Aristotle's Metaphysics

First published Sun Oct 8, 2000; substantive revision Mon Jun 11, 2012
The first major work in the history of philosophy to bear the title Metaphysics was the treatise by
Aristotle that we have come to know by that name. But Aristotle himself did not use that title or even
describe his field of study as metaphysics! the name was evidently coined by the first century ".#.
editor who assembled the treatise we know as Aristotle$s Metaphysics out of various smaller selections
of Aristotle$s works. The title metaphysics%literally& after the Physics%very likely indicated the
place the topics discussed therein were intended to occupy in the philosophical curriculum. They were
to be studied after the treatises dealin' with nature (ta phusika). *n this entry& we discuss the ideas that
are developed in Aristotle$s treatise.
+. The ,ubject Matter of Aristotle$s Metaphysics
-. The "ate'ories
.. The /ole of ,ubstance in the ,tudy of Bein' 0ua Bein'
1. The 2undamental 3rinciples4 A5ioms
6. 7hat is ,ubstance8
9. ,ubstance& Matter& and ,ubject
:. ,ubstance and #ssence
;. ,ubstances as <ylomorphic "ompounds
=. ,ubstance and >efinition
+?. ,ubstances and @niversals
++. ,ubstance as "ause of Bein'
+-. Actuality and 3otentiality
+.. @nity /econsidered
+1. Alossary of Aristotelian Terminolo'y
Biblio'raphy
Academic Tools
Bther *nternet /esources
/elated #ntries
1. The Subject Matter of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Aristotle himself described his subject matter in a variety of ways4 as first philosophy& or the study of
bein' Cua bein'& or wisdom& or theolo'y. A comment on these descriptions will help to clarify
Aristotle$s topic.
*n Metaphysics A.+& Aristotle says that all men suppose what is called wisdom (sophia) to deal with
the first causes (aitia) and the principles (archai) of thin's (=;+b-;)& and it is these causes and
principles that he proposes to study in this work. *t is his customary practice to be'in an inCuiry by
reviewin' the opinions previously held by others& and that is what he does here& as Book A continues
with a history of the thou'ht of his predecessors about causes and principles.
These causes and principles are clearly the subject matter of what he calls first philosophy. But this
does not mean the branch of philosophy that should be studied first. /ather& it concerns issues that are
in some sense the most fundamental or at the hi'hest level of 'enerality. Aristotle distin'uished
between thin's that are better known to us and thin's that are better known in themselves&
D+E
and
maintained that we should be'in our study of a 'iven topic with thin's better known to us and arrive
ultimately at an understandin' of thin's better known in themselves. The principles studied by first
philosophy may seem very 'eneral and abstract& but they are& accordin' to Aristotle& better known in
themselves& however remote they may seem from the world of ordinary e5perience. ,till& since they are
to be studied only by one who has already studied nature (which is the subject matter of the Physics)&
they are Cuite appropriately described as comin' after the Physics.
Aristotle$s description the study of bein' Cua bein' is freCuently and easily misunderstood& for it
seems to su''est that there is a sin'le (albeit special) subject matter%bein' Cua bein'%that is under
investi'ation. But Aristotle$s description does not involve two thin's%(+) a study and (-) a subject
matter (bein' Cua bein')%for he did not think that there is any such subject matter as bein' Cua
bein'. /ather& his description involves three thin's4 (+) a study& (-) a subject matter (bein')& and (.) a
manner in which the subject matter is studied (Cua bein').
Aristotle$s Areek word that has been FatiniGed as Cua means rou'hly in so far as or under the
aspect. A study of Cua y& then& is a study of that concerns itself solely with the y aspect of . ,o
Aristotle$s study does not concern some recondite subject matter known as bein' Cua bein'. /ather it
is a study of bein'& or better& of bein's%of thin's that can be said to be%that studies them in a
particular way4 as bein's& in so far as they are bein's.
Bf course& first philosophy is not the only field of inCuiry to study bein's. Hatural science and
mathematics also study bein's& but in different ways& under different aspects. The natural scientist
studies them as thin's that are subject to the laws of nature& as thin's that move and under'o chan'e.
That is& the natural scientist studies thin's Cua movable (i.e.& in so far as they are subject to chan'e).
The mathematician studies thin's Cua countable and measurable. The metaphysician& on the other hand&
studies them in a more 'eneral and abstract way%Cua bein's. ,o first philosophy studies the causes
and principles of bein's Cua bein's. *n I.-& Aristotle adds that for this reason it studies the causes and
principles of substances (ousiai). 7e will e5plain this connection in ,ection . below.
*n Book #& Aristotle adds another description to the study of the causes and principles of bein's Cua
bein's. 7hereas natural science studies objects that are material and subject to chan'e& and
mathematics studies objects that althou'h not subject to chan'e are nevertheless not separate from (i.e.&
independent of) matter& there is still room for a science that studies thin's (if indeed there are any) that
are eternal& not subject to chan'e& and independent of matter. ,uch a science& he says& is theolo'y& and
this is the first and hi'hest science. Aristotle$s identification of theolo'y& so conceived& with the
study of bein' Cua bein' has proved challen'in' to his interpreters. 7e will deal with this issue in a
future update& when ,ection +1 is completed.
2inally& we may note that in Book B& Aristotle delineates his subject matter in a different way& by listin'
the problems or perple5ities (aporiai) he hopes to deal with. "haracteristic of these perple5ities& he
says& is that they tie our thinkin' up in knots. They include the followin'& amon' others4 Are sensible
substances the only ones that e5ist& or are there others besides them8 *s it kinds or individuals that are
the elements and principles of thin's8 And if it is kinds& which ones4 the most 'eneric or the most
specific8 *s there a cause apart from matter8 *s there anythin' apart from material compounds8 Are the
principles limited& either in number or in kind8 Are the principles of perishable thin's themselves
perishable8 Are the principles universal or particular& and do they e5ist potentially or actually8 Are
mathematical objects (numbers& lines& fi'ures& points) substances8 *f they are& are they separate from or
do they always belon' to sensible thin's8 And (the hardest and most perple5in' of all& Aristotle says)
are unity and bein' the substance of thin's& or are they attributes of some other subject8 *n the
remainder of Book B& Aristotle presents ar'uments on both sides of each of these issues& and in
subseCuent books he takes up many of them a'ain. But it is not always clear precisely how he resolves
them& and it is possible that Aristotle did not think that the Metaphysics contains definitive solutions to
all of these perple5ities.
2. The Categories
To understand the problems and project of Aristotle$s Metaphysics& it is best to be'in with one of his
earlier works& the !ate"ories. Althou'h placed by lon' tradition amon' his lo'ical works (see the
discussion in the entry on Aristotle$s lo'ic)& due to its analysis of the terms that make up the
propositions out of which deductive inferences are constructed& the !ate"ories be'ins with a strikin'ly
'eneral and e5haustive account of the thin's there are (ta onta)%bein's. Accordin' to this account&
bein's can be divided into ten distinct cate'ories. (Althou'h Aristotle never says so& it is temptin' to
suppose that these cate'ories are mutually e5clusive and jointly e5haustive of the thin's there are.)
They include substance& Cuality& Cuantity& and relation& amon' others. Bf these cate'ories of bein's& it
is the first& substance (ousia)& to which Aristotle 'ives a privile'ed position.
,ubstances are uniCue in bein' independent thin's! the items in the other cate'ories all depend
somehow on substances. That is& Cualities are the Cualities of substances! Cuantities are the amounts
and siGes that substances come in! relations are the way substances stand to one another. These various
nonJsubstances all owe their e5istence to substances%each of them& as Aristotle puts it& e5ists only in
a subject. That is& each nonJsubstance is in somethin'& not as a part& and cannot e5ist separately from
what it is in (!at. +a-6). *ndeed& it becomes clear that substances are the subjects that these
ontolo'ically dependent nonJsubstances are in.
#ach member of a nonJsubstance cate'ory thus stands in this inherence relation (as it is freCuently
called) to some substance or other%color is always found in bodies& knowled'e in the soul. Heither
whiteness nor a piece of 'rammatical knowled'e& for e5ample& is capable of e5istin' on its own. #ach
reCuires for its e5istence that there be some substance in which it inheres.
*n addition to this fundamental inherence relation across cate'ories& Aristotle also points out another
fundamental relation that obtains between items within a sin'le cate'ory. <e describes this as the
relation of bein' said of a subject& and his e5amples make clear that it is the relation of a more
'eneral to a less 'eneral thin' within a sin'le cate'ory. Thus& man is said of a particular man& and
animal is said of man& and therefore& as Aristotle points out& animal is said of the particular man
also. The said of relation& that is to say& is transitive (cf. +b+?). ,o the 'enus (e.'.& animal) is said of
the species (e.'.& man) and both 'enus and species are said of the particular. The same holds in nonJ
substance cate'ories. *n the cate'ory of Cuality& for e5ample& the 'enus (color) is said of the species
(white) and both 'enus and species are said of the particular white. There has been considerable
scholarly dispute about these particulars in nonsubstance cate'ories. 2or more detail& see the
supplementary document4
Honsubstantial 3articulars
The lan'ua'e of this contrast (in a subject vs. said of a subject) is peculiar to the !ate"ories& but the
idea seems to recur in other works as the distinction between accidental vs. essential predication.
,imilarly& in works other than the !ate"ories& Aristotle uses the label universals (ta katholou) for the
thin's that are said of many! thin's that are not universal he calls particulars (ta kath# hekasta).
Althou'h he does not use these labels in the !ate"ories& it is not misleadin' to say that the doctrine of
the !ate"ories is that each cate'ory contains a hierarchy of universals and particulars& with each
universal bein' said of the lowerJlevel universals and particulars that fall beneath it. #ach cate'ory
thus has the structure of an upsideJdown tree.
D-E
At the top (or trunk) of the tree are the most 'eneric
items in that cate'ory
D.E
(e.'.& in the case of the cate'ory of substance& the 'enus plant and the 'enus
animal)! branchin' below them are universals at the ne5t hi'hest level& and branchin' below these are
found lower levels of universals& and so on& down to the lowest level universals (e.'.& such in$i%ae
species as man and horse)! at the lowest level%the leaves of the tree%are found the individual
substances& e.'.& this man& that horse& etc.
The individuals in the cate'ory of substance play a special role in this scheme. Aristotle calls them
primary substances (pr&tai ousiai) for without them& as he says& nothin' else would e5ist. *ndeed&
Aristotle offers an ar'ument (-a.6K-b:) to establish the primary substances as the fundamental entities
in this ontolo'y. #verythin' that is not a primary substance& he points out& stands in one of the two
relations (inherin' in& or bein' said of) to primary substances. A 'enus& such as animal& is said of
the species below it and& since they are said of primary substances& so is the 'enus (recall the
transitivity of the said of relation). Thus& everythin' in the cate'ory of substance that is not itself a
primary substance is& ultimately& said of primary substances. And if there were no primary substances&
there would be no secondary substances (species and 'enera)& either. 2or these secondary substances
are just the ways in which the primary substances are fundamentally classified within the cate'ory of
substance. As for the members of nonJsubstance cate'ories& they too depend for their e5istence on
primary substances. A universal in a nonJsubstance cate'ory& e.'.& color& in the cate'ory of Cuality& is
in body& Aristotle tells us& and therefore in individual bodies. 2or color could not be in body& in
'eneral& unless it were in at least some particular bodies. ,imilarly& particulars in nonJsubstance
cate'ories (althou'h there is not 'eneral a'reement amon' scholars about what such particulars mi'ht
be) cannot e5ist on their own. #.'.& a determinate shade of color& or a particular and nonJshareable bit
of that shade& is not capable of e5istin' on its own%if it were not in at least some primary substance&
it would not e5ist. ,o primary substances are the basic entities%the basic thin's that there are%in
the world of the !ate"ories.
3. The Role of Substance in the Study of eing !ua eing
The !ate"ories leads us to e5pect that the study of bein' in 'eneral (bein' Cua bein') will crucially
involve the study of substance& and when we turn to the Metaphysics we are not disappointed. 2irst& in
Metaphysics I Aristotle ar'ues in a new way for the ontolo'ical priority of substance! and then& in
Books L& M& and N& he wrestles with the problem of what it is to be a substance. 7e will be'in with I$s
account of the central place of substance in the study of bein' Cua bein'.
As we noted above& metaphysics (or& first philosophy) is the science which studies bein' Cua bein'. *n
this respect it is unlike the specialiGed or departmental sciences& which study only part of bein' (only
some of the thin's that e5ist) or study bein's only in a specialiGed way (e.'.& only in so far as they are
chan'eable& rather than in so far as they are bein's).
But bein'& as Aristotle tells us in I.-& is said in many ways. That is& the verb to be (einai) has
different senses& as do its co'nates bein' (on) and entities (onta). ,o the universal science of bein'
Cua bein' appears to founder on an eCuivocation4 how can there be a sin'le science of bein' when the
very term bein' is ambi'uous8
"onsider an analo'y. There are dinin' tables& and there are tide tables. A dinin' table is a table in the
sense of a smooth flat slab fi5ed on le's! a tide table is a table in the sense of a systematic arran'ement
of data in rows and columns. But there is not a sin'le sense of table which applies to both the piece of
furniture at which * am writin' these words and to the small booklet that lies upon it. <ence it would be
foolish to e5pect that there is a sin'le science of tables& in 'eneral& that would include amon' its objects
both dinin' tables and tide tables. Tables& that is to say& do not constitute a sin'le kind with a sin'le
definition& so no sin'le science& or field of knowled'e& can encompass precisely those thin's that are
correctly called tables.
*f the term bein' were ambi'uous in the way that table is& Aristotle$s science of bein' Cua bein'
would be as impossible as a science of tables Cua tables. But& Aristotle ar'ues in I.-& bein' is not
ambi'uous in this way. Bein'& he tells us& is said in many ways but it is not merely (what he calls)
homonymous& i.e.& sheerly ambi'uous. /ather& the various senses of bein' have what he calls a
pros hen ambi'uity%they are all related to a sin'le central sense. (The Areek phrase pros hen means
in relation to one.)
Aristotle e5plains his point by means of some e5amples that he takes to be analo'ous to bein'.
"onsider the terms healthy and medical. Heither of these has a sin'le definition that applies
uniformly to all cases4 not every healthy (or medical) thin' is healthy (medical) in the same sense of
healthy (medical). There is a ran'e of thin's that can be called healthy4 people& diets& e5ercise&
comple5ions& etc. Hot all of these are healthy in the same sense. #5ercise is healthy in the sense of
bein' productive of health! a clear comple5ion is healthy in the sense of bein' symptomatic of health! a
person is healthy in the sense of havin' 'ood health.
But notice that these various senses have somethin' in common4 a reference to one central thin'&
health& which is actually possessed by only some of the thin's that are spoken of as healthy& namely&
healthy or'anisms& and these are said to be healthy in the primary sense of the term. Bther thin's are
considered healthy only in so far as they are appropriately related to thin's that are healthy in this
primary sense.
The situation is the same& Aristotle claims& with the term bein'. *t& too& has a primary sense as well as
related senses in which it applies to other thin's because they are appropriately related to thin's that are
called bein's in the primary sense. The bein's in the primary sense are substances! the bein's in other
senses are the Cualities& Cuantities& etc.& that belon' to substances. An animal& e.'.& a horse& is a bein'&
and so is a color& e.'& white& a bein'. But a horse is a bein' in the primary sense%it is a substance%
whereas the color white (a Cuality) is a bein' only because it Cualifies some substance. An account of
the bein' of anythin' that is& therefore& will ultimately have to make some reference to substance.
<ence& the science of bein' Cua bein' will involve an account of the central case of bein's%
substances.
". The #unda$ental %rinciples& A'io$s
Before embarkin' on this study of substance& however& Aristotle 'oes on in Book I to ar'ue that first
philosophy& the most 'eneral of the sciences& must also address the most fundamental principles%the
common a5ioms%that are used in all reasonin'. Thus& first philosophy must also concern itself with
the principle of nonJcontradiction (3H")4 the principle that the same attribute cannot at the same time
belon' and not belon' to the same subject and in the same respect (+??6b+=). This& Aristotle says& is
the most certain of all principles& and it is not just a hypothesis. *t cannot& however& be proved& since it
is employed& implicitly& in all proofs& no matter what the subject matter. *t is a first principle& and hence
is not derived from anythin' more basic.
7hat& then& can the science of first philosophy say about the 3H"8 *t cannot offer a proof of the 3H"&
since the 3H" is presupposed by any proof one mi'ht offer%any purported proof of the 3H" would
therefore be circular. Aristotle thus does not attempt to prove the 3H"! in the subseCuent chapters of I
he ar'ues& instead& that it is impossible to disbelieve the 3H". Those who would claim to deny the 3H"
cannot& if they have any beliefs at all& believe that it is false. 2or one who has a belief must& if he is to
e5press this belief to himself or to others& say somethin'%he must make an assertion. <e must& as
Aristotle says& si'nify somethin'. But the very act of si'nifyin' somethin' is possible only if the 3H"
is accepted. 7ithout acceptin' the 3H"& one would have no reason to think that his words have any
si'nification at all%they could not mean one thin' rather than another. ,o anyone who makes any
assertion has already committed himself to the 3H". Aristotle thus does not ar'ue that the 3H" is a
necessary truth (that is& he does not try to prove the 3H")! rather& he ar'ues that the 3H" is indubitable.
(2or more on the 3H"& see the discussion in the entry on Aristotle$s lo'ic)
(. )hat is Substance*
*n the seventeen chapters that make up Book L of the Metaphysics& Aristotle takes up the promised
study of substance. <e be'ins by reiteratin' and refinin' some of what he said in I4 that bein' is said
in many ways& and that the primary sense of bein' is the sense in which substances are bein's. <ere&
however& he e5plicitly links the secondary senses of bein' to the nonJsubstance cate'ories. The
primacy of substance leads Aristotle to say that the a'eJold Cuestion 7hat is bein'8 is just the
Cuestion 7hat is substance8 (+?-;b1).
Bne mi'ht have thou'ht that this Cuestion had already been answered in the !ate"ories. There we were
'iven& as e5amples of primary substances& an individual man or horse& and we learned that a primary
substance is what is neither in a subject nor said of a subject (-a+?). This would seem to provide us
with both e5amples of& and criteria for bein'& primary substances. But in Metaphysics L& Aristotle does
not seem to take either the e5amples or the criteria for 'ranted.
*n L.- he recounts the various answers that have been 'iven to the Cuestion of which thin's are
substances%bodies (includin' plants& animals& the parts of plants and animals& the elements& the
heavenly bodies)& thin's more basic than bodies (surfaces& lines& and points)& imperceptible thin's (such
as 3latonic 2orms and mathematical objects)%and seems to re'ard them all as viable candidates at this
point. <e does not seem to doubt that the clearest e5amples of substances are perceptible ones& but
leaves open the Cuestion whether there are others as well.
Before answerin' this Cuestion about e5amples& however& he says that we must first answer the
Cuestion about criteria4 what is it to be a substance (t'n ousian pr&ton ti estin)8 The ne'ative criterion
(neither in a subject nor said of a subject) of the !ate"ories tells us only which thin's are substances.
But even if we know that somethin' is a substance& we must still say what %akes it a substance%what
the cause is of its bein' a substance. This is the Cuestion to which Aristotle ne5t turns. To answer it is to
identify& as Aristotle puts it& the substance o$ that thin'.
+. Substance, Matter, and Subject
O.. be'ins with a list of four possible candidates for bein' the substance of somethin'4 essence&
universal& 'enus& and subject. 3resumably& this means that if is a substance& then the substance of
mi'ht be either (i) the essence of & or (ii) some universal predicated of & or (iii) a 'enus that belon's
to& or (iv) a subject of which is predicated. The first three candidates are taken up in later chapters&
and L.. is devoted to an e5amination of the fourth candidate4 the idea that the substance of somethin'
is a subject of which it is predicated.
A subject& Aristotle tells us& is that of which everythin' else is predicated& while it is itself not
predicated of anythin' else (+?-;b.9). This characteriGation of a subject is reminiscent of the
lan'ua'e of the !ate"ories& which tells us that a primary substance is not predicated of anythin' else&
whereas other thin's are predicated of it. "andidate (iv) thus seems to reiterate the !ate"ories criterion
for bein' a substance. But there are two reasons to be wary of drawin' this conclusion. 2irst& whereas
the subject criterion of the !ate"ories told us that substances were the ultimate subjects of predication&
the subject criterion envisa'ed here is supposed to tell us what the substance o$ somethin' is. ,o what it
would tell us is that if is a substance& then the substance of %that which makes a substance%is a
subject that is predicated of. ,econd& as his ne5t comment makes clear& Aristotle has in mind
somethin' other than this !ate"ories idea. 2or the subject that he here envisa'es& he says& is either
matter or form or the compound of matter and form. These are concepts from Aristotle$s Physics& and
none of them fi'ured in the ontolo'y of the !ate"ories. To appreciate the issues Aristotle is raisin'
here& we must briefly compare his treatment of the notion of a subject in the Physics with that in the
!ate"ories.
*n the !ate"ories& Aristotle was concerned with subjects of predication4 what are the thin's we talk
about& and ascribe properties to8 *n the Physics& his concern is with subjects of chan'e4 what is it that
bears (at different times) contrary predicates and persists throu'h a process of chan'e8 But there is an
obvious connection between these conceptions of a subject& since a subject of chan'e must have one
predicate belon'in' to it at one time that does not belon' to it at another time. ,ubjects of chan'e& that
is& are also subjects of predication. (The converse is not true4 numbers are subjects of predication%si5
is even& seven is prime%but not of chan'e.)
*n the !ate"ories& individual substances (a man& a horse) were treated as fundamental subjects of
predication. They were also understood& indirectly& as subjects of chan'e. (A substance& one and the
same in number& can receive contraries. An individual man& for e5ample& bein' one and the same&
becomes now pale and now dark& now hot and now cold& now bad and now 'ood 1a+:K-?.) These are
chan'es in which substances move& or alter& or 'row. 7hat the !ate"ories did not e5plore& however& are
chan'es in which substances are 'enerated or destroyed. But the theory of chan'e Aristotle develops in
the Physics reCuires some other subject for chan'es such as these%a subject of which substance is
predicated%and it identifies matter as the fundamental subject of chan'e (+=-a.+K.-). "han'e is seen
in the Physics as a process in which matter either takes on or loses form.
The concepts of matter and form& as we noted& are absent from the !ate"ories. *ndividual substances%
this man or that horse%apart from their accidental characteristics%the Cualities& etc.& that inhere in
them%are viewed in that work as essentially simple& unanalyGable atoms. Althou'h there is
metaphysical structure to the fact that& e.'.& this horse is (hite (a certain Cuality inheres in a certain
substance)& the fact that this is a horse is a kind of brute fact& devoid of metaphysical structure. This
horse is a primary substance& and horse& the species to which it belon's& is a secondary substance. But
there is no predicative comple5 correspondin' to the fact that this is a horse in the way that there is
such a comple5 correspondin' to the fact that this horse is white.
But from the point of view of the Physics& substantial individuals are seen as predicative comple5es (cf.
Matthen +=;:b)! they are hylomorphic compounds%compounds of matter and form%and the subject
criterion looks rather different from the hylomorphic perspective. Metaphysics L.. e5amines the
subject criterion from this perspective.
Matter& form& and the compound of matter and form may all be considered subjects& Aristotle tells us&
(+?-=a-K1)& but which of them is substance8 The subject criterion by itself leads to the answer that the
substance of is an entirely indeterminate matter of which is composed (+?-=a+?). 2or form is
predicated of matter as subject& and one can always analyGe a hylomorphic compound into its
predicates and the subject of which they are predicated. And when all predicates have been removed (in
thou'ht)& the subject that remains is nothin' at all in its own ri'ht%an entity all of whose properties are
accidental to it (+?-=a+-K-:). The resultin' subject is matter from which all form has been e5pun'ed.
(Traditional scholarship calls this prime matter& but Aristotle does not here indicate whether he thinks
there actually is such a thin'.) ,o the subject criterion leads to the answer that the substance of is the
formless matter of which it is ultimately composed.
But Aristotle rejects this answer as impossible (+?-=a-;)& claimin' that substance must be separate
(ch&riston) and some this (tode ti& sometimes translated this somethin')& and implyin' that matter
fails to meet this reCuirement. 3recisely what the reCuirement amounts to is a matter of considerable
scholarly debate& however. A plausible interpretation runs as follows. Bein' separate has to do with
bein' able to e5ist independently ( is separate from y if is capable of e5istin' independently of y)&
and bein' some this means bein' a determinate individual. ,o a substance must be a determinate
individual that is capable of e5istin' on its own. (Bne mi'ht even hold& althou'h this is controversial&
that on Aristotle$s account not every this is also separate. A particular color or shape mi'ht be
considered a determinate individual that is not capable of e5istin' on its own%it is always the color of
shape of some substance or other.) But matter fails to be simultaneously both ch&riston and tode ti. The
matter of which a substance is composed may e5ist independently of that substance (think of the wood
of which a desk is composed& which e5isted before the desk was made and may survive the
disassembly of the desk)& but it is not as such any definite individual%it is just a Cuantity of a certain
kind of matter. Bf course& the matter may be construed as constitutin' a definite individual substance
(the wood just is& one mi'ht say& the particular desk it composes)& but it is in that sense not separate
from the form or shape that makes it that substance (the wood cannot be that particular desk unless it is
a desk). ,o althou'h matter is in a sense separate and in a sense some this& it cannot be both separate
and some this. *t thus does not Cualify as the substance of the thin' whose matter it is.
-. Substance and .ssence
Aristotle turns in L.1 to a consideration of the ne5t candidate for substance4 essence. (#ssence is the
standard #n'lish translation of Aristotle$s curious phrase to ti 'n einai& literally the what it was to be
for a thin'. This phrase so bo''led his /oman translators that they coined the word essentia to render
the entire phrase& and it is from this Fatin word that ours derives. Aristotle also sometimes uses the
shorter phrase to ti esti& literally the what it is& for appro5imately the same idea.) *n his lo'ical works&
Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of definition (horis%os)%a definition is an account (lo"os)
that si'nifies an essence ()opics +?-a.)%and he links both of these notions to a certain kind of per se
predication (kath# hauto& literally& in respect of itself)%what belon's to a thin' in respect of itself
belon's to it in its essence (en t&i ti esti) for we refer to it in the account that states the essence
(Posterior *nalytics& :.a.1K6). <e reiterates these ideas in L.14 there is an essence of just those thin's
whose lo"os is a definition (+?.?a9)& the essence of a thin' is what it is said to be in respect of itself
(+?-=b+1). *t is important to remember that for Aristotle& one defines thin's& not words. The definition
of ti'er does not tell us the meanin' of the word ti'er! it tells us what it is to be a ti'er& what a ti'er is
said to be in respect of itself. Thus& the definition of ti'er states the essence%the what it is to be of a
ti'er& what is predicated of the ti'er per se.
Aristotle$s preliminary answer (O.1) to the Cuestion 7hat is substance8 is that substance is essence&
but there are important Cualifications. 2or& as he points out& definition (horis%os)& like what it is (ti
esti)& is said in many ways (+?.?a+=). That is& items in all the cate'ories are definable& so items in all
the cate'ories have essences%just as there is an essence of man& there is also an essence of white and
an essence of musical. But& because of the pros hen eCuivocity of is& such essences are secondary
%definition and essence are primarily (prot&s) and without Cualification (hapl&s) of substances
(+?.?b1K9). Thus& L.1 tells us& it is only these primary essences that are substances. Aristotle does not
here work out the details of this hierarchy of essences (Fou5& +==+)& but it is possible to reconstruct a
theory of such a hierarchy on the basis of subseCuent developments in Book L.
*n L.9& Aristotle 'oes on to ar'ue that if somethin' is primary and spoken of in respect of itself
(kath# hauto le"o%enon) it is one and the same as its essence. The precise meanin' of this claim& as
well as the nature and validity of the ar'uments offered in support of it& are matters of scholarly
controversy. But it does seem safe to say that Aristotle thinks that an accidental unity such as a pale
man is not a kath# hauto le"o%enon (since pallor is an accidental characteristic of a man) and so is not
the same as its essence. Pale %an& that is to say& does not specify the what it is of any primary bein'&
and so cannot be an essence of the primary kind. As L.1 has already told us& only species of a 'enus
have an essence (+?.?a++K+-) in the primary sense. Man is a species& and so there is an essence of
man! but pale %an is not a species and so& even if there is such a thin' as the essence of pale man& it is
not& at any rate& a primary essence.
At this point there appears to be a close connection between the essence of a substance and its species
(eidos)& and this mi'ht tempt one to suppose that Aristotle is identifyin' the substance of a thin' (since
the substance of a thin' is its essence) with its species. (A conseCuence of this idea would be that
Aristotle is radically alterin' his conception of the importance of the species& which in the !ate"ories
he called a secondary substance& that is& a substance only in a secondary sense.) But such an
identification would be a mistake& for two reasons. 2irst& Aristotle$s point at +?.?a++ is not that a
species is an essence& but that an essence of the primary kind corresponds to a species (e.'.& %an) and
not to some more narrowly delineated kind (e.'.& pale %an). ,econd& the word eidos& which meant
species in the lo'ical works& has acCuired a new meanin' in a hylomorphic conte5t& where it means
form (contrasted with matter) rather than species (contrasted with 'enus). *n the conceptual
framework of Metaphysics L& a universal such as %an or horse%which was called a species and a
secondary substance in the !ate"ories%is construed as not a substance& but a compound of a certain
formula and a certain matter& taken universally (O.+?& +?.6b-=K.?). The eidos that is primary
substance in Book L is not the species that an individual substance belon's to but the form that is
predicated of the matter of which it is composed.
D1E
/. Substances as 0ylo$orphic Co$pounds
The role of form in this hylomorphic conte5t is the topic of L.:K=. (Althou'h these chapters were
almost certainly not ori'inally included in Book L%there is no reference to them& for e5ample& in the
summary of L 'iven in M.+& which skips directly from L.9 to L.+?%they provide a link between
substance and form and thus fill what would otherwise be a 'ap in the ar'ument.) ,ince individual
substances are seen as hylomorphic compounds& the role of matter and form in their 'eneration must be
accounted for. 7hether we are thinkin' of natural objects& such as plants and animals& or artifacts& such
as houses& the reCuirements for 'eneration are the same. 7e do not produce the matter (to suppose that
we do leads to an infinite re'ress) nor do we produce the form (what could we make it out of8)! rather&
we put the form into the matter& and produce the compound (O.;& +?..a.?Kb=). Both the matter and the
form must preJe5ist (O.=& +?.1b+-). But the source of motion in both cases%what Aristotle calls the
movin' cause of the comin' to be%is the form.
*n artistic production& the form is found in the soul of the artisan& for the art of buildin' is the form of
the house (+?.1a-1) and the form is in the soul (+?.-b-.) of the artisan. 2or e5ample& the builder
has in mind the plan or desi'n for a house and he knows how to build! he then enmatters that plan or
desi'n by puttin' it into the materials out of which he builds the house. *n natural production& the form
is found in the parent& where the be'etter is the same in kind as the be'otten& not one in number but
one in form%for man be'ets man (+?..b.?K-). But in either case& the form preJe5ists and is not
produced (+?..b+;).
As for what is produced in such hylomorphic productions& it is correctly described by the name of its
form& not by that of its matter. 7hat is produced is a house or a man& not bricks or flesh. Bf course&
what is made of 'old may still be described in terms of its material components& but we should call it
not 'old but 'olden (+?..a:). 2or if 'old is the matter out of which a statue is made& there was
'old present at the start& and so it was not 'old that came into bein'. *t was a statue that came into
bein'& and althou'h the statue is 'olden%i.e.& made of 'old%it cannot be identified with the 'old of
which it was made.
The essence of such a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form& not its matter. As Aristotle says by
form * mean the essence of each thin'& and its primary substance (+?.-b+)& and when * speak of
substance without matter * mean the essence (+?.-b+1). *t is the form of a substance that makes it the
kind of thin' that it is& and hence it is form that satisfies the condition initially reCuired for bein' the
substance o$ somethin'. The substance of a thin' is its form.
1. Substance and 2efinition
*n L.+? and ++& Aristotle returns to the consideration of essence and definition left off in L.9& but now
within the hylomorphic conte5t developed in L.:K=. The main Cuestion these chapters consider is
whether the definition of ever includes a reference to the matter of . *f some definitions include a
reference to matter& then the link between essence and form would seem to be weakened.
Aristotle be'ins L.+? by endorsin' the followin' principle about definitions and their parts4 a
definition is an account& and every account has parts& and part of the account stands to part of the thin'
in just the same way that the whole account stands to the whole thin' (+?.1b-?K--). That is& if y is a
part of a definable thin' & then the definition of will include as a part somethin' + that corresponds to
y. *ndeed& + must stand to y in the same relation that the definition of stands in to ! that is& + is the
definition of y. ,o& accordin' to this principle& the definition of a thin' will include the definitions of its
parts.
*n a way& this conseCuence of the principle seems very plausible& 'iven Aristotle$s idea that it is
universals that are definable (O.++& +?.9a-=). "onsider as a definiendum a universal& such as %an& and
its definiens& rational ani%al. The parts of this definiens are the universals rational and ani%al. *f these
parts are& in turn& definable& then each should be replaced& in the definition of %an& with its own
definition& and so on. *n this way the complete and adeCuate definition of a universal such as %an will
contain no parts that are further definable. All proper& or completely analyGed& definitions are ultimately
composed of simple terms that are not further definable.
But the implication of this idea for the definitions of hylomorphic compounds is obvious4 since matter
appears to be a part of such a compound& the definition of the compound will include& as a part& the
definitions of its material components. And this conseCuence seems implausible to Aristotle. A circle&
for e5ample& seems to be composed of two semicircles (for it obviously may be divided into two
semicircles)& but the definition of circle cannot be composed of the definitions of its two semicircular
parts. 2or& as Aristotle points out (+?.6b=)& se%icircle is defined in terms of circle& and not the other
way around. <is point is well taken& for if circles were defined in terms of semicircles& then presumably
semicircles would be defined in terms of the CuarterJcircles of which they are composed& and so on& ad
in$initu%. The resultin' infinite re'ress would make it impossible to define circle at all& for one would
never reach the ultimate simple parts of which such a definition would be composed.
Aristotle flirts with the idea of distin'uishin' between different senses in which one thin' can be a part
of another (+?.1b..)& but instead proposes a different solution4 to specify carefully the whole of which
the matter is alle'edly a part. The bronGe is part of the compound statue& but not of the statue spoken
of as form (+?.6a9). ,imilarly& the line when divided passes away into its halves& and the man into
bones and muscle and flesh& but it does not follow that they are composed of these as parts of their
essence (+?.6a+:K-?). /ather& it is not the substance but the compound that is divided into the body
and its parts as into matter (+?.6b-+K-).
*n restatin' his point yet more clearly (+?.6b1)& Aristotle notes parenthetically another important
aspect of his theory of substance. <e reiterates the priority of form& and its parts& to the matter into
which a compound is divided& and notes that the soul of animals (for this is the substance of livin'
thin's) is their substance (+?.6b+6). The idea recurs in L.++& where he announces that it is clear that
the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter (+?.:a6). *t is further developed& in the
Metaphysics& in L.+:& as we will see below& and especially in ,e *ni%a. 2or more detail on this topic&
see ,ection . of the entry on Aristotle$s psycholo'y.
/eturnin' now to the problem raised by the apparent need to refer to matter in the definition of a
substance& we may note that the solution Aristotle offered in L.+? is only partially successful. <is point
seems to be that whereas bronGe may be a part of a particular statue& neither that particular batch of
bronGe nor even bronGe in 'eneral enters into the essence of statue& since bein' made of bronGe is no
part of what it is to be a statue. But that is only because statues& althou'h they must be made of some
kind of matter& do not reCuire any particular kind of matter. But what about kinds of substances that do
reCuire particular kinds of matter8 Aristotle$s distinction between form and compound cannot be used
in such cases to isolate essence from matter. Thus there may after all be reasons for thinkin' that
reference to matter will have to intrude into at least some definitions.
*n L.++& Aristotle addresses just such a case (althou'h the passa'e is difficult and there is disa'reement
over its interpretation). The form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind&
Aristotle writes (+?.9b1). The point is not just that each particular man must be made of matter& but
that each one must be made of matter of a particular kind%flesh and bones& etc. ,ome thin's& he
continues& surely are a particular form in a particular matter (+?.9b-.)& so that it is not possible to
define them without reference to their material parts (+?.9b-;). Hevertheless& Aristotle ends L.++ as if
he has defended the claim that definition is of the form alone. 3erhaps his point is that whenever it is
essential to a substance that it be made of a certain kind of matter (e.'.& that man be made of flesh and
bones& or that a saw cannot be made of wool or wood& M.1& +?11a-;) this is in some sense a formal
or structural reCuirement. A kind of matter& after all& can itself be analyGed hylomorphically%bronGe&
for e5ample& is a mi5ture of copper and tin accordin' to a certain ratio or formula (lo"os)& which is in
turn predicated of some more 'eneric underlyin' subject. The reference to matter in a definition will
thus always be to a certain kind of matter& and hence to a predicate& rather than a subject. At any rate& if
by matter one has in mind the ultimate subject alluded to in L.. (soJcalled prime matter)& there will
be no reference to it in any definition& for this is indefinite (+?.:a-:).
L.+- introduces a new problem about definitions%the soJcalled unity of definition. The problem is
this4 definitions are comple5 (a definiens is always some combination of terms)& so what accounts for
the definiendum bein' one thin'& rather than many (+?.:b+?)8 Man& for e5ample& is defined as
rational ani%al! why is this one and not many%rational and ani%al8 (+?.:b+.K+1). 3resumably&
Aristotle has in mind his discussion in L.1 of such accidental unities as a pale man. The difference
cannot be that our lan'ua'e contains a sin'le word (man) for a rational animal& but no sin'le word for
a pale man& for Aristotle has already conceded (+?-=b-;) that we mi'ht very well have had a sin'le
term (he su''ests hi%ation& literally cloak) for a pale man& but that would still not make the formula
pale man a definition nor pale %an an essence (+?.?a-).
Aristotle proposes a solution that applies to definitions reached by the method of division. Accordin'
to this method (see Aristotle$s lo'ic)& one be'ins with the broadest 'enus containin' the species to be
defined& and divides the 'enus into two subJ'enera by means of some differentia. Bne then locates the
definiendum in one of the subJ'enera& and proceeds to divide this by another differentia& and so on&
until one arrives at the definiendum species. This is a classic definition by 'enus and differentia.
Aristotle$s proposal is that the division should be by the differentia of the differentia (+?.;a=). 2or
e5ample& if one uses the differentia $ooted to divide the 'enus ani%al& one then uses a differentia such
as cloven-$ooted for the ne5t division. *f one divides in this way& Aristotle claims& clearly the last (or
completin'& teleutaia) differentia will be the substance of the thin' and its definition (+?.;a+=). 2or
each differentia of a differentia entails its predecessor (bein' clovenJfooted entails bein' footed)& and
so the lon' chain of differentiae can be replaced simply by the last differentia. As Aristotle points out&
sayin' $ooted t(o-$ooted ani%al P is sayin' the same thin' more than once (+?.;a--K-1).
This proposal shows how a lon' strin' of differentiae in a definition can be reduced to one& but it does
not solve the problem of the unity of definition. 2or we are still faced with the apparent fact that 'enus
Q differentia constitutes a plurality even if the differentia is the last& or completin'& one. *t is not
surprisin'& then& that Aristotle returns to the problem of unity later (<.9) and offers a different solution.
13. Substances and 4ni5ersals
At this point& we seem to have a clear idea about the nature of substantial form as Aristotle conceives of
it. A substantial form is the essence of a substance& and it corresponds to a species. ,ince it is an
essence& a substantial form is what is denoted by the definiens of a definition. ,ince only universals are
definable& substantial forms are universals. That substantial forms are universals is confirmed by
Aristotle$s comment& at the end of L.;& that ,ocrates and "allias are different because of their matter
P but they are the same in form (+?.1a9K;). 2or them to be the same in form is for them to have the
same form& i.e.& for one and the same substantial form to be predicated of two different clumps of
matter. And bein' predicated of many is what makes somethin' a universal (,e .nterpretatione
+:a.:).
But L.+. throws our entire understandin' into disarray. Aristotle be'ins by returnin' to the candidates
for the title of ousia introduced in L..& and points out that havin' now discussed the claims of the
subject and the essence& it is time to consider the third candidate& the universal. But the remainder of
the chapter consists of a barra'e of ar'uments to the conclusion that universals are not substances.
O.+. therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle$s metaphysics that has fra'mented his
interpreters. ,ome maintain that Aristotle$s theory is ultimately inconsistent& on the 'rounds that it is
committed to all three of the followin' propositions4
(i) ,ubstance is form.
(ii) 2orm is universal.
(iii) Ho universal is a substance.
Bthers have provided interpretations accordin' to which Aristotle does not maintain all of (i)K(iii)& and
there is a considerable variety of such interpretations& too many to be canvassed here. But there are two
main& and opposed& lines of interpretation. Accordin' to one& Aristotle$s substantial forms are not
universals after all& but each belon's e5clusively to the particular whose form it is& and there are
therefore as many substantial forms of a 'iven kind as there are particulars of that kind. Accordin' to
the other& Aristotle$s ar'uments in L.+. are not intended to show that no universal is a substance& tout
court& but some weaker thesis that is compatible with there bein' only one substantial form for all of
the particulars belon'in' to the same species. 3roponents of particular forms (or essences) include
,ellars +=6:& <arter +=:6& <artman +=::& *rwin +=;;& 7itt +=;=b. Bpponents include 7oods +=9:&
Bwen +=:;& "ode +=;9& Fou5 +==+& Fewis +==+.
*t would be foolish to attempt to resolve this issue within the confines of the present entry& as it is
perhaps the lar'est& and most disputed& sin'le interpretative issue concernin' Aristotle$s Metaphysics. *
will& instead& mention some of the main considerations brou'ht up on each side of this dispute& and 'ive
my reasons for thinkin' that substantial forms are universals.
The idea that substantial forms are particulars is supported by Aristotle$s claims that a substance is
separate and some this (ch&riston kai tode ti& L..)& that there are no universals apart from their
particulars (O.+.)& and that universals are not substances (O.+.). Bn the other side& the idea that
substantial forms are universals is supported by Aristotle$s claims that substances are& par ecellence&
the definable entities (O.1)& that definition is of the universal (O.++)& and that it is impossible to define
particulars (O.+6).
*n my opinion& the indefinability of particulars makes it impossible for substantial forms to be
particulars. *f there were a substantial form that is uniCue to some sensible particular& say "allias& then
the definition correspondin' to that form& or essence& would apply uniCuely to "allias%it would define
him& which is precisely what Aristotle says cannot be done. The Cuestion& then& is whether the evidence
a'ainst substantial forms bein' universals can be countered. This is less clear& but the followin'
considerations are relevant. (+) Aristotle$s claim that a substantial form is an individual (tode ti) does
not e5clude its bein' a universal (katholou). @niversals are contrasted with particulars (kath# hekasta)&
not individuals (althou'h Aristotle does sometimes i'nore the distinction between tode ti and kath#
hekaston). 7hat makes somethin' a tode ti is its bein' a fully determinate thin'& not further
differentiable! what makes somethin' a kath# hekaston is its bein' a particular thin'& unrepeatable& and
not predicated of anythin' else. There is thus the possibility of a universal tode ti%a fully determinate
universal not further divisible into lowerJlevel universals& but predicated of numerous particulars. (-)
The claim that there are no universals apart from particulars needs to be understood in conte5t. 7hen
Aristotle asserts (+?.;b..) that there is no animal apart from the particulars (ta tina) he is just as
likely to be referrin' to the particular kinds of animals as he is to particular specimens. *f so& his point
may be that a 'eneric kind& such as animal& is ontolo'ically dependent on its species& and hence on the
substantial forms that are the essences of those species. (.) The ar'uments of L.+. a'ainst the
substantiality of universals are presented as part of a 'iveJandJtake investi'ation of the perple5ities
involved in the notion of substantial form. *t is not clear& therefore& whether the blanket claim Ho
universal is a substance is intended to be accepted without Cualification. *ndeed& a closer e5amination
of the ar'uments may show that Cualifications are reCuired if the ar'uments are to be co'ent. 2or
e5ample& the ar'ument at +?.;b++K+6 is based on the premise that the substance of is peculiar (idion)
to . *t then draws the conclusion that a universal cannot be the substance of all of its instances (for it
could not be idion to all of them)& and concludes that it must be the substance of none. But note that
this conclusion does not say that no universal can be a substance& but only that no universal can be the
substance of any of its instances (cf. "ode +=:;). Aristotle$s point may be that since form is predicated
of matter& a substantial form is predicated of various clumps of matter. But it is not the substance of
those clumps of matter& for it is predicated accidentally of them. The thin' with which it is uniCuely
correlated& and of which it is the substance& is not one of its instances& but is the substantial form itsel$.
This conclusion should not be surprisin' in li'ht of Aristotle$s claim in L.9 that each substance is one
and the same as its essence. A universal substantial form just is that essence.
11. Substance as Cause of eing
*n L.+: Aristotle proposes a new point of departure in his effort to say what sort of a thin' substance is.
The new idea is that a substance is a principle and a cause (arch' kai aitia& +?1+a=) of bein'. Before
lookin' at the details of his account& we will need to make a brief detour into Aristotle$s theory of
causes. The relevant te5ts are Physics **..& Posterior *nalytics **.++& and Metaphysics A.. and R.-. ,ee
also the entry on Aristotle$s natural philosophy and ,ection - of the entry on Aristotle$s psycholo'y.
The word aitia (cause or& perhaps better& e5planation)& Aristotle tells us& is said in many ways. *n
one sense& a cause is that out of which a thin' comes to be& and which persists! e.'.& bronGe& silver& and
the 'enus of these are causes of a statue or a bowl (Physics +=1b-1). A cause in this sense has been
traditionally called a %aterial cause& althou'h Aristotle himself did not use this label. *n a second sense&
a cause is the form P the account of the essence (+=1b-:)& traditionally called the $or%al cause. A
third sense& traditionally called the e$$icient cause& is the primary source of chan'e or rest (+=1b.?).
*n this sense& Aristotle says& an adviser is the cause of an action& a father is the cause of his child& and in
'eneral the producer is the cause of the product. 2ourth is what is traditionally called the $inal cause&
which Aristotle characteriGes as the end (telos)& that for which a thin' is done (+=1b..). *n this sense&
he says& health is the cause of walkin'& since we mi'ht e5plain a person$s walkin' by sayin' that he
walks in order to be healthy%health is what the walkin' is $or. Hote that& as in this case& thin's may
be causes of one another%hard work of fitness& and fitness of hard work%althou'h not in the same
sense4 fitness is what hard work is for& whereas hard work is principle of motion (+=6a+?). ,o hard
work is the efficient cause of fitness& since one becomes fit by means of hard work& while fitness is the
final cause of hard work& since one works hard in order to become fit.
Althou'h Aristotle is careful to distin'uish four different kinds of cause (or four different senses of
cause)& it is important to note that he claims that one and the same thin' can be a cause in more than
one sense. As he puts it& form& mover& and telos often coincide (+=;a-6). And in ,e *ni%a he is
perfectly e5plicit that the soul& which is the form or essence of a livin' thin'& is a cause in three of the
ways we have distin'uished (1+6b+?)%efficient& formal& and final.
Fet us return to Aristotle$s discussion in L.+:. The job of a cause or principle of bein'& he notes& is to
e5plain why one thin' belon's to another (+?1+a++)! that is& it is to e5plain some predicational fact.
7hat needs to be e5plained& for e5ample& is why this is a %an& or that is a house. But what kind of a
Cuestion is this8 The only thin' that can be a man is a man! the only thin' that can be a house is a
house. ,o we would appear to be askin' why a man is a man& or why a house is a house& and these
seem to be foolish Cuestions that all have the same answer4 because each thin' is itself (+?1+a+:K-?).
The Cuestions must therefore be rephrased by takin' advanta'e of the possibility of a hylomorphic
analysis. 7e must ask& e.'.& 7hy are these thin's& i.e.& bricks and stones& a house8 (+?1+a-9). The
answer Aristotle proposes is that the cause of bein' of a substance (e.'.& of a house) is the form or
essence that is predicated of the matter (e.'.& of the bricks and stones) that constitute that substance.
The essence is not always just a formal cause! in some cases& Aristotle says& it is also a final cause (he
'ives the e5amples of a house and a bed)& and in some cases an efficient cause (+?1+a-=K.?). But in
any case what we seek is the cause& i.e.& the form& by reason of which the matter is some definite
thin'! and this is the substance of the thin' (+?1+b9K=) and the primary cause of its bein'
(+?1+b-:).
Hotice that the e5planandum in these cases (why is this a man8 or why is that a house8) involves a
species predication ("allias is a man& 2allin'water is a house). But the answer Aristotle proposes
invokes a hylomorphic analysis of these Cuestions& in which form is predicated of matter. ,o "allias is
a man because the form or essence of man is present in the flesh and bones that constitute the body of
"allias! 2allin'water is a house because the form of house is present in the materials of which
2allin'water is made. *n 'eneral& a species predication is e5plained in terms of an underlyin' form
predication& whose subject is not the particular compound but its matter. 2orm predications are thus
more basic than their correspondin' species predications. A substantial form& as a primary definable& is
its own substance& for it is essentially predicated of itself alone. But the substantial form of a material
compound& because it is predicated (accidentally) of the matter of the compound& is the cause of the
compound$s bein' the kind of thin' that it is. The form is therefore& in a derivative way& the substance
of the compound& as well.
12. Actuality and %otentiality
*n Metaphysics L& Aristotle introduces the distinction between matter and form synchronically&
applyin' it to an individual substance at a particular time. The matter of a substance is the stuff it is
composed of! the form is the way that stuff is put to'ether so that the whole it constitutes can perform
its characteristic functions. But soon he be'ins to apply the distinction diachronically& across time. This
connects the matterSform distinction to another key Aristotelian distinction& that between potentiality
(duna%is) and actuality (entelecheia or ener"eia). This distinction is the main topic of Book N.
Aristotle distin'uishes between two different senses of the term duna%is. *n the strictest sense& a
duna%is is the po(er that a thin' has to produce a chan'e. A thin' has a duna%is in this sense when it
has within it a source of chan'e in somethin' else (or in itself Cua other) (N.+& +?19a+-! cf. R.+-).
The e5ercise of such a power is a kin'sis%a movement or process. ,o& for e5ample& the housebuilder$s
craft is a power whose e5ercise is the process of housebuildin'. But there is a second sense of duna%is
%and it is the one in which Aristotle is mainly interested%that mi'ht be better translated as
potentiality. 2or& as Aristotle tells us& in this sense duna%is is related not to movement (kin'sis) but to
actuality (ener"eia)(N.9& +?1;a-6). A duna%is in this sense is not a thin'$s power to produce a chan'e
but rather its capacity to be in a different and more completed state. Aristotle thinks that potentiality so
understood is indefinable (+?1;a.:)& claimin' that the 'eneral idea can be 'rasped from a consideration
of cases. Actuality is to potentiality& Aristotle tells us& as someone wakin' is to someone sleepin'& as
someone seein' is to a si'hted person with his eyes closed& as that which has been shaped out of some
matter is to the matter from which it has been shaped (+?1;b+K.).
This last illustration is particularly illuminatin'. "onsider& for e5ample& a piece of wood& which can be
carved or shaped into a table or into a bowl. *n Aristotle$s terminolo'y& the wood has (at least) two
different potentialities& since it is potentially a table and also potentially a bowl. The matter (in this
case& wood) is linked with potentialty! the substance (in this case& the table or the bowl) is linked with
actuality. The as yet uncarved wood is only potentially a table& and so it mi'ht seem that once it is
carved the wood is actually a table. 3erhaps this is what Aristotle means& but it is possible that he does
not wish to consider the wood to be a table. <is idea mi'ht be that not only can a piece of raw wood in
the carpenter$s workshop be considered a potential table (since it can be transformed into one)& but the
wood composin' the completed table is also& in a sense& a potential table. The idea here is that it is not
the wood Cua wood that is actually a table& but the wood Cua table. "onsidered as matter& it remains
only potentially the thin' that it is the matter of. (A contemporary philosopher mi'ht make this point by
refusin' to identify the wood with the table& sayin' instead that the wood only constitutes the table and
is not identical to the table it constitutes.)
,ince Aristotle 'ives form priority over matter& we would e5pect him similarly to 'ive actuality priority
over potentiality. And that is e5actly what we find (N.;& +?1=b1K6). Aristotle distin'uishes between
priority in lo"os (account or definition)& in time& and in substance. (+) Actuality is prior in lo"os since
we must cite the actuality when we 'ive an account of its correspondin' potentiality. Thus& visible
means capable of bein" seen! buildable means capable of bein" built(+?1=b+1K+9). (-) As re'ards
temporal priority& by contrast& potentiality may well seem to be prior to actuality& since the wood
precedes the table that is built from it& and the acorn precedes the oak that it 'rows into. Hevertheless&
Aristotle finds that even temporally there is a sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality4 the
actual which is identical in species thou'h not in number with a potentially e5istin' thin' is prior to it
(+?1=b+;K+=). A particular acorn is& of course& temporally prior to the particular oak tree that it 'rows
into& but it is preceded in time by the actual oak tree that produced it& with which it is identical in
species. The seed (potential substance) must have been preceded by an adult (actual substance). ,o in
this sense actuality is prior even in time.
(.) Aristotle ar'ues for the priority in substance of actuality over potentiality in two ways. (a) The first
ar'ument makes use of his notion of final causality. Thin's that come to be move toward an end (telos)
%the boy becomes a man& the acorn becomes an oak%and the actuality is the end& and it is for the
sake of this that the potentiality is acCuired ... animals do not see in order that they may have si'ht& but
they have si'ht that they may see ... matter e5ists in a potential state& just because it may come to its
form! and when it e5ists actually& then it is in its form (+?6?a=K+:). 2orm or actuality is the end
toward which natural processes are directed. Actuality is therefore a cause in more than one sense of a
thin'$s realiGin' its potential. As we noted in ,ection ++& one and the same thin' may be the final&
formal& and efficient cause of another. ,uppose an acorn realiGes its potential to become an oak tree.
The efficient cause here is the actual oak tree that produced the acorn! the formal cause is the lo"os
definin' that actuality! the final cause is the telos toward which the acorn develops%an actual (mature)
oak tree.
(b) Aristotle also offers (+?6?b9K+?6+a-) an even stricter ar'ument for his claim that actuality is
prior in substance to potentiality. A potentiality is for either of a pair of opposites! so anythin' that is
capable of bein' is also capable of not bein'. 7hat is capable of not bein' mi'ht possibly not be& and
what mi'ht possibly not be is perishable. <ence anythin' with the mere potentiality to be is perishable.
7hat is eternal is imperishable& and so nothin' that is eternal can e5ist only potentially%what is
eternal must be fully actual. But the eternal is prior in substance to the perishable. 2or the eternal can
e5ist without the perishable& but not conversely& and that is what priority in substance amounts to (cf.
R.++& +?+=a-). ,o what is actual is prior in substance to what is potential.
13. 4nity Reconsidered
*n M.9& Aristotle returns to the problem of the unity of definition (discussed above in ,ection =) and
offers a new solution based on the concepts of potentiality and actuality. <e be'ins by pointin' out
(recallin' the lan'ua'e of L.+:) that the thin's whose unity he is tryin' to e5plain are those which
have several parts and in which the totality is not& as it were& a mere heap& but the whole is somethin'
besides the parts (+?16a;K+?). <is task is to e5plain the unity of such comple5es.
The problem is insoluble& he says& unless one realiGes that one element is matter and another is form&
and one is potentially and the other is actually. Bnce one realiGes this& the Cuestion will no lon'er be
thou'ht a difficulty (+?16a-?K-6). <e offers the followin' e5ample (+?16a-9K.6). ,uppose round
bron+e were the definition of cloak. *f someone were to ask what makes a cloak one thin'& a unity8
the answer would be obvious. 2or bronGe is the matter& and roundness is the form. The bronGe is
potentially round& and round is what the bronGe actually is when it has received this form. The cause of
the unity of the cloak (in this sense of cloak) is just the cause of bronGe bein' made round. ,ince the
cloak is somethin' that was produced& or brou'ht into bein'& there is no cause of its unity other than the
a'ent who put the form into the matter. BronGe (the matter) is a potential sphere& and the cloak is an
actual sphere. But round bron+e is eCually the essence of both the actual sphere and the potential one.
The bronGe and the roundness are not two separate thin's. The bronGe is potentially a sphere& and when
it is made round it constitutes an actual one%a sin'le sphere of bronGe.
*t is easy to see how this hylomorphic analysis e5plains the unity of a substantial material particular&
since neither the matter nor the form of such a particular is by itself a sin'le material individual& and it
is only when they are taken to'ether that they constitute such an individual. But the problem Aristotle is
tryin' to solve concerns the unity of the thin' whose account we call a definition (O.+-& +?.:b++).
And since proper definables are universals& it remains to be seen how the proposed solution applies to
them. After all& universals are not material objects& and so it is not clear how they can be viewed as
hylomorphic compounds. But Aristotle has at his disposal a concept that can fill this bill perfectly& viG.&
the concept of intelli'ible matter (hul' no't'). (The main purpose of intelli'ible matter is to provide
somethin' CuasiJmaterial for pure 'eometrical objects that are not realiGed in bronGe or stone& for
e5ample& to be made of.) ,o * surmise that it is for this reason that Aristotle 'oes on (+?16a..) to
introduce matter into the current conte5t. *f this is so& we may conclude that the material component in
the definition of a species is intelli'ible matter. #lsewhere& he e5plicitly describes 'enus as matter4 the
'enus is the matter of that of which it is called the 'enus (*.;& +?6;a-.). ,o a species too& althou'h it
is not itself a material object& can be considered a hylomorphic compound. *ts matter is its 'enus& which
is only potentially the species defined! its differentia is the form that actualiGes the matter. The 'enus
does not actually e5ist independently of its species any more than bronGe e5ists apart from all form.
The 'enus ani%al& for e5ample& is just that which is potentially some specific kind of animal or other.
Aristotle concludes (+?16b+:K-+) that the pro5imate matter and the form are one and the same thin'&
the one potentially& and the other actually ... the potential and the actual are somehow one.
This solution& of course& applies only to hylomorphic compounds. But that is all it needs to do&
accordin' to Aristotle. 2or he ends the chapter by claimin' that the problem of unity does not arise for
other kinds of compounds. All thin's which have no matter are without Cualification essentially
unities (+?16b-.).
1". 6lossary of Aristotelian Ter$inology
accident4 su%beb'kos
accidental4 kata su%beb'kos
account4 lo"os
actuality4 ener"eia& entelecheia
alteration4 alloi&sis
affirmative4 kataphatikos
assertion4 apophansis (sentence with a truth value& declarative sentence)
assumption4 hupothesis
attribute4 pathos
a5iom4 aio%a
be4 einai
bein'(s)4 on& onta
belon'4 huparchein
cate'ory4 kat'"oria
cause4 aition& aitia
chan'e4 kin'sis& %etabol'
come to be4 "i"nesthai
comin' to be4 "enesis
contradict4 antiphanai
contradiction4 antiphasis (in the sense contradictory pair of propositions and also in the sense
denial of a proposition)
contrary4 enantion
definition4 horos& horis%os
demonstration4 apodeiis
denial (of a proposition)4 apophasis
dialectic4 dialektik'
differentia4 diaphora! specific difference& eidopoios diaphora
distinctive4 idios& idion
end4 telos
essence4 to ti 'n einai& to ti esti
essential4 en t&i ti esti& en t&i ti 'n einai (of predications)! kath# hauto (of attributes)
e5ist4 einai
e5planation4 aition& aitia
final cause4 hou heneka (literally& what somethin' is for)
form4 eidos& %orph'
formula4 lo"os
function4 er"on
'enus4 "enos
homonymous4 ho%&nu%on
immediate4 a%esos
impossible4 adunaton
in respect of itself4 kath# hauto
individual4 ato%on& tode ti
induction4 epa"&"'
infinite4 apeiron
kind4 "enos& eidos
knowled'e4 epist'%'
matter4 hul'
movement4 kin'sis
nature4 phusis
ne'ation (of a term)4 apophasis
particular4 en %erei& epi %eros (of a proposition)! kath/hekaston (of individuals)
peculiar4 idios& idion
per se4 kath# hauto
perception4 aisth'sis
perple5ity4 aporia
possible4 dunaton& endecho%enon! endechesthai (verb4 be possible)
potentially4 duna%ei
potentiality4 duna%is
predicate4 kat'"orein (verb)! kat'e"orou%enon(what is predicated)
predication4 kat'"oria (act or instance of predicatin'& type of predication)
principle4 arch' (startin' point of a demonstration)
Cua4 h'i
Cuality4 poion
Cuantity4 poson
refute4 elenchein! refutation& elenchos
separate4 ch&riston
said in many ways4 pollach&s le"etai
science4 epist'%'
soul4 psuch'
species4 eidos
specific4 eidopoios (of a differentia that makes a species& eidopoios diaphora)
subject4 hupokei%enon
substance4 ousia
term4 horos
this4 tode ti
universal4 katholou (both of propositions and of individuals)
wisdom4 sophia
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KKK& -??6a& Myles Burnyeat$s Map of Metaphysics Oeta& Philosophical <uarterly& 664 ++1K
+-+.
KKK& -??6b& Aristotle$s Metaphysics /econsidered& Journal o$ the 7istory o$ Philosophy& 1.4
--.K-6+.
KKK& -??9& "ommentary on Modrak& Proceedin"s o$ the 4oston *rea !olloAuiu% in *ncient
Philosophy& --4 +.9K+1-.
Aotthelf& Allan& +===& A Biolo'ical 3rovenance& Philosophical Studies& =14 .6K69.
Araham& >. 7.& +=;:a& The 3arado5 of 3rime Matter& Journal o$ the 7istory o$ Philosophy&
-64 1:6K1=?.
KKK& +=;:b& *ristotle/s )(o Syste%s& B5ford4 B5ford @niversity 3ress.
Aran'er& <.& +=;?& A >efense of the Traditional 3osition concernin' Aristotle$s nonJsubstantial
3articulars& !anadian Journal o$ Philosophy& +?4 6=.K9?9.
KKK& +=;1& Aristotle on Aenus and >ifferentia& Journal o$ the 7istory o$ Philosophy& --4 +K
-1.
KKK& +=;=& Aristotle$s Hatural Xinds& Philosophy& 914 -16K-1:.
Arene& M.& +=:1& *s Aenus to ,pecies as Matter to 2orm8 Aristotle and Ta5onomy& SynthBse&
-;4 6+K9=.
Arice& <. 3.& +=;;& Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Bein'& Paci$ic Philosophical <uarterly& 9=4
+:6K-??.
<alper& #.& +=;:& A ,olution to the 3roblem of ,ensible ,ubstance& Journal o$ Philosophy& ;14
999K9:-.
KKK& +=;=& One and Many in *ristotle/s Metaphysics, the !entral 4ooks& "olumbus4 Bhio ,tate
@niversity 3ress.
KKK& +=:6& Aristotle on 3rimary ousia& *rchiv $Hr 8eschichte der Philosophie& 6:4 +K-?.
<artman& #dwin& +=:9& Aristotle on the *dentity of ,ubstance and #ssence& Philosophical
3evie(& ;64 616K69+.
KKK& +=::& Substance, 4ody, and Soul0 *ristotelian .nvesti"ations& 3rinceton4 3rinceton
@niversity 3ress.
<aslan'er& ,ally& +==1& 3arts& "ompounds& and ,ubstantial @nity& in ,caltsas& "harles& and
Aill +==1& pp. +-=K+:?.
<einaman& /.& +=;+a& HonJsubstantial *ndividuals in the !ate"ories& Phronesis& -94 -=6K.?:.
KKK& +=;+b& Xnowled'e of ,ubstance in Aristotle& Journal o$ 7ellenic Studies& +?+4 9.K::.
KKK& +==:& 2rede and 3atGi' on >efinition in Metaphysics L.+? and ++& Phronesis& 1-4 -;.K
-=;.
<enni'& Boris& -??;& Matter in O.& Foundations o$ Science& +. (.K1)4 +==K-+6.
<enry& >evin& -?++& Aristotle$s 3luralistic /ealism& )he Monist& =1 (-)4 +=:K--?.
<etherin'ton& ,.".& +=;1& A Hote on *nherence& *ncient Philosophy& 14 -+;K--..
*de& <arry A.& +==-& ,una%is in Metaphysics *\& *peiron& -64 +K-9.
*rwin& T. <.& +=;+& <omonymy in Aristotle& 3evie( o$ Metaphysics& .14 6-.K611.
KKK& +=;;& *ristotle/s First Principles& B5ford4 "larendon 3ress.
Tones& B.& +=:-& *ndividuals in Aristotle$s !ate"ories& Phronesis& +:4 +?:K+-..
KKK& +=:6& An *ntroduction to the first five chapters of Aristotle$s !ate"ories& Phronesis& -?4
+19K+:-.
Xirwan& ". A.& +=:?& <ow ,tron' are the Bbjections to #ssence8 Proceedin"s o$ the
*ristotelian Society& :+4 1.K6=.
KKK& +=:+& *ristotle0 Metaphysics 4ooks 8a%%a, ,elta, and 1psilon& B5ford4 "larendon 3ress.
Xohl& Markus& -??;& ,ubstancehood and ,ubjecthood in Aristotle$s "ate'ories& Phronesis&
6. (-)4 +6-K+:=.
Xoslicki& Xathrin& -??9& Aristotle$s Mereolo'y and the ,tatus of 2orm& Journal o$ Philosophy&
+?. (+-)4 :+6K:.9.
Xosman& F. A.& +=;1& ,ubstance& Bein'& and #ner'eia& O$ord Studies in *ncient Philosophy&
-4 +-+K+1=
KKK& +==1& The Activity of Bein' in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& in ,caltsas& "harles& and Aill
+==1& pp. +=6K-+..
KKK& +===& Aristotelian Metaphysics and Biolo'y4 2urth$s Substance, For% and Psyche&
Philosophical Studies& =14 6:K9;.
Xun'& Toan& +=::& Aristotelian #ssence and #5planation& Philosophical Studies& .+4 .9+K.;..
KKK& +=:;& "an ,ubstance be 3redicated of Matter8 *rchiv $Hr 8eschichte der Philosophie&
9?4 +1?K+6=.
KKK& +=;9& Aristotle on Bein' is ,aid in Many 7ays& 7istory o$ Philosophy <uarterly& .4 .K
+;.
Facey& A. /.& +=96& Ousia and 2orm in Aristotle& Phronesis& +?4 61K9=.
Fear& Tonathan& +=;;& *ristotle0 the ,esire to Gnderstand& "ambrid'e4 "ambrid'e @niversity
3ress.
FeBlond& T. M.& +=:=& Aristotle on >efinition& in Barnes& ,chofield& and ,orabji +=:=& pp. 9.K
:=.
Fesher& Tames <.& +=:+& Aristotle on 2orm& ,ubstance& and @niversals4 a >ilemma& Phronesis&
+94 +9=K+:;.
Fewis& 2rank A.& +=;-& Accidental ,ameness in Aristotle& Philosophical Studies& .=4 +K.9.
KKK& +=;.& 2orm and 3redication in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& in Bo'en and McAuire +=;6& pp.
6=K;..
KKK& +=;1& 7hat is Aristotle$s Theory of #ssence8 !anadian Journal o$ Philosophy& ,uppl.
Uol. +?4 ;=K+.-.
KKK& +==+& Substance and Predication in *ristotle& "ambrid'e4 "ambrid'e @niversity 3ress.
KKK& +==1& Aristotle on the /elation between a Thin' and its Matter& in ,caltsas& "harles& and
Aill +==1& pp. -1:K::.
KKK& +==6a& Aristotle on the @nity of ,ubstance& Paci$ic Philosophical <uarterly& :94 ---K
-96.
KKK& +==6b& ,ymposium on ,ubstance& 3redication& and @nity in Aristotle& *ncient
Philosophy& +64 6-+K61=.
KKK& -??.& 2riend or 2oe8 ,ome #ncounters with 3lato in Aristotle$s Metaphysics Oeta&
Modern School%an& ;?4 .96K.=?.
KKK& -??6& A Hose by Any Bther Hame4 ,ameness& ,ubstitution& and #ssence in Aristotle$s
Metaphysics L6& O$ord Studies in *ncient Philosophy& -;4 +9+K+==.
KKK& -??=& 2orm and Matter& in Ana'nostopoulos -??=& pp. +9-K+;6.
Floyd& A. ".& +=:?& Aristotle$s 3rinciple of *ndividuation& Mind& :=4 6+=K6-=.
KKK& +=;+& For% and Gniversal in *ristotle& Fiverpool4 2. "airns.
Fou5& Michael T.& +=:=& 2orm& ,pecies& and 3redication in Metaphysics L& M& and N& Mind&
;;4 +K-..
KKK& +==+& Pri%ary Ousia0 *n 1ssay on *ristotle/s Metaphysics = and >& *thaca& HY4 "ornell
@niversity 3ress.
KKK& +==6a& ,ymposium on Aristotle$s Metaphysics& *ncient Philosophy& +64 1=6K6+?.
KKK& +==6b& "omposition and @nity4 An #5amination of Metaphysics M.9& *n May ,im (ed.)&
)he !rossroads o$ 5or% and 5ature. Fanham& M>4 /owman and Fittlefield.
KKK& -??.& Aristotle4 Metaphysics& in )he 4lack(ell 8uide to *ncient Philosophy& ". ,hields
(ed.)& Malden MA4 Blackwell 3ublishin'& pp. +9.K+;..
KKK& -??6& Aristotle on Matter& 2orm& and Bntolo'ical ,trate'y& *ncient Philosophy& -64 ;+K
+-..
KKK& -??=& Aristotle on @niversals& in Ana'nostopoulos -??=& pp. +;9K+=9.
MacXinnon& >. M.& +=96& Aristotle$s "onception of ,ubstance& in Bambrou'h +=96& pp. =:K
++=.
Makin& ,tephen& -??1& 7hat >oes Aristotle Mean by 3riority in ,ubstance8 O$ord Studies in
*ncient Philosophy& -14 -?=K-.;.
Malcolm& Tohn& +==.& Bn the #ndan'ered ,pecies of the Metaphysics& *ncient Philosophy&
+.4 :=K=..
KKK& +==9& Bn the >uality of 1idos in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& *rchiv $Hr 8eschichte der
Philosophie& :;4 +K+?.
Mansion& ,.& +=:=& The Bntolo'ical "omposition of ,ensible ,ubstances in Aristotle
(Metaphysics U**& :K=)& in Barnes& ,chofield& and ,orabji +=:=& pp. ;?K;:.
Matthen& Mohan (ed.)& +=;:a& *ristotle )oday0 1ssays on *ristotle/s .deal o$ Science&
#dmonton4 Academic 3rintin' and 3ublishin'.
KKK& +=;:b& *ndividual ,ubstances as <ylomorphic "omple5es& in Matthen +=;:a& pp. +6+K
+:9.
Matthews& Aareth B.& +=;-& Accidental @nities& in Can"ua"e and Co"os0 Studies in *ncient
8reek Philosophy& M. ,chofield and M. ". Hussbaum (eds.)& "ambrid'e4 "ambrid'e @niversity
3ress& pp. --.K-1?.
KKK& +=;9& Aender and #ssence in Aristotle& in 6o%en and Philosophy& T. F. Thompson (ed.)&
supplement to *ustralasian Journal o$ Philosophy& 914 +9K-6.
KKK& +=;=& The #ni'ma of !ate"ories la-?ff and 7hy it Matters& *peiron& --4 =+K+?1.
KKK& +==?& Aristotelian #ssentialism& Philosophy and Pheno%enolo"ical 3esearch& ,uppl. 6?4
-6+K-9-.
KKK& +==+& "ontainer Metaphysics Accordin' to Aristotle$s Areek "ommentators& !anadian
Journal o$ Philosophy& ,upp. vol. +:4 :K-..
KKK& -??=& Aristotelian "ate'ories& in Ana'nostopoulos -??=& pp. +11K+9+.
Matthews& Aareth B. and ,. Marc "ohen& +=9;& The Bne and the Many& 3evie( o$
Metaphysics& -+4 9.?K966.
Menn& ,tephen& +==1& The Bri'ins of Aristotle$s "oncept of ener"eia& *ncient Philosophy& +14
:.K++1.
KKK& -??+& Metaphysics @ +?K+9 and the Ar'umentJ,tructure of Metaphysics @& O$ord
Studies in *ncient Philosophy& -+4 ;.K+.1.
KKK& -?++& Bn Myles Burnyeat$s Map of Metaphysics Oeta& *ncient Philosophy& .+ (+)4
+9+K-?-.
Miller& 2. >.& +=:;& Aristotle$s @se of Matter& *n ,immons +=:;& pp. +?6K++=.
Modrak& >eborah X.& +=:=& 2orms& Types& and Tokens in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& Journal o$
the 7istory o$ Philosophy& +:4 .:+K.;+.
KKK& +=;.& 2orms and "ompounds& in Bo'en and McAuire +=;6& pp. ;6K==.
KKK& +=;=& Aristotle on the difference between Mathematics and 3hysics and 2irst 3hilosophy&
*peiron& --4 +-+K+.=.
KKK& -??9& 2orm and 2unction& Proceedin"s o$ the 4oston *rea !olloAuiu% in *ncient
Philosophy& --4 +++K+.6.
Moravcsik& T. M. #.& +=9:& Aristotle on 3redication& Philosophical 3evie(& :94 ;?K=9.
KKK& +==1& #ssences& 3owers& and Aeneric 3ropositions& in ,caltsas& "harles& and Aill +==1&
pp. --=K-11.
KKK& +=;6b& ,eparation in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& O$ord Studies in *ncient Philosophy& .4
+-6K+6:.
KKK& +=;6c& ,eparation4 a /eply to 2ine& O$ord Studies in *ncient Philosophy& .4 +9:K+:..
KKK& +==.& The 3lace of @nity in Aristotle$s Metaphysical 3roject& Proceedin"s o$ the 4oston
*rea !olloAuiu% in *ncient Philosophy& =4 +.+K+69.
Moser& 3.& +=;.& Two Hotions of ,ubstance in Metaphysics L& *peiron& +:4 +?.K++-.
B$Meara& >. T. (ed.)& +=;+& Studies in *ristotle& 7ashin'ton4 "atholic @niversity 3ress.
Bwen& A. #. F.& +=96a& *nherence& Phronesis& +?4 =:K+?6.
KKK& +=96b& Aristotle on the ,nares of Bntolo'y& in Bambrou'h +=96& pp. 9=K=6.
KKK& +=96c& The 3latonism of Aristotle& Proceedin"s o$ the 4ritish *cade%y 6? +-6K+6?!
reprinted in Barnes& ,chofield& and ,orabji +=:6& pp. +1K.1.
KKK& +=:;& 3articular and Aeneral& Proceedin"s o$ the *ristotelian Society& :=4 +K-+.
Bwens& Toseph& +=:;& )he ,octrine o$ 4ein" in the *ristotelian Metaphysics& .d ed.& rev.&
Toronto4 3ontifical *nstitute of Mediaeval ,tudies.
3a'e& ".& +=;6& 3redicatin' 2orms of Matter in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& 3evie( o$
Metaphysics& .=4 6:K;-.
3anayides& "hristos& +===& Aristotle on the 3riority of Actuality in ,ubstance& *ncient
Philosophy& +=4 .-:K.11.
3elletier& 2. T.& +=:=& ,ameness and /eferential Bpacity in Aristotle& 5o?s& +.4 -;.K.++.
3ena& ForenGo& +===& The "oe5istence of "ontradictory 3roperties in the ,ame ,ubject
Accordin' to Aristotle& *peiron& .-4 -?.K--=.
3erin& "asey& -??:& ,ubstantial @niversals in Aristotle$s !ate"ories& O$ord Studies in
*ncient Philosophy& ..4 +-6K+1..
/eeve& ". >. ".& -???& Substantial 2no(led"e0 *ristotle/s Metaphysics& *ndianapolis4 <ackett.
/e'is& #.& +=:9& Aristotle$s 3rinciple of *ndividuation& Phronesis& -+4 +6:K+99.
/obinson& <. M.& +=:1& 3rime Matter in Aristotle& Phronesis& +=4 +9;K+;;.
/orty& /ichard& +=:.& Aenus as Matter4 a /eadin' of Metaphysics LJ<& in Fee& Mourelatos&
and /orty (eds.) 1e"esis and *r"u%ent& Phronesis& ,uppl. +& Assen4 Uan Aorcum. .=.K1-?.
KKK& +=:1& Matter as Aoo4 "omments on Arene$s 3aper& SynthBse& -;4 :+K::.
/oss& 7. >.& +=-1& *ristotle/s Metaphysics& B5ford4 "larendon 3ress.
,caltsas& T.& +=;6& ,ubstratum& ,ubject& and ,ubstance& *ncient Philosophy& 64 -+6K1?.
KKK& +==1a& Substances and Gniversals in *ristotle/s Metaphysics& *thaca4 "ornell @niversity
3ress.
KKK& +==1b& ,ubstantial <olism& in ,caltsas& "harles& and Aill +==1& pp. +?:K+-;
,caltsas& T.& >. "harles& and M. F. Aill (eds.)& +==1& Gnity, .dentity, and 1planation in
*ristotle/s Metaphysics& B5ford4 B5ford @niversity 3ress.
,chofield& M.& +=:-& Metaphysics L.4 ,ome ,u''estions& Phronesis& +:4 =:K+?+.
,ellars& 7ilfrid& +=6:& ,ubstance and 2orm in Aristotle& Journal o$ Philosophy& 614 9;;K9==.
,hields& ".& +==?& The Aeneration of 2orm in Aristotle& 7istory o$ Philosophy <uarterly& :4
.9:K.=?.
KKK& -??;& ,ubstance and Fife in Aristotle& *peiron& 1+ (.)4 +-=K+6+.
,immons& A. ". (ed.)& +=:;& Paideia0 Special *ristotle .ssue& Brockport& HY.
,mith& T. A.& +=-+& )ode ti in Aristotle& !lassical 3evie(& .64 +=.
,pellman& Fynne& +=;=& ,pecimens of Hatural Xinds and the Apparent *nconsistency of
Metaphysics L& *ncient Philosophy& =4 1=K96.
KKK& +==6& Substance and Separation in *ristotle, "ambrid'e4 "ambrid'e @niversity 3ress.
,tahl& >.& +=;+& ,tripped Away4 ,ome "ontemporary Bbscurities ,urroundin' Metaphysics L.
(+?-=a+?K-9)& Phronesis& -94 +::K+;?.
,tou'h& ". F.& +=:-& Fan'ua'e and Bntolo'y in Aristotle$s !ate"ories& Journal o$ the 7istory
o$ Philosophy& +?4 -9+K-:-.
,tudtmann& 3aul& -??;& Bn the several ,enses of 2orm in Aristotle& *peiron& 1+ (.)4 +K-9.
KKK& -?++& Aristotle$s #arly and Fate Bntolo'ies& Philosophy !o%pass& 9 (:)4 19=K1:9.
,ykes& /. >.& +=:6& 2orm in Aristotle4 @niversal or 3articular8 Philosophy& 6?4 .++K..+.
Teloh& <.& +=:=& Aristotle$s Metaphysics O.+.& !anadian Journal o$ Philosophy& 64 ::K:=.
Thorp& T. 7.& +=:1& Aristotle$s @se of !ate"ories& Phronesis& +=4 -.;K-69.
Tweedale& M.& +=;:& Aristotle$s @niversals& *ustralasian Journal o$ Philosophy& 964 1+-K1-9.
KKK& +=;;& Aristotle$s /ealism& !anadian Journal o$ Philosophy& +;4 6?+K6-9.
Uerbeke& A.& +=;+& Aristotle$s Metaphysics viewed by the Ancient Areek "ommentators& in
B$Meara +=;+& pp. +?:K+-:.
7edin& Michael U.& +==+& 3A/Tisanship in Metaphysics O& *ncient Philosophy& ++4 .9+K.;6.
KKK& +==.& Honsubstantial *ndividuals& Phronesis& .;4 +.:K+96.
KKK& +===& The ,cope of HonJ"ontradiction4 A Hote on Aristotle$s #lenctic 3roof in
Metaphysics Aamma 1& *peiron& .-4 -.+K-1-.
KKK& -???& *ristotle/s )heory o$ Substance0 )he "ate'ories and Metaphysics @eta& B5ford4
B5ford @niversity 3ress.
KKK& -??=& The ,cience and A5ioms of Bein'& in Ana'nostopoulos -??=& pp. +-6K+1..
7heeler& Mark& +===& The 3ossibility of /ecurrent *ndividuals in Aristotle$s Or"anon&
8re"orianu%& ;?4 6.=K66+.
7heeler& ,.& +=::. The Theory of Matter from Metaphysics L& M& N& .nternational Studies in
Philosophy& +.K--.
7hite& Hicholas 3.& +=:-& The Bri'ins of Aristotle$s #ssentialism& 3evie( o$ Metaphysics& -94
6:K;6.
KKK& +=;9& *dentity& Modal *ndividuation& and Matter in Aristotle& Mid(est Studies in
Philosophy& ++4 1:6K1=1.
7hitin'& T. #.& +=;9& 2orm and *ndividuation in Aristotle& 7istory o$ Philosophy <uarterly& .4
.6=K.::.
KKK& +==+& Metasubstance4 "ritical Hotice of 2redeJ3atGi' and 2urth& Philosophical 3evie(&
+??4 9?:K9.=.
7illiams& >. ".& +=6;& 2orm and Matter& Philosophical 3evie(& 9:4 -=+K.+-& 1==K6-+.
7itt& "harlotte& +=;:& <ylomorphism in Aristotle& Journal o$ Philosophy& ;14 9:.K9:=.
KKK& +=;=a& <ylomorphism in Aristotle& *peiron& --4 +1+K+6;.
KKK& +=;=b& Aristotelian #ssentialism /evisited& Journal o$ the 7istory o$ Philosophy& -:4
-;6K-=;.
KKK& +=;=c& Substance and 1ssence in *ristotle0 an .nterpretation o$ Metaphysics 9..-.I&
*thaca& HY4 "ornell @niversity 3ress.
KKK& +==1& The 3riority of Actuality in Aristotle& in ,caltsas& "harles& and Aill +==1& pp. -+6K
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KKK& -??.& 6ays o$ 4ein"0 Potentiality and *ctuality in *ristotle/s Metaphysics, *thaca& HY4
"ornell @niversity 3ress.
7oods& Michael& +=9:& 3roblems in Metaphysics L& "hapter +.&! in T. Moravcsik (ed.)&
*ristotle0 * !ollection o$ !ritical 1ssays& Hew York4 Anchor& pp. -+6K-.;.
KKK& +=:1& ,ubstance and #ssence in Aristotle& Proceedin"s o$ the *ristotelian Society& :64
+9:K+;?.
KKK& +==+a& 3articular 2orms /evisited& Phronesis& -94 :6K;:.
KKK& +==+b& @niversals and 3articular 2orms in Aristotle$s Metaphysics& O$ord Studies in
*ncient Philosophy& ,uppl. Uol.4 *ristotle and the Cater )radition& 1+K69.
KKK& +==.& 2orm& ,pecies& and 3redication in Aristotle& SynthBse& =94 .==K1+6.
KKK& +==1& The #ssence of a <uman Bein' and the *ndividual ,oul in Metaphysics = and > &
in ,caltsas& "harles& and Aill +==1& pp. -:=K-=?.
Yu& Tiyuan& +==:& Two "onceptions of <ylomorphism in Metaphysics LMN& O$ord Studies
in *ncient Philosophy& +64 ++=K16.
KKK& -??+a& The *dentity of 2orm and #ssence in Aristotle& Southern Journal o$ Philosophy&
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KKK& -??+b& 7hat is the 2ocal Meanin' of Bein' in Aristotle8 *peiron& .14 -?6K-.+.
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Ac9no:ledg$ents
* am 'rateful to *stvVn Bodnar for his help in clarifyin' and improvin' my presentation of 2rede$s
readin'& and for stressin' the underlyin' similarity between the 2rede and Bwen readin's.