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Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization and History in Western Pakistan Author(s): Paul
Titus Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 657-687 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/313162 . Accessed: 24/04/2014 09:27
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AsianStudies Modern 32, 3 (1998), pp. 657-687.Printedin the United Kingdom
Press 1998 CambridgeUniversity
Social Organization andHistory Stereotypes, in Western Pakistan

PAUL TITUS NewZealand Christchurch, University ofCanterbury,
Warsare butthesurf thatmarks Frontier theedgeand theadvance ofthewaveof civilization. -Lord Salisbury, 1892 tobebroken wasthe Likethe the ofa backbone greatest defense ofthe jellyfish, absence the state which tribes waves beat them. power upon against of
[Yapp 1983:186]
HonortheBaloch,Buy thePushtun:
Introduction An aphorism heardtoday summarizes the occasionally purportedly theBritish oftheempire took togovern theparts that now approach constitute Theirformula, Pakistan. it says, was 'Rule thePunjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, and honorthe Baloch." buythe Pushtun, in While fieldwork the ofPakistani Balochistan doing Quetta, capital in recent for of the several incidents serious ethnic and, years setting I found thatcurrent aboutBalochandPushtun conflict, stereotypes heldbymembers ofbothgroups aboutthemselves and each other reflect the same in theaphorattitudes as those essentially expressed
ism.2Edwin Ardner (1989:24-6) has suggested that such consistency
I wouldlike to acknowledge AkbarAhmed, Alan Beals, Paul Brass,FrankConlon, Michael Kearney,Carol Nagengast, Nina Swidler, and the late Earl Lyonwho made on earlierdrafts comments of thispaper. They,ofcourse,bear none of the responsforits conclusions. The map was preparedbyMichelleRogan. ibility ' This versionwas told to me by the nephewof the head of the BalochJamalli tribe.Duncan (1987:16) provides a versionwhichdiffers from his in an interesting the Sindhis,buythe Pushtun, and befriend the way: 'Rule the Punjabis,intimidate Baloch.' 'Baloch' refersin this paper to the membersof the broader 2 The ethnonym Baloch society. It therefore includesbothBalochi-and Brahui-speaking subgroups. 'Pushtun'is the southern dialecticalvariantof the ethnonym variant (the northern referredto as Pathans to refer to being 'Pukhtun') used by those frequently themselves.
oo26-749X/98/$7.50+$o. 10
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can come from a number of structural relationships including those manifested among the people (or categories of people) involved in actual events, the way those events are recorded, and the way they are communicated. Stimulated by critiques of orientalism and emphasizing the power of discourse, recent studies of the colonial period have tended to focus on the second and third of these relationships. Considerable effort has been made to reveal and deconstruct the 'essentialist' categories throughwhich colonial administratorsknew their Indian subjects.3 That those same subjects make use of similar categories in the post-colonial era can then be explained as the internalization of orientalist and colonialist notions (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993:11). This view is limiting because it exaggerates (even and power of colonial disessentializes) the uniqueness, uniformity, cursive practices. As recent critiques and revisions of post-orientalist approaches have pointed out, essentialist categories were current in South Asia prior to colonialism, and Indian categories were adapted and reified by Europeans in complex ways, not all of which were essentializing.4 Indeed, studies emphasizing cognitive and psychological approaches suggest that all individuals and groups define themselves relative to others and in doing so create more or less exclusive categories.5 This paper, therefore,focuses primarilyon the social relationships that are enacted through but also despite linguistic categories. It examines Baloch and Pushtun historyand social organization for an explanation of stereotypes about them and suggests that those stereotypes reflectdifferent configurationsof hierarchyand equality within the two groups." The firstpart of the paper presents a brief historical sketch of British India's effortsto delimit and pacify its western frontier.This historical narrative provides a background in
Said 1979:204, 321; Inden 1986:403; Pandey 1990:12. SAhmad 1992:184, Rogers 1994:14; Ludden 1992:253, 277; 1993:261. Mahmood and Armstrong 1992; Kearney 1984:68-78; Comaroff 1987:302; 5 Wright 1991; Hirschfeld 1988.
of the economicand 6 This studythus resemblesPandey's (1990) examination social factors thatunderlay the colonialstereotype of theJulaha (Muslimweavers) of centralIndia as religiousfanatics.Unlike Pandey,I do not considerstereotypes to be proof of an essentializing As simplified discourse. generalizations, stereotypes differ in theirformulation and utilization, and may or may not be categoricalor malicious.The argument of thispaper is thatstereotypes reflect (albeit at timesin distorted social position, and route to mobilization of ways) aspects of the history,
the group to which they refer (Lieberson 1985:128-31; Williams 1989:431).
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IRAN
"" j
AFGHANISTAN
...
Ghazni..~ :samabad ...... .. ....... . . R..PA.eshawar. , ::"":"... ?'I.
Hyderabad
Karachi
Major EthnicGroups
INDIA
SBaloch
Pushtun
EPunjabi
Indian
O
O
an
SSindhi
200 400km
Fig. 1. Major Ethno-linguist Groups,PakistaniBalochistanand Region. tones.) (Mixed groupsindicatedby alternating
which to view colonial and contemporarystereotypes of the people of the frontierregion. The second section presents some common stereotypes of Pushtun and Baloch societies as well as the personal qualities of the members of those societies. The followingsections examine some of the structural, ecological, and historical factors underlyingthese stereotypes.The finalsection examines the continuities and transformations in relevant aspects of Baloch and Pushtun society in the contemporarypolitical-economyof the region.
British Relations with the Tribes of the Western Frontier

As the governmentof British India extended its authoritywestward during the nineteenth century,the main discourse throughwhich it
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and the British governmentestablished policywas the need to defend India against external enemies. For much of that period the most serious threat was seen to come fromRussia acting alone or in concert with internal opponents to British rule, and, therefore,security and the most economical means of maintaining it were the main issues in debates over what the western boundaries of the Indian The two fundamental posiempire should be (Yapp 1980:15-20). tions in the debate were known as 'close borders' and the 'forward policy'. Advocates of close borders argued for holding a defensive position along the immediate boundaries of the empire, variously the Indus River or the base of the mountains to the west of it; while advocates of the forwardpolicy called forextending the British presence furtherwest, as far as the Oxus River and Herat in some versions, in order to create protective buffer zones (ibid.:481; Awan 1985:95). Establishing such borders meant dealing not only in the lofty realms of international diplomacy but also with the turbulenton-theground reality of the independent, contentious, and at times predatoryPushtun and Baloch tribes inhabiting the mountains west of the Indus (see map). Given their region's marginal productivity and the trade routes which important passed through it, plunder had long made an important contribution to the subsistence of those tribes.7 The region's cultural ecology also makes direct control by outsiders problematic, and so in dealing with the frontiertribes the British found themselves caught in the same entanglements as those faced by their predecessors, the Mughals and Sikhs.8 Afterthe firstattempt at a forwardpolicy ended with the annihilation of a British army as it retreated fromKabul in December 1841, the governmentimplemented a close borders policy which called for restraintin militarypenetration of tribal territoriesbeyond the areas where the colonial legal system was in force. In the Afghan border region this meant dealing with the tribes outside areas of direct rule by paying allowances for good behavior, manipulating intertribal relations, and using punitive expeditions, blockades, and baramtas9 in response to offenses (Caroe 1986:348-50; Spain 1979:11). In BaloEmbree 1979:33; Hughes 1877:45-7, 79; Lindholm 7 Arlinghaus 1988:54; 1980:353. Richards 1993:17o-1; 8 Arlinghaus 1988:314-16; Singh 1963:281-6. 9 Caroe defines baramtaas 'the seizure of persons, animals, or propertybelonging to a tribe or individual at fault, in order to bring pressure for restitution' (Caroe 1986:350).
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chistan and Sindh it led to a similar policy of 'counter-raiding'(Caroe 1986:330) as well as bolstering the head of the Baloch tribal confederacy, the Khan of Kalat, so that he could police his subjects The close borders approach proved to be ineffective.In Balochistan the Khan of Kalat was incapable of stopping peripheral tribes such as the Marri and Bugti from raiding the plains. Even more problematic were the Khan's attempts, with British backing, to increase his authorityover the tribes making up his confederacyand the chiefs (sardars)that led them, attempts which provoked rebellion and civil war.10Further north, too, the policy of leaving large areas of tribal territoryunadministered led to increasing disorder. Violence in the Pushtun tribal areas increased because of resentment against the government's retaliatoryraiding and such events as the Mutiny of 1857 and the Second Anglo-Afghanwar in 1879 (Caroe 1983:351-64; Spain 1979:10-11). After their second war with Afghanistan the British attempted to assert greater control over the tribal areas. While it took different forms in differentareas the fundamental ingredients of their new forwardpolicy were the concentration of militaryforce in the tribal areas and patronage of tribal leaders but also autonomy and self government according to 'tribal custom' as codified in the colonial Frontier Crimes Regulations (Caroe 1986:376). Forts were built and troops stationed in a number of strategic points in the tribal areas, and legal borders were established delineating areas of sovereignty for the governmentsof India, Iran, Kalat, and Afghanistan. The forwardpolicy,as conceived and implemented by Robert Sandeman, was successful in Balochistan. In 1876 Sandeman negotiated a treatybetween the colonial government,on the one hand, and the Khan of Kalat and his sardars, on the other, which reaffirmedthe status of the Khan as a leader of an independent though subordinate allied state. The treatybroke with the past, however, in that it permitted the British to station troops in Balochistan and it increased the authorityof the sardars who received annual subsidies contingent upon their loyalty to the Khan and their effectivenessin policing their territories (Swidler 1969:52; Baloch 1987:140-1). From that time on, the financial, political, and militarysupport of the colonial government gave Baloch tribal leaders the incentive and the ability to keep the peace. After some initial conflictsimilar arrangements
0oThornton 1895:62; Baloch 1985:224;
(Embree
1979:39;
Awan 1985:151).
Baloch 1987:135-
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were worked out in the Pushtun areas of what is now northernBalochistan (Thornton 1895)-11 Similar attempts to pacify Pushtun areas furthernorth met with considerably less success. Forts were built in strategic areas'2 but penetration of tribal areas was never accompanied by an effective administrative arrangement, and so the occupation remained difficult and tenuous. Chronic small-scale attacks and raids were punctuated by more serious uprisings. In 1897 and 1898 Pushtun tribes attacked government forces throughout the frontier, and 6o,ooo troops were required to extinguish the 'conflagration' (Mills 1979)In 1919 and 19 o a campaign to suppress an uprising by the Mahsud tribe required 8o,ooo troops and cost several times more than the Third Anglo-AfghanWar which had been the catalyst of the fighting. In the 1930S the independence movement in India was manifested as unrest in Pushtun tribal areas and urban centers. Indeed, despite more political reforms and a more vigorous application of the forward policy,there was less securityin the Pushtun frontierin the last decade of British rule than ever before (Spain 1979:1 7-2 1). Poullada (1979:132) imagines the British effortsto exert control over the Pushtun tribes this way: The proudPushtuns, met the forward safelyensconcedin theirmountains, smiledwithcontempt policies withferocious guerrillawarfareand simply at the periodicwithdrawals. In the end Britishadministration contented itselfwitha policyof containment and reprisal.
Colonial and ContemporaryStereotypes

These briefly were the historical circumstances in which the British formulated their opinions of Baloch and Pushtun. The attitude of individual Britons toward the peoples of the frontierranged from romantic admiration to utter revulsion. Lindholm (1980:355-6) has suggested that differencesin the attitudes of colonial observers were
" This is not to Pushtunareas were constantly say thatthe Baloch and southern the first twodecades of the 2oth century the northerly Zhob peaceful.Throughout district was beset bysmall-scaleraidingand occasionally large scale attackson government of Pushtuntribesfromthe area and from troopsbyvariouscombinations In 1918 opposition to recruiting forthe military led to a major uprisAfghanistan. also had to put downoccaing among the Baloch Marri tribe,and the government sional insurgencies in southernBaloch areas (General Staffof India 1929:28-42;
1930:20-43)12
Notablyin the KurramValley,Gomal, and Tochi.
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a functionof the political role theyplayed on the frontier. Those who confronted the frontiertribes while enforcing the more aggressive forward policy developed negative attitudes, while administrators under close borders allowed the tribes more autonomy and had friendlier relations with them. Through time, however, British assessments of the people of the frontiertook on a certain consistency which Yapp (1980:471) characterizes as ambivalence combined with the assumptions that their faults were caused by their institutions and could be alleviated by humanitarian reforms.In his study of the colonial literature on the Pushtun, Anderson (1992:1o6-7) has suggested this conformitywas a symptom of an intellectual involutionwhich took place as the social distance between the British and Pushtun increased with the professionalization and routinization of the colonial administration and as a result of the literary techniques of citing, reusing, and updating previous sources.13He also points out that the ethnographic material on the frontiertribes was produced not by academics but by political administrators,and that much of the published material was in the formof personal memoirs (ibid.:94, 105)A representativework in this genre and one which provides a concise statement of British attitudes towards the border tribes is Thomas Holdich's account of his twenty-year career as a military officerand surveyoron the western frontier.'4 According to Holdich: The Baluch is easier to deal withand to controlthan the Pathan,owingto his tribalorganization, and his freedomfrombigotedfanaticism or blind allegiance to his priest.He respectsand honoursthe chiefof his clan, who in the tribalcouncilsthan is the case with possesses far greaterauthority the Pathan. The Pathan is a republican of the worsttype.He is a law unto and althoughhe is verymuch underthe influence of the Mullah, himself, he has alwaysan eye to business,even in his mostfanaticaloutbursts. Both are warlikeand predatory, but theirmethodsof fighting differ essentially, even when engaged in intertribal The Baluch fights warfares. openly,and faces the enemyboldly.There is a rough formof chivalry amongstthe Baluch warriors, who are in mostrespectsworthy descendantsof the Arab
'3 Andersondepictsthis processas one of degeneration in whichearlier,'more nuanced' insights ofmostly Scottish administrators gave wayto the 'thinand ironic' refinement of insight whichreflected increased'experiencein a situationin which all involved came to knowthe capabilitiesand limitations of the players. This situationwas just one in a largersetting in whichcolonialrulewas increasingly on the defensive as Indians turnedits ideologiesand institutions againstit. in the late officials 14Embree calls Holdich 'one of the ablest of the frontier
nineteenth century'
(1979:34).
ones of their successors (1992:92).
I would argue that the process was in fact a
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conquerorsof Asia ... [T]he Pathan will make use of any stratagemor that suits his purpose.He will shoot his own relations just as subterfuge soon as his enemy,possiblysooner-and he will shoot them frombehind [Holdich 1909:184-51]. Though this statement lacks the subtlety that characterizes the observations of some of the administrators whose writings focus more specificallyon the tribes (see for example Bruce 1900; Howell 1931), it does reflectaspects of their views, and it is consistent with the observations of many other colonial officials,missionaries, and journalists. Holdich's statement is also representative in that it focuses on '"character" with its "natural" locus in tribalism' (Anderson 1992:99). In essence, he and other colonial observers portrayPushtun social organization as egalitarian, and Pushtun themselves as entrepreneurial,religious, and treacherous, even towards their relatives; and they portray Baloch social organization as oligarchic and Baloch as forthright and especially concerned with honor. As sugthese above, gested images from the colonial period resemble common stereotypes in contemporaryBalochistan. As is the case in the colonial literature, not all the Baloch and Pushtun I met in Quetta narrow their experiences into stereotypes but those that did characterize Pushtun as entrepreneurial and religious, and Baloch as having strong tribal values and concern for honor. In the contemporarysetting the value attached to these 'objective' traits can vary, however. A number of studies have shown that the denotative or core traits that make up stereotypes are most widely shared (even by members of the group against whom the stereotype is directed) and persistent, whereas their connotations, the values placed on those traits, vary through time and among individuals (Cauthern et al. 1971:110, 119).16 The positive connotation that can
Bellew 1864:209-10o;Hunter 1871:4-5; Hughes 1877:43; Oliver 1890:23-7; Thor'" See, for example, Elphinstone 1815:162-3, 247-53; Postans 1843:43-50;
Punjabis and Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in Pakistan 16 Kurin's studycontrasting illustrates thispoint.The twogroupsshare a set ofconceptsfordefining effectively the person which include spirit(ruh),energy(nafs),and intellect('aql) and they agree thatMohajirsare characterized bymoredeveloped'aql and Punjabisbymore concentrated Both traitscan take on both negativeand positiveconnotations, nafs. 'aql beingassociatedwitha literateand mannered wayoflifebut one also characterized by timidity and delusionwhile nafsis associated withtraitssuch as strength, health,and realism but also withviolence and illiteracy (1988:232). For a more polarizedexample see Guha's (1983:14-15) discussionof the fineand the terrible.
burn 1894:2o6, 219; Thornton 1895:110; Mills 1897:5-8; Churchill 1898:3-6; Pennell 1909:33-4, 47-50; and General Staff of India 1933:7-8.
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be attached to the entrepreneur is that he is industrious, the negative connotation is that he is venal; the positive connotation that can be attached to the man with strong tribal values is that he is principled, the negative connotation is that he is detached fromthe practical aspects of life. Thus several Pushtun informantsasserted that their group's economic success is due to hard work, an aptitude for education, and their lack of regard for 'backward' tribal institutions. On the other hand, their economic success is interpreted by Baloch as a sign of greediness and a lack of honor. For example, one Baloch informantsaid most Pushtun would kill their own brother formoney, an assessment which combines greed, a want of tribal values, and the sense that Pushtun are at war with their relatives. Conversely, several of my Pushtun informants depicted the lack of Baloch economic success as caused by their laziness. 'All theycare about is their honor' a Pushtun bus driver told me. Baloch themselves oftenidentify the high value placed on honor as characteristicBaloch. Several Baloch informants told me, for example, that ally no Baloch woman would ever dishonor herselfby workingas a prostitute, even if she was destitute. While some Baloch are highlycritical of the power of hereditary tribal leaders, most view loyalty to these sardars as an expression of tribal values and therefore honorable. Pushtun informantsdescribed it as a symptomof their backwardness and subservience. 'They will even kiss the hand of their sardar' one Pushtun said of the Baloch. This is not to say that Pushtun do not value honor (indeed, feuding among Pushtun is acted out through the discourse of honor), nor Baloch economic success; it is a matter of definitionsand prioritieswith members of groups selecting certain traits, some of which are aspects of wider regional culture, to exemplifyperceived differenceswith others."
From Stereotypes to Social Organization

Given these consistencies in the stereotypesof the colonial and postcolonial eras, it holds that such generalizations, while not entirely accurate, are not simply random, and the question then becomes what are their historical and social foundations. My thesis is that these different stereotypes result from differences in the social
17 Until earlythis century (and perhapslater) it was also a customforPushtun in Afghanistan to kiss the hands of the royalfamily (Stewart
1973:132).
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organization of the two peoples, differenceswhich are summarized in the observation that Pushtun groupings are egalitarian and Baloch hierarchic. I suggest that these aspects of Baloch and Pushtun social structure predate the colonial period, that they in part shaped the historic trajectory of colonialism among the two groups, and that, while they may have been altered during the colonial period, they persist. To explore the differencesin their social organization I will initially examine contemporary anthropological descriptions of the two groups, and I will then examine some of the historical evidence that suggests the features they describe are not simply recent developments. Baloch and Pushtun are culturally and socially similar. Both inhabit ecological zones in which agriculture is possible only in limited areas, though among the Baloch pastoralism has assumed much greater importance than among the Pushtun.'8 On the basis of shared descent and territory, segmentary groupings are established in both societies, and those relationships are expressed in the cultural values of patrilineality,honor, and obligation to provide protection (and hospitality) to familyand guests (Barth 1981:94-7). Most Baloch like most Pushtun are Sunni Muslims. In Quetta the two peoples are interpenetrated, with marriages, partnerships, and friendshipsbeing formed between them, and in the rural areas, as discussed below, it is not uncommon for lineages in Baloch tribes to claim Pushtun origins. Despite these similarities and interconnections, there are significantdifferencesin the socio-political structure of Baloch and Pushtun tribes, differenceswhich are summarized in the observation that Baloch tribes are relativelycentralized and hierarchic and Pushtun ones relativelydecentralized and egalitarian. To say that Baloch society is hierarchic and Pushtun society egalitarian is not to make a categorical distinction. Rather, as both colonial observers and anthropologists have noted, forces acting toward both centralization and decentralization are at work in the two societies.19 Among both groups segmentarytribes (which themselves can
This is especiallytrueof the easternPushtun, the Pakisi.e., those inhabiting frontier and therefore the mostrelevant forthisstudy(Arlinghaus tan-Afghanistan
18
towardcentralization and decentralization in the frontier tribes.Salzman (1983) discussesthe phenomenon in a contemporary Baloch tribe.The themeof counterof hierarchy and equalityis a long-standing one in vailingor cyclicalmanifestations See forexampleLeach (1965); Beals and Siegel (1966); Alavi (1972); anthropology.
Comaroff (1982); and Ortner (1989).
1988:172-3). 19 Both Elphinstone (1815)
and Bruce (1900)
were aware of the tendencies
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vary in formthrough time and space) are found in some areas while in others more hierarchical, feudal or semi-feudal forms of social organization prevail, though among them, too, segmentaryprinciples Yet it appears that ecological, structural,and hismay be at work.20 torical factors militate toward hierarchy among Baloch and toward decentralization among Pushtun. This is reflected in the fact that contemporary ethnographers consistently highlight the extreme individualism and radical equality prevalent among Pushtun which contrasts with the nested hierarchyof status and authorityin Baloch groupings which culminates in the officeof the sardar. The practical manifestationof equality among Pushtun is thejirga or council of elders. The relationship betweenmembersof a council is one of equals; with no or speaker leader; the equalityis emphasized by circularseating on the groundand the equal rightof all to speak. The bodydoes not finalizeits decisionsin a vote: discussionand negotiation continueuntilthe decision is unopposed and thereby unanimousand bindingas a decision by each .... It allowsgroupsof men to arriveat joint decisionswithout participant it producesbindingcorporcompromising independence; any participant's ate decisionsabout concertedaction withoutdissembling of the structure the introduction of any one's right egalitarianbalanced segmentsthrough to give commands[Barth 1969:121-2]. Though eligibility for membership in the jirga varies between regions, at minimum it requires patrilineal descent within a Pushtun tribe.21The ownership of land looms large in this regard. Even in areas where land has little economic value and the independent tribesman's income comes fromsuch 'imaginative' sources as smuggling, robbery,or government payoffsto desist from those pursuits, land ownership allows laying claim to the tribal charter (Ahmed 198o:264). In Pushtun society land is individuallyowned and ideally passed from a father to his sons among whom it is divided equally; descent units are thereforeterritorialunits.22Before the economies
20 See Ahmed (1980:116-24) fora discussion of the typesof social organization foundin Pushtunsociety, and Pastner (1978) and Spooner (1983 & 1988:622-9) fora discussionof Baloch society.
Ahmed 1976:74; 1983:91; 143-7; Spain 1962:50; Rittenberg 1979:69. Barth 1981; Ahmed 198o:213-19; and van Steenbergen 1996:258. Anderson (1983:130-1) points out, however, that individual ownership sets up a disjunction
21 22
betweenthe territorial unit and the kinship unit. 'Particularsegmentsmaydecline and mergewithadjacent ones, or growand divide,simply on another by refocusing are not at any level corporate withrespectto land tenure.Real ancestor,forkhels is ownedbyindividuals, from former each constitutproperty inheriting proprietors, economicunitseparatelyendowedwith ing withits own householdan independent the same typesof resourcesas any other.'
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of the region were extensively monetized, if not still in some areas such as Swat, only those who owned land were considered Pushtun because without land one would have had to subordinate oneself to another by working on his land, and in Pushtun society, to be another's client means bearing 'inferior,non-tribesman serf status' (Barth 1969:124). In other words, in some cases the ideology of equality among Pushtun is so strong that once a man is no longer able to demonstrate his autonomy as an independent landlowner he is no longer considered to be Pushtun (Lindholm 1982:74, 91). Just as the emphasis on equality among Pushtun is unusual among tribal peoples in the Islamic world, so too is the degree of hierarchy in Baloch tribes as manifested in the level of authority and status held by Baloch sardars (Spooner 1988:625). The Marritribeand its sectionsmustbe understood as a structure ofgroups and leaders,and the crucialfeatureof membership in a groupis the relato its leader .... The sardaris the centraland tionshipof subordination leader, who by his existencecreates the Marri tribeand who for unifying formal purposesis regardedas the fontof all legitimate powerin the tribe [Pehrson1966:2o]. Their wealth (from personally owned lands and the taxes they levy on their tribesmen and clients), their ability to determine who holds officeat sub-tribal levels, and their formal connections with external political structures give these sardars considerable power to settle disputes and determine events within the tribe (Swidler 1969: 152). Indeed, the centrality of the sardar is such that recognition of his authoritycan initiate a process by which outsiders are incorporated into his tribe. Thus, most Baloch tribes have accretions of lineages fromother Baloch tribes or even other ethnic groups around a core of lineages with recognized descent from the group's patronym. Even in areas, such as Makran, where patrilineal tribes have little importance in peoples' lives, other types of patron-client relationships play a determining role in social organization, and, as Barth points out, those relationships take on differentsignificance than they do in Pushtun society. Judgedby Pathan standards, clientship places a man among the despised subordinates commoners. failures, among independent AmongBaluch, on the other hand, self-respect and recognition as an honorablecommoner does notrequirethisdegreeofassertionand autonomy; the costsbyBaluch standards ofbeinga clientofa chiefand a noblemanare veryslight.[Barth 1969:1251
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This is reflectedin land ownership in Baloch society which is characterized by flexible share-cropping relations and, in the past, various types of communal ownership (Swidler 1973:302-3; van Steenbergen 1996:154-7). Baluch society differsfromPushtun society in much the same way as Kapferer says Asian, hierarchical states differ from Western, egalitarian ones. Deriving his analysis from the work of Dumont, Kapferer argues that in hierarchical societies individuals and groups are seen to be incorporated within and determined by holistic principles. In those societies political (not religious) authority is the encompassing, unifyingforce which subsumes, orders, and makes whole, otherwise weak or destructive individuals and groups (1988:211). By contrast, in the ideology of egalitarian societies, Kapferer says, the individual precedes society and is the fundamental element of it. The danger to egalitarian individuals is that they will be absorbed and homogenized by more inclusive orders such as the state (ibid.:168, 187). In egalitarian societies much is made of the boundaries around groups, i.e., the differenceswhich distinguishwho may be considered the same and thus equal. The high degree of egalitarianism among Pushtun is also marked by a need to distinguish between Pushtun and non-Pushtun,giving Pushtun society its exclusive quality. By contrast, like the hierarchical state Kapferer describes, the Baloch are able to incorporate non-Baloch if they are subordinate to hierarchical authority,i.e., if they acknowledge the authorityof the encompassing social order the sardar embodies.
and Politics Subsistence,Structure, to pointout thatin bothsocieties counterAgainit is important forces are also at work. Some Pushtun or individuals vailing lineages have greaterpowerthan others, forexample,and Baloch 'comcan avoidtheauthority oftribal leaders moners', nomads, especially their distance from them(Pehrson bykeeping 1966:27). Yet,hierandequality areworked outindifferent in thetwo archy ways groups as a result ofbothinternal and external factors. with the Beginning cultural of the two this section examines some of ecology groups thesefactors and therelations between them. As suggested nomadism has beena moreimportabove, pastoral
ant subsistence strategy for Baloch than for Pushtun. Until quite
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recently the subsistence strategies of most Baloch combined smallscale agriculture with semi-nomadic or transhumant pastoralism (and in some instances raiding or wage labor).23Even in areas where most of the population is settled, full-time nomadic pastoralists played and continue to play the vital roles of linking isolated populations and utilizing otherwise unproductive land. Nomadism is not only an economic but a political strategy,however. It can be a political-military adaptation by weaker groups that have been marginalized or sought to avoid domination by more powerful settled groups, or conversely,nomads can themselves be the dominant political force in society (Irons 1974:647-54; Asad 1973). Both are in some sense true in the case of the Baloch since they historically existed on the margins of Persian civilization though, in the areas they have inhabited, leaders with genealogical or political links to pastoral tribes have tended to dominate settled agricultural populations.24Spooner (1987:63) suggests that nomadism 'is still thought of as the genuine Baluch life, which embodies the authentic Baluch virtues of honesty,loyalty,faith,hospitality,asylum forrefugees, and so on'. While pastoral nomadism is an element in the subsistence strategies of the eastern Pushtun, and more so among the southeastern tribes, it does not appear to be central to their social structure or ideology. Nomads were a minor element in the Durrani tribes which dominated Afghanistan's political structurefromthe eighteenth century until recent decades (Khazanov 1984:273; Elphinstone 1969:355). While there was a considerable flow of transhumant nomads from the Afghan highlands to the Indus plains until the creation of Pakistan, most of them originated in the lands to the west of the frontier tribes with whom the British dealt. These nomads were notably different from Baloch pastoral nomads in that combined with trade or money-lending,and many they pastoralism were primarily traders rather than herdsmen (Scholz 1996:197).25 The frontierPushtun were able to exploit their strategic position
See Swidler1980; Pehrson1966:11-16; and Baluchistan19o6a:1o8-9. Swidler1992; Spooner 1988:607; Salzman 1978; Khazanov 1984:223, Baluchistan 19o6b:48. 25 Robinsonreported in the 1930s that these nomadictradersbroughtanimals and animal products, and drugsfromthe highlandsand exchanged carpets,fruits, themforsuch industrial as kerosene, matches,cloth,shoes,sugar,and tea products (1978:23-4). In a more recent studyFerdinandreportedthat thoughrestricted, such tradewas stillbeing carriedout thirty yearslater (1962:156).
23
24
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along the passes between the mountains and the plains by raiding or extracting tribute from those engaged in that trade. Dupree (1980:166-9) notes that nomads fill similar social and ecological roles in Afghanistan as theydo in Balochistan, and that Pushtun like Baloch, romanticize their nomadic past. Nevertheless the core values of Pushtun derive more fromthe notion of being primordial Muslims (Anderson 1984), and fromthe code of honor and revenge that result from tarboorwali, the rivalry between cousins for land, status, and power (Ahmed 1980:91-2).26 Those seeking correlations between ecological factors and social organization provide some insight into the issues raised here. Lindholm, citing Black-Michaud, argues that nomadic societies tend to generate larger groups which act as units than do sedentary peoples among whom individuals act with greater independence (Lindholm 1982:89; see also Spooner 1973:25). Such is the case among Baloch since patrilineal descent, complemented by contract, is the medium through which people formnomadic camps (and obtain land tenure and cultivation rights). These kin also establish local leaders who make decisions, mediate disputes, and are incorporated into the hierarchical structure of the tribe (Swidler 1969:102-6, 142; Pehrson 1966:2o-2). Tribal hierarchies may also be partially determined by cultural ecology because where it is necessary to coordinate annual migration cycles or mediate relations between sedentary and nomadic populations paramount leaders tend to be present in nomadic groups (Spooner 1973:35; Lindholm 1982:90). Until quite recently among Baloch tribes with lands in the highlands and the Kachhi plains the role of the sardars was important in this regard. Another differencein the cultural ecology of nomadic and settled peoples is their ability to handle scarcity. Whereas nomads possess a naturallyincreasing resource and the ability to divide their communities with relative ease, sedentary agriculturalists such as the Pushtun face much stricterlimits. This situation, in which land = wealth = status, land is limited, and one's agnatic kin are one's primarycompetitors foraccess to land, gives rise to the institutionof tarboorwali which shapes both tribal structure and 'character' among Pushtun (Lindholm 1982:75-7; Ahmed 1980:5-7). It is also a 'push' factor giving rise to extensive out-migrationfrom Pushtun areas, another aspect of Pushtun social life that shapes stereotypes about them.
26 Another of the Pushtuntribalcode of honoris tor, important the component ofwomen,a core value of Baloch and otherMuslimpeoples. chastity
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ExternalPoliticalPowerand Tribal Structures be sufficient butit is notnecessary Nomadic for the pastoralism may ofhierarchy tribal creation and attempts to explain peoples, among thedevelopment structures ofhierarchical relaemphasize generally tions between andoutsiders. for nomads Salzman, example, explains thestratified structure oftheBalochYarahmadzai tribe segmentary relations to another ethnic 'quasi-feudal expanding bytheir group's in thenineteenth (Salzman1983:277).To resist proto-state' century more subordinate to that centralized powerthe Yarahbecoming madzai established sardarsas military leaders and negotiators which on a moresustained themselves basis organized through they thanthey he suggests. otherwise theanalysis to specould, Limiting in thelastcentury cific ofhowvirtually events all begsthequestion Balochtribes haveachieved levelofhierarchy in much this thesame contactswith centralized form,however. Rather,long-standing in Iran (and India) havecontributed to thestrain toward authority in a Baloch which increased the hierarchy society, tendency during colonial (Baloch1987:141). period Pushtun madehierarchical as a result of tribes, too,arepotentially external forces. for political Elphinstone (1815:163) noted, example, thatPushtun tribes mostunderthe influence of the Afghan king tended to havea hierarchical structure and hereditary leaders. This wasnotalways thecase,however, sinceagnatic andtheinstirivalry tution of powerful the authority of suchleaders jirgas undermine andperpetuate decentralization (Ahmed 1980:95-6).Thishasgiven Pushtun tribes their and,as Yapp'squoteat the amorphous quality, of this their to resist outsiders. beginning papersuggests, ability Thesetendencies the in of events the frontier. This shaped history canbe discerned inthewords ofRichard an assistant toSandBruce, emanand advocate of theforward Whenhe and Sandeman policy. first to work with the Baloch tribe itssardar lackedthe began Bugti influence to stoprenegade subsections from and raiding, it was,he the of which allowed thesardars contended, support thegovernment to develop their within their tribes.27 authority ofall changes about under Sandeman's ... [T]hegreatest brought regime wasthesetting ontheir ofthehereditary chiefs andmaliks, Pathan as legs
27 Nina Swidlerhas observed in a personalcommunication that the Bugtisardar himself to the Britishas havinglimited may have foundit expedientto represent influence in his tribe.
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well as Beluch,supporting themand working them,and bringing through themintolinewithourselves in all matters connected withthe good adminof the frontier; istration at the same time thathe exerciseda healthycontroland supervision overtheiractions.It is to thispolicythat theyowe the influence theyat presentpossess, and were our supportto be withdrawn theirpowerand authority wouldsoon dwindle[Bruce 1979:19]. The fact that Sandeman and Bruce successfullypacified the southern Pushtun tribes using the same measures that had been successful among the Baloch tribes indicates the potential malleability of Pushtun tribes."8Employing the same methods with which he and Sandeman accommodated the Baloch, Bruce was even able to open temporof some of the most arily the Gomal Pass in Waziristan, the territory intractable Pushtun tribes. His success with those tribes was not to be long-lived,however. Among the northernPushtun tribes the ultimate power of the leaders the British appointed and/or promoted was their personal standing in the tribe, not their ties to the government, and, in fact, such ties made them vulnerable to those preaching opposition to the infideloutsiders on the basis of Islam or ethnicity (Ahmed 1978:167; Caroe 1986:376). It is also necessary to examine the political geographyof the region to understand the differences between the northern and southern tribes in this regard. Holdich (1909:186) pointed out that the latter were strategicallycircumscribedby the militarypresence of the colonial government,unlike the formerwho had 'hidden means of communication with unseen supporters in the vast up land plains which stretchedaway to Kandahar and Kabul'. These back doors allowed the northerntribes to escape militarypressure, and they also provided a convenient means by which the government of Afghanistan could aggravate the British. The situation, of course, allowed the border tribes to play the two governmentsoffagainst one another and would have allowed individuals to operate in theirown interestsindependent of the tribal hierarchy.To have made the forwardpolicy work would have required thoroughlypenetrating the northernareas, the economic and political costs ofwhichwere too great forthe Governmentof India to bear (Howell 1979:50, 98-9; Yapp 1983:187).
28 It is interesting to note,though, that twenty Pushtun yearsafterthe southern tribeswere incorporated into the colonial administration, Britishadministrators continued to characterizethem as less hierarchicaland more democraticthan Baloch tribes(Baluchistan19o6c:67). Since thattime,as I describebelow,the herthan editaryleaders of those southernPushtuntribeshave enjoyedless authority have theirBaloch counterparts.
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The Construction of Character It is also possibleto correlatethese structural factors withthe reocabout the 'character' of Pushtun and Baloch. curring generalizations in Pushtuntribes, notonlyundermines centralization it Tarboorwali also gives rise to destructive feudsbetweenkin and the attendant of treacherpattern of betrayal fromwhich the characterization ousness is drawn.It creates an atmospherein which'honorlies in vengeance, not in keeping a trust' (Lindholm 1982:84).29 the international situationin whichthe governments Undoubtedly ofAfghanistan eventsin the and British India competedto influence border tribes also helped create the impressionthat their trustworthiness was problematic. The factthatthe twogovernments bid forthe loyalty of the tribes musthave also contributed to the Britishperception that the Pushtun were venal. More importantin this regard is the reputation Pushtunhave gained because of theiractivitiesas tradingnomads and as merchants,moneylenders, and mercenariesin towns and cities throughout fromthe push of India. Out migration resulting of factors and the extensive networks and traditions ecological pull of the involvement in the centuries trade and politdevelopedduring ics ofnorthern ofbeingambiIndia has givenPushtunthe reputation tious and hardworking but also shrewdand unethical,stereotypes commonlyassociated with strangercommunitiesand middlemen minorities (Bonacichand Modell 1980:19; Kronenfeld 1985:14).30 the forreligiouszeal, too,is a product Pushtunreputation Finally of both structure and history. Anderson(1984:274) has suggested that a perceivedcongruencebetweenbeing a tribesman and being Muslim is at the heart of Pushtunidentity. The Ghilzai tribesmen he describessee themselves as exemplary Muslimssince the putative
tarboorwali as 'neither chivalric norromantic. It does notoccur 29 Ahmeddescribes at an appointedplace and time withselected weapons and roughly equal chances ofvictory but maybe a shotin the back at the least expectedtime' (1980:182). See also Barth (1981). whichevokes these 'classic' stereo30 Spain (1962:22-3) providesa description types:'You will findPathans all overPakistanand India. They man coastal vessels betweenobscureIndian Ocean ports,theyserve as police officers in East Bengal, householdservantsin Bombay and New Delhi, customs agents on the Malabar in Kashmir,and bank guards in Benares. For a hundredyears Coast, gun-runners there has been scarcelya village in all the subcontinent that did not know the Pathan money-lender, withhis bag of coins,his longknife, hiswickedsmile,and his interest rates ranging upwardsfromfifty per cent a month[Spain 1962:22-3]'.
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ancestor of all Pushtun, Qais, received Islam directlyfrom the tensionsbetweenthese prophetMuhammad.3'There are however, two aspects of Pushtunidentity since Islam and tribalism generate differentvalues, institutions,and lines of unity and division in thisregard (ibid.:28o-6;Ahmed 1976). Of particular importance is the role played by religiousfigures(mullahs orfaqirs)who stand outside the tribalcharterand can thus suppresstribalconflicts and focus oppositionon externalthreatsto autonomy. of This, course, led the Britishto perceiveopposition to theirrule as PushtunfanatiThe reputedtraitsofBaloch 'character'are thosefrequently associated withnomads.These extendfromecologicaland culturalfactorswhichencouragemen of action,movement, and force(Spooner as the 1973:36-7). Given thatcohesivekinshipunitsoftenfunction core of nomadiccamps and allegianceto sardarsprovides a routeto tribal membership, the configuration of honor in Baloch society an on places emphasis displaying loyaltyand keeping one's word. The eclectic, fluid of nature Baloch tribescontributes, relatively perhaps, to the factthat,like manyothernomadicgroupsin the Middle East, Baloch do not equate being Muslim withstrictobservanceof thepracticesand ritualsprescribed bythe Shari'a (ibid.:39;Baluchistan 19o6d:73). It shouldalso be noted,however, thatorthodox Islam been has promoted by some of the Khans of Kalat and is a growing
force in some Baloch areas (Baloch 1996:231, 243)cism (King 1900oo:112).
Stereotypesand Routes to Mobilization In contemporary Pakistan the expansion of the state and market relationshas lessened the importance of tribalinstitutions in shapthe life social of Baloch and Pushtun. Yet the features of ing many the two societies described above continue to provide individual Pushtunand Baloch the networks, and expectaidentities, strategies, tionswithwhichtheyapproach these changed circumstances. It is forthisreason thatstereotypes drawninitially from the triballifeof the twogroupspersistin the urbansetting.
shared by urbanizedethnic-nationalists as 31 This perceptionis not necessarily evidentin the politicianWali Khan's oft-quoted responsewhen he was asked to name his politicalpriorities. 'I have been a Pukhtunfor5000 years,a Muslim for 1500 years,and a Pakistanifor40 years' he said.
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Martin Orans' concept of 'rank paths' or 'avenues of mobility' (Orans 1965:1 3-36; 1971:89-1oo) provides a useful starting point fora discussion of the post-colonial era. Orans suggests that subordinate ethnic or caste groups mobilize along different paths or routes in order to adopt or match the successes of those dominating them. The two routes to mobilization he discusses in most detail are the political route and the economic route. He argues that in general the political route to mobilization engenders greater solidaritythan does the economic route which tends to result in individual, not group, success. He goes on to qualifythese broad conclusions byobservingthat the degree of economic stratification within the group will influence whether or not political mobilization promotes solidaritysince political competition between interest groups or classes also can be divisive (Orans 1971:99-1oo). He observes, too, that the state can enter the picture in ways that decrease the solidarityof groups by undermining their indigenous institutionsor by pressuring them to adopt the symbolsof the nation; or,conversely,the state may promote solidaritybycreating institutionsor offices individuals have access to byvirtueof theirmemin the bership group (Orans 1971:149)The concept of routes to mobilization is pertinent to the discussion of contemporaryPakistan, because in its firstdecades Pushtun and Baloch have occupied marginal, subordinate positions within the state, and in their effortsto mobilize themselves they have confrontedone another as well as the country'sdominant ethnic groups. Especially in the province of Balochistan where the two groups share an ethnic boundary,historical circumstances and the social organization of each group have propelled their members along different routes to mobilization. Though neither route is entirelyexclusive of the other, in post-colonial Balochistan Baloch have followed a predominantlypolitical route, while Pushtun have followed an economic route to mobilization. Pushtun economic success is widely evident in Balochistan. Pushtun merchants replaced many of the Hindus and Sikhs who controlled the wholesale and retail trade in northern Balochistan (including Quetta) before theyleft forIndia during Partition (Scholz The position of Pushtun in the commercial life of the 1996:0oo). is enhanced region by the fact that Pushtun tribes straddle the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, giving them control of important trade and smuggling routes. Relative to Baloch, Pushtun have also been successful in contracting,construction,and the pro-
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fessions;and Pushtun farmershave taken the lead in developing orchardcrops,mostnotably commercial apples. Pushtuneconomicsuccess is not limitedto the Pushtunareas of Balochistan or the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). As because of theirstrategic locationalong the mostimportdescribed, ant trade routes to India as well as their historicties to various and India, Pushtunhave developed networks regimesin northern skillsthatgive themaccess to economicnichesthroughout the subIn Balochistanduringthe nineteenth continent. a thriving century of in Pushtun traders known Kalat as the Babis colony managed 'a considerabletransittrade betweenSind, Bombay,and Kandahar' in Karachi,and in an economicsurvey oftransporters transportation in Quetta several Pushtunbus ownerssaid theyearned the money to buy theirvehicles throughsuch activitiesas lending moneyor in other parts of Pakistan and selling cloth and tobacco (nashwar) in Pakistan'scivilbureaucracy and military. represented The Political Route In Balochistan'spolitics,however, Pushtun are in a much weaker This is of a factor Pakistan's politicalgeography. position. largely Pushtun officially constitutearound 25 percent of the province's population,and their numbershave allowed Baloch to dominate whateveropen politicallife the center has permitted.33 Except for the darkestdays of Zia's martiallaw regimewhen military figures were appointed,over the past 25 years eitherthe Governor or the Chief Ministerof Balochistanhas been Baloch. Those offices were held by Pushtunfora combinedtotal of around threeyearsin that a matterof numbers, period."3Baloch politicalsuccess is not simply
32 33
(Masson 1974:107).32 Presently Pushtun control much of the bus
India
(Titus
1991:167-83).
Pushtun are also relatively well-
This figure is derivedfromstatistics regarding language spokenin the home of Pakistandoes not collect figures on ethnic (madre zuban) since the government affiliation (Pakistan 1984). 34 The head of the PushtunBarozai tribewas chiefminister of Balochistanfora year between 1976 and 1977, and in July1991 Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of theJogezai tribebecame governor of the province, a post he held untilJuly1993. Both men were appointedto office byIslamabad.
See also Hughes 1877:30-1;
Gordon 1855; Barth 1969.
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and it is necessary to examinebothregionaland structural however, to understand the dynamics that underlieit. factors Politicalideologiesin Pakistanare articulated threebasic through themes:Pakistaninationalism, and Islam. Since ethnic-nationalism, of these are not,by and large, 96 percent Pakistanisare Muslims, exclusive identities. Rather,thecorevalues ofthe country's mutually are in one of these fields,though politicalparties and movements fromthere each makes ideological extensionsor alliances in the otherfields. The rationaleofethnic-nationalism is socio-cultural parand ethnic-nationalists in Pakistandemandgreaterpolititicularism, fortheirgroupor region.For cal, economic,and culturalautonomy Baloch and Pushtunethnic-nationalists thecurrent borders withIran and Afghanistan, and maintained imposed by outsiders,create a sense ofbeingunnaturally dividedand weakened.This sense offragmentationis aggravatedby the fact that in Pakistan theyare also dividedamong a numberof administrative units.Not onlydo Pushtun inhabitlarge parts of Balochistanand the NWFP; forexample, some tribeslive in FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), and the situationis Provincially similar for Baloch.35 The call to create a Pushtun homeland definedvariouslyas a state that would unifyall (Pushtunkhwa), Pushtunin Pakistan and Afghanistan or as a provincethat would unitethe Pushtunin Pakistan,has been a persistent ofPushfeature tun politics, and similaraspirations fora 'GreaterBalochistan'have been a major undercurrent in Baloch politics. The government of Pakistan,waryof any demands by minorities that would lead to a restructuring or decentralization of the state, has vigorously movements but they opposed these ethnic-nationalist have also been undermined by the social forceswe have examined. In thecase ofthePushtun, ethnic-nationalists' efforts to unitepeople on a more inclusivebasis than tribalism have been thwarted by the of Islam. This the was case in appeal 1947 whenthe MuslimLeague overwhelmed the Frontier Congressand its call to create a Pushtun state (Rittenberg 1988:243-4). In recent decades the Pushtun nationalist as represented movement, by the NationalAwamiParty and its the Awami National successor, (NAP) Party(ANP), has been contained in the NWFP by the Jamiat 'Ulema-e-Islam (UI), an Islamic party,and Pakistaninationalistparties (various avatars of
Pakistan civiland criminal law prevails whilein FATAand 5 In theprovinces PATAtribal andcustomary lawholds sway.
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the MuslimLeague and the PakistanPeople's Party).The appeal of Islam has been even greateramong Pushtunin Balochistanwhere the JUI has dominated Pushtun electoral politics until quite recently.36 has had a somewhatdifferent AmongBaloch, ethnic-nationalism The of the institution sardar in Baloch tribeshas history. powerful forpowerful created a tendency and dynamicleaders to emergeat the ethnic-national level as well. A numberof Baloch sardars have enteredpoliticsand builtfollowings beyondtheirtribesby advocatBaloch nationalism. First oftheNAP and subsequently as leaders ing the along divergentpaths, throughout 196os, 1970s, and 198os Baloch tribal/political such as Sardar Ataullah Mengal, figures Nawab AkbarKhan Bugti,Nawab Khair BukhshMarri,and Ghous BukhshBizenjo37 the mediumthrough whichthe discourse provided of Baloch nationalismwas carried out. Even young,middle-class Baloch who opposed 'tribalism' articulated theirpositionby aligning withone or anotherof these men. and tribalstructures are thusa dimension Thoughtribalidentities of Baloch ethnic-nationalism, retain considerable In they autonomy. the worldof electoralpolitics, forexample,even sardarswho do not are able to converttheir presentthemselvesas ethnic-nationalists tribalstandinginto politicalpower.The largestgroupof successful candidatesin Balochistan'selectionsis consistently those elected as of all whom are sardars independents, nearly (Yusufzai1993). Indeed, it is the autonomy ofsardarsrather thanthe appeal ofIslam thathas underminedthe Baloch ethnic-nationalist movement. While many sardarsdistancethemselves fromthe Baloch nationalist movement, thosewho have led it have been strong with theirown personalities tribalconstituencies. the differences During among 1970ospersonal themdevelopedintoseriousand destructive rifts (Harrison1981). it can be arguedthatBaloch ethnic-nationalists have Nevertheless, achievedcertainvictories in Balochistan.Thoughit did not have the with supportof all Baloch and was containedby the government relativeease, theirarmed insurrection the central against governmentin the 1970osgained thema certainamountof respectas well as attention. One oftheirmaindemandswas forgreaterrepresentatimea Pushtunnationalist won moreseats than theJUI in an party 36 The first electionin Balochistanwas October,1993the sardar of his tribebut he was in a collateral 37 Bizenjo was not technically line forthe sardarship. One informant in tribalmatterstold me his knowledgeable uncle had usurpedthe office fromhim.
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tionof Balochistanisin the provincial a condition that bureaucracy, has been met.Also, muchas the PPP government did in the 197os, the martiallaw government underZia proposeda numberof development projects for Balochistan and wooed the province'stribal The province receivedlarge amountsofaid from the internaelite.38 tional community as a resultof the civil war in Afghanistan, both because of the refugees who fledtherebut also because of the prospect of anotherBaloch uprising(Ispahani 1989:69-77). While not all of thisaid was directedtowardBaloch areas, since mostrefugees were (and stillare) concentrated in Pushtunareas, and whileBaloch nationalists consider thatwhich was spentinadequate fundamentally to change livingconditions, a significant numberof schools,irrigation works,and development projectssuch as the abortedBela-toTurbat road were initiatedin Baloch areas. Pushtunhave been appointed Also,moreBaloch thanBalochistani to head ministries in the central government, and theyappear to have been betterable to capitalize on those ties. For example,desof seats on Quetta's city pite the factthatPushtunheld the majority council,it elected a Baloch mayorfollowing municipalelectionsin and local observers felt the that influenceof Baloch 1987, many in Islamabad was in instrumental the outcome. Some politicians Pushtun tribal leaders have been among those the center has recruited. Yet, despitethissupportand unliketheirBaloch counterhave byand large not enjoyedelectoral parts,Pushtuntribalfigures to out maulvis affiliated withtheJUI or middle-class success,losing Pushtunnationalists. Since it emergesfromthe tribalsocial order,the ideal of honor reflects values and institutions thatare seen as morepure thanthose the educatedor urbanizedmustaccept (Anderson1983). Baloch sardars represent a bridgebetweenthe worldof the tribeand that of the city,the market,and the state. They representand symbolize the tribe,and therefore theirstandingis part of the tribe'shonor (Ahmed 1987:38; C. Pastner 1988:249-50). Though they act in large part to serve theirown interests, sardars undoubtedly are also able to articulatethe concernsof Baloch in relationto the variousforces assailingthemin a waythatemphasizestheircultural The perpetuation of honoras a positiveand centralvalue identity. ifnota greaterrelianceon tribal amongurbanizedBaloch indicates, ties or institutions than Pushtun,at least that the source of Baloch
38
Harrison1981:169; Ali and Hussain 1986:66; Amin 1988:176-7, 203.
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Pakistan is their mobilizationbehind strengthin contemporary theirstandinginitiallyfromthe tribal who attain politicalfigures links to it. and retain strong sphere Conclusion People approach new situationswith the cultural categories and institutions withwhichtheyare familiar and withwhichtheyhave of social lifethatgave rise to had successin the past. Thus features about Pushtunand Baloch in the colonial generalizations particular forceshave reinforced era persisttoday.To suggestthat historical and even exaggerated certainaspectsof Baloch and Pushtunsociety and culturalidentity is not,of course,to implythat these are inherent or essential characteristics of these groupsor the people that them. Changed circumstances constitute lead people to draw new conclusions and make use of new strategies. the civilwar in Afghanistan and the massivedisplaceSpecifically, mentof people it has entailedhave had profound effects on all citizens ofPakistanand especially thosein the border region.Economic in for international aid the Mujahadin (fueled part by development and the large amountsof moneyenteringthe regionthroughthe drug trade), the collapse of the SovietUnion, and polarizationover thequestionofIslam have all affected social lifein western Pakistan. The influxof refugees, most of whom are Pushtun,has effectively eliminatedthe international and created a defactoPushboundary about 9). These changes have to an extentreinforced stereotypes Baloch and Pushtun.The refugeesare closelyidentified with the cause ofIslam,forexample,and theBaloch responseto theirincreasand social lifeof Balochistanhas been ing presencein the economy a politicalone, whichwarns against the increasingmarginalization and 'red Indianization' of Baloch in their homeland (Jalbani withthis,however, ofnew has been the growth 1992:56). Coincident and alliances that within but classes,organizations, political operate also cross-cut the two ethnicgroups.Tribal affiliations increasingly idenethnic,national,and religious giveway to more encompassing titiesthoughthoseidentities too make use ofor resonatewithlocal, identities.
Those experiencing such changes and reflecting upon them in order to accommodate and take advantage of them, as well as those tunkhwa in the NWFP and northernBalochistan (Noman 1990:198-
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to documentthe process,will identify certainaspects of the striving or exemplary. Those featuresare used experienceas representative to create categorieswhich,whetherpart of folk,liberal,or critical theories of knowledge,are simplifications and generalizationsof diverse and complex, phenomena(Mahmood Armstrong 1992:10o). We must be aware of how such categoriesare constructed and the role theyplay in the ordering of societybut it is also necessaryto contextin order to use them as place themin social and historical the lenses theyare, that is, as means of glimpsing the complexities to whichtheyrefer.
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Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization and History in Western Pakistan Author(s): Paul

AsianStudies Modern 32, 3 (1998), pp. 657-687.Printedin the United Kingdom

Press 1998 CambridgeUniversity

Social Organization andHistory Stereotypes, in Western Pakistan

BUY THE PUSHTUN

Ghazni..~ :samabad ...... .. ....... . . R..PA.eshawar. , ::"":"... ?'I.

Fig. 1. Major Ethno-linguist Groups,PakistaniBalochistanand Region. tones.) (Mixed groupsindicatedby alternating

British Relations with the Tribes of the Western Frontier

Colonial and ContemporaryStereotypes

Notablyin the KurramValley,Gomal, and Tochi.

ones of their successors (1992:92).

I would argue that the process was in fact a

From Stereotypes to Social Organization

1988:172-3). 19 Both Elphinstone (1815)

and Bruce (1900)

were aware of the tendencies

(Masson 1974:107).32 Presently Pushtun control much of the bus

Pushtun are also relatively well-

See also Hughes 1877:30-1;

Gordon 1855; Barth 1969.

HONOR THE BALOCH, BUY THE PUSHTUN

Harrison1981:169; Ali and Hussain 1986:66; Amin 1988:176-7, 203.

Literatures. London: Verso. Ahmad, Classes, Nations, Aijaz,1992,In Theory:

Helm. Pp. 119-49.

HONOR THE BALOCH, BUY THE PUSHTUN

Practiceand the Signs of . 1987, 'Of Totemismand Ethnicity: Consciousness,

Government andHistory in Yemen. Oxford:ClarendonPress. Dresch,Paul, 1989, Tribes,

598-632Stewart, Rhea, 1973, Fire in Afghanistan z914-

. 1973, 'The Political Context of Brahui Sedentarization', in Ethnology 12:299314-

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