G.R. No.

91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J .:p
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new
restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling
objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV,
of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of
the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977
and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well
known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully
attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain
the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one
corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming
pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including
games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which
will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood
control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional
Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated
facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not
totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and
operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause,
all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or
modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of
P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In
addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being
"contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the
equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the
Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs
to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We
need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be
valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its
authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending
statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality
as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one
who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v.
Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g.
Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978];
and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the
instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the
same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly
speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they
were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have
since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the
Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA
481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu
v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It
provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the
Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at
the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that
the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2)
of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise,
as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected
under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the
earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings
derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable
quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of
any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83
Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12
SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish
municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5
SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2,
1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and
was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local
governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and
dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-
alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and
verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no
longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned
or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange
Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to
amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization
and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code
of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the
operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal
government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part
of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140,
emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive
to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless
argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by
law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First
Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by
law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a
measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the
sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of
power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void.
(Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah
You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548,
emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR
conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p.
82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A
law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in
the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same
name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and
stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that
would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US
2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and
crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify
P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend
to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,
170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations
in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state
must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy
for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article
II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it
to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature.
If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not
judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48
SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In
other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable.
But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for
Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned.
Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been
violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed
legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect
that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of
the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not
constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of
government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is
excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also
on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material
fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable
to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent,but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences
could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J .:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan
Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,
for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The
ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN
NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit,
pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng
Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP)
Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng
Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".
3

As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the
defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring
as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from
implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna
prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the
defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
5

On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG.
508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE
LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT
BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL
AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its
vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial
government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.
6
They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and
approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of R.A. 7160.
7

For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state
since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the
country.
8
As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of
Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of
policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.
9
He also states that his operation of the lotto
system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the
lotto by Congress.
10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to
prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government.
11
He argues that this is based on the
principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national
government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress.
This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of
the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking
into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to
conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and
approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outl et
in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the sai d
game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid
ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they
stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration
of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all
forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.
12

As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local
government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act
1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter
designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health
programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general
powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall
have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and
manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of
Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to
permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely
a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
13
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute
enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated inMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
14

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act,
and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing
Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power
to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution,
like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
15

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments
will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within
the state or an "imperium in imperio".
16

To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon
1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of
power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwi se
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These
provisions state:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of
the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented
shall not be evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a
charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the
contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.
17
Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty
of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the
local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and
objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects
are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest
cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously,
none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There i s no
indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was
predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing
the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy
statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It
provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection
with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining
the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.










G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA
Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA,
PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
ABALLA, JR. respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 154683 November 12, 2002
VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. Nos. 155083-84 November 12, 2002
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari
1
seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The Antecedents
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall
2
of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who
assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor
within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due
course to the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc
3
promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and
periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August
27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the
COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-
intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed
another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same
issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division
4
dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-
492 and 02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall
election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo
and Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which
gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the
following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1)
not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably
and legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were
conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed
the recall election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the
COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the
candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673
insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the
candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional
15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24,
2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in
SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the
recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate
in the recall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post aP20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs
as those sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates
Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to
assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on
September 24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of
only 10 days has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an
additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.
First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite
the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC,
however, found that
"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said
notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were
attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective
officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG
officials].
x x x
The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and
careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA
concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or
objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon
proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was
validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
x x x ."
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the
COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,
5
which also dealt with alleged defective
service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that
"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of
the same is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings,
the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the
validity of the same."
In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a
majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This
argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of
office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in
the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending
his representative and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election
submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly,
attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa.
Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates,
however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents
violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution
and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor
in the recall election of September 24, 2002.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there
would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms. This i s
clear from the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO:
6
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are
Alternative No. I where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no
immediate reelection after three successive terms."
7

The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:
"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the
term of Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and
2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."
8

The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits of Senators
9
and
Representatives of the House.
10

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election
involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the
immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit,
then Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit.
The constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
11

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:
"GASCON:
12
I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to
rest for a period of time before he can run again?
DAVIDE:
13
That is correct.
GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that
period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election
following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter,
this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the
Committee's stand.
GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least."
14
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years
15
following his completion of two
terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any
subsequent election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the
period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his
third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three
consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no
longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had
reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for
mayor in the 2001 elections.
16
Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn
ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he
won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms
with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn's
service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,
17
the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any l ength
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an
interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full
term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient
to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,
18
a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting
of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.
had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to
Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao
from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other
candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive
terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was
deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the
2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the
continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this
interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents
his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant
case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents
his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only
difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the
first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases,
the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talaga's
recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact,
then he would have been disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive
terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but
only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an
interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's terms
in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be
disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only
then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three
years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore
reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the
people to choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the
people to elect the leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:
"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F.
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislati ve
officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod
warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'"
19
(Emphasis
supplied)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An
official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
"SUAREZ:
20
For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term?
So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is
that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House."
21

Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle
applies to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more
than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recal l
term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes
by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa
because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on
June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002
during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to
make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose
their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa
in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.


CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J .:
I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No. 154683. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution.
Dismissal then of G.R. No. 154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511
(Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100, 121 [1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in
Section 70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is unconstitutional.
Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its
Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the subsequent Resolution of the
COMELEC giving the candidates an additional campaign period of fifteen days from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and
academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.
However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I respectfully submit that
private respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the
recall election in question.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an Interruption In the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional restriction,
thus: SEC. 43. Term of office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local Governments of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
Commenting thereon in his book entitled "The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers" (1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner
Joaquin Bernas states:
This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as an amendment proposed by
Commissioner Davide. It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.
Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for more than
three consecutive terms.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the Constitution, and
Executive Order No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that is, the election for the first term
under the Constitution for elective local officials, was on 18 January 1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The
second election, i.e., the election for the second term of elective local officials which expired at noon of 30 June 1995,
for elective local officials, was on the second Monday of May 1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The third election, i.e., for the third term which
expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166.
The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the second Monday of May
1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30 June 2004, was on the second
Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160,
a local official elected in the first local election of 18 January 1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in
May 1992 and in May 1995. He could not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would have
been his fourth term. Similarly, a local official who was elected in the May 1992 election could be reelected in the May
1995 and May 1998 elections.
Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election. He was
reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May 1998 election, expired on
30 June 2001. Therefore, he was constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking reelection In the May 2001 election,
which would have been his fourth term.
The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the
wordings thereof: "the term of office of elective local officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local official who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is
disqualified from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term. The provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.
The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I
disagree when it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was
not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the
May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent
confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office
from "involuntary severance" from office and the term of office to which it relates.
Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of "no Immediate reelection after
three consecutive terms." In support of its affirmative conclusion the ponencia quotes the Manifestation of Commissioner
Romulo as entered in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the
term of Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and
2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local officials. However,
the Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer the discussion on the term of
elective local officials until the Commission would consider the report of the Committee on Local Governments. On this point I
quote the pertinent portions of Volume Two, pages 238-245 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings
on 25 July 1986:
THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now is the report of
the Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to what is covered by the report
which is the term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And with respect to the local officials, let us await
the report of the Committee on Local Governments as to its recommendation on this matter.
MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials, that we should
leave this matter to the legislative.
THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the Committee on
the Legislative?
MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about the term of office
of the Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where there is no
further election after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate reelection after three
successive terms?
MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the synchronization
of elections. And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and decided related questions within
the context of synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original task of synchronization which could only be fully
settled in terms of delimitations on the proposed terms of the President and the Vice-President, the Members of
Congress and the local officials, or do we want to postpone the synchronization task to a later time after we hear from
the Committee on Local Governments and the other concerned committees?
THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner Ople?
MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have decided on
the officials' absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are eligible for reelection, and I
think those are separable issues.
MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that is something
to be thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the Acting Floor Leader that
the election of the local officials should be eliminated from the consideration of those two choices?
MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the House of
Representatives.
MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the elimination of
the election of the local officials?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.
MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting would take
only about 10 minutes.
The session is suspended.
It was 3:40 p.m.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting now is just for
Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.
This voting now is only for Representatives.
MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two consecutive terms
or 12 years after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.
THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioner's pardon.
MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.
Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//
Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative No.
2 is approved.
What does the Acting Floor Leader say?
MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the term of office
of the Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my understanding this morning
that when we voted for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be perpetually disqualified.
THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to Scheme No.
II; that is, with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader propose that we vote
again?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting for six years
they can run again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.
THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with one reelection -
22 votes; Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?
MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection, the Senator is
perpetually disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to the House of
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually disqualified after
serving 12 years?
MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very word used - for
six years and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other words, he is entitled to one
immediate reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the same office.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.
REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of hibernation, we have to
clarify how long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed scheme, every three years we can
elect the Senators.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting Floor Leader
so that we will know what we are going to vote on.
The session is suspended
It was 3:58 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes are
as follows: The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is, no immediate reelection
after two successive terms.
Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of
Representatives, I move that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.
THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.
Are we ready now?
The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - /////-/////-//
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II
approved.
All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.
So can we leave this matter now?
The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate reelection was taken
up by the Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the pertinent
portions of Vol. Three, pages 406-408, Record of the Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.
After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It provides as
follows: THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS,
WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL
SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE
OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE
CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. This is in
accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on the terms of officials up to local officials,
excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific exception.
MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials
as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?
MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?
MR. OPLE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.'
MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.
MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.
MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS,
WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE
FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS
SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.
Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the body?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no immediate reelection" after three
consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection" after the 3-term limit
would equally apply to the elective local officials. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee on
Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X
of the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms applies to thefourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three
consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after
three consecutive terms, he has to restfor the entire immediately succeeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he
can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent portions of the debates,
recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without reelection;
Scheme No. II is with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is for 'the Senators.
At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the results of the
voting for President and Vice-President.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will
please proceed.
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - ///
Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-//
Scheme No. Ill - /////-/////-/////-//
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes for Scheme
No. III; Scheme No. II is approved.
MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the Congressmen. I would
assume we can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President - with one reelection."
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.'
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the House of
Representatives?
THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.
MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for Congressmen: '
Scheme No. I, without reelection.
Scheme No. II, with one reelection.
Scheme No. III, with two reelections.
Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.
MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years, according to the
first voting; the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12 years. So, in order for a Member
of the House of Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be entitled to three reelections. I propose another
scheme with three reelections to make it equal.
MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my ballot already
and if I erase, this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme No. II which
we agreed upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the Congressmen will have
five (5) years on the first election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have a longer term than the Congressmen
is remote.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually exclusive. Can
we have only these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited reelection? We are asking here for
plurality only, Madam President. Can we eliminate?
THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without reelection, with
one reelection and unlimited reelection.
REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.
MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted upon to get
the key majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election get the highest number of
votes, then we vote again to get the key majority.
THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?
COUNTING OF BALLOTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.
THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:
Scheme No. I - 0
Scheme No. II - //
Scheme No. III - /////-/////-/////-/////-/
Scheme No. IV - /////-/////-////
Scheme No. V - /////-/
THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for Scheme No.
III; 14 votes for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two immediate
reelections, or a term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower House has been reelected
twice; that means he will serve for nine years. Can he let three years elapse and then run again?
THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the question.
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive reelections. So he
cannot serve beyond nine consecutive years.
MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?
MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.
MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one
MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.
MR. RODRIGO. And run again.
MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.
MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.
MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main proponent of this
proposal on two reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the record. (underscoring supplied
for emphasis.)
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is unnecessary, if not misplaced.
From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following
three consecutive terms. Speaking now of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because
there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was
disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is, definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance.
Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of applying the
three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the ponencia, page 17, is not
applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place during any of
the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no
such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in
1995 and 1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No.
7160 is one that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is
very clear from the last clause of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: "shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent
an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the
term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is
intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying
it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in
the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that
case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall
election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.
Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and Commissioner Davide
found on page 592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19-20 of the ponencia:
SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve
the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the
Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of "term" And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired
portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower
House.
On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one who is elected in
a special election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.
A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term
for which Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold Is to subvert the rationale of
the three-consecutive-term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound
governance. An elective local official who is disqualified to seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to
hold on to power would spend the first year of the fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of
said term. This would' not be a problem If the disqualified official has a solid following and a strong political machinery.
Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Puerto Princesa City is oneMark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly as interim
Chairman.
I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC holding private
respondent Edward Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election, and
to declare him DISQUALIFIED from seeking reelection for a fourth term or from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall
election in question.


















G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA,
TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON,
NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,respondents.
Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.
ALAMPAY, J .:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known
as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the
Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which,
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of
the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality
of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion
to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers
more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected within a
period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of
the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the
Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein provided, the
expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with
the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the
creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand
five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average
estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the
last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother
province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court was in recess and unable
to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the
plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues
raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed
upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and
San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don
Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners
found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action
will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to
stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching
questions that petitioners have brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the
plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-
... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist from issuing
official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other
than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the
Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to
schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros
Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held
on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist
from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite
until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any official
proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27,
1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was
granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer for
restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to
comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885,
should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does
not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents
state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas
Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been
complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area
of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as
referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein,
hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway.
There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to
assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new
one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do
that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should
be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one
avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred.
That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic
presumption all these years is one of validity. ...
3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the
inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed
to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and
they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be
imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their
choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not
yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it
for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the
Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does
is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a
particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned
from provisions in pari materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar. Respondents also
maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square
kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners
insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square
kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in
this regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that
the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that a
plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass
indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and
30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite,
the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus,
respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of
said province created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for
having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or
stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was
required to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the
Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp.
36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the
release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality
of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural boundaries of the northern
portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or
less. (Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of
the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of
the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a
new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality
of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion
of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers
more or less.
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the
Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land area as
indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and
Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8
2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6
7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0
8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)
This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is
not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of
the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and
added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note
the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is
only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the
portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would
constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square
kilometers, representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R.
Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4
square kilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and
1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the original provisi on in the
draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty
days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by
a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new
province.
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above provision. The statute, as
modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the new
province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART
XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a
result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the
voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the questioned
plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that
such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners
strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to
its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to
yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to
the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a
proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now
to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in
the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political
subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts
if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually rapid creation of the instant
province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the
commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government.
This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of
legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution and
the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is
already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the
duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and
pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3
of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval
of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there
is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can
be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political uni ts
would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the
participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the
parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged
statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The
alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be
done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay
homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the
same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents
would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in
enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and
motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and
provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained
changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and
surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news
articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but
are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their reliance on the
rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held to
ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was
participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the
prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The
ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It
did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a
doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by
respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished
member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality
if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities
if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to
the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May
31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a
constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was
intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His
dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the
mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that
local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of greater
magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a
barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are
involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of
the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be
subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square
kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes
easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in
the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province
as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of
the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which
proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted
in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation
speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent
province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new
province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected
referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities
comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their
own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new
proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a
plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province
constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the
points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental
would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No
controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be
diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the
whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known
as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree
with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not
contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province
maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will
involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered.
It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary
substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which
suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere discreti on
that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes
vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in
the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new
political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of
another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued,
directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement
that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of
Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because
We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also
because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another
plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because
of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be
announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending
to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a
suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil
Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in
an amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant
fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government
Code, as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo,
pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to
negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers
because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative
to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the
Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500
square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has
jurisdiction and control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile
limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained,
incorrect, and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local
Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to
the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along
all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when
employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of
two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated
with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of
the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no
need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but
also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be
synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the
legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber
Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the
disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an
entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest
guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony
of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow, extended
coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or
Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and
passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple
gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del
Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved without need of
ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also
be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of
legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent
events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by
our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued
existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they
wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they
valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people
there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of
Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.