Marine Casualty Report 1

Tintomara and Barge DM932 being pushed by the Mel Oliver Marine Casualty Report

Dylan Lovergne Seamanship II Captain Walling 14 November 2013

Marine Casualty Report 2 Tintomara and Barge DM932 being pushed by the Mel Oliver Marine Casualty Report On the early morning hours of 23 July 2008, the Tintomara and the Barge DM932 collided around Mile Marker 99 of the Lower Mississippi River (LMR), which led to the discharge of approximately 282,828 gallons of fuel oil into the Mississippi River. Mile Marker 99 of the LMR is between the Greater New Orleans Bridge and the Huey P. Long Bridge, roughly around the location of the Harvey Canal Locks. The Tintomara is a 600 foot long Liberian flagged oil and chemical tank vessel equipped with a right-hand turning controllable pitch propeller. The Barge DM932 is a 195 foot long single skin tank barge that is owned by American Commercial Lines (ACL). At the time of the accident, DM932 was being pushed ahead by the Mel Oliver, which is 61.2 foot long towing vessel owned by ACL but is chartered to DRD Towing through a Bareboat Charter agreement. The Mississippi River is always in a dynamic state and on 23 July 2008 the river conditions included: a four knot current; wind speeds between five to ten knots; the river stage at approximately ten and a half feet; and the flood stage of the river at 17 feet. Even though the Mississippi River was in a high river state at the time of the accident, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) issued bulletins regarding navigation on the LMR, but none of them mentioned speed limits. As a result of poor communications and leaving the vessel under command of an unlicensed person, the collision between the Tintomara and the Barge DM932 occurred (USCG, 2012, pp. 14-24). Prior to the early morning hours of 23 July 2008, the Mel Olivers actions of both the crew and vessel are pertinent for the serious marine casualty that took a little over four minutes to develop. Crew changes onboard DRD Towing vessels occur on separate days, one day when the wheelhouse personnel change and on another day when deck personnel change in order to minimize the common crews between shifts. On 15 July 2008, the Mel Oliver had a crew

Marine Casualty Report 3 change where Captain Terry Carver and the unlicensed Steersman took over the wheelhouse personnel, however Captain Carver was unable to make the early crew change in which he contacted DRD Towing and informed them of his tardiness. DRD Towing approved of Captain Carver being late to the crew change, and left the unlicensed Steersman in charge of the Mel Oliver until they made it through the Harvey Locks when Captain Carver joined the vessel. Captain Carver stayed onboard the Mel Oliver for five more days until he received a phone call on 20 July 2008 concerning personal issues back home. Captain Carver abruptly left the vessel while enroute with a red flag barge at the Reserve Ferry Landing, and did not contact the DRD Towing personal to inform them of his actions. While Captain Carver was attending to his problems back home, he would frequently call the vessel to check in with the unlicensed Steersman who he left in charge. Captain Carver originally told the unlicensed Steersman that he would return to the vessel on 22 July 2008, but he called the vessel and told one of the deckhands that he would not be returning to the vessel on that day. During the conversation between Captain Carver and the deckhand, the deckhand informed Captain Carver that the Mel Oliver was currently at the Stone Oil Dock where they were loading the Barge DM932 with fuel oil. The Mel Oliver pulled away from the Stone Oil Dock around 0041 on 23 July 2008 proceeding north-bound with a one barge tow in the pushing ahead configuration (USCG, 2012, pp. 27-29). On 22 July 2008 around 2200, the New Orleans and Baton Rouge Pilots Association (NOBRA) pilot boarded the Tintomara. The Master of the Tintomara and the NOBRA Pilot had a proper Master/Pilot exchange; however the Pilot never signed the Pilot Card from the Tintomara. The Tintomara got underway at 2359 on 22 July 2008 and the Pilot gave navigational instructions as the vessel proceeded down-bound the LMR. While underway, the Pilot checked in with the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) at the Cargill Grain Elevator, which is located around

Marine Casualty Report 4 Mile Marker 103 of the LMR. This check in was the first of two required check in calls by the New Orleans VTS service for the section of the LMR (USCG, 2012, p. 29). While the Mel Oliver was proceeding north-bound after departing from the Stone Oil Dock, the unlicensed Steersman contacted one of the deckhands to bring him a mop to the pilot house because he spilt a drink on the deck. The unlicensed Steersman told the deckhand that he would clean the mess up himself and just leave the mop in the wheelhouse. While the unlicensed Steersman was tending to his mess, the Mel Oliver stayed on a steady course in which the VTS confirmed that the Mel Oliver did not make any sporadic course changes in its north-bound journey until just before she made her turn to port. The VTS replay of the Mel Oliver shows a wavering motion, which was caused by an electrical surge that occurred after the unlicensed Steersman tightened the face wires of the tow. This electrical surge caused the radar to shut down, and then the unlicensed Steersman tried manipulating it to come back on. Around the same time as the electrical surge on the Mel Oliver, the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara contacted the VTS conducting his second required check in stating Sixteen to the Governor (USCG, 2012, pp. 29-30). The Tintomara was the second vessel in a line of three deep draft vessels proceeding down-bound on the LMR keeping between a mile and a mile and a half separation between each vessel. Around 01:27:33, the Mel Oliver began a slow arching turn to port which put the tug and barge in a crossing situation with the Tintomara. Approximately 56 seconds later at 01:28:29, the NOBRA Pilot onboard the Tintomara tried hailing the Mel Oliver but did not know the vessels name, so he issued the radio call using bearing and location references. At 01:28:49 the VTS notified the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara that the vessel he was trying to hail is the Mel Oliver. At 01:28:52 the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara ordered the Master to sound the ships

Marine Casualty Report 5 whistle, and it was sounded 14 seconds later at 01:29:06. The NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara ordered a Full Astern bell at 01:29:48, but before that order, the Pilot hailed the Mel Oliver to back his engines at 01:29:38. The Mel Oliver did not listen to this radio call from the Tintomara, but backed his engines after the VTS notified him to do so at 01:30:06. Because the Mel Oliver was equipped with air clutches, there was a time delay after the throttles were put astern, which means the Mel Oliver would not start operating astern until approximately 01:30:21. This action by the Mel Oliver was too late, and the Tintomara collided with the Barge DM932 at 01:30:37; parting the face wires that held the Mel Oliver to the Barge DM932, sending the Mel Oliver in a violent rocking motion, and splitting the Barge DM932 in half (USCG, 2012, pp. 30-37). During the three minutes and four seconds between the time the Mel Oliver turned to port and the collision, communications from the Mel Oliver were nonexistent. However, prior to these three minutes and four seconds, the Mel Oliver was initiating passing and meeting arrangements with the vessels in the area. The Mel Oliver was unaware that the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara was trying to hail him until he heard the VTS say the Mel Olivers name to the NOBRA Pilot. At that point, the unlicensed Steersman on the Mel Oliver realized that the vessel turned to port because he was unaware of the vessels actions since he was preoccupied with the radar. Once the unlicensed Steersman realized that the Mel Oliver turned to port, he immediately tried turning the vessel to starboard, but it would not turn. The unlicensed Steersman continued to try and turn the vessel to starboard in order to avoid collision, and at the same time, the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara as well as the VTS personnel were trying to hail the Mel Oliver to determine his actions. The Mel Oliver was fitted with a pair of flanking rudders, and during the entire evolution, the unlicensed Steersman never tried using the flanking rudders to maneuver the vessel. The unlicensed Steersman never responded to both the NOBRA Pilot on the

Marine Casualty Report 6 Tintomara or the VTS personnel, but did listen to them when they told him to back the engines. Even though both of them ordered the unlicensed Steersman to back his engines, the time at which the command was given was too late and ineffective (USCG, 2012, pp. 30-31). Immediately after the collision occurred, the persons operating the VTS began hailing nearby tugs that could help with on scene operations such as assisting the Mel Oliver, assisting the Tintomara, as well as the salvage efforts for the remains of the Barge DM932. The VTS also contacted the United States Coast Guard Command Center in New Orleans at 0141 on 23 July 2008 of the casualty, and then they contacted the Duty Inspector at 0158. About 30-45 minutes after the collision, the unlicensed Steersman on the Mel Oliver piloted the vessel to the Milan Street Wharf, and while in transit he contacted both the New Orleans VTS as well as the Port Captain for DRD Towing. At around 0315, the Port Captain for DRD Towing showed up at the Mel Oliver, and found there were only three persons onboard and Captain Carver was missing. Shortly after the Port Captain for DRD Towing arrived on the vessel, another person came aboard to administer drug and alcohol tests that are required after any serious marine casualty. After the Tintomara was safely placed at anchor after the collision, the on-watch personnel which included the Master, Bridge Team, Chief Engineer, and forward look-out were all required to complete a drug and alcohol tests. Even though the results came back for all crew members, the tests were later found invalid because they were expired for over eight months. The NOBRA Pilot onboard the Tintomara completed a separate drug test at 0300 on 23 July 2008 as well as an alcohol test at 0320 on the same day. After the Tintomara was secure to the bottom by the anchors, assist tugs came in to remove the remains of the Barge DM932; which were later brought to the riverfront area adjacent to the Greater New Orleans Bridge. Once the barge was secure to the dock, the remaining fuel oil onboard which totaled 136,458 gallons were pumped to

Marine Casualty Report 7 a shore-side reception tank. Therefore, a rough approximation of 282,828 gallons of fuel oil was spilled into the LMR, thus affecting about 100 miles of the Mississippi River and led to the river being closed for over a week to commercial vessel traffic (USCG, 2012, pp. 41-57). After the collision occurred, the unlicensed Steersman was questioned numerous times as to what happened onboard the Mel Oliver and his story varied every time, but all of his recollections shared two similarities, the radar and the vessel would not turn to starboard. The USCG sent out a marine inspector to the Mel Oliver to determine any deficiencies within the system. The marine inspector tested the radar system and could not determine any deficiencies, so he called for a certified radar technician who also tested the system, but could not develop an exact replay of what the unlicensed Steersman said happened. The radar technician did determine that the tune function on the radar was inoperable. The tune function on the radar should change the targets depiction on the display, but it did not work properly. The personnel at DRD Towing were not appeased with the results from the initial test, so they requested that the USCG marine inspector and radar technician come back to the Mel Oliver for more in depth testing. Some of the first tests performed showed no change in the radar system, but eventually the USCG marine inspector and radar technician did overload the electrical system of the Mel Oliver while working the winches and that led to the reboot of the radar system. Even though the initial tests did not confirm the unlicensed Steersmans story of the radar rebooting, after several tests, the radar system did reboot after an electrical surge; but the radar was not a part of the steering problems of the Mel Oliver (USCG, 2012, pp. 53-54). During the investigation after the collision, another contributing factor that stayed consistent with the unlicensed Steersmans story was that the Mel Oliver would not turn to starboard. In the following weeks after the collision, the USCG sent out an inspector to inspect a

Marine Casualty Report 8 void space on the Mel Oliver beneath the wheelhouse. This void space was the location of many systems that ran from the wheelhouse to the engine room, including the steering linkage system. The USCG report on the collision defines the steering linkage system as: The steering linkage system is an open mechanical system consisting of rods and various yokes running from the steering-sticks in the wheelhouse through the void space then through a passage in the deck plate and finally connecting to the hydraulic pumps in the engine room. These hydraulic pumps operate the steering rams which in turn operate the rudders. The majority of the linkage system is located in the void space below the wheelhouse. (USCG, 2012, p. 47) The void space on the Mel Oliver was also home to many discarded parts and excess equipment that was no longer needed onboard the vessel. Since the void space onboard the Mel Oliver housed numerous excess parts, the inspector began a search of the system and parts to determine if any of the loose parts could have become lodged into the steering system. When the investigator was conducting his investigation, he noticed that there were two cream colored paint chips lodged into the yoke, or elbow, of the steering rod. He was able to trace the color of the paint chips back to an electrical box, where he took samples of the paint from. The USCG investigator sent the paint chips as well as the samples to a forensic lab, and the results were that the paint chips matched the paint on the electrical box. After determining that the electrical box could have gotten lodged into the system, the investigating officer attempted to replay the accident and placed the electrical box into the system. When the electrical box was placed into the steering linkage system, the electrical box did not completely jam the system; however it did impede the rudder movement by 15 degrees or 43 percent. As a result of the investigation from the investigating officer and the USCG marine inspector, the two similarities found within all the

Marine Casualty Report 9 stories told by the unlicensed Steersman on the Mel Oliver were confirmed through numerous tests (USCG, 2012, pp. 46-53). As a result of the collision between the Tintomara and the Barge DM932, the USCG issued recommendations for Suspension and Revocation, Civil Penalties, and Referral for Criminal Penalties. The USCG issued Suspension and Revocation of Documents to Captain Terry Carver for leaving the Mel Oliver without permission, leaving the Mel Oliver to an unlicensed individual, leaving a red-flag barge in tow, and violation of the 12-hour rule. The USCG issued Suspension and Revocation of Documents to the unlicensed Steersman on the Mel Oliver as a result of losing situational awareness that resulted in a serious marine casualty and operating a vessel without proper documentation. The Civil Penalties issued by the USCG were issued to both DRD Towing and ACL for numerous reasons including: knowingly allowing unlicensed personnel to operate vessels; knowingly creating a hazardous situation; and knowingly operating vessels beyond the 12-hour rule. The Referral for Criminal Penalties were issued to DRD Towing, ACL, and select personnel on both vessels for reasons including: willfully concealing, altering, and/or destroying documents; willfully and knowingly creating a hazardous condition; failure to properly answer a federally issued subpoena; perjury while testifying under oath; and supplying false information to the USCG. All of the civil and criminal punishments recommended by the USCG were later evaluated and sent to the United States Attorneys Office by the Eighth District Legal Officer if further action was deemed necessary (USCG, 2012, pp. 79-81). After reading a reviewing the USCG report on the collision between the Tintomara and the Barge DM932, actions onboard the vessel as well as from shore-side personnel could have been effective in preventing or minimizing the collision. After Captain Carver received the news

Marine Casualty Report 10 about his personal problems back home, he could have contacted the personnel at DRD Towing and ask for time off so he could tend to his business; however he did not do that, and just departed the vessel. Since Captain Carver departed the vessel without having proper authority, the unlicensed Steersman knew that he was not legally qualified to run the vessel, so he should have contacted DRD Towing to send a relief Captain to meet the manning requirements. Prior to the three minutes and four seconds when the Mel Oliver began her turn to port, the unlicensed Steersman had situational awareness of what was occurring near him between all vessels. However, when the electrical system surged and the radar went out, the unlicensed Steersman then lost all of his situational awareness. The Tintomara and the VTS tried contacting the Mel Oliver but the unlicensed Steersman was too focused on trying to turn the vessel to starboard that he never responded to any of the radio calls. The unlicensed Steersman never slowed the Mel Oliver down until the NOBRA Pilot on the Tintomara and the VTS personnel advised him to, but by the time he reduced speed it was too late. I believe once the unlicensed Steersman realized that he could not turn the Mel Oliver to starboard, he should have slowed the vessel down and tried turning the vessel to port. This action would put the Mel Oliver on a parallel course with the Tintomara, and then the Mel Oliver could maneuver to head back on a north-bound course once the traffic in the area was clear. Even if the NOBRA Pilot and Master onboard the Tintomara would have called for an Emergency Full Astern bell sooner, the actions alone would not have prevented the collision due to the prevailing circumstances on the LMR. As a result of having a legally unqualified person in command of the Mel Oliver who lost situational awareness for a short period of time, the collision between the Tintomara and the Barge DM932 occurred, thus shutting down over 100 miles of the LMR to commercial traffic as a result of the discharge of 282,828 gallons of fuel oil.

Marine Casualty Report 11 Reference United States Coast Guard. (2012). Report of Investigation Into the Circumstances Surrounding the Collision Between the T/V TINTOMARA and the Barge DM932. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security.