AN ANALYSIS OF THE SWORN TESTIMONY BY WAYNE MICHAEL MARTIN, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER THE REASONS FOR THE WAYNE

MARTIN TESTIMONY

Beginning about 1965 businessmen began promoting a new type of fire detector, originally called a Products of Combustion (POC) detector. This device could detect a particulate consisting of an extremely large numbers (billions per cubic inch) of aerosols (atomic sized particles). It was advertised as being able to warn of a pre-fire condition (before smoke or flames appeared). But after some years during which millions of them were installed, the false alarming of the device, and the failures to warn in time to allow escape, were recognized as serious problems. The makers of the device renamed the device a smoke detector, but that was not what it detected. A federally funded, fire test program called the Dunes Tests was conducted during the years 1974-1976. This fire test program involved 76 live fire tests in real homes. Three types of fire detectors were tested including heat detector, the ionization type so-called smoke detector and the photoelectric smoke detector. The testing proved that the ionization device was not a satisfactory warning device for smoke. However, the engineer in charge of the Dunes Tests, Richard Bukowski, an employee of Underwriters Laboratories, rather blatantly falsified the tests and the report of the tests. The Dunes Tests convinced most fire chiefs that the false scenario of fire, as manufactured by the smoke detector industry, was a valid one. Also, due to the falsified Dunes Tests, the idea that heat detectors were essentially useless for warning of fires, even the flaming fires, gained near universal acceptance within the fire protection community. As a consequence, the Federal Trade Commission became convinced that any business selling or installing heat detectors was defrauding and endangering the public. The feds initiated a campaign to put all businesses selling and installing heat detectors out of business. Figgie International was one of the few businesses that continued to operate in defiance of the feds and the anti-heat detector propaganda of the fire establishment. The Feds attempted to destroy the Figgie business by bringing a legal action against Figgie. Mr. Martin was a fire engineer for the Los Angeles Fire Department during the Cal-Chiefs tests of 1978. During this fire test program the ionization device (so-called smoke detector), the photoelectric type smoke detector and the heat detector were all tested against real fires in real homes. This was a time when the ionization type so-called smoke detector had been installed in a very large number of homes but with very disappointing results. The false alarming problem and the very high failure rate of the ionization device were major factors for the testing. Supposedly, the testing was to be an honest evaluation of all three types of fire detectors. Although the reports on this test program were eventually buried (and therefore the details are unavailable) it seems that the majority of the tests involved smoldering type fires and the ionization detector was determined to have a 50 to 80 percent failure rate.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION When I was named the Chairman of four sectional NFPA fire codes dealing with fire detection systems for industrial and commercial properties, I was concerned that there was no code dealing with fire in dwellings where about 95 percent of all fire deaths (within buildings) occur. So, within two years I had a residential fire detection code (NFPA-74) up for adoption at the 1966 NFPA annual meeting. The NFPA Standard No. 74 , had been approved by the entire fire detection committee I headed, set the heat detector as the required detector, and the smoke detector as the back-up detector for those areas where there were significant smoldering fire hazards (bedrooms and living rooms especially). At that time the extremely slow to operate (to prevent avoidable water damage) industrial sprinkler head (operated by a heat detector) had been extremely close to 100 percent reliable at preventing loss of life in buildings. Thus we knew that the heat detector was the extremely reliable detector of the flaming type fire. Because a fire detector does not apply water, the heat detectors are designed to operate much faster than the sprinkler head (that emits water spray). Our goal was to recommend the best but allow a building owner to do less than the best if that is the choice. Apparently my committee moved so fast that I caught the fire establishment by surprise because no effort was made to kill the code until I presented it at the meeting. There a hastily assembled gang of insurance inspectors and their hired guns, headed by FPE Rolf Jenson that lined up at the floor mike and fought against the adoption of the code for about 3-1/2 hours. But finally a vote was allowed and it passed. A fire chief said to me after the meeting, because the fire insurers fought so hard to kill it, we knew it had to be a good code. The creation of this code, which for the first time called for fire detection within the home, sparked a competitive movement to sell (or mandate) fire detectors for home fire safety.

IONIZATION DETECTOR INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE LIES The makers of the ionization type smoke detector apparently gained the cooperation of the NFPA/UL team to revise the NFPA 74 code to eliminate reliance on heat detectors and rely solely on the Product of Combustion (POC) device. Apparently, to make the POC device more competitive with the true smoke detector (photoelectric) it was renamed a smoke detector (even though it had been proven to be unable to detect real visible - smoke. With the NFPA/UL team in the pocket of the makers of the ionization device, the following fallacious fire scenario was promoted by the industry: 1. Smoke will kill the occupants before the heat detector (or sprinkler) activates. 2. The ionization device will sound an alarm even before smoke or flames appear. 3. The smoldering fire is the fire type that causes nearly all the fire deaths. 4. Most fire deaths occur at night (note: because a smoldering fire will alert the occupants long before deadly conditions occur, it was expedient to ignore the daylight fire deaths). 5. Whereas heat detectors had to be installed in each room to be effective, it was claimed that one or two ionization devices could protect an entire home. (Actual fire test results at UL were ignored) 6. The claims equated to this: the ionization device was economical, superfast and reliable for all fire types; but the competitor (heat detector) was not only too costly but

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virtually useless. The photoelectric smoke detector was more costly than the ionization device; hence if both were considered equal the POC device would win. The entire manufactured scenario as stated above was a con. But the smoke men rigged a phony demonstration test and created a dog and pony show to convince the fire chief that the device would perform as claimed. The industry had firefighters selling the devices on their off days. Representatives of the NFPA told Richard Bright of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) that they would name him the chairman of the NFPA Code 74 provided he would revise the code to put more emphasis on smoke detectors and downgrade the heat detectors. He essentially completed that revision before he became the Washington, DC bureaucrat in charge of the Dunes Tests. So, going into the testing, Bright was already committed to the idea that smoke detectors are the right type and heat detectors are unnecessary. As for UL, they had been certifying the device as reliable for protecting lives for years. Therefore UL would suffer serious damage if the truth about the ionization device became public knowledge. HOW BUKOWSKI AND BRIGHT DESTROYED THE HEAT DETECTOR BUSINESS The NFPA, cooperating with the corrupt ionization alarm companies, named Richard Bright of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to be the chairman of the NFPA 74 code with the proviso that he would revise the code to eliminate reliance on heat detectors and instead rely completely on smoke detectors. Mr. bright accomplished that but justification for the revision was needed. The federal fire test program that began during 1974 was intended to test heat detectors and both ionization and photoelectric smoke detectors. Bright was the federal monitor and Richard Bukowski was the Underwriters Laboratory engineer in charge of the field-testing. The following strategy was employed to discredit heat detectors and open the door to the mass marketing of the ionization devices. During 75 of the 76 Dunes Tests the heat detector was tested as follows: It was tested with moldering fires that failed to create significant heat. It was tested with slow burning flaming fires that produced so little heat that the ceiling temperatures failed to reach the 135 degrees needed for operation. When typical fast growing hot flaming fires were set, the heat detector was either not installed or removed before the fires were set. During the entire test series there was only one typical flaming fire was created while a heat detector actually was installed within the fire room. During lone honest test of a heat detector it performed perfectly. Based on the flagrantly falsified fire tests the engineers reported that the heat detector failed the fire testing and that it was essentially useless for protecting life. In time, the Dunes Tests report was used by the Federal Trade Commission to attack businesses that were making or selling heat detectors for home use. Also, many fire department officials, that believed the Dunes Tests were honest, attacked the heat detector industry, coming very close to completely destroying that industry. I ANALYZED THE DUNES REPORT AND REALIZED IT WAS A FRAUD

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When I received a copy of that Dunes Report I quickly realized that that the conclusions were not realistic. Therefore I spent several weeks analyzing the raw computer generated data to try to see how such unrealistic conclusions could have been reached. I soon realized the engineers first rigged the tests to produce the desired results. Then, when they discovered that even rigged fire tests could not produce satisfactory results from the ionization devices, they employed the solution of desperation. They lied about the results and presented the raw data in a manner almost defying analysis. No doubt they assumed that no one would unscramble and analyze the data, but instead would simply assume the lies were truths. I was thoroughly shocked that professional engineers would deceive the fire chiefs and the public in ways that were certain to result in thousands of children being burned to death. CAL-CHIEFS TESTS After my analysis of the Dunes Tests I exposed it as a scam within my 1976 Smoke Detector Fraud report. Then during 1978 the Cal-Chefs (mainly Los Angeles) ran the Cal-Chiefs tests with help from the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). The fire chief in charge of the testing, John Gerard, reported (based on the test results) that the ionization device would have a 50 to 80 percent failure rate in the field. This also is confirmed by the sworn testimony of Wayne Martin. (See page 902 lines 23-25.) This conclusion by Chief John Gerard was a confirmation of my findings several years earlier. A copy of the Cal Chiefs test report landed on the desk of Richard Bukowski at the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). Mr. Bukowski had been the engineer in charge of the Dunes Tests. Following this corrupted fire test program he went to work for the NBS, which is now known as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). When Bukowski received a copy of the Cal-Chiefs test report he obviously realized that the results were confirming that the Dunes Tests report was a dishonest one. So, apparently Mr. Bukowski decided to revise the Cal-Chiefs test data to agree with his prior corrupted report. MR. MARTINS TESTIMONY Because the Dunes Tests concluded that the heat detector was a useless detector for protecting lives in homes, eventually the FTC attacked the businesses that were selling heat detectors for home installation. Figgie is one of the businesses being attacked. Attorney Edwin Rockefeller is defending Figgie and Mr. Martin, who is a fire protection engineer working for the Los Angeles fire department is being interrogated. Mr. Rockefeller is questioning Mr. Martin regarding the findings of the Cal-Chiefs Tests at a time when the test report was already buried, largely due to interferences by Mr. Bukowski. Mr. Martin, during his testimony, is obviously one of the fire officials who bought the phony scenario of fire as created by the ionization smoke detector industry. Mr. Martin therefore is clearly a hostile witness and very reluctant to provide testimony that will be beneficial to Figgie. But certain facts do come through as follows.

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The testimony of Mr. Martin, as I interpret it, reveals that Richard Bukowski received a copy of the first (earliest Cal-Chiefs report of the testing) and that he (Bukowski) then took pencil in hand and revised the computer generated data (numbers) on all 32 pages of computer

generated data for the Cal-Chiefs tests. Although Mr. Bukowski never attended any of the Cal-Chiefs tests, by some magical inspiration, he was able to cross out the numbers on 32 pages of the report and substitute his own numbers. I can only assume the revised numbers by Bukowski would make the Cal-Chiefs tests more compliant with the earlier false Dunes Tests conclusion. Apparently, the writers of the Cal Chiefs test report made some changes to appease Bukowski, but not enough. He also disapproved the second draft. Bukowski also lined up additional support within the federal government to prevent the publication of the Cal-Chiefs report except it is appropriately revised after the third attempt to publish the Cal-Chiefs test report; it was buried and became unavailable. I tried for some years to get a complete copy of any of any of the three drafts. I even was able to get the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate, Senator George Mitchell, to write the mayor of Los Angeles seeking a copy, but without success. That report is still buried. However, here are some extracts from Mr. Martins testimony. On page 803 (9 to19) Mr. Martin agrees that the original computer generated numbers (that Bukowski tried to change) were accurate. On page 804 (22-25) Mr. Martin states that the reason the report was buried was that they ran out of money. He repeatedly was reluctant to agree that it was the objections of Bukowski that resulted in the report being buried. On page 805 (9-14), Mr. Martin claimed that the changed numbers (submitted by Bukowski) did not change the accuracy of the report. No explanation was given to reveal how revised numbers would not change the accuracy. On page 815 (24-25) over to page 816(1-2) Mr. Martin testified I think we had somewhere an hour and a half before a smoke detector would have activated and an hour and a half later we reached a hazardous level (That would be 3 hours before the smoke and toxic gases reached the hazardous level.) Then on page 815(3-4), he reports that the escape time for the smoke detector was in the neighborhood of 2 to 6 minutes. (Apparently he is saying that the ionization device allows a 2 to 6 minute escape time for a smoldering fire that does not become hazardous for 3 hours) On page 816(18-22) Martin claims that the heat detector allowed little to no escape time. (I have to assume that claim is in connection with the smoldering type fire, which is not the type of fire for which the heat detector has value. Of course, this ties in with the false claim that nearly all fire deaths result from smoldering fires.) On page 818(19) Mr. Martin states that a limit of 150 degrees (at the 5 foot level) was the limit for a heat detector to pass the test. (This too low figure plus the manipulating of the fire type and growth have been the methods by which the heat detector was proven to be useless) On page 806(4-17) Mr. Martin testified that the NFPA was willing to publish the Cal-Chiefs test report provided the handwritten numbers supplied by Mr. Bukowski were entered as type. So, apparently the NFPA supported the arbitrary rewriting of the report as per the desires of Mr. Bukowski. (No surprise here.) THE FIGGIE LAWYER CHALLENGES MARTIN

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The exchanges between the attorneys representing the harmed company (making and selling heat detectors as well as smoke detectors) reveal the mindset of Mr. Martin. Martin had agreed that Mr. Bukowski took pencil in hand and crossed out the computer-generated

numbers (which Martin agreed were correct numbers) and substituted his own (self-created) numbers. However, he was unwilling to confirm that the changed numbers were subverting the report. Here are the questions and answers as shown on page 791 (lines 15 to 20). Was any data changed? No. But corrected? Thats correct. MARTIN REFUSES TO ACKNOWLEGE THAT 150 F DOES NOT PREVENT ESCAPE The engineers set the criteria for untenable conditions at 150 F. This meant that if the temperature in the fire room reached 150 F (at the five foot level) before the heat detector sounded the detector would have failed. Obviously, this too low setting was important to a strategy aimed at proving that the heat detector has no value as a protector of life in a home. On page 912(line25) to page 913(line3) the following exchange takes place regarding the survival time at 150 F: Mr. Martin estimates the survival time at that temperature as follows. A. I would say, I dont know, less than 2 minute. Q. Less than 2 minutes? A. Yes. Q. At 150 degrees? A. Yes Then, over the next several pages of the deposition, Attorney Rockefeller cites various studies of survival times under high temperatures (all stated in Fahrenheit). I summarize the information provided by Mr. Rockefeller below: Studies in France revealed that a body condition was but moderately altered in a sauna for 20 minutes at 176 degrees. (Note: Water transmits heat to a body far more rapidly than air does) Another study was cited where the sauna was at 185 to 194 and occupants sat in the spa for 20 minutes. Five male adults sat in a sauna for 15 minutes with water at chest level and the air temperature was 212 degrees. A Wright-Patterson Air Force study on human tolerance and protective clothing concluded that a mans tolerance for 160-degree heat while dressed only in light underwear was 60 minutes. That the same study concluded that man can well tolerate (air) temperatures of 200, 300 and 400 degrees, and perhaps higher, for minutes and perhaps hours depending on heat load and the degree of protection (type of clothing) supplied. Note: An occupant, moving expeditiously, can exit most homes within 30 seconds. Mr. Wayne Martin did not change his opinion based on the information supplied by Mr. Rockefeller. Thus, in my opinion, Mr. Martin proves that he is a true and dedicated fire protection engineer living by the credo: Do not believe your eyes, only the book is reality. THE CHARACTORISTICS OF FIRE VARY WIDELY Page

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Fire has many faces. One of the statements made by Mr. Martin, where he claims that a smoldering fire can smolder for an hour and a half before become life endangering and the

smolder for another hour and a half before it kills, is quite true. But what Mr. Martin did not report is that depending on the material involved, the physical shape, ventilation and other factors a smoldering fire can produce very serious levels toxic gases within perhaps 15 minutes. Another factor is that a fire may smolder for a few minutes, or an hour, and then convert to a fast growing (fast killing) flaming fire. Nearly always a smoldering fire will produce much smoke before the level of toxic gases will reach dangerous levels. This is one of the reasons that smoldering fire is much less deadly than a fast growing flaming fire. Smoldering fires warn long before they can kill. And here is another truth about the nighttime smoldering fire; although sometimes all the occupants will sleep until the gases render them unlikely to awake, often someone will wake up and be able to alert others in time to escape or terminate the danger. Thus, during the night, the flaming fire can still be far more deadly than the smoldering one. The primary reason why smoldering fires receive so much attention is because the ionization device manufacturers manipulated reality to sell what they were selling. Also the flaming fire can have a thousand faces. For example, one of the ways that Richard Bukowski proved that the heat detector was not useful for saving lives is by creating flaming fires that that produced almost no heat. For example, if a towel is draped over the back of a chair that has cotton padding, the burning towel (not close to the detector) may produce inadequate heat to operate the detector. Then, when the cotton fire dies down and the padding is ignited, the cotton will tend to burn with only tiny flames at the surface. The fire will burrow into the cotton and burn very much like a slow smoldering fire. There will be much smoke and very little heat. This type of fire may burn for an hour or more without producing the 135 degrees Fahrenheit (more or less) needed to operate the heat detector. Many of the FPEs are very good at designing fires that will produce the results that are desired. The other extreme is a fast flaming fire that will create a room ceiling temperature above 1000 degrees Fahrenheit within 2 to 5 minutes and the go into the flashover stage within another minute or two. This is he incredibly deadly type fire because it provides very little escape time. The fire protection community has steadfastly refused to recognize the heat detector as the only reliable detector for this fire type. Because a clean burning flaming fire may initially burn with little or no visible smoke there may be a deadly delay in the operation of a photoelectric type smoke detector. As for the ionization type so-called smoke detector, the laboratory testing at UL proved it is an unreliable detector for the flaming fire. But the fire experts have refused to acknowledge that UL has been cooperating with some very profitable industries by concealing the failure modes of the devices they test. It should also be noted that a fire could initiate as a smoldering fire and smolder for 5 seconds or an hour and a half, and then become a fast flaming fire. The fire establishment will probably consider any such fire deaths to be caused by a smoldering fire if that is how it began. Of course all fires smolder (if only for a few microseconds- millionths of a second) before flaming. What equates to a smoldering fire as opposed to a flaming fire has never been defined. But once the fire has become flaming, large, hot and producing dense black smoke and extremely high levels of carbon monoxide and other toxic gases; I say that it was the flaming fire that killed. Page

THE KILLER FIRE

The truth is that the fast flaming fire is the most deadly fire. I suspect that this type fire may cause more than 90 percent of all fire deaths. About half of all fire deaths occur during the daylight hours when the occupants are awake. A smoldering fire will produce smoke and odors long before it becomes deadly; hence flaming fires cause nearly all fire deaths during the daylight hours. Also they are likely to be fast growing ones that can block exits before the occupants are alerted. And if flaming fires kill during the daytime it can also kill during the sleeping hours. The ideas that all fires that kill at night are smoldering fires, and that the smoldering fire is the primary killer, are ridiculous. THE PROOFS Prior to the time (1966) when (against organized resistance) I was able to push through to adoption the first ever fire detection system code for homes (NFPA 74) nearly all homes were devoid of both sprinkler systems and fire detection systems. The average number of fire deaths during the years 1961-1965 (before smoke detectors) was 900,000 and the number of fire deaths due to building fires was approximately 7,500 (source-13th Edition of the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook). That means that roughly only about one percent of the home fires were deadly even before any smoke detectors were installed in homes. So the question arises, which fires are the killer fires? I have long held that it is the fast growing flaming fires (that may actually reach flashover stage before occupants in other areas of the home are aware of the danger) are the most proficient killers. This makes sense because slow growing flaming fire and smoldering fires allow time for escape and have done so long before smoke detectors went into homes. The history of the fire sprinkler system confirms that a heat-detecting element (even a very slow to operate one) will activate before deaths occur. The fire death rate in buildings that are sprinkler protected is essentially zero. I believe that almost any sensible fire oriented specialist will agree that the failures of the ionization smoke detector are into the hundreds of thousands if not the millions. What has not received appropriate attention; however, is that the failure rate and the death rates relative the heat detector is extremely close to zero. The reality is that fire deaths are almost completely nonexistent within heat detector protected homes (and now sprinkler protected homes). This was true even when no smoke detectors were involved, which additional evidence is showing that it is the flaming fire, not the smoldering fire that is the killer of home occupants. SEARCHING FOR FIRE DEATHS WITHIN HEAT DETECTOR PROTECTED HOMES At a time when the heat detector industry was under full scale attack by the NFPA, many fire officials and the Feds, a search was made throughout the country seeking examples of fire deaths within heat detector protected homes. Only two examples were discovered that I know of. Both were spurious. (I will discuss these below.) Thus, for many years heat detectors were installed to protect homes without any smoke detectors being installed, yet the deaths in these heat protected homes were near or at zero. Later, another search for fire deaths within heat detector protected homes was launched via the Internet with zero instances reported. Page

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Because seemingly no one dies by fire within homes protected by heat detectors the conclusion must be that it is the flaming fire that kills, not the smoldering fire. This suggests

that even during the sleeping hours the smoldering fire is less of a threat than believed; and the flaming fire is by far the more dangerous one. Also the deaths, within the ionization detector protected homes, reveal that the ionization device is so defective that it is close to useless night or day. TWO SPURIOUS EXAMPLES OF HEAT DETECTOR FAILURES Years ago I was supplied with two examples of heat detector failures. They were presented as confirming that those who marketed heat detectors were defrauding the public and they should be put out of business. I investigated further and this is what I discovered. One case involved a home where the heat detectors warned the parents at night and they exited the home without injury. However, their son returned home quite late and drunk and went to bed without the parents knowing he was home. Presumably the son spending the night elsewhere was not an unexpected event. The parents did not check for him as they left the home and he failed to wake up. He died. A fire detector can only alert, not control the fire. The second case involved a mentally retarded young man. He had a fan positioned at the doorway of his bedroom, blowing air into the bedroom to keep cool. The fan ignited setting off a heat detector in the hallway and alerting the mother, the only other occupant. She went to the doorway to her sons room and yelled at him to jump over the fan to escape. He was afraid to do so. First he lay down on the floor to escape the smoke. Then he pushed his bed over to the doorway presumably to shield him from the fire. The bed caught on fire. Next he tried to exit the window but only got half way out with his feet hanging back into the room. Eventually the mother ran outside and pulled him all the way out. But his legs were badly burned. Both of these stories were presented to me, with inadequate information, as examples of why businesses that marketed heat detectors were defrauding the public. AN INEXPENSIVE AND NEAR PERFECT FIRE DETECTOR There is only one type of smoke detector that is readily available in the marketplace and actually is a true smoke detector. It is the photoelectric type smoke alarm. There is a eutectic metal type heat detector that is very inexpensive to manufacture, absolutely reliable and could be installed on a photoelectric type smoke detector; making the combination reliable for warning of both the flaming and smoldering fire. It is an alloy that has a very sharp predetermined melting point. It retains its strength until it reaches the set operating temperature and then abruptly loses its strength and fails. This heat detector feature could be added to the smoke detector for probably no more than a one-dollar cost. Of course, the best protection would be this combination device installed in every room including an extra one at bed level in the master bedroom. (Often cool smoke from a smoldering fire will stratify in the lower half of the room.) THE SECRET TO A FIRESAFE AMERICA Page

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There are two reasons for the fire codes that are enforced in America. They are: 1. Reduce fires and save lives.

2. Profit from fire. There is no doubt that the NFPA codes and the UL product certifications have been oriented toward the profits side, and that these organizations have betrayed the public. I say these two organizations are the primary causes of the high number of fire deaths and the high burn rate in America. Other organizations and government bureaucracies also have helped corrupt fire science and fire engineering. But the key organizations behind the fire safety corruption are the two named. I believe that the U.S. will continue to suffer incredibly high annual fire losses until the fire officials will admit that serious regulatory corruption exists, and the media believe that those we trusted to protect us have betrayed us. That is when the U.S. will begin the long journey to become a truly fire safe country. END WARNING- YOUR CHILDREN ARE ENDANGERED Within America approximately 8 to 10 thousand children are killed or horribly injured by house fires every year. These deaths and injuries are close to 100 percent avoidable. Even a greater number of children will lose a sibling, a parent or loved one, which can be equally devastating. The primary reason for these tragedies is calculated and deliberate corruption within the fire regulatory field including the fire insurance industry, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and Underwriters Laboratories (UL). These organizations that have the power to create the fire codes and to certify the fire related products that can be sold in America, have corrupted the codes and the market controls to profit from fire. The end result that your children may be the next to burn. Profits, not human safety, are the driving force behind the fire regulators. This report and many others on the listed web sites provide the evidence proving the unthinkable is the reality. Protect your children and all children by sending this message to all your friends and relatives. Only an angry citizenry can correct deeply entrenched corruption that is deadly.

EVIL WINS WHEN GOOD PEOPLE DO NOTHING

SAVE A CHILDS LIFE

PLEASE SEND THIS REPORT TO TEN FRIENDS AND/OR RELATIVES. www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org www.Firecrusade.com www.AmericasHolocaust.org
RICHARD M. PATTON, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER AUTHOR, THE AMERICAN HOME IS A FIRE TRAP THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS

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rmpatton7@gmail.com

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