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Unpublished boyle papers relating to scientific method.II

Richard S. Westfall M.A. Ph.D.
a a

State University of Iowa Published online: 02 Jun 2006.

To cite this article: Richard S. Westfall M.A. Ph.D. (1956) Unpublished boyle papers relating to scientific method.II, Annals of Science, 12:2, 103-117, DOI: 10.1080/00033795600200086 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033795600200086

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Unpublished Boyle Po/2~ra Relating to Scientific Method.~iI

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UNPUBLISHED

BOYLE P A P E R S R E L A T I N G TO SCIENTIFIC METHOD.--II.

By J~C~AR~ S. WEST~ALL,M.A., P h . D ,

A~sistant Professor of Histo.ry, State University of Iowa.

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THE three papers from the Royal Society's Collection of Robert Boyle's manuscripts do more than illuminate his concept of scientific method ; they serve also as a commentary on other intellectual problems of the seventeenth century. The growth of modern science was more than a rejection of what, mistakenly or not, the early modern scientists took to be the method of scholastic science ; a full scale intellectual revolution against a prevailing tradition, it inevitably drew other questions into the discussion of method. The battle of the ancients and the moderns, the controversy over tlie validity of ancient authority which raged through the seventeenth century, could not be ignored in a paper on method. When Boyle considered the roles of reason and sense in the pursuit of truth, he included a third possible source of conviction beside those t w o - authority. In words which repeated the judgments of Bacon and Galileo and echoed the sentiments of every important scientist of the century, words which indeed expressed the necessary conditioil for scientific progress, Boyle bluntly rejected the claims of authority : " That too great a Reverence for Authority is prejudicial to Philosophy." And again: " That the great Reverence usually given to humane authority is undeserved." Authority ought not to take precedence either over experience or over reason. Boyle's dismissgl of authority to embrace, in effect, the conclnsions of experimental investigations was one facet of the vitro1T that science won for the moderns in their seventeenth-century struggle with the ancients. Without explicitly naming Aristotle, Boyle extended his repudiation of authority into a detailed condemnation of the Stagirite. His requisites of a good hypothesis were a catalogue of Aristotle's sins as seen b y an adherent to the mechanical philosophy. A hypothesis must be intelligible, must contain nothing manifestly false, must suppose nothing unintelligible or absurd, must be consistent. The requirements seem to be the very minimum of gny Serious t h e o r y ; they seem to be so obvious as scarcely to need mention. Yet the scientists of the seventeenth century charged that Aristotelian philosophy was lacking in all of them. As the complaint, which echoed throughout the scientific literature of' the age,

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s u m m a r i z e d t h e i n d i c t m e n t , Aristotle was unintelligble ~. Such was t h e b u r d e n of B o y l e ' s a r g u m e n t in t h e Excellency and G~'ounds of the Co,rFascular or Mechanical Philosophy; the m e c h a n i c a l p h i l o s o p h y gave an intelligible a c c o u n t of p h e n o m e n a , while the Aristotelian p h i l o s o p h y did not. " T h e Schoohnen ", Boyle wrote, " h a v e indeed created a n o t i o n a l world, b u t n o t for all t h a t , p r e s e n t e d us a n intelligible one . . . . ,, 23 H e c o n d e m n e d Aristotle's conception of qualities as one " which does, 1 confess, a p p e a r to me to be either unintelligible or m a n i f e s t l y contradietious " 24. Some peripatetic controversies, he declared, were so fl'ivolous t h a t t h e y did n o t deserve a n y s t u d y w h a t e v e r . For an attentive reader needs not be much conversant with the writing.~ of the modern Peripateticks about such subjects as substantial forms, generation, corruption, &c. to take notice, that it is their custom, when they find themselves distressed by a solid argument, to endeavor to elude it by some pitiful distinction or other ; which is usually so groundless, and so unintelligible, or so nugatory, and so impertinent to the subject, or at least so insufficient for the purpose it is alledged for, that to vouchsafe it a solicitous confutation might question a writer's judgment with intelligent readers; who by such insignificant distinctions are satisfied of nothing so much, as that the framers of them had rather say (that which indeed amounts to) nothing, than not to seem to say something.2 To be intelligible, on t h e o t h e r hand, was to be meehanieM ; for as Boyle s a i d , " m e n do so easily u n d e r s t a n d one-anothers meaning, w h e n t h e y t a l k of local motion, rest, bigness, shape, order, situation, a n d e o n t e x t u r e of m a t e r i a l substances ; a n d these principles do afford such clear accounts of those things, t h a t are r i g h t l y deduced f r o m t h e m only, t h a t e v e n those P e r i p a t e t i c k s or chymists, t h a t m a i n t a i n other principles, acquiesce in explications m a d e b y these, w h e n t h e y can be h a d . . . " 26 I n like to m a n n e r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e s e v e n t e e n t h v o l u m e of t h e Philosophical Transactions asserts t h a t in n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h e m i n d is unable appreh e n d t h a t " w h e r e o f it has n o t in some sense a Meehanieal Conception " ; for [the introduction continues] this knowledge entering wholly by the senses, whose objects only are bodies, whereof their Organs have the perception, but from the Magnitude, Figure, Situation, and Motion of
~ I n t h e Christict~, Virt~toso Boyle defined t h e charge of unintelligibility w h i c h he h a d hm'led at t h e Aristotelian p h i l o s o p h y tbr years. " B y t h e w o r d . . , inconceivable, or u~intelligible, m ~ y be u n d e r s t o o d s u c h a t h i n g as we c a n n o t f r a m e a n idea or conception of, t h a t is no~ either self-destructive (as h a v i n g one p a r t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h another) ; or else, clearly r e p u g n a n t to s o m e m a n i t ~ s t a n d acknowledged t r u t h . . . ' . " (ibid., vi, 693.) Boyle h a s g r o u p e d t h e a n t i t h e s e s of several of his criteria o f h y p o t h e s e s u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of ' unintelligible '. .,a R o y a l Society, B o S e .P~t,'t)erx, I X , f 65. 2~ :Boyle, Wor~s, I I I , 17. ',.a 1bid., I I I , 8. 26 Ybid., IV, 69.

Unpublished Boyle Papers Relating to Scientific Method.

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them which are mechanically to be considered, or we come short of a Satisfactory Information, it follows that Number, Weight, and Measure, must be applied to analizc the Problems of Nature by which they were compounded.2v The scientists of the seventeenth century fully realized t h a t t h e y were participating in an intellectual revolution, but t h e y did not fully comprehend the nature of the revolution. In demanding mechanical explanations, t h e y did not completely understand that they were forsaking the investigation of the ultimate cause of being in order to learn the proximate causes of phenomena. T h e y found Aristotelian science unintelligible largely because t h e y were seeking different ends, and the goal of their science was reflected in their method. Thus the requisites of a good hypothesis in Boyle's eyes were meant to remedy what he considered to be the deficiencies of Aristotelian science. When Boyle demanded that a good hypothesis also be consistent with the phenomena of nature, he was voicing another major complaint against the Aristotelian philosophy. The Peripatetics, according to the indictment of the seventeenth-century scientists, had observed too few particulars and yet had not hesitated to vault to the loftiest generalizations. A chant of protest rose against the insubstantiality of Aristotelian science, a constantly repeated judgment t h a t it consisted only of e m p t y verbosities. Accompanying the protest was ~he demand for a ' real ' philosophy, t h a t is, for a philosophy founded on n~ture herself and not on the minds of men. The Peripatetic discourses, Boyle declared, g i v e " but a specious Theory ofChymeras or N o n - E n t i t i e s . . . " ~s Their explanations consist " much more of logical and metaphysical notions and niceties than of physical observations and r e a s o n i n g s . . . " ~9 The charge t h a t the Aristotclian philosophy contained ' metaphysical ' notions and overly subtle distinctions instead o f ' r e a l ' descriptions of nature, t h a t it was concerned only with words instead of with things, fitted the judgment of the ' mechanical philosophers ' so well t h a t t h e y made and repeated it with little variation. Thus Boyle declared again in the same discourse t h a t Aristotelian arguments " are rather metaphysical or logical, than grounded upon the principles and phaenomena of nature, and respect rather words than things . . . " 80. They reminded him, he remarked in another place, of a room in Leyden with a lens in one wall. When the room was dark, the lens east a good picture of the town's buildings on the opposite wall ; but the image disappeared when light was let in. So it ~ Cited in Charles lZiehard IVeld, A Histor}! of the l~oya7, Society, London, 1848, i, 326-327. ~sRoyal Society,Boyle Papers, VII, ff 199-200. 29Boyle, Works, II~, 4. aoIbid., III, 40.

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lCiehard S. Westfall on

the

was with Aristotelian theories. " F o r if b u t ~ full light of new experi:ments and observations be freely let in upon them, the b e a u t y of those (delightfnl, b u t fantastical) structures, does i m m e d i a t e l y vanish." 31 The same protest had m o v e d Bacon earlier when he condemned the dogmas of philosophers, calling t h e m Idols of the T h e a t r e because " all the received systems are but so m a n y stage-pl~ys, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion " 32. Hooke, among others, repeated th,e c o n d e m n a t i o n in the preface to his Micrographia, and Glanvill sounded the t h e m e in his Vanity of Dogmatizing.

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That the Aristotelian Philosophy :is an huddle o~' words and terms insignificant, [Glanvill wrote] hath been the censure of the wisest: And that both its Basis and Superstructure are Chimaerical, cannot be unobserv'd by them, that knew it, and are free to judge it. 'Tis a Philosophy, that makes most accurate Inspections into the Creatures of the Brain; and gives the exactest Topography of the Extramundane spaces . . . . ' What a number of words here have nothing answering them ? and as many are imposed ~t random . . . . Now hence the genuine Ideas of the Mind are adulterate ; and the Things themselves lost in a crowd of Names, anti Intentional nothings. Thus these Verbosities do emasculate the Understanding; and render it slight and frivolous, as its objects. 33 T h e philosophical revolution of the sevel~teenth c e n t u r y was so closely allied to the methodologica] revolution t h a t the eomlnon complaints against the Aristotelian philosophy could not be eliminated from a p a p e r on scien$ifie method. The one presupposed the other ; and both alike, t:he denunciation of Aristotle and the d e m a n d t h a t seiellee be founded more securely upon observations, expressed the search for a science t h a t would bestow the power to control n a t u r e upon mankind. H o w e v e r vigorous the repudiation of Aristotle, early m o d e r n science found t h a t it could neither escape wholly fl'om his influence nor progress intellectually w i t h o u t it. Once again Boyle's papers reflect the experie1~ce of the scientific m o v e m e n t as a whole. An epistemology t h a t claimed to derive knowledge from observations could not d e n y the heritage of Aristotle. While Boyle's I0~pers denounce the Aristotelian philosophy for not being ibunded upon sufficient observations, t h e y also reveal the influence of Aristotle's analysis of sense perception, l~articul~rly one of the prop o s i t i o n s - - " T h a t Sense is not lightly to be distrusted in its positive Informations, when the Organ being well qualified, 'tis conversant a b o u t its proper Objects " - - b e s p e a k s the debt t h a t the scientific m e t h o d owed to the philosopher whom the scientists denounced so roundly.
:~l .lbid., I, 302. :~ Bacon, Works, V l [ I , 78. ~3 J o s e p h Glanvill, The :Vanity of Dogmatizing, LolJdon, 1661, 150-[ 51.

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As deeply influential was Aristotle's doctrine that a science should consist of necessary demonstrations through causes. Among the continental thinkers Mersenne and Gassend rejected the notion t h a t human science can discover necessary truths and itlsisted instead t h a t its only goal is hypotheses that save the phenomena. Against ~ersenne and Gassend was ranged the powerihl influence of Descartes and, in England, Bacon; English scientists followed the lead of Descartes and Bacon ~lmost unanimously. To English scientists the conclusions of scie~cc, fitted into the fl'amework of the mechanical philosophy, represented metaphysical trUth. In this case Boyle was somewhat of an exception ill ~hat he seemed to waver, sometimes insisting that the new science did rest on necessary demonstrations, sometimes treating it as no more than hypothesis. On the one hand he pointed out that scientific theories had been induced from a limited number of observations, t h a t they were valid only for those observations, and that ~mw observations might require them to be changed. Boyle believed tha~ men ought to collect an adequate number of observations betbre they ventured to construct hypotheses. " And, [he added] . . . . l would have such kind of superstructures looked upon only as temporary ones; which though they m a y be preferred before any others, as being the least imperi~ct, or, if you please, the best in their khld we yet have, yet are they not entirely to be acquiesced in, as absolutely perfect, or uneapable of improving alteration." 3~ Boyle used the word ' hypothesis ' continually throughout his writings whenever he referred to scientific theories ; and when he spoke of the ' atomic hypothesis ' or the ' mechanical hypothesis ', he seemed to mean ~hat he did not impute any metaphysical necessity to his philosophy. Yet there was another element in Boyle's thought that struggled ~gainst the notion of hypothesis. However often he might refer to the ~tomic or mechanical ' hypothesis ', Boyle never doubted tha~ it was the true description of n~ture. To him it was ~mt just a possible system which saved the phenomena ; it was the one true philosophy. The two eo~lflicting tendencies strain against each o~her throughoul hi s writings. A discussion of the mechanical origin of qualities furnishes a typie~l example. Boyle explained that the discussion contained nothing about substantial forms because he was not trying to prove that qualities did not arise from substantial tbrms. But since, [he conthmcd] in my explications of qualities, I pretend only, that they may be explicated by mechanical principles, withou~ enquiring, whether they are explicable by any other; that, which [ need to prove, is, not that mechanical principles are the lmcessary and only things, whereby qualities may be explained, but that probably they will be tbund sufficient tbr ~heir explication. And since these a.re
~ Boyle, Wark~, I, 303.

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confessedly more manifest and more intelligible, than substantial forms and other scholastic entities (if I may so call them) it is obvious, what the consequence wilt be of our not being obliged to have recourse to things, whose existence is very disputable, and their nature very obscure.:~ T h e two sentences speak to c o n t r a r y purposes. I n the first the mechanical philosophy is just a convenient e x p l a n a t i o n which answers to the phenom e n a ; in the second the alternative is too ridiculous to be discussed. This internM contradiction pervades Boyle's w o r k s : all scientific conclusions are hypotheses, b u t the mechanical philosophy is ' reM ' and the Aristotelian philosophy fantastic. H e claimed, for example, t h a t meehanieM principles are so universal and applicable to so m a n y things t h a t t h e y are " fitted to include . . . a n y other hypothesis, t h a t is founded in nature, as far as it is so " Mechanical principles can explain the operation of a n y corporeal agent, " h o w subtil, or diffused, or active soever it be, t h a t can be solidly p r o v e d to be really existent in nature, by what n a m e soever it be called or disguised " aG. I n the Sceptical Chy~nist Boyle denied ind i g n a n t l y t h a t he was a sceptic, despite the n a m e of his book. " I do n o t with the true Sceptieks ", he asserted, " propose doubts to persuade men, t h a t all things are doubtful and will ever remain so (at least) to h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g s ; b u t I propose doubts not only with design, b u t with hope, of being at length freed from t h e m b y the a t t a i n m e n t of u n d o u b t e d t r u t h ; which I seek, t h a t I m a y find it . . . . ,, a7 Boyle wove b o t h the conflicting strains into the paper on hypotheses. W h e n he laid down the requirements t h a t an hypothesis be ' fit & sufficient to Explicate the P h e n o m e n a ', t h a t it not contradict other phenom e n a or manifest physical t r u t h , and t h a t it guide the way to f u r t h e r experimentation, he m e a n t hypothesis ' in his usual sense of provisional supposition. B u t when he suggested t h a t an ' e x c e l l e n t ' hypothesis " be not Precarious, but have sufficient Grounds in y n a t u r e of ye Thing it self, or at lest be well r e c o m m e n d e d b y some Auxiliary Proofs ", and t h a t it be the only hypothesis t h a t can explain the phenomena, he d e a r l y had something more in mind. E v e n in a p~per defining the requisites of an hypothesis Boyle revealed the influence of the Aristotelian heritage, the concept t h a t a science should be more t h a n possible hypotheses, t h a t it should be a system of t r u t h d e m o n s t r a t e d t h r o u g h necessary causes. Boyle's papers reflected even the problems t h a t m o d e r n science raised for religion. In an age when scientific progress was helping to build confidence in h u m a n reason, when science was throwing off reliance on a u t h o r i t y , when increased knowledge of n a t u r a l agents was calling miracles into question, some a t t e m p t to define the spheres of scientific and religious
~ 1bid., "*~ I b i d . , 8, I b i d . ,

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IV, 232. IV, 72-73. I, 591.

My italics.

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t r u t h h a d to be made. i n effect this was to decide if h u m a n reason can reach valid religious conclusions. Several scientists e x a m i n e d the question extensively ; a n d none of t h e m discussed it more t h o r o u g h l y t h a n Boyle. One of the propositions on sense and r e a s o n - - " T h a t as to some things, even in N a t u r a l Philosophy, 'tis disputable w h e t h e r Reason be able to c o m p r e h e n d and judge t h e m " - - r e p e a t e d the f u n d a m e n t M element of Boyle's analysis of faith and reason. On the one hand Boyle did n o t distrust h u m a n reasom H e believed in n a t u r a l science ; he believed in the ability of n a t u r a l science to reveal the Creator t h r o u g h the creation ; and therefore he believed in the c a p a c i t y of h u m a u reason to discover the f u n d a m e n t a l t r u t h s of natural religion. On the other hand, as a d e v o u t Christian concerned to defend the Biblical revelation, Boyle also insisted t h a t there are definite limits b e y o n d which reason is not competent. W e men, Boyle pronounced, " mistake and flatter h u m a n nature too much, when we t h i n k our faculties of u n d e r s t a n d i n g so mfiimited, both in point of capacity and of extent, and so free and unprepossest, as m a n y philosophers seem to suppose ", We are finite beings, created with those cap~eities alone which God determined to give us. " I t seems not therefore unreasonable to think, b o t h t h a t God has made our faculties so limited, t h a t in our present mortM condition there should be some objects b e y o n d the comprehension of our intellects ; t h a t is, t h a t some of his creatures should not be able perfectly t o u n d e r s t a n d some others, ~nd yet t h a t he has given us light enough to perceive, t h a t we cannot a t t a i n a clear and full knowledge of t h e m . " ss Boyle's purpose in discussing things above r e , s o n was, of eom:se, entirely religious. His t h e o r y justified the necessity of the Biblical revelation and defended Christian doctrines t h a t are above reason from the charge of being impossible. To make his argum e n t more compelling he liked t o remind his readers t h a t naturM philosophy as well as religion t o u c h e d on things above reason. The ultimate n a t u r e of m a t t e r is b e y o n d h u m a n comprehension ; we cannot understand infinity ; we cannot u n d e r s t a n d how b o d y and soul interact. I n a word, h u m a n reason is not the ultimate s t a n d a r d of t r u t h . The proposition asserting reason's limitation is ~ s t a t e m e n t of Boyle's formula tbr reconciling Christianity with science. The analysis of things above reason and the conclusion t h a t the h u m a n intellect is limited were i m p o r t a n t for Boyle's conception of science. I f m a n is unable to know things such as the u l t i m a t e nature of matter, he can never reach the level of necessary demonstrations in n a t u r a l science. I t was typical of Boyle t h a t his most vigorous assertions of h u m a n limitations occurred in his religious writings. Decidedly an advocate, he gave his entire support to w h a t e v e r cause he was arguing, so t h a t his
'~s I b i d . , IV, 410.

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emphasis in one work often contradicts that in another. When he was denouncing the Aristotelian philosophy, Boyle had no doubt of' the necessary t r u t h of the mechanical philosophy, while he was never more sure of the limitations of human understanding than when he was defending religious truths above reason. Another aspect of the seventeenth-century scientist's religious attitude appears in the note that heads Boyle's essay oll the atomic philosophy-" T h e s e Papers are without fayle to be burn't " His exact reason for wishing to have the essay burned cannot be known, of course. Since the instructions were not carried out,, the note m a y have been a mere whim with no real meaning. However, its implication, t h a t Boyle did not care t o be known as an atomist, recalls the feeling of uneasiness, shared by Boyle and his contemporaries, about the consequences that atomism might hold fo~' religion. Atomism, that is to say Epicureanism, even Hobbism, was generally supposed to be associated with atheism. No one cared to be known as an atheist in seventeenth-century England. Boyle never overcame the uneasiness t h a t the instructions for burning suggest. Although he quickly summoned courage to embrace the philosopi~y openly, he felt obliged over a period of forty years to prove and reprove that, contrary to popular belief, atomism was actually the support of Christianity. Even in death he carried on the battle through the lectures established by his will to combat atheism. In the same spirit Walter Charleton prefaced his translation of Epicurus's Morals with an embarr~ssingly humble repudation of Epicnrus's less wholesome ideas, while nearly every advocate of" the atomic philosophy published at least one discourse demonstrating J~s support of' Christianity. The purpose of Boyle and the other atomists was not merely to avoid the suspicion of heresy in an iutolerant age. They were writing to salve their own consciences as well, to quiet their fear t h a t less devout men than themselves might draw the wrong conclusions from the atomic philosophy. " These Papers are without fayle to be burn't "---the note seems to preface the long discussion of science and religion, the protracted soul-searctdng of m a n y English scientists who earnestly sought to reconcile their science with their religion in the latter half of the seventeenth century. The unpublistmd manuscripts from the Boyle 1)a2~ers do more than illuminate Boyle's early conversion to atomism and illustr~te tfis grasp of the experimental method. They serve also as a condensed commentary ou the principM themes of Boyle's intellectual life--his insistence on experimental confirmation of theories, but also his realization that only reason can guide experimentation and interpret observations, his acceptance of the atomic or mechanical philosophy and repudiation of Aristotle, and finally his devotion to Christianity which he fully believed to be i , harmony with the new natural science. And in epitomizing Boyle the

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papers become as well an image of the age, when an exciting transformation of a great intellectual tradition was in progress, and a paper on

method could not refrain from touching the other major questions of the (lay. [Of ye Atomicall Philosphy] a9
These Papers are without fayle to be burn't The Atomicalt Philosophy invented or brought into request by Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus & their Contemporaries, the since the inundation of Barbarians & Barbarisme expell'd out of the Roman world all [the] but the casually [a] escaping Peripatetieke Philosophy, it have been either wholly ignor'd in the European Schooles or mention'd there but as an exploded Systeme of Absurdities 40 yet in our lesse partial & more inquisitive times it is so luckyly 41 reviv'd & so skillfully celebrated in divers parts of Europe by the learned pens of Gassendus, Magnenus, Des Cartes 4~ & his disciples our deservedly famous Countryman S ~'Kenelme
:~'~g o y a ! Society, .Boyle Papers, X X V i , ff 162-163. Tile title is crossed out. A b o v e it arc t w o o t h e r words, also crossed o u t - - ' E s s a y ' followed b y wha~ appears, u n d e r the lines m a r k i u g it out, to be ' t h e ', a l t h o u g h t h e two w o r d s t o g e t h e r m a k e no se~'.se. I n t h e t r a n s c r i p t I h a v e b r a c k e t e d w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s t h a t Boyle crossed out. ~o Cfi, B a c o n , N o w t m O~'gannn~ : " B u t in t h e t i m e s w h i c h followed [' t h e t i m e s e~ Cicero a n d s u b s e q u e n t a g e s . . . ' l, w h e n on t h e i n u n d a t i o n of b a r b a r i a n s into t h e R o m a n empire h u m a u l e a r n i n g h a d suffered shipwreek, t h e n t h e s y s t e m s of Aristotle a n d Plato, like p l a n k s of lighter a n d less solid m a t e r i a l , floated on t h e w a v e s o f t i m e s , a n d were p r e s e r v e d " ( Works, V I I I , 108). I n t h e Excellency of Theology Boyle describe d how, a f t e r Aristotle h a d r e d u c e d p h y s i c s to a k i n d of s y s t e m , " t h e r e p u t a t i o n , t h a t his great p u p i l A l e x a n d e r , as well as his l e a r n i n g gave h i m ; t h e easiness of t h e w a y he p r o p o s e d to t h e a t t a i n m e n t of n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y ; t h e good luck his writings h a d to s u r v i v e t h o s e of D e m o c r i t u s , a n d a l m o s t all t h e rest of t h e Corpuseularians, w h e n Charles t h e Great b e g a n to establish l e a r n i n g in E u r o p e : these, I say, a n d s o m e o t h e r l u c k y accidents, t h a t concurred, did for a b o u t s e v e n or eight h u n d r e d y e a r s t o g e t h e r , m a k e t h e Corpuseularian p h i l o s o p h y n o t ~mly be jostled, b u t e v e n exploded o u t o f the schools b y t h e P e r i p a t e t i c k " ( Works, I V , 57). ~ i.e., successfully. " I m u s t m a k e bold to try, w h e t h e r y o u c a n as luckily a n s w e r y o u r o w n a r g u m e n t s , as t h o s e o f y o u r m l t a g o ~ i s t s " (ibid., I, 578). ' L u c k i l y ' s e e m s to h a v e m e a n t ' successfully ' as m u c h in t h e sense of ' skilfully ' as in t h e sense of ' f o r t u i t o u s l y . ' Boyle, for instance, apologized once for n o t p e r f o r m i n g his e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h t h e most, precise i n s t r u m e n t s , b u t he s u g g e s t e d t h a t others, ' t h a t are m o r e l u c k y at c o n t r i v a n c e s ' m i g h t later do t h e m m o r e a c c u r a t e l y (ibid., I I I , 177). ~e Boyle 1-aaintained t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e a t o m i c a l a n d t h e C a r t e s i a n h y p o t h o ~ s differed in s o m e m a t e r i a l points, " y e t in opposition to t h e P e r i p a t e t i c a n d o t h e r v u l g a r doctrines t h e y m i g h t be looked u p o n as one p h i l o s o p h y ; for t h e y agree w i t h one m~other, a n d differ f r o m t h e schools in t h i s g r a n d a n d f u n d a m e n t a l point, t h a t n o t only t h e y t a k e care t e explicate t h i n g s intelligibly ; b u t t h a t w h e r e a s t h o s e o t h e r philosophers give o n l y u general a n d superficial aceotmt of t h e p h a e n o m e n a o f n a t u r e . . , b o t h t h e Cartesians a n d t h e A t o m i s t s explicate t h e s a m e p h a e n o m e n a b y little bodies v a r i o u s l y figured a n d m o v e d " . B e c a u s e " b o t h p a r t i e s agree in d e d u c i n g all t h e p h a e n o m e n a o f n a t u r e from m a t t e r a n t !

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])igby ,~a & many othea' writers especially those that handle magl:eticall & eleetrieM1 operations that it is now growne too considerable to be any longer laugh't at, & considerable enough to deserve a serious enquiry. The Atomists seeme not without reason to complaine that the same envy which mov'd Aristotle to represent the Placits 4~ of his preeeders under a disadvantageous [if not palpably injmious] notion as very injuriously represented the opinions of Democritus & Epicurus as if b y Atomes they understood those Nathematicall points which being suppos'd absolutly indivisible & without any quantity can [by noe number or coaeerration] not consequently become constituent parts of a body nor b y any number or coacervation make up anything [endow'd with] consisting of the three dimensions whereas b y Atoms the Assertors of them understand not indivisible or MathematicM1 points which are so void of quantity that the subtle rasor of Imagination it selfe cannot dissect them but minima Naturalia or the smallest particles of bodyes which they call A t o m e s not because they cannot be suppos'd to be divided into yet smaller parts (tbr they allow them both quantity & figure as wee shall see anon ~5) but because tho they m a y be further divided b y Imagination yet they cannot by Nature, which not being able in her resolutions of Naturall bodyes to proceed ad infinitum must necessarily stop somewhere & have some bodyes which shee can possibly hoe further subdivide & which therefore may be justly termed Atomes. The Hypotheses on which the Moderne Theory of Atomes is superstrueted seeme to have divers of them more of NovMty then Absurdity [Atomes] For first that there are Atomes in [that] the notion [new] freshly given of them seems very probable [since] not only because as wee just now observ'd naturenot [be] being able in her resolutions endlesly to subdivide by the last subdivisions shee can make must necessarily constitute Atomes, but because most of the Phenomena of Nature doe seeme [much] to [countenance] [evince] evince t!e being of Atomes by seeming to be
local m o t i o n " they m a y be considered as ' one philosophy '. " W h i c h because it explicates things b y corpuscles, or m i n u t e bodies, m a y (not v e r y unfitly) be called corpuscular . . . . " (ibid., I, 355-356). Gassend published De vita et ~noribus Epic~ri in I647 and Syntagn~a philosophiae Epic,t~r,i in 1649. Descartes's Principles of Philosophy appeared in 1644. Jean-Chrysost6me Magnen, b o r n early in the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y in Yranehe-Comt4, practised medicine in I t a l y and occupied the chair of philosophy at Pavia. I n 1646 he published Dernocrit~ts reviviscens, sive de atomis ; addita Dernoeriti vita et philosophia. aa Digby, Two Treatises : in the One of WMch, the Nature of Bodies ; in the Other, the

Nature of Man's Soul, Is Looked into : in Way of Discove'ry of the I,mnwrtality of Reasonable Souls, 1644.
44 I.e., opinions. ~5 :Either Boyle never finished the essay or [)art. of it has been lost~ for w h a t has survived does n o t discuss this point,

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productions of Atomes so & so qualified & dispos'd. In [most] similar 4~ bodyes [that are really such] (that are really such for wine milke &c. t h a t seeme so are not) 47 .there being constituted by Atomes is very probable since it is so that their particles are very small & of the same nature with the whole they compose, thus sylver being dissolv'd in Aqua fortis & t h a t Menstruum so well filter'd that the dissolv'd silver & it will both passe thorough Cap paper all the invisible particles of ye Metall which are so small that they hinder not the Diaphaneity of ye menstruum are yet each of them true silver as appeares by precipitating Propositions on Sense, I~eason, and Authority 45 That Arguments drawn from P~eason are preferrable to those drawn from Authority. That Topical Arguments th6 probable, ought not to make us either deny, or neglect Experience 49 That one of the usefullest Imployments of l~eason in Natural Philosophy is to devise apposite Experiments, and contrive the wayes of making them, and of Examining whether t h e y be well made 50 That as to some ~hings, even in Natural Philosophy, 'tis disputable whether I~eason be able to comprehend and judge them. That there are severall things presum'd to be taught us directly and immediately by Sense of wcn we yet owe the knowledg unto Reason. That the Organs of Sense are but the Instruments of I~eason in ye Investigation of Truth.
4~ i.e., homogeneous. Cf., T h e S c e p t i c a l C h y m i s t : "' . . . an element or principle o u g h t to be perfectly similar a n d homogeneous . . . . " ( W o r k s , I, 532). 47 The phrase in parentheses is a marginal insertion. 4s l~oyal Society, B o y l e P a p e r s , I X , f 25. The p a p e r has no n a m e on it. 4a Topical a r g u m e n t s , d r a w n from general m a x i m s , or as Aristotle p u t it, f r o m " opinions t h a t are generally accepted ", are distinguished from demonstrations, which s t a r t from true and p r i m a r y premises. This proposition was m e a n t as a repudiation of Scholastic dialectics. Cf., T h e C h r i s t i a n Virtuoso ; " :For those [the Scholastics], in the framing of their s y s t e m , make b u t little use of experience ; contenting themselves for the m o s t p a r t to e m p l o y bug few and obvious experiments, and vulgar traditions, usually uncertain, a n d oftentimes false ; and s u p e r s t r u c t i n g almost their whole physics u p o n a b s t r a c t e d reason ; b y which I m e a n the rational faculty, endowed w i t h its own congonit, or c o m m o n notions and ideas ; and w i t h p o p u l a r notices, that~ is, such as are c o m m o n a m o n g men, especially those t h a t are any thing learned " ( W o r k s , V, 513). '" Besides, the litigious philosophy o f the schools seldom furnishes its disciples w i t h b e t t e r t h a n dialectical or probable a r g u m e n t s , which are n o t proper, either fully to satisfy the person t h a t e m p l o y s t h e m , or leave his adversary w i t h o u t an answer, plausible at least, if not full as probable as the objection, u p o n which account, men, t h a t have more wit t h a n sincere love of t r u t h , will be able to dispute speciously enough, as long as t h e y h a v e a m i n d to do so " ( W o r k s , V, 523). ~o Cf., Bacon, N o w ~ m O r g a n u m : Sense alone is not to be t r u s t e d ; the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nature m u s t be aided b y experiments ' fit, mid apposite ' (Wor~s, V I I I , 83).

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That where/eason proceeds h.~.a due manner, upon true Met&physi~:Ml ~md ~qathematie~l grounds, its conclusions ~,re to be preferred to some of the Testimonies of Sense 51 That Sense is not lightly to be distrusted in its Positive interruptions when the Organ being well qrIMify'd, 'tis conversant about its proper ()bjects. That the Testimony of Sense is to be preferr'd to the Authority of Philosophers. That the well (Jircumst,~nc'd Testimony of Sense is to be preferr'd to any meer Hypothesis, or to Ratiocinations not grounded upon Sense, or either M~thematicM or Metaphysical Truths .~2 That numerous Observations of Sense ought to be diligently sought after and procured 53
51 Cf., Galileo : Salviatus, w h o s p e a k s for Galileo, declares t h a t he e m m e t " sufficiently a d m i r e t h e e m i n e n c e of t h o s e m e n ' s intelligence w h o h a v e received a n d h e l d it [the Copernican s y s t e m ] to be true, a n d w i t h t h e sprightliness o f l:hoir j u d g m e n t s offered s u c h violence to t h e i r own senses t h a t t h e y h a v e b e c n able ~o prefer tha~ w h i c h their reason d i c t a t e d to t h e m to w h a t sensible a p p e a r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t e d m o s t m a n i f e s t l y on t h e c o n t r a r y " (Dialogue on the O'rec~t Wco'Id Systegns, S a l u s b u r y t r a n s l a t i o n , Chicago, 1953, 341). ~ Cf., Galileo: " Do y o u question w h e t h e r Aristotle, h a d he b u t seen t h e n e w discoveries in h e a v e n , w o u l d l~ot h a v e c h a n g e d his opinions, a m e n d e d his books, a n d e m b r a c e d t h e m o r e sensible doctrine . . . . " Aristotle was n o t ~ m a n w h o preferred his own t e a c h i n g s " before t h e senses, before experience, a n d before ~ a t u r e herself " (ibid., t23-124). Also, T h e Ch.ristian Virtuoso : " A n d Aristotle himself, t h o u g h h e be accused to h a v e , p e r h a p s t h e first of all t h e ancien~ n a t u r a l i s t s , p e r v e r t e d p h y s i c s , b y w r e s t i n g t h e m [opinions] to a compliance w i t h logical a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l fancies ; y e t even he confesses, n o t o~dy ~hat in t h e science of n a t u r e , re~son o u g h t to c o m p o r t w i t h t h e p h a e n o m e n a . a n d t h e p h a e n o m e n a w i t h r e a s o n ; b u t t h a t to adhere to plausible ratiocinations, with t h e neglect of sensible observations, is a w e a k n e s s , or disease of m i n d " (Boyle, Works, V, 538). ~3 Cfl, Bacon, Descr~29tion of a N a t u r a l aq~.d Expeq'iv~ental H i s t o r y : " Meanwhile w h ~ t I h a v e often said I m u s t here e m p h a t i c a l l y r e p e a t ; t h a t if all t h e wits of all t h e ages h a d m e t or shall hereafter m e e t t o g e t h e r ; if t h e whole h u m a n race h a d applied or shall herc~!~:er a p p l y t h e m s e l v e s to philosophy, a n d t h e whole e a r t h h a d been or shall be n o t h i n g b u t a c a d e m i e s a n d colleges a n d schools of learned m e n ; still w i t h o u t a n a t u r a l a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l h i s t o r y s u c h as I a m going to prescribe, no progress w o r t h y o f t h e h u m a n race could h a v e been m a d e or can be m a d e in p h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e sciences. W h e r e a s on t h e o t h e r h a n d , let s/mh a h i s t o r y be once p r o v i d e d a n d well set forth, a n d let t h e r e be a d d e d to it s u c h auxiliary a n d light-giving e x p e r i m e n t s as in t h e v e r y course of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n will p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s or will h a v e to be f o u n d o u t ; a n d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of n a t u r e a n d of all sciences will be t h e work of a few y e a r s " ( W o r k s , V I I I , 354-355). Also N o v u m O r g a n u m : " ~ o w for g r o u n d s o f e x p e r i e n c e - - s i n c e to experience we m u s t c o m e - - w e h a v e as y e t h a d either n o n e or v e r y w e a k ones ; no search h a s b e e n m a d e to collect a store o f p a r t i c u l a r o b s e r v a t i o n s sufficient either in n u m b e r , or in kind, or in c e r t a i n t y , to i n f o r m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , or in a n y w a y a d e q u a t e . On t h e c o n t r a r y , m e n ef lem'ning, b u t e a s y w i t h a l a n d idle, h a v e t a k e n for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n or for t h e confirmation of t h e i r p h i l o s o p h y c e r t a i n t u r n o u t s a n d v a g u e f a m e s or airs of experience, a n d allowed to t h e s e t h e weight of lawful evidence . . . . Nothing d u l y i n v e s t i g a t e d , n o t h i n g verified, n o t h i n g c o u n t e d , weighed, or m e a s u r e d , is to be f o u n d in n a t u r a l h i s t o r y : a n d w h a t in o b s e r v a t i o n is loose a n d vag~le~ is in i n f o r m a t i o n deceptive a n d t r e a c h e r o u s " (ibid., V I I I , 133-134),

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That the negative Testimony of Sense ought not to be admitted wthout distinction gnd caution 54 That the Informations of Sense assisted and hightned by Instruments are usuMly preferrable to those of Sense Mone 55 That Artificial and design'd Experiments are usually more instructive than Obserwtions of n~tures spontaneous acting ss. That too gregt a Reverence for Authority is prejudicial to Philosophy. That the great Reverence usuMly given to humane Authority is undeserved. That Humane Authority ought not to be of force against either right Reason or Experience ~
s~ Although Boyle m a y have intended this proposition as a repudiation of B a c o n ' s n o t i o n of negative instances, he was p r o b a b l y t h i n k i n g of t h e Aristotelian teaehing t h a t all knowledge derives from iadividuM sense perceptions. According to this theory negative sense perceptions could not produce positive conceptions. T h u s in his essay Of the Positive or Privative Nature of Cold Boyle tried to explain h o w a mere privation of h e a t could make a positive impression on the senses (Works, IiI, 733-754). A Discourse of Things above Reason drew a distinction between distinct and confused conceptions : " To our confused, and often also to our inadequate conceptions, belong m a n y of those, t h a t m a y be called negative, which we are w o n t to employ, w h e n we speak of privations or negations, as blindness, ignorance, death, &e. We have a positive idea of things, t h a t are square a n d r o u n d , a n d black a n d white, and in short of other things, whose shape a n d colours m a k e t h e m the objects of our sight ; b u t when we say, ibr instance, t h a t a spirit or a n a t o m is invisible, those words are atteI~ded w i t h a negative conception, which is c o m m o n l y b u t d a r k and confused, because it is indefinite, and removes or lays aside those marks, b y which we are w o n t clearly to perceive a n d distinguish visible substances " (ibid., IV, 421). I n this context the notion of negative t e s t i m o n y of the senses was Mlied to Boyle's doctrine o f t h i n g s above reason, and the proposition appears to join the f o u r t h one in claiming theft some m ~ t t e r s transcend the scope of h u m a n understandhlg'. 5s 6~., H o o k e ' s s t a t e m e n t to the l~oyM Society, w h e n he displayed a new hydroseope, t h a t " his design was r a t h e r to improve a n d increase t h e dlstinguistfing faculties of t h e senses, n o t only in order to reduce these things, w h i c h are already sensible to o u r organs unassisted, to n u m b e r , weight, and moasm'e, b u t also in order to the en]arging the limits of their power, so as to be able to do the same things in regions o f m ~ t t e r hitherto inaccessible, impenetrable, a n d imperceptible b y the senses unassisted. Because this, as it enlarges t h e .emph'e of the senses, so it besieges a n d straitens the recesses of n a t u r e : a n d the use of those, well plied, t h o u g h b u t b y the h a n d s of the c o m m o n soldier, will in a short time force n a t u r e to field even the m o s t inaccessible fortress " ( T h o m a s Birch, The History oJ the Royal Society, London, 1756-7, I I I , 364). ss C~f., Bacon, The Great Insta'l*ration : " ]for t h e s u b t l e t y of e x p e r i m e n t s is far groe~tor t h a n t h a t of the sense itself, even w h e n assisted b y exquisite instrumelxtS ; s u c h experim e n t s , I mean, as are skilfully and artificially devised for t h e express purpose of determining the point in question " (Works, V i l e , 44). Boyle described experiments as operations " wherein n a t u r e is guided, a n d as it were, m a s t e r e d by art, t h a t so she m a y be m a d e t o a t t e s t the t r u t h of our doebrine . . . when she is, as it were, cited to m a k e her depositions b y the i n d u s t r y of m a n " (Works, I I I , 66). 57 Cf., Galileo : SMviatus assorts t h a t a u t h o r i t y m a y be decisive in law a n d other s u c h subjects. " B u t the conclusions of n~tural science are true a n d necessary, a n d the j u d g m e n t

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That Humane Testimony is of great and almost necessary use in NaturM Philosophy. That 'tis improper to urge or relye on Testimonys for matters, whose Truth or ]~lshood may be proved by manifest Reason or easy Experiment. That cited Testimonies ought to be considerately and candidly deliver'd, and for the most part in the Authors words, and if he be a writer w th reibrence to the allegation of the place whence y~ Testimony is taken 58 That many Testimonies are insufficient for want of moral Qualifications in him that gives them. That even of honest and sincere witnesses, the Testimony may be insu~iieient of[sic, obviously a mistake for ' if '] the m~tters of fact require Skill in the Relator ~9 The I~eqnisites of a Good Hy2othesis are 60 1. That it be Intelligible. 2. That it Contain Nothing Impossible or manifestly False. 3. That it Suppose not any thing yt is either Unintelligible, Impossible or Absurd. 4. That it be Consistent with it self.
of men has ~mthing to do with them, so t h a t . . , a m a n of ordinary wit, if b y good fbi'tune on the right side, m a y lay a t h o u s a n d :Demosthenes a n d a t h o u s a n d Aristotles at his foot. Therefore reject the hope t h a t there can be a n y m e n so m u c h more learned, read, and versed in a u t h o r s t h a n we, t h a t in spite of N a t u r e t h e y should be able to m a k e t h a t become true, which is false " (World Systeq~s, 63). Also Bacon, Now~.m Organu.~n : " Again, m e n have been kept back as b y a kind of e n c h a n t m e n t fl'om progress in the sciences b y reverence for antiquity, b y the a u t h o r i t y of m e n accounted great in philosophy . . . . I t is no wonder therefore if those e n c h a n t m e n t s of a n t i q u i t y and a u t h o r i t y a u d consent have so b o u n d u 1) m e n ' s powers t h a t they h a v e been m a d e i m p o t e n t (like persons bewitched) to a c c o m p a n y with the things of n a t u r e " (Worlcs, V I I I , 1 16-117). ~s i n the Sceptical Chymist Boyle lamented t h a t some e m h m n t writers, b o t h physicians al~d philosophers, had recently allowed themselves to be imposed upon, t h a t t h e y h a d published chemical experiments which t h e y could not have performed themselves since the experiments were false. '" A n d indeed, it were to be wished, t h a t now, t h a t those begirt to quote chymical experiments, t h a t are not themselves acquainted with chymical operations, m e n would leave off t h a t indefinite way of vouching, the chymists say this, or the c h y m i s t s aifirm that, ; a n d would rather, ibr each e x p e r i m e n t t h e y allege, n a m e the a u t h o r or authors, u p o n whose credit they relate it : for b y this m e a n s t h e y would secure themselves from tim suspicion of f a l s h o o d . . , and t h e y would leave tho~reader to judge of w h a t is fit for h i m to believe of w h a t is delivered, whilst t h e y employ not their own great n a m e s to cotnltenanco doubtful relations ; and t h e y will also do justice to the inventors or publishers of the true experiments, as well as u p o n the obtruders of false ones " (Works, I, 460). 50 I n discussing Descartes's thee .ry of comets, Boyle declared t h a t those w h o k n o w b y experience k n o w " h o w m u c h m o r e difficult it is,~t h a n m o s t m e n imagine, to m a k e observations a b o u t s u c h nice subjects, w i t h the exactness, t h a t is requisite for the building of a n u n d o u b t e d t h e o r y u p o n t h e m " (ibid,, IV, 42). 60 I~oyal Society, Boyle Papers, X X X V , n.p.

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5. That it [be] fit & Sufficient to Explicate the Phenomena, especially y" Chief. 6. That it be at lest Consistent with y~ rest of yOPhenomena it particularly relates to, & do not Contradict a n y other known Phenomena of Nature, or manifest Physical Truth 6~ The Qualities & Conditions of an Excellent Hypothesis are

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1. That it be not Precarious, but h~ve sufficient Grounds in y0 nature of ye Thing itself, or at least be well recommended by some Auxiliary Proofs ~2 2. That it be the Simplest of all the Good ones we ~re able to frame, at lest Containing nothing yt is Superfluous or Impertinent. 3. That it be ye only Hypothesis y t Can explicate yOPhenomena, or at les~ yt does explicate them so well. 4. That it enable a skilfull NaturMist to foretell future Phenomena, by their Congruity or Incongruity to it ; and especially the Events of such Expts as are aptly devised to Examine it ; as Things y t ought or ought not to be Consequent to it.
~z Boyle made a disthmtion between clear, distinct conceptions and confused, unclear o n e s - - " namely, t h a t of our conceptions o[ things, some are symmetrical (if I m a y so call them) or every w a y consistent, b y which T m e a n those t h a t have these t w o qualifications, the one, t h a t all the p a r t s are consistent a m o n g themselves, and t h e other, t h a t the entire idea is consistent w i t h all other t r u t h s ; a n d some are chimerical or asymmetrical, b y which I u n d e r s t a n d those, t h a t are either self-destroying b y the contrariety of t h e p a r t s ~hemselves t h e y are m a d e u p of', as if one should talk of a triangular square, or a sunshiny n i g h t ; or being e x t r a v a g a n t , lead to some manifest a b s u r d i t y , t h a t m a y be legitimately inferred from t h e m , or into inexixicable difficulties, or involve a real r e p u g n a n c y to some acknowledged t r u t h , or rule of reason " ( W o r k s , IV, 421.) 62 C~'., Bacon, N o w t m O r g a n u m : " For the induction w h i c h proceeds b y simple e n u m e r a tion is childish ; its conclusions are precarious, a n d exposed to peril from a contradictory instance ; a n d it generally decides on t o o small a n u m b e r of facts, a n d on those only which arc at h a n d " ( W o r k s , V I I I , 138).

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