CANADA, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND KYOTO:

Why we were right to pull out of the Protocol

Abstract: The UNFCCCs Kyoto Protocol was once hailed as the (saviour) for the worlds changing climate and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The protocol set out to cap emissions in industrialised countries, encourage climate-friendly projects and help developing countries economies by aiding them in implementing more environmentally friendly practices. In reality, the protocol is ineffective and inefficient. By not indcluding all major emitting countries, it compromises the attempts of countries trying to reach their targets. Its lack of insight into emissions reduction measures has the potential to create more problems than were originally present, and its lack of legally binding consequences mean that no ratified country has any true motivation to get their emissions under control. Keywords: Kyoto, CDM, Annex II, climate change, GHGs, emissions

Introduction Changes to the global climate were long considered to be a process so slow they could only be measured in geological time. Scientists in the late 20th century however, were accumulating an increasing mountain of evidence to suggest that climate change was not a gradual centuries-long process as previously thought, but was actually occurring almost as fast as than their research could report (Weart 2003). The implications of these findings were quickly realised worldwide, and in 1992 at the first Earth Summit, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty was created, followed by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Kerr 2000). The latter protocol was originally signed by 83 nations, but ended up being ratified by 191 countries in subsequent years. The signing-ratifying process proved to be a source of controversy, as the United States and Russia both originally signed the protocol, but then refused to ratify, though the latter eventually ratified the agreement in late 2004. Australia initially signed the protocol as well but did not ratify until 2007, and in 2011, Canada appeared to shock the world by removing itself from the Kyoto Protocol just weeks before the withdrawal deadline. Although that announcement was met with outrage by the some of the UNFCCC and much of the general public, who felt the withdrawal was purely about profit and politics, the underlying motivations behind Canada reneging on the protocol relate more to the flaws of the treaty itself and its specific consequences for the country (Leach 2011). While the Kyoto Protocol was an essential first step towards building a comprehensive international agreement on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Canada was right in pulling its support, as the treaty was inherently, fatally flawed. Though it tries to combat global GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol is futile; it does not hold all major polluting nations accountable, rewards ineffective emissions reduction measures, and has no legally binding consequences for noncompliance. Lack of global inclusiveness One of the major issues associated with the Kyoto Protocol is that it does not include all major emitting nations, namely China and India, as Annex I states. This is one of the main issues Canada had with the treaty (Curry and McCarthy 2011). Though these two countries are still developing and it is regrettable that they would be thus limited in their ability to undergo the industrial revolution many countries move through during development, their populations and economies are growing at such speeds that their GHG emissions top any other country (WRI 2011). With the current agreement, neither China nor India are subject to any sort of emissions target at all, rather they were projected to and have greatly succeeded in increasing their emissions. Exclusion of these nations from the collective emissions reduction targets has been a major point of contention for other countries throughout the past two decades, and was a strong factor in the United States (another major emitter) decision not to ratify the agreement (Kerr 2000). That event ended up crippling the agreement even more, as those three countries emit more GHGs than any other country in the world. Omission of these three countries from the protocol puts the ratified Annex II countries at an economic disadvantage. Investment of time and money by those developed nations into emissions mitigation projects and CDMs (Clean Development Mechanisms) incur major economic costs (Rollings-Magnusson and Magnusson 2000), and as China and India are held to no emissions standard under the protocol, they will incur no economic costs as their emissions continue to rise.

Ineffective reduction mechanisms The basic premise of the Kyoto protocol is for ratified countries to lower their own emissions and help lower the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, while also aiding developing nations in keeping their respective emissions low (RollingsMagnusson and Magnusson 2000). The former is supplemented by the cap-and-trade system of carbon allowance and offset trading, and the latter by implementing clean development mechanisms (CDMs) in non-Annex I countries. With these two mechanisms in place, a developed country really has little motivation to drastically cut its own emissions, as it can use the carbon trade market to essentially buy the right to emit greenhouse gases, and also fund CDMs in other areas (Kerr 2000). Though the clean development mechanisms seem like an ideal way to aid developing countries in bypassing the typical, GHG-intensive industrial revolution, some of these CDMs, such as forestation projects, have the potential to do more climactic harm than good (Totten et al. 2003) Reforestation and afforestation can be considered good CDMs because they are a simple, seemingly natural mechanism to increase CO2 sequestration from the atmosphere. Although forestation seems like the ideal project, the restrictive guidelines for forest activities under the Kyoto Protocol may lead to projects that are in fact detrimental to the environment (Totten et al 2003). Afforestation is defined as the reforestation of an area that has not been forested for over 50 years and Annex II countries are given credits for this type of restoration (Hepburn 2007). Encouraging these actions however, can actually be more of a detriment, as the protocol does not define what type of land should be afforested. (Totten et al. 2003). Converting grasslands or wetlands will likely result in more CO2 being released to the atmosphere than if the land were left alone, as wetlands and grasslands have been proven to be massive carbon sinks (Vicari et al 2011, Don et al 2009). Reforestation can be a better choice, but only if the project has been subject to precise, detailed analysis (Totten et al 2003). Everything from tree species to fertilisation used must be accounted for; planting non-native monocultures has severe impacts on the local ecosystem biodiversity and can lead to problems with soil, water loss and pests, while fertilising those non-native trees with nitrogen in a typically phosphorous-limited tropical system can actually lead to an increase in N2O production, counteracting any carbon sequestration by the plantation (Hall and Matson 1999). Although the UNFCCC requires all CDMs to prove additionality (RollingsMagnusson and Magnusson 2000), Kyoto allows countries to claim some credits for nonadditional, business-as-usual practices. The former Soviet Union countries in Eastern Europe had their targets set before the impending fall of communism (Schuster 2009). This meant that the inefficient factories and coal-burning plants from Soviet rule were still in use and skewed the baseline data for those countries towards having higher emissions. The rapid shutdown of these factories once their countries were no longer a part of the Soviet Union resulted in many Eastern European states easily meeting and exceeding their targets (Schuster 2009). The additionality issue arises when one considered the fact that the actions leading to that surplus of credits were well on their way to happening with or without the Protocol. Because this could technically be considered business-as-usual, there are debates as to the validity of these excess credits

(Hepburn 2007). The protocol also runs into problems involving additionality with regards to its allocation of credit to countries with large forested areas and a strong forest industry. These countries, like Canada and Russia, would be able to do claim automatic credits (12 and 33 Mt C, respectively) for forest management processes that would have been accomplished with or without a climate agreement (van Kooten 2003) and are therefore not additional. Zero reductions? Zero consequence. The lack of legal repercussions in the case of noncompliance highlights yet another weakness in the Kyoto Protocol. Although Canadas original emissions target was set to 6% below the 1990 levels, the end of 2011 saw that the countrys emissions had increased by almost 30% relative to the baseline (Leach 2003). One of the possible consequences for noncompliance under the Kyoto Protocol included buying enough carbon credits within 100 days to offset the total increased emissions (UNFCCC 2008). As the 30% increase in Canadian emissions amounted to approximately 800 Mt of carbon, the price of offsetting emissions would cost the country 13-19 billion dollars, an astronomical sum that would have severely detrimental repercussions for the Canadian economy (Leach 2011). The protocol also stated, however, that if the country did not or could not buy the required number credits within the 100 days they could make up the difference in the next commitment period along with 30% interest (UNFCCC 2008). Interestingly enough, Canada had already made it clear that it would not be signing on to the second commitment period, so technically could have stayed in the Protocol and avoided any excess financial burden that came from not paying off all of its carbon debt though the first clause (Leach 2011). The Protocol is not legally binding, and specifically states within itself that countries in non-compliance would face no further financial repercussions (van Kooten 2003), meaning that Canada could have technically ignored all noncompliance penalties without specific consequence. Carrying out the latter suggestion however, would have been surely impacted Canadas international reputation, but Canada was still able to remove itself from Kyoto through yet another clause in the agreement which stated that, if a country were to decide to remove itself, it would have to do so at least one year before the first commitment period was up (CITE). Although the decision was unpopular and unwelcome, the withdrawal announcement was made before that oneyear cut-off and Canada technically did nothing wrong. Conclusion Though the Kyoto Protocol was effective in getting climate change moving towards the forefront of political agendas, the agreement as a whole has too many flaws to be truly successful. Canadas decision to pull out of the treaty was based upon these issues. In excluding major emitting countries, like China and the United States, from emissions targets, the protocol undermines any efforts made by other Annex II countries to stem the increasing flow of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, as the reductions from the latter countries will be overwhelmed by the increase of emissions from the former. The vague policies regarding clean development mechanisms are ineffective, as they exclude some potential GHG-reducing projects such as certain types of reforestation, yet include some possibly harmful projects such as afforestation of wetlands and grasslands. Finally, without any true consequences for countries, there was no real

motivation for any nation to spend the time and money on such deep emissions cuts. Without worldwide participation, fair and effective reduction mechanisms and legally binding language, any subsequent treaty after the Kyoto Protocol is subject to failure.
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