journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO
China’s Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Strategy
China’s strategy for establishing
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) is pragmatic and far-sighted.
Resolving border issues, trade, trust and
mutual security with neighboring states is
geopolitically sound. The SCO has the
opportunity to expand its scope, restore
political stability to the organization and
act on global issues. China’s success in
creating a positive public image of the
SCO, maintaining stability in Xinjiang,
Tibet and member states of the SCO,
preserving close ties with Russia and
promoting cultural exchange and trade
will safeguard China’s leadership of the
SCO.
The SCO has been labeled “anti-
western” and “shadowy” in the press, but
SCO policies regarding fighting “three
fundamental evils of terrorism, extremism
and separatism,” are consistent with US
and European ideology. China and the
SCO must be transparent with journalists
to ensure their organization is portrayed
accurately. China also has to step in and
make strong policy decisions, working in
concert with the SCO instead of working
through the organization as a proxy. By
working in concert, I mean synergizing.
By saying China should not use SCO as
proxy, I mean that China, with the
backing of SCO states, should make
strong policy statements and defend
nuclear cooperation with Russia and other
states. The SCO’s purpose is not purely
to further China’s hegemony, but it is a
vehicle for China to do that. If the SCO is
for one thing, it is to strengthen
ARIEL PABLO
SZNAJDER
Editor: Andrés Gentry
cooperation with states to become an
economic, political and security bloc that
can tip the global balance of power.
China will be treated as a world
power by developed countries when it acts
like a strong country with the backing of
strong coalitions and exudes hegemony.
China has been having joint anti-
terrorism military exercises with SCO
members as well as India, Pakistan, UK
and France since 2002.1 As one native
regional expert articulated, given Central
Asia’s rich strategic and physical
resources, “one can expect potential
clashes of global interests of great powers
for domination of the region.”2
Strengthening Borders and Stability
Surrounding Xinjiang Province
Historically, unsettled border
regions have led to regional disputes. The
unresolved status of national demarcation
lines has led to war in Nagorno-Karabakh
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well
as between Macedonia and Greece, South
Ossetia in Georgia and Transdneister in
Moldova. The SCO has settled most
border disputes between the Russian
Federation, China and the Central Asian
states. The Tajikistan-China border is an
exception. China has been successful in
persuading SCO member-states to restrict
the activities of the Uighur population
living within their borders. Countries like
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and
even Turkey have disbanded several
Uighur political parties and restricted
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their ability to assemble.3 infrequently but not unnoticed, Uyghurs

The current reduced militarization from China's Xinjiang province.” Islamic
of borders has allowed member states to groups in Xinjiang have allegedly received
commit troops elsewhere. This “good support for education and religious
neighbor strategy” engages Central Asia organization from the Afghan Taliban, the
in international issues involving China, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),
thereby extending China’s influence and the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan
beyond the region: it extends China’s These groups believe in pan-islamism and
influence outside Asia on international a militant return to a caliphate and
issues so that China can take a strong Islamic society.5
stance on issues such as not adding new There have been sporadic market
countries to the UN Security Council. The bombings in Urumqi and Kashgar since
SCO can act as a substantial voting bloc if 1970, and the Chinese Embassy in
members agree on UN Security Council Ankara, Turkey, was attacked in 1997.
resolutions The non-
and WTO violent
treaties. The SCO can act as a substantial voting struggle of
Strengthened Kurash
communicatio
bloc if members agree on UN Security Sultan, a
n will benefit Council resolutions and WTO treaties. Uighur
all members in Strengthened communication will benefit separatist
international musician in
forums. all members in international forums. exile in
Clearly Sweden, has
delineated the potential
borders with neighboring states will to become a “cause-celebre” because of
undermine Uighur hopes for an recent increased media coverage in
independent East Turkestan and cut off October 2005 in the New Internationalist
links with international Islamists. magazine,6 Far Eastern Economic
Because of the Uighurs currently under Review,7 Washington Times, Freemuse
detention in Guantanamo Bay, there has online magazine, and a number of CSIS
been more sympathy in the Islamic world policy briefs. This undermines China’s
for them and more funding from Saudi image in Europe.
Arabia for Islamic education. Evidence China and Russia have determined
also exists of Uighur mujahadeen fighting (like the US in Afghanistan) that it is
with the Taliban in Afghanistan, up to better to fight Islamists in Central Asia
one hundred Uighur fighters may have than within their own national borders.
been aiding the Taliban at the time of the China has made strong demands for the
U.S. invasion, with another thousand extradition of any wanted Uighur
militants from Xinjiang attending nationalists who escape into neighboring
training camps in Afghanistan.4 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. China will be
“Although the biggest names and able to better maintain stability and
largest percentage of captured Al Qaeda economic prosperity in Xinjiang with a
members continue to be primarily of strong coalition of stable SCO neighboring
Middle Eastern or South Asian origin, states.
every now and then reports mention The Tarim basin in Xinjiang
other, more exotic figures in the mix of province is believed to hold immense
captured and killed: Chechens from the untapped oil reserves. Three quarters of
Caucuses, Uzbeks, Filipino Moros, and, China's mineral wealth is concentrated in

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Xinjiang province.8 The cities of Turpan
and Jungar overlooking the basin are of
great strategic importance for energy
security in China. Russia has been
dealing with an Islamic separatist war in
Chechnya for decades, but China has not
suffered this scale of combat in Xinjiang.
The SCO has planned a regional anti-
terrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyz
Republic, to pool the intelligence
operations of each member country and
maintain a standing rapid deployment
force of Russian and Chinese troops and a
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure
(RATS) based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
But, a pro-US Bishkek would do less to
help China root out Uighur separatists.
The US only recognizes one out of four
separatist groups in Xinjiang as “terrorist
groups.”9 Stability is threatened by
violent repression of demonstrations in
Uzbekistan, revolutions in Kyrgyzstan
and porous borders throughout the region.
Instability in Central Asia and the Color
Revolutions
Political instability in Uzbekistan
must be confronted by the SCO through a
multinational agreed-upon policy of giving
concessions, coordination of immediate
responses to violence and allowing limited
autonomy to disenfranchised groups.
China’s pragmatic approach to finding
resolutions within SCO states aims to
contain violent or disruptive activity
within those states where there is a
detailed procedure for managing
instability. When unrest is not dealt with
rapidly with minimal force and moves
outside of SCO jurisdiction or attracts
international scrutiny, then it must be
dealt with on a case by case basis and is
detrimental to the international relations
of the SCO.
Islamic states, Europe and the US
have criticized President Islam Karimov's
brutal repression of Islamic and
democracy activists. On May 13, 2005,
Uzbek troops fired into a crowd of
protesters, killing an estimated 400 to
1000 people in what has been termed the
Andijan massacre. Violent disturbances
subsequently spread to a number of other
cities in the region. Although there was
potential for this to spread to surrounding
countries, there was no evidence of SCO
intervention. Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov said the unrest was an
"internal affair.” The Uzbek authority’s
handling of Andijan met with fierce
criticism and an investigation into the
matter was organized.
Several European nations refused
to participate in this questionable,
Uzbekistan-sponsored "international"
investigation that included
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), China, Iran, India and Pakistan.10
After the US called for a truly
independent international investigation,
the Government of Uzbekistan placed
restrictions on the operation of the U.S.
base in Karshi-Khanabad. When the US
participated in the international effort to
relocate over 400 Andijan refugees from
neighboring Kyrgyzstan (where they were
constantly under threat of illegal
extradition to Uzbekistan) to third
countries (initially Romania), the
Government of Uzbekistan ordered the
Karshi-Khanabad base to be closed within
six months. This iron-fisted reaction
raises the question as to whether the SCO
and Karimov came to this outcome
together. The US wasted hard-earned
diplomatic and political capital by trying
to fight this unnecessary battle whose
costs outweighed its benefits. I argue that
it was not worth the cost, especially since
the encouragement of greater
transparency and democracy was not
successful. This is my opinion, but in
Uzbekistan it seemed to be a lose-lose
situation because the NGOs can no longer
operate there, democracy training was not
effective and US lost a base. NATO will
soon lose its bases as well. Pressuring
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Karimov does not appear to have further
promoted democracy within Uzbekistan.
The closure of the US air force
base in Karshi-Khanabad was a major
victory for the SCO in reducing the US
military presence in Central Asia. The
closure coincided with SCO’s call to set a
timetable for the US military withdrawal
from Central Asia. “US experts suspect
that Moscow and Beijing exerted pressure
on both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to
close US military facilities in the
respective countries. Karimov obliged,
while President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's
administration in Kyrgyzstan said that
American forces could stay at the Manas
air base as long as the Islamic radical
threat remains in Afghanistan.”11
This set the stage for the Astana
Summit in July 2005 where the US was
urged to set a timetable for withdrawing
troops from member states. “For
authoritarian states like Uzbekistan,
closer ties with China present one great
advantage; unlike the US, Beijing does
not pressure its allies to democratize or
liberalize their markets.”12 Russia and
China do not oppose the severe domestic
policies of Uzbekistan or SCO member
nations which severely repress religious
and political opposition movements.
China’s response to the Andijan massacre
was to extend Karimov a $600 million
natural-gas development contract13 and a
ceremonious welcome to China to show
support for his maintenance of stability.
Although this strategy is working in
Uzbekistan, it has failed in Serbia and
Kygyzstan. Personal ties between the
Chinese government and unpopular
leaders such as Slodoban Milosevic of
Serbia and Askar Akayev of Kygyzstan
have led to the waste of China’s financial
and diplomatic capital after these leaders’
political downfalls.
The removal of Askar Akayev from
power in Kyrgyzstan during the Tulip
Revolution in April 2005 was a loss of face
for the SCO because of the time they had
spent endorsing and engaging Akayev’s
government and the inability to maintain
a pro-SCO government in power in a
crucial Chinese border state where a US
base is less than 200 miles from the
Chinese border. The revolution was
sparked in Osh and Jalal-abad by a law
that placed new restrictions on trade,
making it illegal for traders to use
intermediaries or middle-men, as well as
by corruption, the economic hardships in
the coal mining industry, and unfinished
office flats in Bishkek built for expected
economic growth that did not
materialize.14 The government stated this
legislation would keep prices down, but
many feared that tens of thousands of
businesses would collapse. Thousands of
protestors went to the streets and called
for Akayev’s resignation. When Akayev
resigned from the Kyrgyzstan Embassy in
Moscow, SCO suffered another diplomatic
blow. Chinese Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing reportedly offered a self-
criticism for his poor intelligence on this
sudden development.15
Kazakhstan, which is known for
having progressive laws on NGO
regulations compared to other Central
Asian nations has recently had a spat of
political killings.16 On November 13, 2005
in Almaty, Kazakhstan, a former minister
in the government of President Nursultan
A. Nazarbayev who had threatened to
speak publicly about high-level corruption
was found shot to death, according to the
police and an opposition leader. The
killing came three weeks before a
presidential election in this oil-rich former
Soviet state. The victim, Zamanbek K.
Nurkadilov, 61, was a member of the
leading opposition group, For a Fair
Kazakhstan.17
Altynbek Sarsenbaev, Co-
Chairman of the Kazakhstan opposition
party Naghyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path)
was killed on February 13, 2006 in a
politically motivated murder after he
protested against Nazarbayev’s
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authoritarian rule. According to Reuters,
five members of Kazakhstan’s secret
service elite Arystan unit were arrested in
connection with the assassination. These
activities were not condemned by China
and Russia, but are creating an
atmosphere of fear in Kazakhstan and
proving as Yevgeny Zhovtis, Director of
the Kazakhstan International Bureau for
Human Rights and the Rule of Law says,
“Killing is no longer taboo”18 and that
Nazarbayev is unable to control
infighting, corruption and assassinations
by officials in his government. Political
apathy and a growing economy are pivotal
in keeping Nazarbayev in power.
When US Vice President Richard
Cheney visited Kazakhstan on May 5-6,
2006 and made a US$158 million
investment for national nuclear non-
proliferation, energy and business
projects, he did not stress democratic
reform and spoke highly about the
Kazakh government’s newly established
Commission on Democracy.19 Cheney did
not call for democratic reform in
Kazakhstan although he emphasized it in
every other country he visited in his
Eastern European visits after blasting
Russia for using its energy resources to
manipulate countries and being
undemocratic. 20 Kazakhstan is
strategically important as a non-OPEC
state that is increasing oil production over
the next ten years. Kazakhstan is gaining
leverage and its status as an SCO
member is boosting its status. In addition,
being the only Central Asian country to
have committed troops in Iraq it has close
ties with the US.
Mr. Zhovtis says the Kazakh
government has grown impatient with
what it sees as the Soros Foundation's
interference in the political affairs of post-
Soviet countries. According to Wikipedia,
Zhovtis believes the Soros Foundation-
Kazakhstan might follow the fate of the
Open Society Institute (OSI) in
Uzbekistan. China and Russia became
especially suspicious of NGO and foreign
government involvement in the color
revolutions.21
Following the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine in November 2004, several
Central Asian nations took action against
the OSI. Uzbekistan closed OSI regional
offices, while Tajik state-controlled media
have accused OSI-Tajikistan of corruption
and nepotism.22 Evidence suggests US
government involvement in encouraging
demonstrations and communication
between opposition parties through the
internet Freenet structure supported by
USAID and the United Nations
Development Program, which is known to
comprise a major part of the internet
structure in Kyrgyzstan. IGO and foreign
government involvement in political
advocacy is growing throughout Eastern
Europe and Central Asia.23
In April 1999, Uzbekistan
established a favorable new law
regulating non-governmental, non-
commercial, non-profit and all legal
entities that do not pursue economic gain
as their main goal. Agencies such as
UNDP, USAID, ICNL, OSCE and the
Counterpart Consortium had been
pushing for a reform in these laws by
describing how NGOs can play a major
role in the overarching development of a
country. According to an article by
Richard Remias published by the
International Center for Not-for-Profit
Law, the registration and establishment
of philanthropic organizations and foreign
and Uzbek-run NGOs was simplified
substantially by a bill passed by the Olyi
Majilis (Uzbek parliament) on April 15,
2006.24
Shortly after the Rose Revolution
brought opposition leader Mikheil
Saakashvili to power in Georgia in late
2003, Uzbek authorities amended a law
requiring all nongovernmental
organizations to re-register. It is difficult
to substantially improve the regulatory
environment for NGOs because most SCO
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countries have similar laws to the Soviet-
styled Law on Public Associations. This
law leaves undefined the authority of
government bodies which may require re-
registration with expansion of NGO
activities and even denial of registration
with an unclear means to appeal. This is
similar to Russia and China’s law
requiring NGO’s to be registered with a
host country and the requirement that
organizations have government oversight.
US government agencies25 and NGO’s
such as Freedom House and Internews
are closely watched and face closure in
Uzbekistan. Beijing is working to counter
what it perceives as Washington-
fomented instability in the Kyrgyz
Republic, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
China and Russia are staunch opponents
of NGOs and outside interference in the
affairs of any sovereign state.
The Sino-Russian Relationship
The SCO has been a strong
rallying point between China and Russia.
Sino-Russian relations are the closest
they have been since before the Sino-
Soviet split. China and Russia are
resolving their “three fundamental
obstacles” concerning the Outer Mongolia
border, diplomatic relations with Vietnam
and Cambodia and the Taiwan issue.
China’s dismay at the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the emergence of 15
republics is a large motivator for regional
unity. China’s strategic partnership with
Russia is based on Beijing’s desire to
create a multi-polar world that synergizes
with Moscow’s long-standing desire to
strengthen influence over Central Asia.
However, if the “pragmatic” nature of the
Russian-Chinese friendship foreshadows
the future of the SCO, the future is not so
bright.26
In a show of sovereignty,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
all reached border agreements clearly
delineating where one country ends and
the other begins with China without
consulting Russia.27 If Russia feels left out
and thinks that China and Central Asian
states are having private conversations at
the expense of Russia, there may be
conflict. Russia is looking to revive
military bases in Tajikistan and the
Kyrgyz Republic. The USA has a base in
the Kyrgyz Republic and until recently in
Uzbekistan and NATO has two bases in
Tajikistan and one in Uzbekistan.
Resource conflicts will be difficult
to avert because of China and Russia’s
hard stance on water issues in Central
Asia. China has diverted more than 30
rivers in Xinjiang since the start of the
SCO.28 Uzbekistan, courted by the US,
China and Russia, has closer ties with
Beijing and is suspicious of Moscow,
although this is changing. On November
14, 2005 Uzbekistan and Russia signed an
agreement on allied relations intended to
better inter-governmental cooperation.29
Russia is concerned about illegal Chinese
residents30 throughout Russia and
especially concentrated in the Far East.
After Russia made an oil pipeline deal
with Japan that excluded China, Beijing
realized that Moscow’s economic needs
make it a weak partner.
If Jiang Zemin was seen as pro-
US, Hu Jintao is viewed as pro-Russian in
Beijing foreign policy circles.31 Hu is
relying on Russia for diplomatic and
military support against Washington’s
recent “aggressive” activities in Central
Asia. US troops in Bishkek, Kyrgyz
Republic are only 200 miles from the
Chinese border. Military anti-terrorism
exercises with Kazakhstan and Russia
have proven to be successful. Russia-
based political scientist, Zhou Liang,
predicts that if the US and China ever go
to war over Taiwan, Russia would assist
in impeding US forces stationed in
Central Asia. China and Russia have done
well to foster military and strategic ties
with Central Asia. Developing cultural
ties is also part of the SCO plan. The SCO
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funds students from member countries to
study in other member countries to
promote cultural exchange. The Ministers
of Culture of all SCO member nations also
have periodic meetings under the Council
of Heads of Governments and the Council
of Heads of States.
Cultural and Trade Ties
China and Russia focus attention
on cultural interactions with their Central
Asian neighbors to promote educational
exchange and emphasize similarities
between the countries. China called for
the six ministers of culture to meet and
initiate language exchange programs.32
China has a large cultural and language
barrier to overcome. Samat Smagulov, a
30-year-old construction worker in
Almaty, cites a popular proverb to explain
why Kazakhstan should favor Russia over
China as an ally: "If the 'black' Chinese
[hordes] come, the 'white' Russian will
seem like your own father."33
Iran and Turkey have more ethnic,
religious and cultural ties with Central
Asia, but have not put Central Asia on the
top of their list. According to Svante
Cornell, research director of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road
Studies Program at Uppsala University in
Sweden, Turkey’s foreign policy priorities
lie with the EU, the Kurds, Cyprus and
Iraq. Iran’s priorities lie with the Persian
Gulf states and deflecting criticism from
Israel and the US. Currently, most
Central Asian states are secular, which
benefits cooperation with China.
China’s revival of the ancient Silk
Road is very attractive to Central Asia.
Xinjiang has developed a comprehensive
86,000-kilometer road network, including
highways linking various border
gateways. 34 Kazakhstan has great
petroleum potential and China is bidding
for a pipeline east from the Caspian Sea
to Xinjiang and Shanghai. A court in
Canada on 25 October approved the
purchase of oil producer PetroKazakhstan
(actually a Canadian company) by China's
biggest state oil company, China National
Petroleum Corp. This venture will
diversify China’s energy supply.
Kazakhstan and China have agreed on a
one billion dollar trade goal, greatly
benefiting Kazakhstan’s development. In
Uzbekistan, Karimov’s decision to close
borders with Kyrgyzstan in 2003
devastated the local economy by
preventing the importation of Chinese
consumer goods.35
India as a Potential Great Power Rival
While looking primarily to western
neighbors, China should also look at its
southwestern neighbors and not focus
myopically on Central Asia. The Dalai
Llama, chief leader of the separatist
resistance movement of Tibet and a
celebrity in the West, was granted
political asylum in Dharamsala by the
Indian government. India has the
potential to stir up separatist conflicts in
Tibet. The Free Tibet movement has
many followers in Nepal, India, Bhutan,
Japan, Australia, United States and
Canada.
Although China is winning the
hegemony game in most of Southeast
Asia, India is winning in Vietnam,
Indonesia and most of Africa. Although
China is now buying a lot of wood from
and selling a lot of weapons to Indonesia,
anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia happened
less than two decades ago. East and
Southern Africa are full of Indian
business communities. Although Indian
communities were forced out of Uganda in
the 1970s, millions of Indians still live in
Africa and some hold ministerial positions
in the government, such as Dipak K.A.
Patel, the Minister of Commerce in
Zambia. The Chinese business community
has not been able to penetrate Africa as
much as India. The cultural hegemony of
India through Buddhism has been
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widespread in China and Southeast Asia instead of leading a crackdown on Islamic

since it originated in the Indian extremism that might garner the support
subcontinent many millennia ago. In of the US and Russia. Even without the
Cambodia, many scholars of Buddhism, support of the US, China must be able to
often paid for by the Indian government, make strong international
still go to India to learn from the pronouncements, however controversial,
birthplace and cultural home. against separatist movements, terrorism
Indian student enrollment in MBA and extreme Islam when necessary to
programs in the US tops Chinese defend its actions. But this must be done
enrollment. Indian Institute of in a way that does not disturb trade and
Technology (IIT) is one of the best diplomatic alliances. China is becoming a
computer science schools in the world, different kind of world power and
attracting students from around the therefore must project strength and
world. China has no counterpart to IIT control to the international community in
and has yet to create an answer to the a way that is different from how the
high-tech capital United
of Asia, States does
Bangalore. Success for the SCO depends on this.
China has also If
been unable to
farsightedness, conflict resolution with China
create Russia and India, growth of SCO makes no
indigenous membership, and the stability and strong
innovation to the moves, there
level India has prosperity of its members. is always a
in the high tech possibility
or other that the
industries. China would be well advised SCO will end up an irrelevant
not to underestimate India as a potential organization such as the CIS. CIS lost a
superpower rival in the future and to lot of power when the leaders of three of
include them as a permanent member in its member states (Georgia, Ukraine and
the SCO. India’s historical resistance to Kyrgyzstan) were ousted during the “color
alliances, as well as its recent nuclear revolutions.” Yet, if power is measured by
agreements with the United States, waging war without military reprisals
indicate that India is less likely to join the from sovereign states, (as Russia has done
SCO, but Pakistan may be more likely. in Chechnya and the US in Iraq) then
China must strive to include India in the China does have a reason to be cautious.
SCO, because the strength of the SCO will This caution is working to China’s
grow substantially with a major player advantage because China is developing
like India. diplomacy and internal conflict
management skills without the huge
The Future of the SCO burden of resorting to war. The US
recently snubbed Taiwanese leader Chen
Success for the SCO depends on Shui-Bian by only allowing him to land
farsightedness, conflict resolution with for a few hours in Alaska on the way to
Russia and India, growth of SCO official visits to Latin America.36 There is
membership, and the stability and an international understanding that you
prosperity of its members. China’s must ascribe to the “one-China policy” in
policymakers are timid, preferring to deal order to engage China. China is biding its
with Uighur extremism through the SCO time quite well with separatist

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movements, including Taiwan, while it
develops it economy. Since economic
development is the top priority, the
Chinese government is able to develop
diplomatic skills and learn how to act like
a superpower without undergoing costly
wars like the US, Russia have engaged in,
as well as the India-Pakistan conflicts in
Kashmir.
The SCO will not substantially
expand if it limits its scope to regional
security issues and combating Islamic
extremism. Uzbekistan gladly welcomed
US requests to station its military forces
on their soil. This lack of internal unity,
compounded with its inability to mount a
cohesive Afghan strategy has hurt SCO’s
credibility. To the Western media, the
SCO calls itself merely a law enforcement
cooperation organization. Secrecy and a
lack of transparency are not effective
ways to market the diplomatic strength of
the SCO. Although neither China nor
Russia are politically open societies, the
SCO must broadcast its mission more
clearly and try to elevate its international
status to that of NATO’s. The SCO does
not have to publish every meeting or
agreement, but positive press would shed
more light on the organization. Many
scholars agree that Russian and Chinese,
rather than Western, interests are
assumed to most heavily shape Central
Asia’s future.37 But the recent Western
attention to Central Asia since the war in
Afghanistan has shown that the region
has the potential to fall into the US
sphere of influence.
It is in China’s interest to
strengthen the SCO because China stands
to gain the most from the SCO. India,
China and Russia met in Vladivostok in
early June 2005 to discuss a “strategic
triangular relationship.” The participation
of Pakistan and India in the latest SCO
meeting has shown promise for the future
of the organization. Xu Xiaotian of the
China Institute on Contemporary
International Relations and Zhao
Suisheng of University of Denver agree
that the SCO is the largest international
security organization in existence. The
future will reveal whether it can influence
the world with one strong voice.

1
Xinhua News Agency “Iron Fist-2004 expands China’s Military Cooperation with foreign armed forces”
9/25/2004
2
Yom, Sean L. “Power Politics in Central Asia The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”
3
Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Repression and Revolt in China's Wild West" Current History Sep. 2004: 262-267. p. 265.
4
Christoffersen, Gaye. "Constituting the Uyghur in U.S.—China Relations: The Geopolitics of Identity Formation
in the War on Terrorism" Strategic Insight 2 Sep. 2002 (Accessed 11/30/04).
5
Fuller, Graham E. and Jonathan Lipman. "Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland.” S. Frederick Starr, ed. New
York: Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 2004. p.336.
6
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JQP/is_383/ai_n15756291
7
http://web.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=11011
8
Rudelson, Justin J. Oasis Identities New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. p. 35.
9
East Turkestan Opposition Party, the Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for Turkestan
Freedom, and the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan are active groups. According to Chien-peng Chung,
Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore.
10
CIS includes: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine
11
Cohen, Ariel. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6158 (Accessed 4/29/06).
12
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/e127caba-2007-4b14-8744-0ffe06ab697a.html (11-9-2005)
13
Cohen, Ariel. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6158 (Accessed 4/29/06).
14
http://en.wikipedia.org.

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journalofIPS/spring2006/Sznajder_SCO

15
http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3390&article_id=2369973
16
http://cango.net.kg/news/archive/july-30-99/a0002.asp
17
Kramer, Andrew “Ex-Kazakh Official Who Made a Threat Found Slain” New York Times International
November 14, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/international/asia/14kazakhstan.html
18
Gorst, Isabel. “Political Rot Spreading Through Kazakhstan.” Financial Times May 4, 2006.
19
www.whitehouse.gov vice president media releases
20
Espo, David “Cheney Promotes Democratic Reform Overseas” Associated Press May 8, 2006
21
Color revolutions are the names given collectively to a series of related movements that developed in post-
communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe and are possibly spreading elsewhere including some places in
the Middle East. Their participants use mostly nonviolent revolutionary change to protest against governments seen
as entrenched and authoritarian, and to advocate democracy, liberalism, and national independence. They usually
also adopt a specific color or flower as their symbol, and the protests are notable for the important role of NGOs and
particularly student activist organizations in organizing creative nonviolent resistance. source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_revolution (11-12-2005)
22
http://www.dream.net.gr/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1372 (11-9-2005)
23
Activists from Otpor in Serbia and Pora in Ukraine have said that publications and training they received from the
US based Albert Einstein Institute.
24
http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss2/cr_nis.htm#UZBEKISTAN (5-5-06)
25
USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, and Freedom House
26
Hu, Richard W. X. “China’s Central Asia Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”
Central Asia at the End of the Transition ed. Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. New York 2005
27
China and USSR fought a border war in 1969, yet the borders were resolved with the SCO states without military
conflict.
28
Hu, Richard W. X. “China’s Central Asia Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”
Central Asia at the End of the Transition ed. Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. New York 2005.
29
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=29970
30
Estimated more than two million
31
Lam, Willy. “Hu's Central Asian Gamble To Counter The U.S. "Containment Strategy"” China Brief Volume 5,
Issue 15 Jamestown Foundation Washington DC: July 05, 2005.
32
http://www.setsco.org
33
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/e127caba-2007-4b14-8744-0ffe06ab697a.html (11-9-2005)
34
“Xinjiang Becomes Bridgehead for Trade Ties with Central Asia” (Xinhua News Agency September 23, 2005)
http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/143261.htm (11/14/2005)
35
http://www.en.wikipedia.org.
36
5/6/2006 BBC Monitoring Service, UK
37
Yom, Sean L. “Power Politics in Central Asia The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”

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