HADJI RASUL BATADOR BASHER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABULKAIR AMPATUA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: An election must be held at the place, date and time prescribed by law. Likewise, its suspension or postponement must comply requirements. Otherwise, it is irregular and void. The Case Petitioner 1 assails before us the une !, 1""" #esolution of the $ommission on %lections &$omelec' ( in )PA $ase *o. "+,(+- which dismissed a Petition to .eclare a /ailure of %lection and to $all )pecial %lection in Precinct *o. 1(, 0arangay 1aidan, 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur. 2he assailed #esolution disposed as follows3 4n view of the foregoing considerations, 5e he6re7by hold that the special elections in 0arangay 1aidan, 2ugaya Lanao del )ur on August 89, 1""+ did not fail. 2he result thereof must therefore be accorded respect. 5:%#%/O#%, premises considered, the $ommission En Banc #%)OL;%) to .4)14)) the petition for lack of merit. 8 The Facts Petitioner :ad<i #asul 0atador 0asher and Private #espondent Abulkair Ampatua were both candidates for the position of Punong 0arangay in 0arangay 1aidan, 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur during the 1ay 1(, 1""+ barangay election. 2he election was declared a failure and a special one was set for une 1(, 1""+. Again the election failed and was reset to August 89, 1""+. According to the $omelec, the voting started only around "399 p.m. on August 89, 1""+ because the prevailing tension in the said locality. %lection Officer .iana .atu,4mam reported that she was allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed with the election because =it might trigger bloodshed.= )he also claimed the town mayor, =being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare 6a7 failure of election in 1aidan.= )ubsequently, the armed followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her military escorts, who responded in a like manner towards the former. 2he parties were then pacified at the P*P headquarters. 5ith the arrival of additional troops, the election officer proceeded to 1aidan to conduct the election starting at "399 p.m. until the early morning of the following day. 2he holding of the election at that particular time was allegedly announced =over the mosque.= > 2he tally sheet for the said =election= showed the following results3 private respondent ? (@9 votesA petitioner ? 1@ votesA and 0aulo Abdul #aBul, a third candidate ? 19 votes.@ Private respondent was proclaimed winner. Petitioner then filed a Petition before the $omelec praying that the election be declared a failure. Alleging that no election was conducted in place and at the time prescribed by law, petitioner narrated that there was a dispute that day &August 89, 1""+' among the candidates regarding the venue of the election in the lone voting precinct of the barangay. 4n order to avoid bloodshed, they ultimately agreed that no election would be conducted. Accordingly, the election officer turned over for safekeeping the ballot boC containing election paraphernalia to the acting station commander &O4$' of the Philippine *ational Police &P*P'. 2he following day, petitioner and the third candidate were surprised to learn that the election officer had directed the 0oard of %lection 2ellers to conduct the election and to fill up the election returns and

certificates of canvass on the night of August 89, 1""+ at the residence of the former mayor. Petitioner also stated that no announcement to hold the election at the former mayorDs house that night was ever made. As earlier stated, the $omelec dismissed the Petition. :ence, this recourse to this $ourt. + Ruling of the Comelec 2he $omelec ruled against a failure of election because the two conditions laid down in Mitmug v. Comelec! were not established. 4t held that the =election was conducted on the scheduled date. 2he precinct functioned. Actual voting took place, and it resulted not in a failure to elect.= " 4n <ustifying the balloting at the dead of night, the poll body cited )ection ((, Article 4; of $omelec #esolution ("+1, which provided in part that =6i7f at three oDclock, there are still voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have no cast their votes, the voting shall continue to allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption. . . .= 2he $omelec then went on to state that =eCperience had shown that even when there is a long delay in the commencement of the voting, voters continue to stay within the area of the polling place.= 19 Issue Petitioner submits the following questions for the consideration of the $ourt3 1. 5hether or not the election held at around 19399 oDclock in the evening of August 89, 1""+ after the Acting %lection Officer had verbally declared or announced a failure of election in Precinct *o. 1(, 0arangay 1aidan, 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur is contrary to law, rule and <urisprudenceA (. 5hether or not the election held at the residence of an %C,mayor far from the designated Polling Place of Precinct *o. 1(, 0arangay 1aidan, 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur is legal or validA 8. 5hether or not the proclamation of the private respondent as the duly elected Punong 0arangay of 0arangay 1aidan and the seven &+' 0arangay is illegal, null and void ab initio. 11 4n the main, the crucial question that needs to be addressed is whether the =election= held on the date, at the time and in the place other than those officially designated by the law and by the $omelec was valid. The Court's Ruling 2he Petition is meritorious. Main Issue3 Validly of the S ecial Election $iting Mitmug v. Comelec, 1( the $omelec points our that a failure of election requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely &1' no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fiCed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to electA and &(' the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. 4t ruled that these requirements were not met.!"# hi!$n%t 5e do not agree. 2he peculiar set of facts in the present case show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral eCercise. Otherwise stated, the disputed =election= was illegal, irregular and void.

Election Situs &as Illegal First, the place where the voting was conducted was illegal. )ection >( of the Omnibus %lection $ode provides that =6t7he chairman of the board of election tellers shall designate the public school or any other public building #ithin the barangay to be used as polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct . . .. = Petitioner, citing an Affidavit 18 supposedly eCecuted by the members of the 0oard of %lection 2ellers &0%2' for 0arangay 1aidan, alleges that the election of officials for said barangay was held at the residence of former 1ayor Alang )agusara Pukunun, which is located at 0arangay Pandarianao, instead of the officially designated polling precinct at $agayan %lementary )chool. 4f this allegation were true, such =election= cannot be valid, as it was not held within the barangay of the officials who were being elected. On the other hand, it is admitted that there was a public school or building in 0arangay 1aidan ? the $agayan %lementary )chool, which was the earlier validly designated voting center. 5hile the 0%2 members later repudiated their Affidavit, they could only claim that the election was held =in 0arangay 1aidan.= 1> 2hey, however, failed to specify the eCact venue. 4n fact, to this date, even the respondents have failed to disclose where eCactly the voting was conducted. 2his glaring omission definitely raises serious questions on whether the election was indeed held in a place allowed by law. Voting Time &as 'i(e#ise Irregular Second, as to the time for voting, the law provides that =6t7he casting of votes shall start at seven oDclock in the morning and shall end at three oDclock in the afternoon, eCcept when there are voters present within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not yet cast their votes, in which case the voting shall continue but only to allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption.= 1@ )ection ((, Article 4; of $omelec #esolution *o. ("+1 also specifies that the voting hours shall start promptly at +399 a.m. and end at 8399 p.m. of the same day. :owever, the =election= for 0arangay 1aidan officials was supposed to have been held after "399 p.m. of August 89, 1""+ until the wee hours of the following day. $ertainly, such schedule was not in accordance with law or the $omelec #ules. 2he $omelec erred in relying on the second sentence of )ection ((, Article 4; of $omelec #esolution ("+1, which states that =6i7f at three oDclock 6in the afternoon7, there are still voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not cast their votes, the voting shall continue to allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption.= 2his sentence presupposes that the electioncommenced during the official time and is simply continued beyond 8399 p.m. in order to accommodate voters who are within thirty meters of the polling place, already waiting for their turn to cast their votes. 2his is clearly the meaning and intent of the word continue ? =to go on in a specified course of action or condition.= 1- 2he action or condition already subsists and is allowed to go on. Otherwise, the law should have stated instead that =the voting may also start even beyond 8399 p.m. if there are voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place.= 2he strained interpretation espoused by the $omelec encourages the conduct of clandestine =elections,= for it virtually authoriBes the holding of elections beyond normal hours, even at midnight when circumstances could be more threatening and conductive to unlawful activities. On a doctrinal basis, such nocturnal electoral practice discourages the peopleDs eCercise of their fundamental right of suffrage, by eCposing them to the dangers concomitant to the dead of night, especially in far,lung barangays constantly threatened with rebel and military gunfires. Election )ate &as Invalid Third, the $omelec scheduled the special election on August 89, 1""+. Any suspension or postponement of an election is governed by )ection ( of #A --+", 1+ which states that =6w7hen for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection, violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any barangay, the $ommission on %lection motu ro rio or upon sworn petition of ten &19' registered

voters of a barangay, after summary proceedings of the eCistence of such grounds, shall suspend or postpone the election therein to a date reasonably close to the date of the election that is not held or is suspended or postponed, or which resulted in a failure to elect, but not later than thirty &89' days after the cessation of the cause for such suspension or postponement of the election or failure to elect, and in all cases not later than ninety &"9' days from the date of the original election.= %lection Officer .iana .atu,4mam of 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur practically postponed the election in 0arangay 1aidan from the official original schedule of +399 a.m. to 8399 p.m. of August 89, 1""+ to 19399 p.m. of August 89, 1""+ until the early morning of August 81, 1""+. )he attempted to <ustify her postponement of the election by citing threats of violence and bloodshed in the said barangay. Allegedly because of the tension created by armed escorts of the municipal mayor and the military, .atu,4mam declared a failure of election in order =to ease their aggression.= :owever, as election officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. 4ndeed, only the $omelec itself has legal authority to eCercise such awesome power. An election officer alone, or even with the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone or suspend the elections. Election *ost onement &as Invalid Fourth, .atu,4mam did not follow the procedure laid down by law for election postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of election. )he narrated the circumstances surrounding her declaration as follows3 1! 5hen 4 returned to 6as7certain the situation in 1aidan, the 1ayor, being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare 6a7 failure of elections in 1aidan. 5hen 4 insisted to personally confirm the probable cause of bloodshed &at 1aidan', his armed followersEescorts pointed their guns to me and my escorts. Likewise my military escorts pointed their guns to the mayor and his men =1an to 1an=. 2he .atus and religious leaders pacified us at the P*P :eadquarters. After a couple of hours, the military officers and 4 agreed to adapt another strategy <ust to pursue with the elections in 1aidan 6by7 hook or by crook. $onsidering that they forcibly took away from us the ballot boC containing paraphernalia of 1aidan, 4 didnDt have any recourse but give them. 4 turned,over the ballot boC to the Acting $hief of Police, 1alik 0antuas with proper receipt, taking away from the boC the $%/ ( F (,A, declaring verbally a failure of elections in 1aidan <ust to ease their aggression and so that we could pull,out of the place freely. 4t clearly appears from the very report of .atu,4mam to the $omelec that she did not conduct any proceeding, summary or otherwise, to find out whether any of the legal grounds for the suspension or postponement or the declaration of failure of the election actually eCisted in the barangay concerned. +otice &as Irregular /inally and very significantly, the electorate was not given ample notice of the eCact schedule and venue of the election. 2he election officer herself relates3 1" 5hen the tension was slightly alleviated, 4 directed the military personnel to pull,out of the 1unicipio and withdrew to a nearby 0arangay &for safety' where some of the militaries &sic' were deployed. After planning and coordinating with the 0atallion &sic' $ommander, we waited for the additional troups &sic' that arrived at around !389 in the evening. At the stroke of "399 oDclock, we started for 1aidan via the national :ighway thru the 1unicipality of 0alindong and others thru a short,cut way &sic' eastward of 2ugaya. GtiliBing the election paraphernalia earlier shipped by the $ommission as 4 have requested &sic' and a ballot boC from the P%), we went on with the election &after announcing it over the mosque' peacefully orderly despite the tiredness &sic' and eChaustion felt by the people the whole day waitingEeCpecting for the election as 4 have assured them earlier &sic'. . . .

As can be gleaned easily from the above report, the electorate of 0arangay 1aidan was not given due notice that the election would push through after "399 p.m. that same day. Apparently, the election officerDs decision to hold the election on the night of August 89, 1""+ was precipitate. Only after additional military troops had arrived at their site in a nearby barangay about !389 p.m. did the election officers proceed to 0arangay 1aidan. Arriving at 1aidan, they allegedly proceeded to conduct the election =after announcing it over the mosque.= )uch abbreviated announcement =over the mosque= at such late hour did *O2 constitute sufficient notice to the electorate. $onsequently, not the entire electorate or even a respectable number could have known of the activity and actually participated therein or voluntarily and discerningly chosen not to have done so. 4ndeed, the $ourt in ,assan v. Comelec (9 held that the notice given on the afternoon of the election day resetting the election to the following day and transferring its venue was =too short.= 5e said that =6t7o require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. . . . 4t is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place and purpose thereof. (1 2he time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance.= (( 4n the case at bar, the announcement #as made only minutes before the supposed voting. 4f one,day notice was held to be insufficient in ,assan, the much shorter notice in the present case should all the more be declared wanting. 4t should in fact be equated with =no notice.= 4n sum, the =election= supposedly held for officials of 0arangay 1aidan cannot be clothed with any form of validity.!"# hi!4t was clearly unauthoriBed and invalid. 4t had no legal leg to stand on. *ot only did the suspensionEpostponement not comply with the procedure laid down by law and the $omelec #ules, neither was there sufficient notice of the time and date when and the place where it would actually be conducted. 4t was thus as if no election was held at all. :ence, its results could not determine the winning punong barangay. 5:%#%/O#%, the Petition is hereby H#A*2%. and the assailed #esolution )%2 A)4.%. 2he proclamation of private respondent as punong barangay is hereby declared ;O4.. #espondent $omelec is O#.%#%. to conduct a special election for punong barangay of 1aidan, 2ugaya, Lanao del )ur as soon as possible. *o pronouncement as to costs. )O O#.%#%.. %* 0A*$

[G.R. No. 1504 !. J"#$ %, &00&'

MA(OR JUN RASCAL CA)ASA, COUNCILORS MAASIRAL DAMPA, H. ACKIL MAMANTUC, MOMOLA)AN MACALI, ANDAR TALI, ALLAN SANA(ON, and AMIN SANGARAN, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDULMALIK M. MANAMPARAN, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.*

T+, Ca-,

0efore us is a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in<unction and a temporary restraining order under #ule -> of the 1""+ #ules of $ivil Procedure 617 assailing the #esolution of the $ommission on %lections &I$omelecJ for brevity' en banc6(7 in )P$ *o. 91,(+- dated October (>, (991, the dispositive portion of which reads3 I5:%#%/O#%, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby H#A*2%.. 2he results of special elections held on 89 1ay (991 covering Precincts *os. (A, (A1E(A( in 0arangay 0angko, Precinct *o. 8A in 0arangay $abasaran and clustered Precinct *o. 19AE19A1 in 0arangay Liangan are hereby A**GLL%.. Accordingly, the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the four &>' contested precincts affect the standing of candidates is hereby )%2 A)4.% until the choice of the people is finally determined through another special election to be authoriBed, conducted and supervised by this $ommission as soon as possible unless restrained. /inally, the Law .epartment is hereby directed to investigate the election irregularities that transpired in the 1unicipality of *unungan, Lanao del *orte involving the Office of the %lection Officer and thereafter, file election offense caseEs should there be finding of probable cause and other appropriate cases if warranted under the circumstances. )O O#.%#%..J687

T+, .a/0.uring the 1ay 1>, (991 elections, petitioner un #ascal $awasa &Ipetitioner $awasaJ for brevity' and private respondent Adbulmalik 1. 1anamparan &Iprivate respondent 1anamparanJ for brevity' were among the candidates for mayor in the 1unicipality of *unungan, Lanao del *orte &I*ununganJ for brevity'. Out of the forty &>9' precincts in *unungan, only thirty,siC &8-' functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining four &>' precincts. 2he following were the precincts, barangays, polling places and number of registered voters where there was a failure of election3 P#%$4*$2 *O. 0A#A*HAK (A (A1E(A( 8A 19AE19A1 0angko 0angko $abasaran Liangan POLL4*H PLA$% 0angko Prim )chool ,do, $abasaran Prim. )ch. Liangan Prim. )ch. 2otal (8!>@ #%H. ;O2%#) (99 (@> 1@@

After canvassing the election returns from the 8- precincts, the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers of *unungan deferred the proclamation of all winning candidates due to the failure of the said > precincts to function. )pecial elections were set on 1ay 89, (991 considering that the number of registered voters in the remaining four precincts would affect the election results. 2he $omelec promulgated #esolution *o. >8-9 on 1ay (1, (991 authoriBing the conduct of special elections in the affected areas, including barangays 0angko, $abasaran and Liangan in *unungan, the pertinent portion of which states3 I;44. 1emorandum of $ommissioner 1ehol L. )adain dated 1" 1ay (991. #%H4O* 1G*4$4PAL42KEP#O;4*$%

#egion M44

*unu&n'gan, Lanao del *orte 0arangays3 1. 0angco (. $abasaran 8. Liangan

#%A)O*) 3 disagreement of venue of election, tension of 0%4s, forcible taking of the ballot boCes and other election paraphernalia. )cheduled date3 1ay 89, (991 CCC 4n view of the foregoing the $ommission #%)OL;%., as it hereby #%)OL;%., as follows3 1. 2o schedule the special elections in the foregoing areas on 1ay (- and 89, (991 as herein specifiedA CCC Let the %Cecutive .irector, .eputy %Cecutive .irectors for Operations and all the working $ommittees implement this resolution. )O O#.%#%..J6>7 As scheduled, the special elections covering the > precincts were conducted on 1ay 89, (991. 2he special elections for Precincts *os. (A, (A1E(A( of 0arangay 0angko were conducted in the 1unicipality of )ultan *aga .imaporo, Lanao del *orte. 2he special elections for Precinct *o. 8A of 0arangay $abasara and Precinct *os. 19AE19A1 of 0arangay Liangan were conducted in the 1unicipality of )apad, Lanao del *orte. 2he 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers of *unungan canvassed the election returns of the > precincts on 1ay 81, (991. After the canvassing of the election returns, the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers proclaimed the winning candidates on the basis of the earlier 8- election returns of the 1ay 1>, (991 regular elections and the > election returns of the > precincts sub<ect of the special elections. 2he 1ay 1>, (991 regular elections and the 1ay 89, (991 special elections show the following results with respect to the position of mayor3 )ub,2otal of ;otes )ub,2otal of votes Hrand Obtained 1ay 1>, (991 Obtained 1ay 89, #egular %lections (991 )pecial %lections Private #espondent 1anamparan Petitioner $awasa 1,1"+ 1,(!8 @+9 1!+ 1argin . . . . .

2otal

1,+-+ 1,>+9 ("+

As shown above, during the 1ay 1>, (991 regular elections, the lead of petitioner $awasa was eighty siC &!-'. After the 1ay 89, (991 special elections, private respondent 1anamparan overcame the margin with a lead of ("+ votes. Petitioner $awasa was proclaimed mayor of *unungan and his co,petitioners 1aasiral .ampa, :. Ackil 1amantuc, 1omolawan 1acali, Andar 2ali, Allan )anayon and Amin )angaran were also proclaimed as councilors of *unungan.

On une >, (991, private respondent 1anamparan filed an appeal and petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner $awasa docketed as )P$ *o. 91,(@(. 2he appealEpetition was dismissed by the $omelec )econd .ivision on )eptember (-, (991. 4n the meantime, on une !, (991, private respondent 1anamparan filed a petition for -.nnulment of Election Results during the May /01 200! S ecial Elections in *recincts +o$ 2.1 2.!32.21 /.1 and !0.3!0.! of +unungan1 'anao )el +orte1 and .nnulment of Canvass and *roclamation #ith *rayer for Issuance of Tem orary Restraining 4rder and3or &rit of *reliminary In5unction6 docketed as )P$ $ase *o. 91,(+-. 4mpleaded as respondents were petitioner $awasa and the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers composed of 1ario Allan 0allesta, 6@7 *edalyn ). )ebial6-7 and 4luminada O. Pegalan.6+7 As mentioned at the outset, on October (>, (991, the $omelec en banc promulgated a resolution annulling the results of the special elections of the > precincts &Precinct *os. (A, (A1E(A(, 8A, 19AE19A1' held on 1ay 89, (991 conducted in the municipalities of )ultan *aga .imaporo and )apad. 2he $omelec en banc also annulled the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the > contested precincts affect the standing of candidates.

T+, Co1,#,/ R"#2n3 4n granting the petition, the $omelec held that Ithe special elections in the > contested precincts were not genuinely held and resulted in failure to elect on account of fraud. J 2he $omelecNs ruling is summariBed as follows3 First. 2he $omelec clarified that the $omelec en banc can take cogniBance of the petition for annulment of election results in accordance with )ection > of #A +1-- 6!7, otherwise known as the I)ynchroniBed %lections Law of 1""1.J 4t eCplained that while the proclamation of a candidate has the effect of terminating pre,proclamation issues, a proclamation that is a result of an illegal act is void and cannot be ratified by such proclamation and subsequent assumption of office. 2he $omelec declared that there is no forum,shopping considering that )P$ 91,(@( pending before the )econd .ivision of the $omelec is a pre,proclamation controversy, 6"7 while )P$ 91,(+- pending before the $omelec en banc is a case for annulment of election results. Second. 2he $omelec found that the special elections were not held in the designated polling places in *unungan but were transferred to the municipalities of )apad and )ultan *aga .imaporo without any authority from the $omelec. According to the $omelec, the %lection Officer, who happened to be the chairman of the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers, caused the transfer of the polling places without asking permission from the $omelec. 2he transfer was likewise in violation of the due process requirements found in )ection 1@8 of the Omnibus %lection $ode. 1oreover, it ruled that the unauthoriBed transfer of a polling place is also punishable as an election offense under )ection (-1&B' &1+' of the )ame $ode. 5e quote the pertinent portion of the $omelec ruling thus3 I2he transfer of polling places cannot be done without due process. 2his is the eCplicit rule of )ection 1@8 of the Omnibus %lection $ode, C C C3 CCC CCC CCC

4n the instant case, the %lection Officer, who happened to be the $hairman of the respondent 0oard, also caused the transfer of the polling places without asking the permission of this $ommission and in violation of the due process rule, thereby, making the afore,quoted )ection 1@8 inutile. $onsidering these unwarranted acts of the official of this $ommission, the sanctity of the special elections therefore is suspect. No0+2n3 2n 0+, 4,/o4d- /o"#d -+o5 0+a0 no02/, 5a- 326,n 0o 0+, 7o#202/a# /and2da0,- and 0o 0+, 4,32-0,4,d 6o0,4- a88,/0,d 9$ 0+, -7,/2a# ,#,/02on- o8 0+, -a2d 04an-8,4 o8 7o##2n3 7#a/,-. )+o 0+,4,8o4, 6o0,d on 0+, a--a2#,d -7,/2a# ,#,/02on- 326,n 0+,-, /24/"1-0an/,-: T+2- 2--", +a- n,6,4 9,,n -;"a4,#$ add4,--,d 9$ 0+, 4,-7ond,n0-.

), 0a<, ="d2/2a# no02/, o8 0+, d2-0an/, o8 0+, 6,n",- o8 6o02n3 5+2/+ a4, 1o4, o4 #,-- &5 <2#o1,0,4- a5a$ 84o1 N"n"n3an, 8a4 84o1 9,2n3 a//,--29#, 0o 0+, 6o0,4- 326,n 0+, 021, and 1a0,42a# /on-04a2n0-. T+, 7ano4a1a o8 5+a0 2- -"77o-,d 0o 9, a 84,, and +on,-0 ,>,4/2-, o8 d,1o/4a/$ 2- 2nd,,d 4,nd,4,d 1$o72/ 9$ 84a"d 7,47,04a0,d 9$ no o0+,4 0+an 0+, COMELEC o882/2a#- /on/,4n,d.? 6197 Third. 2he $omelec found that the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers, headed by 1ario Allan 0allesta, preposterously feigned ignorance of the fact that during the said special elections, members of the Philippine Army (-th 4nfantry 0attalion served as election inspectors without authority from the $omelec. :ence, the instant petition.

T+, I--",Petitioners argue that the $O1%L%$ en banc #esolution was issued without <urisdiction andEor with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of <urisdiction for the following reasons3 =1. 2he proclamation of the siC &-' petitioners 1aasiral .ampa, :. Ackil 1amantuc, 1omolawan 1acali, Andar 2ali, Allan )anayon, and Amin )angaran were annulled and set aside in violation of due process of law. 2hey were not impleaded as respondents in the petition to annul the election. 2hey were not notified of the proceedings. C C C. (. 2he transfer of the venue of the special elections at )ultan *aga .imaporo and )apad and the appointment of military personnel as members of the 0oard of election 4nspectors of the four &>' precincts were agreed upon by the private respondent and the municipal candidates and their respective political parties. 8. 2he election officer in the eCercise of his discretion has authority to transfer the venue of the special elections in view of the agreement of the political parties and municipal candidates on the transfer of the venue of the special elections. C C C. >. 2here is substantial compliance with the provisions of )ec. 1@8 of the Omnibus %lection $ode. 2he political parties and municipal candidates of the municipality *unungan were notified and in fact agreed to the transfer of venue of the special elections. @. 2he $O1%L%$ en banc promulgated the October (>, (991 resolution without requiring its election officer of *unungan, the provincial election supervisor of Lanao del *orte, and #egional %lection .irector of #egion M44 to eCplain why the special elections of the four &>' precincts were transferred to the municipalities of )ultan *aga .imaporo and )apad. 2he petitioner 1ayor un #ascal $awasa prayed that the case be set for trial and hearing in order that the election officer of *unungan be required to testify and eCplain the circumstances of the special elections. 2he $O1%L%$ en banc did not act on the motion. 4t promulgated the resolution of October (>, (991 without investigating the circumstances why the election officer transferred the venue of the special elections to the municipalities of )ultan *aga .imaporo and )apad. *o hearing was conducted by the $O1%L%$ en banc.J6117

)imply put, the issues raised boil down to whether or not 3 &1' the transfer of the polling places to the ad<acent municipalities is legalA &(' the appointment of military personnel as members of the board of election inspectors is legalA and &8' the petitioners were accorded due process prior to the promulgation of the assailed resolution in )P$ *o. 91,(+-.

T+, Co"40@- R"#2n3 2he petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Legality of the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of of the "oard of #lection Inspectors

ilitary Personnel as

em!ers

2here is no dispute that the venue of the special elections was transferred to the ad<acent municipalities of )ultan *aga .imaporo and )apad in lieu of the regular polling places located in barangays 0angko, $abasaran and Liangan. 2here is likewise no dispute that military personnel were appointed as members of the 0oard of %lection 4nspectors &I0%4J for brevity' in the > precincts. Petitioners and private respondent 1anamparan agree that the > precincts covered by the special elections with a total of !>@ registered voters will affect the result of the elections. Petitioners insist on the validity of the conduct of the special elections claiming that the political parties and the municipal candidates were notified and in fact agreed on the transfer of venue and the appointment of military personnel as members of the 0%4. 2hey contend that there is substantial compliance with the provisions of )ection 1@8 of the Omnibus %lection $ode considering that the election officer as the representative of the $omelec reported the matter to the Provincial %lection )upervisor of Lanao del *orte and the transfer was not disapproved by the $omelec. Petitioners claim that an Ielection officer has authority to transfer the polling places even four days before the scheduled electionJ citing Balindong vs$ Comelec61(7 and .lonto vs$ Comelec$6187 Petitioners fail to persuade. )ections 1@(, 1@8 and 1@> of the Omnibus %lection $ode shed light on this matter, to wit3 )%$. 1@(. Po##2n3 P#a/,. O A polling place is the building or place where the board of election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast their votes. )%$. 1@8. D,-23na02on o8 7o##2n3 7#a/,-. O 2he location of polling places designated in the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the $ommission may find necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political unit affected, if any, and hearing3 provided, 2hat no location shall be changed within forty,five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election or a referendum or plebiscite, eCcept in case it is destroyed or it cannot be used. )%$. 1@>. R,;"24,1,n0- 8o4 7o##2n3 7#a/,-. O%ach polling place shall be, as far as practicable, a ground floor and shall be of sufficient siBe to admit and comfortably accommodate forty voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election inspectors. 2he polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as centrally as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein and whenever possible, such location shall be along a public road. No d,-23na02on o8 7o##2n3 7#a/,- -+a## 9, /+an3,d ,>/,70 "7on 54200,n 7,0202on o8 0+, 1a=o420$ o8 0+, 6o0,4- o8 0+, 74,/2n/0 o4 a34,,1,n0 o8 a## 0+, 7o#202/a# 7a402,- o4 9$ 4,-o#"02on o8 0+, Co112--2on "7on 742o4 no02/, and +,a42n3. A public having the requirements prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be preferred as polling place. 61>7 2he transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of $omelec #esolution *o. >8-9 issued on 1ay (1, (991 specifying the polling places but also )ections 1@8 and 1@> of the %lection $ode. As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. :owever, changes may be initiated by written petition of the ma<ority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the $omelec after notice and hearing. 0ut ultimately, it is the $omelec which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing. 2he $omelec has unequivocally stated that Inothing in the records showed that notice was given to the political candidates and registered voters affected by the transfer.J Private respondent 1anamparan has categorically denied petitionersN claim that all the political parties and municipal candidates agreed to the transfer of venue. 2he $ourt discerns no substantiation of petitionersN claim regarding the agreement to transfer. 2here is then no cogent reason for us to disturb the findings of the $omelec on this matter. 4ndeed, the factual findings of the $omelec supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non,reviewable. 61@7 2hus, it has been held that findings of fact of the $omelec based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this $ourt, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. 61-7 1oreover, there is no question that the transfer of venue was made within the prohibited period of thirty days before the special election.

#eliance on Balindong vs$ Comelec61+7 and .lonto vs$ Comelec61!7 is misplaced. .lonto involved an entirely different factual scenario from the instant case. 4n said case, the $ourt upheld the validity of the transfer of the counting and tallying of the votes after the closing of the olls from the precincts to the P$ camps. 2he $ourt held that the transfer was dictated by necessity and authoriBed by the $omelec directly or by its provincial representative. 2he $ourt eCplained that Iwhile it is highly desirable that the authority for the transfer of the counting should be directly authoriBed by the $omelec itself, the latterNs denial of the petitionersN motion for reconsideration where this legal point was advanced was tantamount to a validation of the authority issued by its provincial representatives.J On the other hand, the $ourt in Balindong61"7 held that the mere fact that the transfer of polling place was not made in accordance with law, particularly )ecs. 1@(,1@> of the Omnibus %lection $ode, does not warrant a declaration of failure of election and the annulment of the proclamation of the winning candidate, because the number of uncast votes #ill not affect the result of the election . 4n the case at bar, there is no dispute that the election returns from the >@ precincts will affect the results of the elections. *eCt, the appointment of military personnel as members of the 0%4 is another grave electoral irregularity that attended the special elections held on 1ay 89, (991. 2here was absolutely no legal basis for the appointment of military personnel as members of the 0%4. ;erily, the appointments were devoid of any <ustification other than the bare assertion, again, that Ithe political parties and municipal candidates agreed on the said arrangement.J 2he pertinent provisions of the Omnibus %lection $ode regarding the composition, appointments and substitution of the members of the 0%4 are quoted as follows3 )%$. 1->. Co17o-202on and a77o2n01,n0- o8 9oa4d o8 ,#,/02on 2n-7,/0o4-. , At least thirty days before the date when the voters list is to be prepared in accordance with this $ode, in the case of a regular election or fifteen days before a special election, 0+, Co112--2on -+a##, d24,/0#$ o4 0+4o"3+ 20- d"#$ a"0+o42A,d 4,74,-,n0a026,-, /on-020"0, a 9oa4d o8 ,#,/02on 2n-7,/0o4- 8o4 ,a/+ 74,/2n/0 0o 9, /o17o-,d o8 a /+a241an and a 7o## /#,4< 5+o 1"-0 9, 7"9#2/ -/+oo# 0,a/+,4-, 742o420$ 0o 9, 326,n 0o /262# -,462/, ,#2329#,-, and 05o 1,19,4-, ,a/+ 4,74,-,n02n3 0+, 05o a//4,d20,d 7o#202/a# 7a402,-. 2he appointment shall state the precinct to which they are assigned and the date of the appointment. )%$. 1-@. Oa0+ o8 0+, 1,19,4- o8 0+, 9oa4d o8 ,#,/02on 2n-7,/0o4-. , 2he members of the board of election inspectors, whether permanent, substitute or temporary, shall before assuming their office, take and sign an oath upon forms prepared by the $ommission, before an officer authoriBed to administer oaths or, in his absence, before any other member of the board of election inspectors present, or in case no one is present, they shall take it before any voter. 2he oaths shall be sent immediately to the city or municipal treasurer. &)ec. 1@+, 1"+1 %$' )%$. 1--. B"a#282/a02on o8 1,19,4- o8 0+, 9oa4d o8 ,#,/02on 2n-7,/0o4-. , *o person shall be appointed chairman, member or substitute member of the board of election inspectors unless he is of good moral character and irreproachable reputation, a registered voter of the city or municipality, has never been convicted of any election offense or of any other crime punishable by more than siC months of imprisonment, or if he has pending against him an information for any election offense. :e must be able to speak and write %nglish or the local dialect. &)ec. 11>, 1"+! %$' CCC )%$. 1+9. R,#2,8 and -"9-020"02on o8 1,19,4- o8 0+, 9oa4d o8 ,#,/02on 2n-7,/0o4- . , Public school teachers who are members of the board of election inspectors shall not be relieved nor disqualified from acting as such members, eCcept for cause and after due hearing. CCC )ection 18 of #epublic Act *o. -->- 6(97 modified )ection 1-> of the Omnibus %lection $ode. )aid section reads3 )%$. 18. Board of Election Ins ectors. O 2he board of election inspectors to be constituted by the $ommission under )ection 1-> of 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !!1 shall be composed of a chairman and two &(' members, one of whom

shall be designated as poll clerk, all of whom shall be public school teachers, giving preference to those with permanent appointments. 4n case there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service, or other citiBens of known probity and competence who are registered voters of the city or municipality may be appointed for election duty. $learly, the 0%4 shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school teachers. 4f there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service or other citiBens of known probity and competence may be appointed. 4t was highly irregular to replace the duly constituted members of the 0%4, who were public school teachers. *othing in petitionersN pleadings would even suggest that the substitution was made for cause and after hearing. 2he importance of the constitution of the 0%4 to the conduct of free, honest and orderly elections cannot be overemphasiBed. 2he $ourt has held that, Ithe members of the board of election inspectors are the front line election officers. 2hey perform such duties and discharge such responsibilities that make them, in a real sense, foot soldiers who see to it that elections are free, honest and orderly. 2hey are essential to the holding of elections.J6(17

Second Issue: $enial of $ue Process Petitioners claim that there was a clear violation of due process of law because a hearing was not conducted on the circumstances of the special election. Petitioners further claim that the $omelec rendered the assailed resolution without requiring its field officers, specifically, the election officer, provincial election supervisor and the regional election director to eCplain the transfer of the polling places. Lastly, petitioners point out that none of the eight &!' proclaimed members of the )angguniang 0ayan 6((7 of *unungan, Lanao del *orte and the proclaimed ;ice 1ayor were notified and impleaded as respondents in the petition to annul the election results citing Velayo vs$ Commission on Elections.6(87 )ection > of #epublic Act *o. +1-- or I2he )ynchroniBed %lections Law of 1""1J provides that the $omelec sitting en banc by a ma<ority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in )ection - of the Omnibus %lection $ode. )aid )ection -, in turn, provides as follows3 -SEC$ 7$ Failure of election$ 8 4f, on account of force ma<eure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fiCed, or had been suspended before the hour fiCed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the $ommission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.J A prayer to annul election results, as in the instant case, and a prayer to declare failure of elections based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous causes, are actually of the same nature and the %lection $ode denominates them similarly. 6(>7 2he $omelec may eCercise the power to annul election results or declare a failure of election motu ro rio6(@7 or upon a verified petition.6(-7 2he hearing of the case shall be summary in nature. 6(+7 A formal trial,type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process O it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to eCplain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. 6(!7 4n fine, a trial is not at all indispensable to satisfy the demands of due process. 2he petition was heard by the $omelec en banc on une (+, (991. .uring the said hearing, the $omelec directed the parties, as agreed upon, to submit their respective memoranda within five &@' days from date and after which, the case shall be submitted for resolution. Petitioners were duly heard through their pleadings, thus, there is no denial of procedural due process to speak of. 1oreover, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the 1unicipal

0oard of $anvassers of *unungan, including %lection Officer 0allesta, were summoned to the hearing held on une (+, (991 and furnished a copy of the petition. 2he pre,conditions for declaring a failure of election are3 &1' that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force ma5eure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes and &(' that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the elections. 2he concurrence of these two circumstances <ustifies the calling of special elections.6("7 :ere, the $omelec found that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places and the appointment of military personnel as members of the 0%4. 4nevitably, the $omelec could not ascertain who voted during the special elections. 2he circumstances were such that the entire electoral process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect no election was held.6897 4n Velayo vs$ Commission of Elections1 6817 the $ourt held that Ithe non,inclusion of a proclaimed winner as respondent in a pre,proclamation controversy and his lack of notice of the proceedings in the $omelec which resulted in the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due process.J 4n the Velayo case, the proclaimed mayor and the members of the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers were not impleaded in the pre, proclamation cases brought before the $omelec. :owever, in this case, petitioner $awasa and the members of the 1unicipal 0oard of $anvassers were in fact impleaded, notified and even heard by the $omelec in )P$ *o. 91,(+-. At this late stage, public interest in the speedy disposition of this case will only be further derailed by the re,opening of the case for the benefit of petitioners,councilors who did not advance any new and substantial matters in this petition warranting the declaration that the special elections were valid and untainted by fraud. )HERE.ORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or eCcess of <urisdiction on the part of public respondent $ommission on %lections, the instant petition is hereby .4)14))%.. 2he resolution of the $ommission on %lections en banc in )P$ *o. 91,(+- dated October (>, (9991 is hereby A//4#1%.. )avide1 9r$1 C$9$1 Bellosillo1 *uno1 Vitug1 :a unan1 Mendo;a1 *anganiban1 <nares=Santiago1 Sandoval= >utierre;1 .ustria=Martine;1 andCorona1 99$1 concur. ?uisumbing1 9$1 on leave.

DECISION BRION, J.:

On une 89, (911, #epublic Act &R.' *o. 191@8, entitled I.n .ct *roviding for the Synchroni;ation of the Elections in the .utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao @.RMMA #ith the +ational and 'ocal Elections and for 4ther *ur osesJ was enacted. 2he law reset the A#11 elections from the !th of August (911, to the second 1onday of 1ay (918 and every three &8' years thereafter, to coincide with the countryNs regular national and local elections. 2he law as well granted the President the power to Iappoint officers,in,charge & 4ICs' for the Office of the #egional Hovernor, the #egional ;ice,Hovernor, and the 1embers of the #egional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the 1ay (918 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.J %ven before its formal passage, the bills that became #A *o. 191@8 already spawned petitions against their validityA :ouse 0ill *o. >1>- and )enate 0ill *o. (+@- were challenged in petitions filed with this $ourt. 2hese petitions multiplied after #A *o. 191@8 was passed.

.a/0"a# An0,/,d,n02he )tate, through )ections 1@ to ((, Article M of the 1"!+ $onstitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in 1uslim 1indanao and the $ordilleras. )ection 1@ states3 )ection 1@. 2here shall be created autonomous regions in 1uslim 1indanao and in the $ordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this $onstitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the #epublic of the Philippines. )ection 1! of the Article, on the other hand, directed $ongress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy. )ection 1!. 2he $ongress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. 2he organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the eCecutive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. 2he organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law <urisdiction consistent with the provisions of this $onstitution and national laws. 2he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a ma<ority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. On August 1, 1"!" or two years after the effectivity of the 1"!+ $onstitution, $ongress acted through #epublic Act &#A' *o. -+8> entitled I.n .ct *roviding for an 4rganic .ct for the .utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.J A plebiscite was held on*ovember -, 1""9 as required by )ection 1!&(', Article M of #A *o. -+8>, thus fully establishing the Autonomous #egion of 1uslim 1indanao & .RMM'. 2he initially assenting provinces were Lanao del )ur, 1aguindanao, )ulu and 2awi,tawi. #A *o. -+8> scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the A#11 on a date not earlier than -9 days nor later than "9 days after its ratification. #A *o. "9@> &entitled I.n .ct to Strengthen and EB and the 4rganic .ct for the .utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao1 .mending for the *ur ose Re ublic .ct +o$ 7C/D1 entitled .n .ct *roviding for the .utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao1 as .mended J' was the neCt legislative act passed. 2his law provided further refinement in the basic A#11 structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the A#11 regional officials to the second 1onday of )eptember (991. $ongress passed the neCt law affecting A#11 O #A *o. "1>9 617 , on une ((, (991. 2his law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under #A *o. "9@>, to *ovember (-, (991. 4t likewise set the plebiscite to ratify #A *o. "9@> to not later thanAugust 1@, (991.

#A

*o.

"9@>

was

ratified

in

plebiscite

held

on August

1>,

(991.

2he province of 0asilan and 1arawi $ity voted to <oin A#11 on the same date. #A *o. "8886(7 was subsequently passed by $ongress to reset the A#11 regional elections to the (nd 1onday of August (99@, and on the same date every 8 years thereafter. Gnlike #A *o. -+8> and #A *o. "9@>, #A *o. "888 was not ratified in a plebiscite. Pursuant to #A *o. "888, the neCt A#11 regional elections should have been held on August !, (911. $O1%L%$ had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. 0ut on une 89, (911, #A *o. 191@8 was enacted, resetting the A#11 elections to 1ay (918, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. #A *o. 191@8 originated in the :ouse of #epresentatives as :ouse 0ill & ,B' *o. >1>-, seeking the postponement of the A#11 elections scheduled on August !, (911. On 1arch ((, (911, the :ouse of #epresentatives passed :0 *o. >1>-, with one hundred ninety one &1"1' 1embers voting in its favor. After the )enate received :0 *o. >1>-, it adopted its own version, )enate 0ill *o. (+@- &)0 *o. (+@-', on une -, (911. 2hirteen &18' )enators voted favorably for its passage. On une +, (911, the :ouse of #epresentative concurred with the )enate amendments, and on une 89, (911, the President signed #A *o. 191@8 into law. As mentioned, the early challenge to #A *o. 191@8 came through a petition filed with this $ourt O G.R. No. 1! &C1687 Dassailing the constitutionality of both :0 *o. >1>- and )0 *o. (+@-, and challenging the validity of #A *o. "888 as well for non,compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. 2hereafter, petitioner 0asari 1apupuno in G.R. No. 1! %05 filed another petition6>7 also assailing the validity of #A *o. "888. 5ith the enactment into law of #A *o. 191@8, the $O1%L%$ stopped its preparations for the A#11 elections. 2he law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality3 a' Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition6@7 filed by #ep. %dcel Lagman as a member of the :ouse of #epresentatives against Paquito Ochoa, r. &in his capacity as the %Cecutive )ecretary' and the $O1%L%$, docketed as G.R. No. 1!C&&1E b' Petition for 1andamus and Prohibition6-7 filed by Atty. #omulo 1acalintal as a taCpayer against the $O1%L%$, docketed asG.R. No. 1!C&F&E

c'

Petition for Certiorari and 1andamus, 4n<unction and Preliminary 4n<unction 6+7 filed by Louis I0arokJ 0iraogo against the $O1%L%$ and %Cecutive )ecretary Paquito *. Ochoa, r., docketed as G.R. No. 1!C%!&A and

d'

Petition for Certiorari and 1andamus6!7 filed by acinto Paras as a member of the :ouse of #epresentatives against %Cecutive )ecretary Paquito Ochoa, r. and the $O1%L%$, docketed as G.R. No. 1!C454. Petitioners Alamarim $enti 2illah and .atu $asan $onding $ana as registered voters from the A#11,

with the Partido .emokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng 0ayan &a political party with candidates in the A#11 regional elections scheduled for August !, (911', also filed a Petition for Prohibition and 1andamus 6"7 against the $O1%L%$, docketed as G.R. No. 1!C&F0, to assail the constitutionality of #A *o. "1>9, #A *o. "888 and #A *o. 191@8. )ubsequently, Anak 1indanao Party,List, 1inority #ights /orum Philippines, 4nc. and 0angsamoro )olidarity 1ovement filed their own 1otion for Leave to Admit their 1otion for 4ntervention and $omment,in, 4ntervention dated uly 1!, (911. On uly (-, (911, the $ourt granted the motion. 4n the same #esolution, the $ourt ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of :0 *o. >1>-, )0 *o. (+@-, #A *o. "888, and #A *o. 191@8. Oral arguments were held on August ", (911 and August 1-, (911. 2hereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty &(9' days. On )eptember 18, (911, the $ourt issued a temporary restraining order en<oining the implementation of #A *o. 191@8 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of A#11 to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on )eptember 89, (911. T+, A43"1,n02he petitioners assailing #A *o. "1>9, #A *o. "888 and #A *o. 191@8 assert that these laws amend #A *o. "9@> and thus, have to comply with the superma<ority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under )ections 1 and 8, Article M;44 of #A *o. "9"> in order to become effective. 2he petitions assailing #A *o. 191@8 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three,reading requirement of )ection (-&(', Article ;4 of the $onstitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of A#11, as well as the failure to adhere to the Ielective and representativeJ character of the eCecutive and legislative departments of the A#11. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint O4$s to undertake the functions of the elective A#11 officials until the officials elected under the 1ay (918 regular elections shall have assumed office. $orrolarily, they

also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the A#11, in complete violation of )ection 1-, Article M of the $onstitution. T+, I--",-

/rom the partiesN submissions, the following issues were recogniBed and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August " and 1-, (9113 4. 44. 5hether the 1"!+ $onstitution mandates the synchroniBation of elections 5hether the passage of #A *o. 191@8 violates )ection (-&(', Article ;4 of the 1"!+ $onstitution 444. 5hether the passage of #A *o. 191@8 requires a superma<ority vote and plebiscite A. .oes the postponement of the A#11 regular elections constitute an amendment to )ection +, Article M;444 of #A *o. "9@>P 0. .oes the requirement of a superma<ority vote for amendments or revisions to #A *o. "9@> violate )ection 1 and )ection 1-&(', Article ;4 of the 1"!+ $onstitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable lawsP $. .oes the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph (, )ection 1!, Article M of the 1"!+ $onstitutionP 4;. 5hether #A *o. 191@8 violates the autonomy granted to the A#11

;. 5hether the grant of the power to appoint O4$s violates3 A. )ection 1@, Article M of the 1"!+ $onstitution 0. )ection 1-, Article M of the 1"!+ $onstitution $. )ection 1!, Article M of the 1"!+ $onstitution

;4.

5hether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal. 5e shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING 5e resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD 0+, /on-020"02ona#20$ o8 RA No. 1015% in toto. I. Synchroni%ation as a recogni%ed constitutional mandate 2he respondent Office of the )olicitor Heneral &4S>' argues that the $onstitution mandates synchroniBation, and in support of this position, cites )ections 1, ( and @, Article M;444 &2ransitory Provisions' of the 1"!+ $onstitution, which provides3 )ection 1. 2he first elections of 1embers of the $ongress under this $onstitution shall be held on the second 1onday of 1ay, 1"!+. 2he first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the 1embers of the $ongress. 4t shall include the election of all 1embers of the city or municipal councils in the 1etropolitan 1anila area. )ection (. 2he )enators, 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives and the local officials first elected under this $onstitution shall serve until noonof 9une /01 !EE2. Of the )enators elected in the election in 1""(, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for siC year and the remaining twelve for three years. CCC )ection @. 2he siC,year term of the incumbent President and ;ice President elected in the /ebruary +, 1"!- election is, for ur oses of synchroni;ation of elections1 hereby eBtended to noon of 9une /01 !EE2. 2he first regular elections for President and ;ice,President under this $onstitution shall be held on the second 1onday of 1ay, 1""(.

), a34,, 520+ 0+2- 7o-202on. 5hile the $onstitution does not eCpressly state that $ongress has to synchroniBe national and local elections, the clear intent towards this ob<ective can be gleaned from the 2ransitory Provisions &Article M;444' of the $onstitution,6197 which show the eCtent to which the $onstitutional $ommission, by deliberately making ad<ustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchroniBation of elections. 6117

2he ob<ective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchroniBe the holding of all future elections O whether national or local O to once every three years. 61(7 2his intention finds full support in the discussions during the $onstitutional $ommission deliberations. 6187 2hese $onstitutional $ommission eCchanges, read with the provisions of the 2ransitory Provisions of the $onstitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchroniBed national and local elections, starting the second 1onday of 1ay, 1""( and for all the following elections. 2his $ourt was not left behind in recogniBing the synchroniBation of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. 4n 4smeFa v$ Commission on Elections,61>7 we eCplained3 4t is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1"!+ $onstitution that the terms of office of )enators, 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives, the local officials, the President and the ;ice,President have been synchroniBed to end on the same hour, date and year ? noon of une 89, 1""(. 4t is likewise evident from the wording of the above,mentioned )ections that the term of synchroni;ation is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office 2enure on the same day or occasion. 2his common termination date will synchroniBe future elections to once every three years &0ernas, the $onstitution of the #epublic of the Philippines, ;ol. 44, p. -9@'. 2hat the election for )enators, 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives and the local officials &under )ec. (, Art. M;444' will have to be synchroniBed with the election for President and ;ice President &under )ec. @, Art. M;444' is likewise evident from the C C C records of the proceedings in the $onstitutional $ommission. 6%mphasis supplied.7 Although called regional elections, the A#11 elections should be included among the elections to be synchroniBed as it is a IlocalJ election based on the wording and structure of the $onstitution. A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, eCcept when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. 61@7 As this $ourt eCplained in *eo le v$ )erilo,61-7 I6a7s the $onstitution is not primarily a lawyerNs document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. 4ts words should be given their ordinary meaning eCcept where technical terms are employed.J Gnderstood in its ordinary sense, the word IlocalJ refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. 61+7 #egional elections in the A#11 for the positions of governor, vice,governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of A#11. /rom the perspective of the $onstitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article M of the $onstitution entitled ILocal Hovernment.J Autonomous regions are

established and discussed under )ections 1@ to (1 of this Article O the article wholly devoted to Local Hovernment. 2hat an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in )ection 1, Article M of the $onstitution, which provides3 )ection 1. 2he territorial and political subdivisions of the #epublic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. 2here shall be autonomous regions in 1uslim 1indanao, and the $ordilleras as hereinafter provided.

2hus, we find the contention O that the synchroniBation mandated by the $onstitution does not include the regional elections of the A#11 Ounmeritorious. 5e shall refer to synchroniBation in the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The President&s 'ertification on the (rgency of )A *o. +,+-. 2he petitioners in G.R. No. 1!C&F0 also challenge the validity of #A *o. 191@8 for its alleged failure to comply with )ection (-&(', Article ;4 of the $onstitution 61!7 which provides that before bills passed by either the :ouse or the )enate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. 2he eCception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the billNs immediate enactment. 2he $ourt, in Tolentino v$ Secretary of Finance ,61"7 eCplained the effect of the PresidentNs certification of necessity in the following manner3 2he presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. 2he phrase =eCcept when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.= in Art. ;4, )ection (-6(7 qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law3 6i7 the bill has passed three readings on separate days and 6ii7 it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. CCC 2hat upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. /or eCample, the bill defining the certiorari <urisdiction of this $ourt which, in consolidation with the )enate version, became #epublic Act *o. @>>9, was passed on second and third readings in the :ouse of #epresentatives on the same day 61ay 1>, 1"-!7 after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

4n the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the )peaker of the :ouse of #epresentatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchroniBing the A#11 elections with the national and local elections.6(97 /ollowing our Tolentino ruling, the PresidentNs certification eCempted both the :ouse and the )enate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow,up contention that no necessity eCisted for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino3 2he sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas cor us or declaration of martial law Art. ;44, )ection 1!, or the eCistence of a national emergency <ustifying the delegation of eCtraordinary powers to the President under Art. ;4, )ection (8&(' is sub<ect to <udicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of haBard. B"0 0+, 8a/0"a# 9a-2- o8 74,-2d,n02a# /,40282/a02on o8 92##-, 5+2/+ 2n6o#6,- do2n3 a5a$ 520+ 74o/,d"4a# 4,;"24,1,n0d,-23n,d 0o 2n-"4, 0+a0 92##- a4, d"#$ /on-2d,4,d 9$ 1,19,4- o8 Con34,--, /,40a2n#$ -+o"#d ,#2/20 a d288,4,n0 -0anda4d o8 4,62,5. 6%mphasis supplied.7

2he :ouse of #epresentatives and the )enate O in the eCercise of their legislative discretion O gave full recognition to the PresidentNs certification and promptly enacted #A *o. 191@8. Gnder the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of $ongress can <ustify our intrusion under our power of <udicial review.6(17 2he petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or <ustification for this course of action. :ence, while the <udicial department and this $ourt are not bound by the acceptance of the PresidentDs certification by both the :ouse of #epresentatives and the )enate, prudent eCercise of our powers and respect due our co,equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the $onstitution, caution a stay of the <udicial hand.6((7 4n any case, despite the PresidentNs certification, the two,fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. )pecifically, the purpose with respect to 1embers of $ongress is3 &1' to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and &(' to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.6(87 5e find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. 4n this light, no reason eCists to nullify #A *o. 191@8 on the cited ground. III. A. )A *o. /... and )A *o. +,+-. are not amendments to )A *o. /,-0 2he effectivity of #A *o. "888 and #A *o. 191@8 has also been challenged because they did not comply with )ections 1 and 8, Article M;44 of #A *o. "9@> in amending this law. 2hese provisions require3

)ection 1. $onsistent with the provisions of the $onstitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the $ongress of the Philippines upon a vote of two,thirds &(E8' of the 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives and of the )enate voting separately. )ection 8. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a ma<ority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than siCty &-9' days or later than ninety &"9' days after the approval of such amendment or revision. ), 82nd no 1,420 2n 0+2- /on0,n02on. 4n the first place, neither #A *o. "888 nor #A *o. 191@8 amends #A *o. "9@>. As an eCamination of these laws will show, #A *o. "9@> only provides for the schedule of the first A#11 elections and does not fiC the date of the regular elections. A need therefore eCisted for the $ongress to fiC the date of the su!se1uent A#11 regular elections, which it did by enacting #A *o. "888 and thereafter, #A *o. 191@8. Obviously, these subsequent laws O )A *o. /... and )A *o. +,+-. O cannot !e considered amendments to )A *o. /,-0 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter la2 A they merely filled in a gap in #A *o. "9@> or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections. 2his view O that $ongress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding A#11 elections to legislative discretion O finds support in A#11Ns recent history. 2o recall, #A *o. 191@8 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the A#11 elections. 2he /irst Organic Act O #A *o. -+8> O not only did not fiC the date of the subsequent electionsA it did not even fiC the specific date of the first A#11 elections, 6(>7leaving the date to be fiCed in another legislative enactment. $onsequently, #A *o. +->+,6(@7 #A *o. !1+-,6(-7 #A *o. !+>-,6(+7#A *o. !+@8,6(!7 and #A *o. "91(6("7 were all enacted by $ongress to fiC the dates of the A#11 elections. )ince these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of #A *o. -+8>, they were not amendments to this latter law. $onsequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification. 2he )econd Organic Act O RA No. !054 O which lapsed into law on 1arch 81, (991, provided that the first elections would be held on the second 1onday of )eptember (991. 2hereafter, $ongress passed #A *o. "1>9 6897 to reset the date of the A#11 elections. )ignificantly, while #A *o. "1>9 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the )econd Organic Act &#A *o. "9@>', 0+, n,5 da0, o8 0+, ARMM 4,32ona# ,#,/02on- 82>,d 2n RA No. !140 5a- no0 a1on3 0+, 74o62-2on- 4a0282,d 2n 0+, 7#,92-/20, +,#d 0o a774o6, RA No. !054 . 2hereafter, $ongress passed #A *o. "888,6817 which further reset the date of the A#11 regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite. /rom these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of $ongress to treat the laws which fiC the date of the subsequent A#11 elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. $ongress only acted consistently

with this intent when it passed #A *o. 191@8 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in )ection 1 and )ection 8, Article M;44 of #A *o. "9@>. III. B. Superma3ority voting re1uirement unconstitutional for giving )A *o. /,-0 the character of an irrepeala!le la2 %ven assuming that #A *o. "888 and #A *o. 191@8 did in fact amend #A *o. "9@>, the superma<ority &(E8' voting requirement required under )ection 1, Article M;44 of #A *o. "9@> 68(7 has to be struck down for giving #A *o. "9@> the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the $onstitution demands. )ection 1-&(', Article ;4 of the $onstitution provides that a Ima<ority of each :ouse shall constitute a quorum to do business.J 4n other words, as long as ma<ority of the members of the :ouse of #epresentatives or the )enate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. 5ithin a quorum, a vote of ma<ority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. 4n contrast, )ection 1, Article M;44 of #A *o. "9@> requires a vote of no less than two,thirds &(E8' of the 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives and of the )enate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend #A *o. "9@>. $learly, this (E8 voting requirement is higher than what the $onstitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of $ongress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. 2he $ourtNs pronouncement in City of )avao v$ >SIS6887 on this sub<ect best eCplains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality3 1oreover, it would be noCious ana0+,1a 0o d,1o/4a02/ 742n/27#,- for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, eCercising as they do the same plenary powers. P,47,0"a# 2n8a##292#20$ 2no0 on, o8 0+, a00429"0,- d,-24,d 2n a #,32-#a026, 9od$, and a #,32-#a0"4, 5+2/+ a00,170- 0o 8o4,-0a## 8"0"4, a1,nd1,n0- o4 4,7,a#- o8 20- ,na/01,n0- #a9o4- "nd,4 d,#"-2on- o8 o1n2-/2,n/,. CCC A state legislature has a plenary law,making power over all sub<ects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial <urisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited eCpressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. 4t cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws eCcept when so restrained. %very legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. 2his power of repeal may be eCercised at the same session at which the original act was passedA and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. T+2- #,32-#a0"4, /anno0 92nd a 8"0"4, #,32-#a0"4, 0o a 7a402/"#a4 1od, o8 4,7,a#. I0 /anno0 d,/#a4, 2n ad6an/, 0+, 2n0,n0 o8 -"9-,;",n0 #,32-#a0"4,- o4 0+, ,88,/0 o8 -"9-,;",n0 #,32-#a02on "7on ,>2-02n3 -0a0"0,- .68>7&%mphasis ours.'

2hus, while a superma<ority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in eCcess of what the $onstitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoCious because it significantly constricts the future legislatorsN room for action and fleCibility.

III. C. Section ., Article 45II of )A *o. /,-0 e6cessively enlarged the ple!iscite re1uirement found in Section +7, Article 4 of the 'onstitution 2he requirements of #A *o. "9@> not only required an unwarranted superma<ority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its )ection 8, Article M;44 of that Act. As we did on the superma<ority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under )ection 1!, Article M of the $onstitution to be eCcessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the $onstitution. )ection 1!, Article M of the $onstitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. 5hile the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, 68@7 questions on the eCtent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the $onstitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment. )ection 1!, Article M of the $onstitution plainly states that I2he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the ma<ority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.J 5ith these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally,essential to the creation of autonomous regions O i$e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the $onstitution which $ongress must provide for in the Organic Act O require ratification through a plebiscite. 2hese amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to3 &a' the basic structure of the regional governmentA &b' the regionNs <udicial system, i$e$, the special courts with personal, family, and property law <urisdictionA and, &c' the grant and eCtent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under )ection (9, Article M of the $onstitution.68-7 2he date of the A#11 elections does not fall under any of the matters that the $onstitution specifically mandated $ongress to provide for in the Organic Act. 2herefore, even assuming that the superma<ority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements. IG. The synchroni%ation issue As we discussed above, synchroniBation of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that $ongress must provide for and this synchroniBation must include the A#11 elections. On this point, an eCisting law in fact already eCists O #A *o. +1-- O as the forerunner of the current #A *o. 191@8. #A *o. +1-- already provides for the synchroniBation of local elections with the national and congressional elections. 2hus, what #A *o. 191@8 provides is an old matter for local governments &with the eCception of barangay and Sanggunian :abataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided' and is

technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by eCpress constitutional recognition.68+7 2o achieve synchroniBation, $ongress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the A#11Ns regular elections &which should have been held in August (911 based on #A *o. "888' with the fiCed schedule of the national and local elections &fiCed by #A *o. +1-- to be held in 1ay (918'. .uring the oral arguments, the $ourt identified the three options open to $ongress in order to resolve this problem. 2hese options are3 &1' to allow the elective officials in the A#11 to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to )ection +&1', Article ;44 of #A *o. "9@>, until those elected in the synchroniBed elections assume officeA68!7 &(' to hold special elections in the A#11, with the terms of those elected to eCpire when those elected in the synchroniBed elections assume officeA or &8' to authoriBe the President to appoint O4$s, pursuant to )ection 8 of #A *o. 191@8, also until those elected in the synchroniBed elections assume office. As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, $ongress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint O4$s, chose the correct option and passed #A *o. 191@8 as a completely valid law. G. A. T+, Con-020"02ona#20$ o8 RA No. 1015% "asic (nderlying Premises

2o fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. 2he first is the eCtent of the powers of $ongress to legislateA the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchroniBation of electionsA and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recogniBed and established under the 1"!+ $onstitution.

2he grant of legislative power to $ongress is broad, general and comprehensive. 68"7 2he legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 6>97 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by $ongress, unless the $onstitution has lodged it elsewhere. 6>17 %Ccept as limited by the $onstitution, either eCpressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all sub<ects and eCtends to all matters of general concern or common interest.6>(7 2he constitutional limitations on legislative power are either eCpress or implied. 2he eCpress limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the .eclaration of Principles and )tate Policies &Article (' and in the provisions 0ill of #ights &Article 8'. Other constitutional provisions &such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article -, )ections 1 and 8(, and the autonomy provisions of Article M' provide their own eCpress limitations. 2he implied limitations are found Iin the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law.J6>87

2he constitutional provisions on autonomy O specifically, )ections 1@ to (1 of Article M of the $onstitution O constitute eCpress limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of $ongress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government O i$e$1 that the government must have an eCecutive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political unitsA national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under )ection (9, Article M. $onversely and as eCpressly reflected in )ection 1+, Article M, -all o#ers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by la# to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the +ational >overnment$6

2he totality of )ections 1@ to (1 of Article M should likewise serve as a standard that $ongress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. 2he terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the $onstitution intends O the idea of self,rule or self,government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters. 0ut equally clear under these provisions are the ermeating rinci les of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Re ublic1 as eCpressed in the above,quoted )ection 1+ and in )ection 1@.6>>7 4n other words, the $onstitution and the supporting <urisprudence, as they now stand, re<ect the notion of im erium et im erio6>@7 in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.

4n relation with synchroniBation, both autonomy and the synchroniBation of national and local elections are recogniBed and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. 4f their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverageA synchroniBation operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy O as the term suggests O directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted. 2hese underlying basic concepts characteriBe the powers and limitations of $ongress when it acted on #A *o. 191@8. 2o succinctly describe the legal situation that faced $ongress then, its decision to synchroniBe the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections &save for barangay and sangguniang (abataan elections' left it with the problem of ho2 to provide the A) 2ith governance in the intervening period between the eCpiration of the term of those elected in August (99! and the assumption to office O twenty,one &(1' months away O of those who will win in the synchroniBed elections on 1ay 18, (918.

2he problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the $onstitution and its established supporting <urisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. 4nterim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. 2he $onstitutionNs 2ransitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new6>-7 and for the introduction of new concepts.6>+7 As previously mentioned, the ad<ustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchroniBation first transpired under the 2ransitory Provisions. 2he ad<ustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchroniBing regional autonomous elections would entailA thus, the present problem is with us today. 2he creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. 4n the creation of QueBon del )ur6>!7 and .inagat 4slands,6>"7 the creating statutes authoriBed the President to appoint an interim governor, vice,governor and members of the sangguniang anlala#igan although these positions are essentially elective in characterA the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified.6@97 A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub,province to a province.6@17 4n all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessityA out,of,the,way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to ad<ust to the goal or ob<ective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the $onstitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Gnder these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion. 2o return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to $ongress to address the problems brought about by the synchroniBation of the A#11 elections, properly understood as interim measures that $ongress had to provide. 2he proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of )A *o. +,+-. should !e measured, i.e., given the constitutional o!3ective of synchroni%ation that cannot legally !e faulted, did 'ongress gravely a!use its discretion or violate the 'onstitution 2hen it addressed through )A *o. +,+-. the concomitant pro!lems that the ad3ustment of elections necessarily !rought 2ith it8 ". 9oldover :ption is (nconstitutional 5e rule out the first option O holdover for those who were elected in eCecutive and legislative positions in the A#11 during the (99!,(911 term O as an option that $ongress could have chosen because a holdover violates )ection !, Article M of the $onstitution. 2his provision states3 )ection !. 2he 0,41 o8 o882/, o8 ,#,/026, #o/a# o882/2a#- , eCcept barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, -+a## 9, 0+4,, $,a4-and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. 6emphases ours7

)ince elective A#11 officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three,year term limit prescribed by the $onstitutionA they cannot eCtend their term through a holdover. As this $ourt put in 4smeFa v$ C4ME'ECG6@(7 4t is not competent for the legislature to eCtend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the $onstitution fiCes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time. 4n American urisprudence it has been stated as follows3 I4t has been broadly stated that 0+, #,32-#a0"4, /anno0, 9$ an a/0 7o-07on2n3 0+, ,#,/02on 0o 82## an o882/, 0+, 0,41 o8 5+2/+ 2- #2120,d 9$ 0+, Con-020"02on, ,>0,nd 0+, 0,41 o8 0+, 2n/"19,n0 9,$ond 0+, 7,42od a- #2120,d 9$ 0+, Con-020"02on.J 6%mphasis ours.7 4ndependently of the 4smeFa ruling, the primacy of the $onstitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the $onstitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the $onstitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate eCcept only as the $onstitution itself may allow. 6@87 4f at all, $ongress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationaliBe the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non,self,eCecutingA this $ourt, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.6@>7 4n the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fiCed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fiCed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this $ourt. 2hus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three &8' years as fiCed by the $onstitution and cannot be eCtended by holdover by $ongress. 4f it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by $ongress, the net result is for $ongress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. 2his view O like the eCtension of the elective term O is constitutionally infirm because $ongress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i$e$, to act in a way that would effectively eCtend the term of the incumbents. 4ndeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. 6@@7 $ongress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. 2his is effectively an act of appointment by $ongress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. 6@-7 :ence, holdover O whichever way it is viewed O is a constitutionally infirm option that $ongress could not have undertaken.

urisprudence, of course, is not without eCamples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this $ourt. 2he present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v$ C4ME'EC,6@+7 .da v$ Comelec,6@!7 and Montesclaros v$ Comelec16@"7 where the $ourt ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity. All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang (abataan officials whose terms of office are not eCplicitly provided for in the $onstitutionE the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials O the A#11 Hovernor, the A#11 ;ice,Hovernor, and the members of the #egional Legislative Assembly O whose terms fall within the three,year term limit set by )ection !, Article M of the $onstitution. 0ecause of their constitutionally limited term, $ongress cannot legislate an eCtension beyond the term for which they were originally elected. %ven assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it &namely )ection +, Article ;44 of #A *o. "9@>' in the past, 6-97 we have to remember that 0+, 4"#, o8 +o#do6,4 /an on#$ a77#$ a- an a6a2#a9#, o702on 5+,4, no ,>74,-- o4 217#2,d #,32-#a026, 2n0,n0 0o 0+, /on04a4$ ,>2-0-E 20 /anno0 a77#$ 5+,4, -"/+ /on04a4$ 2n0,n0 2- ,62d,n0.6-17 $ongress, in passing #A *o. 191@8, made it eCplicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under #A *o. "9@> by completely removing this provision. 2he deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of $ongress to make in the eCercise of its plenary legislative powersA this $ourt cannot pass upon Huestions of #isdom, <ustice or eCpediency of legislation, 6-(7 eCcept where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. C. The ': #L#' has no authority to order special elections Another option proposed by the petitioner in H.#. *o. 1"+(!( is for this $ourt to compel $O1%L%$ to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to )ection @ and - of 0atas Pambansa 0ilang &0P' !!1. 2he power to fiC the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and eCemplified by, the following provisions of the $onstitution3 )ection !, Article ;4, applicable to the legislature, provides3 )ection !. Un#,-- o0+,452-, 74o62d,d 9$ #a5 , the regular election of the )enators and the 1embers of the :ouse of #epresentatives shall be held on the second 1onday of 1ay. 6%mphasis ours7

)ection >&8', Article ;44, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and ;ice,President, states3 CCCC

)ection >. CCC Un#,-- o0+,452-, 74o62d,d 9$ #a5, the regular election for President and ;ice,President shall be held on the second 1onday of 1ay. 6%mphasis ours7

while )ection 8, Article M, on local government, provides3 )ection 8. T+, Con34,-- -+a## ,na/0 a #o/a# 3o6,4n1,n0 /od, which shall provide for CCC the qualifications, ,#,/02on, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of #o/a# o882/2a#-[.7 6%mphases ours7 2hese provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, ;ice President, 1embers of $ongress and local officials, eCcept when so provided by another Act of $ongress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom $ongress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the eCecution of that power. 6-87 *otably, $ongress has acted on the A#11 elections by postponing the scheduled August (911 elections and setting another date O 1ay 18, (911 O for regional elections synchroniBed with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. 0y so doing, $ongress itself has made a policy decision in the e6ercise of its legislative 2isdom that it shall not call special elections as an ad<ustment measure in synchroniBing the A#11 elections with the other elections. After $ongress has so acted, neither the %Cecutive nor the udiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the $O1%L%$. 2his $ourt, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. 2o be sure, the $ourt is not without the power to declare an act of $ongress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been eCercised in grave abuse of discretion.6->7 "ut our po2er rests on very narro2 ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of 'ongress; it is not to supplant the decision of 'ongress nor to mandate 2hat 'ongress itself should have done in the e6ercise of its legislative po2ers. 2hus, contrary to what the petition in H.#. *o. 1"+(!( urges, we cannot compel $O1%L%$ to call for special elections. /urthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the $O1%L%$, in contrast with the power of $ongress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 6-@7 )tatutorily, $O1%L%$ has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. 2rue, $ongress did grant, via )ections @ and - of 0P !!1, $O1%L%$ with the power to postpone elections to another date. :owever, this power is limited to, and can only be eCercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. 5e quote3 )ection @. *ost onement of election$ = 5hen for any serious cause such as 62o#,n/,, 0,44o42-1, #o-- o4 d,-04"/02on o8 ,#,/02on 7a4a7+,4na#2a or records, 8o4/, 1a=,"4,, and o0+,4 ana#o3o"- /a"-,- of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the $ommission, motu ro rio or upon a

verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall 7o-07on, 0+, ,#,/02on 0+,4,2n 0o a da0, 5+2/+ -+o"#d 9, 4,a-ona9#$ /#o-, 0o 0+, da0, o8 0+, ,#,/02on no0 +,#d, -"-7,nd,d o4 5+2/+ 4,-"#0,d 2n a 8a2#"4, 0o ,#,/0 but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. )ection -. /ailure of election. , 4f, on account of 8o4/, 1a=,"4,, 62o#,n/,, 0,44o42-1, 84a"d, or o0+,4 ana#o3o"- /a"-,- 0+, ,#,/02on 2n an$ 7o##2n3 7#a/, +a- no0 9,,n +,#d on 0+, da0, 82>,d, or +ad 9,,n -"-7,nd,d before the hour fiCed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, -"/+ ,#,/02on 4,-"#0- 2n a 8a2#"4, 0o ,#,/0, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the $ommission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. 6%mphasis ours7

A close reading of )ection @ of 0P !!1 reveals that it is meant to address instances where ,#,/02on- +a6, a#4,ad$ 9,,n -/+,d"#,d 0o 0a<, 7#a/, 9"0 +a6, 0o 9, 7o-07on,d because of &a' violence, &b' terrorism, &c' loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, &d' force ma5eure, and &e' other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free1 orderly and honest election should become im ossible in any olitical subdivision . Gnder the principle of e5usdem generis1 the term Ianalogous causesJ will be restricted to those "n8o4,-,,n or "n,>7,/0,d events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. 2hese Ianalogous causesJ are further defined by the phrase I of such nature that the holding of a free1 orderly and honest election should become im ossible.J )imilarly, )ection - of 0P !!1 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of &a' 8o4/, 1a=,"4,, &b' 62o#,n/,, &c' 0,44o42-1, &d' 84a"d, or &e' o0+,4 ana#o3o"/a"-,- 0+, ,#,/02on 2n an$ 7o##2n3 7#a/, +a- no0 9,,n +,#d on 0+, da0, 82>,d, or +ad 9,,n -"-7,nd,d before the hour fiCed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, -"/+ ,#,/02on 4,-"#0- 2n a 8a2#"4, 0o ,#,/0. As in )ection @ of 0P !!1, )ection - addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because of "n,>7,/0,d and "n8o4,-,,n circumstances. 4n the present case, 0+, 7o-07on,1,n0 o8 0+, ARMM ,#,/02on- 2- 9$ #a5 O i$e., by congressional policy O and is 7"4-"an0 0o 0+, /on-020"02ona# 1anda0, o8 -$n/+4on2Aa02on of national and local elections. 0y no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by )ection @ or )ection - of 0P !!1, which all pertain to eCtralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. $ourts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. 6--7 $learly, neither )ection @ nor )ection - of 0P !!1 can apply to the present case and this $ourt has absolutely no legal basis to compel the $O1%L%$ to hold special elections.

D. The 'ourt has no po2er to shorten the terms of elective officials

%ven assuming that it is legally permissible for the $ourt to compel the $O1%L%$ to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise eCists to rule that the newly elected A#11 officials shall hold office only until the A#11 officials elected in the synchroniBed elections shall have assumed office. 4n the first place, the $ourt is not empowered to ad<ust the terms of elective officials. 0ased on the $onstitution, the power to fiC the term of office of elective officials, which can be eCercised only in the case of barangay officials,6-+7 is specifically given to $ongress. %ven $ongress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the $onstitution shortened the terms of twelve )enators obtaining the least votes, 6-!7 and eCtended the terms of the President and the ;ice,President6-"7 in order to synchroniBe electionsA $ongress was not granted this same power. 2he settled rule is that terms fiCed by the $onstitution cannot be changed by mere statute. 6+97 1ore particularly, not even $ongress and certainly not this $ourt, has the authority to fiC the terms of elective local officials in the A#11 for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years 6+17 as this tinkering would directly contravene )ection !, Article M of the $onstitution as we ruled in 4smena$ 2hus, in the same way that the term of elective A#11 officials cannot be eCtended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened 9$ 7"002n3 an ,>724a02on da0, ,a4#2,4 0+an 0+, 0+4,, H%I $,a4- 0+a0 0+, Con-020"02on 20-,#8 /o11and-. T+2- 2- 5+a0 52## +a77,n J a 0,41 o8 #,-- 0+an 05o $,a4- J 28 a /a## 8o4 -7,/2a# ,#,/02on- -+a## 74,6a2#. 4n sum, while synchroniBation is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an eCpress provision of the $onstitution. *either we nor $ongress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the A#11 elections instead of acting on their term &where the ItermJ means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fiCes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the ItenureJ represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office'. 6+(7 As with the fiCing of the elective term, neither $ongress nor the $ourt has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective A#11 officials. 2hey would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so. E. The President&s Po2er to Appoint :I's 2he above considerations leave only $ongressN chosen interim measure O #A *o. 191@8 and the appointment by the President of O4$s to govern the A#11 during the pre,synchroniBation period pursuant to )ections 8, > and @ of this law O as the only measure that $ongress can make. 2his choice itself, however, should be eCamined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially eCecutive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the eCercise of this power should be strictly construedA these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in

order to be recogniBed.6+87 2he appointing power is embodied in )ection 1-, Article ;44 of the $onstitution, which states3 )ection 1-. 2he President shall nominate and, with the consent of the $ommission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the eCecutive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this $onstitution. H, -+a## a#-o a77o2n0 a## o0+,4 o882/,4- o8 0+, Go6,4n1,n0 5+o-, a77o2n01,n0- a4, no0 o0+,452-, 74o62d,d 8o4 9$ #a5, and 0+o-, 5+o1 +, 1a$ 9, a"0+o42A,d 9$ #a5 0o a77o2n0. 2he $ongress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. 6emphasis ours7

2his provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. 2hese are3 First, the heads of the eCecutive departmentsA ambassadorsA other public ministers and consulsA officers of the Armed /orces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captainA and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this $onstitutionA Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by lawA Third, those 2hom the President may !e authori%ed !y la2 to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the $ongress may by law vest in the President alone.6+>7 )ince the PresidentNs authority to appoint O4$s emanates from #A *o. 191@8, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to )ection 1-, Article ;44 of the $onstitution. 2hus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 4f at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint O4$s under )ection 8 of #A *o. 191@8 is the assertion that the $onstitution requires that the A#11 eCecutive and legislative officials to be Ielective and representative of the constituent political units.J 2his requirement indeed is an eCpress limitation whose non,observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of O4$s constitutionally defective. After fully eCamining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if #A *o. 191@8 were to be mista<enly read as a la2 that changes the elective and representative character of A) fact only does is to -a positions. #A *o. 191@8, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the A#11 &#A *o. "9@>' sets outs in terms of structure of governance. 5hat #A *o. 191@8 in oint officers=in=charge for the 4ffice of the Regional >overnor1 Regional Vice >overnor and Members of the Regional 'egislative .ssembly #ho shall erform the functions ertaining to the said offices

until the officials duly elected in the May 20!/ elections shall have Hualified and assumed office$6 2his power is far different from appointing elective A#11 officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the 1ay (918 elections. As we have already established in our discussion of the superma<ority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 1015% d2d no0 a1,nd RA No. !054. )A *o. +,+-., in fact, provides only for synchroni%ation of elections and for the interim measures that must in the mean2hile prevail. And this is how #A *o. 191@8 should be read O in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. 6+@7 Aside from its order for synchroni%ation, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the ad3ustments that the synchroni%ation re1uires. 2hus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for $ongress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchroniBation unavoidably brought with it. 4n more concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavaila!ility of constitutional possi!ilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected A) officials, is the choice of the President&s po2er to appoint = for a fi6ed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allo2ed under Section +>, Article 5II of the 'onstitution = an unconstitutional or unreasona!le choice for 'ongress to ma<e8 Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or #here the a o#er of

ointment #ould eBtend beyond the ad5ustment eriod for synchroni;ation would be to foster a government that is

not Idemocratic and republican.J /or then, the peopleNs right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. 2his is the grant that would frontally breach the Ielective and representativeJ governance requirement of )ection 1!, Article M of the $onstitution. 0ut this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in #A *o. 191@8 where the period is fiCed and, more importantly, the terms of governance O both under )ection 1!, Article M of the $onstitution and #A *o. "9@> O will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. 2o repeat what has previously been said, #A *o. "9@> will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the $onstitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchroniBation of elections requires. ;iewed from another perspective, synchroniBation will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the A#11, as well as the communityNs choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units6+-7 and the ad<ustments of sub,provinces to the status of provinces. 6++7 2hese measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchroniBation of elections &considered vis=I=vis the regional interests involved'. 2he adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the eCercise by $ongress of the inherent police power of the )tate, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.

/urthermore, the IrepresentativeJ character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of O4$s as this requirement is really a function of the appointment processA only the IelectiveJ aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of O4$s. 4n this regard, #A *o. 191@8 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under )ections 8, > and @ of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of O4$, the 1anner and Procedure of Appointing O4$s, and their Qualifications. 0ased on these considerations, we hold that #A *o. 191@8 O viewed in its proper conteCt O is a law that is not violative of the $onstitution &specifically, its autonomy provisions', and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances. GI. :ther 'onstitutional 'oncerns Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of #A *o. 191@8 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with O4$s. 2his claim apparently misunderstands that an across,the,board cancellation of elections is a matter for $ongress, not for the President, to address. 4t is a power that falls within the powers of $ongress in the eCercise of its legislative powers. %ven $ongress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections. 4f #A *o. 191@8 cancelled the regular August (911 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose O the synchroniBation of elections. 4t was a temporary means to a lasting end O the synchroniBation of elections. 2hus, #A *o. 191@8 and the support that the $ourt gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localiBed cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by $ongress to the $O1%L%$, as above discussed. Hiven that the incumbent A#11 elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the eCpiration of their terms, and this $ourt cannot compel the $O1%L%$ to conduct special elections, the $ourt now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the A#11. 2o emphasiBe the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of (1 months O or close to ( years O intervenes from the time that the incumbent A#11 elective officialsN terms eCpired and the time the new A#11 elective officials begin their terms in (918. As the lessons of our 1indanao history O past and current O teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countryNs 1uslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. 6+!7 2hus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting A#11 Hovernor, an acting ;ice,Hovernor and a fully functioning #egional Legislative

Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. 2o our mind, the appointment of O4$s under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity. )ignificantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint O4$s to undertake the functions of the elective members of the #egional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. 5e hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Men;on v$ *etilla1 etc$1 et al.36+"7 4t may be noted that under $ommonwealth Act *o. @!! and the #evised Administrative $ode of 1"!+, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. A#9,20 9o0+ #a5- d,a# on#$ 520+ 0+, 82##2n3 o8 6a/an/2,- 2n a77o2n026, 7o-202on-. Ho5,6,4, 2n 0+, a9-,n/, o8 an$ /on04a4$ 74o62-2on 2n 0+, Lo/a# Go6,4n1,n0 Cod, and 2n 0+, 9,-0 2n0,4,-0 o8 7"9#2/ -,462/,, 5, -,, no /o3,n0 4,a-on 5+$ 0+, 74o/,d"4, 0+"- o"0#2n,d 9$ 0+, 05o #a5- 1a$ no0 9, -212#a4#$ a77#2,d 2n 0+, 74,-,n0 /a-,. 2he respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. 2his argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are <unior to the vice,governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government. 4n a republican form of government, the ma<ority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that eCtent, may be hampered. N,/,--a42#$, 0+,4, 52## 9, a /on-,;",n0 d,#a$ 2n 0+, d,#26,4$ o8 9a-2/ -,462/,- 0o 0+, 7,o7#, o8 L,$0, 28 0+, Go6,4no4 o4 0+, G2/,DGo6,4no4 2- 12--2n3 .6!97&%mphasis ours.' As in Men;on, leaving the positions of A#11 Hovernor, ;ice Hovernor, and members of the #egional Legislative Assembly vacant for (1 months, or almost ( years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. 5hen viewed in this conteCt, allowing the President in the eCercise of his constitutionally,recogniBed appointment power to appoint O4$s is, in our <udgment, a reasonable measure to take. B. Autonomy in the A) 4t is further argued that while synchroniBation may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the $onstitution granted to the A#11. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there eCists a conflict between two recogniBed $onstitutional mandates O synchroniBation and regional autonomy O such that it is necessary to choose one over the other. 5e find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction O ut magis valeat Huam ereat3 that the $onstitution is to be interpreted as a whole, 6!17 and one mandate should not be

given importance over the other eCcept where the primacy of one over the other is clear. 6!(7 5e refer to the $ourtNs declaration in .ng=.ngco v$ Castillo1 et al$16!87thus3 A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. #ather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, /on8#2/02n3 74o62-2on- -+o"#d 9, 4,/on/2#,d and +a41on2A,d 2n a 1ann,4 0+a0 1a$ 326, 0o a## o8 0+,1 8"## 8o4/, and ,88,/0. 6%mphasis supplied.7 )ynchroniBation is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. 2hey are interests that this $ourt should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that $ongress did in #A *o. 191@8 which provides the measure to transit to synchroniBed regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, eCcept in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances. %lsewhere, it has also been argued that the A#11 elections should not be synchroniBed with the national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the A#11 and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. 2his argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits. As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the $onstitution never equated autonomy with independence. 2he A#11 as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the )tate and is still sub<ect to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the $onstitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions3 1r. 0ennagen. CCC 5e do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. 5e see this as an effective partnership, not a separation. 1r. #omulo. 2herefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence. 1r. Ople. ), d,82n, 20 a- a 1,a-"4, o8 -,#8D3o6,4n1,n0 520+2n 0+, #a43,4 7o#202/a# 84a1,5o4< o8 0+, na02on.6!>7 6%mphasis supplied.7 2his eCchange of course is fully and eCpressly reflected in the above,quoted )ection 1+, Article M of the $onstitution, and by the eCpress reservation under )ection 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be -#ithin the frame#or( of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as #ell as the territorial integrity of the Re ublic of the *hili ines$6 4nterestingly, the framers of the $onstitution initially proposed to remove )ection 1+ of Article M, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in )ection (9, Article M of

the $onstitution. Gpon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to Imake it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. T+o-, no0 ,n"1,4a0,d a4, a/0"a##$ 0o 9, ,>,4/2-,d 9$ 0+, na02ona# 3o6,4n1,n0 6.7J6!@7Of note is the $ourtNs pronouncement in *imentel1 9r$ v$ ,on$ .guirre6!-7 which we quote3 Gnder the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. 2he purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. 4n turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are eCpected to propel social and economic growth and development. B"0 0o ,na9#, 0+, /o"n04$ 0o d,6,#o7 a- a 5+o#,, 0+, 74o34a1- and 7o#2/2,- ,88,/0,d #o/a##$ 1"-0 9, 2n0,34a0,d and /oo4d2na0,d 0o5a4d- a /o11on na02ona# 3oa#. T+"-, 7o#2/$D-,002n3 8o4 0+, ,n024, /o"n04$ -02## #2,- 2n 0+, P4,-2d,n0 and Con34,--. 6%mphasis ours.7 4n other words, the autonomy granted to the A#11 cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. )ince the synchroniBation of elections is not <ust a regional concern but a national one, the A#11 is sub<ect to itA the regional autonomy granted to the A#11 cannot be used to eCempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the $onstitution.

Con/#"-2on $ongress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate O the synchroniBation of national and local elections O when it enacted #A *o. 191@8. 2his $ourt cannot question the manner by which $ongress undertook this taskA the udiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, <ustice or eCpediency of legislation.6!+7 As <udges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.6!!7 *or can the $ourt presume to dictate the means by which $ongress should address what is essentially a legislative problem. 4t is not within the $ourtNs power to enlarge or abridge lawsA otherwise, the $ourt will be guilty of usurping the eCclusive prerogative of $ongress. 6!"7 2he petitioners, in asking this $ourt to compel $O1%L%$ to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of <udicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government O the separation of powers. 2he petitioners allege, too, that we should act because $ongress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting #A *o. 191@8. Hrave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical eCercise of <udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty en<oined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is eCercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 6"97

5e find that $ongress, in passing #A *o. 191@8, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Hiven an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary ad<ustments that synchroniBation demands. $ongress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. 5e thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitionersN claims of grave abuse of discretion. On the general claim that #A *o. 191@8 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid. 6"17 $ongress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. 6"(7 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. 6"87 As this $ourt declared in >arcia v$ EBecutive Secretary36">7 2he policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. 2o doubt is to sustain. 2his presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which en<oins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. 2he theory is that a- 0+, =o2n0 a/0 o8 Con34,-- and 0+, P4,-2d,n0 o8 0+, P+2#2772n,-, a #a5 +a- 9,,n /a4,8"##$ -0"d2,d and d,0,412n,d 0o 9, 2n a//o4dan/, 520+ 0+, 8"nda1,n0a# #a5 9,8o4, 20 5a- 82na##$ ,na/0,d.6"@7 6%mphasis ours.7 Hiven the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of #A *o. 191@8, we must support and confirm its validity. )HERE.ORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of #A *o. 191@8 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. 5e likewise LI.T the temporary restraining order we issued in our #esolution of )eptember 18, (911. *o costs