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Chris Harlow
History 450
March 29, 2012
C. Esposito

The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Soviet Countermeasure

The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the most significant events that has ever occurred in
world history, due to the likelihood that a nuclear war could break out. The events that took
place between the Soviet Union and the United States during those thirteen days in October 1962
concluded with a safer world for humankind. Nikita Khrushchevs placement of nuclear
weaponry into Cuba was undeniably a strategic military decision to balance power between the
Soviet Union and the United States missiles in Turkey. The USSRs covert placement of
missiles into Cuba opened the door for disaster; however negotiations would later close with the
withdrawal of the US Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
During the early 1950s, tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States began
to grow. The United States began increasing military forces and in 1952 they tested their first
thermonuclear weapon, the H-bomb. During this time, the Soviet Union was scrambling to
establish atomic weapons in its arsenal and struggled to keep up with the U.S. build up. The
Secret National Security Council Report on Soviet and American Military Capabilities released
an excerpt on April 14, 1950, stating
The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world
domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those
necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet
considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the
United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides
the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its
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objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action
in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.
1


In 1955, the Soviet Union finally added a thermonuclear device to their weapons inventory.
Although with the Soviets new weapon in hand, the Soviet Union still struggled with inferior
weaponry that lacked the ability to reach the U.S.
Throughout the 1950s, the U.S. kept a close eye on the Soviets, therefore, sending
reconnaissance planes to report any new findings. President Eisenhower stated that the Soviets,
must be scared as hell, referring to the United States strategic advantage. In October of 1957,
the Soviets claimed to have opened up a missile gap between themselves and the United States.
Nikita Khrushchev announced that the USSR was producing missiles like sausages, and
launching a spy satellite into orbit called Sputnik. The U.S. feared that the Soviets could take a
significant lead in the arms race and began spending massive amounts on a military build-up.
2

In 1959, the U.S. established missiles sites throughout Europe and placed fifteen nuclear
warheads on Turkish soil. The placement of these Jupiter missiles on the Soviets door-step, put
the Soviet Union at a strategic disadvantage. Khrushchev also now saw himself at the mercy of
the United States, due to military cost cut backs. The Soviets needed a new plan to balance
power. The Bay of Pigs incident opened the door for the Soviets to counter the United States.
3

Fidel Castros rise to power in Cuba, appeared to be a threat to the United States. The
United States believed Castros anti-American influence would lead to an uprising, influencing

1
National Security Council. NSC-68: U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security.
April 14, 1950; in Kevin Hilstrom.ed., The Cold War: Primary Sourcebook Series (Detroit, MI:
Omnigraphics, 2006), 203.
2
Hilstrom, Cold War,197-198.David S. Painter, The Cold War: An International History, (city:
press,1999),.40-44
3
Lawrence Freedman, Kennedys Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, (Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 2000), 205

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Communism and Soviet relations. In April of 1961, the Kennedy administration with
collaboration of the CIA developed a plan to overthrow Castros regime. The United States sent
in1,400 Cuban exiles with some U.S. air support; it was a covert operation to create an uprising
to remove Castro. The invasion takes place on Zapata Beach in the Cuban Bay of Pigs on April
17.
On April 14, the United States had begun a diversion of striking Cuban air bases. The
United Nations caught word of the ongoing strikes and furious opposition arose. Cuban leaders
were weary of a militaristic operation and were on alert for any further attack. On April 17, the
covert brigade of 1,400 Cuban exiles landed to find that their cover had been exposed. The
battalion found itself being overrun by Cuban soldiers ranging up to 20,000 men. The force had
to surrender from the lack of supplies, due to the sinking of a supply freighter by the Cuban air
force. Around 140 exiles were killed and the remaining members of the brigade were taken
prisoner by the Cuban military. The Cuban operation had now failed and the United States was
humiliated by its compromised decisions.
The Bay of Pigs invasion had become a complete failure and the world began to question
the United States actions. Many of the American allies had begun bad-mouthing the American
operation, while the antagonist seemed to become furiously outraged. Khrushchev referred to
the invasion as fraught with danger to world peace and he offered the Cuban government all
necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack.
4
The United States found themselves in a
quandary, with Castro still in power and the Soviet Union now angered by their actions.
On April 22, 1961, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy scolding him on the actions
taken by the U.S. in the Bay of Pigs incident. Khrushchev distinctly pointed out that the United

4
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 123-146.
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States was clearly involved with the Cuban military incident. Throughout the letter Khrushchev
refers to the Bay of Pigs incident as a gangster attack upon Cuba and calls the attack on Cuba a
crime which has revolted the entire world. In the letter, Khrushchev states
You allege that Cuba cannot lend her territory for action against the United States. That
is your supposition, but it is based on no facts. We, on the other hand, can already refer
to concrete facts, no supposition: in some countries, bordering on the Soviet Union by
land and sea, there are at present Governments following a policy that is far from
reasonable, Governments which have concluded military agreements with the United
States and have made their territory available for the establishment of American military
bases. And your military say openly that these bases are spearheaded against the Soviet
Union, as if this were not already sufficiently clear. So, if you consider yourself entitled
to take such measure against Cuba as the United States Government has been resorting to
lately, you must admit that other countries have no lesser grounds for acting in the same
way with regard to States whose territories are the scene of actual preparations
constituting a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.
5


Khrushchev would go on to explain in his letter, that the Soviet Union wanted to establish a good
relationship with the U.S. and keep world peace a priority. Despite Khrushchevs explanation,
the United States feared the USSR would use Cuba against them.
In April 1962, due to the actions taken by the U.S. in the Bay of Pigs operation, the
Soviet Union decided to develop military operations in Cuba. Khrushchev would later state,
Cuba was the opportunity. It was greatly stimulating, it was even a little intoxicating, to see a
Communist regime amazingly established within a stones throw of the American mainland.
6

Khrushchev was planning to establish missiles in Cuba to offer military assistance for any further
invasion. On April 12, the Soviet Union began sending missiles to aid in air and coastal defense,
such as SA-2 missiles. The Soviet Union saw this as an opportunity to balance power between
them and the U.S., Khrushchev was now ready to deploy nuclear weapons. The Russians were

5
Khrushchev to Kennedy, April 22, 1961;in Hilstrom, The Cold War, 242.

6
Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (New York, N.Y: The Viking Press, 1966),281
Formatted: Line spacing: single
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trailing the U.S. significantly in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a strong military
build-up in Cuban could offset their strategic disadvantage.
Although, Khrushchev was very eager to begin deployment, he still had an obstacle
named Fidel Castro to overcome. Many Cuban specialists had warned Khrushchev that Castro
would not be easily influenced to allow the Soviets to build military installations on Cuban soil.
Castro did not want the world to think of Cuba as a country without defense, requiring assistance
to defend itself from foreign allies. On May 24, the Soviets and Cubans met at the Defense
Council in Moscow to discuss further operational planning. The Soviets were able to convince
Castro that Russian military assistance would provide precautionary measures and strengthen
military defense. Khrushchev and Castro now saw this as an opportunity to counter any further
American attacks.
7

In June of 1962, the Soviet Union made clear that the Cuban deployment would greatly
increase Russian significance in the Western Hemisphere. A Soviet plan was presented to the
Presidium by the Russian Defense Minister and was accepted with much anticipation. Under
this plan, the Soviet Union would send 40 nuclear missiles consisting of IRBMs and MRBMs
that could reach U.S. soil. The Russians would also deploy missiles to the Cuban shoreline,
consisting of around 80 mid-range missiles with nuclear capabilities. These missiles would help
patrol the shoreline and provide a devastating equivalency of 12 kilotons of explosives.
The Soviet plan would also establish military infantry and equipment, along with naval
assistance in international waters. Around 60,000 soldiers would be assigned to the mainland to
operate multitudes of tank battalions, fighter planes, bombers and motorized regiments.
Operations offshore would be handled by the Soviet navy, consisting of cruisers, destroyers,

7
Freedman, Kennedys Wars,161-163

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patrol boats and submarines. Many of these submarines would patrol eastern waters off the U.S.
shoreline, carrying weapons with nuclear capabilities. These submarines would give the Soviets
a strategic advantage, thus allowing them to strike the heart of the U.S. at any given moment.
In July of 1962, Russian ships were steadily arriving in Cuba with weapons. Photographs
were now being taken from many defense organizations for surveillance purposes. The Soviet
Union was trying to hide these missiles with all resources necessary, thus placing missiles in
crates and containers. At this time, the (NPIC) National Photography Interpretation Center
would take photographs and use a special method of measuring crates to help identify their
contents. Khrushchev, with this in mind, tried to covertly sneak the weapons in to remain
unnoticed. Arms shipments had been arriving in Cuban, therefore, establishing missile sites
throughout the Cuban mainland.
The Soviet Union was trying to operate a plan called Maskirovka, which consisted of
sending people into Cuba posing as agricultural specialist. The Soviets claimed they were
offering Cubans, machine tools, wheat, and agricultural machinery. Although, with the
Soviets efforts in mind, most of the world found the Soviets alibi very questionable. The
Russians had been furiously working to deliver shipments to Cuba and working secretly at night
to build up their installations.
8

In the course of July, American suspicions began to arise, due to Castros presence in
Moscow. The CIA was under the impression that no nuclear weapons had been placed in Cuba,
but it was possible that some surface-to-air missiles are to be delivered, but none are believed to
have arrived thus far. In August, U-2 reconnaissance brought back information that startled the

8
Kenneth Michael Absher(2009), Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Carlisle, PA,Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College,2009) 26-
28.
Comment [C1]: No comma after thus
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United States: SA-2 missiles had been discovered in Cuba. This discovery now changed
Americas game plan, because there were now questions as to the evidence that the Soviet Union
could be hiding missiles.
9

Tension between the Soviet Union and the United States had slowly begun to develop. In
August of 1962, President Kennedy issued a system of monitoring nuclear tests, in which it
would establish control posts to offer worldwide supervision. Khrushchev, on the other hand, had
a different program and on August 5, 1962, he continued to test nuclear missiles in the Arctic.
These tests seemed to alarm the U.S. that the Soviets could be placing nuclear weapons in Cuba.
The Director of Central Intelligence John McCone had relayed information that the Soviets had
installed (SAMs) or surface to air missiles. McCone believed that the Soviets had established
these missiles in order to conceal MRBMs. He believed the Russians were hiding these
offensive weapons, thus allowing the U.S. to see only the defensive side of things.
In early September of 1962, Khrushchev announced to the world that the Soviet Union
had offered assistance to Cuba in the form of arms and technicians. On September 4, Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was sent to meet with President Kennedy, assuring him the
Soviets involvement into Cuban affairs did not contain offensive weapons. Khrushchev had
specifically instructed Dobrynin to persuade Kennedy into believing Soviet intentions were
solely directed toward helping the Cubans.
10
President Kennedy was deeply concerned that the
Soviets could be building up their offensive capability. A few days later he released a statement
to the United States
If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our
security in any way or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by
force or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union,

9
Freedman, Kennedys Wars,163-164.
10
Absher, Mind- Sets and Missiles,29-33
Comment [C2]: Same clause, no comma here.
Formatted: Line spacing: single
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then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its
allies.
11


On September 6, CIA Director John McCone was still under the impression that the
Soviet Union was placing offensive weaponry into the heart of Cuba. McCone, now on his
honeymoon, related messages between himself and his colleagues about the need for
reconnaissance missions. He pleaded with the Secretary of Defense and the Board of National
Estimates to use all means necessary to understand the efforts of the Soviets in Cuba. McCone
believed the Soviets were using strategic measures so that their offensive potential remained
covert and stated that it was, difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being
established in Cuba.
12

Many Soviet leaders believed that a plentiful build-up of nuclear weaponry could help
counter any U.S. attack. On September 7, 1962, the Soviets began utilizing their resources and
sent six LUNA rocket launchers, capable of launching a missile 20 to 25 miles. The Soviets had
plans on adding more weaponry to the Cuban arsenal, but canceled plans for a fleet of
submarines and battleships. Throughout the month of September, the Russians primary focus
was establishing missile sites at a rapid pace across Cuba.

The National Estimates study published a report in September of 1962 summarizing their
estimates of the Soviets efforts in Cuba. The report stated the build up in Cuba was strictly for
the purpose of strengthening Communism. They believed the USSRs defensive establishment
was purposely used to enhance Castros regime. The report elaborated on the possible use of
offensive weapons, but concluded the USSR offensive build-up would be minimal and probably
non-threatening. The study stated, the USSR could derive considerable military advantage from

11
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 163
12
Absher, Mind- Sets and Missiles, 34-36.
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the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missile in Cuba, or from the
establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. Despite this, the study indicated that a
submarine base was more probable.
13

At this time, the U.S. was not really sure of what the Soviets had planned in Cuba, due to
the lack of reconnaissance missions. The U.S. had sent in several U-2 recon missions throughout
the month of September, but failed to retrieve critical data from the heart of Cuba. McCone
became outraged at the United States lack of intelligence and began lobbying for more flights.
McCone met with a COMOR committee and finally received the permission for a few more U-2
flights. He believed the Soviets were hiding weaponry in Western Cuba, due to a high Soviet
concentration of military personal in the area. He would later argue that, very secret and
important work is in progress, believed to be concerned with missiles.
On October 6, 1962, Khrushchev replied back to Kennedy stating that only exclusively
defensive weapons would be established in Cuba. Khrushchev was already in the process of
carrying out his deceptive plans and U.S. actions did not seem to alter his intentions. The
tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union only seemed to ignite the Russians plans for a
nuclear build-up. Khrushchev intended to send only coastal defense cruise missiles with nuclear
capability, but later insisted on adding to the nuclear arsenal.
On October 11, 1962, DCI McCone and President Kennedy held a meeting to discuss the
events that were occurring in Cuba. McCone relayed photographs to Kennedy that had been
taken in Havana, Cuba. These photographs were factual evidence of cargo ships were carrying
crates loaded with IL-28 Soviet bombers. The U.S. now began to open their eyes, realizing that

13
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 166-168.
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the Soviets had been deceiving them the entire time. Kennedy wanted to keep all information
secure, until more reconnaissance could be taken from within Cuba.
On October 14, U-2 flights discovered the first missile sites in San Cristobal, Cuba.
McCones calculations had now been affirmed, the SAMs were simply a decoy to hide the true
weaponry hidden deep within the borders of Cuba. McCone had believed the coastal SAMs
were built to blind our reconnaissance eye, thus, hiding the SS-4 MRBM installations. A film
of the U-2 mission had recorded the establishment of a SS-4 installation and the construction of
two SS-5 IRBM bases. These bases had the ability to strike the U.S., Canada, and South
America within a 2,000 mile range. The United States now had to make a move if they wanted to
contain a potential crisis.
14

In an excerpt from Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev simply states why the missiles
were constructed in Cuba:
I want to make one thing absolutely clear: when we put our ballistic missiles in Cuba, we
had no desire to start a war. On the contrary, our principal aim was only to deter America
from starting a war. We were well aware that a war which started over Cuba would
quickly expand into a world war. Any idiot could have started a war between America
and Cuba. Cuba was eleven thousand kilometers away from us. Only a fool would think
that we wanted to invade the American continent from Cuba. Our goal was precisely the
opposite: we wanted to keep the Americans from invading Cuba, and, to that end, we
wanted to make them think twice by confronting them with our missiles.
15

On October 16, 1962, President Kennedy established an EXCOM, Executive Committee
of the National Security Council, to help deal with the matter. The council discussed many
different alternatives to the build-up, such as, an invasion or air strikes. The members knew that
there was only one key decision, taking the missiles out of Cuba. All members of the committee
agreed to keep the meetings confidential; not allowing the antagonist to know their intelligence.

14
Absher, Mind- Sets and Missiles,44-52.
15
Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers, 495-496.

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Two days later, Kennedy met with the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko who assured him no
offensive weaponry was constructed in Cuba. This meeting was an outrage for Kennedy,
because he knew Gromyko was trying to deceive him. Kennedy already knew the facts about the
matter, therefore, he nervously listened to the Soviet lie to him.
16

EXCOM and Kennedy finally come to the realization that actions must be taken; the
decision to blockade Cuba was initially coming to the forefront. During the debate Kennedy
states, we should begin by blockading Soviets against the shipment of additional offensive
capacity, and that we could tighten the blockade as the situation requires.
17
The U.S. had no
intentions of starting a war, they only wanted to limit the Soviets shipments into Cuba.
As the idea of a blockade was becoming imminent, the U.S. was strongly debating issues
of a Soviet retaliation. The U.S. now believed that any, direct military action against Cuba
would put great pressure on the Soviet Union. The United States believed quarantine was
necessary, but would possible air strikes help in the aftermath of this blockade. In a meeting
with Kennedy and his Joint Chiefs, arguments questioning the reaction of potential air strikes
arouse. They insisted the pressure of air strikes on Cuba could cause Soviets to attack the Jupiter
missiles in Turkey. In the end, Kennedy deliberated the situation and was convinced, the
blockade might not actually remove the missiles but then neither necessarily would the air
strike.
18


16
Absher, Mind-Sets and Missiles, 54-57.
17
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 185.
18
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 190-192.
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On Monday, October 22, 1962, President Kennedy delivered a televised address to the
American people about the Soviet Unions establishment of missiles in Cuba. In the speech
Kennedy would state:
But this secret, swift and extraordinary build up of Communist missiles in an area well
known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of
the Western Hemisphere policy this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic
weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately provocative and
unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our
courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. The
1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and
unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to prevent the use of these
missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination
from the Western Hemisphere.
Kennedy and the U.S. government wanted to take initial steps to immediately remove the
missiles from Cuba. First, The U.S. would stop the build-up by initiating quarantine on all
offensive weaponry entering Cuba. Thus, denying any ship the ability to carry offensive cargo
into Cuban ports. Second, the U.S. would maintain strict surveillance of Cuba and all Armed
Forces must be prepared for any incident that could arise. Third, any missile launched from
Cuban soil would be a direct threat to the Western Powers, therefore, militaristic action would be
taken upon the Soviets. Fourth, all military personnel at Guantanamo Bay would be placed on
high alert. Fifth, the OAS would meet to survey the Soviets threat to the U.S and allied
security. Sixth, the Security Council will meet to discuss actions against the Soviets, in which, all
weapons must be removed under supervision of the United Nations. Seventh and finally,
Kennedy called out Khrushchevs threat to world peace stating, he has the opportunity now
to move the world back from the abyss of destruction by returning to his governments own
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words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these
weapons from Cuba.
19

After Kennedys address to the American people on October 22, the United States
military was placed on DEFCON 3. Air bases throughout the U.S. were gearing up for potential
war, therefore, arming themselves with nuclear weapons. In the evening of Oct. 22, the 91
Atlas and 41 Titan liquid fueled ICBMs were being readied for firing. Polaris submarines were
being strategically positioned in the North Atlantic, in which, missiles could be fired upon the
Soviet Union. The Pentagon also collaborated with the Association of American Railroads to
move air-defense and warning systems into lower Florida. The U.S. believed, the Soviets
would intercept these communications and would thus fully understand the scope and
seriousness of the growing U.S. military response.
20

On Tuesday, October 23, President Kennedy signed the order to issue the naval blockade
of Cuba. The U.S. did not want to sink any ship if possible, only disable them from reaching the
Cuban shore. The first confrontation between U.S. and Soviet ships occurred around 10:30;
sixteen Soviet ships changed course or stopped short of the quarantine line. Dean Rusk stated,
Were eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked. Moscow had sent orders for
all ships to change course, including the Poltava, the ship that carried the first warheads into
Cuba. Khrushchev did not want any of his valuable weaponry to fall into the hands of the
Americans. The same day, Khrushchev met with the Soviet Council of Ministers, in which, all

19
Kennedy, John F. Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms
Buildup in Cuba. October 22, 1962,Hillstrom, The Cold War,246-251.
20
Absher, Mind-Sets and Missiles,65-67.
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soldiers were placed on war footing and combat forces began preparations for potential
disaster.
21

In an excerpt from Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev refers to the blockade by
stating:
We hadnt had time to deliver all our shipments to Cuba, but we had installed enough
missiles already to destroy New York, Chicago, and the other huge industrial cities, not
to mention a little village like Washington. I dont think America had ever faced such a
real threat of destruction as at that moment.
Meanwhile we went about our business. We didnt let ourselves be intimidated. Our
ships, with the remainder of our deliveries to Cuba, headed straight through an armada of
the American navy, but the Americans didnt try to stop our ships or even check them.
We kept in mind that as long as the United States limited itself to threatening gestures
and didnt actually touch us, we could afford to pretend to ignore the harassment.
22


On Wednesday, October 24, U-2 photos were exchange between Charles Bartlett, a
Washington journalist, and Balshakov. Balshakov completely denied that any missiles were
stationed in Cuba. The day before, the OAS had endorsed the U.S. in their action to quarantine
Cuba. Photographs taken by U.S. U-2 planes, showed the Soviets were now rapidly building
their missiles sites. The San Cristobal site was completed within two days and IL-28 Beagle
bombers were being assembled. The next day, October 25, these photographs were displayed for
the United Nations Security Council, therefore, winning an ever important public relations
battle. On the other hand, Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin refused to view the photos,
signifying somewhat of a guilty gesture.
On October 26, the United States stopped the first ship, Maracula, since the quarantine
had been issued. President Kennedy issued the order to board the ship, in which, no offensive

21
Freedman, Kennedys Wars,196-200.
22
Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers,496.
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weaponry was discovered. Although the ship was non-threatening, the United States was
demonstrating the enforcement of the blockade toward the Russians. The same day, KGB
member Aleksandr Feklisov took Bolshakovs position as the intermediary between Kennedy
and Khrushchev. Fekliso met with John Scali of ABC News, therefore, asking him if the
United States would accept a deal whereby the USSR withdraws all offensive missiles under UN
supervision and the United States agrees not to invade Cuba.
23

The Cuban Missile Crisis was coming to a climax and on October 26, Cuban dictator
Fidel Castro sent a letter of correspondence to Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Castro believed that
the U.S. would attack Cuba within 72 hours or less. He told Khrushchev that the Cuban people
were ready to confront any attack that may present itself. Castro referred to the U.S. as
imperialists and states, the imperialist, without regard for world opinion and against laws and
principles, have blockaded the seas, violated our air-space, and are preparing to invade. Castro
would go on to offer much gratitude for Khrushchevs superhuman efforts and hope for peace
to be maintained throughout the crisis.
24

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a secret message to President Kennedy on
October 26, which would later help end the crisis. Khrushchev would send Kennedy two
different letters within two days in correspondence to help end the dispute. In the first letter,
Khrushchev gives an explanation of why the Soviets sent nuclear missiles to Cuba; strictly for
defensive purposes. He tells Kennedy that peace is a major objective, in which, he states, our
goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all
the peoples. Khrushchev assures Kennedy that all ships bound for Cuba have no offensive

23
Absher, Mind-Sets and Missiles,69-71.
24
Castro, Fidel. Letter to Nikita Khrushchev from Fidel Castro Regarding Defending Cuban Air
Space. October 26, 1962. Hillstrom, The Cold War,252.
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weaponry, therefore, all weapons needed to defend Cuba are already established. He would go
on to state:
Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: We, for our part, will declare that
our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that
the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of
forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the
presence of our military specialist in Cuba would disappear.
25


Although with this in mind, Khrushchev does challenge Kennedy in the presence of war. He
specifically tells Kennedy that if the U.S. starts war, the USSR with all means necessary will
challenge the U.S.
On Saturday mourning, October 27, a United States U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot
down over Cuba. The day before, Fidel Castro stated that any low level aircraft would be fired
upon. Around 10 A.M., U.S. Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson was killed and another U-2
aircraft was being pursued by Soviet aircraft. These actions by the Cubans and the Soviets made
the U.S. question if retaliation was needed. When news reached the White House, President
Kennedy was outraged, but did not decide to result in action. At this time, the U.S. feared that a
war was inevitable and began preparing for nuclear holocaust.
26

Later that day, on October 27, Khrushchev sent a second letter of correspondence to
Kennedy, publicly broadcasted on Moscow radio. The letter contained much of the same
message as the first, but referred to an irreconcilable matter of U.S. offensive weapons.
Khrushchev states that America is disturbed by the presence of destructive missiles in Cuba,

25
Khrushchev to Kennedy, Correspondence, October 26, 1962, Hillstrom, The Cold War, 253-
259.
26
Freedman, Kennedys Wars, 212-215.
Page 17

much like the Soviets are equally bothered by U.S. missiles placed in Turkey. Khrushchev
would go on to state:
I therefore make this proposal: We are wiling to remove from Cuba the means which you
regard as offensive: We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the
United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United
States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will
remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of
time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by
the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the
pledges made.
The letter promptly refers to the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba as a Soviet
countermeasure, therefore, off- setting the presence of missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was now in
a position to make a decision and he would reply to Khrushchevs letter later that evening.
27

Kennedy corresponds to Khrushchevs first letter on October 27, 1962. Kennedy avoided
mentioning the Jupiter missiles verbatim, but does mention the second letter welcoming an end
to the crisis. Kennedy states that in Khrushchevs proposal he understands, allowing the United
Nations to remove the missiles under supervision was acceptable. Also, the United States must
not invade Cuba and directly stop the blockade of shipments into Cuba waters. Kennedy would
go on to state, the effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work
toward a more general arrangement regarding other armaments, as proposed in your second
letter which you made public. He directly told Khrushchev that any delay on his intentions
could cause the Cuban missile crisis to lead to an intensification.
28

In a memorandum between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, on October 30, 1962, Kennedy recalls a telephone call between himself and

27
Khrushchev to Kennedy, Correspondence, October 27, 1962, Hillstrom, The Cold War, 259-
262.
28
Kennedy to Khruschev, Correspondence, October 27, 1962, Hillstrom, The Cold War, 262-263.
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Ambassador Dobrynin. The call occurred at 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27, in which,
Kennedy explains to Dobrynin what actions must be taken. He explains to Dobrynin that a U.S.
U-2 pilot was killed and that an end to the crisis must come shortly. Kennedy also states that
Khrushchev placed missiles secretly into Cuba, therefore, proclaiming, privately and publicly,
that this would never be done. He specifically referred to the U.S. missiles in Turkey as a
decision that would be made by NATO. In the closing remarks of the telephone call, Kennedy
warns Dobrynin stating: I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better
contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the
missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic
consequences.
29

On October 28, 1962, Premier Khrushchev sent a message to President John F. Kennedy,
delivered over Radio Mascow, stating that Soviet missiles will be withdrawn from Cuba. In the
letter Khrushchev states, the withdrawal of Soviet missiles are imminent to eliminate any danger
of devastating war. His message assures the American people that Soviet missiles are being
dismantled and sent back to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev also refers to the missiles as a
defensive strategy to help defend Cuba from outside invasion. He also reiterated about
Kennedys promise not invading Cuba and potential removal of the Jupiter missiles. This letter
brought forth demise to the Cuban missile crisis, therefore, avoiding a potential nuclear war
between the Cubans, Soviets, and the United States.
30


29
Kennedy, Robert F. Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General,
October 30, 1962. Hillstrom, The Cold War, 263-265.
30
Khrushchev to Kennedy, Khrushchev Withdraws Soviet Missile from Cuba, October 28, 1962.
Hillstrom, The Cold War, 265-269.
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In Edward Crankshaws book, Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev states that after
letters were exchanged at the peak of the crisis, our relations with the United States started to
return to normal. The Cubans, on the other hand, were infuriated and thought the U.S.
imperialist could not be trusted. Khrushchev would later reply to Castro in a letter, stating
that, we achieved, I would say, a spectacular success without having to fire a single shot! He
would also state that in the mist of an atomic war, Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba.
Therefore, this promise would become a great victory, in which, we won a Socialist Cuba.
The Soviets would go on to win an even greater victory, which would come in 1963.
31

Throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev wanted the United States to remove
their Jupiter Missiles stationed in Turkey. Castro also believed that the crisis was, a bargaining
chip to remove a marginal threat to the Soviet Union. The United States explained to Turkish
officials that if the U.S. would have invaded Cuba, the Soviet Union most likely would have
struck the Jupiter missiles. On April 23, 1963, all U.S. missiles in Turkey were removed,
therefore, a victory for the Soviets had been achieved. Kennedy would write to Khrushchev
assuring him, he had not been a victim of American duplicity.
32

In conclusion, the events that developed throughout those thirteen days in October, will
forever be inscribed in the minds of mankind. The deliberation between Kennedy and
Khrushchev undeniably saved the world from a nuclear abyss. Americans, Cubans and Soviets
throughout the world were preparing for a war, due to the strategic missile placement by the
Soviet Union. The unconditional bravery of Kennedy and Khrushchev at a time of crisis, helped
bring the world to a more peaceful state.

31
Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remember,500-505.
32
Freedman, Kennedys Wars,222-223.
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The Soviet Union saw an opportunity, given by the U.S. in the Bay of Pigs incident, to
create a Soviet countermeasure. The USSR secretly placed nuclear weaponry into the heart of
Cuba, therefore, vying for an off-set of missiles between themselves and the United States.
Khrushchev, along with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, began establishing these missiles
throughout Cuban territory, thus, personifying them for defensive purposes.
The United States, on the other hand, saw the Soviets actions as an offensive build-up to
gain power in the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy went to work immediately, issuing a naval
blockade of Cuban waters. This U.S. quarantine, along with much deliberated correspondence
between Kennedy and Khrushchev pulled the world from an imminent war. The U.S. won a
victory, in which, the fearful American people were now at ease, due to the removal of Soviet
missiles.
In the end, Khrushchev and the USSR ultimately won the battle, therefore, U.S. Jupiter
missiles on the Soviets back door were dismantled. Khrushchev undeniably had these
intentions in mind before the first missile was shipped to Cuba. Also, Cuba had a promise that it
would not be invaded by the U.S. or any of its allies. The Soviets never wanted to start a war,
only initiate a Soviet countermeasure. Khrushchev would state, the rockets did not have to be
used heaven forbid! But once their presence in combat readiness was revealed, no matter how
America might rave, she could not invade without the full-scale nuclear war which he,
Khrushchev, knew that no government in it senses could conceivably invite over the possession
of an island, not matter how near, no matter how hostile.
33



33
Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career, 281-282.
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