The Treason of Richard Nixon

<img src="http://i.imgur.com/bcXOOra.
jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> THE TREASON OF RICHARD NIXON: FR OM POSSIBILITY TO CERTAINTY PART ONE <a href="http://italkyo ubored.wordpress.com/2014/04/09/the-treason-of-richard-nixon-from-possibility-to -certainty-part-two/">PART TWO</a> The title is not an attempt at cheap provocation, but an attempt to capture the raw truth of an event almost entirely forgotten and rarely spoken of, perhaps ou t of conscious avoidance of the disturbing qualities of the event itself. What f ollows contains no new revelations, and is an attempt at arranging all available materials to craft a substantial narrative around the event, and make a thoroug h case of what took place, rather than to score a simple ideological point. Thos e who wish a more succinct piece on the same event might prefer <a href="http:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21768668">"The Lyndon Johnson tapes: Richard Nixon's ' treason'"</a> by David Taylor, or <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/ lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Rob ert Parry. All of the documents cited in this piece are via Parry's article, and the full outlines of the plot given below is thanks to Parry's work and <a href ="http://www.amazon.com/Arrogance-Power-Secret-World-Richard-ebook/dp/B004IATCA2 /">The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon</a> by Antho ny Summers. I do not agree with all of Parry's conclusions on all issues, but th at someone is doing such solid, vital journalism while relying solely on the ind ividual donations of readers, is one more shameful mark of the established press now, which is happy to subsidize so many banal and unnecessary voices. I first came across this scandal, as did many others, in 2002, when I read <a hr ef="http://www.amazon.com/Trial-Henry-Kissinger-Christopher-Hitchens/dp/18598439 80/">The Trial of Henry Kissinger</a> by Christopher Hitchens. Though the future Secretary of State was indicted for many acts, stunning, depraved, and u nknown to me, this piece of election subterfuge stood out - had it failed, most if not all of the other acts he would be involved in could not have taken place. Hitchens would, in turn, obtain the substantial proof of the allegation from The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon by Summers, a tho rough devastation of the ex-president's life and career. Hitchens would give a p ositive review of the book in the Times, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/ books/00/10/08/reviews/001008.08hitchet.html">"Let Me Say This About That"</a>, and he would appear alongside Summers to promote the book, on the Australian rad io program, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/ nixon/3477054">"Late Night Live"</a> with Philip Adams, on Wednesday, November 1 5, 2000. In the following excerpt from the interview, Hitchens would single out the book's reporting and confirmation of the relevant scandal, the spoiling of t he 1968 Paris Peace Talks to end the Vietnam war, as its most vital point: <blockquote> PHILIP ADAMS Christopher, Kissinger pointed out in his memoirs that Nixon rather liked people to fear his madness. Of course, in '69, he tells Kissinger to warn the Soviet a mbassador that he was out of control on Indochina and capable of anything. Is th ere any evidence that he behaved this way with his staff and aides, or did he ju st direct this terrifying prospect at the Russians? CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS Oh no, there's every kind of evidence that his staff and aides grew to recognize the symptoms. I think the locus classicus would be the Haldeman diaries, where you have an almost weary assumption by Haldeman that the president's at it again . "The P." as he calls it, in his diaries. And very often, Haldeman will not act
on some bizarre instruction or order. Because he thinks that probably when the president either sobers up, because there was a tremendous tendency for one scot ch to make a gigantic difference...or just shakes off the mood. Wait twenty four hours, and he'll have forgotten he told me to do this, or countermand it on sec ond thought. That's true of what I think is the most salient chapter of Mr. Summ ers's book, namely, the conspiracy, because there is no other word for it...to t ry and sabotage the Paris Peace Talks in 1968. ADAMS I'd like you to talk to that, Christopher, because it is the blockbuster revelat ion, isn't it? HITCHENS It isADAMS Or the confirmation of it. HITCHENS The confirmation. You have the skeleton, and quite a lot of the flesh of the sto ry by inference, and by induction, in the Haldeman diaries, 'cause Haldeman disc usses quite freely the fact that Nixon tried, contemplated trying, using, the fa ct he himself had been bugged. In 1968. As a weapon against the democrats in 197 2. Okay, if you think bugging is a scandal, this is Watergate obviously, what if I bring out you bugging me? And then realizing he can't do that, without reveal ing why he's being bugged. Now, that's all in the memoirs and diaries of his clo sest associate. And you can also context that it was about Viet Nam he was being bugged in 1968. Now, why would they be doing this? Why would they have- Why wou ld've President Johnson wanted to tap candidate Nixon, and the answer is now ver y plain from the book we're discussing. That he had opened an illegal backchanne l to the South Vietnamese junta and said to them, "Look, if you don't gratify th e democratic administration by consenting to the Paris peace talks, if you don't do them that favor, and discredit their re-election campaign, you will get a be tter deal in the incoming Republican administration." ANTHONY SUMMERS Can I break in? ADAMS Yes, of course Anthony. SUMMERS The breakthrough for me, journalistically, was to be able to obtain the FBI surv eillance file. As Christopher Hitchens has said, Johnson, who was given human in formation, indicating human intelligence, indicating what Nixon and his people w ere up to in terms of trying to sabotage the peace initiative, he ordered FBI su rveillance to try and establish it. In fact, he didn't establish it fully, becau se the reports didn't come in till after the election. Not least because J. Edga r Hoover was less than keen to obey the president's order in truly expeditious f ashion. But the result that we have today is the FBI surveillance file which sho ws quite clearly that Nixon's intermediary, Anna Chennault, who I also interview ed extensively, many times, was in constant touch, in those days before the elec tion, carrying messages to the South Vietnamese ambassador in Washington, talkin g about "her boss". And it's complex, and you can't explain it in a hurry on rad io, but it becomes completely clear in context, that when she talks about "her b oss", she's talking about Richard Nixon. </blockquote> The FBI surveillance file is now easily available, a document I came across on R obert Parry's <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixon
s-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a>, and the text which Summer s cites is as follows<a name="bkfrftnote1"></a><a href="#ftnote1">1</ a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/mlgUVB3.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> The most succinct, and acerbic, overview of the scandal can be found in The T rial of Henry Kissinger, where Hitchens sums it up in one acrid paragraph: <blockquote>Here is the secret in plain words. In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixo n and some of his emissaries and underlings set out to sabotage the Paris peace negotiations on Vietnam. The means they chose were simple: they privately assure d the South Vietnamese military rulers that an incoming Republican regime would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. In this way, they undercut both the talks themselves and the electoral strategy of Vice-President Hubert H umphrey. The tactic "worked," in that the South Vietnamese junta withdrew from t he talks on the eve of the election, thereby destroying the "peace plank" on whi ch the Democrats had contested it. In another way, it did not "work," because fo ur years later the Nixon administration concluded the war on the same terms that had been on offer in Paris. The reason for the dead silence that still surround s the question is that, in those intervening four years, some twenty thousand Am ericans and an uncalculated number of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians lost t heir lives. Lost them, that is to say, even more pointlessly than had those slai n up to that point. The impact of those four years on Indochinese society, and o n American democracy, is beyond computation. The chief beneficiary of the covert action, and of the subsequent slaughter, was Henry Kissinger.</blockquote> A more detailed overview of the conspiracy was given by a man who was within its near radius, Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense for President Lyndon Johnson when the peace talks were thwarted, and who gave extensive space to it in his 19 91 memoir, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Counsel-President-Memoir-Clark-Cliffor d/dp/0394569954/">Counsel to the President</a>, co-written by Richard Hol brooke, a member of the United States negotiating team at the Vietnam peace talk s in Paris. For some lengthy book excerpts I include their footnotes, separate f rom this post's footnotes, so that readers may have a solid idea on the sources of their information, and this approach is taken here: <blockquote>BUI DIEM AND THE "LITTLE FLOWER" At about this time, a new and potentially explosive factor entered the picture o ur discovery, through intelligence channels, of a plot - there is no other word for it - to help Nixon win the election by a flagrant interference in the negoti ations. History is filled with characters who emerge for a moment, play a critical, some times even decisive, role in a historic event, and then recede again into their normal lives. Such was the function of two people who played key roles in electi ng Richard Nixon in 1968: Bui Diem, South Vietnam's Ambassador in Washington, an d Anna Chennault, the Chinese-born widow of General Claire Chennault, the comman der of the famed Flying Tigers in Burma and China during World War II. Mrs. Chennault, a small, intense, and energetic woman who was often seen in the company of her close friend Tommy Corcoran, was chairwoman of Republican Women f or Nixon in 1968. Early in the year, she took Bui Diem to New York to meet Nixon . When Diem alerted his closest friend in the Administration, Bill Bundy, to the meeting, Bundy raised no objections; it was quite appropriate for an Ambassador to meet with a former Vice President. But Bui Diem neglected to mention to Bund y that, at Nixon's request, he had opened a secret personal channel to John Mitc
hell and other senior members of the Nixon team through Chennault and John Tower , the Republican Senator from Texas.<a name="bkfrftCliffordnote10"></a><a href=" #ftCliffordnote10">10</a> There was almost no one in Washington as well informed as the popular and affabl e Bui Diem. The State Department kept him informed of the negotiations in Paris, his own government sent him reports on the Bunker-Thieu [Bunker is Ellsworth Bu nker, the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam] talks in Saigon, and he maintained c lose relations with many prominent Americans, especially Republican conservative s such as Senator Tower and Everett Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader. It was not difficult for Ambassador Diem to pass information to Anna Chennault, who was in contact with John Mitchell, she said later, "at least once a day."<a name="b kfrftCliffordnote11"></a><a href="#ftCliffordnote11">11</a> Even more important, Diem could convey advice from the Nixon camp to Thieu. In his memoirs, Diem claims he sent only two "relevant messages" to Saigon durin g October. While they "constituted circumstantial evidence for anybody ready to assume the worst," he wrote, "they certainly did not mean that I had arranged a deal with the Republicans." Some of Diem's messages to Saigon later became publi c. On October 23, he cabled Thieu: "Many Republican friends have contacted me an d encouraged us to stand firm. They were alarmed by press reports to the effect that you had already softened your position." October 27: "The longer the presen t situation continues, the more we are favored...I am regularly in touch with th e Nixon entourage."<a name="bkfrftCliffordnote12"></a><a href="#ftCliffordnote12 ">12</a> Despite his disclaimer, I believe there were other messages, delivered through other channels; Diem correctly suspected he was under surveil lance by American intelligence, and tried to fool his watchers by using more sec ure channels. Diem was not Anna Chennault's only channel to Saigon. As he wrote in his own mem oirs, "My impression was that she may have played her own game in encouraging bo th the South Vietnamese and the Republicans." She took seriously Nixon's request that she act as "the sole representative between the Vietnamese government and the Nixon campaign headquarters,"<a name="bkfrftCliffordnote13"></a><a href="#ft Cliffordnote13">13</a> and she certainly found other routes of commun icating with President Thieu [Nguyen Thieu], including the South Vietnamese Amba ssador to Taiwan, who happened to be Thieu's brother. What was conveyed to Thieu through the Chennault channel may never be fully know n, but there was no doubt that she conveyed a simple and authoritative message f rom the Nixon camp that was probably decisive in convincing President Thieu to d efy President Johnson - then delaying the negotiations and prolonging the war. R ather proudly, she recounted one specific message she received from John Mitchel l in the last few days of the campaign. "Anna," she quotes him as saying, "I'm s peaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon, It's very important that our Vietnamese friends understand our Republican position and I hope you have made clear to them."<a na me="bkfrftCliffordnote14"></a><a href="#ftCliffordnote14">14</a> The activities of the Nixon team went far beyond the bounds of justifiable polit ical combat. It constituted direct interference in the activities of the executi ve branch and the responsibilities of the Chief Executive, the only people with authority to negotiate on behalf of the nation. The activities of the Nixon camp aign constituted a gross, even potentially illegal, interference in the security of the nation by private individuals. We first became aware of these activities through the normal operations of the i ntelligence community in the weeks prior to the election. Gradually we realized that President Thieu's growing resistance to the agreement in Paris was being en couraged, indeed stimulated, by the Republicans, and especially by Anna Chennaul t, whom we referred to as the "Little Flower." In total privacy - and, at the Pr
esident's direction, without consulting Humphrey [Vice President Hubert Humphrey ] - the President, Rusk [Secretary of State Dean Rusk], Rostow [National Securit y Adviser Walt Rostow], and I discussed what to do about this attempt to thwart the negotiations. It was an extraordinary dilemma. On one hand, we had positive evidence that the Little Flower and other people speaking for the Republican candidate were encou raging President Thieu to delay the negotiations for political reasons. On the o ther, the information had been derived from extremely sensitive intelligence ope rations of the FBI, the CIA, and the National Security Agency; these included su rveillance of the Ambassador of our ally, and an American citizen with strong po litical ties to the Republicans.* *It should be remembered that the public was considerably more innocent in such matters in the days before the Watergate hearings and the 1974 Senate investigat ion of the CIA. In a decision filled with consequences for the election and for history, Preside nt Johnson, although furious at Mrs. Chennault, decided not to use the informati on or make it public in any way. There were several contributing factors to his decision: <ul> <li>Underestimation of the damage. Bunker [U.S. Ambassador to South Vietn am Ellsworth Bunker] continued to predict that Thieu would accept our position w ithin a few days. As a result, the President and Rusk seriously underestimated t he harm the Chennault channel caused to the negotiating efforts</li> <li>Weakening of support for Saigon. Johnson and Rusk still worried about losing American support for Thieu if information about his behavior and motives became public. For those who liked irony, there was plenty in Thieu's defiance of Johnson while the Administration continued to shield him from the wrath of Am erican public opinion. President Johnson had sacrificed his political career as a result of his efforts to save South Vietnam, but as far as Thieu was concerned , Johnson was just a lame duck - the choice was between Humphrey and Nixon.</li> <li>Effect on the negotiations. Rusk was concerned that revealing the Che nnault channel would reveal to Hanoi the strains between Saigon and Washington, stiffen Hanoi's position, and disrupt the negotiations</li> <li>Ambivalence about Hubert Humphrey. Finally, and most important, there was the question of President Johnson's feelings about Hubert Humphrey. Through out the campaign, the President treated his Vice President badly, excluding him from National Security Council meetings, and threatening to break with him over the platform plank on Vietnam.<a name="bkfrftCliffordnote15"></a><a href="#ftCli ffordnote15">15</a> What mattered to President Johnson at that moment was not who would succeed him, but what his place in history would be.</li> </ul> Characteristically, the generous Humphrey does not even mention the incident in his memoirs,<a name="bkfrftCliffordnote16"></a><a href="#ftCliffordnote16"> 16</a> even though one of his staff told him about Bui Diem's efforts on N ixon's behalf, and he could reasonably have claimed that these events cost him t he Presidency. *** Perhaps in the wake of a decade of post-Watergate revelations about intelligence activities, the decision not to go public may seem fussy and old-fashioned; but whether the President was right or wrong, it was an exceedingly tough call. Had
the decision been mine alone to make, I would either have had a private discuss ion with Nixon, making clear to him that if he did not sent a countervailing sig nal to Thieu immediately he would face public criticism from the President for i nterference in the negotiations; or I would have allowed the incident to become public, so that the American public might take it into account in deciding how t o vote. Had he been the candidate himself, this is what I believed Lyndon Johnso n would have done. All this raises a critical question: what did Richard Nixon know, and when did h e know it? No proof - in the terminology of the Watergate era, no "smoking gun" - has ever turned up linking Nixon directly to the secret messages to Thieu. The re are no self-incriminating tapes from the campaign, and the whole incident has been relegated to the status of an unsolved mystery. On the other hand, this ch ain of events undeniably began in Richard Nixon's apartment in New York, and his closest adviser, John Mitchell, ran the Chennault channel personally, with full understanding of its sensitivity. Given the importance of these events, I have always thought it was reasonable to assume that Mitchell told Nixon about them, and that Nixon knew, and approved, of what was going on in his name.</blockquote > <img src="http://i.imgur.com/pYRhYsA.jpg" title="R ichard Nixon Treason Possibility to Certainty" /> (Picture of Anna Chennault, from the <a href="h ttp://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/schlesinger-library/collection/anna-chennault">P apers of Anna Chennault</a>, at the Schlesinger Library.) The FBI intercept of a conversation between Chennault and an associate in the Ni xon campaign, known to Johnson along with a select few others, was a possible sm oking gun but one of only many that would be unveiled decades later. The vote in 1968 would take place on November 5th, and though some reporting at the time sp oke of the bombing halt and the Peace Talks as a last minute maneuver crafted to swing the election in the favor of Humphrey, the work to implement the talks wa s on-going for a long time. Nor were the intrigues of Nixon to interfere in the talks a last minute move either, but begun a year before, with Anna Chennault, t he woman who would serve as Nixon's weapon for spoiling the talks, already broug ht into the fold. Despite its occasional reliance on stereotypes, perhaps the mo st vivid description of Chennault that I've come across is from Theodore White's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Making-President-1968-Landmark-Political/dp/0061 900648/">The Making of the President 1968</a>, and one of the few contemp orary books to devote some investigative space to the episode, which was then on ly unsubstantiated rumor for those outside the circles of Lyndon Johnson, Richar d Nixon, and their closest intimates, though which White ultimately considers to be only a deadly rumor without proof, and deciding the matter in Nixon's favor: <blockquote>There is no way of getting at the dilemma of both parties except by introducing, at this point, the completely extraneous name of a beautiful Orient al lady, Anna Chan Chennault, the Chinese widow of war-time hero General Claire Chennault. Mrs. Chennault, an American citizen since 1950, comes of a line that begins with Mei-ling Soong (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek) and runs through Madame Nhu (the Dragon Lady of South Vietnam) - a line of Oriental ladies of high purpose and authoritarian manners whose pieties and iron righteousness have frequently o utrun their brains and acknowledged beauty. In the campaign of 1968, Mrs. Chenna ult, a lady of charm, energy and great name, had become chairman or co-chairman of several Nixon citizen committees, wearing honorific titles which were borne b y many but which she took more seriously than most. In that circle of Oriental d iplomacy in Washington once known as the China Lobby, Anna Chennault was hostess -queen. Having raised (by her statement later) some $250 000 for the Nixon campa ign, she felt entitled to authority by her achievement. And, having learned of t he October negotiations by gossip and rumor and press speculation, as did most A
mericans, she had undertaken most energetically to sabotage them. In contact wit h the Formosan, the South Korean and the South Vietnamese governments, she had b egun early, by cable and telephone, to mobilize their resistance to the agreemen t - apparently implying, as she went, that she spoke for the Nixon campaign.</bl ockquote> Summers, who would interview Chennault for his book, would give a more in-depth of the background between the intertwining of Chennault and Nixon in the year be fore the election: <blockquote>The intrigues of 1968 really began the previous year. While Chennaul t was traveling in Asia, she received a spate of telegrams asking her to visit N ixon in New York. Robert Hill, a Republican foreign policy specialist, met her a t the airport and escorted her to Nixon's Fifth Avenue apartment. While Hill wai ted in another room, Nixon introduced her to John Mitchell. Chennault agreed that day to provide Nixon with advice on Vietnam in the coming months, working through Hill and Texas Senator John Tower. "When we do things," Nixon told her as the meeting ended, "it'll be better to keep it secret." He see med even then, Chennault recalled, "conspiratorial." In July the following year, as the election drew nearer, Chennault went to the N ixon apartment with South Vietnam's ambassador Bui Diem-a visit documented by bo th their diaries. A surviving internal staff memo addressed to "DC," Nixon's cam paign pseudonym, pointed out that it "would have to be absolute [sic] top secret ." "Should be," Nixon replied in a scrawled notation, "but I don't see how-with the S.S. [Secret Service] If it can be [secret] RN would like to see. . . ." Nixon had told Chennault he wanted to "end this war with victory," a sentiment h e now always repeated at the meeting with her and Bui Diem. "If I should be elec ted the next President," Chennault recalled his telling Bui Diem, "you can rest assured I will have a meeting with your leader and find a solution to winning th is war." Nixon had met with Thieu in Saigon the previous year. Now, he told Thie u's ambassador that Chennault was to be "the only contact between myself and you r government. If you have any message for me, please give it to Anna, and she wi ll relay it to me, and I will do the same. . . ." According to Chennault, she met more than once that year with President Thieu in Saigon. He complained about the pressure the Johnson administration was putting on him to attend peace talks and told her: "I would much prefer to have the pea ce talks after your elections." He asked her to "convey this message to your can didate." She did. From time to time President Thieu also sent her word through A mbassador Diem. He also used other messengers, including a colonel on his milita ry staff, apparently because he did not entirely trust his own ambassador.<a nam e="bkfrSummersftnote22"></a><a href="#Summersftnote22">22</a> In the weeks that followed Chennault had several more meetings with Nixon and Mi tchell in New York. They told her to inform Saigon that were Nixon to become pre sident, South Vietnam would get "a better deal." "The message," she told the aut hor, "was relayed." Asked if Nixon and Mitchell were trying to cut a deal to help win the election, Chennault nodded. "They worked out this deal to win the campaign," she said. "Po wer overpowers all reason." "It was all very, very confidential," in Chennault's description. The air of int rigue was pervasive. At the July meeting Bui Diem remembered, Mitchell had been "silent, didn't say a word." Chennault noted that he worried constantly about wi retapping and kept changing his private telephone number. Chennault meanwhile to ld Nixon she could always be reached through Robert Hill, the party official who
had arranged the first meeting, Rose Woods, or another prominent Republican, Pa tricia Hitt.</blockquote> There is the possibility that even at this early point, Chennault's interference may have been discovered, without it necessarily being connected to Nixon. The possibility exists, accompanied by all these uncertainties, because at a later d ate many of the documents that resulted from the surveillance of Chennault were collected, declassified, and made public. One document, however, commissioned in August 3rd, 1968, by Bromley Smith, a national security aide in the Johnson adm inistration, remains entirely redacted. It no doubt has something to do with the Paris peace talks and Chennault, but anything else can only be guessed at. Here is all of the text that is public at this time<a name="bkfrftnote2"></a><a href ="#ftnote2">2</a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/dtuAymg.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>RECEIVED WASHINGTON COMCENTER 5:33 P.M. SATURDAY AUG 68 RECEIVED: LBJ RANCH COMCENTER 5:05 P.M. SATURDAY 3 AUG 68 <strike>TOP SECRET</strike> SENSITIVE SANITIZED Z E V EEA973 00 WTE10 DE WTE 2975 FROM BROMLEY SMITH TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP81797 <strike>T O P S E C R E T</strike> SENSITIVE [REDACTED] SANITIZED E.O. 13526 Sec. 3.5 NLJ 10-96 By isl NARA, Date 1-10-11</blockquote> At the same time that Nixon was using Chennault as an active intermediary with A mbassador Bui Diem and the South Vietnamese, he was being given top secret brief ings on the diplomatic negotiations taking place between the Administration and both sides of the civil war. We have a quote from a Nixon ad man when Gloria Ste inem profiled the 1968 Nixon campaign, made on September 20th of that year. Had Nixon's attitude toward Communism changed over the years?, asked Steinem. "Oh no , absolutely not," replies the ad man. "He understands those people. He knows yo u have to be tough or they'll take us over. You see, I have some special knowled ge - though, of course, Mr. Nixon has more. I happen to know he's had top sec ret briefings - but I have some knowledge from old friends in the military. They come back and tell me the way it really is. If we don't stop the Chinese he re, they'll keep right on going. Of course, he can't say anything about Vietnam because it might interfere with the talks in Paris. Mr. Nixon's a man of real in
tegrity-he won't take advantage of his special knowledge if it would help Ho Chi Minh, But he knows the enemy, and he knows they hope to win because of all thes e misguided sympathizers pressuring us here. I'm for him because he won't let th at happen."<a name="bkfrftnote3"></a><a href="#ftnote3">3</a> This would lead up to a conference call between Johnson and the candidates on Oc tober 16th, a little more than two weeks before the election, where he would bri ef them on the negotiations taking place. Thanks to the declassification of thes e recordings, we now know what was said on the call. From here on, I divide the narrative of this crucial narrative of 1968 by date. OCTOBER 16, 1968</a> The audio from the following call, along with its transcript, is available at th e Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Program, record <a href="http://whiteh ousetapes.net/transcript/johnson/wh6810-04-13547-13548">"WH6810-04-13547-13548"< /a>. The call took place between 11:41am and 11:57am, between Johnson, Republica n candidate Richard Nixon, Democrat Hubert Humphrey, and George Wallace, former Democrat, segregationist, and candidate for the American Independent Party. The following are excerpts where Johnson makes clear the importance of maintaining s ecrecy over the negotiations, and the candidates not making any counter-offers i n public speeches, as this would jeopardize negotiations<a name="bkfrftnote4"></ a><a href="#ftnote4">4</a>: <blockquote>JOHNSON This is in absolute confidence because any statement or any speeches or any comm ents at this time referring to the substance of these matters will be injurious to your country. I don't think there's any question about that. First, I want to say this: That our position, the government position, today is exactly what it was the last time all three of you were briefed. That position n amely is this: We are anxious to stop the bombing [of North Vietnam] and would b e willing to stop the bombing if they would sit down with us with the Government of [South] Vietnam present and have productive discussions. We have told them t hat we did not think we could have discussions if, while we were talking, they w ere shelling the cities or if they were abusing the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone]. Fr om time to time, beginning back late last Spring, they have nibbled back and for th at these various items. Each time they do, there is a great flurry of excitem ent. Now, we have been hopeful one day that they would understand this. We don't want to call it "reciprocity"; we don't want to call it "conditions," because t hey object to using those words, and that just knocks us out of an agreement. Bu t we know that you join us in wanting peace the earliest day we can and to save lives as quickly as we can and as many as we can. So, one day we're hopeful, and the next day we're very disillusioned. Now, as of today they have not signed on and agreed to the proposition which I h ave outlined to you, nor have they indicated that this would be a satisfactory s ituation to them in its entirety. Our negotiators are back and forth talking to them, and they have just finished their meeting in Paris this morning. But, yest erday in Saigon, because there are exchanges constantly going on, there came out a report that there was an agreement that would be announced at a specific hour . This morning in Paris the same thing happened, and [Averell] Harriman had to k nock that down. We posted a notice here at the White House that said the same th ing. Now, very frankly, we would hope that we could have a minimum of discussion in t he newspapers about these conferences, because we're not going to get peace with public speeches, and we're not going to get peace through the newspapers. We ca n get it only when they understand that our position is a firm one, and we're go ing to stay by it. And what you all's position will be when you get to be Presid
ent, I would hope you could announce then. Because we have really this kind of a situation. If I've got a house to sell, and I put a rock bottom price of $40,00 0 on it, and the prospective purchaser says, "Well, that's a little high, but le t me see." And he goes--starts to leave to talk to his wife about it, and [First Lady] Lady Bird [Johnson] whispers that, "I would let you have it for $35,000." And then he gets downstairs, and Lynda Bird [Johnson] says, "We don't like the old house anyway, and we get it $30,000." Well, he's not likely to sign up.</blo ckquote> The three things that Johnson is demanding as necessary from North Vietnam is th at there be no shelling of the cities of South Vietnam, no crossing of the DMZ s eparating the two sides of the country, and that the elected government of South Vietnam, the GVN, be at the table. These are the three things he refers to in t he next excerpt, where all three candidates affirm their agreement on the need f or secrecy and non-interference with the diplomatic negotiations. <blockquote>JOHNSON Now, we do not have to get a firm contract on all these three things. But I do h ave to have good reason to believe that it won't be on-again-off-again Flanagan; that I won't have to stop the bombing one day and start it the next. Now, obvio usly, they can deceive me, and we know that in dealing with the Communists that they frequently do that. We have had a good many experiences of that right in th ese negotiations. But what I called you for was to say in substance this: our position has not cha nged. I do not plan to see a change. I have not issued any such orders. I will c on--I will talk to each of you before I do, and all of you on an equal basis. I know you don't want to play politics with your country. I'm trying to tell you w hat my judgment is about how not to play politics with it. And I know all of you want peace at the earliest possible moment. And I would just express the hope t hat you be awfully sure what you're talking about before you get into the intric acies of these negotiations. Over. Now, I'll be glad to have any comment any of you want to make or answer any questions. HUMPHREY No comment, Mr. President. Thank you very much. NIXON Yep. Well, as you know, my--this is consistent with what my position has been al l along. I've made it very clear that I will make no statement that would underc ut the negotiations. So we'll just stay right on there and hope that this thing works out. JOHNSON George, are you on? WALLACE Yes, sir, Mr. President, and of course, that's my position all along, too--is th e position you stated, yes, sir. And I agree with you that we shouldn't play any politics with this matter so that it might foul up the negotiations in any mann er.</blockquote> Though he gave his assent in the phone call, Nixon actually had a very different attitude which he was fully open about a few years later. He would also reveal that he knew in advance of the eventual bombing halt on October 31st, through a mole in the negotiating team: Henry Kissinger. It was his involvement which brou ght this scandal into the purview of Hitchens' book, and it is in The Trial o f Henry Kissinger that the reader can find out where this source is revealed : from the memoirs of the capo di tutti capi himself, Richard Nixon. From Tri al:
<blockquote>There had to be secret communications between Nixon and the South Vi etnamese, as we have seen. But there also had to be an informant inside the incu mbent administration's camp - a source of hints and tips and early warnings of o fficial intentions. That informant was Henry Kissinger. In Nixon's own account, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/RN-Memoirs-Richard-Nixon-ebook/dp/B00AHE24I0/">RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon</a>, the disgraced elder statesman tells u s that, in mid-September 1968, he received private word of a planned "bombing ha lt." In other words, the Johnson administration would, for the sake of the negot iations, consider suspending its aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. This most useful advance intelligence, Nixon tells us, came "through a highly unusual chan nel." It was more unusual even than he acknowledged. Kissinger had until then be en a devoted partisan of Nelson Rockefeller, the matchlessly wealthy prince of l iberal Republicanism. His contempt for the person and the policies of Richard Ni xon was undisguised. Indeed, President Johnson's Paris negotiators, led by Avere ll Harriman, considered Kissinger to be almost one of themselves. He had made hi mself helpful, as Rockefeller's chief foreign policy advisor, by supplying Frenc h intermediaries with their own contacts in Hanoi. "Henry was the only person ou tside of the government we were authorized to discuss the negotiations with," sa ys Richard Holbrooke. "We trusted him. It is not stretching the truth to say tha t the Nixon campaign had a secret source within the US negotiating team."</block quote> Though Nixon is very opaque if not rankly dishonest about many parts of this epi sode in his memoir, never mentioning Chennault or his successful attempt to spoi l the peace talks, he is explicit and up front over the use of Kissinger to hand over information. He is equally explicit in his true reaction to the eventual h alt: "anger and frustration" at what must be an attempt by Johnson to win the el ection for Humphrey. Nixon describes the secret diplomatic channel from the star ting point of Johnson calling him on October 31st to let him know of the announc ement that night of the bombing halt, then moves back to September when he first began using Kissinger to get information on the peace talks, and I follow the e xcerpt up until the conference call of October 16th: <blockquote>More than anything else, Humphrey had Lyndon Johnson to thank for th e eleventh-hour masterstroke that almost won him the election. On October 31 I was to address a nationally televised rally at Madison Square Ga rden in New York. I set aside a couple of quiet hours in the afternoon, and I wa s sitting in my study at home making notes for the speech later that evening whe n the telephone rang. It was a White House operator: the President was placing a conference call to Humphrey, Wallace, and me. A moment later Lyndon Johnson was on the line. He got right to the point. There had been a breakthrough in Paris, he said, and after wide consultations among his advisers, he had decided to call a total bomb ing halt over North Vietnam. He would make the announcement on television in two hours. As Johnson went one, I thought to myself that whatever this meant to Nor th Vietnam, he had just dropped a pretty good bomb in the middle of my campaign. Johnson said, rather defensively, "I'm not concerned with an election. You all are concerned with an election. I don't think this co ncerns an election. I think all of you want the same thing. So I thought if I la id it on the line that way, and presented it to you, you would at least have a c omplete, full understanding of all the facts." Johnson explained that he had not been able to persuade Saigon to agree to the p rovisions of the bombing halt, so that South Vietnam would not be joining in the announcement.
When Johnson finished, and we had asked some perfunctory questions, George Walla ce said, "I'm praying for you." Humphrey said, "I'm backing you up, Mr. President." I thanked Johnson for making the call and seconded Humphrey's pledge of support. The telephone call over, I could feel my anger and frustration welling up. Johns on was making the one move that I thought could determine the outcome of the ele ction. Had I done all this work and come all this way only to be undermined by t he powers of an incumbent who had decided against seeking re-election? I remembered how categorical Johnson had been at our briefing earlier that summe r. Then he had been contemptuous of those who wanted a bombing halt, and his arm s had sliced the air as he insisted that he was not going to let one ammunition truck pass freely into South Vietnam carrying the weapons to kill American boys. In fact, the bombing halt came as no real surprise to me. I had known for severa l weeks that plans were being made for such an action; the announcement was the other shoe that I had been waiting for Johnson to drop. What I found difficult t o accept was the timing. Announcing the halt so close to the election was utterl y callous if politically calculated, and utterly naive if sincere. I had learned of the plan through a highly unusual channel. It began on Septembe r 12, when Haldeman brought me a report from John Mitchell that Rockefeller's fo reign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, was available to assist us with advice. I n 1967 Kissinger had served Johnson as a secret emissary, passing Johnson's offe rs for a bombing halt to the North Vietnamese via French intermediaries. At one point Johnson even recommended a direct meeting, but the North Vietnamese were r ecalcitrant, and the "Kissinger channel" came to an end in October 1967. Kissing er, however, retained the respect of Johnson and his national security advisers, and he continued to have entr&eaute;e into the administration's foreign pol icy circles. I knew that Rockefeller had been offering Kissinger's assistance and urging that I make use of it ever since the convention. I told Haldeman that Mitchell shoul d continue as liaison with Kissinger and that we should honor his desire to keep his role completely confidential. Two weeks after his first meeting with Mitchell, Kissinger called again. He said that he had just returned from Paris, where he had packed up word that somethin g big was afoot regarding Vietnam. He advised that if I had to say anything abou t Vietnam during the following week, I should avoid any new ideas or proposals. Kissinger was completely circumspect in the advice he gave us during the campaig n. If he was privy to the details of negotiations, he did not reveal them to us. He considered it proper and responsible, however, to warn me against mak ing any statements that might be undercut by negotiations I was not aware of. I asked Haldeman to have Bryce Harlow call the Republican Senate Minority Leader , Everett Dirksen. "Have Ev tell Lyndon that I have a message from Paris," I sug gested. "Leave the hint that I know what's going on, and tell Ev to nail Lyndon hard to find out what's happening." I also told Haldeman to have Agnew ask Dean Rusk whether there was anything to " rumors" we had heard. That same day I sent a memo to my key staffers and writers ordering them to put the Vietnam monkey on Humphrey's back, not Johnson's. I wanted to make it clear that I thought it was Humphrey rather than the President who was playing politics with the war.
A few days later Haldeman sent me a memorandum with more information from Kissin ger to Mitchell. <blockquote>Our source feels that there is a better than even chance that Johnso n will order a bombing halt at approximately mid-October. This will be tied in w ith a big flurry of diplomatic activity in Paris which will have no meaning but will be made to look important.</blockquote> After covering other diplomatic matters, the memo continued: <blockquote>Our source does not believe that it is practical to oppose a bombing halt but does feel thought should be given to the fact that it may happen - tha t we may want to anticipate it - and that we certainly will want to be ready at the time it does happen... Our source is extremely concerned about the moves Johnson may take and ex pects that he will take some action before the election. </blockquote> That same day I learned that Dean Rusk had reassured Agnew that there were no ne w developments and that the administration would not "cut our legs off" with an announcement in October. If there were any change, he said, Johnson would call m e right away. Rusk did say, however, that although there was nothing currently p lanned, the situation was "fast-changing." On October 9, the North Vietnamese in Paris publicly called on Johnson to stop t he bombing while he still had the power to do so. Johnson, of course, knew what the public did not know: secret negotiations for a bombing halt were already tak ing place. Three days later we received another secret report from Kissinger saying that th ere was a strong possibility that the administration would move before October 2 3. Kissinger strongly recommended that I avoid making any statements about Humph rey's hurting the prospects of peace. Rather cryptically, Kissinger strongly rep orted that there was "more to this than meets the eye." I thought that this repo rt from Kissinger was uncomfortably vague. Why was he trying to get me to avoid making statements about Vietnam and why was he so insistent about laying off Hum phrey? One factor that had most convinced me of Kissinger's credibility was the length to which he went to protect his secrecy. But what if Johnson's people kne w that he was passing information to me and were feeding him phony stories? In s uch a tense political and diplomatic atmosphere, I was no longer sure of anythin g. Over the next few days rumors became rampant that something big was about to hap pen in Paris. Reporters demanded to know what was happening, and in response to their questions, the White House press office released a statement that there we re no breakthroughs in Paris and no change in the situation. I was campaigning in Missouri on October 16 when word arrived from the White Hou se that Johnson wanted to clarify matters with a conference call to all three ca ndidates. When the call came, I was in Kansas City's Union Station, about to add ress a large rally in the main waiting room. I took his call in a tiny room behi nd the platform. The "room" was like a telephone booth with a glass door. Throug hout our conversation people wandered by, staring quizzically at me jammed into this closet. We had a bad connection, so that I had to strain to make out Johnson's words. He told us to read his Press Secretary's statement. There was no breakthrough in P aris. The rumors were wrong. He urged us not to say anything. He said that there
had in fact been some movement by Hanoi, but that anything might jeopardize it. I asked for some assurance that he was still insisting on reciprocity from the Communists for any concessions on our part, and Johnson replied that he was main taining that three points had to be met: (1) Prompt and serious talks must follo w any bombing halt; (2) Hanoi must not violate the Demilitarized Zone; and (3) t he Vietcong or the North Vietnamese would not carry out large-scale rocket or ar tillery attacks against South Vietnam's major cities. If these conditions were f ulfilled, of course, I would support whatever arrangements Johnson could work ou t. When I saw Johnson that night at the annual Al Smith Dinner in New York, he gave me further assurances that he would not accept any arrangement without reciproc ity, and again requested that I be careful about what I had to say on Vietnam. A fter the dinner, I instructed Haldeman to pass the word that, in view of Johnson 's request, I would not be making any major speeches criticizing the conduct of the war.</blockquote> Nixon had Kissinger, but he also had other sources to let him know about negotia tion developments, channeled through Bryce Harlow, a Nixon campaign aide who wou ld later serve as counselor to the president. Harlow would tell Nixon's top aide , H. R. Haldeman, that developments were still too confused to know whether ther e was to be a bombing halt on the morning of October 16th, with no sources named <a name="bkfrftnote5"></a><a href="#ftnote5">5</a>, along with two no tes that expected a bombing halt based on information passed along from Texas Se nator John Tower, one of which is the following<a name="bkfrftnote6"></a><a href ="#ftnote6">6</a>: <blockquote>Agnew thinks something coming - (large?) day Rusk leaked normal ease didn't want it known they talked = Ottenad has told people McW [Charlie McWhorter] heard from someone Bryce thinks this is all smog</blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/Pvwuwqv.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> McWhorter was another Nixon aide; Ottenad was Tom Ottenad, a reporter for the St-Louis Dispatch who, as we'll see later, was one of the few journalists o f the time to look into the possibility that the peace talks had been deliberate ly sabotaged; Agnew was Spiro Agnew, Nixon's vice presidential candidate who als o, again as we'll soon see, was the man through whom Anna Chennault would pass i nformation on her attempts to stop the negotiations. There was also a note from Bryce Harlow on the October 17th, citing a specific s ource, Rusk's deputy, Harry W. Shlaudeman<a name="bkfrftnote7"></a><a href="#ftn ote7">7</a>: <blockquote>October 17, 1968 TO: DC FROM: Ellsworth Called Rusk but he had his assistant, Shlaudeman [Harry W. Shlaudeman, Special A ssistant to United States Secretary of State], talk to me. Said Rusk had already talked to Agnew. Said Rusk told Agnew the White House statement spoke for itsel f. Said Rusk emphasized to Agnew that there are a number of essential matters st ill under negotiation and discussion at Paris, that it is still up to Hanoi, tha t they are still working at it, that it is hard to predict, and especially empha
sized that the President will be in touch with Mr. Nixon if anything important d evelops.</blockquote> The "DC" mentioned here and in all other notes was a codename for Richard Nixon< a name="bkfrftnote8"></a><a href="#ftnote8">8</a>. That Nixon had another secret source for information about the on-going talks, s omeone other than Kissinger, someone high up and deep within the Johnson circle - we know this because he refers to him as such in his memoirs. Whether this man was Shlaudeman, Rusk, or someone else is unknown to me. He remains unnamed and I have come across no revelation of his identity in any other source. From RN : The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, nearly a week after Johnson's October 16 con ference call: <blockquote>On October 22, Bryce Harlow received information from a source whose credibility was beyond question. It was from someone in Johnson's innermost cir cle, and, as events turned out, it was entirely accurate. I read Harlow's memora ndum several times, and with each reading I became angrier and more frustrated: <blockquote>The President is driving exceedingly hard for a deal with North Viet nam. Expectation is that he is becoming almost pathologically eager for an excus e to order a bombing halt and will accept almost any arrangement... Clark Clifford, [Joseph] Califano, and Llewellyn Thompson are the main participa nts in this effort. [George] Ball is in also, though somewhat on the fringe. Careful plans are being made to help HHH exploit whatever happens. White House s taff liasion with HHH is close. Plan is for LBJ to make a nationwide TV announce ment as quickly as possible after agreement; the object is to get this done as l ong before November 5 as they can... White Housers still think they can pull the election out for HHH with this ploy; that's what is being attempted.</blockquote> I fired off a battery of orders: have Mitchell check with Kissinger; have Dirkse n and Tower blast the moves by the White House; have Dirksen call Johnson and le t him know we were on to his plans. I even considered having Harlow fly to Vietn am to talk to General Andrew Goodpaster to get a firsthand military view of the situation there. But I was simply venting my frustration; no matter what I did, Johnson continued to hold the whip hand. The initial results of my orders raised some doubts about Harlow's secret source . Kissinger had not heard anything about Johnson's plan, and when Ev Dirksen con fronted Johnson with the rumor, he denied it with a vehemence that convinced eve n his skeptical old friend. He said that there was nothing new to report from Pa ris, and he chided Dirksen for being taken in by such obvious rumors at this sta ge of his life.</blockquote> During ces on e know edging this period, Nixon was not simply receiving information from various sour the peace talks. From The Arrogance of Power by Anthony Summers, w from his interviews with Chennault that on the very day that Nixon was pl fealty to Johnson, he was meeting with Chennault to undermine them:
<blockquote>In the weeks before the election, with growing signs of an impending bombing halt and the acceptance of peace talks, Nixon publicly voiced support f or President Johnson. Privately, he admitted years later, he seethed with resent ment. Today any objective reading of the notes and minutes of Johnson's meetings that fall reveals a president sometimes too hesitant in going forward for the t aste of his own aides but genuinely devoted to the cause of peace. Nixon, howeve r, was convinced the peace initiative was at least in part a political ploy, des
igned to swing the election to Humphrey. Chennault stoked this resentment, apparently flying to Kansas City to meet with Nixon on October 16, the very day that Johnson briefed Nixon and the other candi dates on his Vietnam plans, urging discretion in their public statements.<a name ="bkfrftSummersnote23"></a><a href="#ftSummersnote23">23</a> She bore with her a long written presentation that deplored the rumored bombing halt and recommended a long-term approach to the conflict. The same day Agnew received a briefing on the coming halt, originating with unnamed sources. Two days later C hennault saw the South Vietnamese ambassador again. A few days after that there was another meeting with Mitchell. She and Mitchell were now in touch by phone almost daily. "Call me from a pay ph one. Don't talk in your office," he would urge her. When she joked about possibl e wiretaps, he was not amused. Mitchell's message, she said, was always the same : If peace talks were announced, it was vital to persuade President Thieu not to take part. </blockquote> OCTOBER 28, 1968</a> A reporter for the Christian Science Monitor, Beverly Deepe Keever, who h ad arrived in Vietnam in 1962 and would stay for the next seven years, would hea r of a possible story related to the Peace Talks and notified her editor. She wo uld write of the event thirty five years later in her memoir,<a href="http://www .amazon.com/Death-Zones-Darling-Spies-Reporting/dp/0803222610/"> Death Zones and Darling Spies: Seven Years of Vietnam War Reporting</a> (excerpt is take n from a chapter excerpt dealing with the bombing halt, <a href="http://socialsc iences.people.hawaii.edu/publications_lib/Keever-Excerpt.pdf">"The Unexploded El ection-Eve Bombshell"</a>), and I bold the most important part: <blockquote>During October 1968, I was busier than usual covering the impact of a talked-about permanent bombing halt, which was Hanoi's precondition for enteri ng into peace talks with the allies. Most of my dispatches were published on pag e 1, often leading the Monitor. I interviewed senior military commanders along the DMZ and in Saigon, secured comments from Western diplomats, including one who had recently visited Hanoi, and sought input from other sources who asse ssed troop movements in Laos. At the same time I was synthesizing reports that P ham Xuan An [a stringer hired to help with oral and written translations] had gl eaned from sources inside and outside the palace and the Vietnamese High Command . Then, out of the blue, I learned of such outlandish rumblings that on October 28 I sent an advisory to the Monitor's overseas editor, [Henry S.] "Hank" H ayward: "There's a report here that Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington Bui D iem has notified the Foreign Ministry that Nixon aides have approached him and t old him the Saigon government should hold to a firm position now regarding negot iations and that once Nixon is elected, he'll back the Thieu government in their demands. If you could track it down with the Nixon camp, it would probably be a very good story." I was so busy I had no chance to remember my assist eight years earlier in the NBC studios when my boss, Sam Lubell [with whom she had po lled voters in key precincts about the 1960 presidential election], had predicte d Nixon would lose the presidency to John Kennedy. Now, Nixon was facing Democra t Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who was saddled with President Lyndon Johnson' s increasingly controversial Vietnam policy. I received no response to my cable from Boston.</blockquote> The National Security Agency (NSA), would make the following summary of Thieu's public remarks on that day<a name="bkfrftnote9"></a><a href="#ftnote9">9</s up></a>:
<blockquote> THIEU'S VIEWS ON PEACE TALKS AND BOMBING HALT XXCC [REDACTED] 28 OCT 68 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SECRET. ((THIS IS)) A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON MR. THIEU'S SPEECH [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 1. Since the Vietnamese government is ardently laboring [REDACTED] together with the U.S. side to put into practice the items that were naturally agreed upon at the U.S.-Vietnamese Honolulu Summit Conference (19 July), President Thieu empha sized the point that President Johnson must also keep his promises. ((Thieu)) said that it appears that Mr. Nixon will be elected as the next presid ent, and he thinks it would be good to try to solve the important question of th e political talks with the next president (no matter who is elected. ((Thieu)) b elieves that our standpoint should be prepared and strengthened now rather than in the future. </blockquote> OCTOBER 29, 1968</a> It's on this date that we have the event which would trigger the surveillance of Anna Chennault, which would in turn reveal her connection to the Nixon campaign . On the night of October 28th, Eugene Rostow would contact his brother, Walt Ro stow, Lyndon Johnson's National Security Adviser, about a startling piece of inf ormation he'd come across. Walt Rostow would ask that his brother dictate what h e'd just relayed, so that he might pass on this important information to the pre sident the next day. The following are the related papers, the two documents dic tated by Eugene about a stunning discovery and the memo by Walt to the president introducing his brother's findings, and identifying the source<a name="bkfrftno te10"></a><a href="#ftnote10">10</a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/trKeSgX.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>October 29, 1968 Last night I received a telephone call from an old friend in New York, a man of experience and a careful and even exact reporter. He said he had attended a work ing lunch that day with colleagues in Wall Street. Two were men closely involved with Nixon. One of them explained to the group that Nixon was handling the Viet nam peace problem "like another Fortas case." He was trying to frustrate the Pre sident, by inciting Saigon to step up its demands, and by letting Hanoi know tha t when he took office "he could accept anything and blame it on his predecessor. " E. V. Rostow</blockquote> The "Fortas case" refers to Supreme Court justice Abe Fortas, who was nominated to be chief justice in 1968, but whose confirmation was filibustered to prevent the confirmation, with Fortas eventually withdrawing his nomination. Nixon would appoint Warren Burger as Chief Justice after his election in 1968. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/IKVlwuR.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" />
<blockquote>Oct. 29, 1968 Walt: I had a further talk with my informant about the luncheon conversation he attend ed yesterday. The man who spoke was a member of the banking community, a colleague, a man he h as known for many years, and one in whose honesty he has absolute confidence. Th e speaker is reputed to be very close to Nixon -- as close as Gabriel Hauge (it was not Hauge). (He feels he cannot give me his name.) The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the futur e of the financial markets in the near term. The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire wer e dim, because Nixon was playing the problem as he did the Fortas affair -- to b lock. He was taking public positions intended to achieve that end. They would in cite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait. Part of his strategy was an expectation that an offensive would break out soon, that we would have to spend a great deal more (and incur more casualties) -- a f act which would adversely affect the stock market and the bond market. NVN [Nort h Vietnamese] offensive action was a definite element in their thinking about th e future. These difficulties would make it easier for Nixon to settle after January. Like Ike in 1953, he would be able to settle on terms which the President could not a ccept, blaming the deterioration of the situation between now and January or Feb ruary on his predecessor. Gene</blockquote> In this cover letter, Walt Rostow reveals the name of the source: Alexander Sach s. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/UZ7Jh3Q.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>Tuesday, October 29, 1968 6:00 a.m. Mr. President: I just called Gene and asked him to dictate to Miss Nivens what he told me last night. Here it is. I asked him to go back to Alexander Sachs and see how much further detail he can get on the people involved and how close, in fact, they are to Nixon. W.W. Rostow</blockquote> After the election, in a report he compiled on the scandal, Walt Rostow would re late the surrounding events of these revelations<a name="bkfrftnote11"></a><a hr ef="#ftnote11">11</a>: <blockquote>From October 17 to October 29 we received diplomatic intelligence of Saigon's uneasiness with the apparent break in Hanoi's position on a total bomb ing cessation and with the Johnson Administration's apparent willingness to go f
orward. This was an interval, however, when Hanoi backed away from the diplomati c breakthrough of the second week of October. Only towards the end of the month was the agreement with Hanoi re-established. As late as October 28, Thieu, despi te the uneasiness of which we were aware, told Amb. Bunker [U.S. Ambassador to V ietnam Ellsworth Bunker] he would proceed, as he had agreed about two weeks earl ier. [REDACTED] In the early morning hours of October 29 the President and his advisers met with Abrams [The American commander in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams]. Before going to that meeting, I was telephoned at home by my brother, Eugene Rostow. H e reported the first of his messages from New York on Republican strategy -- fro m Alexander Sachs. During the meeting with Abrams word came from Bunker of Thieu's sudden intransig ence. The diplomatic information previously received plus the information from N ew York took on new and serious significance. President Johnson, in the course of October 29, instructed Bromley Smith, Execut ive Secretary of the National Security Council, to get in touch with the Deputy Director of the FBI, Deke DeLoach and arrange that contacts by Americans with th e South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington be monitored.</blockquote> OCTOBER 30, 1968</a> Deputy Director of the FBI, Cartha "Deke" DeLoach would send the following repor t to Johnson, a result of surveillance of the Vietnamese embassy<a name="bkfrftn ote12"></a><a href="#ftnote12">12</a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/seEsbHW.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote><strike>SECRET</strike>/SENSITIVE October 30, 1968 Following from Deke DeLoach: Early this morning, approximately 7:45 A.M., Ambassador Bui Diem of the Vietname se Embassy was contacted by a woman who did not identify herself but whom he see med to recognize by voice. The FBI believes this woman to be possibly Anna Chena ult [sic], widow of General Clare [sic] Chenault [sic]. The woman commented that she did not have an opportunity to talk with the Ambassador on 10/29/68 inasmuc h as there were so many people around. However, she thought that perhaps the Amb assador would have some more information this morning. The woman then asked what the situation is. The Ambassador responded that "just among us" that he could n ot go into specifics on the telephone but something "is cooking." The woman then asked if Thailand is going to be the representative of both South Vietnam and t he Viet Cong to which the Ambassador responded "no, nothing of this sort yet." T he Ambassador then suggested that if the woman had time today she should drop by and talk with him as time is running short. She replied that she would drop by after the luncheon for Mrs. Agnew today.</blockquote> After receiving this, Johnson would contact his friend Georgia Senator Richard R ussell at 10:25 A.M., and explain the problem<a name="bkfrftnote13"></a><a href= "#ftnote13">13</a>: http://youtu.be/FsUz1m-5Ta0 (A clip on youtube of the audio with accompanying transcript of this phone ca ll in its entirety.)
<blockquote> JOHNSON How are you, my friend? RUSSELL Good. I'm sorry about the phone being off the hook upstairs. Everybody's running around trying to fix it, and yesterday the phone was (inaudible) somebody's lis tening. JOHNSON Got some kids. I understand you got some children in the house. RUSSELL No no. JOHNSON Every phone's off the hook at my place when I got that sixteen month grandson. H e's a mechanic. He works on it all the time. RUSSELL He's got an inquiring mind. Goes into things. See what it's about. JOHNSON Well, I've got one this morning that's pretty rough for you. We have found that our friend, the Republican nominee-our California friend-has been playing on the outskirts with our enemies and our friends, both-our allies and the others. He's been doing it through rather subterranean sources here. And he has been saying to the allies that "you're going to get sold out. Watch Y alta, and Potsdam, and two Berlins, and everything. And they're [the Johnson adm inistration] going to recognize the NLF. I [Nixon] don't have to do that. You be tter not give away your liberty just a few hours before I can preserve it for yo u." One or two of his business friends divulged it first a couple of days ago, about the time he [Nixon] made the statement that he had rumors that the staff was se lling out, but he did not include me in it. You saw that, didn't you? </blockquote> The "California friend" is, of course, Richard Nixon. <blockquote> JOHNSON The next thing that we got our teeth in was one of his associates-a fellow named [John] Mitchell, who is running his campaign, who's the real Sherman Adams [Eis enhower's chief of staff] of the operation, in effect said to a businessman that "we're going to handle this like we handled the Fortas matter, unquote. We're going to frustrate the President by saying to the South Vietnamese, and the Kore ans, and the Thailanders [sic], 'Beware of Johnson.'" "At the same time, we're going to say to Hanoi, 'I [Nixon] can make a better dea l than he [Johnson] has, because I'm fresh and new, and I don't have to demand a s much as he does in the light of past positions." Now, when we got that, pure by accident, as a result of some of our Wall Street connections, that caused me to look a little deeper. RUSSELL
I guess so. JOHNSON And I have means of doing that, as you may well imagine. RUSSELL Yes. JOHNSON And...Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is contacting their [South Vietnamese] ambassador fr om time to time-seems to be kind of the go-between, the Chiang Kai-Shek deal. In addition, their ambassador is saying to 'em that "Johnson is desperate and is j ust moving heaven and earth to elect Humphrey, so don't you get sucked in on tha t." He is kind of these folks' agent here, this little South Vietnamese ambassad or. Now, this is not guesswork. </blockquote> The "means of doing that" are, obviously, the various intelligence agencies. <blockquote>JOHNSON Mrs. Chennault, you know, of the Flying Tigers. RUSSELL I know Mrs. Chennault. JOHNSON She's young and attractive. I mean, she's a pretty good-looking girl. RUSSELL She certainly is. JOHNSON And she's around town. And she is warning them to not get pulled in on this John son move. Then he [the ambassador], in turn, is warning his government. Then we, in turn, know pretty well what he [Thieu] is saying out there. So he is saying that well, he's got to play it for time, and get it by the next few days. Now, the Soviets are climbing the wall, and Hanoi is, and of course our people in Paris are, bec ause they have agreed that they will let the GVN come to the table. That has bee n the thing we have insisted on. They have met our demands. The Soviets have sai d that we understand that we're gonna resume if they violate the DMZ and we can see that immediately after we make the announcement whether they are or not. We have reserved the right for reconnaissance and we have made it clear it's an act of force, and not an act of war, in our announcement. And we got South Vietnam, and all the allies aboard on a one day. We announce it one day and we meet the next. But Hanoi wanted more time, so they demanded a couple of weeks, and then t en days, and then a week, and we wouldn't do it, because we thought that Saigon couldn't stand to wait that long between the time of the announcement and the ti me of the meeting. So we have insisted on one day because Hanoi had said product ive discussions could begin the next day. So, we took them at their word. About that time, Humphrey made a fool speech in which he said that he would stop the b ombing without a comma or a semicolon, he'd just make it period. RUSSELL Well, that'd kill the whole thing. JOHNSON
Well, it did for ten days, and then Bundy made a fool speech. And they all of th em had to dissect that and take it- (inaudible) Yes yes, the Adlai Stevenson gro up and they just get the tail of the dashboard right at the right time, they do the wrong thing, every time. But we wore that out, we got it back on the track. And in getting it back on the track, meantime, Nixon gets scared to death, so he gets into the thing. And it gets off the track at the other place. Now, everybo dy had approved the one day thing. Then they came along and approved the three d ay thing, and they actually got down to the wording of the announcement, a joint announcement to be made by the two of us. And it was all agreed upon, all satis factory, and then Nixon gets on and says no use selling out now, just wait a few days. And you can't trust Johnson, may want to, really he's gonna pet the North Vietnamese, NLF, on the back, just like Roosevelt did to Russia. And that scare s them.</blockquote> OCTOBER 31, 1968</a> On 4:10 pm, Johnson would call Everett Dirksen, Republican Senator for Illinois, and explain to him that he'd uncovered Anna Chennault attempting to spoil the p eace talk negotiations through the promise that the South Vietnamese would get a better deal with Nixon. The language is colorful, and though the transcript is my own and there may be errors, the sense is still very clear that Johnson is ve ry upset and deeply disturbed by what is taking place. I give the most relevant excerpts<a name="bkfrftnote14"></a><a href="#ftnote14">14</a>: <blockquote> JOHNSON Everett, we have said to the...first of all, I cannot tell you this, that's gonn a be quoted. Because I can't tell the candidates, and I can't tell anybody else. I haven't talked to a human. I want to comply with it, trust, but I sure don't want it told to a human. DIRKSEN I give you my solemn word. JOHNSON Alright. The situation is this: since September of last year, we have told Hanoi that we would stop the bombing. We're anxious to stop it. When they would engag e in, these are the keywords, prompt, productive discussions that they would not take advantage of. That is September. March 31st I came to the conclusion that no living man can run for office and be a candidate, and have them all shooting at him, and keep this war out of politics, and get peace. So I concluded, that I should not run because I'd just prolong the war by doing it. So I said then, we 're stopping the bombing in ninety percent, we will stop it in the rest. If ther e can be any indication that'll not cost us additional lives. We got, just a lot of procrastination, up until October. During October, they started asking quest ions what did I mean by prompt, and what did I mean by productive. Now, the fact s of life are, they tried two offensives in May and August and they got very sev ere setbacks. The facts are that they've had thirty thousand forty thousand leav e the country to re-fit. The facts are that they're not doing at all well. But t hey can continue to supply what they need for a very long time. But in October w e started getting these nibbles. What did the president mean? What did he say wh en he said he had to have prompt and productive, not take advantage. We said, th at we would consider productive if the GVN had to be present. They said they wer e just generals and stooges, and satellites, and Johnson put them in, always say ing they would never sit down with those traitors. We said, you've got to sit do wn with them, before we can ever work out the future. We can't settle the future of South Vietnam without them being present. We're not going to pull a Hitler-C hamberlin deal. They said they would never do it. So, on October 7th or the 11th , I've forgotten, they said, "Well now, what else, is that all the president wan ts? If we would sit down with the GVN, what would he do?"
Now, they made no commitment, they didn't indicate they accepted, they just aske d the question. But, you know, in trading, when a fellow says how much would you take for that horse, you kinda think that means something. So, we followed it u p, and we said, "No, we don't want to limit ourselves. The GVN's got to be prese nt, and we've got to have productive discussions, and we think they could be pro ductive, if they were present. But we can't have a (pamajon?) and say we'll do t hat, and say we'll meet a year from now. It's got to be a prompt meeting, a week , two weeks, three weeks, something like that. So, they said, "Well, if we could work everything out, we could meet the next day." So, we came back the next day , and said, if you let the GVN come in, and we'll meet the next day, we would li ke to take that up with our government. (coughs) They said, "Well, what else do you want? Is that all?" Right off that, [Averell] Harriman said, "No, these are facts of life. We know you're not going to sell out, and engage in reciprocity, and you're not going to accept conditions, and your pride, and your asiatic face will not let you do that. You've got to save face, we understand that. But we c ould not sit at a conference table if you were shelling the cities." In other wo rds, if I were talking to Dirksen in my living room, and my son was raping his w ife, he'd have to get up and leave, quit trading, and run and protect her. So, w e just could not sit there, if you were shelling the cities. Nor could we sit th ere, and have a productive discussion if you were abusing the DMZ. DIRKSEN Yeah.</blockquote> <blockquote> JOHNSON And we told them all that. Told the Russians, if that gets into the paper, the d eal's off. That's why you cannot say this to anybody, it's gonna get in the pape r. Because these folks are the most sensitive people in the world. But, we have said this, and about that time, some of Mr. Nixon's people come in and tell both sides, "I have information about who you had a glass of beer with last night, y ou don't know it, but I do." And we have ways and means, you get my point, don't you? You have ways and means of knowing what's going on in the country. We know what Thieu says, when he talks out in Vietnam, we know what happens here. And s ome of Mr. Nixon's people are getting a little unbalanced, and unfrightened, lik e Hubert did, when he said, no comma, no period. Like Bundy did. About the time you called me last week, they started going into the South Vietnamese embassy an d also, sending some word to Hanoi. Which has prolonged this thing, a good deal. The net of it is despicable and if it were made public, I think it would rock t he nation. But the net of it was, that if they just hold out a little bit longer , that he's [Nixon] a lot more sympathetic and he could kinda, do better busines s with him than they can with their present President. And, in Hanoi, they've be en saying that, well, if you won't settle this thing, I'm not bound by all these things. So, I haven't had this record, and I could make a little better deal wi th you. There. I rather doubt Nixon has done any of this. But there's no questio n what folks for him are doing it. And very frankly, we're reading some of the t hings that are happening. So, as a consequence, while Thieu and all of our allie s are ready to go on a bombing ceasefire, cessation, it just may be temporary, w e might be back on it in the next day, if they don't follow these two things, if they violate the DMZ, or if they shell the cities. We could stop the killing ou t there, we could get everything we asked for, the GVN in there, but: they got t his question, this new formula put in there. Namely: wait on Nixon. And they're killing four, five hundred every day, waiting on Nixon. Now, these folks I doubt are authorized to speak for Nixon, but they're going in there, and they range all the way from attractive women to old line China lobby ists. And some people, pretty close to him in the business world. I was shocked when I looked at the reports. And I've got them. And so forth.</blockquote> <blockquote>Now, I've been at this five years, and if I don't wanna sell my coun try out, I'd have sold it out five months ago and gone on, run for president and
got this war behind us, then got me re-elected. But I am a conscientious, earne st fella trying to do a job. And I'm gonna do it. I get peace at four o'clock Sa turday noon, I'm damn sure gonna get it, come hell or high water, and woebe onto the guy who says you oughta keep on killing. But I really think it's a little d irty pool for Dick's people to be messing with the South Vietnamese ambassador a nd carrying messages around for both of them. And I don't think people would app rove of it if it were known. So, that's why I'm afraid to talk.</blockquote> <blockquote>I don't see it making any difference in the political campaign 'caus e first of all, conference won't happen till it's over with, I think I'd be glad to say that all the candidates have a, co-operate with me and we oughta have on e voice in foreign affairs. And while they criticize my conduct of the war, they have never told the enemy that he'd get a better deal. But this last few days, Dick is getting just a little bit shakey, and he's pissing on the fire a little. Now, you oughta guide him just a little bit, because they're not running agains t me, I'm not gonna be here, you're gonna be my senator, and you're gonna repres ent me, and whatever I want done, I'm gonna be down at Purnell. But he oughta go back to that old (inaudible), say...as a matter of fact, we have a transcript w here one of his partners said he's gonna play this one just like Fortas. He's go nna take the Republicans and the Southerners and he's gonna frustrate the Presid ent by telling South Vietnamese, just wait a few more days and he's not connecte d to this war, he can make a better peace for them. And by telling Hanoi, that h e isn't running this war, didn't get them into it, be a lot more considerate of them than I can, because I'm pretty inflexible, calling them sonsofbitches. Now, that's not very easy to work under those conditions. Anymore than it is, when H ubert says he'll stop the bombing without a comma semicolon but period. They nei ther one of them got a damn thing to do with it between now and January the 20th . And I'm gonna stop the earliest second I can. And I can stop it for nothing if I want to, I have five times before. But I'm not gonna stop it unless they agre e the GVN will be at that table. I'm not gonna stop it unless they agree the GVN are gonna be at that table.</blockquote> What is crucial to see here is the focus on the negotiations themselves. He take s issue with what Nixon or Nixon's people are doing, but he also criticizes Hump hrey for making declaring that he'll end the bombing without conditions. Both of these things are making it more difficult to set up a peace conference, a confe rence which he emphasizes will take place after the election. If he'd simply wis hed to win another term, Johnson says he would have ended the bombing a long tim e ago: "Now, I've been at this five years, and if I don't wanna sell my country out, I'd have sold it out five months ago and gone on, run for president and got this war behind us, then got me re-elected. But I am a conscientious, earnest f ella trying to do a job. And I'm gonna do it. I get peace at four o'clock Saturd ay noon, I'm damn sure gonna get it, come hell or high water, and woebe onto the guy who says you oughta keep on killing." Two hours later, Johnson would again speak to all three candidates via conferenc e call<a name="bkfrftnote15"></a><a href="#ftnote15">15</a>. During t he call, Johnson would once again emphasize the conditions that he'd required to halt the bombing, discreetly chastise Humphrey and Nixon for their interference , and make clear that he was soon going to announce a halt to the bombing: <blockquote> JOHNSON Do you hear me all right? HUMPHREY Yes, sir. NIXON Yes, sir.
WALLACE Yes, sir. JOHNSON I have with me Secretary Rusk and Clifford and General Wheeler and Mr. Helms of the CIA and Mr. Rostow. I'm reading from - I want to read a brief background to you from my conference call to you of October 16 so you can get a predicate to w hat I'm about to say. I said then-this is in absolute confidence, any statement or any speeches or any comment at this time referring to the substance of this c onversation will be injurious. I don't think there's any question about that and I know you would not want that to happen. First, our position-the government's position today-is exactly what it was the l ast time all three of you were briefed. That position mainly is this. We're anxi ous to stop the bombing and would be willing to stop the bombing if they - Hanoi - would sit down with us, with the Government of South Vietnam present, and hav e productive discussions. We have told them that we did not think that we could have productive discussions if, while we were talking, they were shelling the ci ties, or if they were abusing the DMZ. That was on October 16th, when I talked t o you. The next sentence said, "From time to time they have nibbled back and for th at these various items." Each time they do, there is a flurry of excitement, and so on and so forth. Since that time, they have sent their man back to Hanoi. We have continued to ha ve our regular weekly meetings and other meetings. We have been in touch with a good many Governments in the world, from Eastern Europe to India to the Soviet U nion, all these people working every hour to try to (a) get them to accept the G overnment of South Vietnam - that they're all puppets and that they'd never sit down in a room with, and (b) trying to inform them that we would be glad to stop the bombing, but that the bombing could not continue stopped if they (a) shelle d the cities or (b) if they abused the DMZ. On Sunday night, I was informed by Paris that there were very good indications t hat they would let the Government of Vietnam come and be present at the conferen ce and that they fully understood what would happen if we stop the bombing and t hey shell the cities or abuse the DMZ. When I got back to Washington from New Yo rk, I went back to the Soviet Union and pointed out that I did not want to decei ve anybody and didn't want them to be deceived, didn't want to stop the bombing and have to start it again, but I wanted to make it abundantly clear that if the y would let the Government of Vietnam come to the meetings and if they thoroughl y understood what would happen, then I wanted to seriously consider this matter. But I had doubts - repeat doubts - that the North Vietnamese would stop shellin g the cities or would stop abusing the DMZ. The Soviet Union came back to me on Tuesday or Wednesday and said that my doubts were not justified. Ambassador Harr iman came back to me and said, "We have repeated to you at least 12 times-we've repeated to North Vietnam at least 12 times-in 12 meetings, and some meetings we repeated it several times-that we could not have a productive discussion in an atmosphere of shelling the cities or abusing the DMZ. Therefore, you may be sure we understand it." While this was going on, we'd gone out and talked to all of our allied countries, and at that time they all tentatively agreed that this was a wise move. Now, since that time with our campaign on, we have had some minor problems devel op. First, there have been some speeches that we ought to withdraw troops, or th at we'd stop the bombing without any-obtaining anything in return, or some of ou r folks are-even including some of the old China lobbyists, they are going aroun d and implying to some of the embassies and some of the others that they might g et a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this. Now that's made it difficult and it's held up things a little bit. And I know that none of you c andidates are aware of it or responsible for it, because I'm looking in my trans
cript here, when we talked before, and I asked for your comments. The Vice Presi dent said he had no comment, but thanks very much. Vice President Nixon said, "W ell, as you know, this is consistent with what my position has been all along an d I made it very clear. I'll make no statements that will undercut the negotiati ons. So we'll just stay right on that and hope that this thing works out." And t hen Mr. Wallace said, "Yes, sir, Mr. President, that's been my position all alon g, too, the position you stated, and I agree with you that we shouldn't play any politics in this matter, so it might foul up the negotiations." Now, I concluded last March that I couldn't as a candidate stop this war. And I concluded that I ought to stop it the first day I can. I'm going to try to stop it as soon as I can. Therefore, I am planning to issue an order-I'm meeting with the [National] Security Council tonight -I'm planning to issue an order that wi ll stop the bombing that will set a date for a meeting where the Government of V ietnam will appear, and I'm making it very clear to the intermediaries. I can't do it in public because they'll say it's a condition and reciprocal and we'll ne ver get an agreement-and you must not make that statement either, but I think yo u ought to know it. And we're going to have to wait for 24/48/72 hours to see wh at happens at the DMZ and see what happens at the cities, and we may have to sta rt the bombing just as fast as we stopped it. But I have considered this matter day and night since March 31st at least.</blockquote> Johnson would again declare that his primary purpose for the bombing halt was no t political: "I'm not concerned with an election. Y'all are concerned with an el ection." He would state clearly that any reneging on the conditions would mean a resumption of the bombing, and all three candidates offered their support: <blockquote>JOHNSON Now, I would hope, and I'm going to say so in my statement tonight, that this wo uld not be to anyone's advantage, except to the countries, to peace and to the m en in Vietnam. First of all, the conference won't be held until after the election, probably, w e would hope, the 6th or 7th of November, or sometime in that period. We would h ope that the Government of Vietnam would have time to get their men there and, o f course, the other governments have got to get the NLF there. I would hope that all of you could say - like you said here the other day - that you felt that yo u didn't want to do anything to undercut the negotiations; that you recommended peace at the earliest possible date; this is not peace, this is not a settlement , this is just one step that indicates that if they do not shell the cities, and if they do not abuse the DMZ - both of those would be great military advantages for us at a time when we're giving up bombing that we can't do for the next 90 days anyway on account of the weather in North Vietnam. We can use that very eff ectively in other places. I told General [Creighton] Abrams to return, to give them all he's got in South Vietnam and Laos, but be prepared for this order. The order will not go into eff ect for several hours after it's issued. It's got to go all over the Pacific, pu t out some 12 hours. I would think that when I get through with the Security Cou ncil sometime this evening from 8 [p.m.] on, I'll make a statement to the public . I have confidence enough in y'all that I've called you even before I've called my own legislative leaders. I've told you every bit of the information I have. Every diplomatic and military adviser I have recommends this course. I would not want it on my conscience that I had left the Presidential arena and refused to run to try to get peace, and then when they agreed, that I - the thin g - the thing that I insisted on most, bringing the GVN into the table - that I said, "No, I've got to put it off because I'm concerned with an election." I'm n ot concerned with an election. Y'all are concerned with an election. I don't thi nk this concerns an election. I think all of you want the same thing. So I thoug
ht if I laid it on the line that way and presented it to you, you would at least have a complete, full understanding of all the facts. I'll be glad to give you any of the written recommendations. All the files are open to you-be glad to sho w you what happened. Nobody will know whether it'll be a success or not until we really get into these discussions and these talks with the GVN present. If they shell the cities or if they abuse the DMZ, General Abrams already has his order s, and he is directed to respond immediately without even coming to Washington.< /blockquote> <blockquote> JOHNSON Now, my position is this. I can't wait. I have got every adviser, military/civil ian/CIA/Ambassadors-Bunker, Goodpaster [General Andrew Goodpaster], Abrams - eve ry one of them recommend this course. So, I am going to recommend it to the nati on. I am going to issue the order. I would just hope you all would do likewise. NIXON Okay. Thank you. HUMPHREY Thank you. WALLACE Mr. President, I just pray that everything you do works out fine, and I am prayi ng for you. JOHNSON Well, I need it. Any other comments? NIXON We'll back you up. Thank you, Mr. President. HUMPHREY We'll back you up, Mr. President. WALLACE We'll back you, Mr. President. JOHNSON Thank you very much.</blockquote> I quote again Nixon's perspective on this discussion from his memoir: <blockquote> More than anything else, Humphrey had Lyndon Johnson to thank for the eleventh-h our masterstroke that almost won him the election. On October 31 I was to address a nationally televised rally at Madison Square Ga rden in New York. I set aside a couple of quiet hours in the afternoon, and I wa s sitting in my study at home making notes for the speech later that evening whe n the telephone rang. It was a White House operator: the President was placing a conference call to Humphrey, Wallace, and me. A moment later Lyndon Johnson was on the line. He got right to the point. There had been a breakthrough in Paris, he said, and after wide consultations among his advisers, he had decided to call a total bomb ing halt over North Vietnam. He would make the announcement on television in two hours. As Johnson went one, I thought to myself that whatever this meant to Nor th Vietnam, he had just dropped a pretty good bomb in the middle of my campaign. Johnson said, rather defensively, "I'm not concerned with an election. You all are concerned with an election. I don't think this co ncerns an election. I think all of you want the same thing. So I thought if I la id it on the line that way, and presented it to you, you would at least have a c omplete, full understanding of all the facts." Johnson explained that he had not been able to persuade Saigon to agree to the p rovisions of the bombing halt, so that South Vietnam would not be joining in the announcement. When Johnson finished, and we had asked some perfunctory questions, George Walla ce said, "I'm praying for you." Humphrey said, "I'm backing you up, Mr. President." I thanked Johnson for making the call and seconded Humphrey's pledge of support. The telephone call over, I could feel my anger and frustration welling up. Johns on was making the one move that I thought could determine the outcome of the ele ction. Had I done all this work and come all this way only to be undermined by t he powers of an incumbent who had decided against seeking re-election? </blockquote> Johnson would announce the bombing halt on TV at 8pm that night. A partial excer pt<a name="bkfrftnote16"></a><a href="#ftnote16">16</a>: <blockquote>Good evening, my fellow Americans: I speak to you this evening about very important developments in our search for peace in Vietnam. We have been engaged in discussions with the North Vietnamese in Paris t May. The discussions began after I announced on the evening of March television speech to the Nation that the United States - in an effort lks started on a settlement of the Vietnam war-had stopped the bombing Vietnam in the area where 90 percent of the people live. since las 31st in a to get ta of North
When our representatives-Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance-were sent to P aris, they were instructed to insist throughout the discussions that the legitim ate elected Government of South Vietnam must take its place in any serious negot iations affecting the future of South Vietnam. Therefore, our Ambassadors Harriman and Vance made it abundantly clear to the re presentatives of North Vietnam in the beginning that-as I had indicated on the e vening of March 31st-we would stop the bombing of North Vietnamese territory ent irely when that would lead to prompt and productive talks, meaning by that talks in which the Government of Vietnam was free to participate.</blockquote> <blockquote>Last Sunday evening, and throughout Monday, we began to get confirma tion of the essential understanding that we had been seeking with the North Viet namese on the critical issues between us for some time. I spent most of all day Tuesday reviewing every single detail of this matter with our field commander, G eneral Abrams, whom I had ordered home, and who arrived here at the White House at 2:30 in the morning and went into immediate conference with the President and the appropriate members of his Cabinet. We received General Abrams' judgment an d we heard his recommendations at some length. Now, as a result of all of these developments, I have now ordered that all air, naval, and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease as of 8 a.m., Washington time, Friday morning. I have reached this decision on the basis of the developments in the Paris talks
. And I have reached it in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war.</blockquote> Nixon would give a speech that same night at Madison Square Garden. Again, from RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon: <blockquote>While I believed that Johnson would not go out of his way to help Hu mphrey unless he were forced to meet a clear-cut partisan challenge, the last th ing I wanted to do was to give the President an excuse to get angry with me in p ublic. I hoped to avoid Johnson's going all out for Humphrey with every resource at the command of the White House. There was nothing more I could do. Even though I knew what was coming - had know n about it for weeks - the timing and impact were completely in Johnson's hands. At the Madison Square Garden rally on October 31 I responded to the bombing halt announcement in what I considered the only responsible way: "I will say that as a presidential candidate, and my vice presidential candidate joins me in this, that neither he nor I will say anything that might destroy the chance to have pe ace." One reporter wrote: "President Johnson gave Richard M. Nixon a trick and V ice President Humphrey a treat for Halloween when he announced a complete halt t o the bombing of North Vietnam last night." The bombing halt unquestionably resu lted in a last-minute surge of support for Humphrey. The militant liberals came back to the fold. Even those McCarthy zealots who had pledged never to support H umphrey now had an excuse to vote for him. The bombing halt also undercut one of my most effective issues - the inability of the Democratic leadership to win a permanent peace. Studies made after the election showed that public opinion had been particularly volatile during this period, and the hope that the halt might lead to a peace settlement resulted in massive voter shifts to Humphrey.</blockq uote> I isolate one part of the last for emphasis, and I italicize the ending for furt her emphasis: "At the Madison Square Garden rally on October 31 I responded to t he bombing halt announcement in what I considered the only responsible way: 'I w ill say that as a presidential candidate, and my vice presidential candidate joi ns me in this, that neither he nor I will say anything that might destroy the chance to have peace.'" NOVEMBER 1, 1968</a> Due to time differences, Johnson's speech would be broadcast in Vietnam the next day. We might return to the memoir of foreign correspondent Beverly Deepe Keeve r, as she describes the speech, Thieu's rejection, and her report to her editors on what might have prompted the reversal. This transmission, dealing with possi ble involvement by the Nixon campaign to foil the talks, was a major scoop, but one that was in vain. All details implying such involvement were eliminated from her reporting, because this involvement did not appear to be just politics, or diplomacy, but outright treason. <blockquote>[On] October 31, Johnson announced that he had ordered a complete en d to the bombing of North Vietnam within 12 hours and that the date for the firs t negotiation session with Hanoi was set for November 6, the day after the U.S. presidential election. Johnson's speech was received in Saigon on November 1, wh ich, as I reported, many Vietnamese viewed as an ill-timed insult because it was made on Vietnam's National Day and the anniversary of the Kennedy administratio n's support for the overthrow of President [Ngo Dinh] Diem. Then, just four days before the U.S. election, President Thieu surprisingly rejected Johnson's peace initiative. In a bombshell televised speech before the National Assembly on Vie
tnam's National Day, Thieu announced that South Vietnam would not send delegates to negotiate in Paris by November 6; he feared the Viet Cong's National Liberat ion Front would be seated as a legitimate coequal of his government. I reported that his speech was a direct rebuke to President Johnson. "In effect, Mr. Thieu said LBJ double-crossed him," one longtime Asia observer told me. "And Mr. Thieu is pretty nearly right." To explain Thieu's stunning announcement, I cabled Hayward on November 4: "Purpo rted political encouragement from the Richard Nixon camp was a significant facto r in the last-minute decision of President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks - at least until the American Presidential e lection is over." I relied mostly on "informed sources" for my scoop - an eye-op ening exclusive news report - and added that "the only written report about the alleged Nixon support for the Thieu government was a cable from Bui Diem, Vietna mese ambassador to Washington," confirming what I had asked Hayward to check out days earlier. But my momentous scoop was not published. Hayward cabled back tha t the Monitor had deleted all my references to Bui Diem and to the "purported po litical encouragement from the Nixon camp," which, he wrote, "seems virtual equi valent of treason."</blockquote> On the morning of November 1st, all this still lay in the future. The fraying, h owever, had already begun when Johnson would take a call at 8:30 am from one of the architects of the war, Robert McNamara, congratulating him on the bombing ha lt speech, after which the President would bring up Nixon's interference<a name= "bkfrftnote17"></a><a href="#ftnote17">17</a>: <blockquote> JOHNSON Bob? MCNAMARA Good morning, Mr. President. JOHNSON How're you doing? MCNAMARA I knew you'd be the only other person in town working this morning. JOHNSON No, no, but we have been working, you know. MCNAMARA I know it. I know it. I just wanted to call--I won't take a second, but I just w anted to call and say-JOHNSON Please do. MCNAMARA Congratulations. I think it was terrific, Mr. President. </blockquote> <blockquote>JOHNSON What we are in trouble about, you see, are these candidates. They have been play ing with them. One said he would stop the bombing--no comma, no semi-colon--peri od. MCNAMARA Yeah.
JOHNSON So they get that and they think that if they'll wait 10 days he'll stop the bomb ing everything will be over with--that's what Hanoi thinks. Then Nixon comes alo ng and his people tell them that I'm not stopping the bombing and I'm not sellin g you out and I'm not for letting them take you over and this crowd will sell yo u out just like they did China, and you better wait until I get in. Now you've g ot all the South Vietnamese and maybe the Koreans thinking that. The damned trou ble we're going to have. We had this thing wrapped up, signed, sealed, ready to go two weeks ago, and we got this speech of stopping the bombing, period. So [Le Duc] Tho took off for Hanoi, and we couldn't get him back. Then we got this rea dy, and we found out that they've been playing with the South Vietnamese, and we started watching their messages. It's the damndest mess you ever saw. It's just almost--well, it's just heresy. It's just unbelievable. So we tried to get them aboard. We had a joint announcement that they agreed on with us. But then they all got to fighting and they wouldn't do it. So today, the last thing I heard, I was up late, was that Thieu said that this was entirely unilateral. </blockquote> That the South Vietnamese had abruptly changed their demands, and that this migh t have been caused by interference on the part of Nixon's intermediaries, was br ought up in a phone call later that morning to Senator Richard Russell<a name="b kfrftnote18"></a><a href="#ftnote18">18</a>: <blockquote>RUSSELL Yes? JOHNSON Lyndon Johnson. How are you, Senator? Dick, how are you? RUSSELL Pretty good, Mr. President. How are you? JOHNSON Fine. I just wanted to figure out what you thought over night and what bases you thought were untouched, what your reaction was, to the statement, and what we s hould have said, we didn't. RUSSELL Well, I thought you made a fine statement, Mr. President.</blockquote> <blockquote> JOHNSON Now, the damn fools in Saigon, we don't know what they're going to do. Last nigh t, they came back and made three demands on me. One was, we set no date for the conference. Well, I can't do that, because the main thing I'm getting out of thi s is they let GVN come to the table. That's what I've been demanding all these y ears, and now they've agreed to it. So I've got to have a date. And we so told-no date for the conference. Well, I can't do that, because the main thing I'm ge tting out of this is they let GVN come to the table. That's what I've been deman ding all these years, and now they've agreed to it. So I've got to have a date. And we so told-RUSSELL I thought that they already agreed they're we going to meet and talk on Wednesda y [November 6 1968]. PRESIDENT They all agreed 2 weeks ago. And then they agreed to one day a week ago. But aft er Nixon's operatives got busy with them, they started playing for January. And the first statement that South Vietnam put out was that this was a unilateral ac tion by the President. And old man Bunker stayed with them all night. They put o
ut another one this morning that said that they hoped it would lead to peace, th at you couldn't tell what if it was good, that he really didn't know whether any good would come from it or not, just wouldn't predict.</blockquote> According to encrypted messages sent by South Vietnam's ambassador in the United States, Bui Diem, there was never any possibility of any agreement to a peace t alk which might result in Humphrey being elected instead of Nixon. If an impasse went against Johnson and brought Nixon to power, then so be it: the diplomatic impasse would continue. From Arrogance by Summers: <blockquote>In the last week of October Thieu's ambassador, Bui Diem, sent two e ncrypted radio messages from Washington to Saigon. The first, he wrote in his me moirs, noted: "Many Republican friends have contacted me and encouraged us to st and firm...." The second - again, this is Bui Diem's account - mentioned that he was "regularly in touch with the Nixon entourage." The former ambassador repeatedly told the author he would let him see the full t ext of those messages, but never produced them. His published version of the sec ond cable, it seems, was almost certainly an exercise in damage limitation. The actual message was more troubling, according to the former State Department exec utive secretary, the late Benjamin Read. Read's notes cite Saigon's ambassador as reporting that he had "explained discre etly to our partisan friends our firm attitude" and "plan to adhere to that posi tion." "The longer the impasse continues," Bui Diem told Saigon, "the more we ar e favored," and Johnson would "probably have difficulties in forcing our hand."< /blockquote> This same view is expressed in a formerly top secret intercept made by the Natio nal Security Agency (NSA) of comments made by President Thieu on October 18, 196 8, obtained presumably through surveillance<a name="bkfrftnote19"></a><a href="# ftnote19">19</a>: <blockquote>TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. [REDACTED] XXMMENP01FTB23108 3/0/[REDACTED] -68 [REDACTED] THIEU'S VIEWS ON NLF PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT XXCC [REDACTED] 19 OCT 68 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OF WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU SAID [REDACTED] ON 18 OCTOBER.</blockquote> <blockquote>[REDACTED] as to whether or not the Vietnamese are opposing the U.S. in this and concerning the possibility ((of the U.S.)) making a decisive move t o halt the bombing alone; the following [REDACTED] He said the U.S. can, of course, cease bombing, but is unable to block Vietnam ( (from bombing)). Concerning the enforcement of the bombing halt, this will help candidate Humphrey and this is the purpose of it; but the situation which would occur as the result of a bombing halt, without the agreement of Vietnamese gover nment, rather than being a disadvantage to candidate Humphrey, would be to the a dvantage of candidate Nixon. Accordingly, he said that the possibility of Presi dent Johnson enforcing a bombing halt without Vietnam's agreement appears to be
weak; [REDACTED] just how effective can it be within the short time before the e lection, even though it is effectively enforced?</blockquote> Though Nixon had again pledged his loyalty in the conference call, his manner wa s entirely different off the phone. He and his campaign manager, John Mitchell, were in a panic over the effects of the bombing halt on the election, of the pos sibility that their meddling had been found out, and yet they were still determi ned to make sure that Thieu would toe the line and the Peace Talks would not tak e place. From Arrogance by Summers: <blockquote> On the evening of the thirty-first, during a conference call to the presidential candidates to brief them on the bombing halt, Johnson dropped a heavy hint that he was aware of the machinations to undermine his efforts. Nixon merely joined the opponents in promising the president his full support. Behind the scenes, however, panic and pantomime gripped the Nixon camp. Mitchell [campaign manager and later Attorney General John Mitchell] went through the mo tions of interrogating campaign staffers-none of whom was in the know-asking if they had been "in touch with any embassies." Then he "reassured" administration contacts that his people had not been talking to the South Vietnamese. Chennault suddenly found she could no longer get through to Mitchell. Certain no w of the wiretapping he had always feared, Nixon's closest aide was avoiding dir ect contact with her. That night, however, as she was finishing dinner at the Sh eraton Park Hotel, Chennault was called to the phone. It was Mitchell, tension in his voice, asking her to call back on a safer line. When she did, he picked up on the first ring. "Anna," he said, "I'm speaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon. It's very important that our Vietnamese friends understand our Republican position, and I hope you made that clear to them...Do you think t hey really have decided not to go to Paris?" Realizing that the administration was working around the clock to change Thieu's mind, Nixon's man wanted to make sure he remained firm in his refusal.<a name=" bkfrftSummersnote24"></a><a href="#ftSummersnote24">24</a> Thieu duly obliged. On November 2, only three days before the election, he announced publi cly that his country would not take part in peace talks under present conditions . </blockquote> NOVEMBER 2, 1968</a> The withdrawal of Thieu and South Vietnam from the peace talks on this date is d escribed as follows in Richard Nixon's RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. As said already, Anna Chennault goes entirely unmentioned in this book, and is a bsent in this excerpt: <blockquote>The Democrats' euphoria was dampened on November 2, when President T hieu announced that his government would not participate in the negotiations Joh nson was proposing. Thieu's reaction was totally predictable. He watched American politics no less c arefully than did the leaders in Hanoi. Given his disapproval of any bombing hal t, and the fact that Humphrey was now talking like a dove, it was scarcely in Th ieu's interest to acquiesce in a bad bargain. By holding back his support, Thieu fostered the impression that Johnson's plan had been too quickly conceived and shakily executed.</blockquote> Lyndon Johnson would again speak with Senator Everett Dirksen, and more so than
in his other conversations, he was obviously very upset. In this excerpt, he des cribes the slow development of the peace talks, and their interference through N ixon. Though Clifford would write of there being no smoking gun linking the work of agents like Chennault and the Nixon campaign, and though in the past Johnson had expressed uncertainty in his phone calls about whether there was a connecti on between the candidate and the "old China crowd", he obviously now believes th e two elements to be linked<a name="bkfrftnote20"></a><a href="#ftnote20">2 0</a>: http://youtu.be/qbEPI_9Ju0k (A clip on youtube of the audio with accompanying transcript of this phone ca ll in its entirety.) <blockquote>DIRKSEN Hello? JOHNSON Everett, how are you? DIRKSEN All right. JOHNSON I want to talk to you as a friend, and very confidentially, because I think that we're skirting on dangerous ground. I thought I ought to give you the facts, an d you ought to pass them on if you choose. If you don't, why, then I will a litt le later. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON We have, on October the 13th, an agreement where Thieu [Nguyen Thieu, president of South Vietnam] and Ky [Nguyen Cao Ky, prime minister of South Vietnam], consi dering the bombing halt. At that time, President Thieu stressed, quote There mus t not be a long delay. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON That is, a delay between the halt and the conference. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON On October the 15th, Thieu agreed to a proposal that we worked out of 36 hours. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON On October the 23rd, after the North Vietnamese demanded two or three weeks, Thi eu reluctantly agreed to three days delay. On October the 28th, we agreed on the joint announcement. DIRKSEN Yeah.
JOHNSON Bunker and Abrams [U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker and Creigh ton Abrams, General in the U.S. Army] reached an explicit agreement with Thieu t hat the gap between the bombing and the talks would be two or three days. With t hree days the outer limit. Both Thieu and Ky stressed on us the importance of a minimum delay. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Then we got some of our friends involved. Some of it's your old China crowd... DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And...here's the latest information we've got: the agent says that she's- they'v e just talked to the boss [Nixon] in New Mexico, and that he says that you must hold out, that . . . Just hold on until after the election. Now, we know what Thieu is saying to 'em out there. We're pretty well informed o n both ends. Now Nixon's man travelling with him today, said quote He did not un derstand that Thieu was not aboard. Did you see that?</blockquote> This spokesperson was one of Nixon's aides, Bob Finch, whose name Johnson insist ed on getting wrong. We return to RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon: <blockquote>On the heels of Thieu's recalcitrance, I asked Bob Finch to put the word out to newsmen that the prospects for peace were not as advanced as Johnson 's announcement might have made them seem. Providing background in his capacity as "an aide to Richard Nixon," Finch explained, "We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in position." Then for the record he said, "I think th is will boomerang. It was hastily contrived." Johnson saw the news story with Finch's comments. He was furious, and he made hi s displeasure known. Bryce Harlow urged me to call Johnson to calm him down - an d I did so Sunday morning, November 3. "Who's this guy Fink?" Johnson asked. "Why is he taking out after me?" I said, "Mr. President, that's Finch, not Fink." He ignored my correction and continued to refer to Finch as "Fink."</blockquote> It was on this day that Johnson would receive information that would be publishe d in an FBI intercept two days later, the intercept that Summers considered so v ital in confirming a link between Chennault's efforts and the Nixon campaign, "A nd...here's the latest information we've got: the agent says that she's- they've just talked to the boss [Nixon] in New Mexico, and that he says that you must h old out, that . . . Just hold on until after the election."<a name="bkfrftnote21 "></a><a href="#ftnote21">21</a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/mlgUVB3.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>Received Washington CommCen 9:08 P.M. EDT Monday 4 Nov 68
Received LBJ Ranch CommCen 8:34 P.M. CDT Monday 4 Nov 68 EEA659 00 WTE10 DE WTE 4183 FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP82650 <strike>S E C R E T</strike> THE NEW MEXICO REFERENCE MAY INDICATE AGNEW IS ACTING. TWO REPORTS FOLLOW. REPORT ONE: On November Two Instant, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable infor mation in the past, reported that Mrs. Anna Chennault contacted Vietnamese Ambas sador, Bui Diem, and advised him that she had received a message from her boss ( not further identified), which her boss wanted her to give personally to the amb assador. She said the message was that the ambassador is to "hold on, we are gon na win" and that her boss also said "hold on, he understands all of it". She rep eated that this is the only message "he said please tell your boss to hold on." She advised that her boss had just called from New Mexico.</blockquote> Was Richard Nixon in New Mexico on that day? No, he was in Texas. His nominee vi ce president, however, was in his plane on a campaign stop in Albuquerque when t his call was made. <a href="http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v07/d212">"Fore ign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 Volume VII, Vietnam, September 196 8-January 1969, Document 212"</a> deals with a report of the phone calls from Vi ce Presidential nominee Spiro Agnew's plane on that day, one conducted by the FB I and initiated by Johnson a week after the election. The following is from the accompanying summary: <blockquote>In a telephone conversation on November 12, 1968, President Johnson discussed the Anna Chennault affair with FBI Deputy Director Cartha Dekle "Deke" DeLoach. Johnson told DeLoach that he had "some pretty good information" and "h ard" evidence that the most significant directive from the Republican campaign t o the South Vietnamese Government occurred by way of a November 2 communication between Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew and Anna Chennault. The Presiden t therefore requested that DeLoach check all of the telephone calls originating from the telephone connection in Agnew's chartered campaign plane at the Albuque rque airport.</blockquote> <blockquote>The next day, DeLoach called the President with a report on these ca lls. One of the phones on the plane had been used five times. The first call was made at 11:59 a.m., a personal call from Agnew to Rusk that lasted 3 minutes. T he next call was made to Texas and another two calls were made by Agnew staffer Kent Crane to New York City. A fifth call was made to the Nixon/Agnew campaign h eadquarters at the Willard Hotel in Washington at 1:02 p.m. The President verified that Rusk had talked with Agnew. He added: "We think some body on the plane talked to the woman. We think pretty well that they talked to her and talked to Rusk, and talked on the same thing. And we think that they tol d Rusk-that they wanted to know what was happening in these relations. And Rusk made notes of it, he didn't exactly know what time, but he estimated that it was
about 2 o'clock. And hers, it was immediately followed by a call to her, we thi nk. And what we want to know is what time that was and when it was."</blockquote > There were five phone calls from the plane, one to Rusk, one to campaign headqua rters, one to Texas, and two to New York City. Nixon, as said, was in Texas that day for a rally. Who was in New York City? Anna Chennault was in New York City. Item one of the "her boss" FBI cable deals with the tap revealing that Chennaul t had said those words. Item two in the cable dealt with her location on Novembe r 2nd<a name="bkfrftnote22"></a><a href="#ftnote22">22</a>: <blockquote>REPORT TWO: The November One, last, edition of the "Washington Post," a daily newspaper in t he Washington, D.C. area, carried an article concerning Mrs. Anna Chennault. The article indicated that Mrs. Chennault intended to proceed to New York City wher e she would await the election results on November Five, next, with presidential nominee Richard M. Nixon. On November Two, Instant, at Seven Ten A.M., Mrs. Chennault's car was observed i n the parking garage at Two Five One Zero [2510] Virginia Avenue, N. W. At One Forty Five P.M., she departed her residence and entered the automobile. I t was being driven by her chauffeur and proceeded to the Baltimore-Washington p arkway where it was last observed heading north at Two Fifteen P.M. Arrangements have been made with the New York office of the FBI for them to obse rve the car en route and to undertake discreet surveillance with reference to he r activities while in New York.</blockquote> The Arrogance of Power by Summers gives this episode thorough examination : <blockquote>Spiro Agnew had made a campaign stop at Albuquerque, New Mexico, tha t day-and within the time frame that corresponded to Anna Chennault's movements. <a name="bkfrftSummersnote25"></a><a href="#ftSummersnote25">25</a> Days later, when things quieted down, Johnson would order the FBI to check all c alls made by the Agnew party. He was unfortunately ill served. Director Hoover, a long-term Nixon supporter on cordial terms with Chennault, had already warned her she was being surveilled. As much as possible, he told her, the bureau was m erely "making a show" of obeying Johnson's orders. When it came to the Albuquerque calls, Hoover and his aide Cartha DeLoach ensure d investigation was cursory and incomplete. Eventually, realizing he was being s talled, the president himself called to tell DeLoach: "Get me the information, a nd make it damned fast." Out of the mess, and the still partially censored files, come two salient facts. The first is that phone records show that an Agnew aide in Albuquerque, the ver y aide responsible for briefing Agnew on Vietnam, had made a call during the sto pover to a "Mr. Hitt" at Nixon-Agnew headquarters. Robert Hitt, an official of the Republican National Committee, was paymaster to the wireman Nixon used during the campaign to sweep for bugs and who conducted o ffensive bugging during the presidency. Hitt would also be named during the Wate rgate probe in connection with questionable cash transactions. His wife Patricia , cochairman of the campaign committee and a trusted Nixon friend from Whittier days, was as noted earlier one of the people Chennault earlier named as a potent ial go-between should Nixon wish to pass her messages.
The most important discovery, though, was relayed to the president by National S ecurity Assistant Rostow when all the facts were in, ten days after the Albuquer que stopover. In a brief memo, referring to Chennault as "the Lady" and to Agnew as "the gentleman in Albuquerque," Rostow reported that there had been a call p laced to Chennault.<a name="bkfrftSummersnote26"></a><a href="#ftSummersnote26"> 26</a> Moreover, contrary to an earlier analysis, Agnew himself had h ad ample time to make the call. The new information suggests a logical sequence to the events of those days. Fol lowing Thieu's announcement that he would not join the peace talks, as the Nixon side had hoped, he faced renewed pressure from the outraged Johnson administrat ion. In the wake of the announcement, word came to Chennault from Agnew in Albuq uerque that she should urge the South Vietnamese to remain resolute. As revealed by the wiretap on the South Vietnamese Embassy, she duly relayed the message to President Thieu that he should "Hold on," because "we're gonna win": Nixon was going to win the election and would, as promised, give the South Viet namese a better deal. With whom did the message originate? Early on Rostow surmised in a report to the president that Agnew was "acting" on behalf of another party. While the report is still partially censored, the security assistant's supposition is clear enoug h. Agnew and Chennault barely knew each other; Nixon's running mate acted for no one but Nixon.<a name="bkfrftSummersnote27"></a><a href="#ftSummersnote27">27</a> </blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/5tVKlWw.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> (Puppets by Rick Meyerowitz, for a parody ad in an issue of National Lampoon in 1970. A description of the puppets and the shoot is described by Meyerowitz o n his site, in <a href="http://www.rickmeyerowitz.com/New%20Puppet.html">"The Ni xon & Agnew Puppets"</a>) From the same phone call with Dirksen quoted earlier<a name="bkfrftnote23"></a>< a href="#ftnote23">23</a>: <blockquote> JOHNSON I said, now, there has been speeches that some we oughta withdraw troops, and in cluding some of the old China crowd, going in and implying to the embassies. JOHNSON Now, Everett, I know what happens there. You see what I mean? DIRKSEN I do. JOHNSON And I'm looking at his hole card. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Now, I don't want to get in a fight with him there. I think Nixon's gonna to be elected.
DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I think we ought to have peace, and I'm going to work with him.</blockquote> Johnson would cut even further to the quick in another part of the call<a name=" bkfrftnote24"></a><a href="#ftnote24">24</a>: <blockquote> JOHNSON Well, I don't know who it is that's with Nixon. It may be Laird [Melvin Laird, a Nixon campaign aide]. It may be [Bryce] Harlow. It may be [John] Mitchell. I do n't know who it is. I know this: that they're contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war. DIRKSEN That's a mistake! JOHNSON And it's a damn bad mistake.</blockquote> He would cut even further to the bone, and say the unsayable in another fragment of the phone call<a name="bkfrftnote25"></a><a href="#ftnote25">25</ a>: <blockquote>JOHNSON Now, I'm reading their hand, Everett. I don't want to get this in the campaign. DIRKSEN That's right. JOHNSON And they oughtn't to be doing this. This is treason.</blockquote> Richard Nixon would end the day with a rally in Texas, as described in his memoi r: <blockquote>On the day of Thieu's announcement, I told a Texas rally: "In view o f the early reports that we've had this morning, the prospects for peace are not as bright as they looked only a few days ago." It was Saturday, November 2, les s than three days before the election. Bombing halt or no, the campaign had to c ontinue. I decided to treat Johnson's announcement as a potentially beneficial d iplomatic move botched by lack of planning rather than as a straight political p loy. I told my staff to get our spokesmen asking why we didn't have the agreemen t worked out with our allies.</blockquote> Of course, this we did have an agreement with their allies, the South Vie tnamese, a very secret one and very much for the benefit of Richard Nixon. NOVEMBER 3, 1968</a> During his furious call with Senator Everett Dirksen, Johnson made clear that he wanted Dirksen to contact Nixon on what was taking place<a name="bkfrftnote26"> </a><a href="#ftnote26">26</a>: <blockquote> JOHNSON Well, now, what do you think we ought to do about it?
DIRKSEN Well, I better get in touch with him, I think, and tell him about it. JOHNSON I think you better tell him that his people are saying to these folks that they oughtn't to go through with this meeting [in Paris]. Now, if they don't go throu gh with the meeting, it's not going to be me that's hurt. I think it's going to be whoever's elected. DIRKSEN That's right. </blockquote> We can return to Nixon's memoir on what he says of the events of November 2nd, w here he mentions Dirksen contacting him about Johnson's anger with him. What's s ignificant in this excerpt is that he mentions the statements by his aide, Bob F inch, critiquing Johnson for his failure to bring about the peace talks, but nev er brings up the primary thing that has Johnson furious, does not even bring it up to deny it: that he is conducting back channel diplomacy to foil these peace talks. From RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon: <blockquote>The Democrats' euphoria was dampened on November 2, when President T hieu announced that his government would not participate in the negotiations Joh nson was proposing. Thieu's reaction was totally predictable. He watched American politics no less c arefully than did the leaders in Hanoi. Given his disapproval of any bombing hal t, and the fact that Humphrey was now talking like a dove, it was scarcely in Th ieu's interest to acquiesce in a bad bargain. By holding back his support, Thieu fostered the impression that Johnson's plan had been too quickly conceived and shakily executed. On the heels of Thieu's recalcitrance, I asked Bob Finch to put the word out to newsmen that the prospects for peace were not as advanced as Johnson's announcem ent might have made them seem. Providing background in his capacity as "an aide to Richard Nixon," Finch explained, "We had the impression that all the diplomat ic ducks were in position." Then for the record he said, "I think this will boom erang. It was hastily contrived." Johnson saw the news story with Finch's comments. He was furious, and he made hi s displeasure known. Bryce Harlow urged me to call Johnson to calm him down - an d I did so Sunday morning, November 3.</blockquote> An excerpt from the phone call at 1:54 P.M., where Johnson speaks of the three n ecessary preconditions of the talks - no shelling of the cities, no crossing the DMZ, the government of South Vietnam (GVN) at the table - and the failure of th e talks, possibly due to Nixon offering a better deal to the South Vietnamese<a name="bkfrftnote27"></a><a href="#ftnote27">27</a>: http://youtu.be/52PQxRMGraA (A clip on youtube of the audio with accompanying transcript of this phone ca ll in its entirety.) <blockquote> JOHNSON Now, the other day, we had talked to Thieu on October the 13th, and stressed tha t we had to have these points, and he agreed. On October the 15th, we reviewed i t with him again, and he bought a 36 hour period between stopping the bombing an
d the conference. On October r the 28th, we agreed to the When and if, we could clear goes out, that Nixon will do , as I said the other day, I
the 23rd, he agreed to a three day delay, on Octobe communique, that we both make a joint announcement. it with them. Get them signed on. Then the traffic better by ya. Now, that goes to Thieu. I didn't say didn't say with your knowledge, I hope it wasn't.
NIXON As a matter of fact, I'm not privy to what you were doing- The whole point is th is, I think one thing we have to understand here is that you know, and I know, t hat with the hawk/dove complex out there, as there is here. And that everybody's been saying, "Well, now, after the election, what will happen?" And, of course, there is some thought that Hanoi would rather deal now than deal later. JOHNSON Oh, yesNIXON They think Nixon will be tougher. JOHNSON YeNIXON And I understand that. And I think that's one of the reasons you felt you had t o go forward with the [bombing] pause. But my point that I'm making is this: that, my God, I would never do anything to encourage Hanoi, I mean Saigon not to come to the table, because basically, tha t was what you got out of your bombing pause. That good God, we want them over a t Paris. We've got to get them to Paris, or you can't have a peace.</blockquote> Note that Nixon affects an innocence of the peace negotiations which he himself would later refute. "As a matter of fact, I'm not privy to what you were doing," he says, though as we've already seen, he admits in his memoir that Henry Kissi nger, among others, is passing his campaign information, and it is through these sources that he expects there to be a bombing halt. A little later in the conversation: <blockquote>NIXON Now, getting to the one, the key point: is there anything I could do before that on this business of South Vietnam? If you want me to do something, you know I'l l do anything, because we're not going to let these people stop these peace thin gs, if you think I can do something. JOHNSON Dick, I told [Senate Minority Leader Everett M.] Dirksen [R-Illinois] last night I thought it'd be better to do it that way than to be calling on the trips. I t hink this: These people are proceeding on the assumption that folks close to you tell them to do nothing until January 20. NIXON [Unclear.] JOHNSON Now, we think-NIXON I know who they're talking about, too. Is it [Senator] John Tower? [R-Texas]?
JOHNSON Well, he's one of several. Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is very much in there. NIXON Well, she's very close to John. JOHNSON And the Embassy is telling the [South Vietnamese] President nd the President is acting on this advice. He started doing r 18, following our talk on the conversation on October 16. in the month of October. The first one came from the other t because of what Bundy had said--Mac Bundy NIXON Yeah. JOHNSON --that to withdraw troops, and what Humphrey had said that he wouldn't--7 NIXON They could wait. JOHNSON Well, he just said, "I don't--I will stop the bombing, period, I don't mean comm a or semi-colon." So, Hanoi picked up the next day and went home for two weeks. We had it all wrapped up there and then for the meeting. Now, I don't know what' ll come out of the conference. But that was the way it was. They went off. In th e meantime, these messages started coming out from here that Johnson was going t o have a bombing pause to try to elect Humphrey and that they ought to hold out because Nixon will not sell you out like the Democrats sold out China.8 And we h ave talked to different ones. I think they've been talking to [Vice President-el ect Spiro] Agnew. I think they think that they've been quoting you indirectly, t hat the thing they ought to do is to just not show up at any conference and wait until you come into office.</blockquote> Don Fulsom's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Nixons-Darkest-Secrets-Americas-Pres ident/dp/0312662963">Nixon's Darkest Secrets</a>, a profile of the seamie st elements of the president, has a number of hypotheses that I don't agree with , but it does have this interesting insight into this last part of the conversat ion that I think is worth passing on: <blockquote>In this discussion, Nixon not only threw loyal Texas Republican sena tor John Tower under the bus, but he also stressed the words "very close." What Nixon was apparently alluding to was a not-so-secret affair Senator Tower was ha ving with the fabled Dragon Lady. The supposed lovers were both right-wingers and heavy partiers on the Washington cocktail circuit. Tower had replaced Lyndon Johnson in the Senate. The two men were bitter enemies. So Nixon probably had that in mind when he ratted out Tower to LBJ. A former Tower associate says the senator, long after his second failed marriage , freely admitted having a long-term liaison with Chennault. Tower was very fond of Anna, and, the source added, after they broke up, Tower claimed Chennault we nt on to "a torrid fling" with Thomas McIntyre, a left-wing Democratic Senator f rom new Hampshire and a "heavy foreign policy hitter."</blockquote> Two hours earlier, Johnson had a phone call with Florida Senator George Smathers where he spoke of the "her boss" FBI intercept, and where he appears to make cl ear that he does not trust Nixon at all<a name="bkfrftnote28"></a><a href="#ftno [Nguyen Van Thieu] a it back about Octobe I had two bad breaks side. Hanoi felt tha
te28">28</a>: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Lq3i1Wm7WM (A clip on youtube of the audio with accompanying transcript of a large secti on of this phone call.) <blockquote>JOHNSON His folks get into it. And they say that they know how to deal with these commun ists, and they're not going to be soft on 'em. And if they're elected, they'll s ee it right on through with 'em, and that they'll get a whole lot better deal wi th Nixon than they will with Johnson. Now, first, that comes out of one of his associates, one of his top businesspers ons. That was communicated to us by means that we have of knowing it. And it wa s rather shocking, in the light of what he said. So I started personally watchi ng the traffic myself, and the next day, the traffic shows that that is going in and out of Saigon. Do you follow me? SMATHERS Yeah. JOHNSON I'm not guessing, George. I know what I'm doing, you see. [They said] that Nixon is going to win; therefore, they ought to wait on Nixon. So what he's doing-my judgment is, on the surface, he was playing that he didn't want to undercut me. SMATHERS Yeah. JOHNSON Under the table, his people-and this, I think, you can tell him for sure; there' s no doubt about it-his people (a) business-wise, and (b) political-wise were sa ying that you ought to wait on Dick. Now, that's got it pretty well screwed up. SMATHERS Yeah, it does. JOHNSON That's a hell of a note, and it's a sad thing for people that got boys out here [in Vietnam], to have folks leaving these impressions. SMATHERS Right. JOHNSON They're going around and implying to some of the embassies that they might get a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this-the "somebody not inv olved" is what they refer to as "their boss." SMATHERS Right. JOHNSON
"Their boss" is the code word for Mr. Nixon. </blockquote> Clark Clifford would make the following diary entry on this day, published in Counsel to the President: <blockquote>Sunday, November 3. In growing fury, Johnson told Senator Dir ksen that he knew all about Anna Chennault's activities. Dirksen, the man who pr obably came closest to being a true friend of both Johnson and Nixon (and who al so knew Chennault well), immediately alerted Nixon to Johnson's fury, warning th at Johnson might make it public. Nixon called the President, who was at the LBJ Ranch awaiting the arrival of the Humphreys. (Ironically, hours later, the Johns ons and the Humphreys would make their only joint appearance of the campaign, in the Houston Astrodome.) Sensitive to Johnson's mood, Nixon realized the danger to his floundering campaign if he could not placate Johnson, and the secret chan nel to Saigon became public. Anna Chennault and Bui Diem, at John Mitchell's sug gestion, had convinced Thieu to boycott the November 6 meeting in Paris; Nixon n ow persuaded Johnson that he had had nothing to do with these activities. Presid ent Johnson again decided not to go public.</blockquote> NOVEMBER 4, 1968</a> We have already mentioned the discovery by Saigon correspondent Beverly Deepe Ke ever of the interference in the Paris Peace Talks on the part of Nixon, begun on October 28: "There's a report here that Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington Bui Diem has notified the Foreign Ministry that Nixon aides have approached him and told him the Saigon government should hold to a firm position now regarding neg otiations," she would cable her editor, "and that once Nixon is elected, he'll b ack the Thieu government in their demands. If you could track it down with the N ixon camp, it would probably be a very good story." Her investigation would cont inue on into November 4, two days after Thieu publicly declared that he would no t participate in the talks: <blockquote>To explain Thieu's stunning announcement, I cabled Hayward on Novemb er 4: "Purported political encouragement from the Richard Nixon camp was a signi ficant factor in the last-minute decision of President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusa l to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks - at least until the American Pr esidential election is over." I relied mostly on "informed sources" for my scoop - an eye-opening exclusive news report - and added that "the only written repor t about the alleged Nixon support for the Thieu government was a cable from Bui Diem, Vietnamese ambassador to Washington," confirming what I had asked Hayward to check out days earlier. But my momentous scoop was not published. Hayward cab led back that the Monitor had deleted all my references to Bui Diem and to the " purported political encouragement from the Nixon camp," which, he wrote, "seems virtual equivalent of treason."</blockquote> What was taking place on the other side of that conversation, in the United Stat es, would only be learned forty years later. Again, from Keever's Death Zones and Darling Spies: <blockquote>Hayward could not have known then, but his description of Nixon's "v irtual equivalent of treason" was being privately echoed at the time by Johnson when he sputtered: "It would rock the world if it were known that Thieu was conn iving with the Republicans. Can you imagine what people would say if it Hayward told me within a day or so: "The alleged Nixon involvement was interesting but n eeded confirmation from this end-which was not forthcoming-before we could print such sweeping charges on election day. It was a good story nonetheless, and you get major credit for digging it out." Knowing the time-honored journalistic tra dition of fairness, I understood when Hayward told me that without such confirma tion, the Monitor had "trimmed and softened" my lead. The Monitor's subst
itute lead simply implied that Thieu had acted on his own. Upon receiving the Monitor's Western edition days later, however, I saw my supposed-to-be scoo p relegated to page 2, with no mention of Nixon, under a one-column headline. I could hardly recognize it. Yet 44 years later I was stunned to learn that Presid ent Johnson had indeed read and agonized over my lead with his top aides. Just a s this book was being readied for publication, I was queried about my scoop's Ni xon-Thieu connection by veteran investigative reporter Robert Parry. On March 3, 2012, Parry published an amazing exposé on his online investigative news service headlined: <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on -nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason.'"</a> Parry also included links to the telltale documents he had uncovered.</blockquote> Forty years later, we would learn that Saville Davis, the Monitor's Washi ngton correspondent, had visited both the Vietnamese embassy in D.C. and the Whi te House for comment on this story. This is the memo from Walt Rostow to Johnson, informing him of Saville Davis's v isit to the Vietnamese embassy<a name="bkfrftnote29"></a><a href="#ftnote29"><su p>29</a>: <blockquote>FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP82675 <strike>S E C R E T</strike> SENSITIVE EYES ONLY LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT SAVILLE DAVIS - BUI DIEM CONVERSATION. EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM. A source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that on the late morning of November Four, Nineteen SixtyEight Saville Davis, Washington Bur eau. Christian Science Monitor Newspaper, contacted a representative of the Viet namese embassy, Washington D.C., and asked for an appointment with ambassador Bu i Diem. When informed that the ambassador was busy, Davis stated he wanted to ch eck out a story received from a correspondent in Saigon and that Davis plans to come to the embassy and wait for the ambassador to see him. Davis said that the dispatch from Saigon contains the elements of a major scanda l which also involves the Vietnam ambassador and which will affect presidential candidate Richard Nixon if the Monitor publishes it. Time is of the essence inas much as Davis has a deadline to meet if he publishes it. He speculated that shou ld the story be published, it will create a great deal of excitement. DTG: 041800Z NOV 68</blockquote> This is the memo informing Rostow that Saville Davis is at the White House<a nam e="bkfrftnote30"></a><a href="#ftnote30">30</a>: <blockquote>11/4/68 Saville Davis of the Christian Science Monitor is upstairs: 347-4953 He said they are holding out of the paper a sensational dispatch from Saigon (fr om their Saigon correspondent) the 1st para of which reads: "Purported political encouragement from the Richard Nixon camp was a significant factor in the last-minute decision of President Thieu's refusal to send a deleg ation to the Paris peace talks -- at least until the American Presidential elect
ion is over." He said he will await WWR's comments.</blockquote> Johnson was sufficiently excited by Davis's questions to hold a conference call with two of his senior advisers, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Secur ity Adviser Walt Rostow on how to deal with it. Though Nixon accuses Johnson of playing politics with the bombing halt, this conversation heavily stresses that politics must not be played with this, not even through off the record leaks to the press. The conversation would take place on 12:27 P.M. of that day<a name="b kfrftnote31"></a><a href="#ftnote31">31</a>: <blockquote>JOHNSON Hello, Dean? I think you and Clark and Walt ought to meet on this Saville Davis thing. RUSK Yes sir. JOHNSON It concerns me a great deal. I don't want to be in the position of me being a Mc Carthy. I don't know much more than I told the candidates themselves the other d ay, which my notes will reflect there. Namely, these folks had tentatively agree d out there to go along and then they started having doubts because we had repor ts of some folks-the old China Lobby-contacting embassies, et cetera. Now, I can 't get much more specific than that, A, because of the sensitivity of the source RUSK Right. JOHNSON -and B, because of the limited nature of the information. I told Smathers that, Senator Smathers, who called saying that he understood from what I told Dirksen that I was likely to make public this information if it were confirmed and if th ey kept interfering with it. I also told Dirksen that I believed that the friend s of one of the candidates was reporting to the folks out there that they ought to wait. RUSK Right. JOHNSON I did that on the basis of two things-one, the intercept from the AmbassadorRUSK Right. JOHNSON -saying that he had had a call and the boss said wait and so forth, and second, this China Lobby operation, the Madame involved. RUSK Yeah, that'sJOHNSON Now, I don't want to have information that ought to be public and not make it so . At the-on the other hand, we have a lot of-I don't know how much we can do the re and I know we'll be charged with trying to interfere with the election. And I think this is something that's going to require the best judgments that we have
. I'm rather concerned by this Saville Davis conversation with the Embassy this morning. RUSK Now, which conversation? JOHNSON The Christian Science Monitor man called the Embassy this morning and wanted to see the Ambassador and he was unavailable. He told the party answering that he w anted to check out a story received from his correspondent in Saigon; that he pl anned to come to the Embassy and wait until he could see him; that the dispatch from Saigon contained the elements of a major scandal which involves the Vietnam ese Ambassador and which will affect Presidential candidate Nixon if the Monitor publishes it. Time is of the essence inasmuch as Davis has a deadline to meet i f he publishes it. RUSK Right. JOHNSON He speculated that should the story be published it will create a great deal of excitement. RUSK Right. JOHNSON Now, what he gets from Saigon is well and good and fine. But if he gets it from us, I want to be sure that A, we try to do it in such a way that our motives are not questioned and that if the public interest requires it, and two-and that's the only thing I want to operate under, I'm not interested in the politics of it -the second thing is I want to be sure that what we say can be confirmed. RUSK Well, Mr. President, I have a very definite view on this, for what it's worth. I do not believe that any President can make any use of interceptions or telephon e taps in any way that would involve politics. The moment we cross over that div ide we are in a different kind of society. JOHNSON Yeah.</blockquote> Rostow would summarize the conclusions reached in a later report<a name="bkfrftn ote32"></a><a href="#ftnote32">32</a>: <blockquote> FROM WALT W ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP82683 <strike>S E C R E T</strike> SENSITIVE EYES ONLY DELIVER DIRECT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW NOVEMBER 4, 1968 I have just returned from a meeting of over an hour with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clif ford on the China matter.</blockquote>
<blockquote> Saville Davis volunteered that his newspaper would certainly not print the story in the form in which it was filed; but they might print a story which said Thie u, on his own, decided to hold out until after the election. Incidentally, the story as filed is stated to be based on Vietnamese sources, an d not U.S., in Saigon With respect to the body of information that we now have available, all three of us agreed to the following propositions: --the information sources must be protected and not introduced into domestic pol itics. --even with these sources, the case is not open and shut. On the question of the "public's right to know," Sec. Rusk was very strong on the following position: we get information like this every day, some of it very damaging to american pol itical figures. We have always taken the view that with respect to such sources there is no public "right to know." Such information is collected simply for the purposes of national security. --so far as the information based on such sources is concerned, all three of us agreed: (A) even if the story breaks, it was judged too late to have a significa nt impact on the election. (B) the viability of the man elected as president was involved as well as subsequent relations between him and President Johnson. (C) therefore, the common recommendation was that we should not encourage such stor ies and hold tight the data we have. </blockquote> Robert Parry's <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/06/07/the-almost-scoop-on -nixons-treason/">"The Almost Scoop on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> was a follow-up to his <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason /">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a>, devoted exclusively to Keever's ex plosive scoop, which might well have shifted an election and had consequences an ocean away. Keever would write of the aftermath in Death Zones and Darling S pies; this excerpt begins with quotes from Parry's <a href="http://consortiu mnews.com/2012/06/07/the-almost-scoop-on-nixons-treason/">"The Almost Scoop"</a> : <blockquote>"The Christian Science Monitor's inquiry gave President Johns on one more opportunity to bring to light the Nixon campaign gambit before Elect ion Day," Parry recounts. Before deciding what to do, Johnson consulted in a con ference call with Rostow, Defense Secretary Clifford, and Secretary of State Dea n Rusk. "Those three pillars of the Washington Establishment were unanimous in a dvising Johnson against going public, mostly out of fear that the scandalous inf ormation might reflect badly on the U.S. government," Parry explains in summing up their extended answers. Johnson agreed with his advisers. An administration s pokesman told Davis: "Obviously I'm not going to get into this kind of thing in any way, shape or form." Based on these evasive responses to Davis, the Monit or decided against publishing my lead. My lead gave Johnson a last-minute choice of remaining silent or going public wi th Nixon's ploy on the eve of the election. The scoop also crystallized a unique split-screen moment: The most decisive period of the Vietnam War, settling the conditions for ending it, was moving in parallel with a most indecisive period i n the American democratic process, the U.S. presidential election. The White House joined the Monitor in keeping vital information secret from Amer icans about to cast their ballots for president while GIs and Vietnamese were dy ing in a faraway war. My incriminating lead provided a hinge-of-history moment-
for the American election, the future of South Vietnam, and the thousands of Ame ricans and Vietnamese dying and about to die in Southeast Asia as the war dragge d on for four more bloody years. In what Parry describes in another context, my lead zeroing in on Nixon's "treason" faded away into the United States' "lost hi story"-history that in this case would be written with more blood and tears. Vice President Humphrey was also alerted by his chief speechwriter, Ted Van Dyk, that Thieu was going to hold off sending a delegation to the Paris peace talks, and that "in 1968 the old China Lobby is still alive." Humphrey fumed, "I'll be God-damned if the China Lobby can decide this government." Yet that is what hap pened. Thieu's explosive address made national headlines and cast doubts on John son's ability to get the peace talks going and end the war. Nixon's speechwriter , William Safire, voicing the sentiments of numerous pundits and a reputable pol ling firm, observed, "Nixon would probably not be president were it not for Thie u." </blockquote> NOVEMBER 5, 1968</a> The election was extraordinarily tight down to the day of the vote, when countin g went into late evening and early morning as Nixon and Humphrey held even in th e tally of electoral votes, until finally the winner broke out a lead. For those final deciding hours which bled into the sixth day, we take the perspective of the man who won, who worked so hard for this victory and for which others would pay so much; from RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon: <blockquote>I placed calls to Ted Agnew and Nelson Rockefeller. They agreed that victory was just a matter of time. Then I called in my senior staff. We sat and talked for almost two hours while we waited for the reported results to confirm our predictions. Several times I asked Mitchell or Haldeman to call our people in the key states to break loose better information than the TV commentators see med able to supply. They always came back with the same message: Don't worry - t hings are going well - we're almost there. Almost. I had been almost there in 1960. Finally, around five o'clock, Mitchell and Haldeman persuaded me to try to nap. It was clear that the outcome would not be definite until the morning and at this point I had been up for almost twenty-two hours. I couldn't get to sleep, and after half an hour I got up again. Just before 8 A.M. [H.R.] Haldeman brought in word that both NBC and ABC had dec lared me the winner in California and Ohio. But there was still no movement in I llinois, and that was what I needed to confirm victory. One more state. At 8:30 the door burst open and Dwight Chapin rushed in. "ABC just declared you the winn er!" he shouted. "They've projected Illinois. You got it. You've won." We hurried into the sitting room where the television set was on and we watched as ABC continued to survey the electoral vote count. After we had watched for a few moments, I put a hand on John Mitchell's shoulder and said, "Well, John, we had better get down to Florida and get this thing planned out." Before Mitchell could respond, tears welled up in his eyes. He said very quietly, "Mr. President , I think I'd better go up to be with Martha." This was a doubly moving moment f or us both. It was the first time that anyone addressed me by the title I had ju st won. It was also the first time that Mitchell had directly referred to his wi fe's problems, which I knew had been an immense emotional strain on him. Martha had been in a rest home during the last weeks of the campaign, and I fully under stood his desire to be with her now. I went down the hall to the suite where Pat and the girls were waiting. They wer e so physically and emotionally exhausted that there wasn't the elation one woul d normally expect. We all kissed and embraced. Julie went to her room and then c alled me in. She opened her briefcase and pulled out a piece of crewelwork she h
ad done during campaign flights around the country. It was the Great Seal of the United States, with the inscription "To RN-JN" stitched at the bottom. "Daddy, I never had any doubt you would win," she said as she hugged me. "I just wanted something to be ready right away to prove it."</blockquote> Of those mentioned in this excerpt, Agnew would leave the vice presidency over t ax evasion, Martha Mitchell would become a comical figure during the Watergate s candal for her inappropriate blurtings, eventually confined against her will bec ause of her leaks to the press, while H.R. Haldeman and John Mitchell would serv e, respectively, as a senior adviser to the president and his attorney general, before both ending up in prison for obstruction of justice in the course of the episode of breaking in and cover-up which would force Nixon from office, Waterga te. The entry from Clark Clifford's diary on this day, published in Counsel to th e President: <blockquote>Tuesday, November 5. Election Day at last - I spent the day i n the Pentagon, lunching with Nitze and Westmoreland, meeting with Air Force Sec retary Harold Brown, and carrying out routine business. I was disgusted with the campaign - with Thieu's treachery, with Humphrey's vacillation, with Johnson's failure to give Humphrey enough support, with Nixon's clever deviousness, with C hennault's interference. I assumed Nixon would win, but still hoped for a miracl e. The day dragged on without shape or focus. We went about our work almost numb fr om fatigue and suspense. In the evening I went home to await the results with a few friends, thinking back to narrow victories in 1948 and 1960. But this time, the victory would go to Richard Nixon. With it came the beginning of a generatio n of Republican domination of the executive branch and the end of the great Demo cratic tradition that had begun with FDR in 1932 and run for thirty-six years.</ blockquote> NOVEMBER 7, 1968</a> Two days after the election, Walt Rostow would send the following report with th e accompanying cover letter to president Johnson<a name="bkfrftnote33"></a><a hr ef="#ftnote33">33</a>: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/9RL5bMu.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote><strike>SECRET</strike>-EYES ONLY Thursday, November 7, 1968 5:00 p.m. Mr. President: If you wish to get the story raw, read the last paragraph, marked. Walt Rostow DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMISTRATIVE MARKING E.O. 12856, SEC. 1.1(a) BY JOW ON 8/2/94 <strike>SECRET</strike>--EYES ONLY</blockquote>
The report: <img src="http://i.imgur.com/KLhwu8s.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote><strike>SECRET</strike>-NOFORN '68 NOV 7 PM 3:51 1968 NOV 7 20 43 3:39PM RNK PRIORITY 11-7-68 RNK TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 09 ROM: DIRECTOR, FBI (<strike>SECRET</strike> - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM. On November Seven, Instant, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable in formation in the past, furnished the following information: On instant date, an unidentified male was in contact with Major Bui Cong Minh, A ssistant Armed Forces Attache, Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C. (WDC). The u nidentified individual advised Major Minh that he had just received a call from General Westmoreland's office, and General Westmoreland desired to see the unide ntified man during the evening of November Seven, instant. In view of this appoi ntment, the unidentified man desired to delay his visit to see Major Minh until Saturday, November Nine, PAGE TWO (<strike>SECRET</strike> - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) next. Major Minh agreed and the unidentified man and his wife will visit Major a nd Mrs. Minh on Saturday November Nine, next, (possibly at Major Minh's residenc e One Zero Eight Zero Five [10805] Georgia Avenue, Apartment Two Zero One [201], Wheaton, Maryland). The unidentified man inquired as to how the peace talks were coming, and Major M inh expressed the opinion that the move by Saigon was to help presidential candi date Nixon, and that had Saigon gone to the conference table, presidential candi date Humphrey would probably have won. GP-1</blockquote> "If you wish to get the story raw, read the last paragraph, marked," is the note on the cover letter, and the notable point in the last paragraph is: "Major Min h expressed the opinion that the move by Saigon [the refusal to participate in t he Peace Talks] was to help presidential candidate Nixon, and that had Saigon go ne to the conference table, presidential candidate Humphrey would probably have won." NOVEMBER 8, 1968</a> A conversation between Johnson and Everett Dirksen, where the president stresses that the message must be sent to Nixon that it remains urgent for Thieu to be a t the peace talks. This remains Johnson's priority, even after the election has been decided<a name="bkfrftnote34"></a><a href="#ftnote34">34</a>: <blockquote>DIRKSEN
I talked to Dick this morning. JOHNSON Yes Edward. DIRKSEN He's coming to see you about this, at 1:30 is my understanding. JOHNSON Yes? DIRKSEN And, he has your background. Now, I hated the words. I said, it seems they sent some of their boys out to spy, and tell them to wait. So you'll know that he kno ws the story. JOHNSON Well, what was his reaction? DIRKSEN Well. He said he didn't send anybody. Well, maybe not. But maybe somebody else s ent somebody. ButJOHNSON What was his reaction to the request that he tell somebody to go on and get that Paris meeting? DIRKSEN He didn't give me very much reaction. He just cindered a little by saying "We di dn't do anything." Well, that may well be, but there a lot of those people in (i naudible). You'll know the kind of background that you have to talk to him to. JOHNSON Well, now the point is this'll not going to wait till Monday. No no. Hell no. Th is'll go right now. Because if they don't go in there this week, we're just gonn a have all kinds of problems. DIRKSEN I thought from the arrangement that was made, coming up here on Monday, that'd b e satisfactory. JOHNSON No, I told you last night, I oughta, I thought I'd hear early this morning, cuz we want Thieu to get a message so he can get a delegation Saigon to Paris next w eek. We think we've held up just every day, we're killing men. We're killing men .</blockquote> On this same day, a secret intelligence report was sent to the President on a me eting between a trusted source and South Vietnam's ambassador to the United Stat es, Bui Diem. What is of interest is that the counter-proposal is so minutely di fferent from the original U.S. one, and that what is most wanted is not a resolu tion of the war, but a slowing down of the peace process <a name="bkfrftnote35"> </a><a href="#ftnote35">35</a>: <blockquote>8 November 1968 The following is a report by a reliable and trustworthy American of his breakfas t meeting with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Ambassador Bui Diem on 8 November 1968, at the residence.
1. On the way to this meeting, the news had come over the radio that President T hieu had proposed that, under the "our side, your side", formula, South Vietnam be designated head of the Allies delegation while North Vietnam be head of the C ommunist one. Bui Diem had the full text of Thieu's statement. He commented t hat the GVN position represented only a small change in the original U.S. propos al - rather than a totally new and different formula - but that it satisfied a n umber of Vietnamese concerns: it gave the GVN a more prominent status than the N LF, it would put negotiations on a Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese basis rather than a U.S.-to-Vietnamese basis, and it would clearly represent a new stage of negotiat ions rather than a continuation of the previous phase. Asked if he thought t here was much chance of Hanoi's acceptance, he replied "no," but he added that it put the GVN on the offensive rather than in the position of appearing t o scuttle negotiations. 2. Asked if he thought that, under one formula or another, the negotiations woul d be able to resume soon, Bui Diem said that he thought it would take some time. He said that he thought the fact that the U.S. now had a President-elect would slow down the planning process on the U.S. side, since President Johnson would w ish to inform and seek the opinions of the President-elect's term, and it would also take some time to repair the damage to GVN-U.S. relations. Regarding the la tter point, Bui Diem said that, while there was a minor substantiative differenc e in the U.S. and GVN positions - such as the U.S. willingness to leave GVN and NLF status at the peace talks ambiguous while the GVN wanted more precision - <s trike>much of the difficulty</strike> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 00-231 By com, NARA Date 12-19-00 <strike>SECRET</strike>/SENSITIVE</blockquote> Rostow would also pass on another report on Anna Chennault's activities, accompa nied by a cover letter which urged that they act on the information. Had they do ne so, Nixon's political career would have been destroyed four years before Wate rgate<a name="bkfrftnote36"></a><a href="#ftnote36">36</a>. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/LyYubFF.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>Literally Eyes Only THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Friday, Nov. 8, 1968 7:35 am Mr. President: First reactions may well be wrong. But with this information I think it's time to blow the whistle on these folks. W. W. Rostow Literally Eyes Only</blockquote> The report:
<img src="http://i.imgur.com/b0pXknw.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>245 AM 11-08-68 RDR PRIORITY TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 02 FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI <strike>S E C R E T</strike> - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION EMBASSY OF VIETNAM On November Seven, last, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable infor mation in the past, furnished the following information: In late evening on November Seven, last, Mrs. Anna Chennault contacted Vietnames e ambassador Bui Diem and advised that the message on that date from South Vietn amese president Thieu "which our boss" was alright. She advised she had given "t hem" everything when she finally got back to her office to call, that "they" got the whole message. Chennault stated the person she had mentioned to Diem who might be thinking abou t "the trip" went on vacation this afternoon and will be returning Monday mornin g at which time she will be in touch again and will have more news for Diem. Chennault continued that "they" are still planning things but are not letting pe ople know too much because they want to be careful to avoid embarrassing "you", themselves, or the present END PAGE ONE</blockquote> NOVEMBER 11-12, 1968</a> On November 11, Nixon would visit the White House after a five day vacation in K ey Biscayne, where he would meet with Johnson and his cabinet for the first time since the election. The moment is described in RN: The Memoirs of Richard Ni xon: <blockquote>On November 6 we flew aboard an Air Force jet to Key Biscayne for a postelection rest. On the way we stopped in Washington so that I could visit Eis enhower at Walter Reed Hospital. Few moments in my life have been more satisfyin g than entering his room as the President-elect. When he saw me, his face bright ened and he said, "Congratulations, Mr. President!"</blockquote> <blockquote>After a five-day rest in Key Biscayne we returned to New York to beg in putting together an administration. Once again we stopped in Washington, this time for luncheon at the White House with President and Mrs. Johnson</blockquot e> <blockquote>When we entered the Cabinet Room, the briefers were already waiting for us: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Chair man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Director of Central Inte lligence Richard Helms, and National Security Adviser Walt Rostow. The main subject was Vietnam. The travail of the long war was etched on the face s around me. These were all able and intelligent men. They had wanted desperatel y to end the war before leaving office, but they had not succeeded. They seemed very nearly worn out. They had no new approaches to recommend to me. I sensed th at, despite the disappointment of defeat, they were relieved to be able to turn this morass over to someone else.</blockquote>
<blockquote>When Johnson and I returned to the Oval Office after the briefing, h e talked with a sense of urgency. "There may be times when we disagree, and, if such time comes, I will let you know privately," he said. "But you can be sure t hat I won't criticize you publicly. Eisenhower did the same for me. I know what an enormous burden you will be carrying." He said that he wanted to do everythin g he could to help me succeed. "The problems at home and abroad are probably gre ater than any President has ever confronted since the time of Lincoln," he said. Johnson and I had been adversaries for many years, but on that day our politica l and personal differences melted away. As we stood together in the Oval Office, he welcomed me into a club of very exclusive membership, and he made a promise to adhere to the cardinal rule of that membership: stand behind those who succee d you.</blockquote> Johnson would comply with this ideal in the remaining years in which he lived, d emonstrating once again that the priority was not Humphrey's election or victory over Nixon, but an end to the war in Vietnam. If he simply wished for victory o ver Nixon, he had enough to annihilate his career. However, just as Nixon did no t show his true face to Johnson, the president did not turn up all his cards on the table either. The same day that he counseled Nixon on what lay ahead, he dem anded from Deke DeLoach the information already cited, the phone calls made from Spiro Agnew's plane on the day of the "her boss" intercept<a name="bkfrftnote37 "></a><a href="#ftnote37">37</a>. A CIA intelligence cable on two private parties attended by Thieu on November 11 and 12 would report that Thieu explicitly stated that he'd sent secret emissari es to Nixon's election campaign<a name="bkfrftnote38"></a><a href="#ftnote38"><s up>38</a>: <blockquote>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE CABLE COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM DOI 11-12 NOVEMBER 1968 SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S COMMENTS ON PEACE TALKS IMPASSE AT PRIVATE DINNER PARTIES ON 1 1 AND 12 NOVEMBER 1968 ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [REDACTED] SOURCE [REDACTED] SANITIZED Authority NLJ 10-99 By cbm NARA, Date 1-28-2011</blockquote> <blockquote>2. During the course of a dinner on 11 November 1968, at which he pr esided as a relaxed and genial host and self-assured strong man, president Nguye n Van Thieu spoke critically of the unprecedented pressure to which the U.S. gov ernment had subjected him during the pre-bombing halt discussions. According to Thieu, the americans had cited the size of the U.S. commitment in blood and mone y as justification for insisting that U.S. interests prevail and had cited the p resence in South Vietnam (SVN) of a half million U.S. troops. Thieu said he had had to remind the Americans that the government of Vietnam (GVN) contribution to the war was in fact, larger than the U.S. commitment. Thieu characterized the U.S. government action as a "betrayal" comparable to the
U.S. abandonment of Chiang Kai-Shek as a result of the Yalta, Teheran and Casab lanca conferences. He complained that the Americans had sent the Australian and Korean ambassadors to badger him into accepting the U.S. point of view. Thieu ob served that vice president Nguyen Cao Ky, who was not present, was fully in acco rd with his policy on the Paris talks question, including his recently enunciate d "our side-your side" formula. 4. Thieu told his quests that during the U.S. election campaign he had sent t wo secret emissaries to the U.S. to contact Richard Nixon. He indicated he m ight reshuffle the cabinet in an effort to please the new U.S. administration, m entioning specifically the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.</blockq uote> <blockquote>9. Thieu said that there had been no reaction from Washington to his two-delegation proposal since the recent meeting between President Johnson and President-elect Nixon. He expects Nixon to let Johnson try to solve the talks cr isis and to go as far as possible toward reaching a settlement. This would make Nixon's own job easier after inauguration and would leave for the Nixon administ ration the obvious measures to be taken to disengage the U.S. from SVN, thus all owing Nixon to be the "hero" who de-americanized the war.</blockquote> Nixon would detail the November 11 meeting for his memoir, and Clark Clifford wo uld recall it for his own: <blockquote>I was impressed with the controlled manner in which Nixon conducted himself: always polite and deferential to President Johnson, careful not to reve al his private thoughts on any issue that still lay within the responsibility of the President. Where Johnson liked to obscure his strategy with a stream of Tex as stories and rhetoric, Nixon was self controlled, and conveyed the impression of a man weighing every word. But one could easily overlook Nixon's skill with w ords, because he left such a strong impression of physical awkwardness. Rather opaquely, Nixon said he found no significant differences between his own views on Vietnam and those of the Johnson Administration: "I will do nothing unt il the Inauguration unless it is seen to be helpful by you. We must present a un ited front" - this from the man whose agents had sung the song of dissension to Saigon only a few days earlier. "You can be very helpful in the next sixty-five days, especially with Saigon," I said to Nixon. "I know you want to wind this up as much as we do." "The quicker the better," the President-elect replied.</blockquote> THE AFTERMATH PART I</a> The silence of Johnson and his closest aides would be kept after the election, a nd after Nixon's inauguration, until their deaths. In my research on this episod e, I came across various hypotheses on why Johnson kept their silence on Nixon's backchannel diplomacy, with the major reason given that the information had bee n obtained illegally, without a warrant, and that therefore it would somehow dam age the Johnson White House as much, if not more, than the Nixon campaign. This misunderstands the nature of the evidence against Nixon, which was prompted firs t by the tip of Alexander Sachs, which led to the FBI taps on Anna Chennault. Th is was a major national security issue which Chennault was sticking her fingers into, meddling into secret high level diplomatic talks, and it's to be expected that a suspect would have their phone tapped, just as they would if they sold we apons or secrets. The tapping of the Vietnamese embassy in the U.S. and the NSA intelligence from Vietnam were incidental to the case, only confirming that for the South Vietnamese leadership, Nixon was the one. Even granting that their sil ence during the 1968 race was tactical, it does not explain their stone silence afterwards, which was closely kept for a specific reason, given by Clark Cliffor
d in the conference call of November 2nd: "I think that some elements of the sto ry are so shocking in their nature that I'm wondering whether it would be good f or the country to disclose the story, and then possibly to have a certain indivi dual elected. It could cast his whole administration under such doubts that I wo uld think it would be inimical to our country's interests." As Johnson said in h is phone call with Everett Dirksen, "This is treason."<a name="bkfrftnote39"></a ><a href="#ftnote39">39</a> Two major stories would touch on the machinations of the South Vietnamese govern ment to influence the 1968 election by sabotaging the peace talks. On November 1 5, The Chicago Daily News would published an article by Georgie Anne Geye r headlined "Saigon boast: 'We helped elect Nixon'" which quoted Saigon generals gleeful over scoring Nixon's victory, but without mentioning the Nixon-Chennaul t connection<a name="bkfrftnote40"></a><a href="#ftnote40">40</a>: <blockquote>CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Friday, November 15, 1968 Saigon boast: "We helped elect Nixon" By Georgie Anne Geyer Daily News Foreign Service SAIGON - Top Saigon officials are boasting privately they helped assure the elec tion of Richard M. Nixon. They are pleased about it. "We did it," one of them said. "We helped elect an Am erican President." Their reasoning is that by sabotaging President Johnson's attempt to call a bomb ing halt two weeks before the elections they eliminated the support this would h ave brought for Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. "FIFTEEN DAYS would have done it," one cabinet minister said, obviously pleased, "but four days wasn't enough, and we saw to that." The same minister charged, privately, that since last spring, when the United St ates began meetings with Hanoi in Paris, Washington has been "working for Hanoi. " The Saigon government characterizes any negotiation with its enemy as tantamou nt to treason. But with Nixon as President, they believe they will have not only a more underst anding fellow hard-liner but also will have time. "Johnson was under pressures t o get this thing over," the minister said, "but Nixon will have at least six mon ths or a year." THE GOVERNMENT has long said it does not want peace now, that it wants it only w hen it controls more of the country and can make better use of it. The reasoning is: "We are winning now. Why should we give up anything?" To many American officials here it is offensive that the government for which Mr . Johnson literally gave up the Presidency and sacrificed his political career s hould treat him in this way.</blockquote> Two days later, columnist Drew Pearson would publish <a href="http://news.google .com/newspapers?nid=1964&dat=19681117&id=iacyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VrYFAAAAI BAJ&pg=1570,6163167">"Saigon Generals Played Politics With Election"</a>, an d this would briefly mention that Bui Diem had been secretly in contact with Nix on, and may have even passed money to some of his associates <a name="bkfrftnote 41"></a><a href="#ftnote41">41</a>:
<blockquote>Washington-Saigon Feud Details Leak Out of Backstage Fight Between U.S. and South Vietnam By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson THE EXPLOSIVE details have now leaked out about the backstage blowup between the United States and South Vietnam, which threatened to wreck the Paris peace nego tiations before they start. All along the South Vietnamese had agreed, in principle, to a bombing halt, prov ided they were given a place at the truce table. As the delicate negotiations we re about to bear fruit, however, they suddenly began throwing up procedural obje ctions. In both Paris and Saigon, the Americans and South Vietnamese wound up sh outing angry insults at each other. The South Vietnamese leaders become convinced that President Johnson was trying to rush through an agreement on a bombing halt just before the election in order to win votes for Hubert Humphrey. They felt strongly that LBJ was selling them out, that he was more concerned about winning the election than winning the war. The President, meanwhile, learned that Saigon's Ambassador Bui Diem had been in touch secretly with Richard Nixon's people. There were unconfirmed reports that South Vietnamese leaders had even slipped campaign cash to Nixon representatives . These reports made Mr. Johnson suspicious that the South Vietnamese were tryin g to sabotage the peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the electi on and take a harder line.</blockquote> In the early part of the new year, another reporter came much closer to the frig htening truth, though it remained without the later substantiation of the variou s intelligence intercepts and the explicit admission of Anna Chennault in her ro le. This was the journalist Tom Ottenad, mentioned briefly earlier in a Bryce Ha rlow note as one of those who believed a bombing halt would soon take place. His inquiries at the Vietnamese embassy in D.C. got near enough to what had taken p lace to set off a warning note by the FBI, passed on to Johnson in the days befo re Nixon's inauguration<a name="bkfrftnote42"></a><a href="#ftnote42">42</s up></a>: <blockquote>4:45PM 1-3-69 JDR PRIORITY TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 004 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '69 JAN 3 PM 5:11 <strike>S E C R E T</strike> - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM. On January Three, instant, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable inf ormation in the past, furnished the following information: On the same date, Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem, Washington, D.C. (WDC), was in contact with Richard Dudman of the WDC bureau of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, t his bureau having previously attempted to contact Ambassador Diem on instant dat e. Dudman made reference to an article which has been written for the St. Louis Dispatch, about Anna Chennault, concerning reports that Chennault had frequently been in touch with Vietnamese officials in WDC, encouraging Vietnamese official s to go slow with respect to expanded peace talks in Paris. Ambassador Diem deni ed these reports, stating that Vietnamese decisions are based
END PAGE ONE PAGE TWO (<strike>S E C R E T</strike> - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) on a lot of factors, mainly the problems at home (Vietnam), and not on internal politics in the United States. Dudman questioned as to whether there had not been some concern by the White Hou se, or by Vice President Humphrey about Chennault's activities, further that the St. Louis Post Dispatch had information to this effect and that there had been some kind of inquiry or complaint to the Vietnamese embassy, WDC, in this regard . Ambassador Diem denied this information, commenting that he (Diem) had been in touch with many friends in WDC, both Democrats and Republicans, and again denie d knowledge of an inquiry or complaint in such a matter.</blockquote> Ottenad would attempt to interview Walt Rostow for this piece, and would later a ttempt to speak to Lyndon Johnson and his aide, Tom Johnson, on the same subject . These later inquiries were turned down, just as Rostow would refuse to answer any such questions for the January 6, 1969 article<a name="bkfrftnote43"></a><a href="#ftnote43">43</a>. Rostow may have wished to blow the whistle o n the backchannel diplomacy of Nixon-Chennault, but now that the choice had been made to stay silent, he would abide by it<a name="bkfrftnote44"></a><a href="#f tnote44">44</a>: <blockquote>1/3/69 11:40 am Phone conversation, Tom Ottenad of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and W. W. Rostow Ottenad: I have been working on a story that I wondered if I might talk to you a bout. It's on background basis, or however you want to talk about it. It has to do with the last period of the Presidential campaign about the time of the Presi dent's announcement of the bombing halt and steps to broaden the Paris talks. I' ve been told that during that period some Republican contacts were made with Sou th Vietnamese officials urging them to go slow in the hope that from their stand point, they might get a better shake under Nixon than they would otherwise, and that these contacts--contacts of this type--were made by Mrs. Chennault. We have established this from a number of sources, and it's not really about that as su ch that I was inquiring, but rather about another aspect of it. I was told also that this activity had come to the attention of the Administration, and I wonder ed--I wanted to ask you--if that is in fact correct. WWR: I have not one word to say about that matter. Ottenad: Not even on background or completely non-attributable basis? WWR: On no basis whatsoever. Ottenad: There is no point about my asking other questions related to it. WWR: That is correct. Ottenad: That would be just a waste of your time. WWR: I'm afraid that's right. Ottenad: May I ask about a different but somewhat related matter -- because I do n't know whether you will say the same thing to that or not; if it is, of course , I'll drop the business right there. The other matter I've been told of is abou t this same time. Contacts were made indirectly by South Vietnamese officials wi
th the Nixon camp portunity to meet se would not take ion. My question:
asking -- unsuccessfully, as it turned out -- asking for an op with Nixon or one of his aides and hinting that South Vietname action on the question of going to Paris until after the elect Did that ever come to your attention.
WWR: I have nothing whatsoever to say about it. </blockquote> Ottenad's article, published on January 6 1969, would detail the Nixon-Chennault attempt to sabotage the Paris Peace Talks. Though it would identify Chennault's role, that she was specifically acting on behalf of Nixon was left an open ques tion, and vigorously denied by off-the-record sources of his campaign<a name="bk frftnote45"></a><a href="#ftnote45">45</a>: <blockquote>Was Saigon's peace talk delay due to Republican promises? TOM OTTENAD January 6, 1969 WASHINGTON - A well-known top official of committees working for the election of Richard M. Nixon secretly got in touch with representatives of South Vietnam sh ortly before the presidential election. It was in connection with an apparent effort to encourage them to delay in joini ng the Paris peace talks in hopes of getting a better deal if the Republicans wo n the White House. The government of South Vietnam had been expected to join the Paris discussions soon after President Lyndon B. Johnson announced plans on Oct. 31 to bring both it and the Communist National Liberation Front into the peace talks and to halt all American bombing of North Vietnam. However, it delayed doing so for four wee ks. Its action is credited by some political experts, including some of Nixon's staf f, with cutting the loss of votes that his aides believe he suffered in the elec tion from the last-minute peace move. In this view, the Vietnamese delay lent cr edence to Republican charges that Mr. Johnson's action was a political maneuver to help the Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. Informed diplomats as well as administration sources and a number of Republicans , including some within Nixon's own organization, have said that Republican cont act with South Vietnamese representatives was made by Mrs. Anna Chennault. The i nitial contact was reported to have been made a few days before Mr. Johnson's Oc t. 31 announcement. A high ranking official at the South Vietnamese Embassy here said it was "entire ly untrue" that Mrs. Chennault had urged officials of his government to go slow in joining the Paris peace talks.</blockquote> <blockquote>Mrs. Chennault, who was born in Peking is of Chinese descent, but be came an American citizen in 1950. She is a vice chairman of one of the committee s planning Nixon's inauguration Jan. 20. The attractive 45-year-old woman, who c laims many friends in high government and Republican circles, is to be escorted to the inaugural ball by Gov. Warren P. Knowles of Wisconsin, it was announced r ecently. Her name figures in speculation for possible appointment to a key posit ion in the Nixon administration. In a recent interview, she declined to confirm or deny reports that she had been in frequent touch with representatives of the South Vietnamese Embassy shortly before the Nov. 5 election. "Who told you that?" she asked with a half smile.
In response to further questions the petite, vivacious woman, who rates Bui Diem , South Vietnam's ambassador to the U.S., and other diplomats and world leaders among her friends, refused to give much information. "You're going to get me in a lot of trouble," she remarked. Toying with the high collar of her Chinese-style dress, a personal fashion trademark, she continued with a laugh: "I can't say anything...come back and ask me that after the inauguration. We're at a very sensitive time...I know so much and can say so little." Asked whether others had made contact with the South Vietnamese she replied enig matically, "I certainly was not alone at that time." Friends of Mrs. Chennault have said that she was in sympathy with high South Vie tnamese officials, including some of the country's embassy here, who favored awa iting the outcome of the American presidential election before making any move t oward joining the Paris peace negotiations. High administration sources here say that key South Vietnamese officials general ly favored the election of Nixon over Humphrey. They say also that they received information from Saigon indicating that many believe South Vietnamese officials there believed Mrs. Chennault was acting on Nixon's behalf in contacts with rep resentatives of that country. They termed this belief understandable in view of South Vietnam's reputation for political intrigue. When told that the Nixon forces disclaimed any connection with her reported acti ons, Mrs. Chennault remarked with a laugh: "You've covered politics. What would you expect? In politics nothing is fair."</blockquote> <blockquote>Although Nixon advisers say they learned of Mrs. Chennault's activit ies several days before the Nov. 5 election, they apparently took no steps to ha lt her or remove her from her connection with the campaign. Explaining why, one G.O.P. official said, "She wasn't our baby. She wasn't really part of the campai gn." Another Nixon adviser also emphasized this thought, stressing that Mrs. Chennaul t was not part of Nixon's personal campaign staff. "She was co-chairman of a volunteer organization," he said. "She wasn't a foreig n policy adviser. We were faced with all kinds of people who claimed to speak fo r Nixon on various issues but really didn't." Another Republican aide said, "The difficulty is she is pretty free-wheeling. Sh e took a number of independent actions in the campaign. We had to pull her back several times." Some sources who are friendly to Mrs. Chennault have said privately that the Nix on camp was aware of her actions. They did not make clear, however, at what poin t this reported awareness developed. Sources in the Nixon camp insisted strongly that Nixon was adamant in his refusa l to make political capital out of the Vietnamese conflict or of the peace negot iations. "I saw him explode one time and say he was not going to make the war a political issue even if it cost him the election," said one aide.</blockquote> In contrast, Theodore White's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Making-President-19 68-Landmark-Political/dp/0061900648/">The Making of the President 1968</a > presented the Nixon-Chennault backchannel diplomacy as an unsubstantiated rumo r that may well have blown up in the face of the Democratic party, and therefore
it was best that it had been left alone and unpublicized. I give lengthy excerp t of the section of White's book devoted to the episode: <blockquote>When the American administration announced the bombing halt of Thurs day night, it did so believing that it had the full assent of the South Vietname se government. It had, however, only the assent of its president Nguyen van Thie u. And so solemnly had Thieu been admonished by the American government to keep the secrecy of the preceding weeks of negotiation that he had kept the details o f agreement secret even from his cabinet, his national assembly, and his vice-pr esident and rival, Nguyen Cao Ky. Faced with a revolt of his assembly as the new s leaked, menaced by a coup d'état of his vice-president, Thieu re neged. On Friday, Saigon time (Saturday, American time) came his shattering stat ement, "The Government of South Vietnam deeply regrets not to be able to partici pate in the present exploratory talks." There could be no doubt that someone had blundered; of such blunders great issue s in politics can be made. But over the weekend of November 1st and 2nd, with th e Presidency of the United States apparently at stake, both sides approached the blunder as if it were a political explosive. Given the proper twist, it could e xplode either way, and one must see the temptation of the Democrats to exploit h idden opportunity, the temptation of the Republicans to exploit public confusion . There is no way of getting at the dilemma of both parties except by introducing, at this point, the completely extraneous name of a beautiful Oriental lady, Ann a Chan Chennault, the Chinese widow of war-time hero General Claire Chennault. M rs. Chennault, an American citizen since 1950, comes of a line that begins with Mei-ling Soong (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek) and runs through Madame Nhu (the Dragon Lady of South Vietnam) - a line of Oriental ladies of high purpose and authorit arian manners whose pieties and iron righteousness have frequently outrun their brains and acknowledged beauty. In the campaign of 1968, Mrs. Chennault, a lady of charm, energy and great name, had become chairman or co-chairman of several N ixon citizen committees, wearing honorific titles which were borne by many but w hich she took more seriously than most. In that circle of Oriental diplomacy in Washington once known as the China Lobby, Anna Chennault was hostess-queen. Havi ng raised (by her statement later) some $250 000 for the Nixon campaign, she fel t entitled to authority by her achievement. And, having learned of the October n egotiations by gossip and rumor and press speculation, as did most Americans, sh e had undertaken most energetically to sabotage them. In contact with the Formos an, the South Korean and the South Vietnamese governments, she had begun early, by cable and telephone, to mobilize their resistance to the agreement - apparent ly implying, as she went, that she spoke for the Nixon campaign. She had, however, neglected to take the most elementary precautions of an intrig uer, and her communications with Asia had been tapped by the American government and brought directly to the perusal of President Johnson. Although Johnson had been made aware of Mrs. Chennault's messages even before hi s announcement of the bombing halt, he had not taken them seriously. It was not until Saturday, with the announcement of eleven South Vietnamese senators in Sai gon of their support for Richard M. Nixon(!) and the repudiation of the Paris ag reement by President Thieu, that the President's wrath was lit. By Saturday he h ad accused Senator Everett Dirksen of a Republican plot to sabotage peace (which Dirksen, presumably hastened to relay to Nixon headquarters); and by Sunday, Jo hnson was in direct and bitter telephonic contact with Richard Nixon in Los Ange les (see footnote, page 383)<a name="bkfrftnotewhite1"></a><a href="#ftnotewhite 1">*</a>. What could have been made of an open charge that the Nixon leaders were saboteur s of the peace one cannot guess; how quickly it might, if aired have brought the
last forty-eight hours of the American campaign to squalor is a matter of specu lation. But the good instinct of that small-town boy Hubert Humphrey prevailed. Fully informed of the sabotage of the negotiations and the recalcitrance of the Saigon government, Humphrey might have won the Presidency of the United States b y making it the prime story of the last four days of the campaign. He was urged by several members of his staff to do so. And I know of no more essentially dece nt story in American politics than Humphrey's refusal to do so; his instinct was that Richard Nixon, personally, had no knowledge of Mrs. Chennault's activities ; had no hand in them; and would have forbidden them had he known. Humphrey woul d not air the story. For the sake of the record, I must add that in probing this episode during the w eekend of its happening, this reporter's judgement was that Humphrey's decision was morally, if not tactically, correct. At the first report of Republican sabot age in Saigon, Nixon's headquarters had begun to investigate the story; had disc overed Mrs. Chennault's activities; and was appalled. The fury and dismay at Nix on's headquarters when his aides discovered the report were so intense that they could not have been feigned simply for the benefit of this reporter. Their feel ing on Monday morning before the election was, simply, that if they lost the ele ction, Mrs. Chennault might have lost it for them. She had taken their name and authority in vain; if the Democrats now chose to air the story, no rebuttal of t he Nixon camp would be convincing; and they were at the mercy of Humphrey's good -will.</blockquote> This incredible story would afterwards stay in the realm of intangible, unconfir med mist, occasionally brought to the fore by memoirs of those involved in that election. In his own memoir, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Vantage-Point-Pe rspectives-Presidency/dp/0030844924/">The Vantage Point</a>, Johnson woul d allege that pro-Nixon forces had promised the South Vietnamese leadership a be tter deal, but would not claim that they were acting on the orders of Nixon hims elf, the allegations described in <a href="http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid =1346&dat=19711002&id=UY0sAAAAIBAJ&sjid=qCcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5264,903 851">"LBJ Charges Pro-Nixon Move Beat Humphrey"</a> by Jack Anderson, a column t outing salient excerpts from Johnson's forthcoming book: <blockquote>WASHINGTON - Lyndon Johnson charges in his forthcoming memoirs that Richard Nixon's allies insured Hubert Humphrey's 1968 presidential defeat by sec retly persuading the Saigon government to stay away from the Paris peace talks. The former President's memoirs entitled "The Vantage Point," are being kept unde r tight wraps. But we can quote the highlights. Here, for example, how Johnson describes the GOP-Saigon skulduggery: "People who claimed to speak for the Nixon camp began encouraging Saigon to stay away from Paris and promising that Nixon, if elected, would inaugurate a policy more to Saigon's liking. "Those efforts paid off. "On November 1, after previously indicating that they would have made him the ta lks [sic], the South Vietnamese leaders decided not to participate. That I am co nvinced, cost Hubert Humphrey the presidency, especially since a shift of only a few hundred thousand votes would have made him the winner. "I am certain the outcome would have been different if the Paris peace talks had been in progress on Election day."</blockquote> When Clark Clifford would bluntly state what he knew of the affair in Counsel to the President, it received a strange rebuke from former Nixon speechwrit er William Safire, then a columnist for the New York Times who did not se e the episode as an example of Nixon's duplicity, paid for with American and Vie
tnamese blood, but as a precedent for the wiretapping of Watergate. The piece wa s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/opinion/essay-clark-clifford-s-conf ession.html?pagewanted=print">"Clark Clifford's Confession"</a>, and here is its crux: <blockquote>WASHINGTON- Do you remember what Watergate was all about? It was abo ut the intrusion by the party in power into the rights of political challengers -- the Ins using their power unfairly to block the Outs. In his eye-popping memoirs, "Counsel to the President," Clark Clifford shows in exquisite detail how Lyndon Johnson colluded with Moscow -- and abused the power of our intelligence agencies -- to try to block Richard Nixon's challenge and s wing the 1968 election to the Democrats' Hubert Humphrey. That revelation was not Mr. Clifford's intent, of course; on the contrary, this Democrat, whose civilized partisanship I have long admired, charges the Nixon ca mpaign with "gross, even potentially illegal, interference with the security aff airs of the nation" by encouraging South Vietnam to avoid participating in a Par is meeting central to a 1968 election-weekend stunt.</blockquote> <blockquote>In castigating Mrs. Chennault for foiling the scheme, Mr. Clifford i s forced to reveal the basis of his suspicion of her: "the information had been derived from extremely sensitive intelligence-gathering operations of the F.B.I. , the C.I.A., and the National Security Agency; these included surveillance of t he Ambassador of our ally, and an American citizen with strong political ties to the Republicans." Recognizing that this was a startling admission of the abuse of government power to defeat a political opponent, Mr. Clifford footnotes: "It should be remembere d that the public was considerably more innocent in such matters in the days bef ore the Watergate hearings . . ." John Mitchell, Nixon's 1968 campaign manager, knew what Mrs. Chennault -- who ne eded no guidance -- was doing. Later, as Attorney General, he learned from the F .B.I. and C.I.A. exactly how the White House orchestrated N.S.A.'s eavesdropping on Nixon's "Dragon Lady" and C.I.A.'s illegal surveillance of national-security aide Richard Allen. Returning to manage the 1972 Nixon campaign, Mitchell entru sted such unlawful intrusions to amateurs, for which he was jailed. </blockquote > <blockquote>Clark Clifford's memoirs confirm that. Watergate's crimes grew from seeds planted in the power abuses of the Johnson Administration's "October surpr ise."</blockquote> The piece is so brazen in its dishonesty that I'm sorry Safire is no longer aliv e so I might yell at him on twitter. As already stated, the wiretapping of Chenn ault began with the revelations of Alexander Sachs to Eugene Rostow, that high l evel diplomacy was being messed with. When Clifford writes "we first became awar e of these activities through the normal operations of the intelligence communit y in the weeks prior to the election," it is this that he is referring to. That it was an inquiry into a matter of national security whose thread appeared to le ad to one of the candidates of the 1968 election, and nothing like the free rang ing persecution campaign against all enemies of the Nixon White House, is a subt lety missed by Safire, but exactly the sort of dishonesty you might expect to sh ield against a dart that falls on a tender and vulnerable point. I was not the o nly one incensed by this column, which would provoke a letter from a former memb er of Johnson's cabinet, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/13/opinion/l-th e-real-story-of-68-vietnam-bombing-halt-821191.html?pagewanted=print">"The Real Story of '68 Vietnam Bombing Halt"</a>, written by William Bundy, Assistant Secr etary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: <blockquote>To the Editor:
William Safire's May 23 column ("Clark Clifford's Confession") turns history on its head about the covert operation mounted in October 1968 by Richard M. Nixon, John Mitchell and Anna Chennault to ditch President Lyndon Johnson's agreement with Hanoi for serious peace negotiations to end the Vietnam War. I participated in the events of that month and have recently done extensive research on the pe riod for my own historical purposes. Mr. Safire states that Mr. Johnson's bombing halt announcement on Oct. 31, 1968, looking to immediate negotiations, was an "election-weekend stunt." On the cont rary, "Counsel to the President," Mr. Clifford's memoir, shows that Mr. Johnson' s terms for a bombing halt, worked out in late June 1968, never changed. As Mr. Clifford relates with feeling, Mr. Johnson resisted many attempts to soften or s hade these terms, forcing a platform confrontation that played a big part in the disastrous Democratic National Convention in August. Some election stunt! </blo ckquote> <blockquote>About Oct. 29, as Mr. Clifford recounts in more general terms, Mr. J ohnson and his inner circle (of which I was not part) learned through intercepte d South Vietnam Embassy cables, particularly one of Oct. 27, that Anna Chennault was conveying via Bui Diem apparently authoritative "Republican" messages urgin g Mr. Thieu to abort or cripple the deal by refusing to participate. That "smoking gun" cable included promises of later favor from Mr. Nixon, includ ing a possible visit to Saigon before inauguration if he were elected. (As Mr. N ixon well knew, "reading the mail" of allied governments of importance to United States foreign policy was not an exceptional practice in the postwar period.) T hus alerted, Mr. Johnson requested Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance of Mrs. Chennault and the embassy, and the results amply confirmed her activity. No Clifford "confession" was needed about these actions. The surveillance was di sclosed fully in Senate Committee hearings in 1975, the F.B.I. testifying that i t accepted Mr. Johnson's request based on possible violations of the Neutrality Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, both concerning dealings by United States private citizens with the governments of other countries. Interference su ch as Mrs. Chennault's is certainly something the United States Government is en titled to know about as a matter of national security, in a situation such as pr evailed in late October 1968. On Nov. 3, two days before the election, Mr. Johnson taxed Mr. Nixon with Mrs. C hennault's activities, and Mr. Nixon categorically denied any connection or know ledge -- almost certainly a lie in light of later disclosures. In the circumstan ces, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Humphrey decided, separately, not to raise what would s urely have been a highly divisive issue so late in a campaign. A year later, The odore White, describing the episode in his book on the 1968 campaign, rightly ca lled Mr. Humphrey's decision one of the most decent actions ever taken by an Ame rican political figure. Mr. Safire has badly distorted what was indeed a black page in American politica l history. Clark Clifford's honest and unflinching account nails down the conclu sion that President Johnson acted throughout in the national interest as he perc eived it. We still lack an honest account of what Richard Nixon did and knew, or in what interest, other than his own political gain.</blockquote> The scandal remained in the netherworld of a few tangible facts - that Chennault had contacts with the Nixon campaign, that there were allegations of Chennault contacting the South Vietnamese, that the leadership of South Vietnam had wanted Nixon to win the election - until evidence began to come into place, giving wha t was ghostly a solid, disturbing form. There was Anna Chennault's open admissio n of her role in The Arrogance of Power by Anthony Summers, and the FBI i ntercept reporting her phone calls to a representative of the Nixon campaign. In
2013, the Lyndon Baines Johnson presidential library would release the recordin gs of the calls between Johnson, the candidates, and his advisers, making obviou s and clear that this was no cheap political stunt, but a serious attempt at end ing the war, that was ultimately foiled by one man's own desires. Finally, and m ost importantly, was the unsealing of the contents of what would be referred to as the "X Envelope", one of the few times that history provides us a melodramati c Rosetta stone of the kind that are commonplace in thrillers. This was a collec tion of relevant documents in the possession of Walt Rostow, Johnson's former Na tional Security Adviser, including the FBI intercept, important transcripts, and other investigative materials, some of which have been cited here, and all of w hich can be found in the post by Robert Parry devoted to the envelope, <a href=" http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a>. Parry would describe what took place with the en velope in 1973, a few months after the death of Lyndon Johnson from a heart atta ck, as the Watergate scandal which would eventually destroy the Nixon presidency unfolded: <blockquote>As Johnson's presidency ended in 1969 - and at Johnson's instruction - Rostow had taken with him the White House file chronicling Nixon's Vietnam ga mbit, consisting of scores of "secret" and "top secret" documents. Rostow had la beled the file "The 'X' Envelope." Also, by May 1973, Rostow had been out of government for more than four years an d had no legal standing to possess this classified material. Johnson, who had or dered the file removed from the White House, had died. And, now, a major politic al crisis was unfolding about which Rostow felt he possessed an important missin g link for understanding the history and the context. So what to do? Rostow apparently struggled with this question for the next month as the Waterga te scandal continued to expand. On June 25, 1973, John Dean delivered his blockb uster Senate testimony, claiming that Nixon got involved in the cover-up within days of the June 1972 burglary at the Democratic National Committee. Dean also a sserted that Watergate was just part of a years-long program of political espion age directed by Nixon's White House. The very next day, as headlines of Dean's testimony filled the nation's newspape rs, Rostow reached his conclusion about what to do with "The 'X' Envelope." In l onghand, he wrote a <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/IMG_0486.JPG">"Top Secret " note</a> which read, "To be opened by the Director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Libr ary, not earlier than fifty (50) years from this date June 26, 1973."</blockquot e> The man who had refused to answer the questions of Tom Ottenad, who would keep h is silence about a sordid nasty affair till his very death, would leave behind t he answers for the far, far future<a name="bkfrftnote46"></a><a href="#ftnote46" >46</a>. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/ceawlqt.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <blockquote>TOP SECRET To be opened by the Director, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library not earlier than fifty (50) years from this date June 26, 1973.</blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/UrE2iTl.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" />
Those who wanted to know what took place would finally be given a brief mercy; t hough the envelope was only to be opened fifty years later, in 2023, "ultimately , however, the LBJ Library didn't wait that long," writes Parry in "'X' File." " After a little more than two decades, on July 22, 1994, the envelope was opened and the archivists began the process of declassifying the contents." The end result of the duplicity in 1968 was the eventual betrayal of everyone. T he soldiers, the civilians of Vietnam who would suffer the Christmas bombing, ev en those who thought they'd benefit from the deal, Anna Chennault and Nguyen Thi eu. Anthony Summers, again in his invaluable Arrogance of Power would des cribe what happened after Nixon's win: <blockquote>As late as election eve the word from the White House was that the C hennault matter might "very well blow the roof off the political race yet." In t he end, though, Johnson's advisers decided it was too late and too potentially d amaging to U.S. interests to uncover what had been going on. If Nixon should eme rge as the victor, what would the Chennault outrage do to his viability as an in coming president? And what effect would it have on American opinion about the wa r? "You couldn't surface it," recalled Johnson's assistant Harry McPherson. "The country would be in terrible trouble." There was another reason the lid stayed on. Three days after the election Johnso n was still considering whether to "blow the whistle" on Nixon. Instead, Rostow recalled, the president "actively sought and obtained Nixon's cooperation . . . in delivering the word that the President-elect wished the South Vietnamese to p roceed in moving towards a negotiation with Hanoi." As so often re, as both d President and attend in his career, Nixon's desperate need was to avoid exposure. Therefo Johnson and Humphrey had predicted he would, Nixon now double-crosse Thieu. He sent "strong word" to Saigon that it should reverse course peace talks after all.
Anna Chennault was "flabbergasted" to find herself asked to accept Nixon's new l ine. "What makes you change your mind all of a sudden?" she asked John Mitchell. "Anna, you're no newcomer to politics," Mitchell responded. "This, whether you l ike it or not, is politics." Chennault stormed out in disgust, only to be harried with phone calls from other Nixon aides. At first she was urged again to send the changed signal to Saigon. When it became clear she would never agree, Nixon's people began to fear that s he might disclose the true story.<a name="bkfrftSummersnote29"></a><a href="#ftS ummersnote29">29</a> A string of emissaries was sent to beg her not t o talk to the press. Chennault fended off reporters' inquiries for a long time thereafter, in part, s he claimed, because she feared for her safety.<a name="bkfrftSummersnote30"></a> <a href="#ftSummersnote30">30</a> Later, at a White House function, N ixon thanked her effusively for her help in the election. "I've certainly paid d early for it," she replied curtly. "Yes, I appreciate that," he responded. "I kn ow you're a good soldier." </blockquote> The best that could be said of Nixon's duplicity is that the outcome in Vietnam would have remained the same. This, to my mind, does not make his actions any le ss vile. If one sells weapons or secrets to an enemy, no excuse can be made from the fact that they were not put to use, and no defense can be made from the cla im that those who died as the result of the actions would have died in the war a nyway, with other bullets or other weapons, they just happened to use yours. I d
o not see why there should be a distinction made, in this context, that Nixon's priorities lay, after himself, with an ally rather than an enemy - it is still c onsidered a treasonable offense when one sells classified secrets to an ally. Wh at is most upsetting is that the will of the American people was subverted, only for the vain desires of one man. They wanted an end to the war as soon as possi ble, and so Humphrey, against Johnson's wishes, argued for an unconditional bomb ing halt, while Nixon promised that he had a plan to end the war, though he had none, all while working backstage to delay any end that might inconvenience him. That this moment of American history is so seldom looked at is due to the very obvious reason that here we have democracy made into a sick joke, where American citizens cannot be given what they want on a simple vital issue affecting their children and their families, thanks to the collusion of a sociopath and a forei gn government. While avoiding any blind or naive hopes about the peace process o f 1968, Beverly Deepe Keever would speak of what might have been in an email to Robert Parry published in <a href="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/06/07/the-almo st-scoop-on-nixons-treason/">"The Almost Scoop on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a>: <blockquote>"If Johnson had confirmed my story or the Monitor had run it as file d, it's hard for me to say what the impact would have been on the election...How ever, given how narrow Nixon's margin of victory was, certainly Johnson's confir mation might have swayed enough votes to be decisive. "Hard for me to say without doing my own legwork, but polls I've come across ind icate that might have been the case. Bui Diem quotes William Safire saying that Thieu made Nixon president... "Tho[ugh] I can't judge the impact of pre-election news about the Nixon camp's l iaison with Thieu, I think the more interesting question for me is: What would t he U.S. and Vietnam be like if Humphrey had won? "I think the final outcome would ultimately be the same for Vietnam, with the Co mmunists seizing control of the South, perhaps via a coalition government to per mit the U.S. to save face. "And the war would have been shorter and less bloody without the incursions and bombing in Laos and Cambodia. Far fewer casualties and less cost to the treasuri es on all sides."</blockquote> A lot of people would have to learn to be good soldiers. This, whether you like it or not, was politics. WATERGATE AND THE FIREBOMBING OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE</a> When putting together the 'X' Envelope, former National Security Adviser Walt Ro stow would include the following note<a name="bkfrftnote47"></a><a href="#ftnote 47">47</a>: <blockquote> I am inclined to believe the Republican operation in 1968 relates in two ways to the Watergate affair of 1972. First, the election of 1968 proved to be close and there was some reason for tho se involved on the Republican side to believe their enterprise with the South Vi etnamese and Thieu's recalcitrance may have sufficiently blunted the impact on U .S. politics of the total bombing halt and agreement to negotiate to constitute the margin of victory. Second, they got away with it. Despite considerable press commentary after the e lection, the matter was never investigated fully.
Thus, as the same men faced the election of 1972, there was nothing in their pre vious experience with an operation of doubtful propriety (or, even, legality) to warn them off; and there were memories of how close an election could get and t he possible utility of pressing to the limit -- or beyond. </blockquote> The two scandals were connected not simply through the callous arrogance of the central player in each, but a tangent which would remain below the surface for d ecades, waiting for the Chennault-Nixon episode to gather the substance of the h ard proof of the 'X' envelope and the release of recordings and documents relate d to Watergate. Where I first learned of the link was, like many, in The Tria l of Henry Kissinger by Christopher Hitchens. We might begin with Hitchens' excerpt from Nixon aide H.R. Haldeman's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Halde man-Diaries-Inside-Nixon/dp/0399139621/">Diaries</a>, an entry on January 12, 1973, when the Watergate scandal had already begun to rage full force: <blockquote>The P [President Nixon] also got back on the Watergate thing today, making the point that I should talk to Connelly about the Johnson bugging proces s to get his judgement as to how to handle it. He wonders if we shouldn't just h ave Andreas [Dwayne Andreas, a businessman and heavy political contributor who g ave heavily to Hubert Humphrey; his wikipedia entry is <a href="http://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Dwayne_Andreas">"Dwayne Andreas"</a> and a Mother Jones arti cle devoted to the man is: <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1995/07/ dwaynes-world">"Dwayne's World"</a> by Dan Carney] go in and scare Hubert. The p roblem in going at LBJ is how he'd react, and we need to find out from De Loach who did it, and then run a lie detector on him. I talked to Mitchell on the phon e on this subject and he said De Loach had told him he was up to date on the thi ng because he had a call from Texas. A Star reporter was making an inquiry in th e last week or so, and LBJ got very hot and called Deke [De Loach] and said to h im that if the Nixon people are going to play with this, that he would release [ deleted material - national security], saying that our side was asking that cert ain things be done. By our side, I assume he means the Nixon campaign organizati on. De Loach took this as a direct threat from Johnson ... As he recalls it, bug ging was requested on the planes, but was turned down, and all they did was chec k the phone calls, and put a tap on the Dragon Lady [Mrs. Anna Chennault].</bloc kquote> Hitchens would go on to explain this cryptic post: <blockquote>This bureaucratic prose may be hard to read, but it needs no cypher to decode itself. Under intense pressure about the bugging of the Watergate buil ding, Nixon instructed his chief of staff Haldeman, and his FBI contact Deke De Loach, to unmask the bugging to which his own campaign had been subjected in 196 8. He also sounded out former President Johnson, through former senior Democrats like Governor John Connally, to gauge what his reaction to the disclosure might be. The aim was to show that "everybody does it." (By another bipartisan parado x, in Washington the slogan "they all do it" is used as a slogan for the defense rather than, as one might hope, for the prosecution.) However, a problem presented itself at once. How to reveal the 1968 bugging with out at the same time revealing what that bugging had been about? Hence the secon d thoughts ("that wasn't such a good idea ..."). In his excellent introduction t o The Haldeman Diaries, Nixon's biographer Professor Stephen Ambrose char acterizes the 1973 approach to Lyndon Johnson as "prospective blackmail," design ed to exert backstairs pressure to close down a congressional inquiry. But he al so suggests that Johnson, himself no pushover, had some blackmail ammunition of his own. As Professor Ambrose phrases it, the Haldeman Diaries had been v etted by the National Security Council (NSC), and the bracketed deletion cited a bove is "the only place in the book where an example is given of a deletion by t
he NSC during the Carter administration. Eight days later Nixon was inaugurated for his second term. Ten days later Johnson died of a heart attack. What Johnson had on Nixon I suppose we'll never know."</blockquote> Hitchens would then go on to call Ambrose's conclusions a little too tentative, and we can well see why, because it's very obvious exactly what Johnson had agai nst Nixon. The sentence from H. R. Haldeman's entry for January 12, which begins so dramatically, "LBJ got very hot and called Deke [De Loach] and said to him t hat if the Nixon people are going to play with this, that he would release [dele ted material - national security]," ends with the cliffhanger of a national secu rity redaction, but this redaction is no mystery to us, we can light up the info rmation darkness ourselves: "...that he would release everything related to the sabotage of the 1968 Paris Peace Talks by Anna Chennault under the orders of Ric hard Nixon, that disgusting, blood stained rat fuck cheat." Those familiar with <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Abuse-Power-New-Nixon-Tapes/d p/0684851873/">Abuse of Power</a> by Stanley Kutler, a fascinating and va luable collection of transcripts of the audio recordings from the Nixon White Ho use, will know well that Haldeman's diary entry was no isolated instance of focu s during the Watergate scandal. The theme sounded in the diary entry, of using J ohnson's tapes as leverage, plays several times in the confidential meetings of Nixon and his intimates as they plan defenses. A full excerpt of the entry in Abuse of Power on the conversation on July 1, 1972; Nixon with his top aide and major legbreaker, Charles Colson: <blockquote>JULY 1, 1972: THE PRESIDENT AND COLSON, 11:28-11:36 A.M., OVAL OFFIC E Nixon continues his fascination with wiretapping - of himself and others. NIXON ...I don't want an impression of the big brother thing, the White House and the President ordering buggings and snooping. But Goddamn Kennedy did it all the tim e. Bobby Kennedy had a record number of these bugs. COLSON Well, you saw Kevin Phillips? Did you see Kevin Phillips' column this week? NIXON No. What did he say? COLSON How they bugged [Anna] Chennault's telephones in '68. NIXON Oh, in '68 they bugged our phones, too. COLSON And this was ordered by Johnson. NIXON That's right. COLSON And done through the FBI. My God, if we ever did anything like that you'd have t heNIXON Yes. For example, why didn't we bug McGovern, because, after all, he's affecting
the peace negotiations? COLSON Sure. NIXON That would be exactly the same thing. COLSON That's right. Well, Kevin [Phillips] did - of course, no one else will pick it u p. He's unfortunately considered our guy. But it's very devastating point, that they should not be using that-</blockquote> One on October 17, 1972, between Nixon and Democrat turned Republican John Conna lly, former governor of Texas<a name="bkfrftnote48"></a><a href="#ftnote48">48</a>: <blockquote>NIXON Incidentally, you know the situation with regard to our own. I told you about i t...That's all it was. We are never, we are never going to put that out, you kno w. CONNALLY Well, this morningNIXON There's no reason to embarrass you. But I think that you will know what the situ ation is. Edgar Hoover told Mitchell that our plane was bugged for the last two weeks of the campaign. Now, the reason for bugging it, Johnson had it bugged. He ordered it bugged. And so was Humphrey's. I think. I'm not sure about Humphrey' s. I know about ours. But the reason he says he had it bugged is because he was talking about - he had his Vietnam plans in there and he had to have information as to what we were going to say about Vietnam. But the plane was bugged, John, and that wholeHALDEMAN Two weeks. NIXON -by J. Edgar Hoover, and Johnson knew every conversation. And you know where it was bugged? In my compartment. So every conversation I had, for two weeks Johnso n had it. Now, we're not happy with it. We're not going to say anything. It woul d look like hell.</blockquote> A month later, we might be the most fascinating exchange on the subject, between Nixon and his close aide Haldeman. Kutler prefaces it with the note that this " is a rather cryptic exchange", and "apparently, the two men have an agreement of mutual convenience." The reader who has come this far, or dipped into enough of this post to get a general idea, will not find it cryptic at all, and know exac tly what they're speaking about. I give full excerpt of this session as it appea rs in Kutler's book: <blockquote>NOVEMBER 3, 1972: THE PRESIDENT AND HALDEMAN, 10:46-10:54 A.M., OVAL OFFICE This is a rather cryptic exchange involving Lyndon Johnson's bugging of Nixon in 1968. Apparently, the two men have an agreement of mutual convenience; Johnson acknowledges his wiretapping of Nixon, Nixon makes no public complaints, and LBJ recognizes that Nixon did no wrong.
HALDEMAN I talked to [former Johnson press secretary] George [Christian]. He talked to Pr esident Johnson again this morning. Johnson had his staff working all night revi ewing his files and everything. Last night Johnson had his staff working all nig ht reviewing his files and everything. Last night Johnson had said to George, yo u know, they're going to deny this, and all. This morning Johnson - first of all , after reviewing the files, he's not going to say anything. He was going to den y it. Now he's not going to. He' just going to slough it off. NIXON Good. (Withdrawn item. National security.) HALDEMAN ...Johnson told George, "I have no idea whether that was right or not." He said, "I did call Nixon [in 1968] and go through the problem with him, and we agreed to have [Senator Everett] Dirksen...get it straightened out, and Dirksen met wit h [South Vietnam Ambassador Nguyen Van Bui] Diem on November 9 and went through all that, smoothed it over... NIXON You're citing Johnson? HALDEMAN Johnson said that he decided at the time to interpret this as something foolish that someone did without Nixon's knowledge, and that he and Nixon agreed to do n othing to slow the talks down, and we should look at the way he handled it in hi s books. That's his position, which was that Nixon cooperated fully in proceedin g with the peace talks and all that stuff. Then he said no to Christian, he said - here's the lead-in line. He said, "It is conceivable that somebody here may h ave asked the FBI to follow on up this." See, last night he said it was absolute ly not true. And he said, "So maybe it's possible that Hoover did tell the Presi dent that he was asked to do this." Christian then said, "You better handle this thing straight...That is true, Hoov er did tell the President that; you should know that." And he said Johnson wasn' t surprised and didn't try to deny it at all...Now it's clear, Johnson knows the position we're in; he knows that you know that Hoover did the bugging and that we did nothing about it. Johnson was very grateful for that...Christian also wen t into great detail with him about our concern about the FBI leak and our concer n that, if we try to move on this story or anything like this, it could be a tra p. In other words, the FBI may be prepared to leak on this. NIXON That's right. HALDEMAN Johnson understood that immediately. He didn't have to spell that out at all. NIXON Good.</blockquote> A conversation between Haldeman and Nixon begins on the tangent of preventing th e Watergate burglary team from testifying against anyone in the White House by i mmunizing them, which leads into the recording conducted by Hoover's deputy, Car tha "Deke" DeLoach: <blockquote>NIXON Can the Congress bring them up and immunize them? Can the court immunize them?
EHRLICHMAN Grand jury. NIXON What? EHRLICHMAN A grand jury proceeding. The court immunizes them. And the procedure would be af ter they are sentenced to bring them back in - the grand jury or the Congress, e ither one. HALDEMAN But they intend - the Cubans intend not to talk, and it's not clear what the def ense is going to be with the Cubans at this point. The one thing Dean raises in the congressional thing is whether we have in any way any hard evidence that the plane [in the 1968 campaign] was bugged. The reason he asked is that he sent me a strategy on the Hill of going for an attempt to force the Congress to investi gate hanky-panky in both '68 and '72, rather than letting them just go do an inv estigation of '72 activities. And he can intercede, but we can also start moving on individual Senators and some of the problems they wouldn't like known as to what they've done and not done, but also the question of whether - see, that pla ne bug thing was logged out. Who had the story? Somebody had it - the [Washin gton] Star had the story. NIXON Johnson admitted it, I understand. HALDEMAN Well, sort of. NIXON Did you talk to him? HALDEMAN No, George Christian did. He finally admitted it to George. But the question is whether there will be hard evidence on it. The only input we have on it is J. Ed gar Hoover, who is dead, I presume. EHRLICHMAN Well, [Cartha] DeLoach is around. He's never admitted it, to my knowledge. HALDEMAN Was DeLoach the one who did it? EHRLICHMAN Yep. Johnson called DeLoach and had him do it. HALDEMAN Well, maybe you do have hard evidence... NIXON Well, we have nothing now as far as Johnson is concerned, and we have nothing to worry about. Johnson did not support us..., and at the present time I wouldn't [give] any damn, I'd play that right up to the hilt. What does it do to the Bure au? It's a nasty story. It's just too damn bad. They should not have bugged t he candidate's plane!</blockquote> Nixon's obsession that his plane was bugged during the '68 campaign will be brie fly discussed in the next section, "Oliver Stone's Nixon", but it appears to hav
e been a misunderstanding on his part of what took place. Anna Chennault's phone s were bugged, because of her frequent contacts with the Bui Diem, the ambassado r for South Vietnam and the rumors of her attempts to derail the peace talks. Af ter the election, DeLoach was able to identify the area codes which calls made f rom Agnew's plane on that day went to - Texas, New York City, and so on. They di d not know the content of the calls or any information more specific than that. It is for this reason that it was so important that the FBI intercept establish that Anna Chennault was in New York City at the time of the calls. Nixon discove red that they had identified the contact between himself and Chennault, or come very close to it, and he'd misunderstood what methods they'd used and what they' d obtained, that the FBI had wiretapped the planes of the candidates. Here is a conversation between Haldeman and Nixon on January 11, 1973, a day bef ore Haldeman's cited diary entry. The men discuss approaching Cartha DeLoach and getting the information on Johnson's taping, and that it must be in a form of t angible, irrefutable evidence that's usable, rather than a case of a series of p eople claiming knowledge of the event<a name="bkfrftnote49"></a><a href="#ftnote 49">49</a>: <blockquote>NIXON Have you had any further development, Bob, with regard to the bugging at - I mea n in regard to Mitchell and his talks with DeLoach? If he had? HALDEMAN Yes. NIXON Did he see DeLoach? HALDEMAN Yes. He talked to DeLoach. NIXON DeLoach denies? HALDEMAN No. DeLoach says it's true and that he has hard - he thinks - he has some hard e vidence or some specifics that will lock the thing up. NIXON Will he say so? HALDEMAN I don't know whether he'll say so, but he'll give us the information so that we can say so, and that's all we need. NIXON Well, what I want is this from DeLoach. We know he knows who is in charge of tha t, probably is still in the Bureau, a bugger. Do you know what I mean? The point on that is that Gray gives him a lie detector test, calls him in,, or asks him - do you see what I mean...? That's what I'd like him to do. I'd like to get it so it's nailed down in terms of evidence, rather than that DeLoach told Mitchell or that Hoover, a dead man, told Mitchell, because Johnson will lie about this , if necessary, if we have to use it. My only view is that I would not want to u se this story at all. This is something that I would use only for purposes of-</ blockquote> This approach ends on the next day with Haldeman's diary entry, and the report t hat if this is brought up, Johnson will most certainly hit back with you-know-wh at.
The back channel diplomacy looms over Watergate in these conversations, but it a lso overhangs perhaps the most flagrant criminal act planned in the White House during that administration. This involved what is often referred to as "the fire bombing of the Brookings Institute," a shorthand phrase which misrepresents the primary intent of the act. The firebombing was not an attempt at vandalism, inti midation, or a false flag operation to be blamed on leftist radicals, but a cove r for the actual achievement that Nixon wanted to pull off, a theft of papers fr om the Brookings vault. The best description of this theft I have found which was planned, but never pul led off, can be found in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Will-Autobiography-G-Gor don-Liddy/dp/0312119151/">Will</a>, a memoir by G. Gordon Liddy, one of t he leaders of the Watergate burglary team who also performed various intelligenc e and sabotage operations on behalf of the White House: <blockquote>I continued my close association with Howard Hunt [a former CIA agen t and the other leader of the Watergate burglars], often lunching with him at hi s club in Georgetown, and it was again through Hunt that ODESSA [a group put tog ether by Liddy for intelligence and sabotage operations in the service of the Wh ite House] received its next assignment. Daniel Ellsberg had been associated in the past with Morton Halperin and the Brookings Institution and, according to Co lson as relayed by Hunt, either or both of them were believed to be using Brooki ngs for storage of substantial additional amounts of classified documents at lea st as sensitive, if not more so, than the Pentagon Papers. Further, the Brooking s security vault might have evidence shedding light on the identity of any of El lsberg's criminal associates in the purloining of Top Secret Defense files; whet her Paul Warnke and Leslie Gelb were among them; and whoever delivered the class ified documents to the Soviet Embassy. Could we get into the vault, say, by usin g a fire as a diversion, and retrieve the materials? The problem appealed to me because I recognized it as one turned down earlier by Jack Caulfield [a private detective used by the White House for investigations of their enemies]. He had mentioned it to me, with much rolling of eyes and nodd ing of the head in the direction of Colson's office, as something too "far out" for his imagination and too risky for his nerve. I thought it could be done and so did Hunt. The problem was that the cover under which out men went in there ha d to be first-rate, and that meant costly. We devised a plan that entailed buyin g a used but late-model fire engine of the kind used by the District of Columbia fire department and marking it appropriately; uniforms for a squad of Cubans an d their training so their performance would be believable. Thereafter, Brookings would be firebombed by use of a delay mechanism timed to go off at night so as not to endanger lives needlessly. The Cubans in the authentic-looking fire engin e would "respond" minutes after the timer went off, enter, get anybody in there out, hit the vault, and get themselves out in the confusion of other fire appara tus arriving, calmly loading "rescued" material into a van. The bogus engine wou ld be abandoned at the scene. The taking of the material from the vault would be discovered and the fire engine traced to a cut-out buyer. There would be a lot of who-struck-John in the liberal press, but because nothing could be proved the matter would lapse into the unsolved-mystery category. Hunt submitted the plan for approval, but this time the decision was swift. "No. " Too expensive. The White House wouldn't spring for a fire engine.</blockquote> The task given to Liddy by his superiors was to retrieve the documents in the sa fe at Brookings because these were part of the national security papers which Da niel Ellsberg had taken, photocopied, and leaked to New York Times. We kn ow that this was not an entirely honest assessment of what was expected to be fo und in the safe, because in his memoir, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, the former president provides a slight variation on why he wants this mad burgl
ary to take place: <blockquote>Ellsberg was not our only worry. From the first there had been rumor s and reports of a conspiracy. The earliest report later discounted, centered on a friend of Ellsberg, a former Defense Department employee who was then a Fello w at the Brookings Institution. I remembered him from the early days of the admi nistration when I had asked Haldeman to get me a copy of the Pentagon file on th e events leading up to Johnson's announcement of the bombing halt at the end of the 1968 campaign. I wanted to know what had actually happened; I also wanted th e information as potential leverage against those in Johnson's administration wh o were now trying to undercut my war policy. I was told that a copy of the bombi ng halt material and other secret documents had been taken from the Pentagon to Brookings by the same man. I wanted the documents back, but I was told that one copy of the bombing halt report had already "disappeared"; I was sure that if wo rd got out that we wanted it, the copy at Brookings might disappear as well.</bl ockquote> We might take Nixon at his word here, that he still genuinely thought the bombin g halt was a political act, and he wished to know of the secret planning used to launch it as an attack against the campaign during the '68 election, or that "t he events leading up to Johnson's announcement of the bombing halt" don't refer to what took place on Johnson's side, but on Nixon's. That the "one copy of the bombing halt report had already 'disappeared'" refers to some of the papers whic h Rostow took with him. Nixon, whatever his paranoia, whatever his delusions, kn ew that the backchannel work he orchestrated in '68 was devastating enough that he made no mention or reference to it in his own memoir, leaving our entirely th e name of Anna Chennault. Johnson may well have the restraint and code of honor to stay silent about the file against Nixon - but if something like the Rostow p apers fell into the hands of other Democrats, would they show anything like the same discretion? Again, the obsession with the Brookings institute safe is not a single instance in Nixon's memoir, but surfaces several times, often in his ang riest, most frightening moments in the recordings of the White House. From Kutle r's Abuse of Power: <blockquote>JUNE 17, 1971, THE PRESIDENT, HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, AND KISSINGER, 5 :17-6:13 P.M., OVAL OFFICE A few days after the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Nixon discusses how to exploit the situation to his advantage. He is interested in embarrassing the Joh nson Administration on the bombing halt, for example. Here, he wants a break-in at the Brookings Institution, a centrist Washington think tank, to find classifi ed documents that might be in the Brookings safe. HALDEMAN You maybe can blackmail [Lyndon B.] Johnson on this stuff [Pentagon Papers]. NIXON What? HALDEMAN You can blackmail Johnson on this stuff and it might be worth doing...The bombin g halt stuff is all in that same file or in some of the same hands... NIXON Do we have it? I've asked for it. You said you didn't have it. HALDEMAN We can't find it. KISSINGER
We have nothing here, Mr. President. NIXON Well, damnit, I asked for that because I need it. KISSINGER But Bob and I have been trying to put the damn thing together. HALDEMAN We have a basic history in constructing our own, but there is a file on it. NIXON Where? HALDEMAN [Presidential aide Tom Charles] Huston swears to God there's a file on it and it 's at Brookings [Institution, a centrist Washington "think tank"]. NIXON ...Bob? Bob? Now do you remember Huston's plan [for White House-sponsored breakins as part of domestic counter-intelligence operations]? Implement it. KISSINGER ...Now Brookings has no right to have classified documents. PRESIDENT NIXON ...I want it implemented...Goddamnit, get in and get those files. Blow the safe and get it. HALDEMAN They may well have cleaned them by now, but this thing, you need toKISSINGER I wouldn't be surprised if Brookings had the files. HALDEMAN My point is Johnson knows that those files are around. He doesn't know for sure that we don't have them around.</blockquote> <blockquote>JUNE 30, 1971: THE PRESIDENT, HALDEMAN, MITCHELL, KISSINGER, ZIEGLER , AND MELVIN LAIRD, 5:17-6:23 P.M., OVAL OFFICE E. Howard Hunt, of later fame with the "Plumbers" and the Watergate break-in, wa s no stranger to Nixon. Here, the President wants to use Hunt's talents for brea king into the Brookings. NIXON ...They [the Brookings Institution] have a lot of material...I want Brookings, I want them just to break in and take it out. Do you understand? HALDEMAN Yeah. But you have to have somebody to do it. NIXON That's what I'm talking about. Don't discuss it here. You talk to [E. Howard Hun t]. I want the break-in. Hell, they do that. You're to break into the place, rif le the files, and bring them in. HALDEMAN I don't have any problem with breaking in. It's a Defense Department approved se
curityNIXON Just go in and take it. Go in around 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock. HALDEMAN Make an inspection of the safe. NIXON That's right. You go in to inspect the sae. I mean, clean it up. </blockquote> <blockquote>JULY 1, 1971 8:45-9:52 A.M. NIXON When you get to [John] Ehrlichman now, will you please get - I want you to find me a man by noon. I won't be ready until 12:30 - a recommendation of the man to work directly with me on this whole situation. Do you know what I mean? I've got to have - I've got to have one - I mean, I can't have a high minded lawyer like John Ehrlichman or, you know, Dean [John Dean, White House chief of staff] or s omebody like that. I want somebody just as tough as I am for a change...These Go ddamn lawyers, you know, all fighting around about, you know - I'll never forget . They were all too worried about the [Charles] Manson case. I knew exactly what we were doing on Manson. You've got to win some things in the press. These kids don't understand. They have no understanding of politics. They have n o understanding of public relations. John Mitchell is that way. John is always w orried about is it technically correct? Do you think, for Christ sakes, that the New York Times is worried about all the legal niceties. Those sons of bi tches are killing me. I mean, thank God, I leaked to the press [during the Hiss controversy]. This is what we've got to get - I want you to shake these (unintel ligible) up around here. Now you do it. Shake them up. Get them off their Goddam n dead asses and say now that isn't what you should be talking about. We're up a gainst an enemy, a conspiracy. They're using any means. We are going to use a ny means. Is that clear? Did they get the Brookings Institute raided last night? No. Get it done. I want it done. I want the Brookings Institute's safe cleaned out and have it cl eaned out in a way that it makes somebody else [responsible?].</blockquote> The audio of this last is on youtube, <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KW o2l1SvtUA">"Nixon: raw watergate tape: Orders Brookings Institute's safe 'Cleane d Out'"</a>. OLIVER STONE'S NIXON</a> This episode remained dormant in the three decades after Watergate, and afterwar ds I look at how, despite the influx of confirming information, it remained on t he fringes, an incident perhaps too disturbing, too potentially disruptive, to b e given public exposure. For this was a political moment where a presidential ca ndidate did not simply act in a way which people might disagree with, but made s ure to betray the people's will. The voters of 1968 wanted an end to the war, an d Richard Nixon, who claimed to speak for the common man, who claimed to write f or the silent majority worked to prevent this taking place, so that a few thousa nd more common men might know the sweet cold dirt. Before reaching that point, we might stop briefly in 1995, the year after the di sgraced president's death, when Oliver Stone's <a href="http://www.imdb.com/titl e/tt0113987/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Nixon</a> was released. One might expect th is man celebrated and vilified for his conspiracies, who prides himself on expos
ing the underside of American history to give space to this little known moment of collusion between a U.S. presidential candidate and the leadership of a forei gn power, but Stone does not, and I think I know why: this conspiracy would inte rfere with the overarching conspiracy theory which Nixon presents. Nix on is a strange movie, in that I'm uncertain who it was made for; those igno rant of the president and his administration will be utterly lost as to what is taking place and even who many of the characters are, while those with knowledge of the events will be astonished at the dull superficiality with which it treat s some of the most fascinating and squalid moments in White House history. In an otherwise perceptive review, <a href="http://books.google.ca/books?id=N-ECAAAAM BAJ&pg=PA44&hl=en&sa=X&ei=F_I9U_6HJKTLsAT5zYCQAQ&ved=0CDEQ6A EwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false">"Poor Richard"</a> by David Denby, has this se ctions contrasting this movie's imaginative speculations with that of Stone's <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102138/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">JFK</a>: <blockquote>In all, Nixon sticks much closer to ascertainable fact than did J FK (which was, I admit, entirely reckless on the subject of Lyndon Johnson a nd the assassination of John F. Kennedy). Stone offers only one major speculativ e line - Nixon's alleged involvement as vice-president in CIA plots to assassina te Castro. The plots failed, and the plotters, including Mafia gangsters and Cub an émigrés who became furious at Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs, co nnived in JFK's assassination. (Or so Stone's Nixon thinks.) Years later, even t hough he had nothing personally to do with Kennedy's death, Nixon muses incohere ntly over the old conspiracies and secrets.</blockquote> What this misses is that the movie's entire conception is that Nixon inhabits a vast superstructure of conspiracy, by which he becomes president, who he eventua lly goes against, a betrayal that results in his eventual ouster from office. Ni xon is played by Anthony Hopkins as a bewildered child, a middle aged man who st ill resembles a boy dressed in a business suit, an idiot savant with no sense fo r people but a genius for diplomacy. The movie makes its conception obvious in a sequence that takes place on the day before the assassination of John Kennedy. Visually, it is very well thought out. Kennedy will be killed while in his motor cade, and we start out in darkness with the corner title "1963 DALLAS" before br ight lights switch on and we discover we are at a car show. The movie gives us i ts most striking image, one that has a power too often lacking in Oliver Stone's movies, that of ambiguity: beautiful women in red, white, and blue walk about t he car holding whips. They are chaste, yet very erotic, an eroticism in the serv ice of industry, and the whips are either idle fun, sexual props, or symbols of menace. This points to the primary appeal for me of Nixon, the contrast o f the staid square man, self-appointed representative of the silent majority, wa ndering among the discordant psychedelic imagery associated with the youth cultu re then revolting against him. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/MQ5j7xL.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/LyYMH0X.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/4G3ZB67.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/WAknfXI.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/cvcjyPh.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/Wl1Zexq.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili
ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/eCueKID.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/IaVzFg5.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> Nixon is at this car show, and he is not the villain in what follows - he wears a white hat. The true villain is the wealthy oilman named Jack Jones, and Jones invites Nixon to his mansion where a shadowy council of unnamed men meet. They d espise Kennedy, want Nixon to run for president again, and they have a foreshado wing of what will take place the next day. Dialogue is taken from the script, av ailable <a href="http://sfy.ru/?script=nixon1995">here</a>: <blockquote> JONES Dick, these boys want you to run. They're serious. They can deliver the South a nd they can put Texas in your column. That would've done it in '60. NIXON Only if Kennedy dumps Johnson. JONES That sonofabitch Kennedy is coming back down here tomorrow. Dick, we're willing to put up a shitpot fulla money to get rid of him -- more money'n you ever drea med of. NIXON Nobody's gonna beat Kennedy in '64 with all the money in the world. CUBAN Suppose Kennedy don't run in '64? NIXON Not a chance. CUBAN These are dangerous times, Mr. Nixon. Anything can happen. </blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/XwkCIO3.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/NkSfObm.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/oB05mJo.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/LxI2kCB.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> Nixon leaves Dallas on the day of the assassination, and we have shots of him an d those eagerly awaiting Kennedy looking expectantly up at the sky. The cabal th at will make Nixon president controls their world like a god of the sky. <img src="http://i.imgur.com/5Hbo0MV.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" />
<img src="http://i.imgur.com/fneKSXt.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> After the assassination, there's a scene with J. Edgar Hoover and his top lieute nant, Clyde Tolson. <blockquote>TOLSON It's between Nixon and a Kennedy again, Edgar ... Who do you want? HOOVER Kennedy -- never. He'll fry in hell for what he did to me. But Nixon doesn't k now that, which is why I'm gonna have to remind him he needs us a helluva lot mo re'n we need him.</blockquote> Nixon meets Hoover and Colson at the Del Mar racetrack. A race is just finishing when the horse in the lead, Olly's Boy, crashes to the ground, the script descr ibing it as such, "Then, Olly Boy's right foreleg snaps. It sounds like a rifle shot." The horse falls just as the leading horse in the '68 election, Bobby Kenn edy fell. "Who do you want?" asks Tolson. Hoover: "Kennedy -- never. He'll fry in hell for what he did to me." Hoover and the shadowy oilmen have arranged for Nixon to be president, expecting that he'll do their bidding. Hoover: "I'm gonna have to remind him he needs us a helluva lot more'n we need him." <img src="http://i.imgur.com/7vizfei.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/rTbkZNo.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> We are given no details of the '68 election, nothing of the advertising campaign and racial manipulation depicted in vital books like <a href="http://www.amazon .com/Selling-President-Classical-Packaging-Candidate/dp/0140112405/">The Sell ing of the President</a> by Joe McGinniss and <a href="http://www.amazon.com /Nixon-Agonistes-Crisis-Self-Made-Man/dp/0618134328/">Nixon Agonistes</a> by Garry Wills, as these would go against the movie's thesis of a conspiratoria l theory of history, a "beast" as the script calls it, that is a military indust rial complex which remains an eternal power behind the throne, occasionally shuf fling its figureheads. There can be no room for the Nixon-Chennault back channel either, because this would annihilate the movie's universe and its conception o f Nixon's character. We would then have a man apart from the beast, from the sec urity state, demonstrating full agency outside of this colossus, and working to prolong a war for his own selfish ends. If a shabby mediocrity like Nixon can ac t on his own against the wishes of the security state, then the colossus can't b e as all-powerful as this movie imagines it. In the service of a questionable id ea, Nixon buries a substantial truth. The only reference to the Nixon-Chennault episode anywhere this movie isn't to b e found in the film itself, but in the published screenplay, <a href="http://www .amazon.com/Nixon-Oliver-Stone-Film/dp/0786881577/">Nixon: An Oliver Stone Fi lm</a>, which is accompanied by a group of essays by veterans of the Waterga te affair, such as John Dean and E. Howard Hunt, as well as journalists who cove red the scandal. One of these is "Nixon's Secrets" by the late newsman Daniel Sc horr, a short essay that is more interesting than the accompanying film. The pie ce relates four of Nixon's paranoid obsessions, what fueled those obsessions, an d the lack of substantial basis for any of them. Three of the obsessions are the Bay of Pigs "Secret", the Diem Assassination "Plot", and the Hughes-O'Brien Thr eat. These involve, respectively, that beyond the seamy facts of the Cuban invas ion and Castro assassination attempts there was an additional dark secret, that Kennedy had directly ordered the killing of the leader of South Vietnam, Ngo Din h Diem, and that Larry O'Brien, head of the Democratic National Committee, had k
nowledge of a secret loan made by Howard Hughes to the 1972 Nixon election campa ign, which led to the break-in attempt of the DNC headquarters at the Watergate. The fourth obsession was the previously mentioned idée fixe that Lyndon Johnson had wiretapped Nixon's campaign plane in '68. The two fragments from Schorr's essay which follow are an introductory excerpt a nd the full segment devoted to the bugging of the campaign plane: <blockquote>It is with no sense of vindictiveness that I examine what made this talented and tormented politician go off the rails. I conclude that his paranoia , whatever its origin, led him to imagine conspiracies that he came to believe a nd which served as premises for action. The line between deception and self-dece ption seemed often blurred, leading his subordinates to act on premises that som etimes mystified them. My research leads me to conclude that Nixon nourished at least four grand delusions.</blockquote> <blockquote>3. The "Bugged" Campaign Plane It was an article of faith for Nixon that all the dirty tricks, surveillance, an d wiretaps he sponsored were simply getting back at Democrats who had done the s ame things. As his favorite example he often said that in 1968 the FBI had bugge d his campaign plane on orders from President Lyndon Johnson. The FBI had, in fa ct, wiretapped a Nixon supporter, Mrs. Anna Chennault, who served as a contact w ith the Saigon government. But there had been no eavesdropping on Nixon or his c ampaign plane. Nevertheless, Nixon told Haldeman he thought the "Johnson bugging process" could be "cranked up" to get the former President to use his influence with congressional Democrats to call off the Watergate investigation. The message was conveyed to the LBJ ranch and Johnson countered with the threat that "if the Nixon people are going to play with this," he would release somethi ng about Nixon. That something was deleted from Haldeman's published diary as a national security secret. However, the secret was revealed in the book, <a href= "http://www.amazon.com/Hoovers-FBI-Cartha-D-DeLoach/dp/089526479X/">Hoover's FBI</a> by Cartha D. (Deke) DeLoach, who was number 3 in the FBI and liaison with the White House in both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. Not only di d the FBI wiretap Anna Chennault but the National Security Agency intercepted an d decoded cablegrams from the South Vietnamese Embassy to Saigon, urging that Pr esident Thieu hold off on peace negotiations to get a better deal from Nixon aft er the election. What the FBI did not do, DeLoach says, is bug the Nixon campaign plane. For one thing, DeLoach told me, it would have been unfeasible to get a bug on a plane gu arded by the Secret Service. But, soon after the election, says DeLoach, Directo r J. Edgar Hoover, currying favor with the new President-elect, visited him and told him his campaign plane had been bugged on President Johnson's orders. It wa s a myth that Nixon believed, probably until his dying day.</blockquote> The conspiratorial perspective of the movie is very close to that found in a pap er by entrepreneur and investor Mark Gorton, that I came across in <a href="http ://gawker.com/the-astounding-conspiracy-theories-of-wall-street-geniu-1561427624 ">"The Astounding Conspiracy Theories of Wall Street Genius Mark Gorton"</a> by Hamilton Nolan. <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/217465424/Fifty-Years-of-theDeep-State">"Fifty Years of the Deep State"</a> puts forth the thesis that an al l-powerful cabal has ruled the United States for the past fifty years, one invol ved in drug running and murder, their behind the scenes shenanigans occasionally poking through the veil with the Iran-Contra scandal. In this narrative, George H. W. Bush is "the greatest criminal mastermind in American history." Those who fought against the cabal, John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, are felled by assa ssination and scandal. The section on Nixon, (specific page in scribd document, <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/217465424/Fifty-Years-of-the-Deep-State#page= 8">page 8</a>, opening section is from the very beginning):
<blockquote>Dear Friends and Loved Ones, Today, Nov 22, 2013, is the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President J ohn F. Kennedy. About 6 years ago, quite by accident, I took a passing interest in the assassination of JFK. My research into the assassination of JFK took me o n a path into the dark underbelly of the CIA, and from there, I traced a web of criminality that ran throughout the huge sections of federal government, the pol itical power structure, and the business interests that control our country. As I researched more, I learned that the criminal network behind JFK s assassinati on did not retire after his killing. Instead, the need to cover up past crimes h as motivated them to commit more crimes in a never ending cycle that continues t o this present day. I have tracked this criminal network through time, and I have learned that this cabal has been the most significant political force in the United States for the last 50 years. Yet most people don t have any idea that it exists.</blockquote> <blockquote>Nixon s Relationship with the Cabal Nixon was not a Cabal member, but he was controllable. Nixon s political career ha d been sponsored by Cabal members Prescott Bush and Dulles Brothers and their Ea stern business establishment allies. During his first term, Nixon grappled with the CIA but did nothing serious to reign in its excesses. As the Cabal behind the Coup of 63 positioned itself for the 1972 election, Nixon still seemed to be the best option for them. Nixon had a reputation for using d irty tricks, and Nixon was certainly no angel, but much of the dirty, criminal p olitical tricks done on Nixon s behalf were the work of a network of people loyal not to Nixon but the Cabal.</blockquote> <blockquote>Once Nixon was elected to his second term as president, he achieved a degree of independence that made him a danger to the Cabal. Deep down, Nixon w as never as corrupt as core Cabal members, and toward the end of his first term, he began making plans to purge the entire senior leadership of the CIA. Unfortu nately, Nixon did not realize that the CIA had the White House bugged and his se nior staff filled with spies, so the Cabal leadership was well aware of Nixon's plans. Nixon had a reputation for being paranoid. Yet he was not paranoid enough . His enemies had him surrounded to a degree which he did not understand. Although Cabal members put Nixon on his path to power, they never trusted Nixon, and as early as 1966 (before Nixon is even an official candidate for President) , the Cabal worked to booby trap Nixon's administration, and in 1973, after Nixo n had stopped being a compliant servant of the Cabal, they set off the booby tra p in the form of the Watergate Coup, and they pulled Nixon down from power just as they put him up. The traditional story of Watergate is one where Nixon does a bunch of bad things , gets caught, tries to cover it up, and is forced to resign; however, in realit y Watergate was a plot by the Cabal behind the Coup of 63 and corrupt elements wi thin the CIA and military intelligence to depose Nixon.</blockquote> This is a movie with a president without the freedom of movement to engage in cr uel, callous tactics for the pursuit of his own ends, his entire self tied down by the complex he inhabits. He meets with the student protesters at the Lincoln Memorial, and he is startled at how adeptly they diagnose the essential truth. H e is powerless, with the choice to start or end a war lying elsewhere. <blockquote> STUDENT 2 Come on, man -- Vietnam ain't Germany. It doesn't threaten us. It's a civil war
between the Vietnamese. NIXON But change always comes slowly. I've withdrawn more than half the troops. I'm t rying to cut the military budget for the first time in thirty years. I want an all-volunteer army. But it's also a question of American credibility, our posit ion in the world... YOUNG WOMAN You don't want the war. We don't want the war. The Vietnamese don't want the w ar. So why does it go on? YOUNG WOMAN (CONT'D) Someone wants it ...(a realization) You can't stop it, can you? Even if you wan ted to. Because it's not you. It's the system. And the system won't let you st op it ... NIXON There's a lot more at stake here than what you want. Or even what I want... YOUNG WOMAN Then what's the point? What's the point of being president? You're powerless. </blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/n6Mnz8j.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/Vws8MfU.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> The movie's Nixon does what he can, given his limited freedom of movement. He re duces military spending, he opens relations with Russia and China, he eventually brings the troops home from Vietnam. He stands up to the cabal which appointed him. <blockquote>JACK JONES Mr. President--aren`t you forgetting who put you where you are? NIXON The American people put me where I am, Jack. JONES Really. Well, that can be changed. NIXON Jack, l`ve learned politics is the art of compromise. I learned it the hard way. I don`t know if you have. Well, let me tell you this, Jack. lf you don`t like i t, there`s an election in November... and you can take your money out in the ope n and give it to Wallace. How about it, Jack? You willing to do that? Hand this country over to some pansy poet socialist like George McGovern? `Cause if you`re not happy with the E.P.A. up your ass...try the I.R.S. JONES Goddamn, Dick. You`re not threatenin` me, are ya? NIXON Presidents don`t threaten, Jack. They don`t have to. Good day to you, gentlemen. Thank you.</blockquote> It is after this that Watergate, led by former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt, takes p
lace. Hunt was at the Bay of Pigs, and he's often named in conspiracy theories a s one of the actual assassins in the killing of JFK. The movie tells us what it thinks was lost on the infamous eighteen and a half minute gap on the tapes hand ed over the White House: that those brought in to kill Castro would go on to kil l Kennedy. They are agents of the Beast, the same Beast that is now ousting Nixo n after he rebelled against it. <blockquote>NIXON (on tape) ...these guys went after Castro. Seven times, ten times ... What do you think -people like that, they just give up? They just walk away? Whoever killed Kenne dy came from this...this thing we created. This Beast...That's why we can't let this thing go any farther.</blockquote> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/ksJ1ckH.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <img src="http://i.imgur.com/SyShm72.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> We see Nixon erase this section when the ghost of his mother, Hannah Nixon, appe ars in the room, and his relationship to the Beast is analogous to his feelings towards his mother, a severe merciless woman. He wishes to please her, he wants her to accept him, yet he also despises and resists her. Two Kennedy brothers di e, and the path is cleared for him to become president. Two of his brothers die, and his family now has the money for him to go to college. Richard Nixon please s the Beast by sword rattling, hippie punching, bombing Laos and Vietnam. He fig hts against it through detente and defense cuts. "Richard Nixon is a giant of a tragic figure in the classical Greek or Shakespearean tradition," Stone says in an interview from Nixon: An Oliver Stone Film "Humble origins, rising to the top, then crashing down in a heap of hubris. Nixon himself said that he had been to the highest peaks and the lowest valleys." There is, however a key diffe rence between the tragic figues of Shakespeare and this Nixon, one that is tied to the movie's conception and fatal to its effectiveness. Shakespeare may have b een worked in a society that resembled a modern police state, but his characters are ultimately free in their choices, and their tragic errors. The choices of H amlet, Othello, Macbeth, Richard III, and others, are their own, not a result of entrapment with any larger system. It is this freedom which creates the tension within their characters, that the very thing they want will destroy them, yet t hey continue to pursue it anyway - and it is this which makes them fascinating. The contrasting lack of freedom of this movie's Nixon is what makes him so dull. THE TREASON OF RICHARD NIXON: FR OM POSSIBILITY TO CERTAINTY PART ONE <a href="http://italkyo ubored.wordpress.com/2014/04/09/the-treason-of-richard-nixon-from-possibility-to -certainty-part-two/">PART TWO</a> (All images from Nixon copyright Cinergi Pictures; header image from Point Br eak copyright Twentieth Century Fox.) (Clark Clifford's perspective on the November 11 White House meeting excerpte d from his Counsel to the President was added on April 9th, 2014. Many spelling mistakes, mostly in the transcripts, were corrected on that day as well. On Apri l 10th, the quote from Oliver Stone about Nixon resembling a Shakespearean figur e was added, as was the document dating the George Smathers conversation, as wel l the section of the conversation between Nixon and Johnson dealing with John To wer, and Don Fulsom's observations on Tower and Chennault. The photo of Anna Che nnault was added on the same day. The section on the conspiracy theories of Mark Gorton was added on April 11th, 2014. On April 21, 2014, the embedded youtube c
lip of Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirksen's phone call on November 2nd was added . On April 22nd, 2014, a slightly different version of this video was embedded, with two minor errors in the transcript fixed. On that same day, the youtube vid eo of the conversation between Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon was embedded. Th e youtube clip of the phone call between George Smathers and Lyndon Johnson was embedded on that day as well. On April 25th, 2014, the youtube clip of the phone call between Richard Russell and Lyndon Johnson was embedded.) FOOTNOTES FOR COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT BY CLARK CLIFFORD <a name="ftCliffordnote10"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote10">10</a> Most of those involved in this extraordinary episode have told their version of it, none strike me as completely candid, but they are all useful. See Anna Chen nault, The Education of Anna (New York Times Books, 1980), p. 174, Diem a nd Chanoff, In the Jaws of History, pp. 235-46, Nguyen Tien Hung and Jero ld L. Schecter, The Palace File (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 2330. <a name="ftCliffordnote11"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote11">11</a> The Education of Anna, p. 174. <a name="ftCliffordnote12"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote12">12</a> In the Jaws of History, pp. 244-45 <a name="ftCliffordnote13"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote13">13</a> The Education of Anna, p. 176. <a name="ftCliffordnote14"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote14">14</a> Ibid p. 190; and The Palace File, p. 29. <a name="ftCliffordnote15"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote15">15</a> Carl Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984 ), pp. 391 and 394. <a name="ftCliffordnote16"></a><a href="#bkfrftCliffordnote16">16</a> Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976) FOOTNOTES FOR THE ARROGANCE OF POWER BY ANTHONY SUMMERS</f ont> <a name="ftSummersnote23"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote23">23</a> I t was previously thought that Chennault merely sent a letter to Nixon in Kansas City. Yet her calendar bears the entry "10/16 to meet R. Nixon in Kansas City, M O." (Re: letter: Safire, op. cit., p. 90, and detail at Forslund, op. cit., p. 2 9-.) <a name="ftSummersnote24"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote24">24</a> I n her 1980 book Chennault said she responded by telling Mitchell she thought it unwise to "try to influence the Vietnamese." This seems at odds with her intervi ews with the author, cited earlier, in which she said she was told to promise th e South Vietnamese they would get a better deal with Nixon in the White House. ( not "try to influence": Chennault, op. cit., p. 190.) <a name="ftSummersnote25"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote25">25</a> A report from Rostow to President Johnson, ten days after the event, said that th e "phone call to the Lady was at 1:41 P.M. EST. . . ." Agnew had arrived in Albu querque at 1:15 P.M. EST. Another Rostow report, drawing on FBI surveillance, st ates that Chennault left her Washington apartment at 1:45 P.M. EST. In his recon
struction of the sequence of events for the president, Rostow referred to having received "new times" on Agnew's movements. The initial FBI report contained con tradictory times. It also offered an earlier time-1:30 P.M.-for Chennault's depa rture from home. (Rostow ten days after: Rostow to president, Nov. 12, 1968; re: Rostow and Chennault 1:45 P.M.: Rostow to president, Nov. 2, 1968, both in "X" Envelope; initial FBI report: Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, Nov. 19, 1968, FBI 65-62098-266.) <a name="ftSummersnote26"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote26">26</a> C hennault told both this author and another researcher that she did not remember having received a call from New Mexico. She speculated that if she had been over heard referring to New Mexico, she was probably meaning to refer to New Hampshir e, home state of Robert Hill, one of those she had nominated to Nixon as go-betw eens. The documentary record, however, seems to be more reliable on this matter than Chennault's memory. (Other researcher: conv. Catherine Forslund.) <a name="ftSummersnote27"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote27">27</a> I t was Nixon who called Johnson, not vice versa, as is often reported. Having spo ken with the president, the Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen had passed wo rd that "something had to be done in a hurry to cool him off." According to Will iam Safire, Dirksen thought Johnson was "ready to blow his stack-and blow the wh istle on the Nixon campaign's attempt to defeat his peace efforts by getting Pre sident Thieu to hold back. Anna Chennault's name was mentioned." The message was so troubling that Nixon was roused from his bed and agreed to phone Johnson. (R N made call: Forslund, op. cit., citing LBJ sources, including Defense Communica tions Operations Unit; Safire, op. cit., p. 93, and MEM, p. 320, contradicting, for example, Witcover, op. cit., p. 442; "something had to be done": Safire, op. cit., p. 93.) <a name="ftSummersnote29"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote29">29</a> C hennault said she was pressured not to talk by Herb Klein, Nixon law firm collea gue Tom Evans, Senators Everett Dirksen and John Tower, and Robert Hill. (Chenna ult, op. cit., p. 193-; int. Herb Klein.) <a name="ftSummersnote30"></a><a href="#bkfrftSummersnote30">30</a> C hennault did not reveal what she knew for a long time, but it is not surprising that Nixon's people were nervous. Interviewed before the 1969 inauguration by To m Ottenad, a reporter on the trail of the story, she said: "You're going to get me in a lot of trouble. . . . I can't say anything . . . come back and ask me th at after the inauguration. We're at a very sensitive time. . . . I know so much and can say so little." In September 1969 she asserted: "Whatever I did during t he campaign the Republicans, including Mr. Nixon, knew about." In 1974 she furth er amplified that statement: "From the first conversation [with the South Vietna mese] I made it clear I was speaking for Mr. Nixon. . . ." By 1979, with Nixon l ong disgraced, she was starting to offer more detail. The blanket denials of the Nixon side had upset her, but, she said resignedly, "It was a very vicious camp aign. Politics is a very cruel game." Tom Corcoran said in 1981: "People have us ed Chennault scandalously, Nixon in particular, I know exactly what Nixon said t o her, and then he repudiated her." (Jan. 1969 int.: Boston Globe, Jan. 6, 1969; Sept. 1969 int.: Washingtonian, Sept. 1969; 1974 int.: Howe and Trott, op. cit. , p. 48; 1979 int.: Washington Star, Aug. 20, 1979; Corcoran: WP, Feb. 18, 1981, cited at Forslund, op. cit., p. 52, fn.) FOOTNOTES FOR THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 BY THEODORE H. WHITE <a name="ftnotewhite1"></a><a href="#bkfrftnotewhite1">*</a> For Nixo n, under the menace of the Anna Chennault episode, possibly about to be cast by Democrats as the great saboteur of peace, the question was the most pointed. He solved it by questioning not the President's politics, but his judgement. In ela
boration of this theme, Finch was authorized to brief the press and charge that the President had been either irresponsible or premature in announcing a deal be fore "he had gotten all his ducks in a row." The President, hearing this had, on Nixon's instructions, fluttered the ducks in Saigon, brought the matter up in his telephone call to Nixon on Sunday in Los Angeles. After Nixon had mollified the President on major matters, Johnson inquired, "Who's this guy Fink you got?" "It's Finch, not Fink," replied Nixon. "What's he doing making statements like that without your knowledge?" "Well," said Nixon, as reported by those who overh eard the conversation, "you know how it is, you had George Ball making statement s in your administration." "George Ball isn't any longer with this administratio n." FOOTNOTES</a> <a name="ftnote1"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote1">1</a> Taken from <a href ="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X ' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/z08pmk173/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 27.postimg.org/z08pmk173/FBI_cable_on_Chennault_mention_of_the_big_boss.jpg' bor der='0' alt="FBI cable on Chennault mention of the big boss" /></a> <blockquote>Received Washington CommCen 9:08 P.M. EDT Monday 4 Nov 68 Received LBJ Ranch CommCen 8:34 P.M. CDT Monday 4 Nov 68 EEA659 00 WTE10 DE WTE 4183 FROM WALT ROSTOW TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP82650 <strike>S E C R E T</strike> THE NEW MEXICO REFERENCE MAY INDICATE AGNEW IS ACTING. TWO REPORTS FOLLOW. REPORT ONE: On November Two Instant, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable infor mation in the past, reported that Mrs. Anna Chennault contacted Vietnamese Ambas sador, Bui Diem, and advised him that she had received a message from her boss ( not further identified), which her boss wanted her to give personally to the amb assador. She said the message was that the ambassador is to "hold on, we are gon na win" and that her boss also said "hold on, he understands all of it". She rep eated that this is the only message "he said please tell your boss to hold on." She advised that her boss had just called from New Mexico. REPORT TWO: The November One, last, edition of the "Washington Post," a daily newspaper in t he Washington, D.C. area, carried an article concerning Mrs. Anna Chennault. The article indicated that Mrs. Chennault intended to proceed to New York City wher e she would await the election results on November Five, next, with presidential nominee Richard M. Nixon.
On November Two, Instant, at Seven Ten A.M., Mrs. Chennault's car was observed i n the parking garage at Two Five One Zero [2510] Virginia Avenue, N. W. At One Forty Five P.M., she departed her residence and entered the automobile. I t was being driven by her chauffeur and proceeded to the Baltimore-Washington p arkway where it was last observed heading north at Two Fifteen P.M. Arrangements have been made with the New York office of the FBI for them to obse rve the car en route and to undertake discreet surveillance with reference to he r activities while in New York. DTG: 030208Z NOV 1968 DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 00-231 By com, NARA Date 12-19-00</blockquote> <a name="ftnote2"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote2">2</a> Taken from <a href ="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X ' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/s78cqaadr/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 27.postimg.org/s78cqaadr/top_secret_memo_from_Bromley_Smith_still_classif.jpg' b order='0' alt="top secret memo from Bromley Smith still classif" /></a> <a name="ftnote3"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote3">3</a> From <a href="http ://nymag.com/news/politics/45934/#print">"In Your Heart You Know He's Nixon"</a> by Gloria Steinem: <blockquote>My seat mate, Ed McDaniels, a quiet forceful man who heads the Capit ol Recording Company in Washington, a firm specializing in the radio and televis ion electronic needs of political campaigns, had been with Nixon in 1960, and as sured me that the candidate hadn't changed at all. "Cuba was an issue then," he explained, "but of course Mr. Nixon couldn't say anything, because he might have given away the invasion we were planning. That's the big difference: Kennedy ha d Nixon in a tough spot because he was Vice President, and now Nixon has Humphre y over the same barrel." Had Nixon's attitude toward Communism changed over the years? "Oh no, absolutely not," he said, obviously glad to praise his candidate. "He understands those pe ople. He knows you have to be tough or they'll take us over. You see, I have som e special knowledge-though, of course, Mr. Nixon has more. I happen to know he's had top secret briefings - but I have some knowledge from old friends in the military. They come back and tell me the way it really is. If we don't stop the Chinese here, they'll keep right on going. Of course, he can't say anything about Vietnam because it might interfere with the talks in Paris. Mr. Nixon's a man of real integrity-he won't take advantage of his special knowledge if it wo uld help Ho Chi Minh, But he knows the enemy, and he knows they hope to win beca use of all these misguided sympathizers pressuring us here. I'm for him because he won't let that happen. I'm the head of this company, and I wouldn't go out in the field for anyone else."</blockquote> We can determine when these remarks were made because the article is divided up into sequential days, and this episode takes place on a Friday, and the subseque nt Sunday section tells us "Today's New York Times carried a front page story, " Nixon Visits Negro Slum And Warns White Suburbs,"", and that piece, <a href="htt p://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0D15FB395E1A7B93C0AB1782D85F4C868 5F9">"Nixon Visits Negro Slum And Warns White Suburbs; SUBURBIA HEARS A NIXON WA
RNING"</a>, is listed with a date of September 22, 1968. <a name="ftnote4"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote4">4</a> The original file can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dicta belt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Conversati ons May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Direct link to the original file (mp3 audio): <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlight s/janapril1968/wallaceD1188-21/13548.mp3">13548</a>. Transcript is taken from th e Miller Center Presidential Recordings Program, <a href="http://whitehousetapes .net/transcript/johnson/wh6810-04-13547-13548">"WH6810-04-13547-13548"</a>. <a name="ftnote5"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote5">5</a> From the Nixon Lib rary's <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/whsfreturne d/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf">"White House Special Files Box 35 Folder 15 - WHSF3 5-15"</a> (specific page, <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/do cuments/whsfreturned/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf#page=4">page 4</a>): <img src="http://i.imgur.com/qYu4ziQ.jpg" title="Richard Nixon Treason Possibili ty to Certainty" /> <a name="ftnote6"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote6">6</a> From the Nixon Lib rary's <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/whsfreturne d/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf">"White House Special Files Box 35 Folder 15 - WHSF3 5-15"</a> (specific page, <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/do cuments/whsfreturned/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf#page=4">page 6</a>). <a name="ftnote7"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote7">7</a> From the Nixon Lib rary's <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/whsfreturne d/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf">"White House Special Files Box 35 Folder 15 - WHSF3 5-15"</a> (specific page, <a href="http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/do cuments/whsfreturned/WHSF_Box_35/WHSF35-15.pdf#page=4">page 5</a>). <a name="ftnote8"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote8">8</a> That "DC" was Nixo n's code name in any campaign intercommunication is mentioned in The Arroganc e of Power by Anthony Summers: <blockquote>In July the following year, as the election drew nearer, Chennault w ent to the Nixon apartment with South Vietnam's ambassador Bui Diem-a visit docu mented by both their diaries. A surviving internal staff memo addressed to "DC," Nixon's campaign pseudonym, pointed out that it "would have to be absolute [sic ] top secret." "Should be," Nixon replied in a scrawled notation, "but I don't s ee how-with the S.S. [Secret Service] If it can be [secret] RN would like to see . . . ."</blockquote> <a name="ftnote9"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote9">9</a> Taken from <a href ="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X ' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry. The transcript is my own: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/6yqqiiwav/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 7.postimg.org/6yqqiiwav/NSA_report_Oct_28_1968.jpg' border='0' alt="NSA report O ct 28 1968" /></a> <blockquote><strike>T O P S E C R E T</strike> TRINE XXMMENP01FTB31108 3/0[REDACTED]T44-68 [REDACTED] THIEU'S VIEWS ON PEACE TALKS AND BOMBING HALT
XXCC [REDACTED] 28 OCT 68 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SECRET. ((THIS IS)) A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON MR. THIEU'S SPEECH [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 1. Since the Vietnamese government is ardently laboring [REDACTED] together with the U.S. side to put into practice the items that were naturally agreed upon at the U.S.-Vietnamese Honolulu Summit Conference (19 July), President Thieu empha sized the point that President Johnson must also keep his promises. ((Thieu)) said that it appears that Mr. Nixon will be elected as the next presid ent, and he thinks it would be good to try to solve the important question of th e political talks with the next president (no matter who is elected. ((Thieu)) b elieves that our standpoint should be prepared and strengthened now rather than in the future. 3. As for the Vietnamese reaction to Mr. Humphrey's statement that "Vietnam does not have the right to reject a decision to halt the bombing", etc. etc. there w as a temporary aggravation, and there was an anti-american demonstration with ad herents to the Catholic and Hoa Hao religions taking the initiative. 4. The general sentiment ((both)) domestic and foreign, towards Thieu's 22 Octob er special proclamation was that it was good and a number of Paris newspapers su pported his views (the [REDACTED] was not mentioned, and next, ((it)) will depen d upon Hanoi's attitude. 5. On the U.S. side, rumors are spreading that one cannot predict what President Thieu is going to do and is adopting a much too stubborn attitude. Reference: at the time of the Vietnamese-U.S. talks, the Vietnamese side consist ed for the most part of the president, vice president and foreign minister, the U.S. side attended with their ambassador, deputy ambassador, and Mr. Hertz, mini ster for political affairs. [REDACTED] XXHH 350 SANITIZED Authority NLJ 10-97 By com, NARA, Date 12-17-10</blockquote> <a name="ftnote10"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote10">10</a> Taken from <a h ref="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/cotp7quv7/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 29.postimg.org/cotp7quv7/Eugene_Rostow_memo.jpg' border='0' alt="Eugene Rostow m emo" /></a> <a href='http://postimg.org/image/6dohrbtmr/' target='_blank'><img s rc='http://s29.postimg.org/6dohrbtmr/Eugene_Rostow_second_memo.jpg' border='0' a lt="Eugene Rostow second memo" /></a> <a href='http://postimg.org/image/ll4hbolhf/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 29.postimg.org/ll4hbolhf/Eugene_Rostow_source_identified_as_Alexander_Sac.jpg' b order='0' alt="Eugene Rostow source identified as Alexander Sac" /></a>
<a name="ftnote11"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote11">11</a> Taken from <a h ref="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/yeljkb5ox/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 16.postimg.org/yeljkb5ox/Rostow_memo_1.jpg' border='0' alt="Rostow memo (1)" />< /a> <blockquote>May 14, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD The attached file contains the information available to me and (I believe) the b ulk of the information available to President Johnson on the activities of Mrs. Chennault and other Republicans just before the presidential election of 1968. As the raw data themselves indicate (and the chronologies I prepared for the Pre sident on November 7 and November 11, 1968), the story falls into three parts: -- the period from October 17 to October 29; -- the period from October 29 to the election, November 5; -- the post-election period. From October 17 to October 29 we received diplomatic intelligence of Saigon's un easiness with the apparent break in Hanoi's position on a total bombing cessatio n and with the Johnson Administration's apparent willingness to go forward. This was an interval, however, when Hanoi backed away from the diplomatic breakthrou gh of the second week of October. Only towards the end of the month was the agre ement with Hanoi re-established. As late as October 28, Thieu, despite the uneas iness of which we were aware, told Amb. Bunker he would proceed, as he had agree d about two weeks earlier. [REDACTED] In the early morning hours of October 29 the President and his advisers met with Abrams. Before going to that meeting, I was telephoned at home by my brother, E ugene Rostow. He reported the first of his messages from New York on Republican strategy -- from Alexander Sachs. During the meeting with Abrams word came from Bunker of Thieu's sudden intransig ence. The diplomatic information previously received plus the information from N ew York took on new and serious significance. President Johnson, in the course of October 29, instructed Bromley Smith, Execut ive Secretary of the National Security Council, to get in touch with the Deputy Director of the FBI, Deke DeLoach and arrange that contacts by Americans with th e South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington be monitored. SANITIZED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 NLJ 10-96 By isl NARA, Date 1-10-11</blockquote> <a href='http://postimg.org/image/ac4ppfp1t/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 16.postimg.org/ac4ppfp1t/Rostow_memo_2.jpg' border='0' alt="Rostow memo (2)" />< /a> <blockquote>This was done, yielding the FBI evidence the folder contains. Before the election, President Johnson asked Rusk, Clifford, and me to consider
the question of whether the story should be made public. On November 4 we recomm ended unanimously against that course on the grounds indicated in paragraph 3 of my teletype report to President Johnson, then at his Ranch. President Johnson agreed. Therefore, he continued, as he had since October 29, to confine his actions to t he implications of Mrs. Chennault's effort for foreign policy. He indicated to N ixon and (probably) Dirksen that he was aware of "China Lobby" activity interfer ing with peace negotiations and wished it to stop. (I can only vouch personally for his reference during the conference call with the three candidates on Octobe r 31; but on the basis of President Johnson's later recollections, it is likely that he took the matter up more bluntly with Dirksen on November 2 and when Nixo n called on him at the Ranch on November 3. After the election, he actively sought and obtained Nixon's cooperation (via Dir ksen) in delivering the word that the President-elect wished the South Vietnames e to proceed to cooperate in moving towards a negotiation with Hanoi. Press clippings reflecting the incident we collected; and, as the file indicates , the matter arose subsequently from time to time. So much by way of a brief guide to the file. * * * I would only add these personal reflections as of mid-May 1973. I am inclined to believe the Republican operation in 1968 relates in two ways to the Watergate affair of 1972. First, the election of 1968 proved to be close and there was some reason for tho se involved on the Republican side to believe their enterprise with the South Vi etnamese and Thieu's recalcitrance may have sufficiently blunted the impact on U .S. politics of the total bombing halt and agreement to negotiate to constitute the margin of victory. Second, they got away with it. Despite considerable press commentary after the e lection, the matter was never investigated fully.</blockquote> <a href='http://postimg.org/image/rmqj3prbl/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 16.postimg.org/rmqj3prbl/Rostow_memo_3.jpg' border='0' alt="Rostow memo (3)" />< /a> <blockquote>Thus, as the same men faced the election of 1972, there was nothing in their previous experience with an operation of doubtful propriety (or, even, legality) to warn them off; and there were memories of how close an election cou ld get and the possible utility of pressing to the limit -- or beyond. W. W. Rostow</blockquote> <a name="ftnote12"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote12">12</a> Taken from <a h ref="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/koa5d0i6f/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 23.postimg.org/koa5d0i6f/FBI_intercept_on_Chennault.jpg' border='0' alt="FBI int ercept on Chennault" /></a> <a name="ftnote13"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote13">13</a> Transcript is p
artly my own and taken partly from <a href="http://hnn.us/article/60446">"Did Ni xon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal."</a> The original fil es can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/di ctabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Convers ations May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Conversation is made up of two files. Direct links to audio files (mp3 format): <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson /archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlights/janapril1968/russell-W98-30/13612.mp3">13 612</a>, <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.ho m/highlights/janapril1968/russell-W98-30/13613.mp3">13613</a>. <blockquote>JOHNSON Hello? OPERATOR Go ahead, please sir. RUSSELL Good morning, Mr. President. JOHNSON How are you, my friend? RUSSELL Good. I'm sorry about the phone being off the hook upstairs. Everybody's running around trying to fix it, and yesterday the phone was (inaudible) somebody's lis tening. JOHNSON Got some kids. I understand you got some children in the house. RUSSELL No no. JOHNSON Every phone's off the hook at my place when I got that sixteen month grandson. H e's a mechanic. He works on it all the time. RUSSELL He's got an inquiring mind. Goes into things. See what it's about. JOHNSON Well, I've got one this morning that's pretty rough for you. We have found that our friend, the Republican nominee-our California friend-has been playing on the outskirts with our enemies and our friends, both-our allies and the others. He's been doing it through rather subterranean sources here. And he has been saying to the allies that "you're going to get sold out. Watch Y alta, and Potsdam, and two Berlins, and everything. And they're [the Johnson adm inistration] going to recognize the NLF. I [Nixon] don't have to do that. You be tter not give away your liberty just a few hours before I can preserve it for yo u." One or two of his business friends divulged it first a couple of days ago, about the time he [Nixon] made the statement that he had rumors that the staff was se lling out, but he did not include me in it. You saw that, didn't you? RUSSELL Yeah. And he sorta retracted that didn't he?
JOHNSON Well. No. Laird put that out. Travelling with him. They have three planes, and h e's on a separate plane and he just, his job is to spread rumors and background the press. They all like him because he's strong for health and education and we lfare. On that HEW Committee. And so, the press likes him, and he puts that out. Nixon comes along and says, "Now I have heard this but I do not believe it." In other words, I do not believe Laird. I believe the president is not crooked. Th ey say he is, but I don't believe he is. He becomes a very strong defender of th e president. The press resents it. They come back and say, "Well hell, why, if y ou don't believe it, why'd your man put it out?" The man who wrote the story is very reliable, Merryman Smith, he's covered the White House under four five pres idents. And. But that is what happened. The next thing that we got our teeth in was one of his associates-a fellow named [John] Mitchell, who is running his campaign, who's the real Sherman Adams [Eis enhower's chief of staff] of the operation, in effect said to a businessman that "we're going to handle this like we handled the Fortas matter, unquote. We're going to frustrate the President by saying to the South Vietnamese, and the Kore ans, and the Thailanders [sic], 'Beware of Johnson.'" "At the same time, we're going to say to Hanoi, 'I [Nixon] can make a better dea l than he [Johnson] has, because I'm fresh and new, and I don't have to demand a s much as he does in the light of past positions." Now, when we got that, pure by accident, as a result of some of our Wall Street connections, that caused me to look a little deeper. RUSSELL I guess so. JOHNSON And I have means of doing that, as you may well imagine. RUSSELL Yes. JOHNSON And...Mrs. [Anna] Chennault is contacting their [South Vietnamese] ambassador fr om time to time-seems to be kind of the go-between, the Chiang Kai-Shek deal. In addition, their ambassador is saying to 'em that "Johnson is desperate and is j ust moving heaven and earth to elect Humphrey, so don't you get sucked in on tha t." He is kind of these folks' agent here, this little South Vietnamese ambassad or. Now, this is not guesswork. RUSSELL I just . . . I didn't exactly understand how Taiwan got in it. JOHNSON Well, Mrs. Chennault, you knowRUSSELL I know that, but I didn't understand just what Chiang has to do with itJOHNSON Well, I don't know that he has anything, except just generally that lobby. It ma y be [former Minnesota congressman] Walter Judd. I know it's her.
RUSSELL Uh-huh. Uh-huh. JOHNSON Mrs. Chennault, you know, of the Flying Tigers. RUSSELL I know Mrs. Chennault. JOHNSON She's young and attractive. I mean, she's a pretty good-looking girl. RUSSELL She certainly is. JOHNSON And she's around town. And she is warning them to not get pulled in on this John son move. Then he [the ambassador], in turn, is warning his government. Then we, in turn, know pretty well what he [Thieu] is saying out there. So he is saying that well, he's got to play it for time, and get it by the next few days. Now, the Soviets are climbing the wall, and Hanoi is, and of course our people in Paris are, bec ause they have agreed that they will let the GVN come to the table. That has bee n the thing we have insisted on. They have met our demands. The Soviets have sai d that we understand that we're gonna resume if they violate the DMZ and we can see that immediately after we make the announcement whether they are or not. We have reserved the right for reconnaissance and we have made it clear it's an act of force, and not an act of war, in our announcement. And we got South Vietnam, and all the allies aboard on a one day. We announce it one day and we meet the next. But Hanoi wanted more time, so they demanded a couple of weeks, and then t en days, and then a week, and we wouldn't do it, because we thought that Saigon couldn't stand to wait that long between the time of the announcement and the ti me of the meeting. So we have insisted on one day because Hanoi had said product ive discussions could begin the next day. So, we took them at their word. About that time, Humphrey made a fool speech in which he said that he would stop the b ombing without a comma or a semicolon, he'd just make it period. RUSSELL Well, that'd kill the whole thing. JOHNSON Well, it did for ten days, and then Bundy made a fool speech. And they all of th em had to dissect that and take it- (inaudible) Yes yes, the Adlai Stevenson gro up and they just get the tail of the dashboard right at the right time, they do the wrong thing, every time. But we wore that out, we got it back on the track. And in getting it back on the track, meantime, Nixon gets scared to death, so he gets into the thing. And it gets off the track at the other place. Now, everybo dy had approved the one day thing. Then they came along and approved the three d ay thing, and they actually got down to the wording of the announcement, a joint announcement to be made by the two of us. And it was all agreed upon, all satis factory, and then Nixon gets on and says no use selling out now, just wait a few days. And you can't trust Johnson, may want to, really he's gonna pet the North Vietnamese, NLF, on the back, just like Roosevelt did to Russia. And that scare s them. So then they come back, RUSSELL How'd he get that word to them? JOHNSON
He gets it through their ambassador here. And they are really, they think, he's just been mad something's gonna happen this election. And he's just not erratic at all. Now I played no politics with them, and I'm not going to, I've given Hum phrey more hell at their joint meetings than I have Nixon. Nixon's been pretty r esponsible. But I don't want pass up an opportunity to sit here on my fanny, til l he comes in, let him just pick up like Eisenhower did the Korean thing, and sa y, well I did so-and-so. Same time, I don't want another day to go that I don't have to do when I get what I asked for. Now, the effect of the situation I'm in now is effectively letting Thieu say, well, we gotta have more time. First he sa ys we haven't got enough time to get a delegation there. Second, this Ky gets in it, Ky says he thinks we're really winning militarily, just give a few more day s, we'll have everything. And then Ky demands that rather than have a coup, he'd be the adviser in Paris. And we got all those things, now we have put off and p ut off and we are trying to bring them aboard. After we had them aboard, on both times. RUSSELL I thought they were pretty firm. JOHNSON They were. They were all firm. Now Abrams came in, before I finally make up my m ind. And he spent several hours with me. Just he and I. And then he met with a g roup. But he, not only recommends, he urges me, to take this action with or with out them. That we cannot do any good in the North for the next ninety days anywa y. That we need this power in South Vietnam, and we need this power in Laos. And in any event, the guarantees that we get on the DMZ, if they carry them out alr ight, we're not bound. But what we would get at the DMZ which would be reflected two hours after we make the announcement, what we would get there, we'd get by immunity of the cities, permit him to go through the countryside, and with the p sychological advantage of having these fools at the Paris meeting. Kinda wrap up the country. And he says, from a strictly military standpoint, that this milita ry power is no good for ninety days on account of the weather. That it is needed , and will be used, you either get something for it or you don't. Because he's g onna use it anyway. Ninety percent of it in Laos and South Vietnam, even if it d idn't finish ordering here. He would do it there. Because he says it's unlikely you'll get more than one or two days a month. That you can do anything. RUSSELL Well, they've been giving whole lot of reports I didn't understand, I hear they hit a truck and all that thingJOHNSON Well, they've had ten days and we're coming to the last of that ten days. RUSSELL I see. JOHNSON And by the time we put the thing into the meeting, why, there won't be much chan ce. And, in any event, he says this thing has changed so radically since last Au gust. That, not only do we no longer endanger our men, that this gives them much more protection than we'd have if we just followed the existing policy. Now I'v e heard all that, and I've seen all that in cables, but I just didn't take it, I made him come in. And he is much stronger than any of your joint chiefs. His ge neral statement was very much along the lines, of McConnell's. If you remember i t. RUSSELL Yes, I do quite well.
JOHNSON So, we thought it was all gone, already, then at noon yesterday, Thieu comes in and says, no, and now the question is, do you leave him, and Korea and Thailand, they'll all hang together, they're scared to get peace there, so forth. So, we' ve tried to get them back on board. We don't think they're gonna come in the lig ht of the Nixon thing. RUSSELL -Nixon, I never had much in common with him, but damn, if I thought he'd stoop t o anything like that. JOHNSON It may be his agents. All we know is, I saw him on television this morning, in S yracuse last night. And he says that this conference must be broadened to includ e the Soviets. Well, we're talking to them every day, two three times a day, RUSSELL I doubt they really want to see anything. JOHNSON They wouldn't be in it. They wouldn't come to it, and he just makes an ass of hi mself, they are scared to death, the Chinese, everything they do is subterranean . But there's no question they're in it, I met them Sunday night, go back to Kos ygin [Alexei Kosygin] and say that he understood that I was doing this with his full knowledge, and the problem I would have on DMZ and the cities, and understa nd that, and not charge me with deceit. Because they didn't abide by it, I was g onna hit them. And he came back, said my doubts about their biding by it were no t justified. So, he is in it. But Nixon says, "The Soviets oughta be brought in and he says other asian countries must come to the conference." Well, a f ew hours later, this is last night, this morning at nine o'clock, we get a wire from Korea, saying they oughta be in the conference. So, he's kinda playing with the Asians, see, to divide us, and they're trying to do what the Hanoi's been u nable to do for five years. Divide me from Korea, and Thailand. And so forth. An d that's this damn election, for what I think, seriously, what I'll do is this. The South Vietnamese have no good reason for not coming. They say they need more time. So, I think instead of saying thatRUSSELL -two three months, I don't getJOHNSON Well, they said they got to get a delegation, and all that. I think I'll say to them, well I'll give you the next meeting we have now, normally comes up Wednesd ay. We had one today. That gives you a full week. Now they said three four days ago, they'd need a week or ten days. We'll give you a full week. Now, we're gonn a stop. In the next few hours. And we're gonna make an announcement of that. Now , we're gonna say we have understood that you could be president at this meeting a week from now. And we hope you're there. But in any event, we're not going to force us to keep on bombing when we don't want to. And when we got a chance to get them to lay off the DMZ and when we got a chance to get them to lay off the cities and when we got a guarantee you attend the meeting. Now, we just got to b e that blunt. If they come on board, all and well good, if not, we're just in sh ambles, I guess, but I don't think I could defend the people of this country tha t I had everything I asked for and then this sonofabitch vetoed it. RUSSELL No, I don't see how he can refuse to come aboard. JOHNSON Well, he does though.
RUSSELL -damn well better play than that, leave him over there, let him settle it- (near inaudible line) JOHNSON Well, I've carried on five years pretty big failure happened. RUSSELL Well, I don't think that. I think it's been accepted everywhere the reason we're in there is because they wanted us. They don't want us, well by god, a man is n ot that bad, (inaudible), he said, get out now, wish you were up in the air, I t hought, of course not, I'll leave. JOHNSON Well, what I'm thinking, seriously of doing, I'm not talking to any of the other legislators, or anybody outside my little group. And he weren't in it, and I th ought you could get an independent evaluation of how screwey it sounded to you. What I thought of doing would be to say to them this morning, both in Paris and in Saigon, that I'm gonna say tonight or tomorrow morning, that I am stopping th is action. That I have agreed with the other side to meet in Paris. On the sixth . That's the day after the election, our next regular meeting. Next Wednesday. T hat day we agreed the GVN can be there. That's what I've insisted on for years. And I notified them of this effect. Now, I will background, I can't say publicly , but I'll tell two three reporters confidentially, kind of let them leak it out , that they ought to wipe the DMZ the next few days. And I would think twenty fo ur hours they'll be writing stories that obviously Johnson got to them. Peace on the DMZ. And to watch the cities. Now, if I get peace there, than alright, but if I don't, I can still bomb. In any event, I will have stopped it, and we'll an nounce we'll have this meeting. And then if they come aboard, alright, and if th ey don't, well I justRUSSELL I don't see how they can afford not to. JOHNSON Well. Well, suppose they don't. Where am I? If they don't come aboard, if Korea doesn't come aboard, I think they'd just be so afraid about having Uncle Sam out there, that they just couldn't do it. They might think they'd have Nixon. (inau dible) Well, they don't understand their constitutional system. They may think t hey got Nixon. You know, in their country, when something changes, the whole out fit changes. They don't realize they'll have you, and Fulbright, and the whole C ongress that I've had. And they think that they get Nixon, they get all of Nixon 's casinos. Now, they're not gonna- Nixon's not gonna be able to be much harder than I've been. RUSSELL Well. JOHNSON And I don't believe that publicly Nixon can take us on anyway. He may have a lit tleRUSSELL His published statements haven't been too bad. JOHNSON No, no, that's right. RUSSELL
The leak I heard, in one speech, where he supported you much better than Humphre y was. JOHNSON Oh yeah, he says that, but then he says, everybodyRUSSELL I understand, it's in the interest of. I see that. JOHNSON It's just like my getting upset, I know Dick Russell, they say Dick Russell is s o-and-so-and-so-and-so, but I really don't believe that. RUSSELL Yeah. JOHNSON If you didn't believeRUSSELL Exact statement he made tonight. JOHNSON That's right. RUSSELL Well. That's a (inaudible) for sure. I just don't see how that- that Vietnamese government though can stay out of it. JOHNSON Well, don't you see thisRUSSELL They've been admitted to the table. JOHNSON How can I carry on a bombing, when everyone of my joint chiefs, including Abrams , say, from a military standpoint, it's even better that I go the other route at this time? And the only thing they want assurance of is that I would resume it, if I didn't get these actions that we expect to follow, the DMZ, the cities. RUSSELL Well. It'd be very difficult. It'd be very different. What is your old man out t hereJOHNSON Bunker. RUSSELL Yeah. What does he think of it? JOHNSON He wants to give them this week. That I'm giving them. He says this morning to g ive them a week, and I'll call their bluff. That gives them plenty of time, it's not important when they show up at this meeting. If we give them a week. We wer e gonna have the meeting November the 2nd. He says move it back to the sixth, th e seventh. And he and Abrams both have been hardly for this, had them aboard, bu t this other thing came into it. RUSSELL
Does Bunker know what decision. JOHNSON No, I don't think so. I don't think we've got him all the intercepts and things. We have, though, Thieu's talks to his people, and so forth, and he knows that, he knows part of it. But I've ordered them all sent out to them this morning. Bu t you see it's only natural, you look at it from Thieu's standpoint. RUSSELL He's getting something for nothing. JOHNSON He was staying with me, and he was supporting me, and he was going along with it . Then this guy comes in, and says, now let me show you here. Humphrey says, he' s gonna stop it period, without any comma or semicolon. Now, I'm not gonna do th at. Humphrey says that he's not gonna let you veto anything he does. Well, I'm g onna work with you. So, there's that man looking at two horses, a bay and a blac k, and there's no question that Nixon's statements are better for him than the o ther, so he thinks all he's gotta do is hold out two or three days and he's in c lover. RUSSELL But he hasn't got anything to lose, because he's been busting Humphrey with the election. And Nixon loses. Well, he hasn't lost anything. He just took a gamble. JOHNSON That's right. I think I'm gonna move ahead unless you see some reason I shouldn' t. RUSSELL Well, I don't see any, but it's yours if you thinkJOHNSON It is. It is, but we can'tRUSSELL -it's most confusedJOHNSON It's gonna be more confused when the Koreans and the Thais and all your allies s ay you did it just for election purposes. But the one thing, the meeting doesn't take place until after the election. RUSSELL Yeah, that's right. JOHNSON And I think that helps a little. RUSSELL I think that does. That takes some of the curse off. JOHNSON But the announcement comes beforehand, and they say why didn't you do it before, and I'm gonna say because it's Sunday night, that I got the assurances that I w anted. And I had them confirmed by Abrams yesterday. If they wanna come with me, alright, if they don't, don't. Okay, I just want your feel of it. RUSSELL Well, I'm prepared to get it, but little more, I just don't see how they can sta
y out. I just don't see how they can afford to stay out. You're gonna be the pre sident till January 20th anyhow. JOHNSON You wouldn't let him veto you if you were me, would you? RUSSELL No sir, I wouldn't. JOHNSON Thank you, goodbye. RUSSELL I would've been hard as hell on this matterJOHNSON I have. Thank you.</blockquote> <a name="ftnote14"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote14">14</a> The original fi le can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/di ctabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Convers ations May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Conversation is made up of three files. Direc t links to audio files (mp3 format): <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johns on/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlights/janapril1968/dirksenD1641-2/13614.mp3"> 13614</a>, <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt. hom/highlights/janapril1968/dirksenD1641-2/13616.mp3">13616</a>, <a href="http:/ /www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlights/janapril196 8/dirksenD1641-2/13617.mp3">13617</a>. Transcript is my own. <blockquote>OPERATOR Senator Dirksen. JOHNSON Put Senator Dirksen on, I'm ready. I'm in a meeting, tell him I'm in a meeting, but I want to talk, I missed him when I was at the Security Council. OPERATOR Senator Dirksen? It's the president. DIRKSEN Are you in a meeting? JOHNSON Yes, but go ahead. I can hear. DIRKSEN You can say what is the situation. JOHNSON Everett, we have said to the...first of all, I cannot tell you this, that's gonn a be quoted. Because I can't tell the candidates, and I can't tell anybody else. I haven't talked to a human. I want to comply with it, trust, but I sure don't want it told to a human. DIRKSEN I give you my solemn word. JOHNSON
Alright. The situation is this: since September of last year, we have told Hanoi that we would stop the bombing. We're anxious to stop it. When they would engag e in, these are the keywords, prompt, productive discussions that they would not take advantage of. That is September. March 31st I came to the conclusion that no living man can run for office and be a candidate, and have them all shooting at him, and keep this war out of politics, and get peace. So I concluded, that I should not run because I'd just prolong the war by doing it. So I said then, we 're stopping the bombing in ninety percent, we will stop it in the rest. If ther e can be any indication that'll not cost us additional lives. We got, just a lot of procrastination, up until October. During October, they started asking quest ions what did I mean by prompt, and what did I mean by productive. Now, the fact s of life are, they tried two offensives in May and August and they got very sev ere setbacks. The facts are that they've had thirty thousand forty thousand leav e the country to re-fit. The facts are that they're not doing at all well. But t hey can continue to supply what they need for a very long time. But in October w e started getting these nibbles. What did the president mean? What did he say wh en he said he had to have prompt and productive, not take advantage. We said, th at we would consider productive if the GVN had to be present. They said they wer e just generals and stooges, and satellites, and Johnson put them in, always say ing they would never sit down with those traitors. We said, you've got to sit do wn with them, before we can ever work out the future. We can't settle the future of South Vietnam without them being present. We're not going to pull a Hitler-C hamberlin deal. They said they would never do it. So, on October 7th or the 11th , I've forgotten, they said, "Well now, what else, is that all the president wan ts? If we would sit down with the GVN, what would he do?" Now, they made no commitment, they didn't indicate they accepted, they just aske d the question. But, you know, in trading, when a fellow says how much would you take for that horse, you kinda think that means something. So, we followed it u p, and we said, "No, we don't want to limit ourselves. The GVN's got to be prese nt, and we've got to have productive discussions, and we think they could be pro ductive, if they were present. But we can't have a (pamajon?) and say we'll do t hat, and say we'll meet a year from now. It's got to be a prompt meeting, a week , two weeks, three weeks, something like that. So, they said, "Well, if we could work everything out, we could meet the next day." So, we came back the next day , and said, if you let the GVN come in, and we'll meet the next day, we would li ke to take that up with our government. (coughs) They said, "Well, what else do you want? Is that all?" Right off that, Harriman said, "No, these are facts of l ife. We know you're not going to sell out, and engage in reciprocity, and you're not going to accept conditions, and your pride, and your asiatic face will not let you do that. You've got to save face, we understand that. But we could not s it at a conference table if you were shelling the cities." In other words, if I were talking to Dirksen in my living room, and my son was raping his wife, he'd have to get up and leave, quit trading, and run and protect her. So, we just cou ld not sit there, if you were shelling the cities. Nor could we sit there, and h ave a productive discussion if you were abusing the DMZ. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON So, they said, well, that's reciprocity, and we're not gonna pay any attention t o it, and they about that time, Nixon made some little statement about, we handl ed the war wrong, and Hubert said, he was going to stop bombing without any comm a or semicolon, just period. And then Mac Bundy made a fool speech where he said we oughta stop it for nothing. And pull our troops out. So, they picked up and went to Hanoi. And they stayed in Hanoi two weeks, from October 15th to right ab out now. October 11th, I guess. They come back now and, all this time we have be en working with everybody we knew, the governments cannot be named, because it's a life and death to them. They may be invaded. But the Eastern Europeans have b
een helpful, the Indians have been helpful, the Soviets have been helpful, the F rench have been helpful, we've had them all in. And we have talked to some of th em, yeah, every day. And we have told them the clock was ticking and that they c ould settle this in thirty days, they did 1954 in thirty days [the end of the Ko rean war], but that our constitutional processes did not change, we would have a new president, but Mansfield and Dirksen would still be leaders, and Russell wo uld still be chairman of the Committee and Fulbright would likely be chairman. A nd those men would carry on and on, all of our joint chiefs would be the same, s o they needn't delay, even if Humphrey was elected, they wouldn't be getting any better deal. Even if Nixon, they're not gonna be getting any better deal. Now, this is for your information only. We get to the point where it looks like we mi ght get the GVN in the meeting. And they understand thoroughly that they will bu st up the meeting, we won't come back here, Abrams is authorized by the rules of engagement to retaliate himself, if they shoot across the DMZ. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON By launching bombers immediately. And we told them all that. Told the Russians, if that gets into the paper, the deal's off. That's why you cannot say this to a nybody, it's gonna get in the paper. Because these folks are the most sensitive people in the world. But, we have said this, and about that time, some of Mr. Ni xon's people come in and tell both sides, "I have information about who you had a glass of beer with last night, you don't know it, but I do." And we have ways and means, you get my point, don't you? You have ways and means of knowing what' s going on in the country. We know what Thieu says, when he talks out in Vietnam , we know what happens here. And some of Mr. Nixon's people are getting a little unbalanced, and unfrightened, like Hubert did, when he said, no comma, no perio d. Like Bundy did. About the time you called me last week, they started going in to the South Vietnamese embassy and also, sending some word to Hanoi. Which has prolonged this thing, a good deal. The net of it is despicable and if it were ma de public, I think it would rock the nation. But the net of it was, that if they just hold out a little bit longer, that he's [Nixon] a lot more sympathetic and he could kinda, do better business with him than they can with their present Pr esident. And, in Hanoi, they've been saying that, well, if you won't settle this thing, I'm not bound by all these things. So, I haven't had this record, and I could make a little better deal with you. There. I rather doubt Nixon has done a ny of this. But there's no question what folks for him are doing it. And very fr ankly, we're reading some of the things that are happening. So, as a consequence , while Thieu and all of our allies are ready to go on a bombing ceasefire, cess ation, it just may be temporary, we might be back on it in the next day, if they don't follow these two things, if they violate the DMZ, or if they shell the ci ties. We could stop the killing out there, we could get everything we asked for, the GVN in there, but: they got this question, this new formula put in there. N amely: wait on Nixon. And they're killing four, five hundred every day, waiting on Nixon. Now, these folks I doubt are authorized to speak for Nixon, but they're going in there, and they range all the way from attractive women to old line China lobby ists. And some people, pretty close to him in the business world. I was shocked when I looked at the reports. And I've got them. And so forth. Now, Thieu has, t hat's had a little effect on Thieu. He has signed onto this back as early as Oct ober, that this is what we oughta do. As have all the allied governments, as hav e the French, and as have the Russians, the fact that it's busted up is annoying . And all of our people. I told Dick Nixon, and George Wallace, and Hubert Humph rey, that we had to have prompt and productive discussions. And, in order to be productive, the GVN had to be present. It oughta be prompt, it oughta be in a ma tter of weeks, not two or three years. And that they wouldn't take advantage of, that meant they wouldn't be blowing up our house while trying to eat dinner. Th
ey wouldn't be trying to hit the DMZ and the cities. Now, if they do hit the DMZ and the cities, we would just have to come back to bombing the next day. Now th en the facts are, that as of now, the monsoon has started there. The bombing ain 't worth a damn and not gonna be for ninety days in the north. So, without telli ng them, we might quit anyway. If we had nothing in return. Because we need to d o it in Laos where it's drying up and they can really increase their traffic. An d we need to do it in South Vietnam, where they're trying to mount an offensive on Saigon. So, I called in all the joint chiefs, and all of them recommended tha t we stop. And that we take this GVN presence. I called in General Momyer [Willi am Momyer], in charge of air force, because I knew I'd have this LeMay [Curtis L eMay] on my hands, and Momyer's been in charge of it in Vietnam. He operates fro m Thailand. He's down at Langley. And he explained to me, it wouldn't do any goo d where I'm bombing now, if I can get anything out of it, I oughta do it, and th en move it over to the other place, and we can't say we're gonna move it over be cause it'll look like we're not giving them anything, and we're not sincere. If we'd given up bombing the north, we'd have spread more bombs on the south. But h e told me, that was it. Every civilian, every military man we have talked to, an d any good pastor, particularly, is very strong - but I decided I had to talk to Abrams before I reached any conclusion. He sent me a cable, and said he would d o it, without the cities, and without the DMZ, if they just let the GVN be prese nt because he in effect is going to do it anyway. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And he said, psychologically, the GVN being present will really wreck the Viet C ong because it'll mean that their supporters, the Soviets, and the Hanoi, have r eally recognized them, or they wouldn't let them come at the meeting. Well, that 's what our folks think, I don't know, we're gonna let the NLF come in at the me eting, so we're not recognizing them, but they think psychologically this'll rea lly do them up in the South, and Westmoreland, and Abrams, and Momyer, think the y've had them whipped since September. They think they're whipped. So, Abrams ca me in at 2:30 yesterday morning, or day before yesterday morning, and he drove t wenty four hours straight time, and stayed there till four o'clock. And he was j ust as strong as horse radish, and said this oughta be done. We took this, and I went back to Paris, and asked Paris, how many times they'd told them that they had to respect the cities and respect the DMZ and they counted up, and they came back here, and told them twelve times, now they've never agreed to it, because they will not agree to reciprocity. But they know that if they don't do it, that Abrams may trigger Abrams' reaction, just on again off again, just a matter of hours, the bombing will be resumed. So, then we went back to the Soviets, and we said we don't want to deceive anybody, this is close to the election, it's a ve ry delicate period, I have told Nixon and Wallace and Humphrey all the same thin g, and I'm telling you now. Nixon said, do you have to have all three of them? A nd I said, no, I really don't have to have any of them, if I thought, I said, if they do any little thing, I would stop the bombing. But I'd like to have all th ree, and I'm gonna try and get all three. Well, in effect, that's what we're lik ely to get. So, I went back to the Russians, and said, now, we don't want to be deceitful, and if we should start bombing, the meeting's gotta be prompt. The DM Z's gotta be respected. And the shelling of the cities has got to stop. And we k now you can't guarantee it, but we want you to be damn sure we know it. Because the moment we stop, if you re-start this, you're gonna be hit with interest, and we're gonna double the force. And Abrams is gonna come to Washington, he can do it automatically. Now, we - I, Lyndon Johnson - have grave doubts that they'll stop shelling the cities or the DMZ because if they do, they just admit they've lost South Vietnam. So, I went to Mr. (inaudible) and he came back, and he said, the doubts the pres ident has are unjustified. That he thinks they want peace. So, then we went to t
he Indians, and the Indians came back and said the same thing. Now, that's where we are. We're here now, talking to our folks here, talking about the rules of e ngagement, and what Abrams would do if we stopped the bombing, if they should hi t Saigon, and we're trying to conclude that and we're going to try and have Vanc e [Cyrus Vance] go back and be sure they don't misunderstand any of the language , be sure they're willing to let the GVN come in the room. 'Course a communist a greement ain't worth a dime, they might walk out. But you're gonna have to some time test it. And Clifford says and Bus Wheeler [Earl "Bus" Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] says, you gotta test their faith, they might not mea n it. But that's about where it is. Now, no decision has been reached, no order has been issued. It takes about twelve hours from the time we make a decision... until we issue the order. The meeting, no meeting, could take place before the e lection. The meeting would have to take place after the election, but it's my fe eling that I ought to, the first minute I can, stop the killing if I can, and no t keep justifying I quit the race for the presidency to get peace and put peace before politics. Unlike some sonofabitch like Rafferty [Max Rafferty, a Californ ia Senate candidate, whose profile on-line is here: <a href="http://www.fofweb.c om/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=TJY382&DataType=AmericanHistory&WinTyp e=Free">"Rafferty, Max from The Johnson Years, Presidential Profiles."</a >] out here in Los Angeles say, well, Johnson's playing politics, or, I thought Dick's statement was ugly the other day, that he had been told that I was a thie f, and a sonofabitch, and so forth, but he knew my mother, and she really wasn't a bitch. I mean, you set up a statement like that, then deny it, it's not very good, because he knows better, and it hurt my feelings, you damn republicans get mean when you get into politics, and I think it's cost him a lot of votes, I th ink he's losing the last few days, because of that statement. I played it clean, I talked to Eisenhower about it, I made Wheeler brief him, I' ve told Nixon every bit as much if not more than Humphrey knows, I've given Hump hrey not one thing, and up to now, Nixon and the Republicans have supported me j ust as well as the Democrats and a helluva lot better than McCarthy and Fulbrigh t and the rest of them. But he got into politics and when this goddamn Mel Laird , he told them the other day that Joe Califano and the other were shoving me. We ll, Joe Califano can't spell Vietnam, he's never been in one meeting with me. Bu t that's what he put out. Now, the men I rely on are Bus Wheeler, General Westmo reland, Admiral Moorer, General McConnell the Chief Staff, General, head of the Marine Corps, General Momyer, who's down at Langley but in charge of air, Genera l Abrams, Ambassador Bunker, and Dean Rusk. I don't pay much attention to even t he subordinates over in the other place. Now, I've been at this five years, and if I don't wanna sell my country out, I'd have sold it out five months ago and g one on, run for president and got this war behind us, then got me re-elected. Bu t I am a conscientious, earnest fella trying to do a job. And I'm gonna do it. I get peace at four o'clock Saturday noon, I'm damn sure gonna get it, come hell or high water, and woebe onto the guy who says you oughta keep on killing. But I really think it's a little dirty pool for Dick's people to be messing with the South Vietnamese ambassador and carrying messages around for both of them. And I don't think people would approve of it if it were known. So, that's why I'm afr aid to talk. Now, when I make a decision, and we're meeting again this afternoon, and we met all morning this morning, and we're out there and it's 5:30 in Saigon now, we're awaiting probably 6:30, six o'clock to see what answers they'll get. We had to wait until Abrams got back home, he left, and he had to fly twenty four hours, s o he got in there three o'clock. Straight through. When we do, the first thing I 'm gonna do is call you if it's five minutes from now, or five hours, or five da ys, and I never know, I thought a hundred times in the last month it'd be five h ours. But nobody knows when you're dealing with eight countries with all the fol ks in Paris, with all the folks in Saigon, and here. I'm gonna call you and Mike Mansfield on the phone, I'm gonna tell you exactly what I told you now. I can't
add a damn thing to it. If we stop the bombing, they are gonna agree the GVN is gonna come to the conference table promptly and productively, and we'll stay st opped if they don't hit the cities. And if they don't go across the DMZ. If they do, we'll be right back at it and Abrams got his orders and he's here the other day. Now, we'll just test their faith. I don't see it making any difference in the political campaign cuz first of all, conference won't happen till it's over with, I think I'd be glad to say that all the candidates have a, co-operate with me and we oughta have one voice in foreign affairs. And while they criticize my conduct of the war, they have never told the enemy that he'd get a better deal. But this last few days, Dick is getting just a little bit shakey, and he's piss ing on the fire a little. Now, you oughta guide him just a little bit, because t hey're not running against me, I'm not gonna be here, you're gonna be my senator , and you're gonna represent me, and whatever I want done, I'm gonna be down at Purnell. But he oughta go back to that old (inaudible), say...as a matter of fac t, we have a transcript where one of his partners said he's gonna play this one just like Fortas. He's gonna take the Republicans and the Southerners and he's g onna frustrate the President by telling South Vietnamese, just wait a few more d ays and he's not connected to this war, he can make a better peace for them. And by telling Hanoi, that he isn't running this war, didn't get them into it, be a lot more considerate of them than I can, because I'm pretty inflexible, calling them sonsofbitches. Now, that's not very easy to work under those conditions. A nymore than it is, when Hubert says he'll stop the bombing without a comma semic olon but period. They neither one of them got a damn thing to do with it between now and January the 20th. And I'm gonna stop the earliest second I can. And I c an stop it for nothing if I want to, I have five times before. But I'm not gonna stop it unless they agree the GVN will be at that table. I'm not gonna stop it unless they agree the GVN are gonna be at that table. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON I'm not gonna stop it unless they understand if they want that table blown up al l they got to do is hit the DMZ or the cities. And if I do that, it's complete, absolute 100% all we've asked for since last September. Now, I'd be glad to have any suggestions or judgements or advice, that you've got to give. DIRKEN That GVN, you mean the governmentJOHNSON That means, these satellites, these stooges, puppets, that they've been referrin g to, that they'd never go in a room with. The people who were elected president and vice president, Thieu and Ky. That's been the thing that's held it up. You can't divide up a country, settle it, if you won't let their president come. Unl ess you're Hitler, and Sudetenland, and Chamberlin, and stuff like that. So, bas ically, we have said they have got to have self-determination. And if you're gon na make a decision, that affects them, whether it's the '52 Geneva accords, wher ever you put the boundary lines, you gotta be present. They said shut up, we wil l never let them come in the room. Now, they started asking. If we would let the m come in the room, what else would you make us do? Now, that indicates to us th at we can do it, and Vance is talking to them right today. DIRKSEN Yeah. So that's it. JOHNSON Now what do you think about it? DIRKSEN
Well. I certainly don't quarrel with the way you've handled this matter. And of course (inaudible) the fellows on my side give every (inaudible). They wonder wh at the impact would be if a ceasefire or a halt to the bombing could be proclaim ed at any given hour. What the impact could be on the result next Tuesday. JOHNSON Well I don't know what it'd be. I don't know- First, it's not gonna be any cease fire. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Second, if there's gonna be anything, which we have to decide, and which we're t rying this very minute, it would be just stopping the bombing as we've done six or eight times. But the big question would be: is what did they stop? If they st opped the cities, and if they stopped the DMZ, then there'd be a lot of hard neg otiation that would last several months. It wouldn't stop the war at all. But it might stop the killing temporarily. As a matter of fact, it's been cut down to a hundred the last two weeks. And, to me, when Nixon's saying "I want the war st opped. That I'm supporting Johnson. That I want him to get peace if he can. That I'm not gonna pull the rug out on him." I don't see how in the hell it can be h elped unless he goes to fartin' under the cover and getting his hand under someb ody's dress. And he better keep Mrs. Chennault and all this crowd tied up for a few days cuz he's got the right formula, and I think he done well. I think Humph rey screwed himself up. John Connolly told me he's gonna lose Texas just because he's shedding it on the war. DIRKSEN Well. That's it. I'll have to separate this out a little. Course he'll call agai n. JOHNSON Well, just don't put it in the paper. Tell him the first people- There're gonna be two calls I'm making. And you have to be prepared to get them at any time. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON One of them's gonna be you and Mansfield and leaders. The other's gonna be the c andidates. Both of you gonna be told the same identical thing. The damn man that says he thinks the war oughta go on under these conditions, continue to bomb wh en they say "Let the GVN come," and when we tell them if they bomb the cities we 'll be resuming it in one hour, I don't think anybody can justify that. So I thi nk that everybody oughta have a statement ready and oughta say, "Well, they have apparently given the president what he asked for," and this doesn't mean we got peace at all, it just means we're stopping the bombing and they gonna agree to let this have prompt, productive discussions that we've been raising hell about since September. So I compliment General Abrams, General Westmoreland for bringi ng them to this state of military affairs where they've got to agree to it. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I've supported it all along, and I thank god my conscience I've never pulled the rug out from under my commander-in-chief. Now, that's the way I treat Eisen hower and that's the way you've treated me up to now. And don't you get so damn eager for eighty three percent vote that you go cut me out there in the last few
days. DIRKSEN You know I wouldn'tJOHNSON I know you wouldn't do it. I know you wouldn't. But Dick, I don't quite understa nd his people. I don't know whether he knows it or not, but the other day he cam e out here, he said "They say Johnson is a thief. But I knew his daddy and I don 't think he's a thief, and they say he's a sonofabitch, and I knew his mother, s he's not a bitch." Well, hell he advertised all over the country, he left, he pl anted the idea, he knew goddamn well I've been fair to him. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I didn't like that. And I found out Mel Laird was the one operating on it. Y our friend Mel Laird. DIRKSEN Yeah, I haven't seen him around. Anywhere. JOHNSON How's your campaign coming? DIRKSEN Well, it's coming on pretty fair. JOHNSON Well now, would you do this any differently than the way I've been trying to do it? DIRKSEN No, I wouldn't. JOHNSON I could've settled this thing and stopped the bombing a month ago. But I've been trying to get all of my three things. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Do you understand, don't you, that they are not agreeing that they will stop she lling the cities? DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON You understand that they are not agreeing to respect the DMZ? DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON But they do know that if they don't do either, we're not stopping the bombing ei ther. So we're right where we started. What they are agreeing, if we ever pull o ff the deal, that the GVN can come in the meeting, and that's what Rusk says is
absolutely imperative. DIRKSEN Yeah. That would be the government, the constituted government. JOHNSON The elected government of Vietnam. That all of these men went out there, you app ointed some men to go out from your outfit, I think Rusk went, I've forgotten. A nd they watched the election. Thieu was elected, and Ky was elected. And I hope you think this is alright. DIRKSEN Well, I do. JOHNSON Thank you. DIRKSEN Okay.</blockquote> <a name="ftnote15"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote15">15</a> Transcript take n from <a href="http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21894.htm" >"Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969 : Documents 142-169"</a>, Document 166: "Transcript of Telephone Conversation Am ong President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallac e". <a name="ftnote16"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote16">16</a> Video of the sp eech can be found on youtube: <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHj2OvuyHI I">"The President: October 1968. MP901."</a> A transcript of the speech can be f ound at the Miller Center: <a href="http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/d etail/3389">"Remarks on the Cessation of Bombing of North Vietnam (October 31, 1 968)"</a>. <a name="ftnote17"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote17">17</a> The original f ile can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/d ictabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Conver sations May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Direct links to audio files (mp3 format): <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlight s/janapril1968/mcnamara-W366-5/13701.mp3">13701</a>. Transcript is taken from <a href="http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21895.htm">"Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969 Document s 170-192: November 1-12, 1968: South Vietnamese Abstention From the Expanded Pe ace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair"</a>, "171. Telephone Conversation Bet ween President Johnson and Robert McNamara". <a name="ftnote18"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote18">18</a> Transcript take n from <a href="http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/vii/21895.htm" >"Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 1969 Documents 170-192: November 1-12, 1968: South Vietnamese Abstention From the Ex panded Peace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair"</a>: "172. Telephone Convers ation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell". <a name="ftnote19"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote19">19</a> Taken from <a h ref="http://consortiumnews.com/2012/03/03/lbjs-x-file-on-nixons-treason/">"LBJ's 'X' File on Nixon's 'Treason'"</a> by Robert Parry. The transcript is my own: <a href='http://postimg.org/image/q5tc03ifd/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 4.postimg.org/q5tc03ifd/NSA_Thieu_report_1.jpg' border='0' alt="NSA Thieu report (1)" /></a>
<blockquote>ZCZCKAB647 PP [REDACTED] DE [REDACTED] 2972250 P 232045Z FM DIRNSA TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY) ZEM <strike>T O P S E C R E T TRINE</strike> TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY. [REDACTED] XXMMENP01FTB23108 3/0/[REDACTED] -68 [REDACTED] THIEU'S VIEWS ON NLF PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT XXCC [REDACTED] 19 OCT 68 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OF WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU SAID [REDACTED] ON 18 OCTOBER. 1. President Thieu pointed out the facts that had been discussed [REDACTED] alon g with what was reported [REDACTED] concerning the NLF delegation's eligibility to participate in political talks, the thing they cannot come to an agreement on , President Thieu said he concurs on the items that were agreed upon at the unof ficial talks between the U.S. and North Vietnamese delegations, and, as for what U.S. ambassador to Korea Porter said, the problem lies in the understanding. He said that the reason for the Vietnamese government opposing the NLF's partici pation in the political talks in an independent capacity is that the Vietnamese constitution holds the communist party to be illegal, and the point is that the NLF shifts its position at Hanoi's beck and call; accordingly, ((Thieu)) is adop ting the viewpoint that it is all right for the ((NLF)) to participate as a memb er of Hanoi's delegation. He said that in the event that the NLF delegation part icipates in an independent capacity it would not merely mean that we are legaliz ing the communist party, but the communist side would maintain their coalition, and since we do not know what demands thy would make on the U.S. and Vietnamese governments, we must prevent this.</blockquote> <a href='http://postimg.org/image/mxoun1w5l/' target='_blank'><img src='http://s 4.postimg.org/mxoun1w5l/NSA_Thieu_report_2.jpg' border='0' alt="NSA Thieu report (2)" /></a> <blockquote>4. In this matter of the NLF delegation's eligibility, he is conscio us of the necessity of [REDACTED] clearly to the U.S. side the Vietnamese govern ment's viewpoint before the opening of the political talks. The reason for this is that, for the sake of protecting ourselves against the great possibility, aft er the political talks are held, of U.S. and world opinion criticizing just the Vietnamese government one-sidedly when the Vietnamese government's delegation th inks the circumstances ((dictated)) withdrawing from the site of the talks on th e NLF matter. 5. [REDACTED] as to whether or not the Vietnamese are opposing the U.S. in this and concerning the possibility ((of the U.S.)) making a decisive move to halt th
e bombing alone; the following [REDACTED] He said the U.S. can, of course, cease bombing, but is unable to block Vietnam ( (from bombing)). Concerning the enforcement of the bombing halt, this will help candidate Humphrey and this is the purpose of it; but the situation which would occur as the result of a bombing halt, without the agreement of Vietnamese gover nment, rather than being a disadvantage to candidate Humphrey, would be to the a dvantage of candidate Nixon. Accordingly, he said that the possibility of Presi dent Johnson enforcing a bombing halt without Vietnam's agreement appears to be weak; [REDACTED] just how effective can it be within the short time before the e lection, even though it is effectively enforced? 6. He said that since the military and political situations within Vietnam are d eveloping to our advantage, the longer we can delay the time ((of the bombing ha lt)) the greater will be the advantage to the Vietnamese side. 7. He said that in the even the present government recognize the NLF, they will lose the confidence of the people and would not be able to ([REDACTED] control) them. Military authorities or a group of powerful anti-communist people might un dertake a revolution. 8. At this time, [REDACTED] to President Thieu the new stand that [REDACTED] the President is adopting, as in item two of [REDACTED] that there is no difference between Korea's stand in the matter and that of the Vietnamese government, shed light on the point that ((Korea)) is strongly backing ((the Vietnamese governme nt)) and [REDACTED] the opinion that it is best that [REDACTED] two countries wo rk closely together and take as much time as possible ((on these matters). [REDACTED] ((A)) Not available. ((B)) In series check. [REDACTED] XXHH 800</blockquote> <a name="ftnote20"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote20">20</a> The original fi le can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/di ctabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Convers ations May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Direct link to audio file (mp3 format) is: <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlight s/janapril1968/dirksenD1641-2/13706.mp3">13706</a>. Transcript is partly my own and partly from <a href="http://hnn.us/article/60446">"Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal."</a> <blockquote>DIRKSEN Hello? JOHNSON Everett, how are you? DIRKSEN All right. JOHNSON I want to talk to you as a friend, and very confidentially, because I think that we're skirting on dangerous ground. I thought I ought to give you the facts, an d you ought to pass them on if you choose. If you don't, why, then I will a litt le later. DIRKSEN
Yeah. JOHNSON We have, on October the 13th, an agreement where Thieu and Ky, considering the b ombing halt. At that time, President Thieu stressed, quote There must not be a l ong delay. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON That is, a delay between the halt and the conference. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON On October the 15th, Thieu agreed to a proposal that we worked out of 36 hours. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON On October the 23rd, after the North Vietnamese demanded two or three weeks, Thi eu reluctantly agreed to three days delay. On October the 28th, we agreed on the joint announcement. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Bunker and Abrams reached an explicit agreement with Thieu that the gap between the bombing and the talks would be two or three days. With three days the outer limit. Both Thieu and Ky stressed on us the importance of a minimum delay. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Then we got some of our friends involved. Some of it's your old China crowd... DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And...here's the latest information we've got: the agent says that she's- they'v e just talked to the boss [Nixon] in New Mexico, and that he says that you must hold out, that . . . Just hold on until after the election. Now, we know what Thieu is saying to 'em out there. We're pretty well informed o n both ends. Now Nixon's man travelling with him today, said quote He did not un derstand that Thieu was not aboard. Did you see that? DIRKSEN No, I didn't. Who was that? JOHNSON We don't know...no idea. He speaks through these unknown people. Now, we told Ni xon as we told Thieu...now, let me get the transcript. While this was going on, we went out to Thieu and talked to him, and all of our allied countries, and the
y all tentatively agreed. Now. Since that agreement, we have had problems develo p. First, there's been speeches that we ought to withdraw troops. That was Humph rey and Bundy. Or: that we stop bombing, without getting anything in return. Or: some of our folks, including some of the old China Lobby, are going to the Viet namese embassy and saying, please notify the President, that if he'll hold out t ill November 2nd, they can get a better deal. JOHNSON Now, I'm reading their hand, Everett. I don't want to get this in the campaign. DIRKSEN That's right. JOHNSON And they oughtn't to be doing this. This is treason. DIRKSEN I know. JOHNSON I don't know whether it's [Melvin] Laird; I don't know who it is that is putting it out, but here is the UPI [item number] 48 that came in tonight. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I'm calling you only after talking to [Dean] Rusk and [Clark] Clifford and a ll of 'em, who thought that somebody ought to be notified as to what's happening . DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Here's the Nixon release. "A highly placed aide to Richard Nixon said today: the South Vietnamese decision to boycott the Paris talks did not jibe with the c onfidential assurances given the three major candidates by Johnson. We had t he impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in a row, said the Nixon associ ate." Now, I just read you what I told them. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I told you that, and I told everyone else. "Johnson got Nixon, democratic ca ndidate Humphrey, and third party hopeful Wallace on a conference call about the bombing. The adviser," Nixon's adviser, "volunteered the GOP candidate's reacti on on the condition that he not be identified. Nixon said that the adviser felt that Saigon's refusal to attend the negotiations could jeopardize the military a nd the diplomatic situation in Vietnam. And reflect the credibility of this admi nistration." JOHNSON Now, I can identify 'em, because I know who's doing this. I don't want to identi fy it. I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter this important. DIRKSEN Yeah.
JOHNSON I don't want to do that. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON But if they're going to put this kind of stuff out, they ought to know that...we know what they're doing. I know who they're talking to, and I know what they're saying. And my judgement is, that Nixon oughta play it just like he has all alo ng. That I want to see peace come the first day we can. That's not going to affe ct the election one way or the other. The conference is not even going to be hel d until after the election. They have stopped shelling the cities. They h ave stopped going across the DMZ. We've had twenty four hours of relative peace. Now, if Nixon keeps the South Vietnamese away from the conference, well, that's going to be his responsibility. Up to this point, that's why they're not there. I had them signed on board until this happened. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Well, now, what do you think we ought to do about it? DIRKSEN Well, I better get in touch with him, I think, and tell him about it. JOHNSON I think you better tell him that his people are saying to these folks that they oughtn't to go through with this meeting [in Paris]. Now, if they don't go throu gh with the meeting, it's not going to be me that's hurt. I think it's going to be whoever's elected. DIRKSEN That's right. JOHNSON It may be-my guess-him. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I think they're making a very serious mistake, and I don't want to say this. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And you're the only one I'm going to say it to. DIRKSEN Yeah. I understood they're gonna be in Texas tonight. JOHNSON I don't know. All I know is that, I read you what I told him, the three candidat es, just as I told you. I said, now, there has been speeches that some we oughta withdraw troops, and including some of the old China crowd, going in and implyi ng to the embassies.
JOHNSON Now, Everett, I know what happens there. You see what I mean? DIRKSEN I do. JOHNSON And I'm looking at his hole card. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON Now, I don't want to get in a fight with him there. I think Nixon's gonna to be elected. DIRKSEN Yeah. JOHNSON And I think we ought to have peace, and I'm going to work with him. DIRKSEN That's right. JOHNSON I've worked with you. DIRKSEN That's right. JOHNSON [with Dirksen assenting] But I don't want these sons of bitches like Laird givin g out announcements like this, that Johnson gave them the wrong impression. I ga ve them the right impression, except I gave it to him decently, when I said that you ought to keep the Mrs. Chennaults and all the rest of 'em from running arou nd here. Now, you see, I know what Thieu says to his people out there. DIRKSEN Yeah. I haven't seen Laird. JOHNSON Well, I don't know who it is that's with Nixon. It may be Laird. It may be [Bryc e] Harlow. It may be [John] Mitchell. I don't know who it is. I know this: that they're contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war. DIRKSEN That's a mistake! JOHNSON And it's a damn bad mistake. DIRKSEN Oh, it is. JOHNSON [with Dirksen assenting] And I don't want to say you, and you're the only man th at I have enough confidence in to tell 'em. But you better tell 'em they better
quit playing with it, and the day after the election, I'll sit down with all of you and try to work it out and try and be helpful. But they oughtn't knock out t his conference. DIRKSEN Wherever they are, I'll try and get hold of them. JOHNSON Well, there are two things they ought to do. One is, they ought to stop this bus iness of trying to stop this conference from taking place. It takes place the da y after the election. DIRKSEN Exactly. JOHNSON The second thing is, we can all sit down and talk about it after that time. I'm not a bitter partisan here, and you know it. DIRKSEN I know. Well, I'll try and find a way wherever they are tonight. JOHNSON Well, you just tell them that their people are messing around in this thing and if they don't want it on the front pages, they better quit it, number one. Numbe r two, we better sit down and talk about it, soon as this thing is over with, we 'll try to work out an- and they ought to tell their people that are contacting these embassies to go on with the conference. DIRKSEN Okay. I agree.</blockquote> <a name="ftnote21"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote21">21</a> See footnote #1 . <a name="ftnote22"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote22">22</a> See footnote #1 . <a name="ftnote23"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote23">23</a> See footnote #1 9. <a name="ftnote24"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote24">24</a> See footnote #1 9. <a name="ftnote25"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote25">25</a> See footnote #1 9. <a name="ftnote26"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote26">26</a> See footnote #1 9. <a name="ftnote27"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote27">27</a> The original fi le can be found at <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/di ctabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan69.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ'S Telephone Convers ations May 1968-January 1969"</a>. Direct link to audio file (mp3 format) is: <a href="http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlight s/janapril1968/nixonD1202-15/13710.mp3">13710</a>. Transcript from <a href="http s://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v07/d187">"Foreign Relation s of the United States, 1964-1968 Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968-January 19 69, Document 187"</a>.
<a name="ftnote28"></a><a href="#bkfrftnote28">28</a> Audio is taken from file on youtube <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubVzX3y_yVE&fea ture=player_embedded">"Smathers LBJ VN68"</a>, via <a href="http://hnn.us/articl e/60446">"Did Nixon Commit Treason in 1968? What The New LBJ Tapes Reveal."</a>. The following transcript is partly my own, and partly taken from <a href="http: //hnn.us/article/60446">"Did Nixon Commit Treason"</a>. I was unable to obtain the time and date of this conversation from <a href="http ://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/dictabelt.hom/highlights/may68jan6 9.shtm">"Highlights from LBJ s Telephone Conversations: May 1968 January 1969"</a> . However, one can determine that it took place late in the day of November 3, 1 968 from th

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