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LAS 10 CATEGORIAS DE ARISTOTELES (Extrado de: http://plato.stan ord.ed!/entr"es/ar"stotle# $ate%or"es/ A!tor: &a!l St!dt'ann( past!dt'ann)da*"dson.ed!+

,. The Ten#-old D"*"s"on

,.1 General D"s$!ss"on
After providing his first system of classification (el a!tor se re "ere a la $las" "a$".n en $!atro t"pos de ent"dades ( *"sta en $lase+( Aristotle turns to the predicamenta and presents a second, which ends up occupying him for much of the remainder of the Categories. Aristotle divides what he calls ta legomena ( !, i"e" things that are said, into ten distinct #inds ($%&'!" (hings that are said according to Aristotle, are words (De Int $)a*!, and so it is natural to interpret his second system as a classification of words" And %ecause the +nglish word ,category- comes from the .ree# word for predicate, one might naturally thin# of the second system as a classification of distinct types of linguistic predicates" (here is, however, considera%le de%ate a%out the su%/ect matter of the second system of classification" (here are three reasons to th"n/ that Aristotle is not primarily interested in words %ut rather in the o%/ects in the world to which words correspond" 0irst, his locution ta legomena is in fact am%iguous, as %etween ,things said-1where these might or might not %e words1and ,things spo#en of-1where these are more naturally ta#en to %e things referred to %y means of words" 2econd, Aristotle3s e4amples of items %elonging to the various categories are %enerall0 extra#l"n%!"st"$" 0or instance, his e4amples of su%stances are an individual man and a horse" (hird, Aristotle e4plicitly accepts a doctrine of meaning according to which words conventionally signify concepts, and concepts naturally signify o%/ects in the world (De Int $)a*!" 2o, even if he is in some sense classifying words, it is natural to view his classification as ultimately driven %y concerns a%out o%/ects in the world to which our words correspond" (hose scholars dissatisfied with the linguistic interpretation of Aristotle3s second system of classification have moved in one of several directions" 2ome have interpreted Aristotle as classifying concepts" (he o%/ections raised against the linguistic interpretation, however, can again %e raised against the concept interpretation as well" 5ther scholars have interpreted Aristotle as classifying e4tra6linguistic and e4tra6 conceptual reality" 0inally, some scholars have synthesi7ed the linguistic and e4tra6 linguistic interpretations %y interpreting Aristotle as classifying linguistic predicates in

& so far as they are related to the world in semantically significant ways" Although 8 thin# that this latter interpretation is pro%a%ly the one that %est withstands close te4tual scrutiny, the general character of the second system of classification is most easily seen %y focusing on the e4tra6linguistic interpretation" 2o, in what follows, 8 shall simplify matters %y tal#ing as if Aristotle3s first classificatory system is really a classification of e4tra6linguistic items9 and 8 shall note pla$es at 1h"$h s!$h an "nterpretat"on a$es d" "$!lt"es. :hat then is Aristotle3s second classificatory system; <uite simply, "t "s a l"st o h"%hest /"nds( 1h"$h are also /no1n as categories" (hat there are highest #inds (or perhaps that there is one single highest #ind! can %e motivated %y noticing the fact that the ordinary o%/ects of our e4perience fall into classes of increasing generality" =onsider, for instance, a maple tree" 8t is in the first instance a maple and so %elongs in a class with all and only other maples" 8t is also, however, a tree and so %elongs in a %roader class, namely the class of trees, whose e4tension is wider than the class of maples" =ontinuing on, it is also a living thing and so %elongs in a class whose e4tension is wider still than the class of trees" And so on" >ow, once this %asic pattern is %efore us, we can as# the following ?uestion@ does this increase in generality go on ad infinitum or does it end at a class that is the most general possi%le; Aoes it end, in other words, at a highest #ind; 8t might seem that the answer to this ?uestion is o%vious@ of course there "s a h"%hest /"nd 1 %eing" After all, someone might argue, everything e4ists" 2o the class that contains all and only %eings must %e the class with the greatest possi%le e4tension" 8n the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle argues that %eing is not a genus (BBC%&*, $D'B%*$!" According to Aristotle, every genus must %e differentiated %y some differentia that falls outside that genus" Eence, " 2e"n% 1ere a %en!s( "t 1o!ld ha*e to 2e d" erent"ated 20 a d" erent"a that ell o!ts"de o "t" 8n other words, %eing would have to %e differentiated %y so'e non#2e"n%( which, according to Aristotle, "s a 'etaph0s"$al a2s!rd"t0" Although he does not e4plicitly ma#e this claim, Aristotle3s argument, if cogent, would generali7e to any proposal for a single highest #ind" Eence, he does not thin# that there is one single highest #ind" 8nstead, he thin#s that there are ten@ ($! su%stance9 (&! ?uantity9 (*! ?uality9 (F! relatives9 ('! somewhere9 ()! sometime9 (G! %eing in a position9 (C! having9 (B! acting9 and ($D! %eing acted upon ($%&'6&aF!" 8 shall discuss the first four of these #inds in detail in a moment" Hut doing so will ta#e us into matters that, while interesting, nonetheless distract from the general nature of the scheme" 2o 8 will first discuss some of the general structures inherent in Aristotle3s second system of classification, and then proceed to a more detailed discussion" 8n addition to positing ten highest #inds, Aristotle also has views a%out the structure of such #inds" +ach #ind is differentiated into species %y some set of differentiae" 8n fact, the essence of any species, according to Aristotle, consists in its genus and the differentia that together with that genus defines the species" (8t is for this reason that the h"%hest /"nds are "nde "na2le 1 %ecause there is no genus a%ove a highest #ind, one cannot define it in terms of its genus and a differentia"! 2ome of the species in various categories are also genera 1 they are, in other words differentiated into further species" Hut at some point, there "s a lo1est spe$"es that "s not !rther d" erent"ated. Inder these species, we can suppose, fall the particulars that %elong to that species"

* >ow, if we accept the characteri7ation of sa"d#o and present#"n that 8 have given, we can see that Aristotle3s two classificatory systems can, so to spea#, %e laid on top of each other" (he resulting structure would loo# something li#e the following"

2u%stance 2aid6of >ot Lresent68n >ot 2aid6of >ot Lresent68n

<uantity Jelatives <uality K 2aid6of Lresent68n >ot 2aid6of Lresent68n

2ome features of this system are worth pointing out" -"rst, as 8 have already noted, Aristotle gives pride of place in this scheme to primary su%stances" Ee says that were primary su%stances not to e4ist then no other entity would e4ist (&%)!" As a result, Aristotle3s categorialism is firmly anti6Llatonic" :hereas Llato treated the a%stract as more real than material particulars, in the Categories Aristotle ta#es material particulars as ontological %edroc# 1 to the e4tent that %eing a primary su%stance ma#es something more real than anything else, entities such as 2ocrates and a horse are the most real entities in Aristotle3s worldview" Moreover, among secondary su%stances, those at a lo1er le*el o %eneral"t0 are what Aristotle calls 3pr"or "n s!2stan$e4 than those at a h"%her le*el (,25+. 2o, for instance, human is prior in su%stance than %ody" :hether this is to %e interpreted in terms of the greater reality of the #ind human is an open ?uestion" >onetheless, Aristotle3s e?uating an increase in generality with a decrease in su%stantiality is at least in spirit strongly anti6Llatonic" (here is one other interesting general feature of this scheme that is worth pointing out %efore loo#ing at its details" Aristotle3s re/ection of the view that %eing is a genus and his su%se?uent acceptance of ten distinct highest #inds leads to a doctrine concerning %eing itself that is at the center of Aristotle3s Metaphysics" (8t should %e noted, however, that there is genuine disagreement over the e4tent to which Aristotle accepted the doctrine of %eing that appears in the Metaphysics when he wrote the Categories.! According to Aristotle, some words do not e4press a genus %ut instead are what he calls pros hen ho'on0's 1 that is, homonyms related to one thing (pros hen), variously called cases of ,focal meaning- or ,focal connection- or ,core6dependent homonymy- in the literature on this topic ($DD*a*' ff"!" 2uch words are applica%le to various items in the world in virtue of the fact that those items all %ear some type of relation to some one thing or type of thing" An e4ample o s!$h a ho'on0'( a$$ord"n% to Ar"stotle( "s 3health04. A regimen, he says, is healthy %ecause it is productive of health9 urine is healthy %ecause it is indicative of health9 and 2ocrates is healthy %ecause he has health" 8n this case, a regimen, urine and 2ocrates are all called ,healthy- not %ecause they stand under some one genus, namely healthy things, %ut instead %ecause they all %ear some relation to health" 2imilarly, according to Aristotle, things in the world are not %eings %ecause they stand under some genus, %eing( 2!t rather 2e$a!se the0 all stand "n a relat"on to the pr"'ar0 2e"n%( which "n the Categories he sa0s "s s!2stan$e. (his e4plains in part why he says in the Metaphysics that in order to study %eing one must study su%stance ($DDFa*&, $D&Ca$D6$D&C%C!"

6. 7hen$e the Cate%or"es8

(he issue concerning the origin of the categories can %e raised %y as#ing the most difficult ?uestion there is a%out any philosophical position@ why thin# that it is correct; :hy, in other words, should we thin# that Aristotle3s list of highest #inds contains all and only the highest #inds there are; 5ne might, of course, re/ect the idea that there are some metaphysically privileged #inds in the world" Hut here "t "s "'portant to d"st"n%!"sh 2et1een I9TER9AL A9D E:TER9AL ;<ESTIO9S $on$ern"n% a s0ste' o $ate%or"es" :e can approach category theory e4ternally in which case we would as# ?uestions a%out the status of any system of categories, whatsoever todo el ?ue sea" 2o, for instance, we could as# whether any s0ste' o $ate%or"es '!st exh"2"t so'e /"nd o dependen$0 on the '"nd( lan%!a%e( $on$ept!al s$he'es or 1hate*er" Jealists will answer this ?uestion in the negative, and idealists of one stripe or another in the affirmative" 8n addition, we can as# a%out our epistemic access to the ultimate categories in the world" And we can adopt positions ranging from a radical s/ept"$"s' a%out our access to categories to a #ind of "n all"2"l"s' a%out such access" 8f, on the other hand, we approach $ate%or0 theor0 ro' an "nternal perspe$t"*e, we 1"ll ass!'e so'e ans1er to the external =!est"ons and then go on to as# a%out the correctness of the system of categories under those assumptions" 2o, for instance, we might adopt a real"st perspe$t"*e and hence assume that there "s so'e $orre$t 'etaph0s"$all0 pr"*"le%ed l"st o '"nd and lan%!a%e "ndependent h"%hest /"nds as well as a correct account of the relations %etween them" And we can then try to determine what that list is" >ow, Aristotle certainly %elongs to this latter tradition of speculation a%out categories@ he assumes rather than defends a posture of realism with respect to the metaphysical structures in the world" 8t is thus appropriate to assume realism along with him and then in?uire into the ?uestion of which categories there might %e" 5ne way of approaching this ?uestion is to as# whether there is some principled procedure %y which Aristotle generated his list of categories" 0or, if there is, then one could presuma%ly assess his list of highest #inds %y assessing the procedure %y which he generated it" Infortunately, with the e4ception of some suggestive remar#s in the Topics, Aristotle does not indicate how he generated his scheme" :ithout some procedure %y which one can generate his list, however, Aristotle3s categories argua%ly lac# any /ustification" (he issue is, of course, complicated %y the fact that his list might %e /ustified without some procedure to generate it 1 perhaps we can use a com%ination of metaphysical intuition and philosophical argumentation to convince ourselves that Aristotle3s list is complete" >onetheless, without some procedure of generation Aristotle3s categories at least appear in an uneasy light" And as a matter of historical fact the lac# of any /ustification for his list of highest #inds has %een the source of some

' famous criticisms" Nant, for instance, /ust prior to the articulation of his own categorial scheme, says@

8t was an enterprise worthy of an acute thin#er li#e Aristotle to try to discover these !nda'ental $on$epts9 %ut as he had no guiding principle he merely pic#ed them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments" Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name o post#pred"$a'ents" Hut his ta%le remained imperfect for all that K (>ant( Critique of Pure Reason( Trans$endental Do$tr"ne o Ele'ents( Se$ond &art( -"rst D"*"s"on( ?oo/ I( Chapter 1( Se$t"on 6( 10! According to Nant, Aristotle3s list of categories was the result of an !ns0ste'at"$( al2e"t 2r"ll"ant( 2"t o ph"losoph"$al 2ra"nstor'"n%" Eence, it cannot stand firm as a correct set of categories" As it turns out, although Nant did not #now of any procedure %y which Aristotle might have generated his list of categories, scholars have given a num%er of proposals" (he proposals can %e classified into four types, which 8 shall call@ ($! The Question Approach9 (&! The Grammatical Approach9 (*! The Modal Approach9 (F! The Medieval Derivational Approach. O"P" Ac#rill ($B)*! is the most prominent de ender o the ;!est"on Approa$h. Ee ta#es as evidence for his interpretation Aristotle3s remar#s in Topics 8 B" Ac#rill claims that there are two different ways to generate the categories, each of which involves as#ing ?uestions" According to the first method, 1e are to as/ a s"n%le =!est"on @ 1hat "s "t8 @ o as 'an0 th"n%s as 1e $an" 2o, for instance, we can as# of 2ocrates, what is 2ocrates; And we can answer 1 2ocrates is a human" :e can then direct the same ?uestion at the answer we have given@ what is a human; And we can answer@ a human is an animal" +ventually, this process of ?uestion as#ing will lead us to some highest #ind, in this case 2u%stance" 8f, on the other hand, we had %egun as#ing that same ?uestion of 2ocrates3 color, say his whiteness, we would eventually have ended at the highest #ind ?uality" :hen carried out completely, Ac#rill claims, this procedure will yield the ten distinct and irreduci%le #inds that are Aristotle3s categories" According to the second method of ?uestioning, we are to as# as many different ?uestions as we can a%out a single primary su%stance" 2o, for instance, we might as# 1 how tall is 2ocrates; :here is 2ocrates; :hat is 2ocrates; And in answering these ?uestions, we will respond@ five feet9 in the Agora9 Euman" :e will then reali7e that our answers to our various ?uestions group into ten irreduci%le #inds" 5f all the proposals that scholars have given, Ac#rill3s is the most supported %y Aristotle3s te4ts, though the evidence he cites is far from conclusive" Hut from a philosophical point of view, the ?uestion method suffers from some serious pro%lems" 0irst, it is far from clear that either method actually produces Aristotle3s list" 2uppose, for instance, 8 employ the second method and as#@ does 2ocrates li#e Llato; (he answer,

) let us grant, is ,yes-" Hut where does that answer %elong in the categorical scheme; Ac#rill might respond %y forcing the ?uestion to %e one that is not answered with ,yesor ,no-" Hut we can still as# the ?uestion@ is 2ocrates present6in or not present6in something else; (he answer, of course, is@ not present6in9 %ut where in Aristotle3s list of categories does not present6in %elong; 8t is indeed hard to see" 2imilar pro%lems face the first method" 2uppose 8 were to as#@ what is 2ocrates3 whiteness; 8 might respond %y saying ,a particular-" Again, where does %eing a particular %elong in Aristotle3s list of categories" 5f course, particulars are part of the four6fold system of classification that Aristotle articulates" Hut we are not at the moment concerned with that scheme" 8ndeed, to advert to that scheme in the present conte4t is simply to re6open the ?uestion of the relations %etween the two main systems of classification in the Categories. +ven if Ac#rill can find some plausi%le route from ?uestions to Aristotle3s categories, the methods he propose still seem unsatisfactory for the simple reason that they depend far too much on o!r =!est"on#as/"n% "n$l"nat"ons" 8t may %e that the ?uestions that we in fact as# will yield Aristotle3s categories9 %ut what we should want to #now is whether we are as#ing the right ?uestions" Inless we can %e confident that our ?uestions are trac#ing the metaphysical structures of the world, we should %e unimpressed %y the fact that they yield any set of categories" Hut to #now whether our ?uestions are trac#ing the metaphysical structures of the world re?uires us to have some way of esta%lishing the correctness of the categorial scheme" =learly, at this point we are in a $"r$le that "s too s'all to %e of much help" May%e all metaphysical theori7ing is at some level laden with circularity9 %ut circles this small are generally unaccepta%le to a metaphysician" According to the grammatical approach, which traces to Trendelen2!r% (1ABC! and has most recently %een defended 20 D"$hael ?a!'er (1EE6!, Aristotle generated his list %y pa0"n% attent"on to the str!$t!res "nherent "n lan%!a%e. 5n the assumption that the 'etaph0s"$al str!$t!re o the 1orld '"rrors the str!$t!res "n lan%!a%e( 1e sho!ld 2e a2le to "nd the 2as"$ 'etaph0s"$al str!$t!res 20 exa'"n"n% o!r lan%!a%e" (his approach is ?uite involved %ut for our purposes can %e illustrated with a few e4amples" (he distinction %etween s!2stan$e and the rest o the $ate%or"es, for instance, is %uilt into the su%/ect6predicate structure of our language" =onsider, for instance, the two sentences@ ($! 2ocrates is a human9 and (&! 2ocrates is white" 0irst, we see that each sentence has a su%/ect, namely ,2ocrates-" =orresponding to that su%/ect, one might thin#, is an entity of some #ind, namely a primary su%stance" Moreover, the first sentence contains what might %e called an individuating predicate 1 it is a predicate of the form, a such and such, rather than of the form, such and such" 2o, one might thin#, there are predicates that attri%ute to primary su%stances properties the having of which suffices for that su%stance to %e an individual of some #ind" 5n the other hand, the second sentence contains a non6individuating predicate" 2o %y e4amining the details of the predicates in our language, we have some grounds for distinguishing %etween the category of su%stance and the accidental categories" (he grammatical approach certainly does have so'e *"rt!es" 0irst, we have ample evidence that Ar"stotle 1as sens"t"*e to lan%!a%e and the str!$t!res "nherent "n "t " 2o it would not %e all that surprising were he led %y his sensitivity to linguistic structures to his list of categories" Moreover, some of the peculiarities of his list are nicely e4plained in this way" (wo of the highest #inds are action and passion" 8n hysics 888 *, however, Aristotle argues that in the world there is only motion and that the distinction %etween action and passion lies in the way in which one is considering

G the motion" 2o why should there %e two distinct categories, namely action and passion, rather than /ust one, namely motion; :ell, the grammatical approach offers an e4planation@ "n lan%!a%e 1e d" erent"ate 2et1een a$t"*e and pass"*e *er2s" Eence, there are two distinct categories, not /ust one" Aespite these virtues, the grammatical approach faces a difficult ?uestion@ why thin# that the structures we find in language reflect the metaphysical structures of the world; 0or instance, it may simply %e a historical accident that our language contains individuating and non6individuating predicates" Pi#ewise, it may %e a historical accident that there are a$t"*e and pass"*e *er2s in our language" 5f course, this type of o%/ection, when pushed to its limits, leads to one of the more difficult philosophical ?uestions, namely how can we %e sure that the structures of our representations are in any way related to what some might call the %asic metaphysical structures and to what others might call the things in themselves; Hut one might hold out hope that some /ustification for a categorial scheme could %e given that did not rest entirely on the un/ustified assertion of some deep correspondence %etween linguistic and metaphysical structures" (he Modal Approach, which traces to Honit7 ($C'*! and has most recently %een defended %y Oulius Moravsci# ($B)G!, avoids the defects of %oth the previous two approaches" As Moravsci# formulates this view, the categories are those types of entity to which any sensi%le particular must %e related" Ee says@ According to this interpretation the constitutive principle of the list of categories is that they constitute those classes of items to each of which any sensi%le particular 1 su%stantial or otherwise 1 must %e related" Any sensi%le particular, su%stance, event, sound, etc" must %e related to some su%stance9 it must have some ?uality and ?uantity9 it must have relational properties, it must %e related to times and places9 and it is placed within a networ# of causal chains and laws, thus %eing related to the categories of affecting and %eing affected" 8n virtue of its e4plicitly modal nature, the Modal Approach avoids the defects of the previous two approaches" :hereas the first two approaches ultimately rely on some connection %etween metaphysical structures and what appear to %e merely contingent features of either our ?uestion as#ing proclivities or the structures inherent inherent in our language, the Modal Approach eliminates contingency altogether" Aespite its e4plicitly modal character, the Modal Approach does face a difficulty similar to the one faced %y the <uestion Approach" 8t might turn out that employing the approach yields e4actly the list of Aristotle3s categories, %ut then again it might not" 2o, for instance, every material particular must %e related to a particular" Hut there is no category of particulars" (here are, of course, %eings that are not said6of other %eings" Hut not %eing said6of is not one of Aristotle3s categories" Moreover, must not every material particular %e related to matter; Hut matter is not a highest #ind" 8ndeed, it is far from clear where matter %elongs in the categories" 2o, even if the Modal Approach is a good one for generating some list of #inds, it is not o%vious that it is a good approach for generating Aristotle3s list of #inds" (his pro%lem could of course %e alleviated somewhat if instead of merely appealing to modal structures as such, one could appeal to modal structures that argua%ly Aristotle would have thought are part of the very

C fa%ric of the world" (hen one would at least have an e4planation as to why Aristotle derived the list he in fact derived, even if one is inclined to re/ect Aristotle3s list"

(he last approach to the categories, namely the Medieval derivational approach, goes some way in the direction suggested %ut not ta#en %y Moravsci#3s Modal Approach" (here is a rich tradition of commentators including Jadulphus Hrito, Al%ert the .reat, (homas A?uinas, and most recently their modern heir 0ran7 Hrentano, who provide precisely the #ind of derivation for Aristotle3s categorial scheme found wanting %y Nant" According to the commentators in this tradition, Aristotle3s highest #inds are capa%le of a systematic and argua%ly entirely a priori derivation" (he following ?uotation from Hrentano captures nicely the philosophical import of such derivations" 5n the contrary, it seems to me that there is no dou%t that Aristotle could have arrived at a certain a priori proof, a deductive argument for the completeness of the distinction of categories K (5n the 2everal 2enses of Heing in Aristotle, =h"', section $&! Hrentano3s enthusiasm a%out the possi%ility of deriving Aristotle3s categories is perhaps un/ustified9 %ut the idea that an a priori proof of the completeness of Aristotle3s categories is certainly an intriguing one" Lerhaps the %est representative of this type of interpretation occurs in A?uinas3s commentaries on Aristotle3s Metaphysics" All of A?uinas3s derivation deserves considera%le attention9 %ut for our purposes it will suffice to ?uote /ust a portion of it so as to %ring out its general character as well as one of its more interesting aspects" A predicate is referred to a su%/ect in a second way when the predicate is ta#en as %eing in the su%/ect, and this predicate is in the su%/ect either essentially and a%solutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is ?uantity9 or as something flowing from its form, and then it is ?uality9 or it is not present in the su%/ect a%solutely %ut with reference to something else, and then it is relation" (=ommentaries on Aristotle3s Metaphysics, Hoo# Q, Pesson B, 2ection CBD! (his passage illustrates the tenor of the Medieval derivational approach" A?uinas articulates what appear to %e principled metaphysical principles concerning the way in which a predicate can %e, in his words, ,ta#en as %eing in a su%/ect-" (here are two such ways@ ($! essentially and a%solutely9 or (&! essentially and not a%solutely %ut with reference to something else" (he latter way corresponds to the category of relatives9 the former, to the categories of ?uality and ?uantity" A?uinas then divides the former way of %eing in a su%/ect in terms of form and matter" Ee claims, stri#ingly, that the category of ?uality flo!s from form and that the category of ?uantity flo!s from matter" 8nspecting all of A?uinas3s derivation to determine its cogency is far too large a pro/ect to underta#e here" 8 have ?uoted the portion a%ove to show the way in which the Medieval derivational approach augments in an interesting way Moravsci#3s Modal

B Approach" (he Modal Approach, 8 argued, would gain some plausi%ility if there were some way of seeing Aristotle3s own attitudes a%out the modal structures in the material world somehow determining the generation of the categories" Hy invo#ing a com%ination of a priori sounding semantic principles and theses a%out the relationship %etween form and ?uality and matter and ?uantity, A?uinas has gone some way toward doing this" 0or Aristotle is certainly committed to the claim that form and matter are two of the a%solutely fundamental aspects of the material world" 8ndeed, he argues in the hysics that form and matter are necessary for the e4istence of motion, which, he thin#s, essentially characteri7es %odies" 8f the Medieval Aerivational Approach is correct, Aristotle3s categories ultimately trace to the ways in which form, matter and perhaps motion relate to su%stances and the predicates that apply to them" :hether the derivations can withstand philosophical scrutiny is of course an important ?uestion, one that 8 will not pursue here, though 8 will say that Hrentano was pro%a%ly a %it too enthusiastic a%out the prospects for an entirely satisfactory a priori proof of the completeness of Aristotle3s categories" Moreover, the Medieval interpretations face the charge that they are an over6interpretation of Aristotle" Aristotle simply does not provide in his surviving writings the sort of conceptual connections that underlie the Medieval derivations" 2o perhaps the Medievals have succum%ed to the temptation to read into Aristotle3s system connections that Aristotle did not accept" 8ndeed, from a twentieth century perspective, the Medieval derivations loo# very strange" 8t is commonplace in contemporary Aristotle scholarship to view the Categories as an early wor# and to thin# that Aristotle had not developed his theory of form and matter until later in his career" 8f this general approach is correct, the claim that the categorial scheme can somehow %e derived at least in part from form and matter appears implausi%le" As should %e clear from this %rief discussion, providing a complete derivation of Aristotle3s categorical scheme would %e a difficult, indeed perhaps impossi%le, tas#" After all, someone might conclude that Aristotle3s categorial scheme was either in part or in whole mista#en" Minimally, the tas# is a daunting one" Hut of course, the difficulty in esta%lishing its ultimate correctness is not peculiar to Aristotle3s categorial scheme" 8ndeed, it should not %e at all surprising that the difficulties that have %eset metaphysical speculation in the :estern tradition can %e seen in such a star# and provocative fashion in one of the great founding wor#s of that very tradition" 8n fact, it is in part due to such difficulties that e4ternal ?uestions a%out categorical and other metaphysical structures arise" 2uch difficulties understanda%ly lead to ?uestions a%out the legitimacy of category theory and metaphysical speculation in general" Infortunately, the history of metaphysical speculation

has shown that it is no less difficult to esta%lish answers to e4ternal than to internal ?uestions a%out category theory" (hat ac#nowledged, it is noteworthy that ?uestions of %oth sorts owe their first formulations, ultimately, to the categorialism of Aristotle3s seminal wor#, the Categories"