ANTI-SEXUAL HARRASMENT AT OF 1995 (RA 7877)

1. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Medrano

ISSUE:

Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher, filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a sworn letter-complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and grave misconduct (administrative case). While the administrative case was pending investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six months without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order. The flaw in Medranos argument that the execution of Dumalaogs Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the HELD: the administrative complaint against Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog

administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct and independent character of the remedies available to

The

Ombudsman

rendered

its

decision

with

an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer . It provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.)administrative . These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,

the administrative case and found Medrano guilty of grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not only the factual findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Bian, Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in theadministrative case.

simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it would later be repudiated,

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Ombudsmans jurisdiction over

and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.

the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsmans decision in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs decision but was denied.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint, Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman. Hailed as the protectors of the people, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching

2. authority, powers, functions, and duties to act as on complaints against public provided in Sections 12 and 13. officials and employees,

Aquino vs Acosta

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the against institution erring of

Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing gifts for t he t hr ee j udg es o f th e C TA , i ncl u di ng r es po n de nt . I n th e aft er n o on of t he sa m e day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek. On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, sayi ng h e w i l l g et s o me thi ng i n her offi c e. S h or tl y th er eaft er , h e e nt er ed h er r oo m, s ho ok her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away. On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could se e hi m i n hi s c ha mb er s i n or d er t o di s cus s s o m e mat ter s . W h en c o mpl ai na nt ar r i ved th er e, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, w hi l e c o mpl ai n ant and her c om pa ni o ns w er e co ng r at ul ati ng an d ki ssi ng eac h ot h er , r es po n de nt suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her. In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her.

appropriate administrative proceedings officers or employees.

public

In

light

of this,

the

Court

holds

that

the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd .

While

Ombudsman

should

have

desisted

from

hearing

Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left. The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and a sk ed her t o s e e hi m i n hi s of fi ce t o di sc uss t h e Se nat e bi l l o n th e C TA . S he ag ai n r eq ue st ed R ub y to acc o m pany her . Th e l att er ag r ee d b ut sug g est ed t hat t h ey sh o ul d act as i f t he y me t by acci d ent i n r esp o nd e nts offi c e. R u by th en a ppr oac he d t he s ecr e tar y s ta bl e w hi ch w as se par ate d fr o m r es p on d en ts offi c e by a tr a nsp ar e nt g l ass. For her par t, complainant sat i n f r o n t o f r es po n de nt 's ta bl e a nd ask e d hi m w hat he w a nt ed t o k now a bo ut t he Se nat e bi l l . R es po nd e nt seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself b ut r esp o nd e nt h el d her ar ms ti g htl y, pul l e d h er tow ar ds hi m a nd ki ss e d h er . S he pus h ed hi m away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his fac e w i t h hi s h an ds. T h er ea ft er , co mpl ai nan t l eft cr yi ng a nd l ock ed her s el f i nsi de a co mf or t room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it wont happen again. Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.

the administrative complaint against Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing Ombudsmans acts under

the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman . In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsmans acts belatedly.

Held: No, Judg e Acosta is not g uilty of sexual harassment. H e is exoner ated of the charg es against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment. A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favour and does not fall within the purview of sexual harassment under RA 7877.

3.

Paiste vs Acosta

Facts:
Complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer. She testified that on August 7, 2000, at about 3:00 p.m., a representative from the Plaridel Insurance Co. came to their office seeking clearance. She immediately prepared the necessary form and, together with the representative, went to see respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. When she asked him to sign the document, respondent, who was at that time playing tong-its (a card game) at the lawyers table with unnamed individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He shouted at her: Why did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the Supreme Court? She responded that such was not her intention and reminded him of his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign their clearance. He did not sign the clearance, sent then out and shouted Bullshit ka! at her thrice. They all then went out of the courtroom and proceeded back to the staff room. She went to her table and buried her face in her hands, crying. Respondent followed her and continued uttering unsavory remarks. Thereafter, he asked the utility aide to buy him four bottles of beer. Goltiao declared that her working relationship with the respondent is sometimes good and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. He easily gets mad at her even for small, trivial mistakes. This situation started, according to her, when she told him to stop courting and sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She related an incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to see him inside the judges chamber. At that time, the designated judge was not around. Once inside, she was told to sit in one of the chairs in front of the judges table. The respondent, who was sitting at the judges chair, then extended his hand to her, as if he wanted to shake her hands. She reciprocated by extending her hands and jokingly put his hands on her forehead (agmanmano). She afterwards tried to free her hands off his but he would no let her. Instead, he told her, Wait for a while, I would just like to tell you something. I love you, is that okay? Tell me that you love me too. No strings attached. She retorted, As if you are my father. Spurned, he got mad. This kind of incident happened at least ten more times. Furthermore, respondent sent her love notes. He wrote his love messages on pieces of paper in front of her and handed them to her.[9] She knew that they were intended for her as there was nobody else present when he gave the notes to her. He would also call her at her mothers house. She did not respond affirmatively to his display of affection as both of them are married. Finally, she explained that she filed a complaint against him only on August 10, 2001 because of the August 7, 2001 incident, when she got fed up at the way he treated her.

ISSUE: WON Accused is guilty of the charges filed against him. Ruling: Under the circumstances, we find respondent guilty of sexual harassment. His severely outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working [35] environment for his female subordinates. He abused the power and authority he exercises over them, which is the gravamen of [36] the offense in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power being exercised by a [37] superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous advances.

ANTI-FENCING LAW (PD 1612)

1. D.M Consuji vs. Ramon Esguerra

deprivation of ones property.

Ruling: In the instant case, the first and second elements were duly established. Qualified theft had been committed. Quantities of phenolic plywood were stolen and were discovered in the premises of private respondents. The question is whether the third element exists. Did private respondents know or should they have known that the phenolic plywood were the subjects or proceeds of crime? Dizon-Pamintuan gives us the guidelines: "One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact . Thus, the prima facie presumption was successfully disputed. The logical inference follows that private respondents had no reason to suspect that said plywoods were the proceeds of qualified theft or any other crime. Admittedly, there is no jurisprudence to the effect that a receipt is a sufficient defense against charges of fencing. But logically, and for all practical purposes, such receipt is proof although disputable that the transaction in question is above-board and legitimate. Absent other evidence, the presumption of innocence remains. 2. Dunlao vs CA Intent to gain is an element in Anti-Fencing Law. However, it need not be proved. For the mere possession of any good, article, etc. of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. In the case at bar, Dunlao was found in possession of farrowing crates and GI Pipes inside his compound, they were even displayed in his shelves. His testimony that a group of people alighted from a jeep and left the items in front of his shop is to no avail as it is held contrary to the fact that he displayed such items in his shelves. Such act presupposes a presumption that there is intent to sell such items. 3. Dela Torre vs COMELEC

The crime of fencing is a crime involving moral turpitude as the element of knowledge displays some degree of malicious

BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (BP 22)

1. Mejia vs. People

2.

Lopez vs People

Facts: Petitioner prosecuted for estafa. The prosecution presented the testimonies of private complainant Efren R. Ables and Valentin Luzuriaga, a bank teller of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The prosecution presented Exhibits "A" to "E" with submarkings consisting of the check issued by the petitioner, the demand letter sent by private complainant to petitioner and bank records to show that the said check was dishonored as the account was closed even before the said check was issued. Petitioner contends first that there was absence of deceit as the complainant knew that there was no funds at the time of the issuance of the check. But it was settled that it is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the nonpayment of a debt. Afterwards, Petitioner contends that no presumption or prima facie evidence of guilt would arise if there is no proof as to the date of receipt by the drawer of the said notice "since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 3-day period" from receipt of notice of dishonor of the check within which the amount necessary to cover the check may be done as provided by paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Ruling: The absence of proof as to receipt of the written notice of dishonor notwithstanding, the evidence shows that petitioner had actual notice of the dishonor of the check because he was verbally notified by the respondent and notice whether written or verbal was a surplusage and totally unnecessary considering that almost two (2) months before the issuance of the check, petitioner's current account was already closed. Under these circumstances, the notice of dishonor would have served no useful purpose as no deposit could be made in a closed bank account. Therefore, it may be gleaned from the fact that notice of written dishonour is not a defense in estafa, however, as may be seen in the next case, there should be explicit, actual and written notice to the drawer of the check.

Facts: The trial court found that petitioner issued the check as guarantee for his loan obtained from Bernardo. At the time he issued the check, he knew that his account with the PNB had been closed. When Bernardo deposited the check, it was dishonored by the PNB, the drawee bank, for the reason "account closed." Petitioner was duly notified of such dishonor. In fact, he admitted having received Bernardo's demand letter urging him to make good the check within five (5) banking days from notice. But petitioner failed to heed such demand. Ruling: Issuing a check merely as guarantee is not a defense in the crime of BP22, as compared to that of estafa. Also, the argument that the subject check was issued without consideration is inconsequential. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a worthless check. As stated in the case: The purpose for which the check was i ssued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

3.

Suarez vs People

Facts: Petitioner prosecuted for BP 22 for issuing a check and its subsequent dishonour due to the fact of a closed account. Upon notification, petitioner still has not paid complainant. The evidence shows that the prosecution proved that a notice of dishonor was sent to petitioner through registered mail. The prosecution presented a copy of the demand letter and properly authenticated the registry return receipt. Issue: WON there was sufficient notice to the petitioner to convict him of BP 22? Ruling: It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to show "that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check." A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through registered mail. The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner received such notice, especially considering that he denied receiving it. As there is insufficient proof that the petitioner received notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.

ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972 (RA 6539)

1. People vs Ellasos Facts: Miguel de Belen, who is the registered owner of the tricycle subject of this carnapping case, was last seen by his brother Fernando at the Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992, he (Miguel) was seated beside the accused Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his tricycle which was being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos. Three (3) hours later, Fernando again saw the two accused with the tricycle, but this time without his brother. When Fernando finally asked the accused about the whereabouts of his brother, Ellasos answered that Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos') father in Malasin. The following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de Belen, with a gunshot wound on the head, was found in Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were found sleeping at the gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muoz, and in possession of a gun and the wheel of Miguel's tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered in a culvert. Held: The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the tricycle was unlawfully taken by the two accused from its owner, Miguel de Belen, and the latter was killed on the occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen with the two accused; three hours later, the two were again spotted riding the tricycle without Miguel. The following morning, the two accused were found in possession of a wheel of the tricycle. Such possession, which remained without any satisfactory explanation, raises the presumption that the two accused authored the carnapping. This presumption remains unrebutted. That only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and was intended to be appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The unlawful taking of the tricycle from the owner was already completed. Besides, the accused may be held liable for the unlawful taking of the whole vehicle even if only a part thereof is ultimately taken and/or appropriated while the rest of it is abandoned. The crime was committed before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. Therefore, we have to apply the original provision prescribing the penalty of "life imprisonment to death" where the "owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping". -

owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping, is an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle without the consent of the

2.

People vs Sirad Facts: George Lozano, the victim in this case, made a living by delivering bread around General Santos City using a red Kawasaki motorcycle owned by his employer Aniceto Dela. In the morning of February 4, 1992, he left his house early at around 5:00 a.m. to get bread from the bakery of Aniceto Dela. He returned to his house two hours later and after taking his breakfast, left again at past 7:00 A.M. proceeding towards Barangay Sinawal. At about 9:00 a.m. Martillano Lozano was picking cotton at a cotton farm in Sitio Cabuay (Cabuway), Barangay Sinawal, General Santos City when he saw his cousin George Lozano pass by riding his red Kawasaki motorcycle with the bread box attached at its side. At around 12:00 noon he again saw the red motorcycle pass by, but this time it was not George who was riding the motorcycle but three men and the bread box was no longer attached to the motorcycle. Rita Pino, a co-worker of Martillano Lozano at the cotton farm also saw the red Kawasaki motorcycle pass by the cotton farm at around noon of February 4, 1992, driven by accused-appellant Akmad Sirad with the other accused-appellants Orlie Sultan and Salik Amino riding at the back. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, Martillano Lozano reported to Nenita Lozano, wife of the victim George Lozano, that he saw the motorcycle of George Lozano ridden by another person and that the bread box was no longer attached to the motorcycle. Around 5:00 in the afternoon Nenita Lozano was worried because George Lozano who usually arrived at that time had not arrived. She then went to the wake of Bernardino Lozano where she could ask the people there about her husband's whereabouts. A search party was organized and they looked for George Lozano by tracing the usual routes he would take in delivering bread. On February 7,1992, an informant provided information that a motorcycle was hidden in Purok Islam, General Santos City and that it would soon be transferred to Cotabato. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, a motorcycle with two men on board approached the police roadblock. The motorcycle sped up when its driver Akmad Sirad recognized police officer Domantay. The police officers gave chase on board their motorcycles and were able to overtake and apprehend Akmad Sirad and his companion Orlie Sultan. When Akmad Sirad was asked to explain why they have the motorcycle of the deceased George Lozano, accused told Domantay that he was instructed by Salik Amino to deliver the vehicle to Sultan Kudarat.

Section 14, the penalty for carnapping in case the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime the death penalty was suspended, accused are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. CEDHT

Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping, is an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

3.

People vs Mejia

Ruling: The special complex crime of carnapping with homicide refers to the consummated act of killing. Therefore, if it is merely frustrated homicide/ murder, as the case may be, the offense should not be denominated as the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, but is merely an act that includes the use of violence/ threat/ intimidation.

4.

People vs Tan

Held: During the commission of the crime, which was on February 4, 1992, there was no crime denominated as carnapping with homicide. The proper denomination for the crime is carnapping as defined and penalized under of Republic Act No. 6539, Sections 2 and 14. Under Republic Act No. 6539,

Prepared by: Shenna Jane Parado