JUDITH BUTLER

b. 1956
Judith Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subvers10H ofIdentity (1990) , argu-
ably the most influential theoretical text of the 19905, is a founding document of
queer theory and a key statement of "performative" accounts of cultural meaning.
Butler's work distills forty years of French theory-from pioneer feminist SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR to JULIA KRISTEVA, and from JACQUES lACAN and LOUIS AlTHUSSER (0
JACQUES DERRIOA and MI CHEL FOUCAULT- to explore how gendered identity is
socially produced through repetitions of ordinary daily activities. Her goal is to
uncover the assumptions that "restrict the meaning of gender to received notions of
masculinity and femininity." Tn opening up "the field of possibility for gender," Buder
aims for a feminism that avoids "exclusionary gender norms" in its portrayal of accept-
able identities.
Trained in philosophy, Judith Butler received her undergraduate and graduate
degrees at Yale University. She has taught in interdisciplinary programs, first at Johns
Hopkins University and then at the University of California at Berkeley. Gender Trou-
ble made her something between a celebrity and a cult figure. especially in gay and
lesbian subcultures. and she has responded by jealously guarding her personal life
from public scrutiny.
Key for Butler is the insistence that nothing is natural, not even sexual identity.
Feminists have sometimes distInguished between s e x ' ~ as the anatomical difference
between male and female bodies and "gender" as the meani ngs attached to those
bodily differences in various cultures. Butler argues that even anatomical differences
can be experienced only through the categories and expectations set out by the cul-
ture's signifying order. Moreover, anatomical differences are mapped to expectations
about sexual desire, specifically to society's "compulsory heterosexuality" (a term But-
ler borrows from ADRIENNE RICH) , which posits that there are two sexes and that
desire runs from one sex to the other. Our culture's understanding of sexuality is ill
equipped, therefore, to recognize bodies that confound the strict binary division
between male and female, or desires that cross, combine, or otherwise fail to conform
to a fairly narrow understanding of sex as genital intercourse between two people,
one "naturally" female, the other "naturally" male.
Following Foucault's work in The History of Sexu.ali ty (1976), Butler stresses Ihat
modern cul t ure sees sexuality as a fundamental constituent of identity. Our sex and
our sexual desires and activities are profound indices of who we are. Butler hopes-
like many contemporary critical theorists-to reveal that the seemingly "natural" is
actually socially constructed and, thus, contingent. The established and conventional
connections between anatomy and desire, and between sexual act ivities and ascrip-
tions of identity, are not inevitable; they have been different in other cultures and in
other historical eras, and they are open to revision or, to use one of Butler's favorite
words, "resignification." The meanings and categories by which weunclerstand and
live our daily existence can be altered.
Such alteration does not come easily, however. ''Those naturaJized and reified
notions of gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power" are writ-
ten into our very psyches as well as into the dominant institutions of political and
social life. Butler follows the accounts of subject formation found in Foucault and
Lacan. For Foucault, discourse (the articulated categories of thought) orders knowl-
edge along lines that produce subjects open to power's control. Such power, he
stresses, works at the level of dail y routine. For Lacan, individuals achieve an identity,
a recognized place in the social order, by passing into the Law (the culture's signifying
order)- at the cost of creating the unconscious and establishing a permanent split,
an ali enation of self from desire, within the subj ect.
To Foucault's account of power's "micro-physics" and Lacan's description of sub-
ject formation, Butler adds Derrida's understanding of "performative speech acts."
She believes "the perfonnative" offers her a model of action within theories that often
seem to allow subjects no room for resistance to power. Derrida develops his notion
of the performative in an essay on J. L. AUSTIN, the twentieth-century Oxford philos-
opher who invented the term, and in a later debate \"Iith the American philosopher
John Searl e. Austin comes from an Anglo-American tradition (dating back to John
Locke) that sees the meaning of language as grounded in the way that words refer to
already existing objects. I speak of a certain blue chair, and my words are meaningful
and true insofar as they conform to the facts of the matter. But Austin realized that
some utterances are creative: they make something come into existence, rather than
referring to something that already exists. Anyone who makes a promise, or a judge
who sentences someone to prison, creates a fact (the promise, the sentence) through
the act of speaking. Such speech acts are performatives.
SurpriSingly, as Austin pursues this notion he finds it increasingly djfficult to dis-
tinguish performatives from referential speech acts. Derrida picks up on (his difficulty
and adds the concepts of "citation" and "repetition" to the analysis. Every speech act,
Derrida argues , succeeds in meaning anything at all only by virtue of its "citing"
previous uses of the term it now employs. In other words, language works because
the speakers of that language have a prior knowledge of its terms and its prevailing
usages (both syntactic and semantic). Every new speech act is a repetition, using old
words and structures in this new instance. There are thus fairly strict limits on novelty.
An utterance that departs too far from received understandings will be incomprehen-
sible. But exact repethion does not occur very often either. After all , we are using the
old words in new contexts. Each separate use of a word tweaks it in this or that
direction in relation to a variety of pressures: the context, the audience, conscious or
unconscious purposes. Thus, each speech act has a performative dimension; instead
of repeating or referring to preexisting meanings in its "citation" of a previously used
word, it alters) jf always within limits, the meaning of that word. Languages are repro-
duced, are kept alive and functioning, through innumerable acts of use; but those
acts also constantly change the language. Most changes are inadvertent by-products
of use, but some may be conscious, such as contemporary efforts to abandon "man"
as the generic word referring to all human beings.
Butler proposes that we understand "sex" and '(gender" as citational repetitions.
Various cultural discourses converge in a prevailing (although never fuUy homo
geneous or monolithic) understanding of what "hoy" and ('girl," "man" and "woman"
signify. Individual actions then "cite" these meanings, playing off them in various
ways. Power functions pervaSively through these meanings. The little boy learns that
his crying is nOI masculine; he must grow into his masculinity by imitating the behav-
ior designated as "maJe" to the point that such behavior becomes "second nature,"
The little girl learns that some ways of acting make her a tomboy, and she is encour-
aged to dress the part of "femininity." In Butler's view, we feel our way into these
roles, slowly establishing (under the watchful eyes of powerful social forces ) the way
we will occupy them. Given our prevailing we experience this process as
discovering our identity. Butler believes identity is a trap. a hardening into rigid,
binarized categori es of much more Auid and heterogeneous possibilities. She calls for
actions that will "resignjfy" our received meanings-actions that will lead to a "pro-
liferation" of the "constitutive categori es" into which all selves are now constrai ned
to fit .
The costs of identi ty's straitjacket, Butler believes, are high-both for those who
fit the categori es comfortably and those who don't. "Deviants" (such as homosexuals,
bisexual s, hermaphrodites, or other less recognizable nonidentities) are inevitable,
according to Butler, although her reasons for thls claim are not completely clear. For
her, discursive power is never fully effecti ve. It cannot create all individuals in its
preferred image, in part because any social neld is traversed by various discourses,
none of which ever achieves full domination. In any case, compulsory heterosexuality
cannot erase all non heterosexual desires or acts. But the price paid by those labeled
deviant for such desires and acts- in internalized guilt and external sanctions-is
exorbitant. On the side of "normality," heterosexual identity can be achieved only
through the forceful exclusion or "disavowal" of all nonheterosexual desires, in keep-
ing with commonplace obsessional notions of identity as consistent in all places and
at all times. Socially, this disavowal is expressed through homophobia and other dis-
courses of Nabjection" (Kris teva's famous term) that single out deviants as worthy
targets of aggressjon and punishment.
Butler calls for a loosening of the categories , a relaxation of our fixation on
identity. Power uses identity to latch onto us, and normative identity calls for a
homogeneity too difficult to live. A change of this type can be seen as therapeutic-
and in keeping with SIGMUND FREUD's goal of moderating the strictures of con-
ventional morality and its excessive internal voice, the superego. But Butler's attack
on identity also has specificall y political dimensions. She believes that feminism
has been hurt by its attempt to find an identity that would deSignate some
thing common to everyone in the movement. She call s instead for a coalitional
polities that avoids the fights over purity (of identity, of doctrine, of commitment)
that often tear apart movements dependent on complete agreement among members
over long periods of time. Thus, while Butler's work grows out of feminism, she is
against any "identity politics" that sees political groupings and beliefs as grounded
in a shared identity, whether ethnic, racial, sexual, national, or economic. All forms
of identity politiCS, she believes, are prone to aggressions used to enforce rigid con-
sis tencies.
How do we begin to loosen the hold of identity, especially at a time when the
passions attached to identity and its preservation are fervent and pervasive? An initial
step, Butler says, is to make evident identity's construction; it is not inevitable (even
if social power hardly leaves us much freedom to choose our ways of being in the
worl d). Identi ty is not something planted in us to be discovered, but something that
is performatively produced by acts that "effectively constitute the identity they are
said to express or reveaL" At the end of Gender Trouble., Butler advocates parody in
general and drag performances in particular because such "subversive" performances
"destabilize the nat uralized categories of identity and desire." Ie is here that queer
theory makes its appearance. Such theory is interested in any and all acts, images,
and ideas that "trouble," violate, cross, mix, or otherwise confound established bound-
aries between male and female, nonnal and abnormal, self and other. In a limited
sense, the goal is to create more space for and recognition of the vari ous actions
performed daily in a social landscape blinded and hos tile to variety. But the broader
goal is a general troubling, an attempted unfixing, of the links between acts, catego-
ries, representati ons, desires , and identities.
The main objections to Butler's position echo the objections often made to post-
structuralist work. Key questions focus on agency, power, and ethics, while a difficult
style and specialized terminology seem to guarantee a small audience for work that
aims to have political consequences. To what extent does Butler believe that con-
scious, purposive action is possible if she posits an all.encompassing discursive power
that shapes us at such a deep, unconscious level? How are we to understand "com-
pulsory heterosexualiry," "masculine hegemony," "phallogocentrism" (Derrida's term
for the masculi ne power at the origi n of the Law), and other te rms by which she
deSignates power? Have there been societies in which these forms of power have not
been dominant? Is the formation of subjectivity entirely a matter of the self's relation
to power, or do intersubjecti ve relationships have any important role to pla y? What
enables the critical enterprise itself, the abili ry to describe the processes of subject
formation? Within ongoing debates over the details, however, a new interest in vio-
lations of received categories and the perfonnative reproduction and transformation
of culture attests to Butler's impact on literary studies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Butler's first book, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in
Frame ( 1986), traces French theories of subject formation as influenced by the
nineteenth-century German phiJosopher C. W. F. Hegel. He!" books after Gender
Trouble (1990)-Bod-iS That Matter: On the Limits afuSe:x" ( 1993),Excit
able Speech: A Pol.itics of the Peiformative (1996). and TIle Psychic Life of Power:
Theories in Subjection (1997}-address various objections to herwork and further
develop herperformativemodelofsubjectformation.Also ofinterestis Butier'sAnti-
gone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (2000). Shehas co-editedtwo impor
tantcollections:withJoanW. Scott,Feminists Theorize the PoliticaL (1992);andwith
Linda Singer, Erotic Welfare: Sexual Theory und Politics in the Age of Epidemic
(1993). Limited biographical information can befound in "Preface (1999)" in the
tenth anniversaryeditionofGender Trouble ( 1999).
Twoexcellentplaces to startinexploringtheresponsesoccasionedbyButler'swork
are Peter Osborne and Lynne Segal's "Gender as Performance:An Interview with
Judith Butler," Radical Philosophy 67 (1994). and Feminist Contentions: A Philo-
sophical Exchange (I 995). whichpresents a debate among Butler, Seyla Benhabib,
Drucilia Cornell, and Nancy Fraser, all leading women philosophers. For a good
samplingof otherresponsestoButler'swork,seeSusanBordo,"PostmodernSubjects,
PostmodernBodies,"Feminist Studies 18.1 (1992);ShanePhelan,"SocialConstruc-
tionism, Sexuality, and Politics," Women and Politics 12.1 (I 992);John McGowan,
"Thinking about Violence: Feminism, Cultural,'Politics, and Norms," Centennial
Review 37.3 (1993); Debra Silverman, "Making a Spectacle: Or, Is There Female
Drag?" Critical Matri.."( 7.2 (1993); Biddy Martin, uSexualities without Gender and
Other Queer Utop!as," Diacritics 24,2-3 ( 1994); and Pheng Cheah, "Mattering,"
Diacritics 26.1(1996).
From GenderTrouble
From Preface
Contemporaryfeminist debates over the meanjngs ofgenderlead timeand
again to a certain senseoftrouble, as ifthe indeterminacyofgendermight
eventually culminate in the failure offeminism. Perhaps trouble need not
carry such a negative valence. To make trouble was, within the reigning
discourseofmychildhood,somethingoneshouldneverdopreciselybecause
thatwouldgetonein trouble.Therebellion andits reprimandseemedtobe
caughtupint hesameterms,aphenomenonthatgaverisetomyfirstcritical.
insightintothesubtleruseofpower:theprevailinglawthreatenedonewith
trouble, even put one in t rouble, all to keep one out of trouble. Hence, .1
concluded thattrouble is inevitableand thetask, how bestto makeit,what
best way to be in it. As time went by, further ambiguities arrived on the
critical scene. I noted that troublesometimeseuphemizedsomefundarnen:
tally mysteriousproblem usuallyrelated to the alleged mysteryofall things
feminine. I read Beauvoir
l
who explained that to be a woman within the
termsofamasculinistcultureis to beasourceofmysteryandunknowability
formen,andthis seemedconfirmedsomehowwhenIreadSartre
2
forwhom
all desire, problematically presumed as heterosexual and masculine, was
I . SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR ( 1908-1986). French 2 . JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (1905- 1980), Frenc:h e:us-
exislel'liialisland lenlialistphilosopht'r.
defined as trouble. For that masculine subject'ofdesire, trouble became a
scandal with the sudden intrusion, the unanticipated agency, ofa female
"object"whoinexplicablyreturns theglance,reverses thegaze,andcontests
the place and aUlhority ofthe masculineposition.The radical dependency
ofthemasculinesubjectonthefemale"Other"suddenlyexposes his auton-
omy as illusory. That particular dialectical reversal of power, however,
couldn'tquiteholdmyattention-althoughotherssurelydid. Powerseemed
to be more than an exchange between subjects or a relation ofconstant
inversionbetweenasubjectandanOther;indeed,powerappearedtooperate
intheproductionofthatverybinaryframeforthinkingaboutgender.I asked.
what configuration of power constructs t he subject and the Other, that
binary relation between Hmen" and liwomen," and the internal stabi li ty of
those tenns?Whatrestriction is here atwork?Are those terms untroubling
onlyto theextent that theyconform toa heterosexualmatrix for conceptu-
alizing gender and desire? Whathappens to the subjectand to the stabi li ty
ofgender categories when the epistemic regime ofpresumptive
ualityis unmasked as thatwhichproduces and reines these ostensiblecat-
egories ofontology?
Buthow can an epistemic/ontological regime be brought into question?
Whatbestwaytotroublethegendercategoriesthatsupportgenderhierarchy
andcompulsoryheterosexuality? Considerthefate ofufemale trouble,"that
historical configuration of a nameless female indisposition, which thinly
veiled the notion thatbeingfemale is a naturalindisposition. Seriousas the
medicalizationofwomen'sbodiesis,thetermis alsolaughable,andlaughter
in the face of serious categories is indispensable for femini sm. Without a
doubt ,feminis m continues to require jts own forms ofseriousplay. Female
Trouble is also the title of theJohn Waters film that features Divine, the
hero/ heroineofHairsprayl aswell ,whoseimpersonationof womenimplicitly
suggests thatgenderisa kind ofpersistentimpersonation thatpassesas the
real. Her/hisperformancedestabilizestheverydistinctionsbetweenthenat-
ural and the artificial, depth and surface, inner and outer through which
discourse about genders almost always operates, Is drag the imitation of
gender, or does it dramatiz.e the signifying gestures through which gender
itselfis established? Does being female constitute a "natural fact" ora cul-
turalperformance, or is "naturalness"constitutedthroughdiscursivelycon-
strained performative acts that produce the body through and within the
categories ofsex? Divine notwithstanding, genderpractices wi thin gay and
lesbian culturesoften themati"l,e "thenatu ral"in parodiccontexts thatbring
into reliefthe performative construction ofan origina]and true sex. What
otherfoundational categoriesofidentity- thebinaryofsex,gender,andthe
body-canbeshownas productionsthatcreatetheeffectofthenatural,the
original,and the inevitable?
To exposethefoundational categoriesofsex, gender,anddesireaseffects
ofaspecificformation ofpowerrequiresa form ofcritica1 inquirythatFou
cault, reformulating Nietzsche," designates as flgenealogy." A genealogical
critiquerefusesto searchfor theoriginsofgender, theinnertruthoffemale
3. HUifSproy (1988) and Female (1974), who slarred in manyofWalers'sfilms.
films by Ihe Independent produc:er / direelorJohn 4. NIETZSCHE Cerman
Walers (b. 19'16). Divine(born HarrisClennMil philosopher. MICHEL FOUCAULT (1926- 1984),
slead, 1945-1988), a 300pound c:ro5s-dresser French philosopherand hlsiorianorideas


desire, a genuine orauthentic sexualidentity thatrepression has kepttrom.
viewjrather, genealogyinvestigates thepolitical stakes in designatingas an
origi-n andcause those identitycategories thatarein fact theeffects of
[utions,practices,discourseswith multipleanddiffusepointsoforigin_The
task of this inquiry is to center on-anddecenter-suchdefining institu-
tions: phaUogocentrismandcompulsory
Precisely because "female" no longer appears to be a stable notion, its
meaningis as troubledandunfixedas"women,"andbecausebothtermsgain
theirtroubledsignificationsonlyas relational terms, thisinquirytakesas its
focus genderand the relationalanalysis it suggests. Further, itis nolonger
clear that feminist theory ought to try to settle the questions of primary
identityinorderto gelonwith thetaskofpolitics.Instead,weoughtto ask,
what political possibilities are the consequenceofa radical critique ofthe
categories ofidentity. Whatnewshape ofpoliticsemergeswhenidentityas
a commonground no longer constrains the discourse onfeministpolitics?
Andto whatextentdoes theeffortto locate acommonidentityas the
dation for a feminist politics preclude a radical inquiry into the political
constructionandregulation ofidentityitself?
From Chapter 3. Su!rversive Bodily Acts
BODILYINSCRIPTlONS, PERFORMATIVE SUBVERSIONS
wGarbo 'got in drag' whenevershe tooksome heavy glamour part,
whenevershemeltedinoroutof aman'sarms,whenevershesimply
let tha t heavenl y-Hexed neck...bear the weight of her
back head....How resplendent seems the art ofacting! It is all
impersonation, whetherthe sex underneathis true or not."
-ParkerTyler,''The GarboImage,"
quotedin EstherNewton,Moth81' Camp.
Categoriesoftruesex, discretegender,andspecificsexualityhave
tuted the stable pointof reference for a great deal offemini st theory and
politics. Theseconstructs ofidentityserveas thepoints ofepistemic
ture from which theoryemerges andpoliticsitselfis shaped, In thecaseof
feminism, politicsis ostensiblyshaped to express theinterests, the
tives, of"women." Butis thereapoliticalshape towomen,"as itwere, that
precedes andprefigures the political elaboration oftheirinterests and epi-
stemicpointofview? Howis thatidentityshaped,andis itapoliticalshaping
thattakestheverymorphologyandboundaryofthesexedbodyastheground,
surface, orsite ofculturalinscription?\hatcircumscribes thatsiteas"the
femalebody"? Is "thebody'ortithesexedbody"thefirm foundationonwhich
5. A term <:oined by the American feminist poet system.
ADRI ENNE mCH (b. 1929) to indicate society's 6. MothuCllItIP: Femlll6 Implll1'07Ullorl in Amu-
injunctionagainstall homosexualdesiresandacts. jca (Chicago: Univers!tyofChicago Pren, 1972).
a term coined by the French Greta Garbo (1905-1 990), Swedish-born Ameri-
philosopher '....CQUES DERRtlM (b. 1930) for the clln film , tll r.
patdarchal dominance orsexualit yand the legal
genaer anasystems or compUlSOry sexualItyoperateI' vrIS me Doay Itsel[
shaped by political forces with strategic interests in keeping that body
bounded and constitutedby themarkersofsex?
Thesex/genderdistinctionandthecategoryofsexitselfappearto
posea generalizationof!<the body" thatpreexiststheacquisition ofitssexed
significance. This "body" often appears to be a passive medium that is
nified by an inSCription from a cultural source figured as "external" to that
body.Any theoryoftheculturaHyconstructedbody, however, oughttogues
tion "t he body" as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as
passiveandpriortodiscourse.ThereareChristianandCartesianprecedents
7
to such views which, prior to the emergence of vitalistic biologies in the
nineteenth century, understand "the body" as so much inert matter, signi
fyingnothingor, morespecifically,signifyjngaprofanevoid,thefallenstate:
deception, sin, the premonitiona] metaphorics of hell and the eternal
feminine. There are many occasions in both Sartre's and Beauvoir's work
where Uthe body" is figured as a mute facticity, anticipating some meaning
thatcan be attributedonlyby a transcendentconsciousness, understoodin
Cartesian terms as radically immaterial. But what establishes this dualism
for us? What separates off Hthe body' as indifferent to Signification, and
signification itself as the act ofa radically disembodied consciousness or,
rather,theactthatradicallydisembodiesthatconsciousness?Towhatextent
is Cartesian dualism presupposed in phenomenologyB adapted to the
structuralist frame in which mind/body is redescribed as culture/nature?
Withrespect'to genderdiscourse, to whatextentdotheseproblematicdual
isms still operate within the very descriptions thatare supposed to leadus
outofthatbinarismandits implicithierarchy?How are thecontoursofthe
bodyclearlymarkedas the takenfor-grantedground orsurfaceuponwhich
gendersignifications areinscribed, amerefacticity devoid ofvalue, priorto
significance?
Wittig
9
suggeststhataculturallyspecificepistemica priori establishesthe
naturalness of usex." But by what enigmatic means has "the body." been
accepted as a prima facie given that admits of no genealogy? Even within
Foucault's essay on the very theme ofgenealogy, the body is figured as a
surface and the scene ofa cultural inSCription: "the body is the inscribed
surface ofevents."]The taskofgenealogy, he claims, is .rto expose a body
totallyimprinted by history." His sentencecontinues,however, byreferring
to the goal ofUhistory"- here clearly understood on the model ofFreud's
"civilization"-asthe "destruction ofthe body" (148). Forces andimpulses
with multiple directionalities are precisely thatwhichhistory bothdestroys
andpreserves through theentstehung (historicalevent)ofinscription.As "a
volume in perpetual disintegration" (148), the body is always under siege,
sufferingdestructionbytheverytermsofhistory.And historyis thecreation
ofvalues and meanings by a signifying practice thatrequires thesubjection
7. In thedualistic system of the French phil oso novelist.
pher Descartes(I 596-1650), spirItandmat I. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, His-
lerare mutullllyexclusive. tory," in L"ngulIge, Counter-Memory, Pr"ctice, ed.
8. A philosophiclll method restricted fO DOnll.ld F. Bouchllrd, trans. Donald F. Bouchard
the int ellectual processes ofwhich we are intro- and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University
spectively aware (while ignoring external objects, Press, 1977), p. 148 [Butler's not e]. Some of the
the questionofwhose exlslel'lce is "bracketed"). author'snotes areedited, andsome omitted.
9. MONIQUE WtlTtC (b. 1935), French feminist
ofthebody. Thiscorporealdestructionis necessaryto producethespeaking
subjectanditssignifications.Thi sis abody, described throughthelanguage
of surface and force, weakened through a "single drama" ofdomination,
inscription,andcreation (150). Thisis notthemodus vivendi ofonekindof
historyratherthananother, butis. for Foucault ,"history" (148) in its
tial andrepressive gesture.
Although Foucaultwrites, "Nothinginman [sic]-not even his body-is
sufficientl ystabletoserveas thebasisforself-recognitionorforunderstand-
ingothermen [sic]" (153),heneverthelesspointstotheconstancyofcultural
inscriptionas aUsingledrama"thatactson thebody.If thecreationofvalues,
that historical mode ofsignification, requires the destruction ofthe body,
muchas theinstrumentoftorture in Kafka's In the Penal Colony2 destroys
thebodyon whichit vvrites, thenthere mustbea bodyprior to that .inscnp,
tion, stable and self-identical, subject to that sacrificial destruction. In a
sense, for Foucault,as for Nietzsche,cultural valuesemergeas theresultof
an inscription on the body, understood as a medium, indeed, a blankpage;
in orderfor this inscription tosignify, however, thatmediummustitselfhe
is, fully transvaluated into a sublimated domain ofvalues:
Within the metaphorics of this notion of cultural values is the figure of
historyasarelentlessvvritinginstrument,andthebodyas themediumwhich
mustbe destroyed and transfiguredin orderfor Itculture" to emerge.
By maintaining a body priorto its culturalinscription, Foucaultappears
toassumeamaterialitypriorto significationandform. Because thisdistinc-
tion operates as essential to the taskofgenealogy as he defines it, the
tinction itself is precluded as an object of genealogical investigation.
Occasionallyin his analysis ofHerculine,3 Foucaultsubscribes to a prerus-
cursive multiplicity ofbodLl y forces that break through the surface of the
bodytodisruptthe regulatingpracticesofculturalcoherenceimposedupon
thatbodybya power regime, understood as avicissitudeofhistory." Ifthe
presumption ofsome kind ofprecategorial source ofdisruption is refused,
is it still possible to give a genealogical actountofthe demarcation ofthe
bodyas such as a signifyingpractice?Thisdemarcation is notinitiated bya
reified history or by a subject. This maJ;king is the result ofa diffuse and
active structuringofthesocialfield. This signifyingpractice effectsasocial
space forandofthebodywithincertain regulatorygrids ofintelligibility.
Mary Douglas' Purity and Danger suggests that theverycontours ofli the
body"areestablishedthroughmarkingsthatseekto establishspecifi ccodes
of culturalcoherence,Any discourse thatestablishes the boundaries ofthe
bodyservesthepurposeofinstatingandnaturalizingcertaintaboosregarding
the appropriatelimits, postures, andmodesofexchangethatdefine whatit
is thatconstitutesbodies:
ideas aboutseparating,purifying, demarcatingandpunishingtransgres-
sions have as their main functi on to impose system on an inherently
untidy e:\:perience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between
withi nandwithout,aboveandbelow, mal eandfemal e,withandagainst,
thatasemblance oforderis created.
4
2. A 19195tory by FranzKalka(J883- 1924), Au$' 1978wit hanintroduction by Foucault(disCussed
trian wril er whowasbornandlived mostofhislife by Butlerearlierin this chapter).
in Prague. 4. Mary Douvas, Purity and Dangt!T (London:
3. Hen:uline Barbin. a 19th-century French her Routl edge andKegan Paul, 1969) p. 'I [Butler's
maphrodit e whose memoirs were published in note].Douglas(1921). Itali anbornanthropologist.
AJthough Douglasclearlysubscribes toastructuralistdistinctionbetween
an inherently unruly nature and an order imposed by cultural means, the
"untidiness" to which she refers can be redescribed as a region ofcultural
unruliness and disorder. Ass uming the inevitably binary structure of the
nature/culturedistinction,DouglascannotpOint towardanalternativecon-
fi guration ofculture inwhich such di sti nctionsbecomemalleableorprolif-
erate beyond the binary frame, Her analysis, however, provides a possible
pointofdeparturefor understandingtherelationship bywhichsocialtaboos
institute and maintain the boundaries of the body as such. Her anal ysis
suggests thatwhatconstitut esthelimitofthebodyis nevermerelymaterial,
butthatthe surface,the sJdn, is systemicallysigninedby taboos andantici-
patedtransgreSSions;indeed!theboundariesofthebodybecome, withinher
analysis, the limits ofthe socialper se. Apoststructuralist appr.opriationof
her view might well understand the boundariesofthe bodyas thelimitsof
the sociallyhegemonic. In avarietyofcultures,shemaintains, there are
pollutionpowerswhichinhereinthestructureofideasitselfandwhich
punishasymbolic breaki ngofthatwhichshould bejoinedorjoiningof
that which should be separate. It follows from this that pollution is a
type ofdanger which is not likely to occur e.'(cept where the';lines of
structure, cosmic orsocial, areclearlydefined.
Apollutingpersonisalwaysinthe wrong.He[sic]hasdevelopedsome
wrongconditionorsimplycrossedoversomelinewhichshouldnothave
beencrossed and this displacementunleashesdangerfor someone.
5
In a sense, Simon Watneyhas identified the contemporary constructi on
of 'Ithe polluting person" as the person wi th AIDS in his Policing Desire:
AIDS, Pornography, and the Media, 6 Not only is the illness figured as the
"gay disease," but throughout the media's hysterical and homophobic
responseto theillnessthereisatacticalconstructionofacontinuitybetween
the pollutedstatusofthehomosexualbyvi rtueoftheboundary-trespassthat
is homosexualityand thedi sease as a specific modalityofhomosexual
luti on. Thatthediseaseistransmittedthroughtheexchangeofbodilyfluids
suggestswithinthesensati onalistgraphicsofhomophobicsignifyingsystems
the dangers that permeable bodily boundariespresentto the socialorderas
such, Douglas remarks that "the body is a model that can stand for any
bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are
threatened orprecarious.'" And she asks a question which one might have
expectedto readin Foucault :'Whyshouldbodily margins be thoughtto be
specificallyinvested withpoweranddanger?"8
Douglas suggests that all social systems are vulnerable at theirmargins,
and that all margins are accordingly considered dangerous. 1 the body is
synecdochal for the social system per se or a site in which open systems
converge, then any kind of unregulated permeability constitutes a site of
pollution and endangerment , Since anal and oral sex among men clearly
establishes certain kinds ofbodily permeabilities unsanctioned by the heg-
emonicorder, male homosexualitywould, withinsucha hegemonic pointof
view,constituteasite ofdangerandpollution,priortoandregardlessofthe
5. Ibid.,p. II3IButier'snotej. 7. Douglas, Pll riry and Danger, p. 115 (Butl er's
6. SimonWatney, PoLi.:il1g Desire: AIDS, Pornog- note].
raphy, a11d the Media (Minneapolis: U"iversityof 8. Ibid.,p, 121 [Butler'snotel.
Minnesota Press, 1988) [Butler's note] ,
cultural presence of AIDS. Similarly, the "polluted" status of lesbians,
regardless of their status with respect to AIDS, brings into relief the
dangers of their bodily exchanges. Significantly, being uoutside" the
monic order does not signify being ((in" a state of filthy and untidy nature.
Paradoxically, homosexuality is almost always conceived within the
phobic signifying economy as both uncivilized and unnatural.
The construction of stable bodily contours relies upon fixed sites of
poreal permeability and impermeability. Those sexual practices in both
homosexual and heterosexual contexts that open surfaces and orifices to
erotic signification or close down others effectively rei nscribe the boundaries
of the body along new cultural lines. Anal sex among men is an example, as
is the radical of the body in Wittigls The Lesbian Body.9
las alludes to "a kind of sex pollution which expresses a desire to keep the
body {physical and social} intact, " I suggesting that the naturalized notion of
.Ithe" body is itself a consequence of taboos that render that body discrete
by virtue of its stable boundaries. Further, the rites of passage that govern
various bodily orifices presuppose a heterosexual construction of gendered
exchange, positions, and erotic possibilities. The deregulation of such
exchanges accordingly disrupts the very boundaries that determine what it
is to be a body at all. Indeed, the critical inquiry that traces the regulatory
practices vvithin which bodily contours are constructed constitutes precisely
the genealogy of lithe body" in its discreteness that might further radicalize
Foucault's theory.2
Significantly, Kristeva's discussion of abjection in The Powers of HOTTor
begins to suggest the uses of this structuralist notion of a
constituting taboo for the purposes of constructing a discrete subject through
exclusion.
3
The "abject" designates that which has been expelled from the
body, di scharged as excrement, literally rendered "Other." This appears as
an expulsion of alien elements, but the aHen is effectively established
through this expulsion. The construction of the "not-me" as the abject
lishes the boundaries of the body which are also the first contours of the
subj ect. Kristeva writes:
nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me from the mother
and fa ther who proffer it. ell" want none of that element, sign of their
desire; leI" do not want to listen, 'T' do not assimilate it, "I" expel it.
since the food is not an Hother" for u me," who am only in their desire, I
expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion
through which 'T' claim to establish myself:'
9. Publi shed in 1973.
1. Douglas, Purity and Danger. p. 140
notel.
2. Foucaul t's essay "A Preface to
(in umgtuJgII. Countll!Y-Memory, P",ctiu) does
provide an interest ingj uxtapositionwilh Douglas's
notton of body boundaries constituted by incest
taboos. Origina lly wriuen in honor of Georges
Bataille, this essay explores in part the meta
phori cal of transgressive pleasures and the
association of the forbidden orifice with t he dirt -
Covered lomb. See pp. 46-48 rButier's not e).
Bataille (I897- 1962), French novel ist and phi los-
opher.
3. Kristeva discusses Mary Douglas's work In a
short section of 7he Powers of HOrTor; An Essay on
Abjt ction, trans. Leon Roudiez {New York; Colum-
bia Un, versi'l Press, 1982},originally publishedas
PQllVOirs" 'horrellY (1980). A!5imilating Doug-
las's insights to her own reformulation of Lacan,
Kristeva wri tes. "Defilement Is what is jettisoned
from the symbolic S)'S1e>n. It is what escapes that
social rationality, thlu logical order on which a
social is based. which then becomes dif-
ferentiated from a temporary agglomeration of
individuals and, in short . const itutesaciassijiauion
rysJe," or Q (p. 65) (Butler's flote). JUUA
KRISTEVA (b. 194 1), French feminist lil erarycnti c
and psychoanal yst.
Ib!d . p. 63.
The boundary of the body as welJ as the distinction between internal and
external is established through the ejection and transvaluation of something
Originally part of identity into a defiling otherness. As Iris Young has
gested in her use of Kristeva to understand sexism, homophobia, and racism,
the repudiation of bodies for their sex, sexuality, and/or color is an
sion" followed by a urepulsion" that founds and consolidates culturally
emonic identities along sex/ race/sexuality axes of differentiation.
s
Young's
appropriation of Kristeva shows how the operation of repulsion can consol-
idate "identities" founded on the instituting of the "Other" or a set of Others
through exclusion and domination. What constitutes through division the
"inner" and "outer" worlds of the subject is a border and boundary tenuously
maintained for the purposes of social regulation and control. The boundary
between the inner and outer is confounded by those excremental passages
in which the inner effectively becomes outer, and thi s excreting function
becomes, as it were, the model by which other forms of
djfferentiation are accomplished. In effect, this is the mode by which Others
become shit. For inner and outer worlds to remain utterly distinct, the entire
surface of the body would have to achieve an impossible impermeability.
This sealing of its surfaces would constitute the seamless boundary of the
subject; but this enclosure would invariably be exploded by precisely that
excremental filth that it fears.
Regardless of the compelling metaphors of the spatial distinctions of inner
and outer, they remain linguistic terms that facilitat e and articulate a set of
fan tas ies, fe ared and desired. HInner" and "outer" make sense only with
erence to a mediating boundary that strives for stability. And this stability,
thi s coherence, is determined in large part by cultural orders that sanction
the subject and compel its djfferentiation from the abject. Hence, e'inner"
and "outer" constitute a binary distinction that stabilizes and consolidates
the coherent subject. When that subject is challenged, the meaning and
necessity of the terms are subject to displacement. If the "inner world" no
longer desjgnates a topos/ then the internal fixi ty of the self and, indeed,
the internal locale of gender identity, become similarly suspect. The critical
1
question is not how did that identity become internalized? as if internalization
were a process or a mechanism that might be descriptively reconstructed.
Rather, the question is: From what strategic position in public discourse and
for what reasons has the trope of interiority and the disjunctive binary of
inner/outer taken hold? In what language is "inner space" figured? What
kind of figuration is it, and through what figure of the body is it signified?
How does a body figure on its surface the very invisibility of its hidden depth?
From Interiority to Gender Performatives
In Discipline and Punish Foucault challenges the language of
zation as it operates in the service of the disciplinary regime of the subjection
and subject ivation of criminals. Although Fouca ult objected to what he
5. Iris Marion YOllng. "Objection and Oppression;
Unconscious Dynamics or Racism, Seldsm. and
Homophobia," paper prl':St!: nted at the Society of
Phenome nology and E"is(ential Philos(lphy Meet
ings, Nonhweslem Un iversit y, 1988. The paper is
included 8S part of a larger chapter (chapter 51 in
Justice and tile Politics of Difference ([990) {But-
ler's note].
6. Place (Creekl.
understood to be thepsychoanalytic belietin the"inner"truthotsexIn 1 he
History of Sexuality, he turns to acriticismofthedoctrineofinternalization
forseparate purposes in thecontextofhis historyofcrimi nology. Inasense,
Discipline utul Punish canbereadas Foucault 's effort torewriteNietzsche's
doctrine ofinternalization in On the Genealogy of Morals on the model of
inscription. In thecontextofprisoners,Foucaultwrites,thestrategyhasheen
not to enforce a repression of their desires, hut to compel their hodies to
signify the prohibitive law as their very essence, style, and necessity.That
law is notliterallyinternalized, butincorporated,with theconsequencethat
bodies areproducedwhich signify thatlawon and through thebodYi there
thelawis manifestas theessence oftheirselves, themeaningoftheirsoul,
their conscience, the law oftheir desire. In effect, the law is at once fully
manifest and fully latent, for it never appears as external to the bodies it
subjects and subjectivates. Foucaultwrites:
It would be wrongto say that the soul is an illusion,oran ideological
effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced perma-
nentlyaround, on, 'Within, the body by the functioningofa power that
is exercisedon those that Bre punished {my emphasis],'
The figure ofthe interior soul understood as "wi thin" the body is signified
through itsinscriptionon the body, even though its primary modeofsignif-
ication is through its very absence, its potent invisibility. The effect ofa
structuringinnerspace is producedthrough thesignificationofa bodyas a
vital andsacredenclosure.Thesoul is preciselywhatthebodylacks jhence,
the body presents itself as a signifying lack. That lack which is the body
Signifies the sou} as thatwhichcannotshow. In this sense, then,thesoulis
asurfacesignificationthatcontestsanddisplacestheinner /outerdistinction
itseif, a fi gure ofinterior psychic space jnscribed on the body as a social
signification that perpetuallyrenounces itselfas such. In Foucault's terms,
thesoul isnotimprisonedbyorwi thin the body,as someChristianimagery
would suggest, but"thesoul is theprison ofthe body."1!
Theredescriptionofintrapsychicprocessesin termsofthesurfacepolitics
of the body implies a corollary redescription ofgender as the disciplinary
productionofthefigures offantasythroughtheplayofpresenceandabsence
onthebody'ssurface)theconstructionofthegenderedbodythroughaseries
ofexclusionsanddenials,signifyingabsences.Butwhatdeterminestheman-
ifest and latent text of the body politic? What is the prohibitive law that
generatesthecorporeaJstylizationofgender,thefantasiedandfantasticfig
uration of the body? We have alreadyconsidered the incest taboo and the
priortabooagainsthomosexualityasthegenerativemomentsofgenderiden-
tity,' the prohibitions thatproduce identity alongthe culturally intelligible,
grids ofan idealized and compulsoryheterosexuality.That di sciplinarypro-
duction ofgender effects a false stabili zation ofgender in the interests of
the heterosexual constructionand regulation ofsexualitywithin the repro-
ductive domai n.Theconstructionofcoherenceconceals thegenderdiscon-
tinuitles thatrunrampantwithinheterosexual,bisexual,andgayandlesbian
i. Miche.l FouCliult. Disc:ipl;ne a"d Pllnish: n,e Ce,WIoIiogyof Momls 10 1887,
Birth of the PrisoJl. Alarl Sheridao (New 8. Ibi d" p, 30 (Butle r'sootel
.York: 1979), p.29 [Buder's OGle). The 9. In c hapler2 ofCeouMrTrouble.
H;slory of Se.\""ualityWI15 publi shed io 1976,On lhe
contexts m which gender does not necessarilytollow tram sex, and desire,
orsexualitygenerally,does notseem to foll ow from gender- indeed,where
none of these dimensions ofsignificant corporealityexpress or reflectone
another. When thedisorganizationanddisaggregationofthefield ofbodies
disrupt the regulatory fiction ofheterosexual coherence, it seems that the
expressive model loses its descriptive force. That regul atory ideal is then
exposed as a norm and a fiction thatdisguises itselfas adevelopmental law
regulatingthesexualneld that it purportstodescribe.
Accordingto the understandingofidentificationas an enactedfantasy or
incorporation, however,it is clear thatcoherenceis desired,wishedfor, ide-
alized,and that this idealization is an effect ofa corporeal signification. In
otherwords, acts,gestures, anddesireproducetheeffectofaninternalcore
or substance, but produce thi son the surface ofthe body, through theplay
ofsignifyingabsencesthatsuggest,butneverreveal, theorganizingprinciple
ofidentityasacause.Suchacts,gestures,enactments,generallyconstrued,
arepeiformative inthesensethat theessenceoridentitythatthey otherwise
purport toexpressarefabrications manufacturedandsustainedthroughcor-
poreal signs and other discursive means, Thatthegendered body is perfor-
mativesuggests thatit has noontologicalstatusapartfrom thevarious acts
whichconstituteitsreality.Thisalsosuggeststhatifthatrealityisfabricated
as an interior essence, that very interiority is an effect and function ofa
decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy
through the surfacepolitics ofthe body,thegenderbordercontrol thatdif-
ferentiates innerfrom outer,and so institutes the"integrity"ofthe subject.
Inotherwords,actsandgestures, articulatedandenacteddesirescreatethe
illusion ofan interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively
maintained for thepurposesoftheregulation ofsexuality within the oblig-
atoryframeofreproductiveheterosexuality.If the"cause"ofdesire,gesture,
and act can be localized within the "selF' of the actor, then the political
regulations anddisciplinarypractices which produce that ostensiblycoher-
entgenderare effectivelydisplaced from view. Thedisplacementofa poli ti-
cal and di scursive origin of gender identity onto a psychological "core"
precludes an analysis of the political constitution ofthe gendered subject
and its fabricated notions about the ineffable interiority ofits sex or ofits
true identity.
If theinnertruthofgenderisafabri cationandifatruegenderisafantasy
institutedandinscribedonthe surfaceofbodies, then it seemsthatgenders
can be neithertrue norfalse, butareonlyproduced asthetrutheffectsofa
discourseofprimaryandstableidentity, InMother Camp: Female Imperson-
ators in America, anthropologist Esther Newtonsuggests thatthestructure
of impersonation reveals one of the key fabricating mechanisms through
which thesocial constructionofgendertakes place, Iwould suggestas well
thatdragfullysubvertsthedistinctionbetweeninnerandouterpsychicspace
andeffectivelymocks boththeexpressive modelofgenderandthe notionof
a true genderidentity. Newton writes:
At its mostcomplex, [drag] isa double inversion thatsays,"appearance
isanillusion."Dragsays[Newton'scuriouspersonification]"my'outside'
appearanceisfeminine,butmyessence'inside'{thebody]ismasculine,"
At the same time it symbolizes theopposite inversionj"my appearance
'outside' [my body, my gender] is masculine but my essence 'inside'
lmyseJf] is feminine.))1
Bothclaims to truthcontradictoncanotherandso displacetheentireenact-
ment ofgendersignificationsfrom thediscourse oftruthand falsity.
The notion ofan original or primary gender identity is often parodied
within the cultural practices ofdrag, cross-dressing, and the sexualstyliza-
tion ofbutch/ femme identities.Withinfeminist theory,such iden-
tities have been understood to beeitherdegradingtowomen,inthecaseof
drag andcross-dressing, oranuncriticalappropriationofsex-role stereotyp-
ing from within the practice of heterosexuality, especially in the case of
butch/femmelesbianidentities.Buttherelationbetweenthe"imitation"and
the I'origi nal" is, I think, more complicated than that cri tique generally
allows. Moreover, it gives us a clue to the way in which the relationship
between primaryidentification-thatis, the original meanings accorded to
gender-andsubsequentgenderexperiencemightbe reframed.Theperfor-
mance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the
performerandthegenderthatisbeingperformed.Butwe arcactuallyinthe
presenceofthreecontingentdimensionsofsignificantcorporeality:anatom-
ical sex, gender identity, and gender performance. If the anatomy of the
performeris already distinctfrom thegenderoftheperformer, andbothof
thosearedistinctfrom thegenderoftheperformance,thentheperformance
suggests a dissonance not only between sex and performance, butsex and
gender, and gender and performance. As much as drag creates a unified
picture of"woman" (what its critics often oppose), it also reveals the dis-
tinctness ofthoseaspects ofgendered experiencewhkh falselynatural-
ized as a unitythrough the regulatoryfiction ofheterosexualcoherence.111.
imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative struct-ure ofgender
itself-aswellas its contingency. Indeed, parrofthepleasure, thegiddiness
of the performance is in the recognition of a radical contingency in the
relation between sex and gender in the face ofcultural configurations of
causal unities thatareregularlyassumedtobe naturalandnecessary.Inthe
place ofthe law ofheterosexual coherence, we see sex andgenderdenatu-
ralizedby meansofaperformancewhichavows theirdistinctnessanddrama-
tizes theculturalmechanism oftheir fabricated unity.
The notion ofgenderparodydefendedheredoes notassumethatthereis
an original which such parodic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is of
the very notion ofan original jjustas the psychoanalytic notion ofgender
identification is constitutedby a fantasy ofa fantasy, the Lransfigurationof
an Other who is always already a "figure" in that double sense, so gender
parodyreveals thattheoriginal identityafterwhichgenderfashions itselfis
an imitationwithoutanorigin.Tobemoreprecise,it is aproductionwhich,
in effect-thatis, inits effect-posturesas an imitation.Thisperpetualdis-
placement constitutes a fluidity ofidentities that suggests an openness to
resignification and recontextualizationjparodicproliferation deprives
moniccultureanditscriticsoftheclaimtonaturalizedoressentialistgender
identities. Although the gender meanings taken up in these parodic styles
are clearly part of hegemonic, misogynist culture, they are nevertheless
I , New"on.Morner Camp, p. 103 [Buder's noIe].
denaturalized and mobilized through thei r parodic recontextualization.As
imitationswhicheffectivelydisplacethemeaningoftheoriginal,theyimitate
themyth ofOriginalityitself. In the placeofanoriginalidentificationwhich
serves as a determining cause, gender identity might be reconceived as a
personal/cultural historyofreceived meanings subject to a set ofimitative
practices which refer laterally to other imitations and which, jointly, con-
structtheillusionofaprimaryandinteriorgenderedselforparodythemech-
anismofthatconstruction.
Accordingto FredricJameson's"PostmodemismandConsumerSociety,"
theimitationthatmocks thenotionofanoriginalischaracteristicofpastiche
ratherthan parody:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation ofa peculiarOr uniquestyle, the
wearingofastylisticmask,speechin adeadlanguage: butitis aneutral,
practice ofmimicry, withoutparody's ulteriormotive, withoutthesatir-
ical impulse,withoutlaughter,withoutthatstill latentfeelingthatthere
exists something nonnal compared to which what is being imitated is
rathercomic.Pasticheis blankparody, parody that has lost its humor.
l
Theloss ofthe senseof"the normal," however, can be its ownoccasionfor
laughter,especiallywhen"thenormal,>! "theoriginal"isrevealedtobeacopy,
andan inevitablyfailed one, anideal thatno onccan embody, In thissense,
laughteremerges in therealitation thatall along theoriginal was derived.
Parodyby it selfis not subversive,and there must be a way to understand
what makes certain kinds ofparodic repetiti onseffectivelydisruptive,truly
troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated and recirculated as
instrumentsofculturalhegemony.jAtypology ofactions would clearly not
suffice, for parodic displacement, indeed, parodic laughter, depends on a
contextandreceptioninwhichsubversiveconfusionscanbe fostered. What
performancewhere will inverttheinner / outerdistinctionandcompelarad
ical rethinking ofthe psychological presuppositions ofgenderidentity and
sexuality? What performance where will compel a reconsideration of the
place and stability of the masculine and the feminine?And what kind of
genderperformancewiU enactandreveal theperformativityofgenderitself
in a way thatdestabilizes thenaturalizedcategoriesofidentityanddesire.
Ifthe body is not a "being." buta variable boundary, a surface whose per-
meabilityis politicallyregulated, asignifyingpractice within acultural field
ofgender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, then whatlanguage is
leftfor understandingthiscorporealenactment,gender, thatconstitutesits
"interior"signification on itssurface?Sartrewould perhaps havecalledthis
act "a style ofbeing." Foucault,"a stylisticsofexistence."And in my earlier
readingof Isuggestthat gendered bodies are so many"stylesof
the flesh." These styles all never fully selfstyled, for styles have a history,
andthosehistoriesconditionandlimitthepossibilities.Considergender,for
instance,as acorporeal style, an "act," as it were,which is both intentional
2. Frwric Jameson, "Poslmodunism and Con- 3. The manufactured consent Ihal legitimates a
sumer Sodety,- in Tht Ami-Aesln"tie: EUD)'S on dominant group and unifiesa societ y.astheorizw
POSllllod"nr CU/llln, ed. Hal FOSler(Pon To...."'s by the halian Marxist ANTONIO CRAMSCI (1891-
hend. Wuh.: Bay Press, 1983), p. 114 {Butler's 1937).
note]. J....MESON (b. 1934). U.S. Mandst literary 4. Inchapter) orCend,rTroub/e.
critic.
and performative, wll ere "perjormat.ive" suggests a dramatic and contingent
construction of meaning.
Wittig understands gender as the workings of "sex," where 'IS'ex" is an
obligatory injunction for the body to become a cultural sign, to materialize
itself in obedience to a hi storicall y delimited possibility, and to do this, not
once or t\vice, but as a sustained and repeated corporeal project. The notion
of a Ilproject ," however, suggests the originating force of a radical will, and
because gender is a project which has cultural survival as its end, the term
strategy better suggests the situation of duress under which gender perfor-
mance always and variously occurs. Hence, as a strategy of survival withi n
compul sory systems, gender is a perfonnance with clearly punitive conse-
quences. Discrete genders are part of what "humanizes" individuals within
contemporary culture; indeed, we regularly puni sh those who fail to do their
gender right. Because there is neither an "essence" that gender expresses or
externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gen
der is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and
without those acts, there would be no gender at alL Gender is, thus, a con-
struction that regularly conceals its genesisj the tacit collective agreement
to perfonn, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fic-
tions is obscured by the credibility of those the punish-
ment s that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction
"compels" our belief in its necessity and naturalness. The historical possi-
bilities materialized through various corporeal styles are nothing other than
those punitively regulated cultural fictions alternately embodl ed and
deflected under duress.
Consider that a sedimentation of gender norms produces the peculiarphe-
Domenon of a "natural sex" or a "real woman" or any numbel:' of prevalent
and compelling social fictions, and that .his is a sedimentation that over time
has produced a set of corporeal styles which, in reified form, appear as rhe
natural configuration of bodies into sexes existing in a binary relation to one
another. If these styles are enacted, and if they produce the coherent gen-
dered subjects who pose as their originators, what kind of performance might
reveal this ostensible "cause" to be an "effece'?
In what senses, then, is gender an act? As in other ritual social dramas,
the action of gender requires a perfonnance that is repeated. This repetition
is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already
socially established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legit-
imation.
S
Although there are individual bodies that enact these significations
by becoming stylized into gendered modes, this "action" is a public action.
There are temporal and collective dimensions to these actions, and their
public character is not inconsequential; indeed, the performance is effected
with the strategic aim of maintaining gender within its binary frame-an aim
that cannot be attributed to a subject, but, rather , must be understood to
found and consolidate the subject.
Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency
from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously can
stituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition
S. See Viclor Turner, DmlnlU, Fidds, lIPId Milia guration orlhought," In Local KfWwledge: FUl1l1er
phON (Ithaca: Cornell Uoivc:ni ly Press, 197'1 ). See Emys in bllll"prllllw Anthropology (New York:
11150 Clifford CetTtl., Genres: The Rell Saslc Boob. 1983) IBuller's nole].
of acts. The effect of gender is produced through the stylizati on of the body
and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily ges-
tures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an
abiding gendered self. This formulati on moves the conception of gender off
the ground of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a concep
tion of gender as a constituted social temporality. Si gnificantly, if gender is
inst itut ed through acts which are internally di scontinuous, then the appear-
ance of suhstance is precisely that , a constructed identity, a performative
accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief. Gender is
also a norm that can never be fully internalized; "the interna)" is a surface
signification, and gender norms are finally phantasmatic, impossible to
embody. If the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts
through time and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the spatial meta-
phor of a <iground" will be displaced and revealed as a stylized configuration,
indeed. a gendered corporealization of time. The abiding gendered self will
then be shown to be structured by repeated act s that seek to approximate
the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their occasional
discontinui ty, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this
"ground. " The possibilities of gender transformation are to be found precisely
in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a faHure to
repeat, a deformity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic
effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous constructi on.
If gender attributes, however, are not expressive but performative, then
these attributes effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or
reveaL The distinction between expression and performativeness is crucial.
If gender at tributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or
produces its cultural signification, are performative, then there is no pre-
existing identity by which an act or attribute might be measured; there woul d
be no true or fal se, real or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a
true gender identity wou ld be revealed as a regulatory fiction. That gender
reality is created through sustained soci al performances means that the very
notions of an essential sex and a true or abiding masculinity or femininity
are also constituted as part of the strategy that conceals gender's performa-
tive character and the perfonnative possibilities for proliferating gender con
figurations outside the restricting frames of masculinist domination and
compulsory heterosexuality.
Genders can be neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent, neither
original nor derived. As credible bearers of those attributes, however, genders
can also be rendered thoroughly and radically 1-ncredible.
1990