Inherently Safe Designs for Petrochemical Facilities

An Inherently Safe Design is one where the potential of equipment failures and/or
release of volatile hydrocarbons or toxic materials is substantially reduced
because appropriate safe design decisions were incorporated at project
inception. requently small! fairly low cost changes made at time of the initial
design can greatly increase reliability and "Inherent Safety# of facilities.
$he focus of inherently safe designs is to prevent the release/failure from
occurring in the first place. $his may be accomplished by eliminating the
scenario as a realistic possibility. It may also be accomplished by providing
primary and secondary protection in the form of automated shutdowns and fail%
safe protective devices.
&ydrocarbon/toxic material sensors and fire detection/protection systems are
also important components of a petrochemical facilities safety protection system.
&owever! because these systems are in general non%preventative measures!
they are not included in design approaches to create inherently safe designs.

$o increase the inherent safety of the facilities that handle volatile hydrocarbons
and/or toxic materials! the following strategies should be considered during the
design phase'
1. Equipment/Pipe Design Pressure Rating
Strategic selection of equipment/pipe design rating may sometimes entirely
eliminate certain potential over%pressure scenarios. Some examples are
indicated below'
(quipment design pressure should be above )A*+ of inlet pipeline
or gathering system. ,here not feasible! appropriate safety
protection systems should be installed. $his may include an (SD
at inlet. -efer to item .! safety protection systems.
,here high pressure systems feed low pressure systems! consider
ma/ing low pressure system equipment rating same as high
pressure rating. As an alternate! high pressure system outlet
control valve 0and bypass1 should have minimum acceptable trim
si2e. ,here not feasible! appropriate safety protection systems
should be installed. $his may include an (SD downstream of high
pressure outlet control valve. -efer to item .! safety protection
systems.
Systems that include spill%bac/ or recycle valves to suction
piping/equipment 0e.g. compressor spillbac/1 also involve potential
feed from a high pressure to low pressure. $he recommendations
above also may apply for these systems.
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,here pump discharge pressure requires discharge rating above
suction requirements! consider selecting flange rating of pump
suction piping and suction vessel to be equal to required discharge
piping. ,here not feasible! pipe spec brea/ should be upstream of
suction valve 0i.e. suction valve has same rating as discharge
valve1. $his prevents overpressure should chec/ valve lea/ when
pump is out of service and its suction valve is closed.
,here a vessel or tan/ is blan/eted! the vent regulator should be
si2ed so that its capacity is greater than the fail open capacity of the
blan/et supply regulator. Also where series regulators are
required! the downstream regulator rating should be equal or
greater than the pressure upstream of the first regulator! to protect
the system in case the first regulator fails open.
,here a high pressure system feeds a low pressure system and it
is not feasible to maintain same system rating! consider location of
all bloc/ valves when choosing location of pipe spec. brea/. +ipe
spec. brea/ should be generally downstream of the last bloc/ valve
in the piping system that may be closed. *therwise! bloc/ valves
should be loc/ed open or a relief valve installed upstream of bloc/
valves.
,here a chec/ valve is used to prevent bac/ flow from a system
with higher pressure rating! consider si2ing lower pressure system
for same rating as higher pressure system. *therwise! relief valve
should be si2ed for chec/ valve flapper failure to close.
$o prevent need to si2e for heat exchanger tube rupture! low side
design pressure should be at least ./5 of high side design pressure.
Also consider si2ing vent system for compressor seal/pac/ing
failure.
Avoid connecting higher pressure components and lower pressure
components into the same drain or vent system. 6onsider
separate high pressure and low pressure drain/vent systems or
installation of a relief valve in drain system si2ed for worst case gas
blow%by from highest operating pressure. Also consider installing
chec/ valves in all drain/vent connections from lower pressure
vessels.
2 Safety Protection Systems
,here a failure scenario cannot be eliminated as in item 3 above! plant
safety systems should provide two levels of protection to prevent or
minimi2e the effects of a component failure within the process. $he two
levels of protection should be independent of and in addition to the control
devices used in normal process operation. In general! the two levels
should be provided by functionally different types of safety devices as two
identical devices may have the same inherent wea/nesses. A+I -+ 34 7
Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of
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Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms
Section 4 provides an excellent explanation of primary and secondary
protection schemes for many failure scenarios. Although this document is
intended for offshore platforms! the -+ provides a good guideline for all
facilities that handle volatile hydrocarbons or toxic material. &owever!
A+I 346 should only be used as a guideline for onshore facilities.
Distance between equipment! personnel/public exposure! operating
pressure/temperature! and other mitigating factors should be considered
when applying A+I 346 to onshore facilities.
Additional considerations for safety protection systems for inherently safe
facilities are below'
,here primary and secondary devices or elements are utili2ed!
they should not be mounted on same connection 0e.g. 7 separate
level bridles or pressure taps1.
Separate instrument air regulators should be provided for all
instruments.
6ontrol system failure modes should be analy2ed thoroughly to
select appropriate failure modes 0fail open or fail closed! etc.1.
Additionally! it should be verified that control devices will revert to
their failure position on failure of electrical signal! failure of
instrument air! and coincident failure of both electrical/instrument
air.
3 ppropriate !etallurgy Selection
Appropriate metallurgy selection results not only in a more reliable facility
but also reduces the li/elihood of equipment or pipe material failure and
corresponding hydrocarbon/toxic material release. &ence! inherent safety
and equipment reliability are both important considerations when choosing
plant metallurgy'
-eview potential corrosion for each system. 6onsider increased
cost of non%corroding system in lieu of utili2ing corrosion allowance.
0I.e. stainless steel vs. carbon steel vs. internally coating1.
6onsider upset conditions when choosing metallurgy. As an
example! generally a stream may operate above 588 ! so water
based corrosion may not occur at typical operating pressures.
&owever! consider shutdowns! dead legs! start%up! abnormal
operations! etc. when temperature may be lower than .88 to
select appropriate metallurgy.
Similarly! when selecting equipment design temperature! consider
abnormal conditions where equipment may be exposed to
temperatures well above or below normal operating conditions.
0(.g. fracture toughness of metals subjected to temperatures below
%.8
o
is an important consideration1. AS)( pressure vessel code!
AS)(/A9SI :53.5 piping code! and other applicable codes dictate
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permitted metallurgy at rated temperature and pressure. *nce!
design temperature is judiciously selected! AS)(! A9SI! and other
pertinent design codes will dictate available metallurgy for selected
design conditions.
6onsider external corrosion and install appropriate pipe wrapping!
coating for conditions.
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