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Fire & Gas System (FGS) Integrity Analysis

KENEXIS

Background
Fire&GasDetectionandSuppressionsystemsare criticalinstrumentation/controlsystems FGSSystemscanbeakeysafeguardusedtoreduce risktotolerablelevels
SafetyRisk EnvironmentalRisk AssetRisk(Commercial/Business)

Allcriticalinstrumentation/controlsystemsrequirea basisofsafetyforspecifyingadequateequipment designandfunctionaltestingrequirements


Option1:PrescriptiveBasisofSafety,NFPAstandards,etc. Option2:PerformanceBasis/RiskAssessment
Option2workswithCustomerCorporateRiskTolerancecriteria

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2

Typical FGS Components


Process

Input FGS Logic Solver Area Fire or Gas Detector

Output
IAS

SV

Safety valve

Detector(s)

Logic solver Programmable or non-Programmable

Final Element(s)

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Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

PFD concept is highly relevant to design of Fire and Gas System Functions However, component equipment failures are not the only consideration!

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Rules for Layers of Protection Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) MUST Completely Prevent Hazard More credit given to Hazard Prevention versus Mitigation Systems

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FGS Design & Analysis Challenges


WhenTryingtousetypicalRiskAnalysistechniques forcompliancewithISA84/IEC61511StandardforSIS
Fire&GassystemsMitigateConsequence TheyarenotPreventativesafeguards DetectorPlacementandCoveragecantbeignored UK/HSENorthSeadataindicatemorethan30%ofgas releasesarenotdetectedbyautomatedsystems FireandGasHazardsaregeneralinnature,difficultto characterizeincontextofLayersofProtectionAnalysis(LOPA)

Howtomakedecisionsabouttolerableriskwith respecttoFire&GasSystems? WhenisitappropriatetotakecreditforFireandGas detection/suppressioninthecontextofLOPA?

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6

LOPA works well for Hazard Prevention


5 0 3 4 5 6 7 4 SEVERITY - SAFETY 0 2 3 4 5 6

0 0

0 1

0 4

0 5

2 3 LIKELIHOOD

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TypicalRiskModelforLOPA
Based on QRA / Event Tree Analysis By definition: Only one branch results in hazard Hazard is a single event of definable magnitude, severity IPL = Independent Protection Layer

IPL1 Success S1 Initiating Event Occurs (Fi per yr)

Conditional Outcome No Hazard

IPL 2 Success Fail F1 S2 Fail F2 No Hazard IPL 3 Success S3 Fail F3 Hazard Occurs No Hazard

Fi * F1* F2*F3 = Hazard Frequency (per yr)

KENEXIS

SimplifiedRiskModelfor Fire&GasSystemIntegrityAnalysis
Detector Coverage S1 Hazard occurs (Fi per yr) FGS Effectiveness (PFD) S2 F2 Conditional Outcome Mitigated Hazard

Unmitigated Hazard F1

Fi * (F1 + S1* F2) = Unmitigated Hazard Frequency Fi * (S1 * S2) = Mitigated Hazard Frequency S1* S2 = Effectiveness of FGS Function

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SimplifiedRiskModelfor Fire&GasSystemIntegrityAnalysis
Hazardsofvaryingmagnitudeoccuronseveralbranches ofFGSeventtree Possiblehazardousoutcomesareofdifferentmagnitude, severity FGSdetectorcoverageandsafetyavailabilityare importantfactorsinoutcomes,buthavepracticallimits, especiallyondetectorcoverage. Initiatingeventsincludeleaks,rupturesduetocorrosion, erosion,externalimpact.TypicallynotincludedinLOPA. EffectivenessofFGSfinalelementactionsneedstobe considered.

KENEXIS

LOPA does not work well for Hazard Mitigation


5 0 3 4 5 6 7 4 SEVERITY - SAFETY 0 2 3 4 5 6

Unmitigated 1 Hazard

Mitigated 1 Hazard

0 0

0 1

0 4

0 5

2 3 LIKELIHOOD

- Multiple outcomes of same hazard scenario

KENEXIS

FGSIntegrityAnalysisGeneralApproach
1. 2. 3. 4.

UseaRiskModelthataccountsforboth MitigatedandUnmitigatedHazards SamelevelofanalysisasLOPA...butOptionalfullQRA CalibratetoRiskToleranceCriteria UseRiskModeltoEstablishPerformanceParameters forFGSDesign


Target:DetectorCoverage Target:FGSFunctionSafetyAvailability(PFDavg)

5.

Verifyperformancetargetshavebeenachieved
Achieved:DetectorCoverage>Target Achieved:FGSFunctionSafetyAvailability(PFDavg)>Target Note:QRA/safetycaseanalysisassumes probabilityvaluesfor DetectorCoverageandFGSAvailability FGSIntegrityAnalysisdoesnotassumeprobabilityvalues,it establishesdesigntargetsthataresubsequentlyverified

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FGSIntegrityAnalysisProcedure
1. 2. 3.

DefineFireHazardZonesandGasHazardZones ClassifyFire&GasZoneHazardRank DetermineFGSPerformanceRequirements


FireDetectorPlacementandPerformance FlammableGasDetectorPlacementandPerformance

4. 5. 6.

DetectorcoveragemappingandDetectorPlacement Detector/FGSPerformanceVerification ModificationofFGSdesign,asnecessarytoachieve performancetargets

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DefineFireHazardZones

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HazardZonesConsiderations
GroupSimilarEquipmenttogetherinZone Considerdifferentiatingzonesby:
Deck FGSsystemactions Segregationofhazards ClassifiedElectricalEquipment Specialoccupancies

SeparateZonesfordifferenthazards:
FlammableHazards(fireandcombustibleGas) ToxicHazards(H2S)

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ListofZones

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CategorizeZones
Zone Category AreaDefinition HydrocarbonPossessingArea,GeneralFire/ GasHazard Examples wellbay,production separation, gascompression, CombustibleLiquid Storage LubricationOilSystem AccommodationsModule ControlModule NonclassifiedElectrical Equipment GasTurbineandTurbine Enclosures ReboilerCombustionAir blower, H

N D E T V

NonHydrocarbonFireHazard GeneralOccupancy,NoHydrocarbonFire Hazard NonHydrocarbonSpecialEquipment Protection GasTurbineorEngineEnclosures CombustionAirIntake/VentilationAirIntakes

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CategorizeZonestodetermine ObjectivesofFGSIntegrityAnalysis
ZoneH(Hydrocarbon) andZoneN(Nonhydrocarbon)
AnalysisObjective:Determineadequacyof generalareacoverageofhydrocarbon/non hydrocarbonfireandgasdetectionsystems

ZoneD(GeneralOccupancy)
Conformancewithapplicable,prescriptive standards,NFPA72,EN54orequivalent

ZoneE,ZoneT,ZoneV (ProtectionofNonhazardousAreas)
AnalysisObjective:Determineadequacyof separationofzonefromotherhydrocarbon/ nonhydrocarbonfireorgashazards.

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FGSRiskModel
SemiQuantitative(SimilartoLOPA)versusFully QuantitativeRiskAnalysis(QRA) DesireaRiskModelthatissensitiveto:
DetectorCoverage FGSSystemProbabilityofFailureonDemand

AnalysisConsiderationsinclude:
AssessmentofHydrocarbonProcessingEquipment AssessmentofFireandGasConsequences AssessmentofReleaseLikelihood AssessmentofLevelofHumanOccupancyofZone AssessmentofProductionValueforProcess

KENEXIS

SelectFGSRiskMethod
Zone Category H H H N E T V HazardofConcern HydrocarbonFire CombustibleGas ToxicGas NonhydrocarbonFire AirintakeforSpecial Equipment CombustibleGasat AirIntake CombustibleGasat AirIntake PrimaryRisk AnalysisMethod SemiQuantitative SemiQuantitative Quantitative SemiQuantitative Quantitative (none) Quantitative (none) Quantitative AlternateRiskAnalysis Method Quantitative Quantitative (none) Quantitative (none)

Where no FGS is in place, then fully-quantitative method is used to determine if risk is acceptable without the benefit of any automated FGS.

KENEXIS

Hydrocarbonvs NonHydrocarbonZones
Step 1: Define Zone Category

Zone Category N or H ?

Use Prescriptive Standards

NO

YES

Step 2: Select Processing Unit

Step 3: Adjust For Occupancy

Step 4: Adjust For Production Rate

Step 5: Adjust For Confinement Criteria

KENEXIS

SemiQuantitativeMethod: AssignedGrades
Grade ExposureDefinition A HydrocarbonProcessing, HighExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, ModerateExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, LoworVeryLow Exposure

Hazard Grades assigned to Hydrocarbon Zones (fire and gas) and Non-Hydrocarbon Fire Zones Semi-Quantitative Method

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SemiQuantitativeMethod: AssignedGrades
Grade ExposureDefinition HazardRank (Risk) FGS Performance Targets HighCoverage VeryLowPFD Moderate Coverage LowPFD,SIL1 Min.Coverage LowPFD,SIL1 A HydrocarbonProcessing, HighRisk HighExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, MediumRisk ModerateExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, LowRisk LoworVeryLow Exposure

Semi-Quantitative Method

KENEXIS

SemiQuantitativeMethod: AssignedGrades
Grade ExposureDefinition HazardRank (Risk) 3+ FGS Performance Targets HighCoverage VeryLowPFD Moderate Coverage LowPFD,SIL1 Min.Coverage LowPFD,SIL1 A HydrocarbonProcessing, HighExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, ModerateExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, LoworVeryLow Exposure

1or2

Semi-Quantitative Method

KENEXIS

BaselineZoneHazardRank
ProcessingUnits ProductionWells WaterInjectionWells GasInjectionWells GasLiftWells ObservationcWells DisposalWells ProductionSeparation TestSeparation Launcher/Receiver ChemicalInjection (flamm) OilTransfer(pumping) ZoneHazard Rank 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ProcessingUnits GasCompression(<500psi) GasCompression(500 2500) GasCompression(>2500) FuelGas(<500psi) FuelGas(5002500psi) Sump/Disposal(Closed/ Open) FlareSystem NGLRecovery GasTurbine GlycolRegeneration ZoneHazard Rank 1 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1

Semi-Quantitative Method

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OccupancyAdjustment
Occupancy NUI=NormallyunmannedInstallation MannedInstallationAND Zone=<10%occupiedAND AdjacentZoneProtected[1] or<10%occupied MannedInstallationAND Zone=<10%occupiedAND AdjacentZoneNotProtected[1] or>10%occupied MannedInstallationAND Zone=neartocontinuousoccupancyOR AdjacentOccupiedZoneNotProtected[1] ZoneHazardRankAdjustment +0

+0

+1

+2

Semi-Quantitative Method

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ProductionAdjustment

ProductionRate(Oil/Gas) Oil<5000BPDandGas<20MMSCFD

ZoneHazardRankAdjustment 1(ifoccupancyadjustmentwas=0) +0(ifoccupancyadjustmentwas>0)

Oil5000 40,000BPDandGas20 150 MMSCFD Oil>40,000BPDorGas>150MMSCFD

+0

+1

Semi-Quantitative Method

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SpecialFactorsAdjustment
DeckType Grated Solid ZoneHazardRank Adjustment +0 +1

Semi-Quantitative Method

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HydrocarbonZones AssignedGrades
Grade ExposureDefinition HazardRank (Risk) 3+ FGS Performance Targets HighCoverage VeryLowPFD Moderate Coverage LowPFD,SIL1 Min.Coverage LowPFD,SIL1

HydrocarbonProcessing, HighExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, ModerateExposure HydrocarbonProcessing, LoworVeryLow Exposure

1or2

Semi-Quantitative Method

KENEXIS

FGSPerformanceTargets
FireGrade A B C GasGrade A B C FireDetectionCoverage 0.90 0.85 0.60 GasDetectionCoverage 0.90 0.85 0.60 FGSSafetyAvailability 0.97 0.90 0.90 FGSSafetyAvailability 0.97 0.90 0.90

Semi-Quantitative Method

KENEXIS

ApplicationFireGradeA HighExposure
(NotehighcoveragetargetsandFGSEffectivenessTargetsforGradeA)
FGS Effectiveness (PFD) S2 = 0.97 F2 = 0.03 High-SIL 1 Equivalent Effectiveness

Detector Coverage S1 = 0.90 Hazard occurs (Fi per yr)

Mitigated Hazard

Unmitigated Hazard F1 = 0.10

Fi * (F1 + S1* F2) = Unmitigated Hazard Frequency Fi * (S1 * S2) = Mitigated Hazard Frequency S1* S2 = Effectiveness of FGS Function

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ApplicationFireGradeB ModerateExposure
(NotelowercoveragetargetsandFGSEffectivenessTargetsallowedforGradeB)
FGS Effectiveness (PFD) S2 = 0.90 F2 = 0.10 SIL 1 Equivalent Effectiveness

Detector Coverage S1 = 0.85 Hazard occurs (Fi per yr)

Mitigated Hazard

Unmitigated Hazard F1 = 0.15

Fi * (F1 + S1* F2) = Unmitigated Hazard Frequency Fi * (S1 * S2) = Mitigated Hazard Frequency S1* S2 = Effectiveness of FGS Function

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ApplicationFireGradeC LowExposure
(NotelowercoveragetargetsandFGSEffectivenessTargetsallowedforGradeC)
FGS Effectiveness (PFD) S2 = 0.90 F2 = 0.10 SIL 1 Equivalent Effectiveness

Detector Coverage S1 = 0.60 Hazard occurs (Fi per yr)

Mitigated Hazard

Unmitigated Hazard F1 = 0.40

Fi * (F1 + S1* F2) = Unmitigated Hazard Frequency Fi * (S1 * S2) = Mitigated Hazard Frequency S1* S2 = Effectiveness of FGS Function

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OptionalAnalysisMethod: FullyQuantitativeAnalysis
Applicationsinclude:
ToxicGasZones dueto highlylocationspecificanalysis SpecialExposureZones(E,T,V) AlternativeprocedureforHydrocarbonFire &GasZoneswhereSemiquantitative Methoddoesnotprovideadequateresults Usedexclusivelywhenno(orlimited)FGS systemexistsanddesiretojustifyadequacy ofexistingsituation

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HazardScenarioIdentification
Hazardscenariosshouldincludegeneralrelease/firescenarios
Identifyallcrediblereleasescenarios,including:
Vessels, process piping, flanges, instruments, wellheads, pumps, compressors, heat exchangers, launchers/receivers, risers and pipelines

Identifyspecificfactorseffectingreleasescenario
Holesize,location,orientation,phase,toxicity(H2S),occupancy

ReleaseScenarioswithextremelylowlikelihoodand/or consequenceneednotbeconsidered Resultshouldbeadetailedlistofreleasescenarioswithenough detailtoundertakeconsequenceandlikelihoodanalysis

Fully-Quantitative Method

KENEXIS

HydrocarbonFireConsequenceAnalysis
TwoConsequenceTypes:
JetFire(EarlyIgnition,Turbulentdiffusion,momentum driven) PoolFire(LateIgnition,consequenceseverityisdefinedby poolsizeandfueltype)

Radiantheatoutputisbasisforsafety consensuses: Requiresdispersionandconsequence modelingusingpurposebuiltsoftware (PHAST)


Fully-Quantitative Method

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HydrocarbonGasConsequenceAnalysis
Consideroneormorepotentialhazardousoutcomes
JetFire VaporCloudExplosion(VCE) VaporCloudFlashFire ToxicExposure(H2S)

Sensitivetoatmosphericconditions(i.e.prevailing winds,relativehumidity,ambienttemperature) Requiresdispersionandconsequencemodelingusing purposebuiltsoftware(PHAST)

Fully-Quantitative Method

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FlashFireConsequenceAnalysis
Resultofdelayed,unconfinedignitionof combustiblegasrelease
Intense,shortdurationfire Burnsfrompointofignitionbacktopointofrelease Potentialtoresultinresidualfireatpointofrelease(i.e.jet fire)

LELisflammableendpointforvaporcloud
Analysismustaccountforpocketsofflammablevaporwithin thevaporcloudathigherconcentrationthanthebulkvapor

Fully-Quantitative Method

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VaporCloudExplosionConsequenceAnalysis
Ignitionofsemiconfinedhydrocarbongasreleaseina congestedenvironment.
Flamefrontaccelerationresultsindamagingoverpressure Transientblastfollowedbyresidualfireatpointofrelease

AnalyzeFGSZonetodetermineifVCEispossible
Overlayvaporclouddispersionresultswithplatformdeck plantoidentifyareasofpotentialconfinement Factorsforanalysisinclude:
Considerationofdimensionalconfinement(1D,2D,3D) Considerationofblockageratio(low,medium,high) Sufficientvolumeofconfinedvapor(50m3,UKHealth&SafetyExec.) OverpressuregeneratedbyVCE(LethalBlastOverpressurethreshold) Presenceorabsenceofblastwalls

Fully-Quantitative Method

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ToxicGas(H2S)ConsequenceAnalysis
Gasreleasewithoutignitionresultsintoxicexposure Analysisisextremelysensitivetometeorological conditions
Modelingofmultiplereleaseorientations Considerationofgasdetectionsindownwind,upwindand crosswind

Analysisrequirestoxicendpoints
Lethalconcentrationendpoint ImmediatelyDangeroustoLifeandHealth

Fully-Quantitative Method

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LikelihoodAnalysis
BasedonHistoricalOffshoreData:
OffshoreReleaseStatistics,2001.UKHealth& SafetyExec. PARLOC2001:TheupdateofLossofContainment DataforOffshorePipelines.UKHealth&Safety Exec.

Sensitivetoholesizedistribution SensitivetoEquipmentType

Fully-Quantitative Method

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RiskIntegration
JoinConsequenceandLikelihoodtogeneratealistof possiblescenariooutcomes
Eachoutcomehasanassociatedlevelofrisk(PLL,Financial Loss) EventTreesareusedtodetermineriskforeachoutcome

Eventoutcomesareintegratedtodetermineriskfora FGSzoneorPlatform
RiskforFGSzone/platformiscomparedagainstCustomer tolerableriskcriteria

Initiallyselectlowdetectorcoverageandprogressively increaseuntiltolerableriskachieved.

Fully-Quantitative Method

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RiskIntegration EventTree

Fully-Quantitative Method

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Application WellheadPlatform

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DetectorPerformanceVerification Application WellheadPlatform


Baseline case includes two optical fire detectors in opposite corners of wellbay

No Coverage Single Detector Coverage 2+ Detector Coverage

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DetectorPerformanceVerification Application WellheadPlatform


FireGradeB,requires85%coverage AchievedGeographicCoverageof62% Largeportionofobstructedby:
Wellheads Piping ControlEquipment

Designonlyused2detectors Insufficientcoverageasper guidelinesforFireGradeB

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DetectorPerformanceVerification Application WellheadPlatform


Improved coverage due to addition of flame detector for total of three.

No Coverage Single Detector Coverage 2+ Detector Coverage

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FGSDesignModifications
ObjectiveistoSatisfyFGSPerformanceTargets ImproveCoverage
Increasenumberofdetectors Changesensororientation Changevotingarchitecture(2ooN,1ooN)

ReduceProbabilityofFGSFunctionFailureon Demand
ChangeDetectorTechnology, ChangeLogicSolverTechnology, IncreaseFunctiontesting,etc.

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RiskToleranceCriteria
RiskAcceptancedecisionsbased onCustomerRiskManagement Guidelines
SemiQuantitativeRiskMatrix IndividualRiskBenchmark

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CalibrationofSemiQuantitative MethodtoCorporateRiskTarget
Detector Coverage S1 = 0.85 Gas Release Occurs FGS Effectiveness 1-Pignition = 0.99 (PFD) S2 = 0.90 F2 = 0.10 Ignition Probability Fatality PLL

0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0

0E-0 8E-6 0E-0 3E-5

Pignition = 0.01
1-Pignition = 0.95

Pignition = 0.03

(0.01 per yr)


F1 = 0.15 1-Pignition = 0.95 0.0

0E-0 3E-5

Pignition = 0.03
Fi * (F1 + S1* F2) * Pignition = Unmitigated Hazard Frequency Fi * (S1 * S2) * Pignition = Mitigated Hazard Frequency

1.0

PLL Sum = 7E-5

KENEXIS

FGSIntegrityAnalysis Conclusion
1.

RiskModelallowsforperformancespecificationson Fire&GasSystemDesign:
DetectorCoverage FGSFunctionSafetyAvailability(PFDavg)

2. 3. 4. 5.

SamelevelofsimplifiedriskanalysisasLOPA,with optionforfullyquantitativeanalysis CalibratedtoCorporateRiskTargets Allowsperformancetobeverifiedanddesign/ testingmodifiedaccordingly AllowsanalysisofexistingFGSsystemstodetermine theiracceptabilityforcontinueduse.

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