The Latell Report

July 2012

The Latell Report analyzes Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, and is published periodically. It is distributed by the electronic information service of the Cuba Transition Pro ect !CTP" at the #niversity of $iami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban%&merican 'tudies !ICC&'".

Cubas Intelligence Machine

(ithin a fe) years of its inception in *+,* the Castro brothers- foreign intelligence service rose into the elite ran.s of the best in the )orld. Retired CI& officers I consulted as I )rote Castros Secrets stand in a)e of ho) the Cubans )ere able to build up such e/ceptional clandestine capabilities to run productive penetration operations against &merican targets and ingeniously deceive the CI&. 0ne &gency officer admitted to me ruefully, 12oy did they do a ob on us.3 &nother said, 1They )ere better than us. In truth )e lost during much of the Cold (ar to the Cubans.3 Current and former 42I officers agree. They share a grudging admiration for )hat until *+5+ )as .no)n as the 6eneral 7irectorate of Intelligence, the 76I, and the ease )ith )hich it burro)ed spies and moles and agents of influence into significant &merican institutions, including, according to Cuban defectors I have intervie)ed, universities, the 'tate 7epartment and the Congress. 0ne former 42I officer )ho trac.ed Cuban intelligence told me, 1They outperformed us by any ob ective measure.3 These &mericans )ere referring specifically to the 8uarter century of Cuban%&merican intelligence ousting from *+,* until the summer of *+59. It )as then, in the )aning years of the Cold (ar, that 4lorentino&spillaga, a senior and highly decorated Cuban intelligence officer, defected into &merican hands from his post as the 76I Center chief in 2ratislava, no) the capital of 'lova.ia. :e is )idely ac.no)ledged to have been the most important defector ;among a surprisingly large number%% to betray the Castros and their secret services. &fter threats against his life by former colleagues, &spillaga no) lives obscurely )ith a ne) identity. :e has made no public appearances or spo.en on the record since the late *+5<s. 2ut during more than a dozen hours of intervie)s he shared )ith me shoc.ing secrets of Cuban intelligence tradecraft and operations. I have no doubt about &spillaga-s authenticity as a true defector or any of the secrets that he has told. :is value )as so great that throughout the CI& and 42I hierarchies no doubts about him )ere ever e/pressed. :e unveiled Cuban double agent and penetration operations and detailed ho) the 76I had penetrated &merican targets, mainly in (ashington and $iami. &nother defector I intervie)ed said that Cuban intelligence 1has been targeting &mericans ;the great enemy= for fifty years. 'o it is not surprising they have had so many successes.3 That focus permits a concentration of resources, efficiencies of scale, and the development by the Cubans over time of a depth of e/pertise. &merican targets are 1the raison d->tre3 of Cuban intelligence, according to still another e/perienced defector I intervie)ed. 2ut &spillaga-s decision to betray his former masters proved to be an historic turning point. :e

e/posed double agents thought by the CI& to have been bona fide operatives )or.ing against Cuban interests. $oles and spies )or.ing for the Castros and operating in the #nited 'tates )ere bared and neutralized. Cuban operations ;including sophisticated medidasactivas ;active measures, or covert actions= )ere compromised. In short, the virtually free ride the 76I had en oyed until &spillaga-s defection abruptly ended as Cuba became a prime target for &merican counterintelligence, a respected )orld%class foe. :is reporting enabled &mericans to better understand ;and more easily counter=aggressive Cuban tradecraft. Covert Cuban operations abroad )ere temporarily hobbled, no)here more decisively than in Latin &merica. &ccording to another defector )ho confided in me, more than *?< Cuban operatives in the region )ere compromised and ta.en out of service after &spillaga began unreeling his secrets. 6radually, in the years since his flight the intelligence )ars )aged across the 4lorida 'traits have resulted in many notable &merican successes. 0nly four Cuban spies )ere arrested in the #nited 'tates bet)een *+?+ and *++?. Then, since 'eptember *++5, about four dozen undercover Cuban agents have been prosecuted or other)ise neutralized. $ore than thirty )ere members of the spra)ling Avispa, or (asp, net)or.. 'i/ other &mericans )or.ing for Cuban intelligence have also been prosecuted successfully. They include academics, &na $ontes ;the super Cuban mole in the 7efense Intelligence &gency, an analyst )or.ing for the 'tate 7epartment-s intelligence bureau, and a high%level official of the Immigration and @aturalization 'ervice. 'till others )ho )ittingly assisted Cuban intelligence are no longer able to function as viable Cuban assets. It )as, therefore, in the aftermath of &spillaga-s defection that the many advantages Cuban intelligence had )ielded against &merican interests began decisively to diminish. Previously a highly decorated Cuban intelligence operative, &spillaga became a genuine &merican hero. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 7r. 2rian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and author of the boo., After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castros Regime and Cubas Ne t !eader, is a 'enior Research &ssociate at ICC&'. :e has informed &merican and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and 4idel Castro in a number of capacities. :e served in the early *++<s as @ational Intelligence 0fficer for Latin &merica at the Central Intelligence &gency and taught at 6eorgeto)n #niversity for a 8uarter century. 7r. Latell has )ritten, lectured, and consulted e/tensively. :is ne) boo., Castros Secrets: The CIA and Cubas Intelligence "achine# )as published in &pril B<*B by Palgrave $acmillan. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA The CTP can be contacted at P.O. Box 248174, Co al !ables, "lo ida ##124$#%1%, Tel& #%'$ 284$C(B) *2822+, "ax& #%'$284$487', and b, e-ail at ct..iccas/-ia-i.edu.