RULE 21 Canilla vs Pelayo/Mendoza Facts: -Canillas charged Pelayo, Clerk of Court, with Grave Abuse of Authority.

-Canillas alleged that he received a subpoena merely to compel him to settle his obligation or as an invitation for mediation conference

Issue: w/n the act of the clerk of court of sending a subpoena as an invitation for mediation conference was violative of sec. of !ule " .

Held: -it was a violation -#ection !ule " simply states that a subpoena is a process directing a person to attend or to testiy in the trial or hearing of a case or at an investigation. -in the instant case, the subpoena sent was not for the complainant to attend or testify since there was no case filed yet. -this was sent merely as an invitation for mediation conference which is a violation of the rule.
HC Liebenow v PVOC HC Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Company Nov. 9 1918

Facts: The purpose o the pro!ee"ing is to re!over a sum o money to whi!h the Liebenow !onsi"ers himsel entitle" by way o a bonus in a""ition to the salary earne" by him while in the employment o the "e en"ant !ompany as superinten"ent o its a!tory in the "istri!t o Nagtahan# !ity o $anila.

% &uestion whi!h we !onsi"er o mu!h importan!e is presente" in an assignment o error "ire!te" to the a!tion o the trial !ourt with re eren!e to a subpoena duces tecum whi!h the Liebenow !ause" to be issue" a ew "ays prior to the hearing in the Court o 'irst (nstan!e. )ai" subpoena was "ire!te" to the managing "ire!tor o the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company an" !omman"e" him to pro"u!e in !ourt upon the "ay set or the hearing o the !ause the ollowing "o!uments. re!or"s# an" papers relative to the !ompany*s business.

+hen the !ase was !alle" or hearing the attorney or the PVOC move" the !ourt to va!ate this subpoena on the groun" that the Liebenow was not entitle" to re&uire the pro"u!tion o the "o!uments !alle" or. The !ourt rule" that the witness was e,!use" rom pro"u!ing the papers in the subpoena.

Issue: +ON the subpoena "u!es te!um was proper.

Held: No.

The subpoena duces tecum is# in all respe!ts# li-e the or"inary subpoena ad testificandum# with the e,!eption that it !on!lu"es with an in.un!tion that the witness shall bring with him an" pro"u!e at the e,amination the boo-s# "o!uments# or things "es!ribe" in the subpoena. (t is issue" in the same manner as the or"inary subpoena# an" is pro!urable rom the !ler- as o !ourse without appli!ation to the !ourt. )e!tion /01 o the Co"e o Civil Pro!e"ure says that the subpoena duces tecum may be use" to !ompel the witness to bring any boo-# "o!ument# or other thing un"er his !ontrol# whi!h he is boun" by law to pro"u!e in evi"en!e. The wor"s 2whi!h he is boun" by law to pro"u!e in evi"en!e2 in"i!ate a limitation upon the e,igen!y o the writ3 an" it is evi"ent that there is this "i eren!e between the or"inary subpoena to testi y an the subpoena duces tecum# namely# that while the person to whom the subpoena to testi y is "ire!te" is boun" absolutely an" without &uali i!ation to appear in response to the subpoena# the person to whom the subpoena duces tecum is "ire!te" is boun" only in so ar as he is re&uire" by law to pro"u!e the "o!uments in evi"en!e. To en or!e the pro"u!tion o these great piles o material un!on"itionally in !ourt woul" in many !ases operate with unreasonable har"ship on the party against whom the subpoena is issue" an" not in re&uently the step woul" be barren o results to the person see-ing to e,amine them. )u!h pro!e"ure is not to be en!ourage"3 an" it is the "uty o the !ourt# in su!h a situation# to !ontrol the pro!ess so as to ma-e it !on ormable to law an" .usti!e. 4)ubse!tion 5# se!tion 11# Co"e o Civil Pro!e"ure.6 The motion to vacate or set aside the subpoena gives the court the requisite opportunit to e!amine the issues raised b the pleadings in the cause and to consider not onl the relevanc o" the evidence which is to be elicited but also to consider whether an order "or the production o" the document would constitute an unlaw"ul invasion o" privac #

(n "etermining whether the pro"u!tion o the "o!uments "es!ribe" in a subpoena duces tecum shoul" be en or!e" by the !ourt# it is proper to !onsi"er# irst# whether the subpoena !alls or the pro"u!tion o spe!i i! "o!uments# or rather or spe!i i! proo # an" se!on"ly# whether that proo is prima facie su i!iently relevant to .usti y en or!ing its pro"u!tion. % general in&uisitorial e,amination o all the boo-s# papers# an" "o!uments o an a"versary# !on"u!te" with a view to as!ertain whether something o value may not show up# will not be en or!e". 4)treet# 'e"eral 7&uity Pra!ti!e# vol. 1# se!. 18//.6 No !ourt# it is nee"less to say# woul" punish a witness or !ontempt in re using to obey a subpoena duces tecum the issuan!e o whi!h has been pro!ure" with su!h en" in view.

Gil Georga vs. Hon. Pedro Quitain AM No. 981-CFI ( ul! "9# 19$$% FAC&' In 1975, Judge Quitain issued a subpoena which was duly served upon Dr. Ge orga to appear as govern!ent witness in a !urder case. Dr. Ge orga "ailed to appear in court, which pro!pted Judge Quitain to order the "or!er#s arrest, upon !otion o" the $iscal. Dr. Ge orga "iled the present ad!inistrative co!plaint against Judge Quitain, "or grave abuse o" authority and conduct unbeco!ing a %udge.

 Dr. Ge orga e&plained that his "ailure to testi"y was due to the "ar distance between his place in 'ayasan, (egros )ccidental and the *$I in +asbate. Dr. Ge orga added that he ,uestioned via telegra! who would rei!burse his traveling e&penses, but Judge Quitain did not reply, so Ge orga "ailed to testi"y on the given date. -cting -ssistant Judicial *onsultant .elova o" the *- reco!!ended that Judge Quitain is not guilty o" the ad!inistrative charges, since it is within the coercive power o" the courts to co!pel the attendance o" witnesses by subpoena. I''()* +,N udge Quitain or CFI -earing a .ase /a! .o/0el 1! su10oena t-e attendan.e o2 a 3itness in Mas1ate# 3-en t-e 4no3n address o2 su.- 3itness is in Negros ,..idental5 6 7)'. H)89* /es. Judge Quitain !ay co!pel attendance by subpoena and is there"ore, not ad!inistratively liable. 0nder .ule 11 2ec 3, it is within the coercive power o" the courts to co!pel the attendance o" witnesses to testi"y in court. 'he order o" arrest was not done in abuse o" authority, since "ailure o" the govern!ent witness to attend would sub%ect the prosecution to a serious handicap in proving its case. 4hat was done by Judge Quitain was law"ully within his %udicial discretion. $urther!ore, Ge orga was already "urnished a copy o" Quitain#s e&planation but no longer replied to such, leading the *ourt to in"er that he is already satis"ied with such e&planation. $%&'(!#A) !$**(! P!+,$C-#, &%C. vs. CA, C+%'(!#( !$**(! C+!P+!A-&+%, (,.A!,#+% /A%$0AC-$!&%G C+., &%C. A%, 1+%. P(,!+ C. %A'A!!+ 0AC-#2 Converse !ubber Corporation and (dwardson /anufacturing Co. sued $niversal !ubber Products for unfair competition. After they have presented about nine witnesses and various pieces of documentary evidence, Converse and (dwardson made a re3uest to 4udge %avarro to issue a subpoena duces tecum which was granted by the court. 4udge %avarro issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the treasurer of $niversal !ubber to bring with him 5all sales invoices, sales books and ledgers wherein are recorded the sales of Plymouth #tar Player rubber shoes from the time the corporation started manufacturing and selling said shoes up to the present.5 $niversal !ubber filed a motion praying that the subpoena duces tecum be 3uashed on the grounds that2 6 7 the said subpoena is both $nreasonable and oppressive as the books and documents caned for are numerous and voluminous8 6"7 there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof8 and 697 the books and documents are not relevant to the case pending below. +n the other hand, Converse and (dwardson claims that 6 7 the subpoena duces tecum in 3uestion specifically designates the books and documents that should be produced in court and they are : sales invoices, sales books and ledgers where are recorded the sales of Plymouth #tar Player !ubber #hoes from the time the corporation started manufacturing and selling shoes 6that is from April , ;<97 up to the present8 and 6"7 the relevance of the books sub=ect to the controverted subpoena duces tecum cannot be seriously denied, because if and when they are ultimately ad=udged to be entitled to recover compensatory damages from the $niversal !ubber, there would be no factual basis for the amount of such damages unless those books and documents are laid open for the court>s scrutiny. &##$(2 .+% the issuance of the 5subpoena duces tecum5 is proper in a suit for unfair competition. ?(#

1(),2 .hile this petition remains pending before the Court, $niversal !ubber manifested that their establishment was totally burned together with all the records which is sought to be produced in court by the 3uestioned 5subpoena duces tecum5. &n effect, it renders the present petition moot and academic. 1owever, the legal principles arising from the issues deserve +ur discussion and resolution. .ell-settled is +ur =urisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a 5subpoena duces tecum 5, it must appear, by clear and une3uivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A 5subpoena duces tecum once issued by the court may be 3uashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof. &n the instant case, in determining whether the books sub=ect to the subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint for unfair competition, .e have to e@amine !epublic Act %o. <<. &n recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to unfair competition,5 #ec. "9 of !.A. << grants the complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages recoverable. +ne of which is the 6"7 the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement. &n giving life to this remedial statute, .e must uphold the order of the lower court denying the motion to 3uash the 5subpoena duces tecum5. &n a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the 3uestioned 5subpoena duces tecum 5 that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of redress. -he sufficiency in the description of the books sought to be produced in court by the 3uestioned 5subpoena duces tecum is not disputed in this case, hence, .e hold that the same has passed the test of sufficient description. As .e said earlier, the establishment of the $niversal !ubber burned down together with all the records sought to be produced by the 3uestioned 5subpoena duces tecum,5 hence this case has become moot and academic. .e have no recourse but to dismiss the same.

Collado vs. Bravo/Murcia FACTS: Lorena Collado filed an administrative complaint against Teresita bravo, Clerk of Court, alleging that Teresita Bravo issued a subpoena directed to Lorena Collado for the mere purpose of allowing a certain PerlaBaterina to talk to Lorena Collado. Bravo averred in her answer that her only purpose in issuing the subpoena was to enable Lorena Collado and the Baterinas to settle their differences. ISSUE: WON the issuance of the subpoena was valid? HELD: NO. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. Bravo should have known that a process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this

case, Bravo knew there was no case filed against Collado. Neither had Collado commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Bravo, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.

MACASPAC VS. FLORES/PA ER Facts: !ommel /acaspac filed an administrative case against !icardo 0lores, the Process #erver of !-C *ataan, charging him with #erious %eglect of ,uty for his failure to serve a copy of the subpoena on the former and for per=uring his report. /acaspac countered that the reason why he failed to serve a copy of the subpoena was that at the time he went to the police station to effect the service, /acaspac was nowhere to be found and upon in3uiry, he was informed by /acaspacAs colleague that he was assigned to -ondo, /anila. &n his !eply, complainant reacted that 0lores merely went through the process of serving a subpoena without e@erting much effort to locate him. 1e asserted that during the time where the subpoena was allegedly served, he was not assigned or transferred to another station, and that he was the desk officer-on-duty in that same station. Issue: .+% there was compliance by 0lores of the manner of service of subpoena under #ec. <, !ule " of the !ules of Court. Held: !O. $nder #ection <, !ule " of the !evised !ules of Court, service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal or substituted service of summons. Personal se"vice and substituted se"vice are the two modes of serving a subpoena. &n this case, after 0loresAs frustrated attempt to personally serve complainant a copy of the subpoena he acted no further. -his he cannot deny since the certification itself only reflected2 I have this 18th day of November 2003 not served of (sic) witness subpoena upon P 1 !omme" #acaspac on the $round that the said P 1 !omme" #acaspac is now %assi$ned& at 'P( )tation 2%*& +ondo* #ani"a accordin$ to )P 3 ,ntonio -apu"i of the PNP* rani* .ataan/0 1e did not attest in his report or aver in his Comment that, upon learning that personal service is not possible, he served the subpoena by leaving a copy thereof to some responsible person at complainantAs dwelling place in +rani, *ataan or in the police station. 0lores actually had ample time to properly serve it thereafter because complainant was only re3uired to appear as a witness on 0ebruary ", "BB:, but 0lores chose to be apathetic. -he manner by which he served the court process clearly does not suffice to comply with the re3uirements of the !ules.

RULE 22
Luz vs. nat'l Amnesty commission/REYES

Facts: luz was charged with a violation (for illegal possession of fire arms) and was convicted. He applied for amnesty which was denied. He had until December 7 !""! which was a saturday to file a petition for review. on December # !""! he filed a motion for e$tension for %& days to file said petition for review which was going to be on december !' and the !'th and !&th are both legal holiday. december !( !""! luz filed a second motion for e$tension. )* denied since the time to file said motion for e$tension already e$pires. issue: +,- luz timely filed his second motion for e$tension (to file his petition for review) .uling: /) said yes. /) e$plained that the ca was correct for granting the first motion for e$tension rec0oned from december 7 !""! and not from december # !""! as stated in the general rule that it merely applied rule !! sec.% as amended. otherwise he would have acted with grave abuse of discretion. however as stated in the court in labad vs. 1/23 the underpinning consideration in this case is the liberal interpretation of the rules of court to attain substantial 4ustice. it appears that luz relied in good faith. the /) said that there would be apparent unfairness if the e$tension was to be counted from the original period and not from the date she had prayed for.
Neypes v. CA / Sagarino / Rule 22.
0acts2 %eypes filed in the !-C an action for annulment of =udgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion against the del/undo>s. -he del/undo>s filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of prescription. &n 0ebruary ", ;;C, the !-C dismissed the case on the ground that the action has already prescribed. %eypes received a copy of the order of dismissal on /arch 9, ;;C and, on the Dth day thereafter or on /arch C, ;;C, filed /!. +n 4uly , ;;C, the !-C issued another order dismissing the /! which %eypes received on 4uly "", ;;C. 0ive days later, on 4uly "E, ;;C, %eypes filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 9, ;;C. +n August :, ;;C, the !-C denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. -his was received by %eypes on August 9 , ;;C. %eypes filed a /! but this too was denied in an order dated #eptember 9, ;;C. %eypes assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. &n the CA, %eypes claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. -hey argued that the D-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on 4uly "", ;;C since this was the day they received the final order of the !-C denying their /!. .hen they filed their notice of appeal on 4uly "E, ;;C, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. CA dismissed the petition. &t ruled that the D-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from /arch 9, ;;C or the day they received the 0ebruary ", ;;C order dismissing their complaint. According to the CA, the order was the 5final order5 appealable under the !ules.

&ssue2 A. .hat should be deemed as the 5final order,5 receipt of which triggers the start of the D-day reglementary period to appeal, the 0ebruary ", ;;C order dismissing the complaint or the 4uly , ;;C order dismissing the /!F *. .+% %eypes file their notice of APP(A) on timeF ?(# 1eld2 0inal order2 the 4uly , ;;C order dismissing the /!. -he. #C has ruled in previous cases that it was the denial of the /! of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. $nder !ule : , #ection 9, %eypes had D days from notice of =udgment or final order to appeal the decision of the !-C. +n the Dth day of the original appeal period 6/arch C, ;;C7, %eypes did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the !-C, the /! only interrupted the running of the D-day appeal period. &t ruled that %eypes, having filed their /! on the last day of the D-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one 6 7 day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their /!. %eypes, however, argue that they were entitled under the !ules to a fresh period of D days from receipt of the 5final order5 or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration. -o standardiGe the appeal periods provided in the !ules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, #C deems it practical to allow a fresh period of D days within which to file the notice of appeal in the !-C, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. -his 5fresh period rule5 shall also apply to !ule :B governing appeals from the /-C to the !-C8 !ule :" on petitions for review from the !-C to CA8 !ule :9 on appeals from 3uasi-=udicial agencies to the CA and !ule :D governing appeals by certiorari to the #C. -he new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration 6whether full or partial7 or any final order or resolution. #C thus hold that %eypes seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of D days, counted from 4uly "", ;;C 6the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration7. -his pronouncement is not inconsistent with !ule : , #ection 9 of the !ules which states that the appeal shall be taken within D days from notice of =udgment or final order appealed from. -he use of the dis=unctive word 5or5 signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. 1ence, the use of 5or5 in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within D days from the notice of =udgment or within D days from notice of the 5final order,5 which we already determined to refer to the 4uly , ;;C order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. D-,A? 0!(#1 P(!&+, !$)( applies only to APP(A)#. 0inal order is the 0&%A) %+&%-(!)+C$-+!? +!,(!, and not 0&%A) H (I(C$-+!? +!,(!.

A!U"LAR #S. CA

F*)5/: *rnulfo *guilar was an 2, of ),6272)8-avotas during the %##9 -ational and 7ocal 2lections. He was designated as the *cting 2, and )hairman of the 6unicipal :oard of )anvassers. Due to the failure of *guilar to report in his post during the canvassing of the 2. he was charged with ;gnorance of the 7aw -eglect of Duty *bandonment and )onduct 1nbecoming a 3ublic ,fficer 3re4udicial to the ;nterest of 3ublic /ervice before the ),6272).

5he ),6272) through a resolution on 6ay <% %### found him guilty of the charged and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the service for ( months. ;nstead of filing an appeal with the )/) *guilar sought on -ovember !( %### a reconsideration of his suspension but this was denied by the ),6272) in a resolution dated =anuary !7 !""". *guilar filed an 1rgent 6otion for .einvestigation but this was li0ewise denied by ),6272) on February %7 !""". *guilar filed a -otice of *ppeal with the )/) on *pril !9 !""". ,n *ugust %7 !""% )/) denied *guilar>s appeal and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from service. *guilar moved for the reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the )/) on =anuary < !""!. *guilar brought his case with the )* on /eptember !< !""'. )* dismissed the petition on the ground that the )/) resolution on *ugust %7 !""% had become final and e$ecutory without any timely 6. having been filed and therefore could no longer be modified and set aside. 5he appellate court found that *guilar>s 6. was filed only on ,ctober % !""% more than %& days from /eptember 7 !""% when *guilar received a copy of the said resolution. *guilar now contends that he filed his 6. on /eptember !& !""% as indicated by the date stamped on the motion and not on ,ctober % !""% as declared by the )*. He further argues that his 6. was filed only % day late since the %& day period from /eptember 7 !""% fell on /eptember !! !""% which is a /aturday therefore he had only until /eptember !' !""% a 6onday to file his motion. ;//12: H27D: 5he 6. with the )/) was not filed on time resulting in finality of 4udgment sought to be reconsidered. ),6272) decision lapsed into finality for reasons subse?uent to the 6. therefore they affect the 4urisdiction of )/). =urisprudence teaches us that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also 4urisdictional. !( 5his rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be e$ercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. .ule ;;; of )/) .esolution -o. ##%#<( <" otherwise 0nown as the 1niform .ules on *dministrative )ases in the )ivil /ervice (1.*))/) provides the following remedies to a party adversely affected by the decision of the disciplining authority: /ection <9.Filing of 6otion for .econsideration. @ 5he party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen (%&) days from receipt thereof. $ $$ /ection '%.7imitation. @ ,nly one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. $ $$ /ection '<.Filing of *ppeals. @ Decisions of heads of departments agencies provinces cities municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty e$ceeding thirty (<") days suspension or fine in an amount e$ceeding thirty days salary may be appealed to the )ommission 3roper within a period of fifteen (%&) days from receipt thereof. $ $$ (2mphasis supplied) ;n the present case the *guilar instead of filing a proper appeal with the )/) filed a second motion for reconsideration with the ),6272) on -ovember !( %### after the denial of his

first motion for reconsideration in ),6272) .esolution -o. ##8%9"& dated ,ctober %% %###. *guilar also subse?uently filed an 1rgent 6otion for .einvestigation. +hen *guilar filed his -otice of *ppeal with the )/) on *pril !9 !""" more than si$ (() months had lapsed and the )/) should have forthwith denied his -otice of *ppeal for non8compliance with .ule ;;; of the 1.*))/. 5he petitionerAs -otice of *ppeal on *pril !9 !""" having been filed beyond the fifteen8day reglementary period did not toll ),6272) .esolution -o. ##8%"(7 from becoming final and e$ecutory. 5he settled and firmly established rule is that a decision that has ac?uired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. 5his ?uality of immutability precludes the modification of the 4udgment even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. *nd this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. :eing an immutable decision ),6272) .esolution -o. ##8%"(7 may no longer be modified altered or changed. )/) .esolution -o. "%%<#( which modified a final and e$ecutory 4udgment is a void 4udgment. *s such it is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid 4udgment but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. ;t is attended by none of the conse?uences of a valid ad4udication. <' 5hus )/) .esolution -o. "%%<#( finding the petitioner guilty of Bross -eglect of Duty and )onduct Brossly 3re4udicial to the :est ;nterest of the /ervice and the conse?uent penalty of dismissal from the service is rendered ineffectual.
RULE 22.2/SERE$R"CA/suma%ayvs ur&an &an'( inc. SU)A*AY #S UR+AN +AN,( "NC./SERE$R"CA ---.igest proper--$onatoSuma%ay( et al versus Ur&an +an'( "nc.( et al !.R. No. /201/ 2une 23( 2445 AUS6R"A7)AR6"NE8( 2.9
0AC-#2 Petitioners filed an action for !eformation of Contract, #pecific Performance, ,amages, Consignation with &n=unction, with !estraining +rder, with the !egional -rial Court of Pasay City, *ranch B;, docketed as Civil Case %o. ;D-BB"<. !espondents $rban *ank, &sabela #ugar Co., &nc., and Atty. /agdaleno /. PeJa, filed a /otion to ,ismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action8 the claim is unenforceable under the #tatute of 0rauds8 the action has prescribed8 and the pendency of another action. -he trial court, in its +rder dated #eptember ", ;;D, granted the motion to dismiss. -he order of dismissal was received on #eptember ;, ;;D, and filed a motion for reconsideration on +ctober ", ;;D. K " days passed e@cluding +ctober "from count, remaining balance 9 daysL +n 4anuary 9B, ;;<, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, which order was received by petitionersA counsel on April "D, ;;<.

+n /ay 9, ;;<, petitionersA counsel filed a %otice of Appeal, which was given due course by the trial court in its +rder dated /ay E, ;;<, and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.!. C' %o. D9"EB. +n 4une 9, ;;E, respondent $rban *ank filed a /otion to ,ismiss Appeal on the ground that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. !espondent contended that petitionersA notice of appeal was filed five days late, as it should have been filed on April "C, ;;E, and not /ay 9, ;;E. &##$(2 .hether or not #umaway and company>s appeal was filed out of timeF 1(),2 %o. &n this case, the liberal construction provided in the %eypes ruling was applied. #trictly speaking, 4urisprudence is consistent in ruling that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but =urisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the =udgment final and e@ecutory, although the Court, in e@ceptional circumstances, allowed the filing of a belated notice of appeal. 0ortunately, however, for petitioners, the Court recently modified the rule on the counting of the D-day period within which to appeal. &n the precedent-setting case of %eypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically set a fresh period of D days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. 1enceforth, this Mfresh period ruleN shall also apply to !ule :B governing appeals from the /unicipal -rial Courts to the !egional -rial Courts8 !ule :" on petitions for review from the !egional -rial Courts to the Court of Appeals8 !ule :9 on appeals from 3uasi-=udicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and !ule :D governing appeals by certiorari to the #upreme Court. -he new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration 6whether full or partial7 or any final order or resolution. -his fresh D-day period within which to file notice of appeal counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration may be applied to petitionersA case inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. -herefore, the appeal before the CA should be deemed as timely filed and the case be remanded to the CA for further proceedings as was done in the %eypes case.

RULE 23
RULE 21.4 /S:LAN:/R; vs. S+
FACTS: Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants. After having been served with summons, the defendants filed a motion for leave to file interrogatories under !ule "D of the !ules of Court and &nterrogatories under the same rule. -he defendants moved to strike out said motion and interrogatories. &##$(#2 7 ./% /odes of ,iscovery was properF ?(# -he various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 6 7 as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under !ule "B, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and 6"7 as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. -he evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recogniGed privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. ## -o this end, the field of in3uiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. -he in3uiry e@tends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, e@cepting only those matters which are privileged.

-he ob=ective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. 2) ./% )eave of Court is necessaryF %+ &n line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as 6a7 depositions 6whether by oral e@amination or written interrogatories7 under !ule ":, 6b$ inte""o%ato"ies to &a"ties unde" Rule '(, and 6c7 re3uests for admissions under !ule "<, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. -he !ules of Court e@plicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after

jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
+n the other hand, leave of court is re3uired as regards discovery by 6a7 production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with !ule "E, or 6b7 physical and mental e@amination of persons under !ule "C, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

;ro.ucers +an' vs. CA/6aut<o

FACTS: State Investment House Inc.(SIHI) file a com!laint fo" sum of mone# a$ainst %"o uce"s &an' of t(e %(ili!!ines (%&%). )(en t(e t"ial of t(e me"its sta"te * SIHI se"ve +"itten inte""o$ato"ies to %&%. %&% file a motion to ,uas( on t(e $"oun t(at t(e# +e"e im!"o!e" since t(e t"ial +as a-out to -e te"minate . T(e t"ial cou"t enie t(e motion an a mitte t(e +"itten inte""o$ato"ies. .R +as file -# %&% -ut +as li'e+ise enie . /n a!!eal* t(e CA still ismisse t(e !etition statin$ t(at t(e Rules o not !"ovi e a time f"ame in t(e fillin$ of +"itten inte""o$ato"ies an ot(e" mo es of iscove"#. ISSUE: )/0 t(e cou"t +as co""ect in allo+in$ t(e a mission of t(e +"itten inte""o$ato"ies file -# SIHI as t(e "e-uttal sta$e of t(e !"ocee in$s. HEL1: 2ES3 Sec.4* Rule 23 oes not !"ovi e fo" an# time f"ame +it(in +(ic( t(e mo es of iscove"# can -e utili5e ot(e" t(an statin$ t(at it must -e availe of +it( leave of cou"t afte" 6u"is iction (as -een o-taine ove" t(e efen ant o" +it(out suc( leave afte" an ans+e" (as -een se"ve . Since t(e "ules a"e silent as to !e"io +it(in +(ic( +"itten inte""o$ato"ies ma# still -e "e,ueste * it is necessa"# fo" t(e "esolution of t(e case to ete"mine t(e !u"!ose of +"itten inte""o$ato"ies. In t(e case at -a"* %&% alle$e t(at it issue t(e 2. in t(e name of 7o(nn# Lu an t(e# al"ea # !ai it* t(us t(e"e is no mo"e lia-ilit#. T(e ,uestions !"o!oun e in t(e +"itten inte""o$ato"ies +e"e meant to illicit info"mation !e"tinent to t(e natu"e of %&%8s efense. T(us* allo+in$ t(e a mission of t(e +"itten inte""o$ato"ies* t(e t"ial cou"t is in a -ette" !osition to e9amine t(e evi ence !"esente an to ete"mine +(et(e" t(e info"mation sou$(t -# SIHI +oul e9!e ite t(e "esolution of t(e case.
ELENA S. :N!( :ng( vs. =:N. >RANC"SC: #. )A8:/ ALA+AS6R:

(lvira C. )anuevo 6)anuevo7 and Charito A. -omilloso 6-omilloso7 filed a complaint for damages against +ng along with &luminado 4. Caramoan 6Caramoan7 before the !egional -rial Court 6!-C7 of Guiuan, (astern #amar.

-his is a collision case2 -+ng is a bus owner -Caramaon is the driver -)anuevo is the driver/owner of the =eepney --omisillo is the passenger

+n %ovember :, ;;<, +ng served written interrogatories KEL upon )anuevo and -omisillo

on %ovember " , ;;<, she filed a 5/anifestation and +mnibus /otion5 KCL seeking, among other things, an order from the trial court directing the latter to answer the interrogatories.

)anuevo and -omisillo filed their ob=ection.

!-C denied the motion to compel )anuevo and -omisillo to answer the interrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a 5fishing e@pedition5 which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference

was the denial on the answer and the availment of the written interrogatories properF %o, it was not proper.

-his Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in !ules

": to "; of the !evised !ules of Court.

in !epublic v. #andiganbayan, K9 L it held2 . . . &ndeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries8 in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark8 and the !ules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in !ules ": to ";.

-he thrust of the !ules is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery - depositions, interrogatories and re3uests for admissions without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint has been served.

-he rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or e@pedite the trial of the case.

&n this case, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a 5fishing e@pedition,5 is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of !epublic vs. #andiganbayan that the time-honored cry of >fishing e@pedition> can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party from in3uiring into the facts underlying the opposing party>s case through the discovery procedures.

Ayala Lan. vs 2u.ge 6agle/AL#AR

FAC)S2 A#* !ealty filed a case for nullification of Contract to #ell and damages against Ayala )and, et al. Ayala )and 6A)&7 thereafter filed its Answer. A#* subse3uently filed a /otion for )eave to take testimony by deposition upon oral e@amination of (merito !amos #r. -he depositions happened on < different occasions. *ut before they could proceed to the cross-e@amination, A)& filed a /otion to !esolve +b=ections regarding the admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the !ules.

A)& contends that the pre3re3uisites of a valid deposition were disregarded. &t repeatedly insists that what transpired was simply a recordation of testimony of (merito !amos, #r. intended to form part of a deposition for submission to the trial court but not a deposition itself considering that it never underwent the process of a valid deposition taken under !ules "9 and 9" of the !ules of Court, as the deposition was not completed, signed, certified, filed or offered before the court a 3uo, hence, under the !ules, considered incompetent evidence. ISS*E2 .+% the deposition was valid +ES HEL 2 -he deposition of the late (merito !amos, #r. was taken inside the courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the parties and their lawyers, and the entire proceedings was transcribed by the stenographers of the Court. -hus, the re3uirements that the deposition has to be sealed, e@amined and signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the deposition officer would be, to the mind of the court, already unnecessary. #trict compliance with the formal re3uirements of !ule "9 would hold true in cases of depositions taken outside the Court. As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted8 otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and e@pediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. +n the ob=ection of A)& owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it should be noted that a deposition not signed does not preclude its use during the trial. A deponentAs signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of signature goes primarily to the form of deposition. -he re3uirement that the deposition must be e@amined and signed by the witness is only to ensure that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy. &t has been repeatedly held that the deposition O discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters in3uired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the in3uiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.

Rule 21 Section / AN")A ;<ilippines Computer Solution "nc. vs =ernan.ez an. )anzo
0AC-#2 PC#& alleged that its corporate name was being unlawfully used in an unauthoriGed business transaction. -hat Candol, )isama and /anGo e@ecuted a -rusteeAs Certificate where they made it appear that PC#& created a *oard of -rustees where they were appointed as members. -hat they entered into a partnership with People #oft Australia &n the #(C complaint, only /anGo filed an answer 0or their failure to file an answer, PC#& filed a motion dated #eptember <, "BB9 for the issuance of a commission to take the deposition in Australia of a corporate officer of People #oft Australia as well as that of *ergen, are of PC#&As incorporators and stockholders, who was then in $#. -he !-C denied the motion since a party can only avail of any of the modes of discovery not later than D days from the =oinder of issues. !ule 9 sec. of the &nterior !ules on &ntra-Corporate Controversies. &##$(2 .+%, deposition may be accepted by the Court in lieu of direct testimony of the witness especially when the party could have taken such deposition at the earliest possible opportunity and within the period prescribed by law, but failed to do so. !$)&%G2 %+ -here is deemed to have been a =oinder of issues as of 4uly 9, "BB" or immediately after the period where /anGo et.al to file their answer has lapsed.

PC#& had until 4uly C, "BB" of D days there from within which to serve written interrogatives on its witnesses abroad. 1owever, it is not disputed that a decision in the main case in the #(C has already been rendered and the prayer of PC#& was substantially needed by the trail court. (ven more, during the hearings before the trial court, /r. *ergen had already testified, hence, foregoing any need for taking his disposition. #ince a decision has already been rendered, the order denying the motion to take deposition, being an order, should have been included and raised in the petition for review filed by PC#& before the CA.

Rule 21./ 2onat<an lan. :il vs)angu.a.atu

0AC-#2 /angudadatu filed a complaint for damages against 4) before the !-C of -acurong City. 4) was declared in default. 4) filed a motion for new trial but & was denied. .rit of e@ecution was issued. 4) filed a motion to 3uash/recall the writ of e@ecution claiming that it has not yet received the order denying the motion for new trial. &t took the deposition of its witness in /akati City to prove the non-receipt of the order. /angudadatu filed a motion to strike off the deposition on the ground that trial 6for complaint for damages7 was already terminated. &##$(2 .+% the position can be taken even after trial has been terminated. ?(#. 1(),2 A deposition may be taken with leave of court after =urisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the sub=ect of the action8 or, without such leave, after an answer has been served.<B ,eposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an ade3uate factual basis during the preparation for trial.< -he liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is 5well-nigh unrestricted if the matters in3uired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the in3uiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law. -he !ules of Court<D and =urisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. $nder certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. &n ,asmariJas Garments v. !eyes,<< we allowed the taking of the witnessesA testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. -hus, 5KdLepositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. -here is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it8 no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.5<E -here can be no valid ob=ection to allowing them during the process of e@ecuting final and e@ecutory =udgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.<C -he present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited #ection :6c76"7 of !ule "9 -- the witnesses of petitioner in /etro /anila resided beyond BB kilometers from #ultan Pudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its /otion to Quash 6the .rit of (@ecution7 and for the purpose of proving that the trial courtAs ,ecision was not yet final. As previously e@plained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

2o%el Sales vs. Cyril Sa&ino

0acts2 Cyril #abino filed a case for damages against 4owel #ales for the death of his son in a vehicular accident. *efore any responsive pleading was filed, Cyril #abino notified 4owel #ales that he will take the deposition of one *uanares Corral. -hen after the deposition taking, Cyril #abino formally offered the deposition of *uanares Corral as evidence. *ut during this time, *uanares Corral is no longer in the Philippines and to prove it, Cyril #abino attached the certification from the *ureau of &mmigration attesting to the /ay "C, ;;< departure for abroad of *uaneres Corral. *ut this was opposed by 4owel #ales on the ground that Cyril #abino could not admit the deposition as evidence because the re3uirements under #ection : !ule "9 were not complied. &ssues2 . ./% the deposition taken from *uanares Corral can be used during the trial although he is not here in the Philippines. ". ./% the plaintiff in cross-e@amining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all ob=ections in connection therewith.

1olding2

. -he deposition of *uanares Corral can be used during the trial although he is not here in the Philippines in accordance with !ule "9 #ection :. -hough the general rule is that deposition offered during trial in lieu of actual testimony is not accepted. -here are e@ceptions to the same in which depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the e@istence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. +ne of which is paragraph " of #ubsection C of #ection : !ule "9 which provides
#ection : $se of depositions.- At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions2 6c7 -he deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds2 ,'$ t-at t-e .itness "esides at a distance /o"e t-an one -und"ed ,011$ 2ilo/ete"s 3"o/ t-e &lace o3 t"ial o" -ea"in%4 o" is out o3 t-e P-ili&&ines4 unless it a&&ea"s t-at -is a5sence .as &"ocu"ed 5y t-e &a"ty o33e"in% t-e de&osition.

". !o. )-e &lainti33 in c"oss6e7a/inin% t-e de&onent du"in% t-e ta2in% o3 de&osition did
not .aived all o58ections in connection t-e"e.it-. 9ecause acco"din% to Section ': !ule "9 of the !ules of Court provides that while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, 3ualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not ob=ected to before or during the taking of the deposition, ob=ections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

Rule 23 sec 4 /CAMELLO/ Tiu v Ca, Sps Montebon

Tiu and Sps Montebon entered into a contract of sale. It was a pacto de retro sale (sale with right of repurchase), however, the Deed of Absolute Sale which was procured by Tiu through Judge Bornia says that the sale was absolute. Because of that, the Montebon sps filed an action for reformation of the instrument before the rtc. During trial, Tiu offered in evidence the deposition of Judge Bornia, the one who notarized the deed. He said that because Judge Bornia could not testify due to sickness, the deposition should be taken to substitute for his oral testimony in court. The use of such deposition was however assailed on the ground that it was not formally offered in evidence. ISSUE: WON the deposition of witness Bornia may be admitted in lieu of his oral testimony in court. NO. The deposition was not admissible under the rules of evidence. RULE: A deposition is not intended to substitute for the actual testimony of the deponent witness in open court. : However, a deposition may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand, provided, any of the circumstances under Rule 23, Sec 4 par c. exists. One of these is when the deponent witness is unable to testify because he is sick. In this case, while it is true that Judge Bornia was sick during the trial, his deposition cannot be admitted because it was not formally offered in evidence - the deposition was NOT SIGNED by him, it does not contain the CERTIFICATION of the deposition officer and there was NO NOTICE of the filing of the deposition given to the parties. The SC emphasized that Section 4 allows the use of deposition only in so far as admissible under the rules of evidence.
Fo"tune Co"&o"ation vs. Inte"6Me"c-ants Co"&o"ation Facts: An action for breach of contract was filed by 0ortune Corporation against &nter-/erchants Corporation before the !egional -rial Court. After &nter-/erchants corporation had filed its Answer, 0ortune corporation served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to !ule "D of the !ules of Court. -he interrogatories were answered by &nter-/erchants through its board chairman, 4uanito A. -eope. #ubse3uently, however, 0ortune served upon &nter-/erchants a %otice to -ake ,eposition $pon +ral (@amination and would take the deposition of said 4uanito A. -eope. &nter-/erchants filed an $rgent /otion %ot -o -ake ,eposition/'ehement +pposition to Plaintiff>s %otice to -ake ,eposition $pon +ral (@amination, alleging inter a"ia that 2 6a7 0ortune has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case and to which the proposed deponent already responded8 6b7 /r. -eope, the proposed deponent has no intention of leaving the country and even signified his availability to testify in open court if re3uired during the trial on the merits8 6b7 such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, 4uanito A. -eope. -he trial court thereafter issued an order that the re3uested deposition shall not be taken. Issue: .+% the grounds cited constitute the Mgood causeN contemplated under !ule "9, #ec. < and C. Held: %o. &n the present case, &nter-/erchants failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.

. .e agree with 0ortune>s submission that the fact that petitioner had previously availed of the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case, cannot 5e conside"ed ;%ood cause;, because2 6a7 the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories does not bar an e@amination before trial, and is not a valid ob=ection to the taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the e@amining party is not acting in bad faith8 and 6b7 knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed deponent is to be e@amined does not =ustify a refusal of such e@amination. As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the e@penditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. /oreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the !ules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually e@clusive. $nder the present !ules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subse3uent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. ". -he availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute ;%ood cause; to =ustify the court>s order that his deposition shall not be taken. -hat the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. *ut the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition. -he right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. -he utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions8 restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is sub=ect to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable. 9. 0inally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that 0ortune merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. +rders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following re3uirements are complied with2 6a7 that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be e@amined8 6b7 that the motion has been seasonably filed8 6c7 that there is good cause shown8 and 6d7 that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. +nce a party has re3uested discovery, the burden is on the party ob=ecting to show that the discovery re3uested is not relevant to the issues, and to establish the e@istence of any claimed privilege. -hese, &nter-/erchants has failed to do so. Conse3uently, its ob=ection to the taking of the deposition cannot be sustained. %ote2 !ead the 0- for #Cs e@haustive discussion on the reason, purpose, benefit/s and importance of discovery procedu