANIANS VERY DEFINITELY PUSHING AN ASSERITVE AND VINDICTIVE LINE VIS A VIS U. S·. PRESS AND CARmR AJ:MINISTRATION POLICY IN IRAN.

2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH DR. MCMKEN DESCRIBING THE

MINISTRY'S INTENTIONS TO PROVIDE SOO: ORDER IN THE

BURGEONING PRESS INDUSTRY IN IRAN. HE MADE IT QUITE

TEHRM 4260

CHRGE: ICA; 4/23179 APPHI': PAO, JSHELLENBERGE DfFill: ICA;BROSEN:MS CLEAR, NONE

DISTR: ICA- 3 CHARGE POL

eRU

LnC'rEIl OFFICIAL USE

SYS,TIl( FALTeriS THE GOVEffirr,ffiNT luLL TURN 10 THE PUBLIC PR05'ECU'IOR'S O}1"ICE AJI,jD THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ON A

e!\SE BY CASE BASIS. AT 'TIllS JUNC1IC""', MClI1KEIJ IXlES NOT

INTEND TC BAR ANY NEVISPAPE11S FRClI1 PUBLISHING BUT WIlli THE AD\!EIIT OF THE NEW CONSTI=ON HE IXlES FORFBEE Sct,1E LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENT PERMI'rS.

3. MOMKFJ'l WAS QUITE CANDID RE THE VIRULENTLY ANTI-

AMERICAN CClI1PAIGN IN THE PERSIAN PPESS AND ASSURl:,il THE PRESS ATTACHE THAT TIME, PATIENCE AND EDUCATION ARE INl'EGRAL TC DEVELOPING AN "IMPARI'IAL" (BITARAP) PRESS. WIlli lliAT GAMBTT PRESS ATTACHE BROUGHT UP THE U},S8URCED AND UNBYIINED ARTICLES APPEARING KAYHAN DURING THE

FIRST HALF OF APRIL WHICH ACCUSED THE U. S. OF OCNTRIVING EXtENsIVE PI.CT.S TC DESTROY TIlE IRANIAN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. AS SUGGESTED BY fftR. SADEGH

DR. M:MKEN SAID THE MINISTRY OF INFOHllATION AND fiE PERSONAILY CAN SERVE AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR ANY

LEGITIMATE CCMPLAINTS RE PERSIAN PRESS COVERAGE AND ASKED ROSEN TC SEND A CJ\RBON COPY OF ANY CORRESPONDENCE 10

TIlE MFA.

4 • DISCUSSING HIS OWN CAREER M(1I]J(JlN AOOTTED SPENDING

SDl'IJE TIME IN JAIL AS A POLITICAL PRISONER. ALlliOUGH

IT WAS THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY WHICH ACWAILY IMPRISONED

HIM HE BL/IME.S THE U. S. FOR THE RESERVOIR OF DISTRUST BETWEEN THE '[WO OCUNl'RIES. HE CANNOT, HE SAID, AS AN INDIVIWAL OR A ME1IIBER OF THE· IRANIAN NATION UNDERSTAND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SUPERPOWER WHIOH SUPPORTED THE SHAH, BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI ALL WITHIN A TWo 110N'IB

PERIOD. MAHANI ~ IN ACCUSING THE U.S. PRESS OF

WORKING 1[1 TANDEM WIlli THE CARI'ER ADMINIS'l'RATION, WITNESS TIIEIR IlJPLICITY RE H1JII'JIN RIGH'rS. SADEGH FELT '!BAT TIlE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT AN ANrAGONISTIC STANCE FRClI1 TIlE IRANIANS FOR A HHILE BUT FELT THAT "BOTH THE U. S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER" AND THI~ IMPERATIVE MIGHr PROVIDE THE BRIDJE FOR A NEW AND BETTER RELATIONSHIP. SHELLENBERGER

BT

#4260

NNNN

OFFICIAL USE

TEHRAN 4260

S 7

TEHRAN 4260

CLEAR THAT THE PGOl WAS IN NO POSITION TO ACT OR DID

IT WANT TO CONTROL THE PRINT MEDIA. HOWEVER, HE ADDED

WITH THE END OF fu~ ER~ IN WHICH THE PRESS WAS UNDER

THE HAMMER (ZIR-E OHUr1AQ) WE APE NCtv/ LIVING 'IllROUGH

AN INTERREDNUM l,'HEREIN NEWSPAPERS AND REPORTERS ARE,

IN SQIIE INSTANCES, r,oING BEYOND WHAT IS CONSIDERED

GOOD JUIXlEMENT, WITNFSS THE RECENT SPATE OF SCANDAL TABLOIDS ILWSTRATING PAHLAVI EXCF.3SES.

THE DEPUTY MININFO SAID HE HAS PREPARED A BILL FeR THE PRIME MINISTER WHEREIN THE PRESS WILL BE ENCOUMGED TO FeRM A PRESS ASSOCIATION( KANUN--E MA'IBUAT) MADE DE

OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDUSTRY ACTING AS A

REGllLATING BODY. IN THE EVENT THIS SELE-REGULATING

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TERMN 4260

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN

o 241323Z APR 79

FM AMENBASSY TEHRAN

10 SECSTA'IE WASHOC D'MiZDIA'IE 1061 BT

CON F' IDE N T I A L TEHRAN 04301

E.O. 12065; Gre 4/14/85 (TAYLOR, C.D.) OR-E

TAGS: PFOR, BGEN, BOIS, IR

3UBJ : CALL ON MINISTER OF CCMMERCE DR. RAZA SADR

1. (C- ENIIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE CHARGE, IN HIS CALL ON MINISTER OF CCI-IMERCE DR. RAZA SADR, EXPRESSED THE VIEvI THAT OUR C011NTRIES MU'IUAL INTERESTS TRANSCEND SPECIFIC GGlVERNMENTS AND GAVE ASSURANCES, ON BEHAIF OF THE SECRETARY OF STA'IE, THAT WE ARE NOT AND DC NOT IN'IEND 10 BE INVOLVED

IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN, HE SAID THE U.S. DESIRES

10 WORK WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND AT THE PACE IT SETS IN ESTABLISHING OUR NEW RELATIONSHIPS. LIKEWISE, U. S. FIR4S STIlL OCNSIDER IRAN AND IMPORTANT MARKET AND CAN ADAPT 10 NEW CONDITIONS. THE MINISTER SAID IT WAS HIS

IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS ARE THE MOST PRACTICAL IN THE

WORLD AND CAN ADAPT 10 ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. GIVEN THE UNCONDITIONAL usa SUPPORT OF THE SHAH , IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE U. S. 10 MAKE GESTURES AND EXERCISE PATIENCE IN ORDER'lD OVERCCME UNDEF.3TANIl,ABLE HOSTILI'l'IES 'IIYIIARD THE U.S. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE ENVIRCD1ENT FOR NEGOTIATIN3 OF 01JI'STANDING COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS IS Il\!PR:JVING AND THAT HE,

LIKE WE, DESIRES 10 AVOID LEGAL ACTIONS. SEP'IEL DISCUSSES

IRANIAN CCM<1ERCIAL ~PRESENIATION IN THE U.S. END OF SUMMARY.

3. THE CHARGE, ACCC!IIPANIED BY ACTING ECONCllITC :COONsELOR CALLEC ON MINISTER OF CCl'iMERCE DR. RAZA SADR ON AFRIL 23. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR NORTH AMERICAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS,

GOLSHAN-BOZORG, WAS ALSO PRESENI. THE 45-MINU'IE MEErING

WAS FRIENDLY AND FRANK AND WE BELIEVE THAT A GOOD BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR OUR ji'UTURE DEALINGS WITH THE

MINISTER AND HIS SUBGRDINATES. AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER

59

4301/01

CHRGE: STA'IE

4/24/79 APPRV: E/OOCDTAYLOR

DRF'ID: :CDTAYLOR

CLERD: NONE

DISTR: ECON-2

CHO POL ICA CRU RF

".0[1<>111"'01113/;: I '

\\".;-1 i li /-{('5 ~owC1'{<" -I

CALLS ON MINISTERS, ','IE \{ERE URG28 TO COUWEL AND PRACTICE PATIENCE IN TIlE RESOWITON OF OUTSTANDING DISPUTES AS \IELL AS IN OBTAINING CLARIFICATION OF FGOI POLICIES.

4. THE :HARGE CONVEYED 'IO THE MINISTER THE USG' S BELIEF THAT CDR COUNTRIE.S' PERSPECTIVE INTE:RE.STS TRANSCEND SPECIFIC GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL TO IRAN M'lJ THAT OUR RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE

MG"'l'lJALLY BENEFICIAL. HE PLEDGED ON THE AU'mORIT'! OF TIlE

SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE US ,rILL NOT INTERFERE AND IS NOT INTER',ERING IN THE I:JIERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. HE SAID THAT \IE ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN AND AT THE PACE THAT

IT DESIRES. HE AJ:MITTED THAT (l!.iR RELATIONSHIP \VIIL BE

DIFFERENT AND THAT \IE CAN ACCEPT THAT. U. S. FIfll>",s, HE SAID,

WILL STILL CONSIDER IRAN AN IMPORTANT MARKEl". THEY HAVE

BROUGHT IMPORTANI TECllNOLCGY TO IRAN AND THEY TOO CAN ADAPT 'IO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO CONIINUE THEIR RELATIONSHIPS HERE. THE CHARGE SAID THAT HE HOPED TIrAT SUCH TflADE DISPUTEs ~llAT EXIST CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOU'T LFGM~ REC01JRSE.

5. MINISTER SADR REPLIED BY SAYING THAT AFl'ER 20 YEARS OF

STJDYING, WORKING AND IJ11ING IN THE UNITED STATES, HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN IS THE MOST PRACTICAL PERSON IN TIlE WORLD; flE CAN ADAPT AND AIlJUST TO NEW SITUATIONS, AS

fIE WILL BE ABLE TO ro IN IRAN. fIE SAID THAT TIlE U.S. 'S

UNCONDITIONf<1 SUPPORT TO THE SHAH LEFT WOUNDS, BU'T TIlA T HAVING BEEN IN THE U. S. DURING THE REVOLU'TIONARY PERIOD, HE WAS \lELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEM WITHIN TI-lE DEPT OF STATE CONCERNING IRAN. HE APPRECIA= OUR POLITICAL NEEDS, CIJR LIMITATIONS AND OUR PRESSURE GROUPS AND REALIZED THAT THOSE

FACTORS \,0lJLQ CONIlNUE. HE BELIEVES THAT THE REVOWITON

WILL BENEFIT TI-lE == STATES AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER

COUNTRIF,s. HE '!!-lEN MENTIONED TWO APPREHENSIONS THAT INFW-

ENeE OUR BILATERAL R!llATIONSHIPS: 1) TI-lE SINGULAR PLACEMENT OF THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITIl THE "PAHLAVI" AND 2) TI-lE

BELIEF OF TI-lE U.S. THAT TI-lE FALL OF THE SHAH WOULD LEAD TO

CCJIIMUNISM IN IRAN. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES TP.AT '!!-lESE TWO

PERCEPTIONS. ARE BEING ERRODED BU'T THAT SrnE GOOD GES'IIJRE

BY TI-lE U. S. TO ELIMINATE THE SCAR OF TI-lE PAST WOULD BE

HEIJ'FUL. LASTLY, HE SAID THAT TIlE DATA AND PRIORITIES OF

THE PAST \JERE INACC;JRATE AND MUST BE IMPROVED. IRAN'S

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.--EDUCATIONAL, TECHNOLCXlICAL, AND FAMILY TIES ARE SUCH AS TO SUPPORT IRAN'S WISH TO SUSTAIN RELATIClNSHIPS.

6. THE CHARGE ASKED THE MINISTER IF HE ['AD ANY SUGGESTIONS

CONCERNING HIS DESIRED GES'IURE BY THE U. S. THE MINISTF.R

SAID Tf!AT SUCH ACTIONS CANNOT BE LONE OVERNIGHT. HE ADDED

THAT THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE ASPECT OF THE SINGULAR PLACEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH WAS THE DIRECT IN'IERVENTION IN IRAN AS SEEN PARTICULARLY IN THE sHAH'S DEPENDING

UPON THE U.S. TO DECIDE WHElJlER HE WOOlD STA~ OR LEAVE. HE

THEN DID ADD Tf!AT THE U.S. COULD USE ITS BEST EFFDRT 1'0 IMPROVE WITH THE PRESS AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN AND

ITS'REIlOWTION. THE CHARJE NOTED, IN GOOD HUMOR, THE

COINCIDENCE OF THE MINISTER'S CONCERNS WITH THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE SHAH ON HIS LAST AUDIENCE. THE SHAH, IliTER ALII" CCMPLAINED ABOOT THE MISPERCEPTIONS OF IRAN BY THE U. S. PRESS AND WAS SUSPICIOUS Tf!AT THE U.S. WAS MEDDLING IN

IRAN'S OCSTINY BY CONI'RIVING WITH THE SOVIETS I'O DIVIDE IRAN. THE CHARGE ADMITffilJ Tf!AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WAS LITl'IE INFORMED CONCERNDIG ISLAM BUT Tf!AT THERE WAS LJTl'IE THE

uso' COOlD 00 IN Tf!AT REGARD.

THE MINISTER REFERRED WITH

PLEASURE TO HIS MEETING WITH AMB. YOUNG AND SAID Tf!AT HIS ATTI'lIJED 11::MARD IRAN SHOOlD BE IN;::THUCTIVE AND HE HOPES IT WIlL INDICATE A CHANGE.

7. ACTlNGE/C COUNSELCR BROUGHT TO THE MINISTER:S'ATTENTION

TIlE ACTIVITIES OF MOHAMMED SOURI AND MR. HASHEMI IN THE UNITED STATES AND POINTED OUT Tf!AT THEIR ACTIONS, LACKING APPROPRIATE CREDE:NTIALS, TENDED TO CONFUSE A'lTElVIPJ.'S TO RESOLVE OOTSTANDING BUSINESS PROBLEMS AND NORMALIZE

<XJIIMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. HE ALSO REF'EFRED TO CONTINENTAL

GRAIN'S DEMURRAGE CLAIM AND THOSE WHICH ARE BUT PARTIALLY SETl'LED. (SEPTELS FOL!..OII ON 'IBSE ISSUES.) HE SAID Tf!AT

WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF IRANIAN ECONaoITC/CQ\!\1ERCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THEIR WASHINGTON EMBASSY, A FUNCTION SORELY NEEDED WfffiN U. S. FIRIlS ARE FRUSTn!lTED IN ATrEMPTS ~D Cl.M>1UNICATE WITH IRANIAN BliSINF.';S CONTACTS.

8. THE MINISTEB SAID, ON THE BASIS OF HIS 12 YEARS AS P BUSINESSMAN IN THE UNITED STATES, Tf!AT HE APPRECIATES ~!E

01

NEED FOR NEXlOTIATION OF cmSTANDING BUSINESS ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE A'IMOSPHERE FOR NEXlOTIATION WILL IMPROVE. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD NOT YET PRESS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES AND, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO WE DEMURRAGE CLAIMS, SAID THAT 'JJlESE HAD BEEN SIT'I'lN:l AROUND IN THE MINISTRY FOR YEARS AND HAD DAMAGED THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN. HE SAID HE HAS GIVEN ATrnNTION TO 'JJlESE PROJ3LElI1S BUT THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND. mAT UNFORIUNA'rELY IT ~UIRFS PATIENCE BY ALL INVOLVED.

9. BIOGRAPHIC: SADR IS CONFIDENT AND ARTICULA'IE. HIS

ENGLISH NOT SURPRISING AF'IER 20 YEARS IN THE U. S., IS A

4.75 BY FSI STANDARDS AND HAS A DECIDED NEW YORK IDENTIFICATION. HE POSSESSES THE POLITICIAN'S ABILITY OF FEIGNING

A SMILE WHIIE DELIVERING GOD'S LAST WORD. HIS REVOlliTIONARY RHEIORIC WAS EXPEC'IED, SINCE HE BY AIMISSION WAS A MEMBER

OF KHCMEINI' S KCMITAY IN THE U. S. , BUT IT WAS PROPERLY BUIXlET'IED FOR THE OCCASION. SHORT, BY IRANIAN STA'IURFS,

IS BALDING, HAS A PARTIAL BEARD AND PROBABLY SUFFERS FROM PCOR EYESIGHT SINCE DESPI'IE THICK GLASSES HE SQUINTS

FREXlUENTLY. NAAS

BI'

#4301

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN

4301/02

, NNNN

K

I)i RU:~;C #::'.759 114(?'Z~5 ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZY

o 24PttgZ ~PR 79

F"~ S::CSTAT, I'A Hnc

TO R~~r'HR/Ml~M3ASSY Tt.HkAN IMMiWUTE 1882 INFO RUHVClAMU1BASSY KBSHASA I"II"SDIATE 3908 sr

CON F I DiN T I A L

v

102759

ONTROL UPON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMEN'!

TAGS: APER (CUTLER, WALTER L.),

Si'~.IFCT: ANNOUNCC'1c'H OF I.OMINATION

I'HIE HOUS: PLANS TO ,A"NOUNCE PRESIDENT'S INTE:HION TO ~;m~INATL I,'ALTER L. CUTLeR AS AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AT PRiiSS fRFF'INr-, TlJiSnAY, APRIL 24. ;)ILL CONFIRM BY IMM.EOIATE

Ll.,GRA'~ ["Ha! ANNOUNCL~~NT IS MAN:. VANCE

sr

#2759

~JNN NZVUL C

CONrIDENTIAt

TEHRAN 045:30

P 011232Z ~AY 79

F~, AMEM]ASSY TEHUN

TO SEC STATE WASHDC 118? BT

CON , IDE N T I A L TEHRAN ~453a

E.O. 12065: XDS-l 5/1/0g (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IR

SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE RAISED SEVERAL POIN!S ON U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAN. YAZDI PROMISED TO LOOK INTO MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

CLASS: CONFIDF.NTIAL CERGE: STATE

APPRV: CO/NAAS

DRITD: POL:JDSTEMPEL CLEAR: NONE

DISTRI eRG POL (2)

~O ECON MUG D~O

~r.kRjy ... "1..t...(

3. ON MAY 1, CHARGE AND ACTIH~ POL CRIEF PAID :FIRST CHL

ON YAZDI SINCE BE BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS C~BLE COVERS ~AIN POINTS U.S. RAISED AND !lEPLIES. SEPTELS

,,'ILL TREAT HORF SPECIALIZEn ITEMS. "

4. CRARG.E RAISED QUESTIONS OF U.S. ACCESS TO G!'LF DISTRICT AND ARMY HOSPITAL, ~~D PERMISSIO~ TO \lnEllE,,,", U.S. DOC")nNTS FROM LAVISAN M'ILITARY COMPOl1Nll, !JOSREN TAPPEH AIR BASE AND NAVY HEADQUARTERS. YAZDI APP'!'ARED SURPRIZED T1AT HIS EARLIER EFFORTS TO ALLOW D.S. OJfICIALS TO GAIN

ENTRY HAD NOT BORNE F~UIT AND SAID HE ~OULD LOOI INTO ~lTTERS AND BJ BlCt TO OS.

5. CHA%!: RAISED MATTEi! OF PERMISSION TO 5;:LL EXCESS

COMMISSARY LIQUOR TO iiELIGIOUS MIN6RITY BUYER I"HO HAD

liOMEINI COMMITT.! PERMISSION TO prICRAS! LIDUOR rOR MINORITY VSP. HT!:V. SHORT L!:CT'lRE ON qO'. !'11~ORITIE5

COULD HAn LI<UOR. LUT NOT SELL rt , ~N;J UPON tURNING

ilun;R MAL COMMITT,;E PE~MISSIN', PROVIDED :IE PAID Gl'STOMS DDTY, YAZDI SAID TdiS WAS ALL !IGAT. POLO" ASIID QUESTION AGAIN AND GOT A DEFINITE AFFIRMATIVE RIPLt TO DIRICT

Q:JESTio:, ON \11l~TH,R SALE ·,·i~S ULO'IiED. BMoOFl'S CO~?IR"'FD

TO YAZDI THAT THIS WAS A ONE-TIK! D~IL. YlZDI THEN MENTION£D TilAT 7'H1i'FB W~RE R,;PORTS THAT SOMF. DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN SEtLlN~ LIQUOR ON THl BLAC~ 11AF.KET. C;lARl:;'; STATED TEAT IF AKY OFFICIAL !~E21C!N IS .CAUGHT SELLiNG LIQUOR IN CONTRAVENTION OF I,A~IAN LA., CHARGE wOULD S~E VIOLATOR ON PLANE OUT OF TOitN IinEI N TWE~TT FOUR "OtJRS. CEARG. USGED FONMI~ TO BRING TO OUR ATTE~TI0N ANY U.S. VIOLATION. YAZDI ~AS APPRECIATIVE OF T~IS ASSryRANCI. NBS

?T

#4530

TEERAN 04530

SECRET STAH

CHG: CWNAAS POL: J OS TEMPEL NONE

POL

AMEMBASSY ~EHRAN

SECSTATE WASHDC,-NIACT IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

•

E.0 •• 12065: .XDS-4 5/1/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PGOV, EFIN, IR, PINT'

,UBJ: MEETING WITH YAZDI: IRANIAN CONCERNS

IE F: TEHRAN 453'0

1. ~S - EhT\RE,TEXT; ACTION REQUIRED)

2. SUMMARY: YAZDI RAISED QUESTION OF PRESENCE OF.AMCITS IN OR NE~R ~AGHADEH AT TIME OF RECENT DISTURBANCES. FONMIN ASKED WHAT PROSPECTS WERE FOR.GETTING.JURIS~ICTION OVER CRIMINALS FROM OLD REGIME WHO HAn FLH TO U.S •. U.N~ER ASSUMED NAMES, AND FOR BLOCKING ACTIVITIES OF PAHLAUI. FOUNDATION IN U.S. CHARGE SAID WE WOULD LOOK INTO PROBLEMS ,AND AGAIN URGED GOI TO HIRE A GOOD LAWYER. END • . SUMMARY.

3. AT END OF DISCUSSION OF U.S. PRESENCE PROBLEMS (SEE REFTEl), YAlDl ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PENNSYLVANIANS

IoN NORTHWESTERN IRAN. HE SAID PGOI HAD REPORTS OF "TWO OR THREE AMERICANS FROM PENNSYLVANIA" BEING PRESENT THERE JUST BEFORE TROUBLES. EFFORTS HAD BEEN MADE TO TRACE THEM LATER, BUT TO NO AVAIL. ALLEGED AMERICANS SPOKE GOOD KURDISH AN. TOLD PEOPLE THEY WERE ORIENTALISTS ON A ~ISSION TO STUDY THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF KURDISH PEOPLE. CHARGE AND ACTING POL CHIEF SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AMCITS AND EXPRESSED DOUBT U.S. SCHOLARS WOULD 8E WANDERING ABOUT IRAN AT THIS TIME. CHARGE REQUESTED WHATEVER FURTHER INFO PGOI COULD PROVIDE AND SUGGESTED THAT STORY COULD BE RESULT OF DIS INFORMATION CAMPAIGN, BUT PROMISED TO CHECK. (SUBSEQUENTLY, POLOFF LEARNED FROM LOCAL U.S. ACADEMIC THAT THERE HAD BEEN UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ARCHAEOLOGISTS AT HASSANLOO-A SHORT WALK FROM NAGHADEH--UP UNTIL TWO YEARS AGO, BUT NONE· WERE THERE NOW. CHECK OF OUR BADLY TRUNCATED

SECRET

65

SECRET

SECRET

CONSULAR RECORDS SHOWS NO AMCITS IN REGION. EITHER. BUT THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF VISITORS. ABOVE BEING PASSED TO YAZDI IN SPIRIT OF HELPING DEFUSE ISSUE.) ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE CHECK ASAP WITH UNIVERSITY

OF PENNSYLVANIA AND LEARNED SOCIETIES TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER THERE ARE. SCHOLARS IN AREA. TWO DAYS AJlSO AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD PRESS THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE INFO TO PRESS

ON Spy RING THURSDAY. MAY 3. WE HAD HOPED THIS WAS REFERENCE TO A SDVIET CAPER GONE SOUR (REPORTED EL~EWHERE) BUT YAZDI'S QUESTION RAISES POSSIBILITY WE WILL BE

TARGET OF ATTACK OR THAT "FOR BALANCE" BOTH MATTERS WILL BE RELEASED AT S~ME TIME.

4. FONMIN THEN RAISED QUESTION OF HOW IRAN COULD GO ABOUT TRYING TO GET CUSTODY OF "SEVERAL CRIMINALS" FROM OLD REGIME. YAZDI SAID Gal HAS TRACED SEVERAL WANTED EXSAVAK MEN TO U.S •• INCLUDING ALLEGED PERPETRATOR OF

A8IDAN REX CINEMA FIRE WHICH KILLED OVER 400 PEOPLE IN AUGUST 1978. CHARGE REPLIED THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO IRAN-U.S. EXTRADITION TREATY. PROBLEM WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT AND THAT HE WOULD SEEK ADVICE. CHARGE CONFIRMED THIS WAS QUESTION OF SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE

WANTED ON SPECIFIC CHARGES. YAZDI SAID ALL HAD NEW PASSPORTS IN ASSUMED NAMES ISSUED BEFORE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT FELL. HE DID NOT PURSUE QUESTION OF HOW GROUP GOT VISAS TO U.S. (AS MAJOR BENEFICIARY OF PAST LACK OF EXTRADICTION TREATY BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAN. YAZDI IS CERTAINLY MORE BLOODTHIRSTY ON THIS POINT THAN ONE MIGHT EXPECT.) COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ME WHETHER ANY ACTION CAN BE TAKEN IN U.S. COUR,S BY PGOI FOR CRIMES COMMITTED ABROAD.

5. YAZDI THEN RAISED QUESTION OF HOW PGOI COULD STOP PAHLAVI FOUNDATION IN NEW JORK FROM SELLING OFF ITS ASSETS--BUILDING r ; ETC. IRAN's CENTRAL BANK HAD LOANED FOUNDATION DOLS 39 MILLION. AND PGOI WANTED TO STOP WHAT WAS APPARENT ATTEMPT BY OLD REGIME LEADERS TO MILK OUT

LOAN THROUGH SALE OF BUILDINGS. TWICE ALLUDING TO FACT THAT EX-SECSTATE WILLIAM ROGERS WAS CHAIRMAN OF PAHLAVI BOARD. YAZDI SAID IRANIAN PEOPLE HAD TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING NUANCES OF LAW. BUT UNDERSTOOD THEY HAD BEEN ROBBED. HE CONCLUDED THAT USG HAD OBLIGATION TO HELP

PGOI STOP THIS. PGOI IS PREPARED TO SHOW PAHLAVl FOUNDATION ASSETS WERE IRANIAN TREASURY FUNDS ILLEGALLY CHANNELED TO FOUNDATION. EMBOFFS SAID CENTRAL BANK COULD PROBABLY

SECRET

USE U.S. COURTS IF THERE WERE VIOLATIONS OF LAW ~ITHIN

US JURISDICTION. AS EMBOFFS WERE NOT LEGAL SPECIALISTS. HOWEVER. CHARGE WOULD HAVE TO ASK DEPARTMENT FOR ITS

VIEWS ON SUBJECT. YAZDI MADE CLEAR THAT HTS QUERY WAS

NOT LIMITED TO CBI LOAN BUT COVERED ALL PAHLAVI FOUNDATION ASSETS. CHARGE URGED YAZDI (AS HE HAS URGED OTHERS) TO CONVINCE HIS COLLEAGUES TO HIRE A GOOD LAW FIRM TO FIGHT THE NUMBER OF CASES WHICH ARE COMING TO ~OURT._ HE CITED INSTANCES WHERE GOI MIGHT HAVE WON ITS POINT WITH

SOVEIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT IF IT HAD BEEN REPRESENTED INCOURT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED U.S. TRADE UNLON SUIT AGAINST OPEC COUNTRIES. NOTING MATERIAL WOUL~ BE TURNED OVER 1'0 PGOI SHORTLY. YAZDI NOTED .THAT .uS6 (;OULD SAY PRIVATELY IT WISHED TO IMPROVE ITS :1'1-£5 WITH IsLA~IC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. BUT IF IT REALLY WANTED TO DO SO. IT

MUST DO SOMETHING TO HELP.

6. COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHE~ P-GOI ~OULD GET AROUND TO RAISING QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE ABOVE. ~AZDL

WAS VAGUE ENOUGH ON DETAILS O~ EXTRAblTION PRO~LEM AND PAHLAVI FOUNDATION SITUATION THAT W"E ARE UNABLE TO I'·OSE SPECIFIC LEGAL QUESTIONS. BUT POLITIcAL THRUST OF HIS APPROACH IS CLEAR: U.S. MUST AT LEAST TRY-TO HELP. AS DEPT KNOWS. CORRUPTION WAS BIGGEST POLITICAL ISSUE IN REVOLUTION WHICH DREW SUPPORT FRQM ALL REPEAT ALL CLASSES OF IRANIAN SOCIETY. I WOULD LIKE A STATEMENT FROM L ON_STEPS PGOI COULD TAKE IN. COURTS IF IT WISHED. TO RECOVER PAHLAVI FOUNDATION ASSETS. NAAS##

SECRET

P 0212402 r·1AY 79

FN AMFMBASSY TEHRAN

IJ,() SECSTATE ',oJAS}-I!X; PRIORITI 1217

ET

SEC RET TEHRAN 04578

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FRCM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: ems 5/2/85 (NAAS, c.w.) OR-M

TAGS: PFOR, IR

ST!llJ: VOA INTER'lIEW

1. (S-ENTIRE ~'EXT; REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. IN ALL MY FECEN'f CAlLS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Hl!V)C HIT 11E HARD vliTH CCI'IlPLAINTS ABOUT THE CRITICAL MANNER IN WHICH THE WESTERN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THE U.S. , IS

TREATING Tl-iB REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE FOLKS CUR-

RENTLY IN THE SADDLE, NO LESS THAN THEIR PREDECESSOR, APE PRE'lTY THIN SKINNED AND PRONE TO SEE A CONSPIRACY --USG, ZIONIST, OR CJIllERvIISE. ALSO, I HAVE BEEN REHINDl'IJ OF OUR DAILY STATEMENTS OF SUPFORT FOR BAKHTIAR IN JAJ'MARY AND OUR OFFICIAL SILENCE (WHICH I HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED) (N THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT IN THE

LAST MANY \<EEJ(S. TI-!ERE IS NO CURE, OF COURSE, FOR

PERSIAN PARANOIA, BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSI~

SCME EFFORT TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE U. S. VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT •

3. OUR PAO TOLS ME 'lllAT, WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON IN LATE MARCH, VOA WAS TO APPROACH YOU RE AN INTERVIEW ON IRAN. THIS SEEM3 TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENr FORm~ AND I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE ON TI-!E TASK SOON. YOU ARE AN OIll HAND AT THIS AND CAN PLAY Tl-iB '[lJEME;S OF NORMALIZATION, HISTORICAL TIES, PARALLEL INTERESTS, THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, ~'C. I>'ITi-IOUT TOO CLDSE AN EMBRACE OF TIlE GOVERNMENT, EIlliER 'ill ITS DISADVANTAGE OR OUR OWN. NAAS

B'r

N N NN

SECRET

TTHWi 4578

Cf-lR<:E: ,,-:r:'ATE
APPHV: CHO : C1,o,lNAAS
DFFl'D: CHG : C\o,iNAASIBJH
CU:AR: PAG: JSHELLENBEffiE
POL: JDSTEMPEL "
DISTR: PAG . ;J

TEHRAN 4578

ESBo04BRA40B

NNNNW 00 RUQMHR

DE RUEHC #3756 1242251

ZNY ccccc zm

° 042136Z MAY 79 I'M SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 2151 B1'

C,O N F IDE N T I A L STATE 113756

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/4/85 (P!1ECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINr, IR

SUBJECT: MEETING WIW CHARGE AGAH AND ROUHANI

1. IN A MEETING WIW AGAH AND ROUHANI MAY 4 ON arnrn SUBJECTS, Rrol'.ANI STRESSED IRANIAN INI'EREST IN RESUMPrION

OF VISA WORK BY EMBASSY TEHRAN. DEPOFF REPLIED WAT IN-

CREASE IN VISA SERVICES WOULD DEl'END PRIMARILY ON %0 FACTORS: (1) EJ:lUIFMENr OF A NEW BUILDING FOR cOOstlLAR SERVICES, WORK WAS AB01JI' TO BEGIN AND WE NEW PREMISES SHOllID BE READY IN A FEW mN'lRS. (2) PROVISION OF ADEXlUATE

SECURITY FOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL. DEPOFF REVIEWED PRESENT

SECURITY CONDITIOOS AND INDICATED 'IllIS WAS WE OVERRIDING CONCERN WHICH PREVENTED OUR RESUMING NOmIAL 00NStlLAR ACTIVITIES. ROUHANI TOOK NOI'E AND INDICATED HE WOULD MAKE A SPECIAL EPPCRT TO ASSIST EMBASSY WIW rrs SECURITY PROBIDIS.

2. ROUlIANI SAID 'IRE ACTIVITIES OF HIS CCM'lITTEE WERE TER~lINATED EFFECTIVE MAY 4. HE PLANS TO RE1URN TO TEHRAN IN ABOtII' 10 DAY'S TIME AND TO REMAIN FOR AT IEAST 'IHROUGH WE

SUMMER. VANCE

BT

#3756

i)

Tehran, ~Iay 8, 1979.

l'xcellency:

At our meeting on ~Iay 1, 1979, you reques 0

look into the questions of the assets of th Pahlavi

Foundation and the possible extradition from ted

States of Ir~_n.ationals charged with having committed

specif~..:::'"~-,,_s_i,,~r~

As you undoubtedly have been informed, your Embassy in Washington formally raised the question of the assets

of the Pahlavi Foundation in a diplomatic note on April 16, 1979. The Department of State replied in a diplomatic

note on May 1, 1979. For your convenience the texts of both notes are given below:

Iranian Embassy Note of April 16:

"The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to advise that it has received a report of the possibility of an imminent transfer of ownership of an office building in New York City, at 650 5th Avenue, Ne" York, Ne" York 10019, heretofore held by the Pahlavi Foundation as owners, to other interests.

70

tlIn the event that the Department is approached with respect to any of the details of such a transaction, it would be appreciated if the Department of State "ould advise any potential purchaser of the fact that the ownership of the Pahlavi Pounda,io~ and of its several and individual assets,

IUs Excellency

Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi,

Hinister of Foreign Affairs, Tehran.

- 2 -

is under investiRntion hy the novernment of Iran, and would discourage any transfers until the investigation has heen completed, and this Embassy has advised the Department of the results.

"It. would also be apnreciated if the Department will inform this Emhassy of the names and addresses of any potential purchasers which come to the Department's attention, so that the Embassy may convey the same message to them.

"The Embassy of the Islamic Repuhlic of Iran further avails itself of tois opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its hi~hest consideration."

Department of State Note of Hay 1:

"The Department of State acknow l edge s receipt of Note No. 226 of Anril 16, 1979, from the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"In the event that the n~partment is anPToached by a potential purchaser of Pahla.vi Foundation assets on by other interested parties, the Department will bring to the attention of such purchaser or parties the fact that the Embassy has informed the Department that ownership of the Foundation and its severalaBnd individual assets are under investi~ation by the Government of Iran.

"The Department has advised interested agencies in the IJnited States Government of the contents of the referenced note. The Embassy, may w i sh to consider other means of making its views on the Pahlavi Foundation known to Ame r Lc an commercial enterprises .. The nepartment assumes that any action taken hy the r.overnment of Trnn with resnect to the transfer of ownership of Pahlavi Foundation assets located within the jurisdiction of the United States will he taken

in accordance with applicable federal, state. and other laws, regulations, and p r-oc odur-e s wh i ch may govern such transfers."

With respect to the extradition issue I have repeated below the information provided me hy the Office of the Legal Adviser in the- Department of State:

lfuder international law there is no ohligation to extradite a fugitive in the absence of an agreement. Factor. v. Lauhcnheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 2R7 (1933). Unde r ITniT';<1States rawtncre-can be no extraditions apart from treatv (18 U.S.Co 3181). There is no executive discretion to s rrr re nde r a

71

- 3 -

f uo t t t vc to a f o r o i cn ,r:OVC'TnJ"'10nt, 1.1:11('55 t h a t discretion is prantell hy an Act of ron~Te~s n'r hv the teT~S of a

t re a tv , Va l c n t i ne v. Un i t e d <r a t e s ex TC'l. Ne f de de r ,

299 U.S. -'-,-lfTFf:\6). -Curr-cii-trv~--i:ller-e-Ts-noextra-dition treaty with Iran.

While t he U,S, courts woulal not have +u r i s d i c t i on over

c r i me s of the kind d e sc r i b ed hy Fo r e i.gn 1<1inister Yazdi committed al)rnarl, individu~ls with a Rrievance a~ainst

former Iranian officials may sue them for damape s in U.S.

civil courts for injuries ann Lo s s e s caused abroad. The Islanlic Repuhlic of Iran it~elf could assist aR~rieved individuals in bringing legal actions here. If those sued claim IMmunity the Islamic Re nub Ld c of Iran could waive immunity in a'declaration to the court. The outcome of

any s pec t f i c rase wou l d he base,", nn f'ac t s at hand and the judge's interpretation of such legal issues as immunity. slJfficiency of evidence nn~ so forth. It WOll1d be preferahle for the Islamic Reriub l t c of Iran to explore these nossihilities itself with a nua f Lf f e d Lawve r in the n.s.

I hope that this information is of value to you anti I

am prepared to discuss these issues furtl-)er at vour convenience.

-~inccrely,

Cha r I o s N. 'caa s Cl-)ar~e d'Affaires, n.i.

1142

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ICA 5/9179 PAO:JHSHELLE~"ERGER PAO:JHSHELLENBERGER:MN

1. CHARGE:CNAAS. 2. PDL:JSTE~PEL ICA-2 CHARGE POL. AD~N CRU

AMEf'1.8ASSY TEHRt(N

USICA WASH DC. PRIORITY

USICA

fOR: NEA CURRA~

SPECDIS E.O. 12D{5: N/A

SUBJECT: BILATERAL CO'MMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP

1. ALTHQUGH CP INSTRUCTIONS WERE LOST DURING

ICA BUILDING BREAKIN, I HAVE HAD A CRACK AT DOING ANOTHER ESTIMATE Of THE BILATERAL COI'I!M!,INICATION RELATIONSHIP IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS OCCURRED DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. IT MAY OR MAY NOT CONFORM ~ITH

THE AGENCY'S GUIDELINES. BUT IS OFFERED BOTH AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE FY'79 E3SAY AND THE FY'8~ - 181 REQUIREMENT. ESSAY HAS SEEN REVIEWED BY CHARGE AND ACTING POLCOUNS. YOUR COMMENTS AND CRITIQUE WELCOMED.

A. THE BILATERAL COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES. AT THIS WRITING (MAY '79) CAN

BE CHARACTERIZED AS SCHIZOID ON THE IRANIAN SIDE.

THERE IS WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DUSTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. A PREVAILING· SIJSPICION THAT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO FU** FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION THROUGH

ALL MANNER OF ACTIVITIES RANGING FROM EMPLOYING FORMER SAVAK AGENTS AS ASSASSINi AND EXPLOITERS OF ~ISCCNTENT AND INSURRECTION AMONG MINORITIES TO THROTTLING IRAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND. THE U.S. REMAINS THE PREFERRED LOcALE FOR STUDY, TRAINING. TOURISM. INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE. THE AMERICAN LIFESTYLE. DESPITE DENUNCIATIONS BY THE

CLERGY. CONTINUES TO BE EMULATED BY YOUTH AND THE MIDDLE CLASS. AMERICA. HAVING SPAWNED MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION. AND NOW HOME FOR AS MANY AS A HUNDRED THOUSAND IRANIAN STUDENTS. IS CONSIDERED BOTH HOSPITABLE AND HUMANE AS CONTRASTED WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. AMERICA AND THINGS AMERICAN ARE INTERESTING TO IRANIANS WHO BELIEVE BOTH THEIR RECENT PAST AND THEIR DESTINY

ARE INEXTRICABLE** INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE U.S. THE

LiMITED OFFICIAL USE

FRUSTRATIONS OF THESE DAYS ARE EASILY ATTRIBUTED TO IMPERIALISM, USUALLY OF THE U.S. VARIETY (ALTHOUGH THE USSR AND ISRAEL ARE ALSO INVEIGHED). COMMUNICATION

ON A ONE TO ONE BASIS IS USUALLY SPONTANEOUS, CANDID AND CORDIAL. BUT THE PUBLIC RHETORIC AS CONVEYED BY

A VENGEFUL MEDIA IS UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE AND ~ARSH. U.S. MISSION GOALS IN IRAN AT PRESENT ARE TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN, COOPERATIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THOSE AREAS IN WHICH OUR SERVICES AND PRODUCTS MEET IRAN'S REQUIREMENTS. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN.A-PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE USG IS AT tHE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S *** TROUBLES IN CONJECTURAL AT BEST***

WHEREIN THE USG IS**(IN LEAGUE WITH U.S. MEDIA) IS AT

THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S TROUBLES IS CONJECTURAL AT BEST, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE NEW IMAGE IRAN PROJECTS INTERNATIONALLY. US** U.S. MEDIA'S ABSORPTION WITH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS TENDSD TO FOCUS ON

ALL THAT IS WRONG HERE. CLOSELY MONITERING SUCH

COVERAGE LEADS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES HERE TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH US WELL, AND TENDS TO CONFIRM IN AMERICAN MINDS THAT IRAN IS A DISASTER IN EVERY SPHERE. FURTHER CONTRIBUTING TO THE TENSION IN OUR COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP IS THE PRESENCE IN THE U.S.

OF LEADING PERSONALITIES Of THE FORMER REGIME. SHOULD THE SHAH TAKE REFUGE IN THE U.S. AS SOME PROMINENT AMERICANS HAVE URGEO,POTENTIAL IS THERE FOR A TOTAL BREAK IN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION. BEYOND PERSONALITIES, THERE ARE AN IMMENSE NUMBER OF CLAIMS FROM BOTH SIDES RESPEC** RESPECTING FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, DELIVERY OF MATERIALS, CONTRACTUAL DISPUTESOBSTRUCT RESUMPTION OF THE ACTIVe US-IRAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. WHEREAS ONE YEAR AGO, IRAN'S ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS HAD SCORES OF AMERICANS TEACHING, CONSULTING, ADVISING, RESEARCHING, NO MORE

THAN A HANDFUL ARE LEFT AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FOR THE MOMENT ESCHEWING IMPORTED LECTURERS. OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN, LIMITED BUT POTENTIALLY ACTIVE COMMUNICATION WAS POSSIBLE THROUGH IRAN AMERICA SOCIETIES IN FIVE MAJOR CITIES. OF THESE ONLY ISFAHAN REMAINS INTACT. FOR ICA, TASK IS TO DETERMINE WHAT SYMBOLICALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY CAN BE CONVEYED (AND HOW) TO BOTH THE SOPHISTICATED AND NON-SOPHISTICATED WHICH WILL ALLAY FEARS AND RESENTMENTS FOSTERED BY THOSE WHO INSTINCTIVELY DESPISE US AND THOSE WHOSE STRATEGY IS TO OBLITERATE OR AT LEAST THOROUGHLY DISCREDIT THE US-IRAN CONNECTION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

B. MAJOR ISSUES AND CONCERNS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1. COUNTER THE FALSE BELIEF THAT THE USG IS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION AND SEEK. A RETURN TO FORMER TIMES WHEN IRAN WAS A U.S. "DEPENDENCY".

2. ENCOURAGE THE RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN IN NON SECURITY-RELATED FIELDS.

3. EASE THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS FOR IRANIAN UNIVERSITY SUT" SoTUDENTS SEEKING STUDY IN THE U.S. THROUGH .:

ENGLISH TEACHING AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMS.

4. FOSTER A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICANS WHO ARE P.ERSIAN STUDIES SPECIALISTS AND THEIR IRANIAN .COUNTERPARTS SO AS TO REVEAL A SIDE OF AMERICA WHICH

REVERES PERSIAN TRADITIONS.

S. SUSTAIN THE NOTION THAT FOR All OF ITS ILLS, THE US IS AN INTERESTING, DYNAMIC, CREATIVE PLACE WITH MUCH. TO CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD PEACE A~D HUMAN BETTERMENT.

6. PROVIDE GREATER UNFILTERED ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, U.S. OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL ATTITUDES AND AMERICAN LIFE THkOUGH THE VOA'S PERSIAN SERVICE.

S HELLENB E RG ER##

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

70

CON F IDE N T I A L ::','NlE 12:'586

FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/14/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: IR

SllK'ECT: YOUR MEEITNG WI'Ill FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-E!'1rlRE TEXT)

2. WHEN YOU SEE YAZDI, PlEASE MENTION W HIM lliAT AMBASSACOR CUTLER WIlL-HAVE HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS A'" 10 A.M.

WASHINGWN TIME MAY 15. WE WOUID APPRECIATE JWY WORD YAZDI

MIGHT GIVE US ON THE FCLLOWING TWO SUBJECTS. YOU MAY SAY THAT WE ANTICIPATE STRCNG CONGRF.s5IONAL INTERESTS IN 'IllESE TWO SUBJECTS AND WOUUl BE GLAD W RF.J'FAT JWY lo!)RD OF EXPU,NATION OR STATEMENT OF POOl POLICY THAT YAZDI MIGHT LIKE

W PROVIDE.

(A) STAWS OF JEWS AND CIIllER MINOR!TY GROUPS. THERE IS CONCERN liERll THAT EXECUTION OF EIDHANIAN MAY LEAD W PRESSURE AGAINST JEWISH Ca.1MUNI1'Y BECAUSE OF

TIE.~ WI'Ill ISRAEL AND -ZIONISM. - THERE ARE MANY SWRIES TH[;',' NU'MBERS QF PRCMINENT JEWS HAVE RECENl'LY BEEN ARRFSTED.

WE WOUID APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION AS W FACl'S AND POLICY.

(B) LEGAL STATUS OF ARMISH-MAAG PERSOill.'EL. IN CURRENT IRANIAN CONDI'tIONS OF REVOIJmONARY COURI'S IN OPERATION, SCl'IE AMERICANS FEAR 'mAT DEPRIVING AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISERS OP ~IR IMMUNITY MAY PLACE TIlEM IN JEOPARDY. PlEASE NOTE THAT U.S. -IP-'INIAN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT HEMAIN IN EB"FECT. IF IRAN IS W SEEK U. S. MILITARY ADVISORY EFPORr IN '!HE FUTURE, WE WILL NAWRALLY HAVE W MAKE ADEQUATE APRANGEJI1EN'J'S W ProTIDE FCRPRIJI'EC--' TION OF PERSONNEL. WOULD APPRECIATE JWY CLARIFICATION

YAZDI CAN PROVIDE ON THIS SUEJEGr. VANCE

BT 2586

CONf! DENT! A.L STATE CHG:CWNAAS CHG:CWNAAS/SJH NONE

AIM CHG

A~EMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

INFO USCINCEUR V'AIHINGEN GE, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/15/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M TAGS: PFOR, IR, US

SUBJ: MEETING WITH FONMIN YAZDI: 1964 LEGISLATION ON ARMISH-MAAG IMMUNITIES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: THIS IS ~ REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. DURING MEETING WITH FONMIN YAZDI MAY 15, I ASKED HIM FOR EXPLANATION OF PGOI'S ACTION ABROGATING 1964 LEGISLATION AFFORDING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO U.S. MILITARY. YAZDI REPLIED THAT I SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THIS STEP AS ANTI-AMERICAN OR INDICATING ANY CHANGE IN PGOI'S DESIRE TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS. IT WAS A MATTER OF "CLEANING UP" SOME OF THE PAST AND THEN, WITH A GRIN, HE NOTED THAT THE DEMONSTRATION ~N TEHRAN FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF THIS "CAPITULATION" HAD LED TO THE EXILE TO TURKEY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

77

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE L'<

CHG;CWNAAS

CHG;CWNAAS

NONE

CHG POL ICA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECSTATE WAS HOC, NIACT IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

FOR WHITE HOUSE AND 0

E.O. 12065; GO'S 5/15/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M TAGS; SHUM, IR

~UBJ; MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER: STATUS OF JEWISH COMMUNITY

1. (t - ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING CrBLE)

2. DURING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI ON MAY 15, I NOTED THAT THE EXECUTION OF MR ELGHANIAN AND THE RUMORS OF WIDESPREAD ARRESTS OF JEWS IN TEHRAN HAD CREATED A SHOCK WAVE IN THE UNITED STATES AND PARTS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THERE WAS A FEAR, I SAID, OF PERSECUTIONS OF

THE JEWISH MINORITY. YAZDI REPLIED THAT ELGHANIAN WAS NOT EXECUTED BECAUSE HE WAS A JEW; CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY RELATIONSHIP IN THE EXECUTION AND ELGHANIAN'S FAITH, NO JEWS ARE BEING PERSECUTED BE-

CAUSE OF THEIR RELIGION, HE CONTINUED,AND THERE WILL BE NO PERSECUTION AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUAL BECAUSE HE IS A

MEMBER OF A MINORITY GROUP. HOWEVER, SOME JEWS, LIKE

MANY MOSLIMS, COMMITTED CRIMES DURING THE PREVIOUS

REGIME AND THEY, LIKE THE, MOSLlMS, CHRISTIANS AND OTHERS, WILL BE PROSECUTED IF THE EVIDENCE WARRANTS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN IRAN. REPRESENTATIVES OF REPUTABLE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE WELCOME TO COME AND

SEE FOR THEMSELVES.

3. DURING THIS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION, DR. YAZDI WAS SLIGHTLY PRICKLY AND WONDERED WHERE THE BORDER LINE WAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. I REPLIED THAT THIS IS A QUESTION THAT COULD BE ENDLESSLY DEBATED BUT THAT CLEARLY CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES WAS OF MORE THAN NATIONAL INTEREST.

CONFIDENTIAL

78

CONFIDENTIAL

I ALSO SAID THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO BE FRANK WITH EACH OTHER AND NOT TO LET DOUBTS FESTER AND THAT

MY QUE'y $HOULD ALSO BE SEEN IN THAT CONTEXT. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT IN THE DEV~LOPMENT OF

OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP THAT WE OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF

FACTS AND THE POLICIES OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS

AND NOT ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RU00HR #5140 157"

CCCCCZZl!

R 1709411z MAY 79

"'M AI-IF:r.lBASSY TEHRA,\i

TO SECSTA1'E WI8HX 1'198 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L TElffiAN 051110

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/17/85 (NAAS, c.w.) OR-M TAGS: US, IR

SUBJ: US-IRAN RELATIONS: FONMIN YAZDI'S vtEWS

1. (C-ENI'lflE TEJi'l'; REPORTING CABIE)

c. AT TtiE CONCWSION OF' MY MECTING ON MAY 15 WITH FONMIN YAZDI, I DRa·] AT"IENI'lON 1D AN AFP NEWS REPORr QUCYI'ING

HIM AS SAYING, "THE IRANINAN GOVERNMENT HAS CI]I1E 1D THE CONCWSION TIlAT AMERICANS HAD BEEN INVOLVEIJ IN ALMOST

ALL ATI'EMF'l'ED SUICIDES, ~\JRIIJRES, AND OORFIUPTION OF '!HE PAHLAVI REGJJvIE. OF COURSE, 'IlIEY HAVE NO BAD INIEm'IONS

AMERICA AND AMERICANS; HChIEVER , IT :rs DIFFICULT FeR 1}!EM 1D FORGEr TI{FBE PAST INVOLVE1o!Em'S". YAZDI IMMEDIATELY DENTIm THAT THE QUOTE WAS FULLY ACCURA'Ill AND SAID T'r'J\T. 'lliE AFP REPORT HAD BEEN INCORRE=Y DIlAVlN

FROM EI8 INTERVIEW WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES. HE WEN STATED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT "IRANIANS" WERE CONVINCED OF u.s.: DEEP' INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH MATTERS, BUT THAT HE fLID VERY CAREFULLY N01 ATl'RIBUTED lliESE VIEWS ro '!HE IRANIAN GOVENMENT. "AFlER ALL, 1 HAvE LFARlOOl ENOOGH AiliEADY OF WHAT 1 CAN SAY AS AN IRANIAN OFFICIAL, WHATEVER MY PERSoNAL VIEWS ARE."

3, IN A VERy FRIENDLY HANEER, HE 'mEN BRIEFLY LECl1JRED

ME ON THE NEED OF THE U.S. so TAKE WE INITIATIVES ro DISABUSE IRANIANS 0"' THEm CURRE:NT SUSPICIONS AND ro WIPE WI' TIlE MEMORIES OF '!HE PAST. HE WENT 'IHRJUGH '!HE FAMTLIAR CATEClllSM OF' OUR INVOLVEr1ENT IN WE MOSSAzy.GH OVERTHROW, THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BE'IWEEN SAVAK AND CIA, THE ENOFJ<KJUS U. S. SUPPORT FOR '!HE SHAll'S INIllRNATIONAL OhmCTIVES, THE SALE OF MANY ITI'lIIS, WHICH. IRAN DID NOr NEED, l<:re. llE 'Il-lEN s'rATED THAT, ACCORDING'ro HIS III-

30

5140

CLASS: CONFIDENI'lAL Clffi}E: STATE

APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS!BJH ClEAR: NONE

DIS'IR: CHG POL OR

ECON ICA RF

!'DRMATION, PRESIDENT CARl'ER HAD PERSONALLY 'I'EtEPHoNED THE SHAH ON SEPI»1BER 8, THE VERY EVENING OF 'THE JAIEH SQUARE MASSACRE IN WHICH "'lHOUSANIS WERE KIILED." HE SAID '!HAT EVERY IRANIAN BELIEVED '!HAT '!HE PHESIDENT HAD CALIED TC GIVE '!HE SHAH HIS FULL SUPPORT !'DR 'THE MILITARY A=ONS OF 'THE DAY AND IT WOULD BE HARD FOR IRANIANS TC !'DRaE!' 'IRIS. '!HE BROAD WEB OF PERSCNAL RELATIONSHIPS AT '!HE TCP WI'IH THE SHAH AND HIS I'ROTI!GES ESTABLISHED OVER THE YEARS lIUJLD ALSO HINDER U.S. -IRAN RELATIONS IN '!HE FU'IURE; FOR EXAMPLE, FOI'I!IER SECREl'ARY OF srA:rE RO:lERS WAS ON 'THE BOARD OF DIRECTCRS OF 'THE PAHLAVI rouNDATION, AND 0'lHER PEDPIE l'RCMrNENr IN U.S. IRANIAN RELATIONS HAVE IDNG 'IERII RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ARE AGAINST '!HE IN:rEHESTS OF 'THE PHESENT OOVERNME:NT.

4. YAZDI '!HEN SAID '!HAT , OF COURSE, 'THE PURPOSE OF SUCH

MEEI'INGS AS '!HE ONE WE WERE HAVING WAS TC PUr '!HE PAST

BEHIND US AND TC I1XJK AHEAD. HCl\IE\IER, 'THE ONUS IS ON

THE U. S. TC TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND SPECIFIC A=ONS TC SHCM THE IRANIAN PEOPLE '!HAT 'THE PAST WAS INIlEID PAST AND '!HAT 'THE IRANIAN REVOWTION HAD TRULY BEEN ACCEPIED BY, 'THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPIE.

5. I REPORT THE ABOVE SIMPLY TC SHCM 'THE MIlID-SEI' OF 'THE !'DREIGN MINISTER AND MANY OF lliOSE IN 'THE PRESENT GOV:EJW.1ENT. YAZDI APPEARS TC BE BASICAU.Y FRIENDLY TC US AND DESIROUS OF A NORMAL RELATAIONSHIP. BUT"mS CMN PAST OPPOSITION TC THE SHAH AND '!HE CCJIIPLEX INTERTWINING TIES OF 'THE U.S. WI'IH 'THE PAHLAVI REXlIME OONTINUE TC WEIGH HEAVILY ON HIM. NAAS

OONFIIlENTIAL

TEHRAN 5140

CONFlDE'Nl'IAL

TEHRAN 5211

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/85 (TCMSE'llI" V.C) OJlr.p TAGS: PEPR, SHUM, IR

SUBJ: ~RANIAN .Th"'WS AND OTHER MINORITIES

DURING CALL OF FON MIN YAZDI MAY 20 ( REFeRrED SEPTEL) YAZDI STRONGLY REITERATED !'GO!' S POSITION THAT JEWS AND CITHER MINORITY GROUPS ARE NOT NOlI AND WILL NOT BE SUB-. .JECTED 'IQ DISCRIMINA'lQRY TREA'IMENr IN REVOumONARY IRAN, THE U.S. SENATE, WHICH HE CLAIMED EVERYONE KNCWS IS JXtolINATED BY THE ZIONIST LOBBY • IS MISTAKEN 'IQ PERCEIVE OIHERWISE. 'IQ SUPPORI' HIS CONTENTION THAT IRANIAN MINORITIES ENJOY THE SAME FRillJXII'IS AS IRANIP.N mSLIMS, YAZDI CITED THE RECEr;Il' VISIT OF A JEWISH DELEGATION 'IQ QCM WHERE KHCMEINI REASUUJiED 'I'fIDo1 ON THE RIGHTS OF MINCRITY GROUPS. YAZDI SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMEm' HAS FIWl EVIDENCE THAT ISFAEL HAD SEN!' AGENIS 'IQ IRAN WHERE THEY WERE GIVEN TIwrrAN PASSPORI'S AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE SHAH:

Illi SAID THAT IRAN HAS EVERY RIGHT 'IQ ARRF.ST 'lllE3E ZIONIST SPIES, BUT THAT SUCH ARRESTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRPIED AS A POGROM AGAINST THE JEWISH CI»IUNITY. NAPB

BT

#5211

NNNN

o 201239Z MAY 79

liM AMEMBASSY 'lEHRAN

'IQ RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC JMI1EDIA'l1l 1545

INFO RUEHTV/~Y TEL AVIV PRIORITY' 0027 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L TEHRAN 05211

CHRGE: STA'l1l

APPR'l: CHG: CWNAAS DRFTD: POL:VTCMSE'llI ClEAR: NONE

DISTR: POL em HI'

CRU

CONFIDE'Nl'IAL

'lEHRAN 5211

82

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE,

May

22,1979 /

- Clyde D~aYlOr

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

~

E/C

SIJIlJECT:

Perceived Effects of the Javits Resolution

Charge

We have already noted in this Section several instances of nervousness or boycott of contac~s with us which are most understandable in the context of the Javits resolution. Richard Bash had two appointments at the General Manager level of the NIOC cancelled on May 21; both of these officials are long time contacts who he has seen since the revolution. One even called after hi~ secretary had cancelled the appointment to apologize but offered no explanation. Barbara Schell had an appointment with the head of a major PGOI-owned company cancelled with no explanation. On May 20 a senior Official of the CBI, who was merely to have rescheduled his appointment, told me

he would be busy for the foreseeable future.

1'1e have had a number of calls or expressions by visitors expressing the COncern that o.Ur. days here Were numbered.

In one instance, the vice president of a large American company was advised by his firm's Iranians to advance his departure time from three weeks hence to as soon as possible.

cc: POL V

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly On the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL. FORM NO 10 {R£V, '.7.1

(!;5A f'PMA (.1 C,,"I'III 101.11 e _\(>..111

CONFII:ENTIAL

DE RUQMHR #5316 142" ZNY CCCCC ZZH

o 221259Z MAY 79

JiM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

'lD SECSTA'lE WASHDC DlMEDIA'lE 1598 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L TEHRAN 05316

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/22/85 (NAAS, C.W.!'l'Ct1'3E'IR, V.L.) TAGS: PEPR, IR, US

SUN: U.S. -IRANIAN RELATIONS: MAY 17 SENA'lE RESOWI'ION 1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT; =S IS A REPOffi'ING MESSAGE)

2. I APPRECIATE '!HE WAY IN WHICH '!HE DEPARIMENT'S SPOKES-

MAN HANDlED '!HE FLOOD OF QUESTIONS MAY 21 ON '!HE IRANIAN REA=ON ro '!HE SENA'lE RESOWI'ION. NO EASY TASK: • AS WE ARE REPOffi'ING SEPARA'lELY, '!HE DECIBEL I.EVEL AND SHRIIllESS OF PRESS AND RADIO COVERAGE HERE MARKEDLY DECREASED =AY AND WE HOPE THAT ON OUR SIDE WE CAN AVOID RESTIMULATING

IT.

3. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS DIREarED ro '!HE DEPARIMENT SPOKE'S-

MAN AT '!HE MAY 21 PRESS BRIEFING INDICA'lED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL MISUNDERSTANDING MAY EXIST AS ro '!HE NA'IURE OF '!HE POO!' S PRaI'FST OF 'IHE MAY 17 SENA'lE RESCWI'ION SPONSORED

BY SENA'lDR J AVIS AND ITS FOSTION KMARD '!HE SENA'lDR !lIM3E[1i'. '!HE 'SPOKESMAN'S RESPONSE, WE BELIEVE, MAY IDI' HAVE ENTIRELY SEr TIlE RECORD STRAIGHT IN =S REGARD.

FOR '!HE RECORD, '!HEN, '!HE POO!' S PROI'EST IS WITH '!HE RESOlliTION WHICH IT REGARDS AS UNWARRAN'lED INI'ERFERENCE

IN IRAN'S INIERNAL AFFAIRS. OFFICIAL CC»1ENTS ON SENATOR

JAVITS HAVE BEEN LIMI'lED 'lD ALLEGATIONS THAT HE HAS ZIONIST CO~ONS. HIW WIFE'S FORoIER RELATIONSHIP

WIlli IRAN AIR HAS ALSO BEEN '!HE SUBJECT OF OFFICIAL

CRITICISM. NO THREAT AGAINST SENA'lDR JAVITS HAS BEEN

MADE BY '!HE POOl, HOWEVER, NCR, ro '!HE BEST OF OUR KNOWLl'WE, HAS ANY KIND THREAT BEEN MADE AGAINST HIM BY ANY INDIVILUIL OR GROUP WHICH MIGHT EVEN BE =Y C0NSTRUED AS AN AGENT OF '!HE POOl.

34

mIRAN '5316

CLASS: CQNFII:ENTIAL CllRGE: STA'lE

APPRV': CHG: CWNAAS IlRF'l1:: CHQ: CWNAAS ClEAR: NONE

DISTR: CHG POL CRU

In/f), vi !)r/,;/ L.

ORf7

4. I HAVE SENT 10 YAZDI 'IHE TEX'T OF = PREPARED STA'lE-

MEN!' BY 'IHE SPOTlE'SMAN AND A COPY OF 'IHE SECRErARY' SMAY 1

ADDRESS. I DREW YAZDI'S ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR 10 THE

SECRETARY'S CrnMENTS ON 'IHE U. S. APPROACH 10 INrERNAL CHANGE.

5. WE HAVE BEEN REl'LECI'ING OVERNIGHT AJ3CUT THE 1JEI!ElI1E;NCE

OF 'lliE POOl REACTION 10 'IHE SENATE RESOLUTION. 'IHE POOl'S

RESPONSE SURELY RELATES IN PART 10 TTS CONTINUING INS&-

CURITY. HIGHLY SENSTTIVE 10 ITS VULNERABILITIES, IT IS

INCLINElJ 10 REGARD EVEN 'IHE SLIGHTEST SUGGESTION OF PRESSURE F'f((Jo! OUTSIDE SOORCES AS UNWARRAm'ED INTERFERENCE

IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, WE SPECULATE THAT 'IllERE MAY

BE AN0I'HER MOl'IVATION FOR 'IHE POOl'S DECISION 10 ASK US THAT AMBASSAIXlR CUT[ER'S ARRIVAL IN IRAN BE RELAYED Ii

. MOl'IVATION THAT GIVES US CAUTIOUS OPTIf.!ISM REGARDING OOR PROSPECI'S FOR WEATHERING 'IHE CURRENT sroRM wrmouT

MllJOR, lASTING DAMAGE. 'lllE POOl HAS BEEN VICT1M1=ON

NUMERalS OCCASIONS BY 'lliE SYSTEM OF DUAL GOVERNMENTS

(I.E., 'IHE PGOl ON 1'HE ONE HAND AND 'IHE REVOWTIONARY CCM1ITIEE STRUCWRE SUBJECT 10 KHCMEINI' S DIRECTION ON 'lliE 0I'HER), NOr 'lliE LEAST OF WHICH WAS 'IHE BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS wrl'Il EllYPT. FORCED BY KHCMEINI' S VIE'dS ON 'IHE ISSUE. SEVERAL FAOTORS LEAD US TENTATIVELY 10 CONCIDDE THAT 'lliE Pam; MAY HAVE TAKEN 'IHE ACTION IT DID 10 FORESTALL MORE PREXm'lUJS DNILATEHAL ACTION ON 'IHE I'ARr

OF 'IHE IMAM. AM:Nl 'lliESE ARE 'IHE O'lBERWISE SURPRISINGLY

us« KEY MANNER IN WHICH 'IHE I WAS RECEIVED BY FOUR

DIFFERENl' CABINEr MINISTERS ON MAY 20 AND 21--MEFl'INGS WHICH OCCURRED AFTER 'IHE DECISION' 10 REQUEST AMBASSADOR CUT[ER TO DELAY HIS A.~AL HAD BEEN MAD&-- AND 'IHE PUBLIC TREA'Jlo1ENT TO 'lliE MOVE BCYI!I IN 'IHE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED

MEDIA AND BYFOlf.lIN YA.ZDI. FOLLOWING. 'IHE VITRIOLIC

ATrACKS OF MP:i 20 IN NIRT'S RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMMING, 'IHE ISSUE WAS DECIDEDLY IXMNPLAYED IN PROGRAMMING ON MAY 21. YAZDI IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 21 AND AN INTERVIEW AIRED 'IHE SAME DAY BY NIRT WAS MODERATE IN TONE, CAREFUL 10 DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 'IHE lEGISLATIVE

AND EXECUTIVE BRANCRES OF 'IHE USG, AND HOPEFUL THAT GOOD RELATIONS BEIWEENIRAN AND 'IHE U.S. WOULD NOI BE IMPEDED BY 'IHE SENATE. RESOWTION.

35

mIRAN 5316

6. AIL OF THIS SUGGE'STS THAT OUR BE'ST HOPE OF REA=m

A SATISFAcroRY ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NEW IRAN LIES IN

QUIET DIPLaolACY. DE'SPI'lE KHCMEINI' S INTRANSIGENCE 'roWARD

THE U.S. , THERE ARE MANY HERE WHO SINCERELY WANT ro HAVE CORDIAL, COOPEHATIVE RELATIONS WIlli US, WHO ARE RECEPTIVE ro OUR VIEWS AND WHO ARE SENSITIVE ro IN'I'ERNATIO~

OPINIOO ON MATI'ERS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. UNFOFlIUNATELY,

KHCMEINI Ri'NAINS FOR THE MCfo1ENr '!HE M:lST PCMERFUL POLITICAL

FIGlfflE IN IRAN AND AN INDIVIDUAL WH<l>l PERHAPS MORE PROGRFSSIVE IRANIANS DARE NOT CHALLENGE FRONl'AILY. WE

SHOULD NOT OVER-ESTIMATE OUR ABILITY ro AFFECT EVEm'S

HERE., BUT WE CAN HOPE ro HAVE AN IMPORrANT IMPACT AT THE MARGINS BY PllJGGIm AWAY WITH THOSE IRANIAN WHO ARE INCLINED ro APPRECIATE THE IMPORrANCE OF FRIENDSlIIP WIlli

THE U.S •. THE ASSUMPTION, OF COURSE, IS THAT THESE SAME =IVIDUALS WILL CONTllIUE ro HAVE AU'lllORITY AND INFLUENCE IN 'IBIS cumoos MIX OF Z!AIJJI'S AND DEMOCRATIC ,REFOmERS .. NAAS

BT

~5316

NNNN

,86

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUQMHR #5824 156 ••

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

o 050751Z JUN 79 ZFF4

I'M AM1JIJBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATI: WASHOC NIACT IMMEDIATI: 1840 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L TEHRAN 05824

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHROE: STATI: 5/6/79

APPRV: CHAroE' CWNAAS

DRFTD: CHAroE' CWNAAS

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: CHARGE' POL ICA

RF' CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/5/85 (NAAS, c.w.) OR-M TAGS: PEPR, Scr'N, IR, US

SUB]: NOON BRIEFING RE AMBASSAOOR CUTLER JUNE 4

1. I WOULD APPRECIATI: CLARIFICATION AND ElDCIDATIONON SPOKESlWl'S STATI:MENIS ON P,MBASSAOOR ClJI'LER JUNE 4. STATB-, MENI'S THAT "THE UNITI:D STATI:S AT TIlIS TIME HAS NO PLANS EITfIER TO WI'IllDRAW HI2 NA':E OR 'ID REA2SIGN HIM 'ID 'ANO'IHER POST" CERl'AUNLY RAISES THE QUESTION WHY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF IRANIAN REQUEST TO WI'IllDRAW TIlE AMBASSAOOR' S APPOINT-

MENT WAS MADE AT THIS TII'ffi. THE MANNER IN WHICH TIlIS

DELICATI: MATI'ER HAS BEEN HANDLED, 'lHEREFORE, CAN ONLY BE VIEWED HERE AS AGRATIJITOUS SLAP AT poor, A DESIRE TO PLAY TIT FOR TAT. I CAN APPRECIATI: ElIIOITONS AND IRRITATIONS AROUSED IN WASHINGTON BY root ACTIONS. THOSE OF us HERE WHO BEAR TIlE DAILY BRUNI' OF TIlE EFFECTS OF lliESE ACTIONS SHARE THEM.

2. HOWEVER, r HAD THOUGHT lliAT WE WERE GOINJ 'ID TRY

lliROUGH QUIET DIFLCMACY TO 00 WHAT WE CAN TO MODERATE CURREm' PASSIONS. THAT APPEARED TO BE THE CRUX OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY MEETING WIlli YAZDI WHICH IRONICALLY TOOK

PLACE A FEl\T HOURS BEFORE THE NOON BRIEFING. IF HE IS SOME

. WHAT CONFUSED TODAY, I CAN WEIL UNDER2TAD. I AM SURE

YOU WILL AGREE THAT lliERE IS A CERTAIN INCONSISTENCY IN CUR APPOOACI!.

3· FIN.ULY, SINCE DEPAR'IMEN'r'KNEW THAT I WAS ABOUT TO CARRY OUT MY INSTRUCTIONS WIlli YAZDI, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO IEr l'ffi KNOW ANNOUNCEMENT WAS 'ID BE MADE SO THAT I COULD HAVE INFORMED PGOI, I FIRST LIlARNED OF CUR ACTION FROM TEflRAN RADIO BROADCAST TIlIS MORNING AS lliOUSANDS OF DEMONS'IllA'IDRS WERE MOVINJ BY THE EMBASSY.

.87

VV ESA912BR A242 \ 1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t

RR R UQMHR 1 .lUll

DE RUEHRO '4953 15811815

Z NY CCCCC ZZH

R 07'0801Z JUN 79 1'1'1 AM EMBASSY ROME

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7629 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 995

BT

CON F' IDE N T I A L ROME 14953

E.0.12065. RDS-I (6/6/99), HOLMES, H.A., OR-M TAGS. PEPR, MASS, IR, IT

SUBJ: (C) IRANIAN INTEREST IN SPARE PARTS

I. C-ENT IRE TEXT

2. MF'A OF'F'ICIAL TOLD US JUNE 5 THAT AT RECENT MEETING BETWEoEN IRANIAN F'ClREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN TAI'IAGNINI, YAZDI EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING SPARE PARTS PRODUCED IN ITALY UNDER U.S. LICENSE F'OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOW IN IRAN, SUCH

AS BELL HELICOPTERS. OF'F'ICIAL SAID THAT ITALIANS, WHO ARE NOW CONSIDERING THEIR RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL ,BELIEVE THAT YAZDI REQUEST IS EF'F'ORT TO IMPROVE CONTACTS

WITH THE U.S. THROUGH THIRD COUNTRY AS IT IS NOT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE AT THE MOMENT TO APPROACH U.S. DIRECTLY.

3. COMMENT: WHILE WE ARE NOT IN A POSIT ION TO JUDGE

VALID ITY OF' THIS INTERPRETATION OF' YAZDI REQUEST, WE NOTE THAT ITALIANS WOUlD PROBABLY BE EAGER TO SELL SPARE

PARTS TO IRAN IN ANY CASE. WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT

TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THIS MATTER SHOUlD IRANIANS PRESENT SPECIF'IC LIST OF'DESIRED SPARE PARTS.

GARD NER

BT #4953

88

SEC R E T/NODIS

DE RUQMHR #5952 159** ZNY SSSSS ZZH

o o?o826Z JUN 79

FM AMEMBAsSY TlliRAN

,TO SECSTATE WASlIDC IMiIEDIATE.1900 BT

S' E C RET TlliRAN 05952

NODIS

fOR TIlE SECRETARY FRClII CHARGE

E.O. 12065: =-3 6/8/99 (NAAS, c.w.) Op,.:M

TAGS: IR, US

SUBJECT: U. S. POSTURE IN FORI'HCClIIING MONTHS

1. (S-ENI'IRE TEXT.)

2. IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE, I RAVESJ'Nl' YOU A FAIRLY GLOCMY OVERVIEW OF 'IRE SI'IUATION HERE. FCIliWING ARE MY 'IHOUGHTS ON HO\I' WE SHOULD POS'IURE OURSELVES IN 'IRE SUMMER MON'IHS

AHEAD.. ONE CANNOT PRACTICALLY LOCK FUffi'HER 'IRAN THAT.

3. GENERAL APPROACH TO PGOI:

--I RAVE TAKEN A FAIRLY ACTIVIST APPROACH ',SINCE MY REIURN TO rosr, E. G., CALLING ON MANY MINISTERS AND SPELLING OUT OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOWI'ION, EI'C. I RAVE BEEN GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED, BUT 'IRE CENTRALITY OF KHCf.1EINI AND THE TUMULTUOUS IRANIAN REACTION TO THE SENATE RESOW'I'ION RAVE SUBSTANTIALLY NEGATED ANY GOOD IXlNE.

-I BELIEVE THE NEW CHARGE SHOULD REIURN TO A rm PROFILE. IEr 'IRE lRANINAS TAKE 'IRE INITIATIVES WHEN THEY REALIZE

THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES TO GOOD RELATIONS WIlli US. IT

IS LIKELY THAT THOSE CLOSE TO KHCfoIEINI, CERTAINLY 'IRE MANY IRANIAN OPPOSED TO HIM, SEE US AS EAGER TO PROPITIATE HIM ANC, THEREFORE, WILLING TO ENDURE MUCH ABUSE.

--DISTANCE IS ALSO CALLED FOR IN VIEW OF MY ASSESSMENT (SEPTEL) THAT WE CAN CURRENI'LY RAVE LITI'LE POSITIVE LONG

TEHRAN 5952

CLASS: SECREl'

CHRGE: STATE 6/8/79 APPR'l: CHARG: CWNAAS DRF'ID: CHARGE: CWNAAS :MA CLEAR: NONE

DISTH: CHG

NNNN

SEC R E T/NODIS go

'lEIIRAN 5952

TFllM IMP ACT ON THE SI'IlJATION HERE. WE SHOULD NOT BECCME IDENTIFIED WITH THE KIND OF STATE AND POLICIES KHCMEINI IS CRFATING AND II'HICH ARE UNLIKELY TO ENDURE OVER THE IDNG TERM.

-- I 00 NCJl' FAVOR THE DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY TO KHCMIlINI UNLESS PGOI TAKES THE INITIATIVE. AN EMISSARY WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NO OPPOlillJNITY NOR CHANCE OF AFFECTING HIS MIND-

SET AND IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A FURI'HER KNUCKLING DOWN TO RIS BRAl'ID. OF EXTREMISM.

--EMBASSY STAFF, TO THE EXTENr POSSIBIE, SHOUID MAINTAIN trs FORMERLY FAIRLY WIDESPREAD CONTACTS.

--THE DIALOGUE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS A SIGN OF GCOD WILL AND, IF SPARE PARTS ORrnRS ARE SUBMITTFll,WE SHOUID BE REASONABLY FORTHCCMING (TO THE EXTENr CONGRESSIONAL OPINION WILL PERMIT).

--THE DEPJ\R11IlENT SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC CCMMENT ON IRAN INSOFAR AS POSSIBIE AND, WIlEN IT IS NECESSARY TO CCMMENT, TAKE A

BLAND "WE I.OJK FORWARD TO IMPRCJVE10lENT OF RELATIONs" LINE.

--WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO A STRIcT POLICY OF NONINTERFERNCE FOR THE TJ}IE BEING. THE BODY POLITIC IS SIMPLY TOO FRAC'IURED TO 00 ANY'IHING EWE.

4. STAFFING--THE DECISION TO DENAY APPOIN'IMENI' OF A NEW

AMBASSAOOR IS JUST RIGHT. A LATE SEPTIMBER OR 0C'I1JBER ARRIVAL WOULD BE A GOOD TARGET DATE.

--EMBASSY STAFF SHOULD NCJl' BE INCREASED AND POSSIBIE SHOULD BE DECREASED; ONLY REPLACEMENTS OF CURRENT STAFF SHOULD CCMIl HERE THIS SUMMER. OTHERS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY SHOULD BE HELD IN WAITING PATI'E11N TO SEE HOW SIWATION ENVOLVES.

--WIVES AND CHIWREN SHOUID NCJl' BE PREMITIElJ TO TRAVEL HERE UNTIL A NEW AMBASSAOOR CAN MAKE HIS OWN ASSESSMENT.

--CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW COSULAR QUARTERS SHOUID BE C(!.1- PLETED BUT FULL CONSULAR SERVICES SHOULD NCJl' BE RESUMED

UNTIL THE /,'EW AMBASSooR· ARRJ'IIES. VISA SERVICES ARE ONE

THING WE HAVE THE IRANIANS WANT. CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESF"fl' LIMITED SERVICES IS A SMALL SIGNAL OF OUR DIS-

PIEASURE. NAAS

BT

#5952

c: !' eRE T

OJ:

tl'yjf)l/(]}

159**

zr,i lZH o 080814z JlJN 79

"M A'IEJI1BASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IJI!MEDIATE 1898 81'

SEC RET TEHRAN 05951

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.0.12065: XIJS..3 6/8/99 (HAAS, C.'I.) OR-M

TAGS: IR, US

SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN SCENE; IMPUCATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS-

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS I PREPARE TO REUNQUISH CHAAGE OF THIS fA.ISSION,

I WISH TO SHARE A FEW OBSERVATIONS AND TIlOUGHI'S WITH YOU. IN FAIRNESS.I SHOULD ALERl' YOU THAT THE EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST YEAR PERHAPS ACCENTUATE THE DOURNESS OF MY VIEWS. HOWEVER, AIMOST AU MY DIPUMATIC COLLEAGUES (EXCEPT THE JAPANESE) AND EMBASSY OO-WORKERS WOULD SHARE MOST OF MY THOUGHI'S.

3. THE IJC:MESTIC POUTICAL SCENE-THE IRANIAN REVOWI'ION

HAS NOT RUN ITS COURSE. THE otes ARE BElTER THAN' 50-50 THAT FURIHER SERIOUS VIOLENCE WILL OCCUR. THE SI'lUATION IS HIGHLY VOLATIIE.

- THE BODY POUTrC IS SPUNTERED nzro AN AlMOST HOPEIESS PROFUSION OF POLITIC~ GROUPS AND 'I'HERE SEEMS LITI'LE UKELIHOOD OF MEAmNGFUL COOPERATION (NEVER AN IRANIAN CHARACTERISTIC ) AMONG THEM.

--KHCME= IS UNDER ATTACK FROM DIVERSE GROUPS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND NA'lURE OF THE STATE. VIOLENCE MAY .OCCUR. BUT, I BELIEVE HE WILL REMAIN POR THE FORESEEABIE FUTURE THE SINGIE STRONGEST POUTICAL FORCE. THERE IS NO VISIBlE REPLACEMENT TO HIM WHO COULD COMMAND SUFFICIThT AUTHORITY

~1

TEHRAN 5951/1

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 6/8/79
APPRV: ~E:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHAAGE: CWNAAS : MAM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG W CONTROL THE NATION. COERCIVE AtmlORITY RESTS WI'lll HIM

AND HIS REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND '!HE ARMED M:ES. '!HE POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS HAVE RECOVERED ONLY SLIGHTLY. --ANTI-AMERCIANISM IS A FACT OF LIFE HERE AND COULD GROW WORSE AS THE POLITICAL ror BOILS. WE ARE '!HE OBVIOUS

TARGEl' BECAUSE OF OUR TIES WI'lH '!HE SHAH. IN '!HE BEST

OF TIMES THE PERSIANS MUST BLAME sa.JEONE ELSE FOR '!HEIR WCES.

- THE "GCVERNMENT" IS CCl>lPOSED OF ESSENTIALLY DEGENI' MEN, BUT '!HEY HAVE LITTIE OR NO POWER; '!HEY ARE BEHOLDEN TO KHClolEINI, WHO DICTATES THE REVOUJTIONARY CCMIII'ITEE SYSTEM. '!HUS, '!HE DUALITY OF A\JIllORITY HERE WHICH AFFECTS ALL LEVELS OF GCVERNMENTAL, BUSINESS AND PRIVATE ACTIVITIES AND DRIVES THE MINISTERS TO DISTRACTION.

-THE ECONOMY IS A MESS. MUCH OF THE FORMER FOREIGN AND

IRANIAN MANAGEMENT LEVEL HAS FLED; OTHERS ARE IN <1" AIL, DEMORALIZED OR UNABLE TO PERFO~ '!HEIR WORK BECAUSE OF WCRKER OR REVOLUTIONARY CCMIII'ITEE INTRUSION AND SHORTAGES OF IMPORTED MATERIALS. '!HE BANKING SYSTEM HAS RECOVERED

SUBSTANTIALLY. UNSMPLCft'MENr IS VAST. BUT, '!HE HEAVY

OOLLAR EARNINGS FRCM OIL ARE BEING PIDIIED BACK INTO ECONOMIC RECOVERY LOANS W SUPPORT WAGES FOR UNPRODUCTIVE WORK AND CAN FINANCE RELIEF OF FOOD AND NON-EDIBLE SHORTAGES '!HAT ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

~2

-'!HE FISSIPAROUS STRAINS OF '!HIS POLYGlJJI' AND EIHNICALLY DIVERSE COUNTRY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEEN IN TURKESTAN,

KURDISTAN AND KHUZESTAN. THEY ARE LIKELY TO 0El' WORSE

AND AZERBAIJAN COULD BE NEXT.

- KHa-lEINI IS 79, TIRED AND Nor IN '!HE BEST OF HEAL'lH. HOWEVER, OUR POLICY FOR THE NEAR ~ MUST REALISTICALLY BE BASED ON '!HE EXPECTATION '!HAT" RE WILL BE AROUND FOR AWHILE. IN FACT, HIS DEATH NOW COULD 'lHROW THIS ODUNTRY INTO EVEN GREATER ~IL; HIS CHARISMA IS ONE OF THE FEW ELEMENTS KEEPING THE SOCIETY FRCM CQ'lIPLEI'E ANARCHY.

-HE IS A MAN DRIVEN BY HIS VISION OF CREATIt¥l A PURE MUSLI M STATE GOVERNED BY THE KOHAN AND THE ASCENDANCY OF

ISLAM IN 'lJlE WORID. AT TIMES HE SQUN[\S AS IF HE BELIEVES HE IS ALlAH'S CHOSEN MESSENGER.

-HE IS CONVINCED THAT HE AND "THE MASSiIl" ALONE BROOGIIT ABOUT THE REVDWI'ION AND THAT THEY ALONE ARE CCMoIITI'ED ro AN ISLAMIC STATE. 'lliUS, HIS CONl'EMPT .FCR THE l"DDERNlZERS AND DEMJCRACY AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS ro SHARE PCMER wrrn THE DEMJCRATIC OPPOSITION.

--H\l IS SUllROUNDED BY EX'J'REM[STS (ISLAMIC, LEFTIST, M, En:.) AND EVEN lliE CASTNEr lIAS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GEl'I'ING HIS DNDIVIDED ATTENTION. DIRECTlY INFlUENCING HIM, IN SUM, IS VIR'IUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

--KIICH:INI IS UNIUIDRED IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND lliE NEEDS OF BT

#5951

• NNNN

SECRET

TEHRAN 5951/1

-INTERNATIONALLY, WE WILL FIND IRAN GENERALLY NON-CONFORMIST LENDING SUPPORT TO RADICAL REVOLuTIONARY MOVEMENTS, AND A SOllRCE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

CI'EHRAN

j\ ·'IC;ty·~D~\l ~:r:'XI~:, ::J'.1arTO~jAL, ZEAICUS AND PROl\.~ 'ID OFF-THE-CUFF PRONOUNCEMENT? '1IHICH CREATE SERIOUS ID'lESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DI SCORD HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO CARE WHAT TL'RBULENCE !P. CAUSES.

--HIS DISLIKE (HATRED?) FOR THE U.S. IS REAL. HE UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVES THAT WE ARE INTERFERING AND ATTIMPTING TO UNDO THE REVOLUTION.

5. THE NEAR TERM FUTURE:

IF I AM RIGHT '!'fl.AT KHa1EINI WILL RENAIN '!HE PREIXIMINANT FIGURE IN '!HE MONTHS AHEAD, IRAN PRESEm'S A BLEAK LANDSCAPE

FOR US:

--IT WILL BE A VIR'lUAL DICTATORSHIP BY THE MOST CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS IEADERS WHO WILL USE 'rEREATS FORCE AND '!HE REVOUJTIONARY COURTS TO ATl'EM'l' TO COW THE OPPOSITION.

ALL OF THIS WILL BE MITIGATED BY AIMlNISTRATIVE INEFFICIENCY, PERSIAN OOlVIlJULAISM, CORRUPTION, AND OONTINUED OPPOSITION OF OTHER POLITICAL FORCES, INCUJDING THE IEFr, THAT HAVE

BECa1E USED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THIS WILL AISO INCWDE

THE INCREASING RESORT TO TERRORISM BY DISAFFECTED GROUPS.

--OUR DIPLCMATIC RELATIONS WIlL BE SUBJECT TO THE WHJMS OF

KHOfiEINI AND COULD BE SEVERED AT ANY TIME. ANl'I-AMERICANISM

WILL RE1>lAIN A FAVORED THEME AND OUR PERSONNEL CQUID BE

ENDANGERED ON OCCASION. OUR ACCESS TO USEFUL SOURCES WILL

BE DIFFICULT.

--THE ECONOMY WILL RECOVER VERY SLOWLY. OPPORIlJNITIES FOR U • S. BUSINESS, EXCEPT FO THE EXPORT OF CRITICAL ITEMS

SUCH AS FOOD GRAII'fS, WILL BE EXCEEDINGLY LIlITTED. BUSINESS-

MEN SEEXlNG TO COLLECT AGAINST OLD CONTRACTS, REGULARIZE THEIR STILL VALID ONES AND JOINT VEN'l\JRFS WILL CONTINUE TO FACE A LABYRINTH OF CONFLICTING AUTHORITIES AND EXPERIENCE PERSONAL AS WELL AS CORPORATE RISK.

-IN 'IRIS EN\IIRCtlMENl' OF ACUTE ISTABILITY, 'lllERE IS THE POSSIBILITY 'mAT IRANIAN OIL PRCroCTION WILL BE DISRUPIED IN SPI'IE OF THE INIERNAL ECONCMIC INCENI'IVES TO PREVENT =S.

6. I WILL c:cmENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON OUR POSWRE

O\TER 'ruE CCMJID M:lm'HS. MAY I ALSO RE'.CCMIIEND 'mAT YOO FIND

A FEW MINt1IES TO READ POLITICAL COUNSELOR 'IU!SEI'H'S

ANALYSIS ''WAITIID !'OR aoror-IRANIAN STYLE" (TEHRAN 5932).

IT TAKES A LONGER TERM VIEW 'mAN THIS MESSAGE. NAAS

BT

#5951

NNNN

SEC R E 'rINODIS TEHRAN 05951/2

Tehran, Iran

June 13, 1979

Excellency:

1 request your assistance in a muter eoneerntns the Iran-Allerican Society in Isfahan and the Isfahan "£fice of Education.

As you know, the Iran-America Society (lAS) is a private cultural association which attempts to maintain and improve relations'between the people of Iran and the people of the U.S. through a program of cultural events and exchan~es, library and .eeting services, and classes in English for Irantans and Parsi for Americans. The lAS offices in Tehran and ot~.r cities have had their charters approved throughth~Mlnl.t.r of Cultural Affairs. In Isfahan, however, althou,h the charter approval has been pendin~ for sOllie

time, it "'a. not completed prior to the Revolution, and 15 still pendin,.

. Today, June 13, the Di r ee tor of the Is fahan lAS, Mr.

Dennis Wilson, received a letur from Mr. lIassan Nilfroushand, Director-Genaral of the Office of Education in Isfahan. In that letter, Mr. Nil froushand , apparently considering the

lAS a foreign langua~e school rather .than a cultural association, has ordered the lAS to immediately suspend operations until it receives 1t3 school license, and to follow all regulations for schools.

While the lAS is not a U.S. Government organization, the Bmbassy does incourage and suP?ort the lAS and believes these associations contribute to better understanding

9(,

His Excellency,

Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi,

Minister of l'oreign Aftairs, Tehran.

2 -

between our countries. If the Isfahan lAS is forced to close now, just as its new season is beginning and it is accepting applications fo.r membership and language classes, there is a good possibility that it would never reopen, since its current costs far exceed its income. This would' be regrettable for both those residents of Isfahan who use its services, and for 8 better understanding between our peoples. The o r-de r is apparently in error, as the lAS has never come under the Ministry of Bducation but rather the. Ministry of Cultural Affairs. I hope that you can intervene to set aside this order and to advise the aftica of Culture in Isfahan that it has the proper ,urisdiction over the lAS.

With high esteem and thanking you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas Charge d ' Affai res, a. 1;

~ 7

CONFIDENTIAL

'IEHRAN 6263

CONFIDENTIAL

DE RUQMHR #6263 167**

ZNY cccce ZZH

o 160900Z JlJN 79

FM AMEMBASSY 'IEHRAN

'ID SECSTATE WA.SIire IMMEDIATE 2058 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L 'IEHRAN 06263

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHRGE: STATE 4/16 APPRV: CHG: CWNAAS DRF'ID: CHG: CWNA.AS ClEAR: NONE

DIS'lR: CHG POL RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/16/85 (NAAS, C,W.)OR-M TAGS: IB, US

SUBJ: RESOLUTION ON IRAN

1. (C-ENl'IRE TEXT; ACTION CABIE)

2. E'ITESAM ( DIR Gm EUKJPE AND /lMERCIAS) ~ ME 'ID CAlL ON HIM ON "UmENI''' MATI'ER '!HIS MORNIOO. WHEN I ARRIVED HE 'IDLD ME '!HAT FOlMN YAZDI HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION 'lijAT "'IW) SENA'lUIS" BARNES AND HOLLENBECK WERE SPONSORING A RESOLUTION ON IRAN J\LOOO TIiE LINES OF THE PREVIOUS SENATE RESOlllTION ( I CANOOI' FUl' MY HANDS ON CURREN.!' COIDRESSIONAL DIREC'IDRY Bt1I' NEA!IRN OFFICER

HAS :rNF'OR'IED 'IHAT A REPRESENTATIVE HOLLENBECK HAS BEEN WORKING ON SUCH A -RESOLUTION) • E'ITESAM SAID 'IHAT POOl

rs VERY CONCERNED 'IHAT TIiE PASSAGE OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL CREATE A VERY S'I'ROm RESURGENCE OF ANI'I-AMERICAN FEELING IN TIiE COONI'RY. GOVERNMENI' BELIEVES THAT PASSING OF SHCH A RESOLUTION, IN FACT, WOULD CREATE EVEN STRONGER

REACTION THEN EARLIER SENATE RESOLUTION. HE ASRED 'IHAT

WE DO WHATEVER COULD BE DONE 'ID PREVENl' '!HIS HAPPENING.

3. AT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF 'IHE FOREIGN MINISTER, EI1ESAM REFERRED FAVORABLY)I'() THE SENl'Ilflml OF SECRETARY VANCE'S IE'ITER 'ID THE FONMIN AND SAID 'IHAT THE POOl RECIPRCCATES 'IHESE REELINGS AND WISHES 'ID SEE A GRADUAL IMPR<JIlElIIEm

OF RELATIONS. HOWEVER, ANO'IHER CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

WOULD MAKE '!HIS EX'mEMELY DIFFICULT.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE A CURREN.!' READING ON THIS MA'I'IER SO

'IHAT I MAY INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I REALIZE '!HAT

'!HIS IS SATURDAY BUT IF YOO COULD HAVE EVEN A PRELIMINARY REPORT SENr 'ID ME 'IDDAY, I COULD PASS THE INFOR1ATION 'ID FONMIN YAZDI 'ICMJRROW MORNING A'l' OUR 10:30 MEETING.

THANKS. NAAS

BI

#6263

NNNN

E:'A122BR.A291

(J(] RlIQr·1HR

DE RUEHC #6044 1671819

2NY CCCCC ZZH

o 1620072 JUN 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN If.l\lEDIATE 3026 BT

CON F IDE N T I A L STATE 156044

E.O. 1206SGIlS 6/16/79 (PRECHT, H.)

TAGS: IR, US

SUBJECT: RE30UlTION ON IRAN

REFERENCE: 'IEHRAN 6263

1. CONGRESSMAN HOllENBECK, CONGRESSMEN SOLARZ AND POSSIBLY

arnERS INTRODUCED RESOUJ'ITONS SEVERAL WEEKS AOO ON SI'lUATION IN IRAN WIlli PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JEWISH CCf/lMUNITY. IT IS OUR UNDEFISTANDING THESE RE30UJ'ITONS HAVE BEEN ~ Ell TO HIRC.

2. cctlGRESSMAN BARNF.S HAS INVITED DEPT O!'F'S ON JUNE 18 TO

MEET WIlli INTERESTED CITIZENS FRCfo! HIS DISTRICT FOR DIS-

CUSSICN OF SI'lUATION IN IRAN. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING 'tHAT

SC\I1E 30 PERSONs WILL ATIEND AND THAT MFFl'ING-WIT...L BE PRIVATE.

3. OONGRESSMAN HOllENBECK HAD PREVICUSLY SCHEruLED A CLOSED HEARING ON JUNE 19 TO REVIEW STA'lUS OF IRANIAN JEWISH CCMIIUNITY. HE HAD PLANNED TO lNVl'm DEPT OFFS, CIA

AND AMERICAN JEWISH LEA!ERS. 'mIS HEARING HAS BEEN

CANCELLED AND, INSTEAD, !EPT OFFS WILL MEET WITH HIM AND POSSIBLY 0'rnER CONGRESSMEN PRIVATELY. CIA REP MAY ALSO BE INVITED.

4. IRANIAN PMBASSY CllAffiE AGAH WAS AWARE OF PLANNED

MEEl'INGS AND RESOWI'IONs AND ASKED US AllOJT '!HEM ON JUNE 15.

WE REPLIED ALONG FOREXlOING LINES. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#6044

_CO~FID'-~'J'IAL .\ ,U.~HR ~6279/01 163 *.

?NY cecce ZZH

o l'111,03Z JUN 79 ?~ ~~l~MBASSI T;3RAN

jj S),CSTAT3 tASHDC IMMEDIATE 2069 b1

CON F IDE N T I ~ L 06279

1:.0. 12065; GDS 6/17/35 (NAAS, c.w.) OR-M I,GS: PEPR, '1ASS, EFIN, IR

SUBJ: U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

,

REF: STATE: 1560440

1. (c - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: DUBINJ FIPEWELL CALL ON rONMIN YAZDI JUHZ 17 IlE REITERATED TO ME PGOI'S (AND ;;HOMEINI'S) LESIRE fOR CO~TINUED RELATIONS wITH U.S. YAZDI ~PPFALED FOR COO,~~ATION PREVENTING INCIDENTS SUCH AS MAY 17 SB~ATE RESOLUTION FPOM FRUSTR~!ING T§E PROCESS OF NORM~LIZ~TIC~. 91 ALSO. EMPEATICALLY STATEL TBAT U.S. PARTNERS IN RJi:CP<TL~ NATIONALIZED IRANIAN BANKS SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED

lEOUT RECOVERY OF THEIR EQUITY. END SUMMARY.

3. YAZDI RECEIVED ME A\D POLCOUNS JUNE 16 FOR F1RE~ELL ~IT,L., I ASKED iiIM WRAT MESS.!~-': I COULD CARRY BAC, TO

.. ;.';:,I\~G~i'O~:. Ht: ~EPLIED THAT HE "OU~D APPReCIATE MY LX,rNDING HIS REJARDS TO S!CRETARY V'~CE. IN THIS RE~l'D, cE ~AID. HE ~ANTEC TO REITERATE THAT IT CONTI~U~S TO

;.5T'!:~6 r.~i~ g9.Nh~rA~~~!i~~~iT~N~H~F U~~ ~ T~~i~~R ;q~~!~ ~ I

,'!~TS TO I~PROVE THISE RELATIONS AND TO fOT THE PAST

-"tlH:D. 'iIE ;(NO'II rats ',iILL Nn BE EASY, HE SAID. HE

;DI1D TRAT IT WAS 'SRY UNFORTUNATE THlT THK MAY 17 ~;~~1i a~SOLUTIOM aiD ST~~TED "A ~AVI" OF MUTUAL RECIMI\~TIO~. HE SAID TRAT T2E PGOI HiD BEEN DISTURBED TO

FAE RECENTLY lHAT CON~RESSMAN BARNES HAD PROPOSED A 'IMILAR kESOLUTION TO THE ONE PAS SID IY THE SINATE.

4. us.rxc INFO CO\TAINED I!~ REFTEL 1 OUTLINED FOR HZDI

j'.1I FFFO?TS vs rca HAD BEEN MADE AND \tERE CONTINUlrlJ TO BE ",Ue rc p~rnNT 'fHE ,l'iL OF '.CTIO:lS 1HA'l' so CONCERNED

.'11', AND '1';:2' P~OI., !IE REPLIED T'lAT HE VAS GLAD liE U~DER- 5THD THE PROBI,3~. "TEIS IS ',HAT 1 \'ANTED TO TELL YOU," ~E SAID, -&ND TriAT I WOULD LIIE YOU TO CONVEY IT TO j~SEI~GTON THESE KINrs OF RESOLUTIONS to NOT HELP. lnFY tar c ~T~A2Y TO THE EXPRESSIONS OF GOODVILL FROM ~J1T A~MINI j~AcICN." HztI THE" \\'ENT OVER THE NO~' '.'.:·",ILII.R R ;'RUN OF HIS U~D:ERSTANDING TilE DIFFERENCE ~~T~FEN TE Ar~!NISTRATION AND TEE ~ONGRESS IU! TB~ l~h~Il~ M~ -l\-TBE-STRIFT'S LACK OF DISTINCTION IET~EEN 'i'EE T;iu.

KT ON TO TEE QUESTION of MILITARY SAtES.

HE HAD P.ECE,'TLY BEEN I~FOR'1ED BY AIR FORCE ANlA~ TEP.T ~E ARE HOI,tING UP TilE DELIVERY OF ;:5 THAT IBN RAD t..LR':ADY PAID FOR. lIE ASKED

111

CL'"SS CH.'.GE ~.?P{·\' DRnrCLHR DIS'i'R

(,O"FID~~~!'JrI, sr:~i'"S ~h7

C'ri -:. : C:,~', P. h 3 F!.'T~ :VLIO...,Si ~: r ;'~B

POL >iF CHi !iCON

CONI'I:;."NTIAL

t~hT WE "PAVE ~HE WAY FOR DFLIVERY or THESE ITE~S. I AS~1D HI~ TO PFOilPE us rlTH MORE PRECISE DIT'ILS I\D PLOMISED I~AT .B ~ODLD DO WDAf WE COULD. YAZDI SAID. T"~ ~AN~~R IN ~HICH MOST OF TRE ~ILITARY CONTRACTS 91- T~~'N THi PR1VIOUS REGI~E AND THE U.S. HlP SEEN WRITTEN IS "UNACCE?TAB~E" TO THE P}OI. "THESE CON~RAcrr ARE J.IU A gA~::; C':"~~ TO OUR MILI'fARY I.SSISTA~CE ~ROUP. IF WE CA~C~I. wr ST~ND TO LOSS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS.

vii; ?':Ff,;R TO ct.NC}:L TH,;;! CONTRACTS IN A WhY I'Hh·T ;;ILL NOT ~URT JS ?I~ANCI'~LY. IT COULD COST us ALMOST A blLtlON DOLLARS. IF YOU H~LP US WI~H THIS, IT WOULD

pr SCM~THING I COUlD GO TO TBE PEOPLE WITH AND TILL T6EM ~dAT YOU HAVi DO~E fOR us."

6. I ~XPL'I\ED .ICB~T ACTIONS ~ITH BE3AR: TO THE DOD SUPPL~M~NTAL. YAZLI ~ENT ON TO H3QUEST dBLP ~ITH N09- D~F.NS! CONlKAC1UAL MA~rIRS lS WILL. HE ~OIID THA~ A CONTRACT fOk GB0 MILLION LOLS HAD 31EN GIVEN TO GT~

AND TEAT ABOUT 451 ~ILLION HAD fiEN P'ID OUT TO DITE BU!

~:A~A~~~ ~:D~:g: ~~;~L~J:DN~~~I~~ :~ED~O~;l=E~~~N~ri,

BUT tijE PEOPLE Sll GTE AS AN AMFiICAN CO~PANY. ~E ~EED YOUi ESLP IN G~TTIN= THE~ TO COMPLi!! THE jOR~."

POI~n:j; OUT 'jn;; El'FORT, WE HAVE r~ADE TO aT BUSINESSMEN TO f.TUR~ TO S'TrLC TH~IR AFFAIRS AND NJTfD T~lT GTE ITS~LF HAD 5ENI A D1~~]AtION TO IRAN ALaUT SIX ~.~{S 1ISLI'~ TO ~ISCUSS ITS CO~~kACT rlTH TH~ RFLEVANT IRANIAN JO'E~N~i~T OFFICES. I j~~N IPP~ALED TO HI~ TO J,LT lIS ~~o~ IN EACH INSTANC~ ~EFN 1}~A~IAN ENTITI~S ARS Fa~pARED TO lIsruss SP;CI1IC CO~T~bCTS tl~D P30MIS?D THAT Yo" «our.t ro ';V)';'lTEI'lG ,r COULD TO SEE Te,~T Ti'E u.s. COM~ANIES SEND SOM10NE OUT.

7. I.S HIS yItJl.L Ml;SSA}E YAZDI 'SAID TflAT HE WANTED IT TO FE FEWFiC"LY CLFAR ~HAT THE P~OI'S POLICY IS il~&

n~~lRC TO NAtIOW~LllA'ION OF PAN{S IN II N. ~£

SAID THAT G0VEFN!~~~T ~:Ar T[~EN CO~T~OI, C l'RE ?~~iS

FOR MANAGE~~~T ?~RF~5~S. t~1RICA~ BA~:~S ~ I H i·~;~

SiPES IN i.NY c,' 'fcl,:SE IHANIAI, cl.Nrs SHO:1l or )""'.";

TEl LOSS OF rE~IR EQUITY. "~E ~ILL ~!:E I DOD TO

llT

#6279

CONfID~NTIAL

1')1