Allison Si Halperin - Bureaucratic Politics

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Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications Author(s): Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin Source: World Politics, Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring, 1972), pp. 40-79 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010559 . Accessed: 10/03/2014 17:09
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BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS:
A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications

URING the Tet holiday of i968, North Vietnamesetroops launched on a largenumber massive attacks ofSouthVietnamese cities.Why? In December, 1950, the Chinese Communistsintervened in the Korean War. Today some Senators raisethe specter of ChineseCommunist intervention in the Vietnamese War. Will Communist China in Vietnam?Specifically, intervene iftheU.S. wereto renewthebombing ofNorthVietnamwitha vengeance, destroying thedikesand closing Haiphong, and South Vietnamesetroopswere to invade North Vietnam-both unlikelycontingencies-would large units of Communist Chinesetroops enterthewar? In themid-ig6o's, theU.S. put a lid on American strategic weapons: 1000 Minutemen, and a limited numberof 54 Titans,and 640 Polaris, bombers. officials Administration announcedtheselimits, recognizing thattheSoviets of parity would build up to a position buthopingthat Moscow would not go forsuperiority. If in the mid-ig6o's a Secretary of Defensehad wantedto persuade theSovietUnion not to deployan ICBM fleet U.S. forces, thatwould seriously threaten how mighthe have proceeded? The first the secondfora predicquestionasks foran explanation; tion; the thirdfora plan. These are threecentralactivities in which of international and bothanalysts makers of politics foreign policyento thefirst gage. In response mostanalysts question, beginby considerthatthe NorthVietnamese ing variousobjectives mighthave had in mind: forexample,to shockthe Americanpublic and thereby affect to collapsethegovernment ofSouthVietnam; thepresidential election; of military and civilians in SouthVietnam, to cause a massive uprising or to takethecitiesand keep them.By extotalvictory; thusbringing
of a bureaucratic *This presentation politics approachto foreign policybuildsupon it takesas a pointof departure worksof bothauthors. previous Specifically, Allison's
LXIII
By GRAHAM T. ALLISON
and MORTON
H. HALPERIN*
of "Model III," recognizing Here we focuson the further thatorganizadevelopment in thegame of bureaucratic tionscan be includedas players the facpolitics, treating torsemphasized by an organizational the processapproachas constraints, developing a distinction and introducing between"decisiongames" notionof sharedattitudes, and "actiongames."
"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, (September I970) and Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston I971); and Halperin's Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, forthcoming.
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
41
of theaction thatHanoi facedand thecharacter amining theproblems Exsome of theseaims as implausible. eliminate theychose,analysts us to thatpermits a calculation in constructing thenconsists planation one objections, withcertain situation, why,in theparticular understand to predict In attempting wouldhavechosento launchtheTet offensive. in the Vietnamese whetherthe CommunistChinese will intervene would consider(i) War, and if so, in what fashion,most analysts in Vietnam,(2) the likelihoodof interests Chinesenationalsecurity in the absenceof ChineseComthecollapseof theNorthVietnamese troops ofChineseCommunist intervention, munist (3) thecontribution of ChineseComand (4) indications efforts, to theNorthVietnamese for example,warningsto the U.S., pledgesto the munistintentions, etc.These conNorthVietnamese, statements about Chineseinterests, to yield fashion would thenbe combinedin some intuitive siderations U.S. actionsto persuadethe Soviets a prediction. In recommending and not to push for "superiority," many to stop with rough parity, interests. They on Sovietnationalsecurity would have focused analysts thoseinterests actions American thatwould affect would thenconsider forces would be counterin such a way thatdeploying largerstrategic productive. of each of thesethreeanswersis a basic approach:a Characteristic forthinking and categories aboutforset fundamental of assumptions on theassumption that This approachdependsprimarily eign affairs.1 of themoreor lesspurposive acts in international consist politics events and thatgovernmental behaviorcan of unifiednationalgovernments coordinated acts of inbe understood by analogywiththe intelligent, focuson the analysts dividualhumanbeings. Followingthisapproach, of actionsavailcourses the alternative and goals of a nation, interests of benefits each An alternative. eventhas been and able,and thecosts has shown,forexample,how the Tet ofexplainedwhen the analyst Preobjectives. was a reasonable choice,givenHanoi's strategic fensive therational todo in a certain aregenerated dictions thing bycalculating Recommended plans concentrate objectives. given specified situation, and ways of affecting interests on analyzingothernations'strategic ofactions. abouttheconsequences calculations their for Let the readerconsider, example,how he would explain the in i968, or NorthVietnamese ofCzechoslovakia activity Sovietinvasion in theplace of the in Laos and Cambodia.One typically putshimself confronted with a problemof fornationor the nationalgovernment to figure outhow he might havechosentheaction and tries eignaffairs in question.If I had been the SovietUnion facedwith the threat of
1
section,see Allison, op. cit. For an elaboration of the argument of this introductory
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GRAHAM T. ALLISON
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Czech liberalization, or the Czech threat to the economyof the Bloc, whatwould I havedone? Moreover, thisis notsimply thewaywe react to current events. It is theway mostanalysts, mostofthetime, structure theirmost carefulexplanations and predictions of important occurrencesin foreign affairs. Few readers will findthe simpleassertion of thispointpersuasive. of thisbasic approach.Obviously Obviously thereare severalvariants theapproachdoes not capture theentire of thosewho employ analysis it. Obviously not all analysts relyon thisapproachall of the time.But as one of us has arguedat muchgreater lengthelsewhere, thisframework,which has been labelled Model I, has been the dominantapproachto thestudy offoreign policyand international politics.2 (Even analysts primarily concerned withdiscovering causal relations between variables-forexample,betweenenvironmental or intra-national factors-and specific when called upon to explain or predict, outcomes, to relyon the assumption naof purposive displaya tendency unitary theconstraints established causalrelations.) tions copingwithin bythese to international This traditional has muchtorecomapproach politics mendit.As a "lens"it reduces theorganizational and political complito thesimplification of government of a singleactor. The array cations aroundthe major of detailsabout a happeningcan be seen to cluster and even confeatures of an action.Throughthislens,the confused an occurrence becomea singledynamic: factors thatinfluence tradictory a certain thatachieved thechoiceofthealternative goal. This approach out of theproblem a quick,imaginative of explanation permits sorting as a productive a minimum It serves or prediction. shorthand, requiring of information. It can yieldan informative of tendencies, for summary the of costs and benefits. example, by identifying weight strategic all simplifications-obscures But thissimplification-like as well as the persistently reveals.In particular, it obscures neglected factof buthe "maker" of government reaucracy: policyis not one calculating but rather a conglomerate of large organizations decision-maker, and politicalactorswho differ about what theirgovernment substantially issue and who competein attempting shoulddo on any particular to bothgovernmental decisions and theactions affect oftheir government. an alternative The purposeof thispaperis to present approachthat in particular on intra-national focuses Bureaucratic factors, Politics, in nationalbehavior in international relations. The argument explaining is thatthese factors are very in thecurrent important, underemphasized when one is concerned withplanning literature, yetcritical policy.Sec2 For an elaborationof thispoint,see Allison, op. cit.
43
tion I of thispaper presents the alternative approach:a Bureaucratic PoliticsModel.3Our hope is thattheframework is sufficiently general in industrialized to applyto thebehavior of mostmodern governments nations, though it will be obvious base is theU.S. govthatourprimary II can be appliedto underernment. Section suggests how thisapproach standhow one nationinfluences the behaviorof another. SectionIII states a numberof policyimplications of thisalternative approach. SectionI A BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL forfocusing Our purposehereis to outlinea rough-cut framework primarily on the individuals withina government, and the interaction in interof the actionsof a government amongthem, as determinants nationalpolitics. What a government instance does in any particular can be understood as a result ofbargaining largely amongplayers posifollowsreguThe bargaining tionedhierarchically in thegovernment. are importantly afand theresults larizedcircuits. Boththebargaining fected bya number ofconstraints, in particular, organizational processes and sharedvalues.4 PoliticsModel sees no In contrast with Model I, this Bureaucratic unitary actorbutrather who focusnot manyactors as players-players on a singlestrategic issuebut on manydiverse intra-national problems as well. Players in choose terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives, but rather according to variousconceptions of nationalsecurity, and personalinterests. organizational, domestic, Playersmake governmentaldecisionsnot by a singlerationalchoice,but by pulling and hauling. (This by no means impliesthatindividualplayersare not actingrationally, giventheir interests.)5 ofnational The conception security policyas "political" result contradictsbothpublicimagery and academicorthodoxy. Issuesvital to naare considered tionalsecurity too important to be settled by political games.They mustbe "above" politics:to accusesomeoneof "playing
3In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim that foreign policy analysts have developed any satisfactory empirically testedtheory.In this essay, the use of the term "model" with qualifiers should be read "conceptual scheme or framework." 4 For a review of earlier proponentsof the bureaucraticpolitics approach, see Allison, op. cit. 5 In order to highlight the distinctive characteristicsof the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), we contrast it with the traditional approach. Our argument is not, however, that the approaches are exclusive alternatives. The relationshipsbetween these approaches is discussed in Allison, op. cit.
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Thus,memoirs charge. serious is a most security" with national politics For glove. with a velvet ofsuch bargaining thedetails handle typically of theExtheefforts present and Schlesinger bothSorensen example, as rational essentially crisis in theCubanmissile Committee ecutive expectation Whatpublic ofequals.6 group a unified among deliberation reinforces. elegance theacademic forintellectual penchant demands, doctrine, to prevailing according moreover, is messy; politics Internal for journalgossip It constitutes substance. intellectual lacks politicking memoirs, Occasional investigation. a subject for serious rather than ists, to case studies detailed and several accounts, in historical anecdotes bureaucratic avoids literature of theforeign policy most thecontrary, politics. of particiand theexperience literature academic The gap between who Forthose point. than atthis wider ingovernment isnowhere pants be cannot of dailyemployment theterms in government, participate inleaders havecompetitive, nothomogeneous government ignored: areshaped are andperceptions problems bypositions; terests; priorities issues; themanagestrategic thanstraightforward, muchmore varied ofdecisions is more thansteady important ofpiecemeal streams ment doeswhatis decidedsure that thegovernment making choices; state than moredifficult and does notdo whathas notbeendirected-is solution. thepreferred selecting moresharply can be stated orientation byformulation Thisgeneral an in the Modelas Politics "analytic paradigm" of theBureaucratic forsociological K. Merton analysense byRobert technical developed
ofbasicassumptions, and suggestive concepts, sis.7 Systematic statement
ofthis ofanalysis. thrust thedistinctive style willhighlight propositions we use wordsthe wherever the paradigm, possible, In formulating Buttheterms that constitute areusedin ordinary language. waythey of for areoften a more definition purposes specific this given paradigm clarity.
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM I. BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS
affected oftherealworldimportantly of states by theactions limited

6Arthur Schlesinger,Jr.,A Thousand Days (Boston i965); see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York i1965). 7Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structures (rev. and enl. ed., New York I957)-
in are outcomes-that dearereally interested is,selectively and analysts
whatmost offoreign about participants In thinking affairs, problems
45
of proliferation formost governments. Thus,forexample, theproblem participants or analysts is: how manynationswill have what nuclear Similarly, an explanation of capabilities at some pointin the future.* why at some the Cuban missilecrisismustallow one to understand point,Sovietmissiles were no longerin Cuba. The U.S. was publicly committed not to invade Cuba, and all this had been accomplished without is made by the analyst nuclearwar. The selection of variables or participant of some problemor iswithreference to his perception sue. When explaining, predicting, or planning,an analyst,at least somecharacteristics oftherealworld-an outcomeimplicitly, specifies thatfocushis attention. of developed hereis actions The basicunitofanalysis oftheapproach a government actsofofficials ofa governwhichwe define as thevarious ment in exercises of governmental that can be perceived authority a presidential outsidethe government. Accordingto this definition, announcement of a decisionto bomb NorthVietnam,the subsequent of an aircraft movement carrier into a positionnear NorthVietnam, ofa government. Whereand theactualdropping ofbombsare actions of Defense to the Presias a secretpaper sent fromthe Secretary ofNorthVietnamor a private dentrecommending presidenbombing tial decisionto bombNorthVietnamare not actionsof a government. herethatin orderto exIt is an assumption of theapproachdeveloped of to identify theactions plain,predict, or plan outcomes it is necessary to treattheseactions particular governments thataffect the outcome, another)and in separately (includinghow one nation'sactionsaffect thisway to treat theeventin itsentirety. In explaining, or planningactionsof a government, one predicting, sets of procemust identify the actionchannels-thatis, regularized forproducing ofactions. For example, oneaction dures classes particular U.S. military in another inchannelforproducing intervention country to thatcountry, an assesscludesa recommendation by theambassador a recommendation mentby the regionalmilitary commander, by the an assessment of Chiefsof Staff, community Joint by the intelligence of intervention, recommendations the consequences by the Secretaries a presidential decision to intervene, thetransmittal ofStateand Defense, of Defenseand the Secretary of an orderfromthe President through
* More specifically,the outcome might be defined in terms of a set of variables: (a) the number of states that have formally renounced nuclear weapons, (b) the number of states that have announced intentionsto acquire nuclear weapons, (c) the nuclear technologyof various nations, (d) the number of states with a stand-bycapability, (e) the number of states that have tested nuclear weapons, (f) the number of states that have nuclear stockpilesand the size of these stockpiles.
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GRAHAM T. ALLISON
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H. HALPERIN
hisdeterminamilitary commander, to theregional Chiefs ofStaff Joint the orderfromhim to thecommander to employ, tionof whattroops thatcommander to theindividuals from and theorders ofthosetroops, to action from initiation The path country. moveintothe who actually designathatis authoritative of decisions, a number includes frequently to be takenbyspecific actions ofspecific internal to a government, tions, and the to intervene, decisionby the President Thus, a secret officials. but a are both decisions, by the regionalcommander determination is an actionof thegovernment. of either publicannouncement policydecisionscan be useThe actionchannelfor major foreign bysenior players whichleadstodecisions fully dividedintothatportion The latteris freand thatpart which followsfromthosedecisions. thatterminology butwe resist to as "implementation" referred quently fromsources stem implementation of Manyelements as too restrictive. thepresence Thus, forexample, byseniorplayers. otherthandecisions froma of U.S. troopsin the Dominican Republicin I965 stemmed but the to send theMarinesto thatcountry, decision by thePresident of the i8,oooMarinesin theDominicanRepublic(e.g., thepreactions defrommuch lower-level thattheyoccupied) followed cise positions ofgovernfactors. Moreover, manyactions other as well as from cisions in For example, occurin theabsenceof anyhighleveldecision. ments of JuanBosch, the earlierDominicancrisisthatled to the overthrow offer to Boschto sendin theU.S. Marines B. Martin's John Ambassador Actions to makethatoffer.8 decision was notpreceded byanyhigh-level thatis, on otherissuesand by policy, by decisions mayalso be affected about outcomes. internalto a government, aspirations, authoritative by the U.S. policyof was influenced For example,Martin'sbehavior in Latin America.The actionsof governments democratic supporting were affected by priorbudget the Marines, when theydid intervene, we will identify theactivity of playof analysis For purposes decisions. as decision activities games, ers leadingto decisions by seniorplayers thatfollowfrom, or leadingto policyas policygames,and activities as action games. players bysenior in theabsenceof,decisions proceed action thefollowing terms: outcomes, actions, Thus we have defined and action and decision policy games, games, decisions, policy, channels, games.
II. ORGANIZING CONCEPTS
The organizing conceptsof thisparadigmcan be arrangedas eleto threecentral questions:(I) Who plays? (2) mentsin the answers
8 John Overtaken byEvents (New York 1966). B. Martin,
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What determines each player'sstand? (3) How are players'stands to decisions and actions? aggregated yieldgovernmental havean important and behavior A. Whoplays?That is,whoseinterests decisionsand actions? efect on the government's in the naIn any government, thereexistsa circleof seniorplayers tional security policygame.9This circleincludesthe major political includorganizations, figures, theheads of the majornationalsecurity the organization and, forsome purposes, ing intelligence, the military one of allocations and theeconomy. Generally thatmanagesbudgetary a of He have government. may is the chief executive the theseplayers on major decisions. shareof influence The President disproportionate and formal powers oftheU.S.,forexample, has a rangeofbothinterests can enterthis Otherindividuals thatsethim apartfromother players. because ad hoc basis, on a moreregular or a strictly central circle, either and Organizations of their relation withthe head of the government. when be treated as players, forexample, groupscan forsomepurposes can be sum(i) the official papersthatemergefroman organization actor;(2) theactions calculated movesofa unitary marizedas coherent by of thehead of an organization, whosegoals are determined largely can be treated as actions oftheorganization; and (3) thatorganization, individualmembers of an organizaof different thevariousbehaviors in a singleplan. as coherent and tactics tioncan be regarded strategies circleof seniorplayers, thereare variouscircles Aroundthe central in thewidergovernmental actors ofjuniorplayers. In theUnitedStates members of the press,spokesmen game ("Congressional influentials," the "bipartisan forimportant interest policy foreign groups, especially in and out of Congress, and surrogates foreach of these establishment" Other fashion. groups)can enter thegamein a moreor lessregularized the press,interest members of the Congress, groups,and publicform circles around the centralarena-circles that demarcate concentric limitswithinwhich the game is played. on theissueand thetypeof will varydepending The mix of players in large part,which playersenter game. Actionchannelsdetermine, and handicaps. Seniorplayers will whatgames,withwhat advantages dominatein decisiongames. But in actiongames on the same issue in theorganization who are charged withcarrying quitejuniorplayers out the decisionmay play a major role.
9 In the statementof this paradigm we focus primarilyon issues of foreign policy that arise as matters of national security.Extension of the argument to other issue areas, e.g., foreign trade, is straightforward.
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his percepstand? Whatdetermines B. Whatdetermines each player's tionsand interests whichlead to a stand? Answersto the questions"What is the issue?" or "What mustbe done?" are coloredby the positionfromwhich the questionis considered. A playeris an individual in a position. Hi' perceptions and prefercharacteristics (for example,attiencesstembothfromhis individual and tudessharedwith othermembers of the society and government his position. attitudes specialto himself)and from The interests thataffect desiredresults can be characterized players' underfourheadings:nationalsecurity interests, organizational interinterests. Someelements ofnational ests, domestic interests, and personal suchas theinterest in theUnited security interests are widelyaccepted, and thebelief States' domination, thatiftheU.S. were avoiding foreign forceagainst othernationswould use military to disarmunilaterally, But in most it and its allies with veryseriousadverseconsequences. men on how can disagree interests nationalsecurity cases,reasonable can affect will be affected issue.Otherinterests an individby a specific of thenationalsecurity interest. Members of an organual's perception careerofficials, come to believethatthe healthof ization,particularly is vitalto the nationalinterest.10 The healthof the theirorganization is seen to dependon maintaining in turn, fulinfluence, organization, and securing thenecessary The latter capabilities. two filling itsmission, formaintaining and organizational interests lead to concern autonomy the organization's or expandessence, maintaining morale,protecting or increasing and maintaining While budgets. ing rolesand missions, are unconcerned with domestic affairs and politics manybureaucrats how a proposed and do notask themselves changein policyor behavior some seniorplayers domestic will almost would affect politicalissues, about domesticimplications. Finally,a player's alwaysbe concerned interests and hisconception ofhis role. standdependson hispersonal issuearises, When an ostensible is e.g.,when a new weaponssystem will cometo see quitedifferent facesoftheissue.For proposed, players AmericantroopsfromEurope is to example,a proposalto withdraw to itsbudgetand size; to the BudgetBureaua way theArmya threat a balance of payments to save money;to Treasury gain; to the State a threat to good relations BureauofEuropeanAffairs with Department adviser an opportunity to reCongressional NATO; to thePresident's in thePresident's relations withtheHill. (Senior movea majorirritant
10 For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational interests see Halperin "Why Bureaucrats Play Games," Foreign Policy (Spring I971).
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players, especially, tendto see several facesof theissuesimultaneously.) Giventhefaceof theissuethathe sees,each playermustcalculate how the resolution of this issue may affect his interests. This defineshis stakesin the issueat hand. In the lightof thesestakeshe thendetermineshisstandon theissue. Suggestive propositions
i. There are important differences between(a) governmental systemsin whichmanyplayers in thecentral begamehold their positions cause of political influence and aspireto theposition of chiefexecutive of thegovernment and (b) governmental in whichmostcensystems tralplayers have no thought of becomingthe chiefexecutive. In the former, mostplayers' in the game and personalinterest in remaining advancingtowardthe top frequently dominates theirstand on most
2. Beyondthecircleof senior individuals players, certain (viz., noncareerofficials and those in organizations withoutorganizationallydefined are often motivated toparticipate missions) bythedesire perse. These individuals are likelyto takestands thatpermit themto get into thegame. 3. There are important differences between(a) governmental systemsthatare relatively closed to expressions of interest and pressures fromoutsidethe governmental game and (b) governmental systems that are relatively of elections. In thelatter, open as a result suchfactorsas dependency of a widercircle upon theapprovalor acquiescence of individuals, and vulnerability to pressures fromthis wider circle, force to a largerconception of their players interests. interests 4. Organizational weighmoreheavilyin thefullset of inof some seniorplayers terests In the U.S. government than in others. of such weightsfromgreater thereseemsto be a roughspectrum to forexample, the Chiefof Naval Operations, lesser, to the Secretary of Defense,to the Secretary of State,to the President's Special Assistant forNationalSecurity Affairs. 5. Organizationalinterests are oftendominatedby the desire to maintain theautonomy of theorganization in pursuing whatitsmembersview as the essenceof the organization's activity, e.g., flying for theAir Force. 6. Even,and perhaps in crises, particularly organizations compete for rolesand missions. take standsthatrequireelaborate 7. Organizations rarely coordinationwith otherorganizations.
issues.
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GRAHAM T. ALLISON
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senior players, havea very highdiscount 8. Mostplayers, especially are on anyissue. Players whose stands rate: that is,a short time horizon often influenced interests, especially careerists, heavily byorganizational havea muchlonger timehorizon theinterests of theorregarding
ganization. aggregated to yielddecisions and actions C. How aretheplayers' stands of a government?
playerseessomething thathe wantsto change,and moves.Most often, be done, the game is begunby the necessity thatsomething however, in response either to a deadline (e.g., the annual budget) or an event (externalor domestic).When he becomesaware thata game has beto his standand thendecidewhether gun,each playermustdetermine These decisions a a and if so, how hard. require play (if he has choice) and reputation. Recalculation(oftenimplicit)about both resources e.g.,timeand senior players' reputation sources are finite and fungible, with the President. depends on one's trackrecord,thus Reputation of successas partof theirstake. consider theprobability players but ratheraccordingto Decision games do not proceedrandomly, issuesare recognized and determined withinan fixedrules.Typically, or a deaddecisions. Where established channelforproducing policies thegame,thattrigger influences of line or eventinitiates the selection thereare severalpossible the actionchannel.In mostcases,however, channelsthroughwhich an issue could be resolved.Because action the major players, deterchannelsstructure the game by pre-selecting intothegame,and by distributing miningtheusual pointsof entrance maneuver to get theissue foreach game,players particular advantages is believe most into the channelthatthey likelyto yieldthe desired result. of successdependsupon at leastthreeeleEach player's probability skill and will in usingbargaining adments:bargaining advantages, and otherplayers'perceptions of the first two ingredients. vantages, stemfromcontrolof implementation, control Bargaining advantages thatenablesone to definethe problemand identify overinformation withother theavailableoptions, playplayers (including persuasiveness and the abilityto affect ers outsidethe bureaucracy) otherplayers' in other domestic political games. objectives games,including
to produce first stands We consider how players' aggregate policies decianddecisions second, we consider howpolicies, bysenior players; governmental actions. sions, andother factors produce a an issuearises because i. Policy and decisiongames. Sometimes
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affected What emergesfromthe game is also importantly by conin supplying of organizations by the routines straints, in particular information and options, and by the sharedvalueswithinthe society and thebureaucracy. to of each playerengagingin variousmaneuvers The game consists plans, Some playersdevelop sophisticated achievehis desiredresults. thoughmostplayersseem to plan verylittle.All playerscan tryto stands by arguments. changeother players' or theavoidance a decision, ofan issuecan be a policy, The resolution In some of a decision. Decisionsmaybe verygeneralor quite specific. out the will have no choiceaboutwho will carry cases,seniorplayers action.But in othercases,the rulespermita choiceof implementers. are usuallythe governments For example,negotiations with foreign can be assigned to a specialenvoy domainoftheforeign butthey office; services. Bombing of the head of government, or to the intelligence but theremay be a choice missions mustbe assignedto the military, or withina Service, between Services e.g.,betweentheNavy,SAC, or with TAC. Monitoring functions maybe assignedto an organization it out. an interest to carry butwithno capability in theaction, ofa government an outcome 2. Action thataffect games.The actions of distinct elements. For example, retypically includea largenumber of nuclear weapwhich affect the spread actions centU.S. government efforts ons include: the StateDepartment's to gain adherenceto the of guaranteesto nonoffers Non-Proliferation Treaty; Presidential Commission nations nuclear blackmail;AtomicEnergy nuclear against forpeaceful tests of nuclearexplosives purposes(which providea conofnuclear devices); development venient shieldfornon-nuclear powers' of U.S. forces fromthe Far East (which mayincrease the withdrawal or Indians about theirnationalsecurity); concernof some Japanese forpeacefulnuclear statements by the AEC aboutthe greatprospects AEC budgets); an AEC weapons (which are designedto influence in the absenceof any higherlevel decision, commissioner's argument, of peacefulnuclearexabout the greatvirtues to a Brazilianscientist or deny the refusalto confirm plosives;and the U.S. government's of nuclearweapons aboard shipscalling in foreign reported presence As thislistsuggests, actionsthataffect outcomes maybe imporports. affected by decisiongamesabout by policiesaboutthatoutcome, tantly and bydecision outcomes. Actions that that gamesaboutother outcome, in theabsenceof higher outcomes leveldeciaffect mayalso be actions an outcome, in decisiongames,or sionsdesignedto affect maneuvers of organizations. behavior routine
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thataffect an outcome, theanaTo treat theactions of a government of actionand provide lystneeds to separate out thesevariousstrands mostactions arean amalgamofseveral explanations foreach.Obviously strands. behavior of organizations, If the actionis in facta resultof routine one needsto explainthe organizational standard operating procedures in If the actionis a maneuver (SOP's) thatproducedthatbehavior.1" or policygame,one needsto identify a decision thegame and explain was used. If the actionwas takenwithout a highwhy the maneuver the the circumstances thatpermitted level decision, one mustidentify playerthatleewayand explainwhat led the playerto take thatstep. from a policyor a decision game unrelated to the If theactionresulted the relevantdecisionor outcomebeing analyzed,one must identify an explanation forthedecision and theaction policygame and provide iftheactionflows followed. from a relevant decision game, that Finally, of thatactiongame. one needsan explanation Actiongames,whichfollowfrom decision games,do notproceedat thattriggers thegame and therulesof thegame random. The decision assignthe actionto a playerand pick the actionchannel.However, sub-channels. will maneuver to get there are likely to be several Players forgetbelieveoffers thebestprospects theissueintothechannelthey ting the desiredresult. of successdepend upon As in decisiongames,players' probabilities In theirpower. this case, bargaining advantagesstem from:formal overthe resources control to carry out the action, necessary authority, that forcarrying out theaction, control overinformation responsibility the feasibility of the action and its conseenablesone to determine that enables seniorplayersto dequences,controlover information is beingimplemented, whether thedecision and persuasiveness termine thoseresponsible forimplementation. with otherplayers, particularly operActionis also affected imposedby thestandard by theconstraints of largeorganizations. atingprocedures for implementing In some cases,playersresponsible decisionswill thespirit as well as theletter to implement ofthedecision. feelobligated fromthe action that the Even in such cases, the action may differ would result fromtheir senior decision. This is in part players thought because actionsare carriedout by large organizations accordingto in do not usuallyincludean existing routines, partbecausedecisions of what the actionis intended to accomplish, and in part explanation
I' For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational routines, programs and SOP's, see Allison, op. cit.
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theaction. players maydistort details junior because whenspecifying them considthedecision leaves players willfeelthat In most cases, thedecision who supported Players erable leeway in implementation. thespirit willmaneuver Theymaygo beyond to see it implemented. orwho thedecision, ifnottheletter decision. Thosewhoopposed ofthe
to limit oppose the action,will maneuverto delay implementation, or evento have thedecibutnotthespirit, implementation to theletter siondisobeyed. of decision and action games capturesthe The characterization politicsapproach.If problemsof foreign thrust of the bureaucratic issues,and decisionsand actionswere deterpolicyarose as discrete would suffice. But most"issues," thisaccount minedone gameat a time, of nuclearweapons,emergepiecee.g., Vietnamor the proliferation Hundreds a secondin another. mealovertime, one lumpin one contest, is forced every day.Each player of issuescompete forplayers' attention own terms, to fixupon his issuesforthatday,deal withthemon their issue,and of theemerging and rushon to thenext.Thus thecharacter the pace at which the game is played,converge to yielda collage of and actions.Choicesby one player(e.g., to augovernment decisions from or to refrain actionby his department, to make a speech, thorize and "foul-ups"(e.g., points decisions acquiringcertaininformation), raisedtoo late, thatare not decidedbecausetheyare not recognized, or misunderstood) are pieceswhich,when stuckto the same canvas, to an outcome. constitute actionsrelevant
Suggestive Propositions About Decisions
a singlecoherent, conseldomreflect Decisionsof a government aboutnationalsecurity interests. setof calculations sistent but actions tospecific 2. Decisions players, bydefinition assign specific leaveconsiderable leewaybothaboutwhichsubordinates they typically and whatspecific actions shouldbe taken. shouldbe involved considerable reflect Compromise compromise. 3. Decisionstypically a needto avoidharming a needto gain adherence, strongly from results and theneedtohedge interests interests), felt organizational (including of other participants. againstthedirepredictions tailored to facilitate As a result, monitoring. 4. Decisionsare rarely on the faithful in checking have greatdifficulty impleseniorplayers of a decision. mentation substantial reflect changesin actiontypically 5. Decisionsthatdirect or seniorplayersthat of (a) a deadlinefora President a coincidence
i.
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and (b) focuses them on a problem andfuels thesearch fora solution and in theinterests of junior players committed to a specific solution search of a problem.'2
About Actions
i. Presidential decisions will be faithfully implemented when: a President's involvement is unambiguous, hiswords are unambiguous, of hisorder is widely publicized, themenwhoreceive it havecontrol everything needed to carry it out,and thosemenhaveno apparent ofhisauthority doubt to issuethedecision."3 stem from some 2. Majornewdepartures in foreign policy typically oftheaction taken decision details bycentral players. Butthespecific andproaredetermined in large part bystandard operating procedure grams existing in theorganizations at thetime. to faithfully feellessobliged andfield commanders 3. Ambassadors in havenotbeeninvolved implement decisions because they typically one should thedecision knowbetter whatactions game. Theyfeel they actions. wantfrom another andhowto getthose government number 4. Thelarger the ofplayers whocanactindependently onan issue,the less the government's actionwill reflect decisions of the on that government issue. leavesleeway fortheorganization thatis im5. Wherea decision that will so as act to maximize its it, plementing organization organizational interest within constraints.
III.
CONSTRAINTS
The factors a ceteris inthis model assume highlighted clause. paribus Otherfeatures, hereas constraints, treated bias the outcome of the bureaucratic politics game. For someclasses ofgovernmental behavior (e.g.,thedetail characteristics ofthebehavior of largeorganizations), these other factors maybe more important thanthose emphasized by theBureaucratic Politics Model.Indeed, whatis described hereas an "organizational constraint" hasbeenelaborated elsewhere byoneofus as an alternative model.'4 The issueof typology, thatis,whatfactors most for whatclasses is a central issuefor weigh heavily ofoutcomes, further research.
For this proposition we are indebted to Ernest R. May. This proposition is drawn from Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York i960). 14 See Allison's "Model II," op. cit. The discussion of organizational constraints draws heavilyon that account.
12 13
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A. Organizational Constraints The game amongplayers(and organizations considered as players) proceeds withina context. A largepartof thatcontext is the existing configuration of large organizations, theirestablished programsand standard These operating procedures forperforming various functions. organizational routines are especially important in determining (i) the information availableto the centralplayers, (2) the optionsthat the is done seniorplayers consider, and (3) the actualdetailsof whatever by thegovernment. becomeavailHow does information aboutmostnationalproblems able to members of a government? For example,how did the U.S. of missilesin government become aware of the Soviet construction Cuba in i962? For themostpart, information is collected and processed of the by largeorganizations. In the Cuban missile crisis, theexistence CIA and Air Force,withexisting capabilities and processes, yieldeda themissiles U-2 flight overCuba according to a pattern thatdiscovered in the secondweek of October. The menuof alternatives in sufficient defined by organizations detail to be liveoptions is severely in bothnumber limited and character. The character of the alternatives availableto a leader (i.e., the locationof the set of alternatives in the universe of possiblealternatives relevant to his objectives) differs fromthecharacter of alternatives significantly presented by a team of fivedisinterested The difference experts. is a function of the configuration and their of established organizations existing goals and procedures. that are built into Those alternatives in each existing organizational goals (e.g., incremental improvements service's will be adequate (i.e., commilitary primary weaponssystem) pare favorably with the experts'list,thoughwith less sensitivity to that requirecoordination of severalorcost). However,alternatives or weaponssystems) ganizations (e.g.,multi-service military operations in areasbetween and alternatives organizations (e.g., weaponsthatare not represented by a major service component)are likelyto be inadequate. and programs Action accordingto standardoperating procedures flexible does not constitute far-sighted, adaptationto "the issue" (as it is conceived by an analyst).Detail and nuanceof actions by organizations are determined routines. Standard chiefly by organizational constitute routinesfor dealing with standard operatingprocedures situations. Routines allow largenumbers of individuals on low organisituations zationallevelsto deal withnumerous day after day,without
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muchthought. But thisregularized capacity foradequateperformance is purchased at thepriceof standardization. Specific instances, particularlycritical instances thattypically do not have "standard" characteristics,are oftenhandled sluggishly or inappropriately. A program, thatis, a complexcluster of standardoperating procedures, is rarely in which it is executed.Rather,the tailoredto the specific situation program is (at best) the mostappropriate of programs in the existing repertoire. Since repertoires are developedby parochialorganizations forstandard scenarios thattheorganization has defined, theprograms availablefordealingwitha particular are often ill-suited situation to it. B. Shared Attitudes do not Perceptions of issuesor arguments aboutthenationalinterest beginab initio.Beneaththedifferences is thatfuelbureaucratic politics a foundation of sharedassumptions aboutbasicvaluesand facts. These underlying assumptions are reflected in variousattitudes and images whichare takenforgranted by mostplayers. Sharedattitudes and imagesprovidecommonanswers to suchquestionsas: Who are theactualor potential of theUnitedStates? enemies What are their intentions and capabilities? Who areour friends? What are theircapabilities and intentions? What influences the behaviorof othernations?Among the attitudes and the imagesthathave recently in theU.S. bureaucracy are: prevailed . The UnitedStatesshouldact to halt the spreadof Communism. . Only forcewill deterthe Chinesefromaggression. . The loss of Americangold to foreign central banks is a threat to U.S. prosperity and shouldbe avoided. * The capability for assureddestruction is necessary to deter the SovietUnion. . Europeanunification is desirable. withJapanare important . Good relations to U.S. security interests. Most participants accept these images. Their idea of the national interest is shapedby theseattitudes, and theirarguments are based on them.Most participants tend to interpret the actionsof othernations to make themconsistent with held images,ratherthan reexamining basic views.Even thosein the bureaucracy who do not sharesome or all of thesevalues and images are inclinedto act and to argue as if theybelieved them.They do thisbecauseto do otherwise would make themsuspect by othermembers of the bureaucracy.
57
SectionII INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONS thatof another? How does the behavior of one nationaffect politicsapproachthisquestionby apMost analysts of international of each nation.This applyinga version of Model I to the behavior betweennationsas if it proach leads them to treatthe interaction Each betweentwo purposive individuals. resulted froma competition to influence the actionsof nation'sactionsare seen to be an attempt theother calculus. The behavior of each nation by affecting itsstrategic is explainedas a reaction of the other. to the behavior Considerhow analysts who take thisapproachexplain armsraces. nationB. forthepurpose of influencing NationA buildsmilitary forces to attack If it fears and hencemaybe tempted thatnationB is stronger A or to exploititsmilitary nation will increase the size of superiority, of the inthisbuildup,and fearful itsown forces. NationB, observing creasedstrength itsown forces. of nationA, in turnincreases answerto The Bureaucratic an alternative PoliticsModel suggests the questionof how one nation'sbehavioraffects the behaviorof anon processes internal to each naother.Explanation focuses primarily tion.The actions not froman agreedupon calculus of a nationresult of strategic frompullingand hauling among ininterests, but rather dividualswith differing and stakes.These arise not only perceptions fromdiffering interest but also from conceptions of nationalsecurity The influence interests. and personal differing domestic, organizational on the ofone nation's from theactions' actions on another result impact in decisionor actiongames in the stands, or on the powerof players other nation. From thisalternative the explanation of an "armsrace" perspective, in theprocess each nation-in particular is tobe foundprimarily within At any given and deploysmilitary forces. by whicheach one procures timesome players in nationA will take standsin favorof increasing The and procuring defense particular weapons systems. expenditures in Careerofficers will be diverse. interests thatlead themto these stands forexample, will seek additionalfundsforforces the armedservices, by controlled Otherplayers'standswill be affected by theirservices. the influence will affect theirperceptions of how particular decisions of particular nationwill be interpreted by players. Actionsby another and inthoseseekingadditional weaponsto enhancetheirarguments defense will affect fluence. decisions These actions to increase spending
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for national senior ofwhat isnecessary players' perceptions ifthey affect their other interests. topromote security orofwhatis necessary canbe relied on to predict thefact that a largeinModelI analysis in nation an increase A's defense budget willproduce crease in nation and,evenmore But the size of thatincrease B's defense spending. withthe ofweapons purchased characteristics importantly, thespecific Politics by the Bureaucratic explained or predicted increase arebetter where for explaining actions Model.In general, ModelI is more useful whereshared valueslead to a interests dominate, national security requires, and whereactions on whatthenational security consensus modelis politics from decisions. The bureaucratic flow rather directly ofplayers andtherules more useful where there is dataon theinterests interests predominate, organizational anddomestic ofthegame, where onewishes of action. or where to treat thedetails a number of propositions Politics Modelsuggests The Bureaucratic of another. We affect theactions ofonenation about thewayactions Butbefore preexplicitly. toformulate these propositions shallattempt general to consider in a more it should be useful senting propositions, theprocess as itlooksthrough thelens manner ofnational interaction ofbureaucratic politics. procon intra-national Politics Model'semphasis The Bureaucratic nations do within thefactthatindividuals esses stems notonlyfrom of playthat thesatisfaction theobservation theacting, butalsofrom leaders at home. Political overwhelmingly ers'interests aretobe found domestic of a nation riseand falldepending on whether satisfy they when theymeetthe advancein the bureaucracy needs.Individuals leaders or by career ladders. standards setby political Organizations in that bureaucracy support ordecline depending on domestic prosper arewhatpreThesestruggles and beyond it-but within thenation. bureaucracies. Threatsto interests in foreign-policy occupy players are farmore or competing rivalorganizations, political groups, from abroad. from realthanthreats interests. do nothavenational Thisis nottosaythat security players tosendtheir andfewdesire toseehisnation No leader wants attacked, arecommitted to a off to fight in distant wars.Someleaders soldiers ofinterests havea widerange order. Someplayers ofworld conception are concerned Evenwhenplayers of thenation. theborders beyond to see the however, theyare likely aboutnational security interests, a truism athome. Thishasbecome wonorlostmainly as being battles forother as well.ForPresioftheVietnam policies war,butitis true theproblem oftheMarshall Plan was howto S. Truman dentHarry
59
not how to and votethefunds, theprogram to establish get Congress to take the moneyor use it wisely.For get European governments was how of armscontrol theproblem DwightD. Eisenhower President For plannersin the proposalsfromhis associates. to get imaginative necessary to defendthe nationis thedriveto get theforces Pentagon, the Secrebut by rival services, governments, not by foreign stymied, of Defense,and thePresident. tary they but rather It is not thatactionsof othernationsdo not matter, efforts A player's domestic struggles. influence ifand whenthey matter to advance domesticpolitical to accomplishhis objectives-whether or nationalsecurity interests, personal interests, organizational interests, cometo players bywhathe and other affected sometimes interests-are whose A Germanchancellor nations. believeaboutthe actions of other for being able to get domestic positiondependsupon his reputation what the Federal Republicneeds fromthe UnitedStateswill be concernedaboutAmericanactionsthatlead his colleaguesand opponents Secreto him.An American no longerlistens to concludeWashington will spending who wishesto cut defense tary of Defenseor President see thathis positionrequiresSovietactionsthatpermithim to argue A State withreducedforces. security can be protected thatthenation's who believeshis government's security requires official Department to get the UnitedStates will fearthathis efforts Europeanunification by Common Markettrade to promotethis cause could be undercut forothers to pointto the adan opportunity sincetheseoffer policies, Since actions of Europeanunification. by verseeconomic consequences affect the standsplayerstake, and thereby othernationscan affect how actionsof othernations and actions, we mustconsider decisions enter into the processof decision bargainingand how they affect actions. Many nationsare doing manythingsat any giventime.Not all of become relevantto decisionor action games theseforeignactivities a nation. Those thatdo are the actions reported by thenation's within or by seniorplayersdior intelligence organizations, foreignoffice are not perfect and neutraltransorganizations rectly.Intelligence whattheir belts. mission imagesof theworldlead themto They notice to seniorplayers.They reporteventsand thinkwill be important and in ways designedto to established procedures opinionsaccording Seniorplayers noticewhat interests. theirown organizational protect and relatemainlyto the former. may help themor theiropponents of anothernation'sactionscomes to be acIf a new interpretation some players will see new opportunities ceptedamong seniorplayers,
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to seekdecisions or actions. Others willsee threats actions to ongoing or desired newones;still others willbe unconcerned. oftheactions Reports ofother nations willnever be morethanone of many on influences decisions and actions. However, whenplayers areevenly divided, ornewaction suggests tomany a substantial change in anticipated future these actions, reports of another nation's actions The Japanese attack on PearlHarbor, can be decisive. to takean extreme affected the perceptions of manyAmericans example, about whether thenational American forces to engagein security required waragainst The Soviet ABM deployment Japan. maywellhavetipped in thehard-fought American thebalance overwhether to controversy an ABM. President of deploy estimate of theeffect Lyndon Johnson's notdeploying an American ABM system on his reelection prospects thathe could mayhavebeensubstantially changed bythepossibility be charged an "ABM gap."'5 with permitting ofonenation areeffective inchanging thebehavior Whentheactions is rarely ofa second, whatwas intended thenewaction byanyplayer in stands in in thefirst nation. will lead to desired Changes changes in theaction of will produce desired action, whichin turn changes in the a clear someone another nation is sent, when only: when signal and theaction wantsto takethedesired action other nation already are marginal influence. Moreoften, increases that theeffects player's or unintended.
About National Interaction Propositions
A that i. The actions ofnation to an outside appear observer to be ofnation B willin fact toinfluence theactions be a combinadesigned of behavior; tionof: (a) routine in decision patterns (b) maneuvers areincidentally gamesthat visible to other nations or deliberately vistobe effective since must ible, tobe a "signal";(c) actions they appear in theabsence ofdecisions; a decision byplayers (d) actions following gamenotrelated toinfluence nation B; as wellas (e) actions following a decision B. toinfluencing nation gamerelated 2. Reports and interpretations of theseactions provided to senior in nation B (in the Foreign players by participants Office and Inwithobserving, telligence) charged and prereporting, explaining ofother actions willbe affected dicting nations, by (a) theperceptual of all individuals; tendencies (b) theuse of ModelI analysis or (c) evenifnot, thelackofrequired dataand understanding; and (d) the
15
WorldPolitics, xxv (October1972).
On the ABM discussion see Morton Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM,"
61
of theseorganizations. standard operating procedures and interests A. Theseplayers share theperceptual tendencies of all individuals. Thismeans, forexample, that and (i) New information willbe fitted into their existing attitudes images; (2) Reports that should leadtoa change willbe distorted in plans so as to "savetheir theory"; of change in theprobabilities (3) Cluesthatsignala significant events willbe lostin thesurrounding noise.'6 Examples: Evidence of a Japanese attack on PearlHarbor was explained away.'7 One senior military officer urged that theUnited States proceed to invade Cuba evenafter theSoviets agreed to remove their
missiles."8
B. Because these players use ModelI they tendto assume thatthe actions were: (i) designed and executed, in effect, by a singleindito influence vidual;(2) designed carefully their nation;(3) designed witha worldviewliketheir own; and (4) designed without regard tothedomestic A. andbureaucratic politics ofnation warned of thedifficulty he had Khrushchev Examples: Kennedy theCubanmissile crisis thatan of convincing his associates during American crossed into wasnotan indication U-2 which Soviet territory toattack.19 theUnited wasabout that States The American intelligence in predicting Soviet force structure community persists on thebasisof ModelI analysis.20 a bureaucratic C. Evenifthey modelthey employ politics willlack ofnuances dataand understanding ofwhatdetermines theactions of B. nation Bothin theSuez crisis of i956 and theSkybolt crisis of Examples: in the British and American i96i, senior players fregovernments ofactions misread themeaning because lacked an underquently they of how theother of thenuances worked.2' standing system and interests will affect whatis D. Standard operating procedures reported. andtoselecwillleadtodelays (i) Standard operating procedures wouldchoose. from whatsenior different tions players of theintelligence led to For example: theprocedures community
16
17
Ibid. 18 Robert Thirteen Days (New York i969), Kennedy,
Pearl Harbor (Stanford See Roberta Wohlstetter,
i962). ii9.
19For examples fromthe Cuban missile crisis,see Allison, op. cit. 20 This point has oftenbeen made by A. W. Marshall. 21 On Suez and Skybolt see Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York
I970).
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a considerable thetimeevidence of Soviet delaybetween missiles in Cuba entered thesystem and the timethisevidence reached senior players. (2) Standard and interests operating procedures maylead to disinternal guising bureaucratic and thewithholding disagreements of bad news. an action willbe presented so as toimply recom(3) Information mendation. For example: the Chinese President Eisenhower was told during would andcatastrophic Quemoy haveconsequences more "far-reaching thanthose which followed" thefallof China.This report clearly signaledtheaction favored.22 and reporting procedures will be de(4) Information-gathering to protect signed theinterests of intelligence agencies, suchas to protect the andmissions roles oftheCIA inrelation toother organizations. Procedures will also be designed to protect the organizational (5) interests ofa parent operating organization. For example: to a former according Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst, DIA estimates concerning Vietnam werewritten so as notto undercut theaction recommendations of theU.S. Military Commander in Vietnam and theJoint Chiefs ofStaff.23 ofsenior 3. The ability in nation players B to pursue their interests A onlyto theextent willbe affected bytheactions ofnation the that actions ofnation bytheForeign and Office, Intelligence A,as reported other senior players, affect (a) who is in power in nation B, (b) the powerof participantsin nationA, or (c) theselatter participants' perception oftheir national security interests. President Examples: Lyndon Johnson may havebelieved that Soviet an of deployment ABM wouldhurt hischances ofreelection in i968. failure to get Soviet Kennedy's missiles removed from Cuba would havereduced his influence on the American government. President is reported Johnson to have believed thatgetting his GreatSociety legislation through Congress required that he notpermit SouthVietnam to fall to communism. The NorthKoreaninvasion of South Koreachanged President S. viewof whether Harry Truman's it was to American important to keepSouthKoreanon-communist. security A do affect 4. If actions a player bynation in B's ability to pursue hisinterests he willat a minimum on theaction and interpret report
22 23
attack on the offshore island of Quemoy in I958 that the fall of
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York i965), 692. Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," Washington Monthly, ii (July
I970) .
63
ofthe If theinterpretation taken. previously stands it so as toadvance of what thecalculation players affects bymostsenior action accepted and hisstand willchange theplayer hisinterests, stand wouldadvance A of nation theactions affecting without hisinterest seekto advance ifnecessary. A's actions nation canbe done) orbyaffecting (ifthis SouthKoreain I950 Koreans invaded Examples: WhentheNorth peacesettleofan early on thedesirability State andDefense weresplit in Japan were bases a delay because favored ment Japan. Defense with theneed Wardemonstrated that theKorean Defense argued required. the peace delaying signing the casefor strengthened for andhence bases concern would Japanese oftheattack, that because argued treaty. State Hencethe a PeaceTreaty. after baserights make tonegotiate itpossible tosigna PeaceTreaty.24 move quickly United States should an ABM todeploy hisstand anddecide didchange Johnson President theposin order to cancel in response to theSoviet ABM deployment an Bypreventing ABM on thei968 election. sibleeffect oftheSoviet needto itspurpose without accomplished "ABMgap"issue change this ofDeOn theother Secretary hand, causea particular Soviet reaction. the forSALT talksto prevent McNamara's proposal fenseRobert to parwillingness on a Soviet American depended ABM deployment in nation A may in thestands ofoneormore participants 5. Changes in behavior ofB is unB. Butthechange affect ofnation theactions A which is detheaction tobe welldesigned tosecure bynation likely ofa Thisis because: (a) thegenerator sired participant. byanysingle will an optimum signal;(b) thedecision willnotputforward proposal will and (c) theactions deviate from theproposal ofanysingle player; from deviate thedecisions. to affect thebefor action designed ofa proposal 5.i The generator A willnotputforward an optimum havior ofnation signal. a signal the toaffect interest is todesign only 5.1.i Evenifa player's A he is likely to do a poorjob because(a) he uses of nation actions Politics ModelbutlacksthereModelI or (b) he usesa Bureaucratic dataandunderstanding. quired which asa particular ModelI framework A. He is likely toemploy nation A: sumes that ofhisnation; influenced bythebehavior (i) Willbe heavily andwillunderstand andwith sophistication closely (2) Is listening ofcomplex themeaning signals;
24 On Korea, see Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision (New York i968), and Joseph de Rivera, Psychological Dimensions in Foreign Policy (Columbus i968).
in negotiations. ticipate
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bydomestic political constraints (embassy officials (3) Is unaffected will generally norwill senior nothold to thispoint, players fornations whoseleadersthey know well); (4) Sharestheimagesof theworldwhichhis nationaccepts. For example: a dyingSecretary of StateJohnF. Dulles, givinghis last adviceto thenVice President RichardNixon on how to communicatewithSovietleaders, assured him that"Khrushchev does notneed to be convinced ofourgood intentions. He knowswe arenotaggressors and do not threaten the security of the SovietUnion. He understands
us. 25
B. Even ifa participant usesa Bureaucratic Politics Model he is likely to lack data and an understanding of nuances about how processes workin nationA. For example: Britishand Americanleadersduring the Suez and crisesfailedto designoptimumsignalsbecause theydid not Skybolt understand thenuancesofeach other's A rarecounter-example system. in a memorandum is presented Richard Neustadton how prepared by to sell theMLF to a new Labour British government.26 is focused interonlyon nationalsecurity 5.I.2 Even if a participant aboutother at homeand abroad. audiences ests, he will be concerned For example:duringthe 1958 Quemoycrisis Dulles wantedto make clearto theChinesethatwe would defendQuemoy.But he absolutely a clearsignalbyhis fearthatothers from was inhibited would sending Domesticcritics of U.S. policymightuse it to also hear the warning. effectively challengehis policy.And the ChineseNationalists might a clashbetween use thewarning as a handletoprovoke theU.S. and the ChineseCommunists.27 who desires to senda signalwill have other 5.1.3 A participant interhis proposal.He will know thatotheraudiestswhichwill influence will alwaysbe takenintoacenceswill hear his signal.Their reaction on his interests, be of greater countand may,depending concern. ofStateJohn F. Dulles,in a private For example:Secretary conversaPrime Minister tion where he soughtto conveyto British Anthony Eden what the Americanpositionon Suez was, recognizedthatthe or appreciation, British leader,out of concern his old mighttelephone to reportthe conversation. Eisenhower friendPresident This report, to establish could set back his efforts a relationship Dulles feared, of
24I. Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York i962), Richard Neustadt, "Memorandum on the British Labour Party and the MLF," New Left Review, LI (September i968). 27 On the I958 Quemoy crisis,see Morton Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy Toward the OffshoreIslands," Public Policy, xv (Carnbridge i966). 25 26
BUREAUCRATIC
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aboutAmerican explicit Thus he was notvery trust withthePresident. policy. in a game designedto influence 5.2 The decisionof a government thebehavior of nationA will deviatefromthe proposalof any single thataffect among participants participant. Some of the disagreements of nationA. (a) Pardecisions will relateto influencing the behavior and (b) on whatactions by nationA are desirable; ticipants maydefer the desired behavior. differ on how to induce participants may proFor example:at one pointin the Suez crisisDulles apparently that the government posed that the United Statesassurethe British costofbypassing theSuez Canal ifthis U.S. would assumethefinancial thatDulles had concluded(corNeustadtsuggests becamenecessary. rectly, Neustadtargues) thatthispromisewould reducesubstantially to forcewithout any real probabilthe chanceof the British resorting would haveto makegood on itscommitment. itythattheUnitedStates of the TreasuryGeorge HumHe was unable to convinceSecretary did notwantto stoptheBritish, This was notbecauseHumphrey phrey. did notquiteacceptDulles' butbecause(Neustadtimplies)Humphrey and of how the British cabinetfunctioned, explanation complicated of thefundsinvolved. he did notwant to yieldhis control the 5.3 Actionswhich follow froma decisionrelatedto affecting A the decision.In partthe deviaactionsof nation will deviatefrom about influencing the tion will be directly relatedto disagreements ofnationA, in that(a) participants on whatactions maydiffer actions on how to inand (b) participants maydiffer bynationA aredesirable, behavior. duce thedesired learned thatTruman, Examples:When GeneralDouglas MacArthur was about to announce terms, hopingto end the war on compromise in Korea, MacArthur, publiclythe Americandesirefor an armistice broadcasta surrender who opposed a compromise, demand to the to India KennethGalbraith FormerU.S. Ambassador reports enemy. occasions when his actions in his journal many deviatedfromhis inbecause he believedhis actionswere more likelyto bring structions aboutthedesiredIndian action.28 6. Changes in actionsof one nationwill succeedin changingthe direction of a secondnationin a desired that onlyto theextent actions of thefirst nationsend a clear,consistent, simplesignal (a) theactions in theothernationwant,in pursuit and (b) someparticipants of their in thedesired to changebehavior own interests, way,and (c) thissignal of theseparticipants. the influence to increase serves
28 John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal (Boston i969).
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For example: the Americaneffort to get the Japanese government to surrender without invasion of Japansucceeded onlybecause (i) the UnitedStatessentJapansomeof theclearest includsignalsin history, ing dropping two atomicbombs, destroying Tokyo withfire bombing, destroying the Japanese and assembling an invasionforce; (2) fleet, therewas a strong groupwithinthe Japanese government, including the Emperor, his principal adviser, and theForeignMinister who had opposedthewar fromthestart and wantedto surrender; and (3) the Americansignalsincreasedthis group's sense of determination and willingness to run riskswhile discrediting and demoralizing theiropponents. No majorfigure in Japanese rulingcircles changedhis mind aboutthedesirability thebeginning ofwar withtheUnitedStates from of thewar to theend. Those who wantedto begin the war remained opposedto surrender.29 7. More often changesin actions by one nationwill have unintended and unanticipated effects on actions. Pearl Harborand Skybolt In the monthsleading up to Pearl Harbor, competing groups in Japanand theUnitedStates neededdifferent actions fromeach other's in orderto accomplish theirobjectives.30 government In Tokyo those who opposedwarwiththeUnitedStates neededto be able to showthat theUnitedStateswould not interfere withJapanese expansion by cutof scrapiron,oil,and othermaterials. sources ing off They also needed whichwould have enabledtheiroptheUnitedStatesto avoid actions to arguethatwar withtheUnitedStates ponents was inevitable. Those war had quitedifferent who favored needs. of war withJapanlooked In theAmerican government, proponents for Japaneseactionswhich would demonstrate that Japan's objecand threatened Americanand British tiveswereunlimited possessions. who soughtto avoid war with Japan,had quite different Roosevelt, within thegovernment needs.He had toresist from pressures those who At to to war with the same he time did wanted go not wantto Japan. so demoralizethemthattheywould resignor reducetheirefforts to whichhe believedwas necessary. prepareforthe war with Germany
29 See Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford I954), and Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Princeton i96i). 30 On Pearl Harbor, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York i969); Herbert Feis, The Robert Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton i96i); Joseph Grew, My Years in Japan (New Road to Pearl Harbor (New York i962); York I944); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New York I953); and Wohlstetter(fn. i6). On Skybolt, see Neustadt (fn. 2I).
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Thus Roosevelt's avoid: (i) flagrant violapurposes required thatJapan in waysthat tionsof international law, (2) linkingup withGermany made it impossible to resist arguments thatwar withJapanwas a part or of thewar againsttheFascistalliance, to the British and (3) threats Dutch colonies whichcouldbe seenas a threat to theAlliesin Europe. of purActionsof both governments were designedwith a variety poses.Japanese military movesfolloweddecisions to expand the area in signalsto underdirectJapanese control without any directinterest theUnitedStates. On theother hand,thenegotiating positions proposed were de(and in some cases implemented) by the StateDepartment soluthata negotiated signed, in part,to demonstrate to thePresident on negotiations tionwas impossible. The standof theJapanese military probably had a similar purpose. Roosevelt and Japanese ForeignMinof ister Togo proposed positions designedto keep open the possibility negotiations with the hope of reachinga settlement. This In thiscontext Japanmovedto occupyall ofFrenchIndochina. to theUnitedStates Japanese movewas notintended to signalanything or to influence it was incompatible Americanactions.Nevertheless, He no with what Rooseveltneeded fromthe Japanese government. to takesomesortof actionagainst longer felt able to resist thepressures Japan.Resisting pleas fora totalembargo, he compromised by requirof all exports to Japan. ing licensing Those who favored war,including of StateforEconomicAffairs thenAssistant Dean Acheson, Secretary of thisdecision. were able to control implementation They did so by a totalembargo on oil shipments to Japan. imposing At thispointtheJapanese leadersopposedto war did not have what neededfromtheUnitedStatesto pursuetheir they objective. A period and intensive of high-level negotiations began.Those opposedto war on bothsidessoughtto persuade theotherside to rescind thebehavior to resist to go to war.Roosevelt, thatmadeitimpossible pressures recoginterests nizingthattheStateDepartment's differed fromhis,used his Postmaster Generalas a negotiating agent.He also intervened directly by dealing personally with the Japaneseenvoy.The peace partyin the Japanese Tokyo,withconsiderable difficulty, got through governoffers. Plan "A" promisedan ultimate menttwo watered-down Japfrom China.Plan "B" offered an immediate anesewithdrawal Japanese from in return Indochina forlifting withdrawal southern thetradeemin those both who saw war as necessary or bargo.However, capitals wereable to resist the proposedcompromises. And the two inevitable foundthemselves at war. governments accountof the Skybolt crisistellsa quite difRichardE. Neustadt's
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ferent taleofrelations between allieswitha relatively successful resolution.Nevertheless, thebasicpoints are thesame. What British Harold Macmillanneeded fromthe Prime Minister UnitedStates wereindications thatAmerican leaders held him in high regard.He was particularly good at getting fromthe United States whatwas in Britain's interest. He also neededtheSkybolt missile, since he had made thata symbol of his independent nucleardeterrent. He neededthedeterrent to pursuehis domestic interests. If he failedto get thesethings from theUnitedStates, Macmillanwas threatened bothby potential alternative leadersin the Conservative Partyand by thenext election. He neededto Kennedy's needsfromMacmillanwere moremodest. or non-support of beastliness to the British, for avoid a demonstration the needs of a Conservative government. Kennedy'sneeds stemmed of the fromhis desireto maintain the activeand enthusiastic support whichwas sympathetic to Britain eastern foreign policyestablishment Conservative Macin generaland to particular Partyleaders, especially of extreme discrimination in millan.He also neededto avoid evidence of improving relations in orderto pursuehis objective favorof Britain of consistency withFrance. He also needed to maintaina semblance withhisnon-proliferation policy. of Secretary of DeKennedy'sacceptanceof the recommendation was in no way intended fenseRobertS. McNamara to cancel Skybolt to suggest a lack as a signalto theUnitedKingdom.It was notintended fortheBritish or respect or itsleaders, offriendship or any government, from itsroleas an independent Britain to remove nuclear desire power. of Skybolt was incompatible the cancellation withMacNevertheless, of his interests. millan'spursuit Thus, Macmillan'sfirst hope was that If thisfailed, couldbe rescinded. he would need somesubthedecision to continue withwhathe could describe at home as stitute forSkybolt nuclearcapability. He also neededa demonstration an independent of ofhim and a demonstration of thewillingness American ofthe support to respondto his needs. However,Macmillan Americangovernment Nassau before the could not, Conference, requestPolaris.The British as was theAirForce.The British Navywas opposed, Navywas opposed of fundsfromthe navy'sbasic program becauseit feareda diversion and theAir Forcewishedto keepthestrategic deter(aircraft carriers), had important Bothservices on theback rentroleforitself. supporters Macmillanwas reluctant to go to his cabinet More important, benches. of the independent deterrent whereopponents mightjoin with those of and cost Polaris defeat the added him. about concerned
69
The needsofAmerican officials weredifferent. The Secretary ofState, Dean Rusk,who might havefavored was unwilling continuing Skybolt, to meddlein theaffairs ofhiscolleague, theSecretary ofDefense. Robert McNamarawas determined to cancelSkybolt; buthe was prepared to givetheBritish Polarisas a substitute. He was unwilling, however, to do battle withtheEuropeanists in theStateDepartment-which he would havehad to havedone to offer Polarisbefore theBritish they demanded it. As a crisis ensuedKennedybecamedirectly involved. He saw thatif the U.S. government persisted in itscurrent courseof action, what he, Kennedy,needed fromMacmillan would be threatened. Macmillan was prepared to have a breakovertheissue.He demonstrated to KennedythatKennedy had tochoosebetween getting whathe neededfrom the U.K. and othercoststo his interests at home. The compromise which ensued gave Macmillan virtually that he needed, everything while only marginally affecting Kennedy'sdomestic Britain position. gotPolaris, whichcouldbe usedindependently in moments of supreme nationalconcern. Kennedycould pointto theBritish to use agreement Polarisas partofan integrated NATO force. The needsofbothleaders weremet.Otherplayers wereunhappy. The crisis receded. The two cases, in theirsimilarities and differences, illustrate the ofthepropositions utility foranalyzing how thebehavior of one nation affects thebehavior of another. In bothcases the key eventthattriggered the serious crisiswas not meantas a signalto the other. The Japanese occupation of Indochina and thecancellation of Skybolt bothresulted fromdecisiongamesdesignedto affect otheroutcomes. in Washington, Analysts Tokyo, and London did a poor job of explaining the meaningof theseand other actionsand of predicting future actions.Seniorplayersattempted to interpret actionsto support standstheyhad previously taken.For example,thosein the United Stateswho believedwar with Japanwas inevitable pointedwithalarmto Japanese actions. In the Skybolt case the stakesforleaderson bothsideswere largely domestic. Macmillanand Kennedysaw dangersto theirpowerin the possiblechangesin actionsof the othernation.For otherplayers, particularly thearmedforces, thefaceof theissuewas rolesand missions. saw nationalsecurity to proliferation Others interests related and EuroIn case of unification. the Harbor Pearl the stakeswerenational pean of thehighest interests war. Actionsof the security order-preventing of leadersto veto actionsof other the ability othernationthreatened whichtheyfearedwould lead to war. players,
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in eachcrisis, at least at first, Changes in thebehavior ofeachnation led tounintended in thebehavior Thisincreased changes oftheother. to interests of senior on bothsides.The Japanese thethreat players an embargo. move madeitimpossible for The emRoosevelt toprevent warcould bargo, in turn, so weakened in Japan thepeacegroup that notbe prevented. In theSkybolt of casethefirst move-cancellation Macmillan's andalmost ledhimtoattack interests Skybolt-threatened American action. further Thiswouldhaverequired Kennedy publicly. The twoleaders, in Bermuda, meeting wereable to finda solution. that Theywerethenableto force their reluctant to accept colleagues In this wouldhavebeena moreinsolution. casetheprice offailure crisis In thePearlHarbor tense and troubles for both leaders at home. a direct whether weremuchgreater. One wonders case,thestakes not FDR and theJapanese PrimeMinister between meeting might a mutually which eachcouldhave haveproduced solution compatible at home. imposed III Section POLICY IMPLICATIONS We present heresomeillustrative policy implications oftheBureaucratic Politics Modelin theform ofpolicy advice toplayers in theU.S. in particular tosenior government, players. The presentation takes the form of precepts without evidence or elaboration. In somecaseswe present examples to illustrate a point, or to showthat somepeople believe thecontrary. Theseprecepts aredivided into twoparts: (I) advice about the behavior ofother governments andthe effect ofU.S.behavior on other government and (2) advice actions, about thebehavior ofthe U.S. government.
BEHAVIOR OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS EXPLANATION OF THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS
i. Be suspicious ofexplanations that on theassumption depend that backfrom onecanreason detailed characteristics ofspecific behavior to central intentions or doctrine. government For example, on theSoviet Lairdhastestified, Secretary that "they aregoing for SS-9deployment a first-strike and there's no doubt capability about it."" in most 2. Recognize that casesthefullrange ofbehavior exhibited was notintended bya government In most byanysingle participant. 31New York Times,March22,
i969,
p. i6.
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Actualbewerecompromises. and actiondecisions cases,thepolicy and interests procedures, standard operating reflects programs, havior a Soviet Forexample, decisions. relevant as wellas the ofimplementors, confactors wouldhavecometoerroneous these analyst whoneglected an ABM system. was deploying States whytheUnited clusions about in October i967 of Defense S. McNamara's speech Robert Secretary ABM system against a largeSoviet-oriented laid out thearguments ofABM's. deployment a limited whileannouncing exfordetailed explanations withproviding those charged 3. Press Model. Politics basedon a Bureaucratic planations mayhavequitedifleaders ofother governments that 4. Recognize etc.,thatlead themto see information, images of theworld, ferent bombardChinese Forexample, different light. ina dramatically events on thepart fear havereflected in 1954 may islands ment oftheoffshore ofAmerican due to thesecurity leaders encirclement ofsomeChinese was was currently Thisexplanation signing. theUnited States treaties thetreaties knewthat they because byU.S. leaders notevenconsidered were defensive.32
PREDICTION
basedprimarily on calculations about i. Be suspicious ofpredictions and doctrines of another interests Calcunation. thenational security an appropriate surrogate in thecase of thissort mayprovide lations forexample, deterrence ofnuclear warbya stable of someproblems, cases such In most willnotbe satisfactory. predictions ofterror. balance of Soviet force havefrequently gone estimates postures For example, reason. forthis astray a bureaucratic-political that can affect mapofthefactors 2. Askfor a listoftheparticipants in particular and their an outcome, including
interests.
a setof specific has provided W. Marshall repropositions Andrew force Soviet fora nation latedtopredicting (i) Force posture posture: interests and behavior influenced of is especially bytheorganizational establishment. Sovietsecurity of the military (2) Internal sub-parts and thegeneral of information overtheflow of the privacy controls to an even more leads influbureaucratically decision-making process countries. than is usualin Western ofthe force enced posture (3) Parts strive to keeptheir shares and Soviet budgetary bureaucracy military in doingso. (4) The mechanics of theoperation successful arefairly
32See Halperinand Tsou (fn. 27), and Leon Sigal, "The RationalPolicy Model xiv (June I970). StudiesQuarterly, International and the FormosaStraits Crisis,"
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of thebudgetary process have a substantial impacton theformation of forceposture."

PLANNING
i. Ask who in another government wantsto do what you want for his own reasons.If you locate him, strengthen him. If you do not, despair. 2. Limit claims on other governments to outcomesreachableby themwithina wide rangeof internal politics, undera variety of perand circumstances. sonalities 3. Recognizethelow probability of success.
PLANNING WITHIN THE GENERAL PLANNING PRECEPTS
U.S. GOVERNMENT
i. Focus on changing governmental action. a changein governmental 2. Decide whether that actionsrequires be changed. somepolicyor decision 3. Be aware thatif it does appearnecessary (desirable) to change policyin orderto change action,the change in policyin the great of casesis onlya way-station to the desiredoutcomeand not majority thepolicychangeis onlyan earlyway-station. itself-often theoutcome who maydesiredifferent 4. Realize thatothers, outcomes, mayalso and taketheirplanningintoaccount. be planning, to modify or yourdeclared 5. Be prepared yourchoiceof outcome, of that outcome,in order to induce of the consequences prediction Take into account, thatthesemodificato cooperate. others however, the natureof yourgame with third tionsmay (or may not) affect parties. 6. Be aware thatsuch modifications (compromises) may give rise than the existing which are less desirable to outcomes stateof affairs. ofsuchoutcomes is sufficiently If theprobability high,thegame should ended.Withthisconsideration notbe started, or,oncestarted, in mind, of thestate playfrequently. review thedesired consider how manychangesin 7. In choosing outcome, behavior are required foritsachievement. or organizational individual 8. Assesswhetherdesiredchangesin behaviorwill be easily obso as to produce or monitored. natural served Designoutcomes monitors (but don'tcounton them). so as not to affect 9. Try to designoutcomes major organizational of an the or its ability interests, particularly autonomy organization to
33Andrew Marshall, unpublished paper.
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pursue whatit seesto be theessence ofitsfunction, promotions, roles and missions, andbudgets. io. Designproposals so that peoplecan agreefordifferent reasons. (Use arguments thatappealto one side and offend others onlyin private.) an explicit ii. Plan systematically. Eitherinternalize or consult planning guide. See Appendix.
INTERESTS
stand i. Recognize multiple interest andfaces ("where they depends on where they sit"). on issuesare determined 2. Recognize thatstands by calculations areonlyone. interests ofmultiple ofwhich interests national security areclearly Therefore, onlyin caseswhere national security arguments to change a player's stance on a particular are they dominant likely
issue.
a participant is strongly thatwhere motivated 3. Recognize by oractions thatseemto threaten the ganizational interests, he willresist topursue whatis conceived ofhisorganization tobe theesautonomy For example, service officers have consenceof its activity. foreign sistently opposed proposals giving theStateDepartment operational and control of foreign operations beyond representation, negotiation, reporting, e.g.,of foreign aid, military assistance programs, and forservice. eign information
withstrong thatplayers interests will 4. Recognize organizational affected alsobe importantly of an action of promotion bytheimpact andbudgets. roles andmissions, patterns, theinterest in roles 5. Theseinterests, particularly andmissions, will in situations behavior these affect players' thatare regarded by the as major national crises inwhich senior all areobviously players pulling together. thecompetition For example: between theAir Forceand Navyin ofthebombing on theeffectiveness in North reporting Vietnam.
INFORMATION
willgiveyouinformation that others i. Assume that they think will rather than leadyoutodo what information they want, that youwould to have. prefer to theBayofPigs, President For example: prior Kennedy indicated cancel theplanned invasion from he might fear that that itmight be a oftheintelligence He was assured failure. total byleaders community
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failed, the Iftheeffort toestablish a beachhead that this wasimpossible. wouldmoveto had received guerrilla training, landing forces, which there was a swamp Kennedy was nottoldthat thenearby mountains. lessthan one-third of andthemountains, that between thelanding site party training; andno onein theinvasion theforce had anyguerrilla was toldthatthey if theeffort was shouldmoveto themountains failing.34 is provided bya former DIA analyst: Another example
in Vietnambegan to be From i964-65, when U.S. involvement in Saigon considerable, untillate i966 or earlyi967, the generals
they wanted strength. Therefore, worked to buildup U.S. troop inthat couldshowthat brought to thefore every bitofevidence DIA obliged and alsoemphasized in all filtration was increasing. fromthe South capability to recruit forces reports the enemy's The high In i967 a second Vietnamese began. period population. ThentheparaofSaigon that we were"winning." priests decided capability to to showtheenemy's reduced mount interest became The in infiltration due to ourbombing. recruit and a slowdown ofreports from and tune thefield changed radically, andemphasis so did those putoutbyDIA. No thatanyone notbe concluded evidence. suppressed It should sent backtoWashingin Saigon all thefacts onedid.The military data and infiltration toneventually. Duringthebuildup period, cabledatacamein viaGeneral Westmoreland's daily recruitment contact withenemy field units cameamidthe Data from gram. cables or bycourier weeks later. Cables up to five more mundane ofcourse, were inWashpriority from given higher Westmoreland, detailed Whenwe started reports highlighting "winning," ington. on how many werepacified and statistics villages "bodycounts" recruitment studies werecabledwithWestmoreland's signature; on thefluctuating or cabledwiththereports werepouched price ofemphasis.35 ofrice. It wasall a matter arenotcritical there differences in these that eval2. Do notassume a pieceofpaperreports because unaniofinformation uations simply For example, DIA differences of thegroup. with mousconclusions
34See Haynes Johnson,Bay of Pigs (New York i964); Sorensen (fn. 6). 35 Patrick J.McGarvey (fn. 23), 7I-72.
Schlesinger (fn. 6), and
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General Westmoreland's evaluation oftheTet offensive as total defeat fortheenemy were notreported.36 are fre3. Recognize thattechnical evaluations and conclusions on complex quently basedon simple techrules ofthumb, than rather nicalcalculations. The rules of thumb areoften wrong. For example, theoptimum mischaracteristics forthefirst of American generation siles, specified by thevonNeumann as destructive committee power ofonemegaton, as a CEP range of5500miles, and accuracy measured of5 miles, of a quarter werebasedrespectively on a round number, those who were theearth's between circumference, and compromise optimistic andthose whowere pessimistic about accuracy.37 4. Don'tassume that information thatyoupasson to other players is passed on bythem or superiors. to their subordinates
OPTIONS
i. Recognize thattheoptions will be basedon thepropresented gramsand standard operating procedures of the organizations that generate theoptions. 2. Recognize thatoptions whichrequire between two cooperation are unlikely to be advanced independent organizations of by either these organizations. an option is feathat that 3. Recognize organizations tendto assert sible ifitpermits freedom ofaction. only theorganization considerable to maximize Options designed byorganizations willbe designed their freedom ofaction. For example, in i962 theJoint Chiefs ofStaff were prepared torecommend theintroduction ofAmerican troops into Laos onlyif thePresident issued them an assurance thatnuclear weapons wouldbe usedifnecessary.38 that tend tobebiased 4. Recognize options bysimplistic andunstated hunches about domestic andbureaucratic politics politics. that willbedesigned onthe 5. Recognize basis options oftheassumpact as singleindividuals tionthatother governments motivated priIn some interests. cases this marily bynational security assumption will be complicated feelfor Office or domestic bysome Foreign politics. that 6. Don'tassume arein fact motivated participants bythearguin favor oftheir ments stand. they putforward
37 Herbert York, Race to Oblivion (New York I970),
36Ibid.
38See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York i967), and Sorensen,op. cit.
89.
Schlesinger, op. cit.
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fora posiargument ofa participant's 7. Recognizethattheintensity to thatstand. of his commitment theintensity tionmaynotreflect
IMPLEMENTATION
faithfully Recognizethatpeopledo notfeelobligedto implement a chosenaction. including: of alternatives, have availablea number 2. Note thatthey disobedience, delay,outright theletter and notthespirit, implementing implementation. as well as overzealous givenby an organization 3. Examinewithgreatcaretheinstructions of somedecision. to itsmembers fortheimplementation in and presumed opponents helpers, prospective 4. Locate yourself, availableforimplerelation to all actionchannelsreadilyor possibly you want,and block thoseyou fear. menting theresults will 5. Recognizethatin the shortrun,the behaviorimplemented proand standardoperating programs organizational reflect existing cedures. to changeitsbehavior is forced 6. Recognizethatif an organization or standard it will tendto changeto another operating proprogram moreapthandevisea new and perhaps rather cedurein itsrepertoire, procedure. propriate operating is morelikelyto lead to changing 7. Note thatchangingpersonnel one new ambasto existing personnel: behavior thanchangingorders cables. sador (of theright is wortha thousand persuasion) of foreign missions will employvarious 8. Recognizethatmembers of home authority: devicesto increase theirindependence to present theirgovernments witha (a) They will oftenattempt pli. faitaccom of theirgovernments by high officials (b) They will exploitvisits positions. They mission as supporting these officials on record bygetting of a nationalcommitment. will thenuse therecord as evidence or evade unwelcomedirectives from (c) They will reinterpret home,hopingthattheissuing or inattentive. will be forgetful authority thesehopes will be fulfilled. Ordinarily, at home insiston compliance with unwelcome (d) If authorities etc.39 the mission will warn of "direconsequences," directives,
i.
39Ernest May, unpublishedpaper.
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APPENDIX Planning Guide I. What precisely do I want to accomplish? to predictwhat will occur. A. Firstattempt B. Plan and implement only if i. Disaster appears likely (possible); 2. Substantial is likely. improvement C. Identify the outcomeI seek. precisely D. Why do I seek it? givenmy values. (If so, do I wish to reconsider i. Good in itself my values?) outcomewhichI value. (If 2. I believeit will lead to a further so, can I statethecausal chain so I can retest?) (If so, 3. I believeit will lead to behaviorby othergovernments. is not a unitary actorand considerthatthe othergovernment in that its bureaucracy will do only what is in theirinterest Influence is most likelyto take the formof theirown terms. and power. Consideralso how reliablemy incentives altering is about the othergovernment.) information E. How likelyam I to get theoutcomeas I desireit? i. Withhold judgment until workingout paths to action and strategy. 2. Consider relevantprogramsand standard operatingprocedures. and external biases. 3. Considerinternal F. How important is thisoutcometo me as comparedto others? II. Alternative paths to action A. Map out alternative routesto the desiredoutcome. nor suffinecessary B. Recognizethata changein policymaybe neither C. Seek to changepolicyonlyif to removean absolutebarrierto changingaction; i. Necessary 2. Useful as a hunting license; the 3. Necessarygiven my access to those who must perform action; 4. Likely to lead easilyto a changein action. unD. Considerhow highI need to go. (Do not involvethePresident or he is likelyto be sympathetic, less necessary i.e., unlesshe has a problem thismay solve.) E. If seekinga change in policy,plot the action path fromthereto changesin actions. F. Considerforeach path who will have the action.(Is thereany path in which I will have the action?) G. Specify the formalactionswhich are necessary.
cient.
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H. What resources do I have to move actionalong each path withsuccess? (Re-judge afterconsidering tactics.) Relative advantagesof each path. I. How will resources expended to get to one way-station outcome affect ability to get to further stations? information will help? Can I get it? At whatcost? J. What additional
III. Framing tactics-maneuvers and arguments-tomove along a path

A. Identification of the participants and theirinterests, includingthose beyondtheexecutive branch. i. Who will inevitably be involvedaccording to the rulesof the game? 2. Who mightseek to play but could be excluded? 3. Who mightnot seek to play but could be brought in? what 4. What are the likelyinterests of the variousparticipants, the stakes? faceof theissue will theysee,how will theydefine Considerorganization, personal,political,and nationalinterests. 5. Who are naturalallies,unappeasableopponents, neutrals who mightbe converted to support, or opponentswho mightbe converted to neutrality? B. How can I lead a participant to see thatthe outcomesI desireare in his interest as he sees it? C. How can I changethe situation to have an outcomeconflicting less as theysee them? (or not at all) with participants' interests D. Do I have the resources forthispurpose?If not,can I get others to use theirs? E. What specific maneuvers should I use at what stages? F. What arguments shouldI use: On a discriminatory basis? G. If I must get a large organizationto change its behavior, I must consider the interests, and programs standard operating procedures, of thatorganization. H. Should I tryto bring in playersoutside the executivebranch? If so, how? I. How can I tell how well I am doing?
2.
i.
In general?
IV. Gauging costsand benefits A. Reconsiderall phases fromtime to time. Specifically: i. How high up should one seek a decision? 2. How should the decisionsoughtrelateto the change desired, i.e.,shouldit be a decisionto changepolicy, to changepatterns of action, or to take a singleparticular new step (or to stopan on-goingaction)? 3. By what means will the initial decision which is soughtbe converted into the desiredaction?
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B. Plan of action. and finaloutcome i. How to move the actionto the way-station desired. and arguments to use on or with the other 2. What maneuvers 3. A time sequence. duplicated by participants is thisprocessconsciously C. To whatextent more likelyto plan than seekinga change? Are some participants others?To plan effectively? outcomesand routeactionmade? D. How is the choiceof way-station
participants.

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Trustees of Princeton University

A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications

affected oftherealworldimportantly of states by theactions limited

in are outcomes-that dearereally interested is,selectively and analysts

whatmost offoreign about participants In thinking affairs, problems

WorldPolitics, xxv (October1972).

Ibid. 18 Robert Thirteen Days (New York i969), Kennedy,

Pearl Harbor (Stanford See Roberta Wohlstetter,

attack on the offshore island of Quemoy in I958 that the fall of

of thebudgetary process have a substantial impacton theformation of forceposture."

Schlesinger (fn. 6), and

Schlesinger, op. cit.

39Ernest May, unpublishedpaper.

III. Framing tactics-maneuvers and arguments-tomove along a path

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