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4.3.1 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no.

1
Situation
A 12000 ton dwt. foreign-going cargo ship built in 1966 was berthed in an
Australian port, when an outbreak of fire occurred in a deck container stowed
adjacent to No.2 hatch.
Initial Action
At 16.00 hours the fire alars were sounded b! the dut! officer, fro a fire
point in the poop accoodation, after obser"ing fire in a container during
discharging operations. #n hearing the alar the crew ustered at their fire
stations.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
$oses were alread! laid out on the fore deck since this is a routine
precaution when dangerous cargoes are loaded or discharged. Additional hoses
were ade a"ailable and arrangeents ade for the aintenance of essential
ser"ices and counications.
%he affected container contained drus of phosphorus and it was
therefore considered that the use of water in the for of a jet or spra!, fro
hoses, would be likel! to pro"e ineffecti"e. $owe"er, as the container was in the
process of being unloaded and was alread! secured in a spreader the crane
dri"er was instructed to lift the container clear of the ship and suberge it in the
dock. %his was done without incident and the container subse&uentl! landed
onto the &ua!. $owe"er as soon as the water had drained fro the copartent
the phosphorus re-ignited. '! this tie the fire brigade were in attendance and
fought the bla(e with dr! powder. %he fire was e)tinguished at 16.*+ hours.
Damage and Personal Inuries
,aage was liited to the container concerned. No injuries occurred.
!ause of Fire
-hilst lifting the container fro its locator the forward right hand corner
was not cleared properl!. As a result the container tilted, then swung "iolentl!,
striking an obstruction which punctured the container wall and a dru of
phosphorus, the contents of which ignited spontaneousl!.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
As it was considered inad"isable to use hoses on this t!pe of fire, and dr!
powder was not a"ailable in sufficient &uantities, the action of suberging the
container in the dock, awa! fro the "essel, was the correct procedure. %his
action resulted in the containent of the fire until the arri"al of the fire ser"ice.
%he crew were also correct in adopting fire control procedures in the area to liit
the fire spread in case the container crashed to the deck.
%he crew carried out their duties satisfactoril! within the liited resources
a"ailable.
"emedial Action Ta#en by !ompany
%he probles of dealing with the ultiplicit! of ha(ardous cargoes in an
eergenc! situation are an! and "er! often a coproise has to be reached.
.n this particular instance, subject to the general conclusions shown
below, no specific action was adopted b! the /opan!.
!onclusions
%his occurrence highlights the following 0
a1 %he iportance of read! identification of dangerous goods - b! correct
arking and labelling on the outside of the container - in addition to such arking
and labelling on indi"idual receptacles stowed within the container.
b1 .f the aount and t!pe of cargo constitutes an unusual risk, the fire
brigade should be alerted before loading or discharging operations coence.
c1 -here practicable, the "essel itself should carr! suppleentar!
e&uipent of a t!pe appropriate to the cargo2es1 being carried.
1$th September% 1&'4.
4.3.( International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. (
Situation
A cargo ship of 26,000 tons dwt. built in 1930 was on passage fro
/anada4s western seaboard to 5urope with a cargo of tiber products and a full
deck cargo of tiber. %he "essel had been on passage for 2* da!s when the fire
was disco"ered.
%wo da!s before the disco"er! hurricane weather conditions had been
e)perienced in which the deck cargo had shifted. %he wind had oderated but
fairl! hea"! sea conditions were pre"ailing at the tie of disco"er!.
Initial Action
%he bridge soke detection cabinet ga"e first indications of a fire in No. 2
hold. %he audible alar did not function. At 12.22 hours soke was obser"ed in
the "icinit! of No. 2 hatchwa!.
%he #fficer of the -atch iediatel! sounded the fire alar6 engines
were put on 7standb!7 and the ship4s speed reduced.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
No. 2 hold was sealed and carbon dio)ide injected b! the ship4s fi)ed
installation. 8i) fire hoses were used for cooling decks and tiber in the "icinit!
of the hold.
At 1*.06 hours the ship resued full speed.
At 13.09 hours soke was again seen in the "icinit! of No. 2 hatch. :ore
carbon dio)ide was injected. At 19.00 hours No. 1 and No. 9 holds were
e)ained and found noral.
;ro then onwards carbon dio)ide was injected into No. 2 hold at hourl!
inter"als, and decks and the tiber cargo in the "icinit! were cooled continousl!.
5)ainations of No. 1 and No. 2 holds were ade at regular inter"als.
#n the twent!-si)th da! of passage when sothering and cooling
procedures had been in progress for ** hours, the "essel altered course for
;alouth.
%he #wners ade arrangeents with the ;alouth ;ire 8er"ice for
e&uipent and fireen to be a"ailable when the ship arri"ed.
%hirteen hours after altering course a sall e)plosion was heard in No. 2
hold. 5ight hours later the suppl! of carbon dio)ide ran out.
'! this tie the "essel was within two hours steaing fro ;alouth.
8ince the disco"er! of the fire a south-westerl! wind between force +-<
had been e)perienced.
%wo hours after picking up the ;alouth =ilot and $arbour :aster the
local fire ser"ice boarded the ship oored in the harbour and coenced
arrangeents to control the fire.
.t was decided to inject high e)pansion foa into No. 2 hold through
"entilator trunks at the aft end. %o accoplish this a portable foa generator was
shipped and tiber shifted to gi"e access. ;oa was fed through a large
diaeter pol!eth!lene pipe and "ents for4d were opened to allow the
e)tinguishing agent to spread through the hold. %he ship4s carbon dio)ide suppl!
was replenished and a 90 cwt. tank of carbon dio)ide shipped on deck to
suppleent the fi)ed installation. %wo da!s after arri"al at ;alouth the "essel
sailed for its first scheduled discharge port, /ardiff, with si) fireen on board.
#n the twent!-one hour passage fro ;alouth to /ardiff soke and
stea were obser"ed. ,uring this period the le"el of high e)pansion foa in the
hold was aintained.
At /ardiff the local fire ser"ice relie"ed the fireen on board and stood b!
while tiber, destined for the port, was discharged. ;urther foa was injected
into the hold. After reo"ing tiber fro No. 2 hatch it was found that water had
entered the hold causing cargo to swell, as a result of which the hatch co"ers
had lifted and becoe distorted. .t was decided not to open up No. 2 hatch as it
was felt that farther ingress of air would increase the fire risk.
%eporar! repairs were carried out and the "essel sailed for its second
scheduled discharge port, Antwerp, with two fireen on board.
#n the fift!-one hour passage fro /ardiff to Antwerp bad weather
conditions pre"ented the inspection of No. 2 hold, but it was then disco"ered that
the hatch co"ers had lifted farther due to the ingress of sea spra! swelling the
cargo. #n enti!, the hold was found to be cool although traces of stea were
being eitted. $old teperatures were taken throughout and the high e)pansion
foa topped up as necessar!. %he condition of other holds was found to be
noral.
#n arri"al at Antwerp the local fire ser"ice attended. .t was decided that
the! need not reain on board but should attend when No. 2 hatch co"ers were
reo"ed to discharge cargo.
-hen the hatch co"ers were e"entuall! reo"ed, traces of stea were
obser"ed. ,uring discharge, which took place with little difficult!, the cargo was
found to be cooling rapidl! and no farther outbreak of fire occurred. .t was e"ident
that the high e)pansion foa had penetrated the entire cargo.
Damage and Personal Inuries
%here was considerable charring and water daage to cargo in No. 2 hold
and to the deck cargo abo"e this hold. 8tructural daage had occurred to
hatches, hatch coaings, deck plating and associated stiffeners due to the
ingress of water swelling the cargo. No personal injuries were sustained.
!ause of Fife
%he seat of the fire in No. 2 hold was located in sulphite paper rolls. %he
cause was not deterined.
%he suggestion that steel wrapping bands on the cargo rubbing adjacent
steel structure could generate sufficient heat to cause the fire was discounted, as
was the suggestion that breakage of a wrapping band caused a spark. %here is
no e"idence that this product ignites through spontaneous cobustion. %he ost
logical e)planation is a carelessl! discarded cigarette or cigar. 5)perients ha"e
shown that sulphite paper will soulder and burn "er! slowl! without generating
uch soke or heat if in contact with a lighted cigarette.
%actical ;ire ;ighting Appraisal
%he sothering and cooling procedures used kept the fire under control.
$ad the "essel been further fro a port of refuge, with depleted supplies of
carbon dio)ide, the situation would ha"e been far ore serious.
;oa penetration in the hold was probabl! a ajor factor in e)tinguishing
the fire.
"emedial Action Ta#en by !ompany
$igh e)pansion foa generators ha"e been supplied to "essels as well as
operating and testing instructions for soke detectors. %esting of detectors is
now being regularl! carried out.
!onclusions
>egular inspection of the hold spaces a! well ha"e detected this fire at
an earlier stage. .t is considered that soe daage had alread! occurred to the
hatch which allowed the escape of soke when the fire was disco"ered.
%he use of water in fighting the fire in the hold would ha"e caused swelling
of the cargo and a! ha"e caused ore structural as well as cargo daage.
)o*ember% 1&'4
4.3.3 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 3
Situation
A 163,000 ton dwt. crude oil carrier, built in 196<, was in ballast and at
anchor off a =ersian ?ulf loading terinal, awaiting a berth, when an outbreak of
fire occurred in the engine roo following leakage fro the lubricating oil suppl!
to a turbo alternator.
Initial Action
%he bridge was infored of the outbreak b! actuation of the ?eneral and
5ngineer4s alars. 'ridge onitors also indicated a fire in the engine roo.
5ngine roo personnel tackled the fire with a 90 gallon portable foa
e)tinguisher and fire hoses fitted with spra! no((les but their efforts were
insufficient to contain the bla(e.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
At the sae tie other fire fighting teas were deplo!ed in cooling
boundar! bulkheads and e)tinguishing secondar! fires which had started.
%he engine roo becae untenable after soe ten inutes, ainl! due
to dense soke. %he ain fire was finall! contained and e)tinguished b! the
engine roo water spra! s!ste, while the ship4s fire fighting teas
progressi"el! dealt with secondar! fires.
Damage and Personal Inuries
5lectric cables, au)iliar! achiner! and store roos sustained fire
daage.
-hile attepting to escape, a eber of the engine roo staff becae
isolated. $e was later found unconscious and all efforts to re"i"e hi failed.
,eath was reported as due to suffocation.
!ause of Fire
%he fire was caused b! lubricating oil, under pressure, spra!ing on to the
hot surface of a turbine casing, during routine ser"icing of a ,uple) filter. %he oil
suppl! should ha"e been depressurised before the filter co"er was reo"ed.
;ailure to stop the turbo alternator and to shut off the lubricating oil suppl!
resulted in a local tire de"eloping into a ajor incident.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
Apart fro failing to shut off the lubricating oil suppl!, which resulted in the
fire reaching the proportions of a ajor outbreak, the easures taken to fight the
fire were correct and effecti"e. As it was. the oil flow was ultiatel! reduced
when the turbo alternator sei(ed.
Actuation of the engine roo water spra! s!ste was the ost effecti"e
easure taken to reduce the fire to containable proportions.
%he ship4s fire fighting teas dealt with secondar! fires in a "er!
copetent anner and ade a significant contribution towards bringing the
situation under control.
"emedial Action ta#en by !ompany
All ships in the fleet were warned of the ha(ards associated with incorrect
aintenance of lubricating oil filters. $ot surfaces adjacent to lubricating oil filters
were fitted with etal shields.
%o a"oid future errors a work control s!ste was adopted to ensure that
potentiall! dangerous work acti"it! was properl! pre-planned and controlled.
%hus, ha(ard potential now recei"es a proper degree of consideration,
resulting in better precautions.
!onclusions
%his incident illustrates the ha(ards caused b! incorrect aintenance
procedures. :oreo"er, it ephasises the paraount iportance of cutting the
suppl! of fuel as &uickl! as possible in the e"ent of an oil fire in the engine roo.
+anuary% 1&',
4.3.4 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 4
Situation
A 1*000 dwt. tanker built in 1930, was undergoing shell-plating and
engine roo repairs in"ol"ing welding at a repair berth. %he ship was partiall!
anned and, with fire-fighting e&uipent out of coission while certain ites
were undergoing inspection ashore, the repair !ard had assued responsibilit!
for fire protection on board.
A shore labourer, engaged in la!ing alle!wa! flooring in the aft
accoodation, obser"ed soke coing fro a cabin.
Initial Action
;inding that there was no fire-fighting e&uipent at hand, he went on deck
and procured a fire hose, onl! to find that it was not connected to the shore
h!drant.
,uring the tie taken to connect the hose the fire spread fro the cabin to
the adjacent corridor and dense soke ade it ipossible to enter the area.
Tactical Fire-Fighting Procedures
%he unicipal fire brigade was called in but no further details are a"ailable
be!ond the fact that water and foa were used.
Damage and Personal Inuries
%he entire after part of the ship was daaged. .n particular, the
accoodation was gutted. A an working in the engine roo perished,
although the cause of death is not known.
!ause of Fire
As a result of an asbestos fire screen becoing dislodged, cabin furniture
and bedding were ignited b! heat fro e)terior welding work.
Tactical Fire-Fighting Appraisal
Nothing can be said about the fire fighting procedures adopted, because
of the absence of detailed inforation. $owe"er, it is probable that if a watchan
had been stationed in the accoodation area and portable e)tinguishers
pro"ided as re&uired b! the regulations of the repair !ard, the outbreak of fire
ight ha"e been contained.
@ard regulations also re&uired the following easures0 the siting of
e)tinguishers in the "icinit! of the gangwa!, and a fire hose-connected to a shore
h!drant at all tiesAon deck.
Non-copliance with these regulations allowed the fire to assue the
proportions of a ajor outbreak. %he situation was further aggra"ated b! the fact
that free circulation of air could not be eliinated as it was not possible to close
doors in the area, due to the presence of cables carr!ing ser"ices for repairs in
the engine roo.
"emedial Action ta#en by !ompany
All ships4 officers were instructed to ake sure, regardless of whoe"er is
responsible for safet! when repair work is being carried out, that fire fighting
e&uipent is a"ailable, read! for use, and that the necessar! sur"eillance is
carried out, particularl! when welding operations are in progress.
!onclusion
-hen a "essel is undergoing repairs, the risk of fire is increased.
8hipowners and personnel should satisf! thesel"es that all the safet!
precautions are obser"ed especiall! where the responsibilit! for ship safet! is
shared.
.arch% 1&',
4.3., International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. ,
Situation
An 11000 dwt. cargo ship built in 19+9, was berthed in an .ndian port
when fire started in an engineersB store-roo, in which cotton waste had been
stowed earlier in the da!.
Initial Action
At about 1900 hrs. soke was obser"ed coing fro the poop deck
"entilator and a check was ade of the store-roos in. the area. %he fire was
found to be in the engineers4 store on the lower deck starboard side.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
%he poop accoodation was cleared of personnel and at 1990 hrs.
carbon dio)ide was discharged into the store-roo fro the ship4s fi)ed
installation. At the sae tie the engine roo fire pup was started and water
was used to cool the ship4s starboard side, in wa! of the store-roo.
%he =ort fire brigade was suoned and arri"ed on the scene at 19*0
hrs. to super"ise fire fighting.
'etween 1990 and 2290 hrs. < c!linders of carbon dio)ide 2in all about
2*0 Cgs.1 were discharged into the store-roo but the door was not kept properl!
closed and the gas concentration was too low to be effecti"e.
$oses were used to flood the store-roo and the fire was e"entuall!
e)tinguished b! 0+00 hrs. the following orning.
Damage and Personal Inuries
No structural daage or injuries to personnel were sustained.
;ire daage was confined to electrical circuits, fittings and stores in the
copartent6 engine spares were daaged b! water. ;looding also caused
drus of paint to float about, spilling their contents.
!ause of Fire
/otton waste, stowed in the store-roo earlier in the da!, had been
placed in contact with a bare electric light bulb.
At the tie the ship4s after electric lighting was turned off so that repairs
could be carried out to a defecti"e flood-light. $owe"er, the circuit ser"ing the
store-roo light had been left with the switch in the 7on7 position.
>epairs were copleted at 1300 hrs. and the electricit! suppl! restored.
$eat fro the store-roo light bulb which, of course, lit autoaticall!, caused the
cotton waste to ignite.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
%he fact that the door to the store-roo had not been properl! closed and
that this door was repeatedl! opened to obser"e results, reduced the
effecti"eness of the carbon dio)ide. %he copartent had to be flooded to
e)tinguish the fire, causing water daage.
"emedial Action Ta#en by !ompany
%he following instructions were issued b! the /opan!0A
/otton waste should be stowed in spaces pro"ided for the purpose.
=aint and cotton waste should not be stowed together.
All electric light bulbs should ha"e protecti"e guards in place at all ties.
-hen lea"ing a copartent, personnel should ensure that light switches
are in the 7off position.
!onclusions
%he iportance of checking that electrical fittings are in good order and
that, when not in use, electric lights are switched off cannot be o"er-stressed. .f
proper care had been taken in stowing the cotton waste, there would ha"e been
no fire.
+une 1&',.
4.3./ International chamber of shipping fire !asualty report scheme no. /
Situation
A 19000 dwt. general cargo "essel was discharging a cargo of gunnies,
jute, tea and carpeting aterials. '! the afternoon of the thirteenth da! of
discharge, bales of jute stacked four high in the after part of No. 2 hold, reained
to be unloaded.
%he =#rt ;ire =re"ention #fficer had just boarded for his dail! inspection
when the alar was raised fro No. 2 hold.
Initial Action
%he ;ire =re"ention #fficer ran to No. 2 where dockers in the lower hold
were attepting to sother a fire in the jute cargo. $e took a hose, which was
alread! coupled to the deck ain suppl! as part of the precautionar! easures,
and directed it onto the fire. At the sae tie the hold was e"acuated.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
Another hose was alread! being connected to the ship4s ain deck suppl!
and this was also brought to bear on the fire. %hese two hoses were then
anoeu"red into the 4tween deck fro where fire-fighting continued until dense
soke ade further efforts ipossible in this area. -ithin si)teen inutes of the
warning being gi"en, the local ;ire 'rigade had arri"ed and took charge of
operations.
%he fire was now located in three areas of the cargo in No. 2 lower hold.
%he initial two jets of water were used b! the ;ire 'rigade to attack and contain
these fires.
Dater, teas with breathing apparatus in"estigated the e)tent of the fire
and positioned the hoses. ;our jets of water were now used to tackle the fire and
cool down oil tanks under the jute. %wo ediu e)pansion foa jets were also
used.
After about fi"e hours the hold was soke free and no fire was "isible. A
watch was kept o"ernight and a ediu e)pansion foa jet was used at ties to
control interittent outbreaks. %his watch was aintained while the reaining
cargo was discharged fro the hold.
Damage and Personal Inuries
No personal injuries were sustained but a considerable aount of daage
was done to the jute cargo. %he hold bulkhead in No. 2 was also slightl! buckled.
!ause of fire
%he cause of the fire was not full! established.
%he possibilit! of sparks fro the funnel being responsible was put
forward but discounted, as was an electrical source.
%he ost probable cause sees to ha"e been the hurried disposal of
soking aterials b! dockers when the! were infored that the ;ire =re"ention
#fficer was approaching the 78oking =rohibited7 area of No. 2 hold.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
%he proptness in tackling the fire pre"ented a ajor incident as the
"essel had jute in other holds and there were large &uantities of jute in the sheds
on the &ua!.
"emedial Action Ta#en 0y !ompany
.ncident reported to all other units of the fleet and the need for constant
"igilance reiterated with especial reference to jute cargo.
/onclusions
%his incident highlights the need for0
2a1 fire hoses to be coupled and read! for iediate use when
handling certain t!pes of readil! cobustible cargo - the wisdo of this practice
was apl! deonstrated in this case6
2b1 a strict control being placed on personnel in 7soking prohibited7
areas.
August 1&',.
4.3.' International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. '
Situation
A 1+000 dwt. general cargo ship built in 1930 was on passage fro 8outh
Aerica to 5urope with a cargo including asbestos, coffee and cotton, and a
nuber of containers. %he ship had been at sea for 19 da!s when a fire was
disco"ered in a forward cargo copartent. ,uring this tie the weather had
been fine with oderate winds.
Initial Action
At 18.80 hours "er! slight white soke was seen issuing fro the
"entilators at No. 2 hatch. %he bridge soke detecting cabinet was checked and
showed siilar white soke. %he audible alar sounded fi"e inutes later. %he
"entilator fans were stopped and the fire flaps closed. %he :aster ordered 7stop
engines7 and ga"e instructions for the "entilators to be sealed. -ithin a few
inutes the soke becae thick but reained white.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
At 16.2+ all hatches were sealed and the ship resued its "o!age to the
first port of discharge. /#, was injected into No. 2E9 hold, and Nos. 1 and * were
inspected6 slight soke was noticed but no apparent fire. At 20.00 hours, a
teperature check was ade in No. 2E9 tween-deck and checks were repeated
e"er! hour. '! noon the following da! the tween-deck teperature had dropped
9F/ and, at that tie, the teperature in the lower hold was 9F/ below the
tween-deck figure. At idnight the tween-deck teperature had fallen b! a
further +7/ and the lower hold figure showed a 1F/ drop. 8oke eission fro
the sall hatch through which teperatures were recorded had now ceased
altogether.
%hroughout the passage oderate weather pre"ailed and the ship arri"ed
at its first discharge port soe fort! hours after the fire was disco"ered.
%eperatures on arri"al showed a rise of *F/ in the tween-deck but no change in
the lower hold. ,ischarging of Nos. 1 and + holds coenced at 10.00, but it
was decided n&t to open No. 2E9, and at 1+.00 further /#2 was injected. ,uring
the following da! tween-deck teperatures were down b! between +F/ and <F/6
in the lower hold the drop was not so pronounced, reaching 9F/. At 19.00 further
/#2 was injected and the ship sailed that e"ening for the ne)t discharge port,
ha"ing replenished /#2 stocks.
,uring the twent! hour passage there was no change in the situation.
;ireen boarded the ship on arri"al and entered No. 2E9 hold6 no signs of soke
or fire were found.
,ischarging of Nos. 1 and + was resued at 1*.00 but no decision had
been taken about opening No. 2E9. %he tween-deck teperature was stead! and
a further drop of 2F to *F/ was recorded in the lower hold.
'! noon the following da!, the tween-deck teperature had risen slightl!
and soke was issuing fro the hatch6 further /#2 was. injected. %he fire-
brigade attended at 19.00 and stood b! with hoses while deck cargo on the No.
2E9 hatch co"ers was discharged and the hatches prepared for opening. %he
aster had suggested using foa as well as water for fire-fighting but the fire-
brigade refused on the grounds that it was custoar! to use water on fires in
cotton cargoes.
At 16.*0 the fire-brigade ordered No. 9 hatch to be opened and, after thick
soke had cleared, the copartent was inspected but there was no e"idence
of a fire.
No. 2 hatch was opened at 13.00, and about ten inutes later flaes
were seen in baled cotton in the lower hold port side6 the fire brigade applied
water using hoses fro the ain deck, and spent about fort!-fi"e inutes shifting
hea"! cargo fro the afterost section of the tween-deck hatch co"ers. At about
1<.00 the fire-brigade estiated it would take twent! inutes to ha"e the fire
under control.
An hour later, howe"er, it was ob"ious that the fire was intensif!ing. %he
fire-brigade continued to appl! water and the ship4s crew cleared and opened up
further sections of the tween-deck6 hatch co"ers to ake the lower hold ore
accessible for fire fighting.
'! this tie the ship4s side and starboard deck plating had started to
buckle, and water was used for cooling. %he fire continued to spread, and at
29.9+ the fire-brigade forced air into the hold to clear the soke b! eans of a
copressor, with an air-hose leading into the hold.
At 00.+0 the fire-brigade started flooding the hold, and b! 09.00 the soke
had lessened and another tween-deck hatch co"er was opened.
%he fire was e"entuall! brought under control at about 0<.00, although
cargo at the top of the port side was still burning. %hese upperost bales were
abo"e the water le"el in the hold due to the list which the ship had taken.
,ischarging of the cotton started at 11.1+, but at noon work switched to
coffee in the forepart which had started to swell, pushing up sections of the
tween-deck hatch co"er and the tween-deck itself.
Damage and Personal Inuries
Apart fro considerable fire and water daage to cargo, structural
daage was caused to the tween-deck plating and stiffeners, ain deck plating,
ship4s side and the forward bulkhead of No. 2E9 hold. %here were no personal
injuries.
!ause of Fire
Not !et known
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
%he fire was disco"ered at an earl! stage, 4.his enabled it to be kept under
control with /#2 during the "o!age.
.t is felt that the tactics eplo!ed b! the fire-brigade in opening up all of
No. 2E9 hold created greater difficulties than would otherwise ha"e been et in
e)tinguishing the outbreak. %he use of foa, as suggested b! the aster, ight
also ha"e been ore effecti"e than water at the earl! stages, thereb! perhaps
ob"iating the need to flood, and iniising cargo and structural daage.
"emedial Action Ta#en by the !ompany
All necessar! and concei"able easures were taken to iniise daage
and protect the interests of the "essel and the other parties in"ol"ed.
!onclusions
%his incident appears to confir the owners4 opinion that the fire-brigade
lacked e)perience in handling shipboard fires6 continuous pressure b! the ship4s
coand, full! supported b! the owners4 agents, had little if an! effect in
ipro"ing the fire fighting tactics used. .t also underlines the ease with which a
deep-seated fire in a cobustible cargo can spread if air is re-aditted.
+anuary 1&'/.
4.3.1 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 1
Situation
An 11,000 dwt cargo liner loaded with general cargo and cotton was
enroute to the west coast of the G.8.A. when fire broke out in No. * hold.
-eather at the tie was %ine with a force 9 wind.
Initial Action
At 01.0+ hours, soke was seen coing fro "entilators ai No. * hold.
%he fire alar was sounded and "entilation fans to the cargo copartents
were stopped. %he ain engines were ordered to 7stand b!7 and the ship was
turned off wind.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
At 01.1* the engineer on watch reported that the bulkhead between the
engine roo and No. * cargo hold was e)treel! hot. 8hortl! afterwards flaes
were seen in the after part of the engine roo. %he ain engines were stopped,
the sk!light and "entilators were closed and the engine roo was e"acuated.
:eanwhile the ship4s fire-fighting tea led b! the /hief #fficer had been
organised. %he eergenc! fire pup located in the poop section was brought
into operation and an attept was ade to gain entr! into No. * hold but this
was not possible because of the heat and soke.
.t was decided to tackle both fires with /#2. ?reater priorit! was gi"en to
the engine roo fire which was threatening the whole of the idships
superstructure. ;urtherore, it was hoped this action would enable the ain fire
pups to be brought into use to tackle the fire in No. *. Accordingl!, fift!
c!linders were discharged into the engine roo and twent!-four into No. * hold
but shortl! afterwards it was reported that the fire had spread to the store-roo
abo"e and adjacent to the engine roo.
%he officers4 and crew4s &uarters were located on the deck abo"e the store-
roo and the danger of fire spreading throughout the accoodation was
iinent.
,ue to the ain fire pups still being inoperable the onl! fire-fighting
resources a"ailable were the eergenc! pup and portable e)tinguishers.
Access to the store-roo was through a narrow, soke-filled passage but
two seaen wearing fire suits and copressed air breathing apparatus
succeeded in controlling the fire there, while others tackled fires which had
broken out in the accoodation abo"e.
At 02.90 the fire in the engine roo appeared to be e)tinguished and
the store-roo fire brought under control.
.n No. * hold howe"er, the teperature was again rising and it was clear
that the /#2 had onl! teporaril! subdued the fire. .t was decided to flood the
hold using the eergenc! pup. :eanwhile fires continued to break out in the
store-roo and these were tackled with portable e)tinguishers.
,uring the fire-fighting operations, radio contact was established with the
ship4s agent and with the authorities at the nearest portE,etails of cargo
coposition, draught, weather conditions and the fire situation were gi"en and
the assistance of a fire-fighting boat was4 re&uested. .n addition lifeboats and
rafts were prepared for launching and other precautions taken to abandon the
"essel should this becoe necessar!.
At 06.+0, a fire-fighting tug arri"ed and increased the rate of flooding of
No. * hold using three jets.
A second tug arri"ed at 12.1+. %he jets fro the first tug were stopped and
the ship was taken in tow6 flooding of No. * continued, using the ship4s
eergenc! pup.
At 19.*0 the "essel arri"ed in port and the tugs resued flooding. A
further suppl! of /#2 was pro"ided and discharged into the hold.
At 0<.20 the following da!, flooding of No. * was ceased and at 09.00,
crew ebers were able to gain entr! to the tweendeck. %he ship had listed 10F
to port and while the port side of the lower hold was filled with water the
starboard side was dr!. $ot plating in this area indicated that a renewed outbreak
of fire could be e)pected. %he local fire brigade which had been in attendance
since the ship berthed cut si) holes through the plating and further water was
applied b! one of the tugs.
At 1+.00 there were no signs of fire in the hold and at 16.*0 the
hatchco"er was opened.
At 19.20 the au)iliar! engines and pups were started and the water was
reo"ed fro No. *. ,ischarge of daaged cargo began at 19.*+.
Damage and Personal Inuries
/onsiderable structural and cargo daage was sustained but further
details were not gi"en. %here were no personal injuries.
!ause of Fire
.n"estigations showed that the fire originated in the iddle of the cotton
cargo in No. * lower hold. %he ost probable cause was thought to be soking
b! dockers during loading. 8pontaneous cobustion, put forward as an
alternati"e theor!, was considered to be less likel!.
Tactical Fire-fighting Appraisal
%he fire broke out at night while the ship was at sea. After the initial
outbreak it spread &uickl! to the engine roo and idships accoodation.
5"en after the fire in the engine roo appeared to be e)tinguished the ain fire
pups could not be used because of the concentration of /#2 reaining in the
engine roo.
%he ost critical phases of what was a difficult incident to control were
successfull! tackled b! the ship4s personnel who acted with deterination and
skill.
"emedial Action Ta#en by The !ompany
%he incident was studied b! the copan!4s safet! coittee. All senior
deck and engineer officers undergo copulsor! training courses in fire-fighting.
%he copan! also operates onthl! safet! conferences which officers on shore
lea"e attend. #n all ships great attention is gi"en to training and fire-fighting
drills.
!onclusions
%his incident deonstrates the "alue of well trained personnel on board
and an acti"e copan! polic! towards education and training in all safet!
atters.
September 1&'/
4.3.& International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. &
Situation
%his report concerns an engine roo fire on an ore carrier of 1<,900 dwt,
built in 1960, proceeding on a short coastwise passage in Gnited Cingdo
waters. %he ain propulsion achiner! was a fi"e c!linder turbo-charged unit,
which at the tie of the incident was operating on diesel fuel.
'efore the start of the "o!age the fuel "al"es of nubers * and + c!linders
had been replaced b! o"erhauled spares. ,uring the passage the %hird 5ngineer
was rectif!ing inor leaks in the fuel lines to these replaceent "al"es and while
attepting to tighten a connection, the stud coupling sheared. 5scaping fuel ignited
on contact with the e)haust anifold.
Initial Action
%he %hird 5ngineer infored the 8econd 5ngineer who was at the ain
engine controls. $e then returned to tackle the fire with a two-gallon foa
e)tinguisher. %he 8econd 5ngineer sounded the general alar and instructed a
Hunior 5ngineer to ad"ise the bridge. %he ain engine was stopped and the fuel
oil booster pup shut down. %he 8econd 5ngineer then went to the outbreak
where the %hird 5ngineer and ;irean ?reaser were attacking the fire with
portable foa e)tinguishers. %he fire was getting out of hand and all three, two
Apprentices and the Hunior 5ngineer e"acuated the engine roo. At this tie the
/hief 5ngineer who had been off-dut! arri"ed and assued coand of the
fire-fighting operation.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
:eanwhile the 5lectrician had acti"ated the /#2 discharge s!ste alar
but had not operated the release "al"es. $e was told not to do so b! the /hief
5ngineer so that the situation could be assessed and a check ade that all
personnel had e"acuated the engine roo. %he electrical shut down switches
were operated and engine roo sk!lights, "ent flaps and funnel dapers closed.
,eck personnel were set to rigging hoses and soke asks, catering staff and
another Hunior 5ngineer collected fire e)tinguishers in readiness for use.
%he fire appeared to be seated at the e)haust trunking in wa! of nuber 8
c!linder. %he /hief 5ngineer and 8tore-keeper used foa and soda acid
e)tinguishers but were unable to get close enough because of thickening fues
and soke. An attept to clear the atosphere b! opening the sk!light caused a
flare up. All the &uick release "al"e gear were operated e)cept the fuel suppl! to
the generators which was clear of the fire.
'! this tie the fire had begun to subside but flared up as spilt fuel on the
c!linder head footplates dripped on to the e)haust s!ste. %he 8econd 5ngineer
and the 5lectrician, both wearing soke helets and the /hief 5ngineer, without
a soke helet so that he could o"e ore freel! to direct operations, applied
water fro hoses fitted with spra! jets to the e)haust anifold and the
adjacent floor plates. A rescue part! stationed outside helped to anoeu"re the
hoses. %he /hief 5ngineer was of the opinion that the situation was coing
under control but at the sae tie a glow was noticed in the area of the
workshop aft and purifier flat at the upper platfor le"el. .t was thought that the
fire had spread to these parts where lubricating oil and kerosene tanks were
located, and it was decided to close the fuel suppl! to the generators, "acate the
engine roo and discharge /#2 into it. %his decision had been dela!ed for soe
fort! inutes as the ship was in a buo!ed channel and hitherto the apparent seat
of the fire had not endangered these tanks.
As soon as the fues had cleared, the /hief and 8econd 5ngineers
checked the engine roo casing for hot spots but found none. '! 1*.00 hrs.,
thirt! inutes after discharging the /#2, the /hief 5ngineer was con"inced that
the fire was e)tinguished but decided to allow further tie for the e)haust
anifold to cool down to a"oid the possibilit! of re-ignition when the engine roo
was opened up for inspection.
At 1+.00 hrs. the /hief 5ngineer entered the engine roo wearing a
soke helet and safet! line6 a hose part! stood b!. %he fire was out and
unlikel! to re-start. 8k!lights were eased up to "entilate the space and as soon
as power had been restored the engine roo forced "entilation fans were
started.
Damage and Personal Inuries
%he ain engine turbo-blower was seriousl! daaged, in particular the
circular frae, inner and outer suction no((les and the air inlet filter eleents.
5)haust gas b!-pass trunking was fitted and after repairs had been ade
to the fuel piping and the whole tested, the "o!age was resued on reduced
re"olutions.
No personal injuries were sustained.
!ause of Fire
%he fire was caused b! ignition of leaking fuel fro a sheared fuel pipe
coupling.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
%he propt actions of the 8econd 5ngineer confined the fire so that the
onl! serious daage was to the turbo-charger.
Allowing for the fact that the ship4s position ade iediate use of the
engine roo /2h s!ste undesirable, the /hief 5ngineer4s control of the situation
resulted in speed! resuption of noral conditions in the engine roo.
After operating the /#2 s!ste, soke in the alle!wa! pre"ented a check
being ade that all the bottles had discharged. .t was found afterwards that nine
bottles out of the total of si)t! had not operated because their pull-cord was not
properl! connected to the operating piston.
.n addition to the fift!-one bottles of /#2 discharged, a total of si) two-
gallon foa e)tinguishers and two two-gallon soda-acid e)tinguishers were used.
"emedial Action Ta#en by the !ompany
;ire-fighting personnel reported that soke helets restricted o"eent
and sets of self-contained breathing apparatus were subse&uentl! supplied.
A thirt!-gallon foa e)tinguisher located at the forward end of the boiler
flat could not be used due to insufficient length of hose. %his was re-sited in a
position appro"ed b! a sur"e!or of the national adinistration.
!onclusions
%his incident deonstrates the need to replace copressible oli"es in
couplings whene"er fuel "al"es are changed A to pre"ent o"er-tightening of
couplings. 8uch work should not be undertaken while the engine is running or
still hot.
.t was reported that too an! personnel were attepting to assist fire-
fighting and in so doing generall! hapering operations. .nstructions should be
gi"en that all personnel, apart fro fire-fighting and back-up teas, should
uster at an appro"ed position for ease of counting and to facilitate gi"ing of
assistance where re&uired.
)o*ember% 1&'/.
4.3.1$ International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 1$
Situation
%his report concerns a fire in the accoodation space of a passenger
ship of 2+,000 tons which, at the tie of the incident, was in port, berthed
alongside.
Initial Action
At 2900 an outbreak of fire occurred in a locker in the 8oke >oo.
Attepts to e)tinguish it b! eans of fire e)tinguishers were unsuccessful and
the general alar was sounded, the port fire brigade was suoned and the
=ort /aptain4s #ffice was also infored. %he fire spread rapidl! fro the locker
into the ca"it! between the 8oke >oo ceiling panelling and the steel deck
abo"e. 8hortl! afterwards the interior of the ship rapidl! filled with soke and
instructions were gi"en to e"acuate all passengers ashore. %he public address
s!ste and the general alar s!ste could no longer be used because the
wiring of these s!stes passed through the locker where the fire originated and
had been daaged. .nstructions to e"acuate were passed orall! b! ebers of
the crew and the e"acuation proceeded in a "er! orderl! anner, being
copleted b! 29.*+.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
At this tie four ?rinnel sprinkler heads were operating in the 8oke
>oo, but it soon becae clear, fro the rapid increase in deck teperatures of
the 8un ,eck cabins o"erhead, that the fire was abo"e the deckhead panelling in
the 8oke >oo. As the continued use of sprinklers was ha"ing little effect, and
was causing unnecessar! flooding, the sprinkler s!ste was shut down. %he fire
brigade produced a soke e)tracting pup which was partl! effecti"e in clearing
soke in the "icinit! of the door into the 8oke >oo. -ith the assistance of
breathing apparatus and strong lighting, it was possible to use hoses on the
8oke >oo locker which was still e)treel! hot.
%o check the spread of fire abo"e the deckhead panelling, part of the
panelling was reo"ed and water was spra!ed into the area where the fire was
still burning fiercel! in the trunkings and ceiling grounds. %his action brought the
fire under control and considerabl! cooled the area. .t also further reduced the
concentration of soke. ;urther deckhead panels were reo"ed to release
trapped heat and the deckhead plating was cooled with water.
%he fire was e"entuall! e)tinguished at 00.90 the following orning.
Damage and Personal Inuries
All electrical cables passing through the locker had been badl! charred
and, in addition to the side panelling in the iediate "icinit! of the fire, there
was e)tensi"e daage to the deckhead panelling o"er a fairl! large area.
%he steel deck o"er the area was buckled and a cabin on this deck had
been badl! affected. %here was inor fire and water daage to furniture in the
8oke >oo and water daage to soe cabins on the deck below, where water
had penetrated b! wa! of the stairwa!s.
No personal injuries were reported.
!ause of Fire
%he fire appears to-ha"e been caused b! the ignition of waste paper in a
refuse bag in one of the 8oke >oo lockers. %he contents of ashtra!s had
been eptied into this bag.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
.t is possible that the fire had alread! spread fro the locker into the
space o"er the 8oke >oo deckhead panelling b! the tie it was detected.
%he use of fire e)tinguishers was not effecti"e but propt application of
water, which had the added benefit of cooling the deck plating abo"e, pre"ented
still greater spread of fire and conse&uent daage.
!onclusions
,espite the ob"ious risks of putting the contents of ashtra!s into
receptacles containing cobustible aterial, reports of an! incidents where fire
appears to ha"e been caused b! soking show that huan carelessness is all
too coon.
Although fitted with a sprinkler s!ste, the construction of the deckhead
panelling was such that a fire, which started at a lower le"el, was able to spread
into the space between the panelling and the steel deckhead and affect a wide
area of this space.
February% 1&''.
4.3.11 International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 11
Situation
%his report concerns a fire which broke out aong dangerous goods
stowed on deck on a fi"e hatch general cargo ship of 1+,000 dwt. %he ship had
loaded at northwest 5uropean ports for 8outh Africa and the =ersian ?ulf and at
the tie of the incident was berthed alongside at Cuwait.
Initial Action
At 13*+, during discharge, a fire occurred on deck at No. + hatch in a stow
of plastics receptacles of 7'utano)7 2eth!l eth!l ketone pero)ide A a
dangerous substance classified b! .:/# as /lass +.2 A organic pero)ides1.
%he crew went to fire stations and shore fire ser"ices were notified. All
cargo discharging was stopped and ste"edores sent ashore. %he fire was tackled
with a 10 lb. dr! powder e)tinguisher and at first this action appeared to ha"e
been effecti"e, but within a few seconds the fire broke out again and spread
rapidl! to an adjacent stow of steel drus of ;enitrothion pesticide 2/lass 6.1 A
poisons1. $eat and soke &uickl! de"eloped and despite the efforts of two hose
parties, the fire spread to cartons of aerosol cans and butane gas lighter refills
2/lass 2 A inflaable gas1. %hese began to e)plode and fl! in ail directions,
creating additional ha(ards for the fire fighting parties.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
#wing to the "er! rapid spread and intensit! of the fire, it was ipossible
to close No. + hatch and a nuber of burning aerosol cans fell into the 4tween
deck of No. +, setting fire to the cardboard packing of pallets of plastics granules
in the s&uare of the hatch. %his fire which soon ignited dunnage and the ain
stow of plastics granules in the port wing of the 4tween deck, was tackled with
another hose.
8hortl! afterwards, at 1<00, the port fire ser"ice arri"ed with two
appliances and a fire float. %he fire float &uickl! e)tinguished the fire on deck,
and two hoses fro the shore appliances soon brought the outbreak in the
4tween deck under control.
After the arri"al of shore assistance the ship4s fire parties concentrated on
cooling the ship4s structure. %he fire was copletel! e)tinguished b! 1<1+.
Adjacent copartents were checked for an! daage or spread of fire
but none was found. %he water which had been discharged into No. + 4tween
deck drained into the bilges and was puped out.
At 1900, cargo discharge was resued at Nos. 1,2,9 and * hatches.
/ontinuous fire watches were set during the night and the fire ain was kept
pressurised. No further outbreaks of fire occurred.
Damage and Personal Inuries
,aage to the ship was confined to electrical wiring, ropes and a
gangwa! net, and the starboard accoodation ladder.
No personal injuries were reported.
!ause of Fire
%he cause of the fire was not reported but spontaneous decoposition of
eth!l eth!l ketone pero)ide cannot be disregarded especiall! at an abient
teperature to be e)pected in Cuwait in Hul!. =ossible leakage of the pero)ide
fro a daaged receptacle or through an insecure closure would be likel! to
increase such a risk.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
;ires in"ol"ing, or in the "icinit! of, organic pero)ides can lead to an
e)plosion and should be tackled fro a distance using water onl!. .n this incident
onl! a oderate &uantit! of pero)ide was in"ol"ed 2one pallet load of
appro)iatel! <00 kg.1 but the use of a dr! powder e)tinguisher was ineffecti"e.
/onsidering the nature of the cargo in"ol"ed and the si(e and "iolence of the fire,
the action of the ship4s fire fighting hose parties was coendable. ;ire ser"ice
assistance using water was correct and effecti"e.
"emedial Action ta#en by die !ompany
.t was established that the segregation of the dangerous goods on deck
did not copl! with the re&uireents of the .:,? /ode or the ;lag 8tate
national adinistration. At the tie of the "o!age in &uestion, the ship was on
tie charter and the stowage proposals were prepared b! charterers4 ste"edores
and subitted to the :aster for appro"al. %he charterers ga"e "er! clear
instructions to their ste"edores which re&uired the to copl! in full with the
re&uireents of the ;lag 8tate national adinistration, and the :aster was
siilarl! instructed.
#n this occasion it appears that a istake b! the ste"edores was not
noticed b! the :aster when the docuents were subitted to hi for appro"al of
stowage.
%his incident was discussed with the charterers and steps were taken to
ensure that standing instructions are ipleented on all occasions in the future.
8iilarl! all :asters were ad"ised of the iportance of checking dangerous
cargo anifests and stowages.
!onclusions
.n addition to the breakdown in the charterers4 operating arrangeents,
disclosed b! the copan!4s en&uiries, part of the ship4s list of dangerous goods
A reproduced below A shows that fi"e substances out of the eight listed were
described b! trade naes onl!. %his suggests that the cargo in &uestion was
declared in this anner b! the shippers and, therefore, the re&uireents of
/hapter I.. of 8#DA8 were not coplied with in full.
%his incident also suggests that the aster was unaware of the special
risks associated with organic pero)ides and the correct fire fighting procedure for
this class of substances.
Appendi2
A34)T555555555555555..
6IST
7F DA)34"78S !A"37
94SS46 : 97;A34 )7: F"7. :
nr port pieces packing description weight shipper Imco
Class.
Flashpoint
stowage
* ,ubai *0 nour!-
tainers
/!clono) DN/
2/!clo-
he)anone
=ero)ide1
1100 +.2E211< $ + #N ,5/C AE=
< ,ubai +00 cartons ,iptere)
2.nsecticides1
11100 6.1 E 161+ $ 9 %E, =E8
19 Cuwait 1 pallet stc 92 nour!-
tainers
'utano) :10+
2:eth!l 5th!l
Cetone
=ero)ide1
<<0 +.2 E 2123
;=$J%/
$ + #N ,5/C AE=
1+ Cuwait *0 drus Accelerator
ND+9
1120 9.9 E 1999
;=+<F/
$ 9 %E, A ;E=
16 Cuwait +0 drus >elease Agent
ND1
119+ 9.9 E 1999
;=*6F/
$9%E ,- ;E =
2* Cuwait 2*0 drus ,esodur %
<0 28!nth.
6+2<0 6.1 E 203< $9,E% AAE=
< cans *60 < E1319
;=6+F/
$ * #N ,5/C ;E=
2+ Cuwait 200 drus ,esodur
%<0
+**00 6.1E 203< $9,E%A193)
$9#N,5/C-9)
April% 1&''.
4.3.1( International chamber of shipping fire casualty report scheme no. 1(
1. Situation
%his report concerns an engine roo fire in a roll-onEroll-of ferr! of 1,900
dwt, on a short sea passage to a Gnited Cingdo port.
(. Initial Action
At 0003 the %hird 5ngineer, on watch in the control roo, saw the fire start
through the control roo window. $e stopped both ain engines and infored
the /hief 5ngineer b! telephone, but did not switch off the oil fuel booster pups
or the fuel suppl! to the ain engines. $e then attepted to tackle the fire with a
portable dr! powder e)tinguisher but was unable to do so because of soke.
$eat fro the fire acti"ated the autoatic fire alar.
%he na"igating officer, on hearing the fire alar, noted that the engine
control warning lights showed the starboard engine to be stopped and the port
engine on o"erload. $e put both cobinator le"ers to the stop position, switched
off the echanical "entilation to the "ehicle deck and engine roo, and reported
the situation to the :aster who arri"ed in the wheelhouse when the fire alar
sounded. %he officer then went to the scene of the fire, closing the engine roo
"entilator flaps on the boat deck on his wa!.
3. Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
%he /hief 5ngineer, alerted b! the fire alar and the telephone call fro
the %hird 5ngineer, went to the engine roo which he found full of soke. $e
ga"e instructions for the eergenc! fire pup and the eergenc! generator to
be started. %hen he and the 'osun, both wearing self-contained breathing
apparatus and the latter a life line, took a hose and entered the engine roo to
see if the cause and seat of the fire could be identified, but both were forced to
lea"e because of soke entering their face asks. %he fault to the asks was
reedied and the! re-entered the engine roo. A bellows t!pe breathing
apparatus was rigged and anned in case the need arose for assistance to be
gi"en to the two en. %he /hief 5ngineer was able to see the fire which was in
the "icinit! of the turbo blower. -ater was directed towards the fire b! a jet
no((le but the hose was not long enough for the seat of the fire to be reached
and both en withdrew.
An additional length of hose was connected and, because of the intense
heat in the engine roo, the /hief 5ngineer asked for a spra! no((le to be fitted
in place of the jet no((le, hoping that b! using the spra! as a curtain, he would
be able to get closer to the seat of the fire. %his plan could not be put into effect
as all the spra! no((les were stowed in the engine roo and could not be
reached.
At about 0090 the /hief 5ngineer and the 'osun re-entered the engine
roo, and found that the teperature had dropped significantl! and the fire
appeared to be burning itself out. -ater was escaping fro burst connections in
the cooling water s!ste and it was considered that this was helping to reduce
the intensit! of the fire. %he /hief 5ngineer therefore decided that he and the
'osun should withdraw again and let the fire e)tinguish itself.
%he /hief 5ngineer, and the 8econd and %hird 5ngineers, ade a
nuber of inspections of the engine roo and at 00*+ no further flaes could be
seen. After an inspection of the whole of the achiner! spaces the :aster was
infored, at 0110, that the fire was e)tinguished.
.n addition to the fire in the engine roo itself, the deck plating of the
"ehicle space abo"e becae "er! hot and the /hief #fficer organi(ed four hoses
for cooling purposes. Darge aounts of stea were produced and "isibilit! in the
area was bad. -hen the /hief 5ngineer reported that the fire was out the /hief
#fficer asked the :aster to restart the "ehicle deck fans to clear the atosphere.
.t did not pro"e necessar! to o"e an! of the "ehicles but a nuber of t!res
were daaged b! heat.
At 0*08, the port engine, which reained ser"iceable, was restarted and
the "essel copleted the passage on one engine, entering harbour at 0<9<.
Damage and Personal Inuries
%he ajor part of the daage was to electrical wiring and fittings, all
wiring and light fittings abo"e both ain engines re&uiring renewal. %he effects of
heat were apparent diagonall! across the port engine and along the starboard
engine, the insulation of a large nuber of power and lighting cables, carried on
cable tra!s below the deck head being daaged. ,aage to the ain engines
was confined ainl! to au)iliar! fittings, fle)ible pipe connections and joints. %he
starboard turbo-blower inlet filter casing had partl! elted, together with the rotor
bearings. %he starboard go"ernor with associated starting and control gear and
the oil ist detector re&uired coplete o"erhaul. ;uel rack return springs, and all
pipe joints and fle)ible connections affected b! heat had to be renewed.
,aage to the ship4s structure consisted of locali(ed buckling of the deck
head longitudinal abo"e the after end of the engine roo.
%here were no injuries to personnel.
!ause of Fire
-hen the fire was e)tinguished and conditions were suitable for a detailed
e)aination to be carried out it was found that No. < starboard fuel pup low
pressure deli"er! pipe had fractured. %he broken ends of pipe had sprung out of
line, peritting a discharge of fuel oil towards the engine in line with the fuel
pup. .gnition was caused b! fuel oil coing into contact with the e)haust
s!ste. %he cause of the fracture is not known but it was apparent fro the
isalignent of the sections of fractured pipe that the pipe had been under
tension.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
%he "essel was fitted with /#2 e)tinguishing s!stes both for the engine
roo and the "ehicle deck, but the /hief 5ngineer considered that the use of
/#2 in the engine roo should be a"oided if at all possible. %he diesel
generator was still running and pro"iding light and power, and the use of /#2
would ha"e iobilised the generator. %here would also be the proble of
purging the engine roo atosphere after the fire was e)tinguished and of
ensuring that it was safe for personnel to an the control roo, the door
between the engine roo and the control roo not being gas-tight. /#2 was not
used on the car deck as it was considered that the situation did not justif! it.
%he efforts of the /hief 5ngineer and the 'osun, coendable as the!
were, probabl! had onl! inial effects on the fire. .t was considered that the fire
went out through a cobination of two factors0
/essation of the suppl! of fuel oil "ia the broken pipe due to the stopping
on the booster pups6
%he escape of water fro the burnt fle)ible cooling water pipes. /ooling
the "ehicle deck abo"e the fire with hoses a! also ha"e been a contributing
factor.
All engineer officers were closel! &uestioned about stopping the booster
pups but no one could recollect ha"ing done so either b! operating the breaker
at the ain switchboard or the eergenc! stop switch in the engine roo
entrance. After the fire it was found that the port booster pup, which had been
in operation at the outbreak, could not be restarted due to a loose connection in
the starter. %his loose connection a! ha"e been the reason for the pup
stopping when it did but no e)planation could be found for the failure of the
starboard pup-on standb!-to cut in on pressure drop. $ad the low pressure fuel
suppl! continued to deli"er fuel oil to the seat of the fire, the incident would
ha"e been far ore serious.
"emedial Action Ta#en by the !ompany
.n"estigations into the incident re"ealed that within a few seconds of the
initial outbreak treendous heat and large "olues of soke and fues were
generated. /oupled with loss of engine roo lighting, these conditions ade it
ipossible for staff to reain in the engine roo without breathing apparatus or
to approach close enough to the fire to ake effecti"e use of portable
e)tinguishers. 8oke and fues rapidl! spread to the control roo which had to
be e"acuated. .n the circustances the fire had to be fought with e&uipent
located outside the engine roo.
%he onl! fire fighting appliances located in the "ehicle deck were hoses
with fi)ed no((les. -hen carr!ing out fire drills, a situation whereb! a hose had
to be taken into the engine roo fro outside had not been en"isaged. ;or this
reason the length of hose used at first was insufficient to enable a jet of water to
be directed onto the fire. %he hose had to follow a "er! tortuous path fro the car
deck down a stairwa! to the control roo, around the console and down a further
stairwa! to the engine roo floor plate6 se"ere kinking seriousl! restricted the
flow of water.
%he /hief 5ngineer and the 'osun found that their breathing apparatus
ade it ipossible to counicate with one another and difficult to reain in
contact. %he 'osun also found his life line awkward and at ties it becae
entangled with the hose.
%he following recoendations were ade as a result of the /opan!4s
in"estigations into the incident0
/onsideration should be gi"en to fitting all ships of the t!pe in &uestion with a water
spra! s!ste in the engine roo, operable fro outside the achiner! space and capable
of being selecti"el! operated in sections.
/onsideration should be gi"en to fitting all ships of the t!pe in &uestion with a
anuall! operated drencher s!ste on the "ehicle deck.
8upplies of portable foa aking e&uipent should be a"ailable on "ehicle decks
of all roll-onE roll-off "essels.
All hoses in the "ehicle deck should be fitted with cobined jetEspra! no((les.
A non-kinking hose fitted with a jetEspra! no((le should be ounted on a reel
peranentl! connected to the ship4s fire ain, adjacent to an! door between the control
roo and the achiner! space.
%he door and bulkhead between an! achiner! space and control roo should be
gas-tight.
!onclusions
Apart fro the reedial easures listed, this casualt! ephasises the
necessit! of carr!ing out realistic fire drillsAwith the source of fire in "arious
locations. #nl! b! so doing can defects in e&uipent or procedure be
disco"ered.
+uly% 1&''.

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