MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTURO C.

MOJICA,
in his capacity as Deputy O!u"san #$% the Visayas, VIRGINIA
&ALANCA'(ANTIAGO, in his capacity as Di%ect$%, O##ice $# the
O!u"san )Visayas*, ALAN +RANCI(CO (. GARCIANO, in his
capacity as G%a#t In,esti-ati$n O##ice% I, O##ice $# the O!u"san
)Visayas*, an" J.(U( RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.
D . C I ( I O N
/UI(UMBING, J.0
The present controversy involves the preventive suspension order issued on June 25,
1999, by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in O!"V#$"%&"99"'(52, a)ainst
petitioner *ebu *ity ayor %lvin !+ ,arcia and ei)ht other city officials+ -nder the said
order, petitioner .as placed under preventive suspension .ithout pay for the ma/imum
period of si/ months and told to cease and desist from holdin) office immediately+
The factual antecedents are as follo.s0
On ay 1, 1992, petitioner, in his capacity as *ebu *ity mayor, si)ned a contract .ith
3+4+ 5uelli) for the supply of asphalt to the city+ The contract covers the period 1992"2''1,
.hich period .as to commence on $eptember 1992 .hen the first delivery should have been
made by 3+4+ 5uelli)+
$ometime in arch 1999, ne.s reports came out re)ardin) the alle)ed anomalous
purchase of asphalt by *ebu *ity, throu)h the contract si)ned by petitioner+ This prompted
the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an in6uiry into the matter+
718
9espondent Jesus 9odri)o T+ Ta)aan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, .as assi)ned to conduct the in6uiry, doc:eted as #;<"V#$"99"'1=2+ %fter his
investi)ation, he recommended that the said in6uiry be up)raded
to criminal and administrative cases a)ainst petitioner and the other city officials
involved+ 9espondent %rturo *+ o>ica, &eputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation+
#n a memorandum dated June 22, 1999, respondent %llan 3rancisco $+ ,arciano, the
)raft investi)atin) officer to .hom the case .as raffled for investi)ation, recommended the
preventive suspension of petitioner and the others+ T.o days later, or on June 2(, 1999, the
affidavit"complaint a)ainst petitioner .as filed+ The follo.in) day, on June 25, 1999, the
Office of the Ombudsman issued the 6uestioned preventive suspension order+ On June 29,
1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, .hich motion .as denied in
an order dated July 5, 1999+
?etitioner is no. before this *ourt assailin) the validity of the said order+ @e pleads for
immediate relief throu)h the present petition for certiorari and prohibition .ith a prayer for
temporary restrainin) order andAor .rit of preliminary in>unction+ ?etitioner contends that0
I
T@4 94$?O;&4;T$ %*T4& B#T@ ,9%V4 %!-$4 O3
&#$*94T#O;, %O-;T#;, TO C%*D O9 4E*4$$ O3
J-9#$&#*T#O; #; %$$-#;, J-9#$&#*T#O; OV49 O!"V#$"
%&"99"'(52 %;& #$$-#;, T@4 ?94V4;T#V4 $-$?4;$#O;
O9&49, T@4 O33#*4 O3 T@4 O!-&$%; !4#;, B#T@O-T
J-9#$&#*T#O; OV49 T@4 %&#;#$T9%T#V4 *%$4,
*O;$#&49#;, T@%T T@4 %CC4,4& %*T *O;$T#T-T#;, T@4
*@%9,4 %,%#;$T ?4T#T#O;49 @494#; B%$ *O#TT4&
&-9#;, @#$ ?94V#O-$ T49, %;& ?4T#T#O;49 @%V#;, !44;
944C4*T4& TO T@4 $%4 ?O$#T#O;+
II
%$$-#;,, ARGUENDO, T@%T T@4 O33#*4 O3 T@4
O!-&$%; @%$ J-9#$&#*T#O; OV49 O!"V#$"%&"99"'(52,
T@4 ?94V4;T#V4 $-$?4;$#O; 3O9 $#E O;T@$ B%$ B#T@
,9%V4 %!-$4 O3 &#$*94T#O; %O-;T#;, TO C%*D O9
4E*4$$ O3 J-9#$&#*T#O;, %;& #; ,9O$$ V#OC%T#O; O3 T@4
?9OV#$#O;$ O3 $4*T#O; F= O3 T@4 CO*%C ,OV49;4;T
*O&4 B@#*@ %;&%T4$ T@%T T@4 ?94V4;T#V4 $-$?4;$#O;
O3 CO*%C 4C4*T#V4 O33#*#%C$ !4 O9&494& O;CG %3T49 T@4
#$$-4$ @%V4 !44; JO#;4&, %;& O;CG 3O9 % ?49#O& ;OT #;
4E*4$$ O3 $#ETG (F') &%G$+
III
%$$-#;,, ARGUENDO, T@%T T@4 O33#*4 O3 T@4
O!-&$%; @%$ J-9#$&#*T#O; OV49 O!"V#$"%&"99"'(52,
T@4 ?94V4;T#V4 $-$?4;$#O; B%$ #$$-4& B#T@ ,9%V4
%!-$4 O3 &#$*94T#O; %O-;T#;, TO C%*D O9 4E*4$$ O3
J-9#$&#*T#O;, %;& #; ,9O$$ V#OC%T#O; O3 $4*T#O; 2F(2) O3
T@4 O!-&$%; C%B+
IV
%$$-#;,, ARGUENDO, T@%T T@4 O33#*4 O3 T@4
O!-&$%; @%$ J-9#$&#*T#O;, T@4 94$?O;&4;T$
*O#TT4& ,9%V4 %!-$4 O3 &#$*94T#O;, %O-;T#;, TO
C%*D O9 4E*4$$ O3 J-9#$&#*T#O; #; *O;*C-&#;, T@%T T@4
4V#&4;*4 %,%#;$T ?4T#T#O;49 B%$ H$T9O;,I, T@4 C#TTC4
4V#&4;*4 O; 94*O9& *O;$#$T#;, $OC4CG O3 % @4%9$%G
%33#&%V#T, %;& #;%&#$$#!C4 ;4B$?%?49 94?O9T$+
On July 19, 1999, .e directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders
from this *ourt+ #t appears that on the same day, petitioner issued a memorandum informin)
employees and officials of the Office of the *ity ayor that he .as assumin) the post of
mayor effective immediately+ On July 2=, 1999, respondents filed a motion see:in)
clarification of our status quo order+ 9espondents claimed that the status quo referred to in
the order should be that .here petitioner is already suspended and vice mayor 9enato
OsmeJa is the actin) city mayor+
?etitioner, in reply, ar)ued that the status quo refers to Hthe last actual peaceable
uncontested status .hich preceded the pendin) controversy+I
728
Thus, the status quo could not
be that .here petitioner is preventively suspended since the suspension did not precede the
present controversyK it is the controversy+
Be a)ree .ith petitioner in this re)ard+ %s e/plained by Justice 3lorenL &+ 9e)alado, an
authority on remedial la.0
HThere have been instances .hen the $upreme *ourt has issued a status quo order
.hich, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of thin)s .hich preceded the controversy+ This
.as resorted to .hen the pro>ected proceedin)s in the case made the conservation
of the status quo desirable or essential, but the affected party neither sou)ht such
relief or the alle)ations in his pleadin) did not sufficiently ma:e out a case for a
temporary restrainin) order+ Thestatus quo order .as thus issued motu proprio on
e6uitable considerations+ %lso, unli:e a temporary restrainin) order or a
preliminary in>unction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and
desist order, since it neither directs the doin) or undoin) of acts as in the case of
prohibitory or mandatory in>unctive relief+ The further distinction is provided by
the present amendment in the sense that, unli:e the amended rule on restrainin)
orders, a status quo order does not re6uire the postin) of a bond+I
7=8
On July 22, 1999, .e heard the partiesM oral ar)uments on the follo.in) issues0
1+ Bhat is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investi)ation of acts
done before his reelectionN &id the Ombudsman for the Visayas )ravely abuse his
discretion in conductin) the investi)ation of petitioner and orderin) his preventive
suspensionN
2+ %ssumin) that the Ombudsman properly too: co)niLance of the case, .hat la.
should apply to the investi)ation bein) conducted by him, the Cocal ,overnment
*ode (9+%+ 11F') or the Ombudsman Ca. (9+%+ F11')N Bas the procedure in the
la. properly observedN
=+ %ssumin) further that the Ombudsman has >urisdiction, is the preventive
suspension of petitioner based on Hstron) evidenceI as re6uired by la.N
Be .ill no. address these issues to)ether, for the proper resolution on the merits of the
present controversy+
?etitioner contends that, per our rulin) in Aguinaldo v. Santos,
7(8
his reelection has
rendered the administrative case filed a)ainst him moot and academic+ This is because
reelection operates as a condonation by the electorate of the misconduct committed by an
elective official durin) his previous term+ ?etitioner further cites the rulin) of this *ourt
in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board o Nueva Eci!a,
758
that
H+ + + Bhen the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they
did this .ith :no.led)e of his life and character, and that they disre)arded or
for)ave his faults or misconduct, if he had been )uilty of any+ #t is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the .ill of the
people+I
9espondents, on the other hand, contend that .hile the contract in 6uestion .as si)ned
durin) the previous term of petitioner, it .as to commence or be effective only on $eptember
1992 or durin) his current term+ #t is the respondentsM submission that petitioner H.ent
beyond the protective confinesI
7F8
of >urisprudence .hen he Ha)reed to e/tend his act to his
current term of office+I
718
Aguinaldo cannot apply, accordin) to respondents, because .hat is
involved in this case is a misconduct committed durin) a previous term but to be effective
durin) the current term+
9espondents maintain that,
H+++petitioner performed t.o acts .ith respect to the contract0 he provided for a
suspensive period ma:in) the supply contract commence or be effective durin) his
succeedin) or current term and durin) his current term of office he acceded to the
suspensive period ma:in) the contract effective durin) his current term by causin)
the implementation of the contract+I
728
@ence, petitioner cannot ta:e refu)e in the fact of his reelection, accordin) to
respondents+
3urther, respondents point out that the contract in 6uestion .as si)ned >ust four days
before the date of the 1992 election and so it could not be presumed that .hen the people of
*ebu *ity voted petitioner to office, they did so .ith full :no.led)e of petitionerMs character+
On this point, petitioner responds that :no.led)e of an officialMs previous acts is
presumed and the court need not in6uire .hether, in reelectin) him, the electorate .as
actually a.are of his prior misdeeds+
?etitioner cites our rulin) in Salalima v. Guingona,
798
.herein .e absolved %lbay
)overnor 9omeo 9+ $alalima of his administrative liability as re)ards a retainer a)reement he
si)ned in favor of a la. firm durin) his previous term, althou)h disbursements of public
funds to cover payments under the a)reement .ere still bein) done durin) his subse6uent
term+ ?etitioner ar)ues that, follo.in) Salalima, the doctrine in Aguinaldo applies even
.here the effects of the act complained of are still evident durin) the subse6uent term of the
reelected official+ The implementation of the contract is a mere incident of its
e/ecution+ !esides, accordin) to petitioner, the Hsole actI for .hich he has been
administratively char)ed is the si)nin) of the contract .ith 3+4+ 5uelli)+ The char)e, in his
vie., e/cludes the contractMs e/ecution or implementation, or any act subse6uent to the
perfection of the contract+
#n Salalima, .e recall that the $olicitor ,eneral maintained that Aguinaldo did not apply
to that case because the administrative case a)ainst ,overnor 9odolfo %)uinaldo of *a)ayan
.as already pendin) .hen he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection
bid+ ;evertheless, in Salalima, the *ourt applied the Aguinaldodoctrine, even if the
administrative case a)ainst ,overnor $alalima .as filed after his reelection+
Borth stressin), to resolve the present controversy, .e must recall that the authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investi)ations is mandated by no less than the
*onstitution+ -nder %rticle E#, $ection 1=718, the Ombudsman has the po.er to0
Hinvesti)ate on its o.n, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or a)ency, .hen such act or omission appears to
be ille)al, un>ust, improper, or inefficient+I
9+%+ F11', the Ombudsman Ca., further )rants the Office of the Ombudsman the
statutory po.er to conduct administrative investi)ations+ Thus, $ection 19 of said la.
provides0
H$4*+ 19+ Administrative "omplaints+ O The Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relatin), but not limited to acts or omissions .hich0
(1) %re contrary to la. or re)ulationK
(2) %re unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatoryK
(=) %re inconsistent .ith the )eneral course of an a)encyMs functions, thou)h in
accordance .ith la.K
(() ?roceed from a mista:e of la. or an arbitrary ascertainment of factsK
(5) %re in the e/ercise of discretionary po.ers but for an improper purposeK or
(F) %re other.ise irre)ular, immoral or devoid of >ustification+I
$ection 21 of 9+%+ F11' names the officials sub>ect to the OmbudsmanMs disciplinary
authority0
H$4*+ 21+ Oicials Su#!ect $o Disciplinar% Aut&orit%' E(ceptions+ O The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the ,overnment and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and a)encies,
includin) embers of the *abinet, local )overnment, )overnment"o.ned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, e/cept over officials .ho may be
removed only by impeachment or over embers of *on)ress, and the
Judiciary+I(4mphasis supplied+)
?etitioner is an elective local official accused of )rave misconduct and dishonesty+
71'8
That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investi)ation into the
acts complained of, appears clear from the fore)oin) provisions of 9+%+ F11'+
@o.ever, the 6uestion of .hether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investi)ation
over a particular act or omission, is different from the 6uestion of .hether or not petitioner,
after investi)ation, may be held administratively liable+ This distinction ou)ht here to be :ept
in mind, even as .e must also ta:e note that the po.er to investi)ate is distinct from the
po.er to suspend preventively an errin) public officer+
Ci:e.ise .orthy of note, the po.er of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend an official sub>ect to its administrative investi)ation is provided by specific provision
of la.+ -nder $ection 2( of 9+%+ F11' O
H$4*+ 2(+ Preventive Suspension+ O The Ombudsman or his &eputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pendin) an
investi)ation, if in his >ud)ment the evidence of )uilt is stron), and (a) the char)e
a)ainst such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or )rave
misconduct or ne)lect in the performance of dutyK (b) the char)es .ould .arrant
removal from the serviceK or (c) the respondentMs continued stay in office may
pre>udice the case filed a)ainst him+
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of the Ombudsman but not more than si/ months, .ithout pay, e/cept .hen the
delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the
fault, ne)li)ence or petition of the respondent, in .hich case the period of such
delay shall not be counted in computin) the period of suspension herein provided+I
(-nderscorin) supplied+)
Be have previously interpreted the phrase Hunder his authorityI to mean that the
Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investi)ation by his office,
re)ardless of the branch of )overnment in .hich they are employed,
7118
e/ceptin) of course
those removable by impeachment, members of *on)ress and the Judiciary+
The po.er to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to
the &eputy Ombudsman+ This is the clear import of $ection 2( of 9+%+ F11' abovecited+
There can be no 6uestion in this case as to the po.er and authority of respondent &eputy
Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension a)ainst an official li:e the petitioner,
to prevent that official from usin) his office to intimidate or influence .itnesses
7128
or to
tamper .ith records that mi)ht be vital to the prosecution of the case a)ainst him+
71=8
#n our
vie., the present controversy simply boils do.n to this pivotal 6uestion0 ,iven the purpose
of preventive suspension and the circumstances of this case, did respondent &eputy
Ombudsman commit a )rave abuse of discretion .hen he set the period of preventive
suspension at si/ monthsN
?reventive suspension under $ec+ 2(, 9+%+ F11', to repeat, may be imposed .hen,
amon) other factors, the evidence of )uilt is stron)+ The period for .hich an official may be
preventively suspended must not e/ceed si/ months+ #n this case, petitioner .as preventively
suspended and ordered to cease and desist from holdin) office for the entire period of si/
months, .hich is the ma/imum provided by la.+
H$4*+ 2(+ Preventive Suspension+ O
/ / /
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of the Ombudsman but not more than si/ months, .ithout pay, e/cept .hen the
delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the
fault, ne)li)ence or petition of the respondent, in .hich case the period of such
delay shall not be counted in computin) the period of suspension herein provided+I
(-nderscorin) supplied+)
The determination of .hether or not the evidence of )uilt is stron) as to .arrant
preventive suspension rests .ith the Ombudsman+
71(8
The discretion as re)ards the period of
such suspension also necessarily belon)s to the Ombudsman, e/cept that he cannot e/tend the
period of suspension beyond that provided by la.+
7158
!ut, in our vie., both the stren)th of the
evidence to .arrant said suspension and the propriety of the len)th or period of suspension
imposed on petitioner are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and prohibition+ These
e6uitable remedies under 9ule F5 of the 9ules of *ourt precisely e/ist to provide prompt
relief .here an Hofficer e/ercisin) >udicial or 6uasi">udicial functions has acted+++.ith )rave
abuse of discretion amountin) to lac: or e/cess of >urisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and ade6uate remedy in the ordinary course of la.+I ($ee 9ule F5, $ec+ 1)+
#t is pertinent to note here that the in6uiry that preceded the filin) of an administrative
case a)ainst petitioner .as prompted by ne.spaper reports re)ardin) the alle)edly
anomalous contract entered into by petitioner, on behalf of *ebu *ity, .ith 3+4+ 5uelli)+
71F8
#n
the memorandum to respondent o>ica,
7118
respondent ,arciano recommended that petitioner
be preventively suspended, based on an initial investi)ation purportedly sho.in)0 (1) the
contract for supply of asphalt to *ebu *ity .as desi)ned to favor 3+4+ 5uelli), (2) the amount
6uoted in the contract .as too e/pensive compared to the amount for .hich asphalt may be
bou)ht from local suppliers such as $hell and ?etron, particularly considerin) that the amount
.as fi/ed in dollars and .as payable in pesos, thus e/posin) the city )overnment to the ris:s
attendant to a fluctuatin) e/chan)e rate, and (=) the interest of the city under the contract is
not protected by ade6uate security+ These findin)s .ere based on the contract itself and on
letters from !itume/ and *redit Cyonnais+ There .ere also letters from $hell and ?etron that
.ere replies to the Office of the OmbudsmanMs (Visayas) in6uiry on .hether or not they
could supply *ebu *ity .ith asphalt and on .hat terms+
,iven these findin)s, .e cannot say no. that there is no evidence sufficiently stron) to
>ustify the imposition of preventive suspension a)ainst petitioner+ !ut considerin) its
purpose and the circumstances in the case brou)ht before us, it does appear to us that the
imposition of the ma/imum period of si/ months is un.arranted+
On behalf of respondents, the $olicitor ,eneral stated durin) his oral ar)ument at the
hearin) that the documents mentioned in respondentsM comment (such as purchase orders,
purchase re6uests, and disbursement vouchers), documents that sho. petitionerMs )uilt, .ere
obtained after petitioner had been suspended+ 4ven if an afterthou)ht, he claimed
they stren)then the evidence of respondents a)ainst petitioner+ #f the purpose of the
preventive suspension .as to enable the investi)atin) authority to )ather documents .ithout
intervention from petitioner, then, from respondentsM submission, .e can only conclude that
this purpose .as already achieved, durin) the nearly month"lon) suspension of petitioner
from June 25 to July 19, 1999+ ,rantin) that no. the evidence a)ainst petitioner is already
stron), even .ithout concedin) that initially it .as .ea:, it is clear to us that the ma/imum
si/"month period is e/cessive and definitely lon)er than necessary for the Ombudsman to
ma:e its le)itimate case a)ainst petitioner+ Be must conclude that the period durin) .hich
petitioner .as already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the la.ful purpose of
preventin) petitioner from hidin) and destroyin) needed documents, or harassin) and
preventin) .itnesses .ho .ish to appear a)ainst him+
Be reach the fore)oin) conclusion, ho.ever, .ithout necessarily subscribin) to
petitionerMs claim that the Cocal ,overnment *ode, .hich he averred should apply to this
case of an elective local official, has been violated+ True, under said *ode, preventive
suspension may only be imposed after the issues are >oined, and only for a ma/imum period
of si/ty days+ @ere, petitioner .as suspended .ithout havin) had the chance to refute first
the char)es a)ainst him, and for the ma/imum period of si/ months provided by the
Ombudsman Ca.+ !ut as respondents ar)ue, administrative complaints commenced under
the Ombudsman Ca. are distinct from those initiated under the Cocal ,overnment
*ode+ 9espondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Cocal
,overnment *ode is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a
mayor, a )overnor, or the ?resident, .ho may be motivated by partisan political
considerations+ #n contrast the Ombudsman, .ho can impose a lon)er period of preventive
suspension, is not li:ely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body+ The
distinction is valid but not decisive, in our vie., of .hether there has been )rave abuse of
discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension+
9espondents base their ar)ument on the deliberations of the $enate on $enate !ill ;o+
155, .hich became the Cocal ,overnment *ode+ $enator %6uilino ?imentel, Jr+,
commentin) on the preservation in the proposed *ode of the po.er of the Office of the
?resident to suspend local officials, said0
H(enat$% &iente1. ;o., as far as .e are concerned, the $enate *ommittee is
ready to adopt a more strin)ent rule re)ardin) the po.er of removal and
suspension by the Office of the ?resident over local )overnment officials, r+
?resident+ Be .ould only .ish to point out that in a subse6uent section, .e have
provided for the po.er of suspension of local )overnment officials to be limited
only to F' days and not more than 9' days in any one year, re)ardless of the
number of administrative char)es that may be filed a)ainst a local )overnment
official+ Be, in fact, had in mind the case of ayor ,anLon of #loilo .here the
$ecretary of Cocal ,overnment sort of serialiLed the filin) of char)es a)ainst him
so that he can be continuously suspended .hen one case is filed ri)ht after the
other, r+ ?resident+I
7128
9espondents may be correct in pointin) out the reason for the shorter period of
preventive suspension imposable under the Cocal ,overnment *ode+ ?olitical color could
taint the e/ercise of the po.er to suspend local officials by the mayor, )overnor, or
?residentMs office+ #n contrast the Ombudsman, considerin) the constitutional ori)in of his
Office, al.ays ou)ht to be insulated from the va)aries of politics, as respondents .ould have
us believe+
#n Hagad v. Go)o*Dadole,
7198
on the matter of .hether or not the Ombudsman has been
stripped of his po.er to investi)ate local elective officials by virtue of the Cocal ,overnment
*ode, .e said0
H#ndeed, there is nothin) in the Cocal ,overnment *ode to indicate that it has
repealed, .hether e/pressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman %ct+ The t.o statutes on the specific matter in 6uestion are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and stri:e
do.n the other+I
72'8
#t .as also ar)ued in Hagad, that the si/"month preventive suspension under the
Ombudsman Ca. is Hmuch too repu)nantI to the F'"day period that may be imposed under
the Cocal ,overnment *ode+ !ut per J+ Vitu), Hthe t.o provisions )overn differently+I
7218
@o.ever, petitioner no. contends that Hagad did not settle the 6uestion of .hether a
local elective official may be preventively suspended even before the issues could be
>oined+ #ndeed it did not, but .e have held in other cases that there could be preventive
suspension even before the char)es a)ainst the official are heard, or before the official is
)iven an opportunity to prove his innocence+
7228
?reventive suspension is merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investi)ation and is not in any .ay the final determination of the
)uilt of the official concerned+
?etitioner also avers that the suspension order a)ainst him .as issued in violation of
$ection 2F(2) of the Ombudsman Ca., .hich provides0
H$4*+ 2F+ +nquiries+ O ///
(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
.hatever form concernin) an official act or omission+ #t shall act on the complaint
immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and
inform the complainant of such dismissal citin) the reasons therefor+ #f it finds a
reasonable )round to investi)ate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public
officer or employee .ith a summary of the complaint and re6uire him to submit a
.ritten ans.er .ithin seventy"t.o hours from receipt thereofPI
?etitioner ar)ues that before an in6uiry may be converted into a full"blo.n
administrative investi)ation, the official concerned must be )iven 12 hours to ans.er the
char)es a)ainst him+ #n his case, petitioner says the in6uiry .as converted into an
administrative investi)ation .ithout him bein) )iven the re6uired number of hours to ans.er+
#ndeed, it does not appear that petitioner .as )iven the re6uisite 12 hours to submit a
.ritten ans.er to the complaint a)ainst him+ This, ho.ever, does not ma:e invalid the
preventive suspension order issued a)ainst him+ %s .e have earlier stated, a preventive
suspension order may be issued even before the char)es a)ainst the official concerned is
heard+
oreover, respondents state that petitioner .as )iven 1' days to submit his counter"
affidavit to the complaint filed by respondent Ta)aan+ Be find this 1'"day period is in
:eepin) .ith $ection 5(a) of the 9ules of ?rocedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
72=8
.hich provides0
H$ec+ 5+ Administrative ad!udication' Ho, conducted+Q
(a) #f the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated in $ection 2'
of 9epublic %ct ;o+ F11', the respondent shall be furnished .ith copy of the
affidavits and other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered
to file his counter"affidavits and other evidences in support of his defense, .ithin
ten (1') days from receipt thereof, to)ether .ith proof of service of the same on the
complainant .ho may file reply affidavits .ithin ten (1') days from receipt of the
counter"affidavits of the respondent+I
Be no. come to the concludin) in6uiry+ ,rantin) that the Office of the Ombudsman
may investi)ate, for purposes provided for by la., the acts of petitioner committed prior to
his present term of officeK and that it may preventively suspend him for a reasonable period,
can that office hold him administratively liable for said actsN
#n a number of cases, .e have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be
held administratively accountable for misconduct committed durin) his prior term of office+
72(8
The rationale for this holdin) is that .hen the electorate put him bac: into office, it is
presumed that it did so .ith full :no.led)e of his life and character, includin) his past
misconduct+ #f, armed .ith such :no.led)e, it still reelects him, then such reelection is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds+
@o.ever, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner .ith 3+4+ 5uelli) .as si)ned >ust four days before the date of the elections+ #t .as
not made an issue durin) the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted
for petitioner .ith :no.led)e of this particular aspect of his life and character+
3or his part, petitioner contends that Hthe only conclusive determinin) factorI
7258
as
re)ards the peopleMs thin:in) on the matter is an election+ On this point, .e a)ree .ith
petitioner+ That the people voted for an official .ith :no.led)e of his character is presumed,
precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the e/tent of this
:no.led)e+ $uch an underta:in) .ill obviously be impossible+ Our rulin)s on the matter do
not distin)uish the precise timin) or period .hen the misconduct .as committed, rec:oned
from the date of the officialMs reelection, e/cept that it must be prior to said date+
%s held in Salalima,
HThe rule adopted in Pascual, 6ualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are
concerned, is still a )ood la.+ $uch a rule is not only founded on the theory that an
officialMs reelection e/presses the soverei)n .ill of the electorate to for)ive or
condone any act or omission constitutin) a )round for administrative discipline
.hich .as committed durin) his previous term+ Be may add that sound polic%
dictates it. $o rule ot&er,ise ,ould open t&e loodgates to e(acer#ating endless
partisan contests #et,een t&e reelected oicial and &is political enemies- ,&o ma%
not stop to &ound t&e ormer during &is ne, term ,it& administrative cases or
acts alleged to &ave #een committed during &is previous term+ @is second term
may thus be devoted to defendin) himself in the said cases to the detriment of
public service+++I (4mphasis added+)
72F8
The above rulin) in Salalima applies to this case+ ?etitioner cannot anymore be
held administratively liable for an act done durin) his previous term, that is, his si)nin) of the
contract .ith 3+4+ 5uelli)+
The assailed retainer a)reement in Salalima .as e/ecuted sometime in
199'+ ,overnor Salalima .as reelected in 1992 and payments for the retainer continued to
be made durin) his succeedin) term+ This situation is no different from the one in the present
case, .herein deliveries of the asphalt under the contract .ith 3+4+ 5uelli) and the payments
therefor .ere supposed to have commenced on $eptember 1992, durin) petitionerMs second
term+
@o.ever, respondents ar)ue that the contract, althou)h si)ned on ay 1, 1992, durin)
petitionerMs prior term, is to be made effective only durin) his present term+
Be fail to see any difference to >ustify a valid distinction in the result+ The a)reement
bet.een petitioner (representin) *ebu *ity) and 3+4+ 5uelli) .as perfected on the date the
contract .as si)ned, durin) petitionerMs prior term+ %t that moment, petitioner already
acceded to the terms of the contract, includin) stipulations no. alle)ed to be pre>udicial to
the city )overnment+ Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in si)nin) the contract
already became e/tant on the day the contract .as si)ned+ #t hardly matters that the
deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later+
Bhile petitioner can no lon)er be held administratively liable for si)nin) the contract
.ith 3+ 4+ 5uelli), ho.ever, this should not pre>udice the filin) of any case other than
administrative a)ainst petitioner+ Our rulin) in this case, may not be ta:en to mean the total
e/oneration of petitioner for .hatever .ron)doin), if any, mi)ht have been committed in
si)nin) the sub>ect contract+ The rulin) no. is limited to the 6uestion of .hether or not he
may be held administrativel% liable therefor, and it is our considered vie. that he may not+
2H.R.+OR., the petition is hereby &4;#4& insofar as it see:s to declare that
respondents committed )rave abuse of discretion in conductin) an in6uiry on complaints
a)ainst petitioner, and orderin) their investi)ation pursuant to respondentsM mandate under
the *onstitution and the Ombudsman Ca.+ !ut the petition is hereby ,9%;T4& insofar as
it see:s to declare that respondents committed )rave abuse of discretion concernin) the
period of preventive suspension imposed on petitioner, .hich is the ma/imum of si/ months,
it appearin) that 2( days O the number of days from the date petitioner .as suspended on
June 25, 1999, to the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999 O .ere sufficient for the
purpose+ %ccordin)ly, petitionerMs preventive suspension, embodied in the order of
respondent &eputy Ombudsman, dated June 25, 1999, should no. be, as it is hereby,
C#3T4& immediately+
(O ORD.R.D.
Bellosillo- Acting "...- /"&airman0- endoLa- and Buena- ...- concur+