Carroll - Aquin - On Creation

Preface
Explanations of the origin of the universe have

fascinated men and women in every age. The distinctively
Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing received its
fullest expression and most sophisticated exposition in the
thirteenth century at the hands of St. Thomas Aquinas. The
doctrine of creation represents a crucial nexus of faith and
reason. Is there common ground, for example, etween the
eliever!s claim that the world was created out of nothing
and the natural scientist!s insistence that it is impossile to
get something from nothing" #ust one choose etween the
conclusions of reason and the tenets of faith" The
discussion of such topics in the #iddle Ages $$ y #uslims,
%ews, and Christians $$ was profound. Aquinas, himself,
recogni&ed a considerale det to #uslim and %ewish
thin'ers.
The text on creation we have translated, a section
from Aquinas( Writings on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
has never een pulished in English. It is the most
economical of Aquinas( extensive accounts creation, and yet
it contains the asis of all his future commentary on the
su)ect. It is a rich text, worthy of analysis in its own right
as well as for understanding Aquinas( place in the history of
reflection on creation. The distinctions Aquinas draws
among physics *natural philosophy+, metaphysics, and
theology have much to offer contemporary discourse
concerning cosmology and creation. #ost importantly, we
thin' that what Aquinas says aout creation is true.
,e have provided a rief historical introduction to
the development of the doctrine of creation *to Aquinas+ and
we have provided an analysis of the translated text itself.
The text is not always easy to understand and we hope that the summary
found in our analysis will assist readers. The appendices include
supplementary material- a selection from the Summa theologiae in which
Aquinas re)ects emanationism as philosophically possile. a new translation
of De aeternitate mundi /On the Eternity of the World0, which is Aquinas(
most mature wor' on the question of creation and the eternity of the world.
selections from Aquinas( Commentary on Aristotle(s Physics, in which
Aquinas re)ects Aristotle(s arguments for the eternity of the world. a rief
selection of texts in which Aquinas attriutes to Aristotle a doctrine of
creation. a translation of the prologue of the oo' *II+ of Aquinas( Writings
on the Sentences in which our principal text is found. and a glossary of
important terms found in the text we have translated. Two final appendices
contain an essay y each of us in which we discuss Aquinas! analysis of
creation in the context of certain trends in contemporary cosmology,
philosophy, and theology. All translations are ours.
,e should li'e to than' the Earhart 1oundation for a generous grant
which made this volume possile. Its preparation egan in the late 2345s
when a group of graduate students and professors met at the 6ontifical
Institute for #ediaeval Studies *Toronto+ to discuss this text. As participants
in this year$long underta'ing we enefitted from the insightful comments of
many collaorators. Aove all, however, we are grateful to the late 1ather
%ames ,eisheipl, who led these discussions and whose own analysis of
Aquinas and mediaeval natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology has
contriuted sustantially to our wor'.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2
In principio: An Introduction to Creation ex nihilo
A. Origins of the Doctrine
If one were to read the opening line of 7enesis without any
reference to the history of Christian thought, it would not e
immediately apparent that the words, 8In the eginning 7od
created the heavens and the earth,9 are an affirmation of
creation out of nothing. In fact, there continues to e
considerale disagreement as to how the opening verse of
the :ile ought to e understood. Some scholars translate
the first verse as 8In the eginning when 7od created the
heavens and the earth, the earth was without form and void.9
Such a rendering of the original ;erew text would certainly
seem to call into question an explicit source in 7enesis for
the doctrine of creation out of nothing.
2

The opening of 7enesis is not the earliest text in the
:ile. It received its final written form only during the
2. The <atin =ulgate!s text is- In principio creavit Deus caelum et
terram. The >ing %ames text from the early seventeenth century is- 8In
the eginning 7od created the heaven and the earth.9 The 1rench
%erusalem :ile in the twentieth century has a similar rendering- 8Au
commencement, ?ieu cr@a le ciel et la terre.9 Aet, the Bew English
:ile, also in the twentieth century, is quite different- 8In the eginning
of creation, when 7od made heaven and earth, the earth was without
form and void, with dar'ness over the face of the ayss, and a mighty
wind that swept over the surface of the waters.9 ;erew scholars are not
unanimous in how one ought to translate the ;erew br! $$ the word
which ecomes creavit in <atin. 1or a recent discussion of the various
ways the opening of 7enesis can e understood, see :ruce =awter!s
essay on 7enesis in " #e$ Catholic Commentary on %oly Scripture,
Ceginald 1uller, general editor *Bew Aor'- Thomas Belson, 23D3+,
2EFa$h, pp. 24G$E.
period of the :aylonian exile of the %ewish people. The prophets of Israel
remind the %ews, in the midst of their pessimism, that their 7od is not li'e
other gods. 7od who has made a covenant with Araham and who rought
;is people out of Egypt is the Creator of all that is.
G
;erew Scriptures
return, from time to time, to this theme. Indeed, immediately following the
initial account of creation in 7enesis there is a second story of origins, a
story composed efore the first and containing different imagery. ,e can
find other commentary in the 6salms and in the ,isdom literature.
Throughout the :ile there are various images and modes of spea'ing which
ear witness to the fundamental truth of 7od!s creative act.
The question of reading the opening line of 7enesis $$ aside from
identifying what the line is $$ is part of a much larger question- how does one
read the :ile" ,hen we loo' at the development of the Christian doctrine
of creation we must rememer how Christians in the early Church and in the
#iddle Ages approached the evidence from ilical revelation. They read
7enesis, for example, not as an isolated account of origins, ut as part of a
whole, which could e understood only with Christ in mind. Thus, for
example, Christians read the opening of 7enesis in the light of the opening
of the 7ospel of %ohn- identifying 8in the eginning9 with 8inHthrough
Christ.9
I

G. 8It was in exile and in the seeming defeat of Israel that there occurred an opening to the
awareness of the 7od who holds every people and all of history in ;is hands, who holds
everything ecause ;e is the creator of everything and the source of all power.9 Cardinal
%oseph Cat&inger, &In the 'eginning . . .! " Catholic (nderstanding of the Story of Creation
and the )all, translated y :oniface Camsey, J.6. *7rand Capids, #ichigan- ,.:.
Eerdmans, 233K+, pp. 22$2G.
I. ibid., pp. 3$25. The 7ospel of %ohn opens with the words- 8In the eginning was the
,ord. . . .9 Coert Alter, a leading literary scholar of the ;erew Scriptures, argues that the
8atomistic9 tendency to discover discontinuities, contradictions, duplications, and fissures in
the text of the :ile, has drawn our attention away from the design of the whole. The
;erew :ile, he writes, 8is a corpus which ears within it the seeds of its own canonicity. .
. /I0t is a set of texts in restless dialogue with one another.9 Alter oserves that 8the star'
initiating act of creation through divine speech from formlessness, chaos, nothingness *tohu*
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation G
:eginning in the sixteenth century, in part as a result
of the controversies of the Ceformation, the living unity of
Scripture was suordinated to a 'ind of propositionali+ation
according to which each text, each verse, was read in its are
literalness. Such literalism *as distinct from the literal
meaning of the :ile+
E
was evident in the dispute etween
the Inquisition and 7alileo. In the twentieth century, the
bohu+ lingers in the ;erew imagination as a measure of the
asoluteness of 7od!s power and also as a looming perspective on the
contingency of all human existence and the frailty of all human exercises
of 'nowledge and power. . . . Sometime in the latter part of the second
millennium :.C.E., the spiritual avant$garde of the ;erew people
egan to imagine creation and creator, history and human'ind, in a
radically new way. This radicalism of vision, though it would never
produce anything li'e unanimity, generated certain underlying patterns
of literary expression in the centuries that followed.9 ,he Literary
-uide to the 'ible, edited y Coert Alter and 1ran' >ermode
*Camridge, #A- ;arvard Lniversity 6ress, 23F4+, pp. GK, I2, IE.
Jther excellent oo's y Alter are- ,he "rt of 'iblical #arrative *23F2+.
,he "rt of 'iblical Poetry *23FK+. and ,he World of 'iblical Literature
*233G+. Still one of the est accounts of medieval exegesis is- :eryl
Smalley, ,he Study of the 'ible in the .iddle "ges *Jxford- :asil
:lac'well, 23KG and Lniversity of Botre ?ame 6ress, 23DE+.
E. In the theological tradition of ilical interpretation, the literal sense
of Sacred Scripture is what the author *i.e., ultimately 7od+ intends the
words to mean. The literal sense is, thus, quite distinct from a
literalistic emphasis on the are signification of the words. A common
example is Scripture!s reference to 7od!s stretching out ;is hand. The
literal sense of this passage refers to 7od!s power, not to some divine
anatomical part. 1or a current discussion of the Catholic understanding
of ilical interpretation see the 233I report of the 6ontifical :ilical
Commission- %oseph A. 1it&meyer, ,he 'iblical Commission!s
Document &,he Interpretation of the 'ible in the Church!/ ,e0t and
Commentary *Come- Editrice 6ontificio Istituto :ilico, 233K+. 1or a
rief history of the interpretation of the creation stories in 7enesis, see 1.
Coins, ,he %e0aemeral Literature *Chicago, 232G+
concern for the ilical text as a historical document $$ connected with the
times and culture in which it was composed $$ often excludes the
consideration of how each text is an integral part of the :ile as a whole.
Such an approach to the :ile leads many to question whether the opening
line of 7enesis can really support the doctrine of creation out of nothing.
K
It is important to recogni&e a distinction etween creation,
understood as 7od!s causing the universe to e, and the account of the 8six
days of creation9 set forth in 7enesis. As Augustine and Aquinas oserve,
what is essential to the Christian faith is the fact of creation, not its manner
or mode.
D
The explanation of the six days is really an account of the
formation of the world, not its creation. Such explanations, given y
6atristic and medieval thin'ers in their hexaemeral literature, involved a
commentary on 7enesis rather than a philosophical treatment of creation.
Jften in this hexaemeral literature we find elaorate attempts to discover a
concordance etween the description of the formation of the world and
contemporary scientific 'nowledge of the world. Jn the other hand, the
K. The new historical thin'ing 8no longer read the texts forward ut ac'ward $$ that is,
with a view not to Christ ut to the proale origins of those texts. 6eople were no longer
concerned with understanding what a text said or what a thing was from the aspect of its
fulfillment, ut from that of its eginning, its source. As a result of this isolation from the
whole and of this literal$mindedness with respect to particulars, which contradicts the entire
inner nature of the :ile ut which was now considered to e the truly scientific approach,
there arose that conflict etween the natural sciences and theology which has een, up to our
own day, a urden for the faith.9 Cat&inger, op. cit., p. 24. Coert Alter spea's of an
8atomistic9 approach to the text. see note I.
D. 8There are some things that are y their very nature the sustance of the faith, as to say
of 7od that ;e is three and one . . . aout which it is foridden for anyone to thin'
otherwise. . . . There are other things that relate to the faith only incidentally . . . and, with
respect to these, Christian authors have different opinions, interpreting the Sacred Scripture
in various ways. Thus with respect to the origin of the world, there is one point that is of the
sustance of faith, vi+., to 'now that it egan y creation. . . . :ut the manner and the order
according to which creation too' place concerns the faith only incidentally. . . . 8 Aquinas,
In II Sent., 2G, I, 2. see De potentia Dei q. E, a. G.. Aquinas! commentary on the story of
creation in 7enesis can e found in Summa theologiae I, qq. DK$4E.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation I
philosophical and theological treatment of creation is the
investigation of the dependence of all that is on 7od. In the
language of metaphysics, creation is a dependence in the
order of eing. Thus questions such as, how does the first
cause give eing *existence+ to creatures, and how do
creatures receive the eing that is given to them, are central
to such an investigation. Although the prolem of creation
may well have entered philosophical discourse ecause of a
elief in 7od!s revelation, it is nevertheless a prolem that
can e, and was in the #iddle Ages, treated in a properly
philosophical way. In fact, the discussion of creation is an
excellent example of the ways in which medieval thin'ers in
diverse religious traditions wrestled with the relationship
etween faith and reason, and etween theology and
philosophy.
In the early Church, well efore the thirteenth
century and the age of Thomas Aquinas, there was little
question among Christian thin'ers that 7enesis did reveal
that 7od created the world out of nothing. The encounter
etween the ilical affirmation of the radical dependence of
all things upon 7od as their source and the traditions of
,estern philosophical and scientific reflection constitutes
one of the central characteristics of ,estern culture.
Although the origins of the Christian understanding of
creation are prior to philosophical and theological
reflection,
4
it is in the encounter etween philosophy and
4. #ost scholars now re)ect the view that the doctrine of creation out of
nothing received its first formulation in %ewish theology in the
;ellenistic age $$ with, for example, the famous passage from G
#accaees 4-GF. Although some %ewish theologians did spea' of 7od!s
creating 8out of nothing,9 recent scholarship has shown that the
expression was not meant in a metaphysical sense and that it did not
science, on the one hand, and the insights derived from Scripture, on the
other, that the Christian doctrine of creation is forged. ,e need to
rememer that doctrines, even Church doctrines, have their origins in time,
place, and historical circumstance. Such rootedness in history does not
invalidate claims for a truth of doctrine which transcends time and place, ut
it does mean that as we see' to understand the doctrine $$ a tas' which is
oth theological and philosophical $$ we need the assistance of history.
,hen theologians in the second, third, and fourth centuries came to
define the Christian view of nature, human nature, and 7od $$ as distinct
from the views found in the pagan intellectual world in which they lived $$
they found in the opening verses of 7enesis, interpreted in the light of
Christian faith, a source for a view of creation which they developed into a
doctrine of the origin of the universe characteristically their own. The
;ellenistic world in which the early Christian theologians sought to
understand their faith shared an intellectual patrimony which, despite its
diversity, maintained that the universe is eternal. 1rom ;eraclitus and
6armenides to 6lato and Aristotle, and from the Stoics to 6lotinus, the
ancient philosophers appeared to spea' with one voice. ,hether there e
nothing ut change or change e an illusion, whether we distinguish etween
a world of ecoming and a world of eing, or etween potentiality and
actuality, one thing is clear- there is no asolute temporal eginning of the
universe. 1or the Church 1athers, Christian revelation stood out in star'
contrast to this traditional philosophical view. ?espite an early flirtation
with a 6latonic interpretation, according to which 7od forms the world in the
same way as does 6lato!s ?emiurge in the ,imaeus, y the early second
century we discover the first clear indications of what ecomes the orthodox
doctrine of creation out of nothing.
F
exclude 7od!s wor'ing with existent matter. See 7. Shmuttermayr, 8MShNpfung aus dem
Bichts! in G #acc. 4-GF",9 'iblische 1eitschrift 24 *234I+, pp. G5I$GGF.
F. 1or an excellent survey of this development see 7erhard #ay, &Creatio e0 nihilo!/ ,he
Doctrine of &Creation out of #othing! in Early Christian ,hought, translated y A.S.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation E
:y the early third century *ca. GI5+ ;ippolytus of
Come, in a sustained polemic entitled, ,he 2efutation of "ll
%eresies, offers a clear, concise statement of the Christian
doctrine of creation-
The one 7od, the first and only ?eity, oth
Creator and <ord of all, had nothing coeval
with ;imself, not infinite chaos, nor
measureless water or solid earth, nor dense
air, nor warm fire, nor refined spirit, nor the
a&ure canopy of the stupendous firmament.
:ut ;e was Jne, alone in ;imself. :y an
exercise of ;is will ;e created things that
are, which antecedently had no existence,
except that ;e willed to ma'e them.
3
The 7od in whom Christians elieve is transcendent
$$ wholly other from the world. ;e is not on the same
ontological level $$ i.e., the same level of eing $$ with any
thing. In order to affirm the transcendence of the Christian
7od one must affirm a radical distinction etween 7od and
the universe, a distinction which the Church 1athers were
convinced was denied in the ;ellenistic view that the world
is eternal. The 7od of Araham, the 7od who reveals
;imself as 8I Am ,ho Am,9 cannot e co$eternal with
anything else. 1or the Church 1athers, to claim that the
world is eternal is to claim that it is equal to 7od. Thus, one
,orrall *Edinurgh- T. and T. Clar', 233E+
3. ,he 2efutation of "ll %eresies O.G4. Philosophumena in Patrologiae
cursus completus series -raeca *P67+, edited y %.6. #igne, 2DG vols.
*6aris- 2FK4$232G + vol. 2D, col. IEED$4.
important reason for ma'ing clear that Christians elieve in a 7od who
creates the world out of nothing is to deny any 'ind of identification of the
world with 7od. Bot even eternal formless stuff which a demiurgic god
molds or forms into the created universe is acceptale- 7od must e creator
of all, including formless matter.
Jnly 7od is eternal. the world is finite. ,e see in the early
discussion of the Christian doctrine of creation the equating of the
temporally finite with the created, and of the eternal with the uncreated.
<ater commentators, Christian, %ewish, and #uslim, will argue, in addition,
that an eternal universe is a necessary universe- necessary in the sense that
such a universe would e wholly self$sufficient, with no need for a cause, or
necessary in the sense that it would not e the production of 7od!s will. A
necessary universe could not e a universe which depended upon the free
creative act of 7od. In order to defend a view of 7od as asolutely free and
sovereign, it seemed that one must affirm that the world is temporally finite.
Although it is true that a world which is temporally finite *in which, that is,
there is a t!5+ is a world produced y the will of another, there will e
considerale deate as to whether the world must have a temporal eginning
if it is in fact the result of 7od!s choice. Again, if the universe has an
asolute eginning, efore
25
which it was not, then its coming$into$existence
requires a divine agent. The question which will occupy our attention when
we turn to Aquinas and the thirteenth century is- if the world is created y
7od, must it have a temporal eginning, i.e., must it e temporally finite"
Even the view of 6lotinus *G5IHE$GD3H45+, who reduces the source of all to a
divine Jne, fails for Christians to recogni&e the radical freedom of divine
creation. Creation as a free act must e distinct from any form of necessary
emanation, i.e., of a divine 8uling over9 of eing.
25. Jviously the sense of 8efore9 the eginning of time involves an act of imagination
since there can e no temporal 8efore9 efore there is time. ,e will see Aquinas ma'e this
point.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation K
1urthermore, for the Church 1athers, the view that
the world is eternal, in the specific sense of eing without a
finite temporal duration, seemed inevitaly to require a
cyclical view of history- a view of history which would raise
fundamental prolems for Christianity. Jnly a temporally
finite world could constitute the scene for the religious
drama of 1all and Cedemption, with its central, unique,
unrepeatale event- the coming of Christ. Jnly in a world
temporally finite did it seem possile to ma'e sense of the
Christian understanding of each man!s destiny
providentially designed y a loving 7od. If salvation
history is to ma'e sense, time cannot e cyclical.
Among all the Church 1athers, Saint Augustine
*IKE$EI5+ ma'es the most important contriution to the
doctrine of creation. ;is sustained explication of the
account of creation found in 7enesis
22
served as the
foundation for future Christian commentary on the su)ect.
Bot only does he ma'e clear the difference etween an
eternal universe of 7ree' philosophy and the Christian
understanding that the universe and time egin together, ut
he also distinguishes etween the way we come to 'now
creatures as they exist and develop in time and the way 7od
'nows creatures as their cause. Augustine oserves that
there are 8two moments of creation-Q
one in the original creation when 7od made
all creatures efore resting from all ;is wor's
22. 1or a good, succinct account of Augustine(s understanding of
creation, see Ernan #c#ullin, QIntroduction- Evolution and Creation,Q
in Evolution and Creation, edited y Ernan #c#ullin *Lniversity of
Botre ?ame 6ress, 23FK+, pp. 3$2D. See also Etienne 7ilson, ,he
Christian Philosophy of St. "ugustine, translated y <.E.#. <ynch
*<ondon- =ictor 7ollanc&, <td., 23D2+, pp. 2F3$23D.
on the seventh day, and the other in the administration of
creatures y which ;e wor's even now. In the first instance
7od made everything together without any moments of time
intervening, ut now ;e wor's within the course of time, y
which we see the stars move from their rising to their setting,
the weather change from summer to winter . . . .
2G
,hen we thin' of the first creation of things we should not thin' of
7od(s activity as occurring over a period of Qsolar daysQ as though 7od
wor's in time. The creation descried in 7enesis occurred simultaneously-
Q;e made that which gave time its eginning, as he made all things together,
disposing them in an order ased not on intervals of time ut on causal
connections.Q
2I

Augustine also recogni&es that 7od(s creative agency is not only
exercised at the eginning of the universe, ut continuously, causing all that
is to exist.
1or the power and might of the Creator, who rules and
emraces all, ma'es every creature aide. and if this power
ever ceases to govern creatures, their essences would pass
away and all nature would perish. ,hen a uilder puts up a
house and departs, his wor' remains in spite of the fact that
he is no longer there. :ut the universe will pass away in the
twin'ling of an eye if 7od withdraws ;is ruling hand. . . .
2E

2G. Augustine, ,he Literal .eaning of -enesis, translated y %ohn Taylor *Bew Aor'-
Bewman 6ress, 23FG+, :oo' =. 22. G4, =ol. 2, p. 2DG.
2I. ibid., :oo' =. K. 2G, p. 2KE.
2E. ibid., :oo' I=.2G. GG, p. 224.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation D
,e must, therefore, distinguish in the wor's
of 7od those which ;e ma'es even now and
those from which he rested on the seventh
day. 1or there are some who thin' that only
the world was made y 7od and that
everything else is made y the world
according to ;is ordination and command,
ut that 7od ;imself ma'es nothing /other
than ;is original act of creation0. . . . ;ence,
7od moves ;is whole creation y a hidden
power, and all creatures are su)ect to this
movement- the angels carry out ;is
commands, the stars move in their courses,
the winds low now this way, now that, deep
pools seethe with tumling waterfalls and
mists forming aove them, meadows come to
life as their seeds put forth the grass, animals
are orn and live their lives according to their
proper instincts, the evil are permitted to try
the )ust. It is thus that 7od unfolds the
generations which ;e laid up in creation
when first ;e founded it. and they would not
e sent forth to run their course if ;e who
made creatures ceased to exercise ;is
provident rule over them.
2K

Although strongly influenced y Beoplatonic thought,
Augustine thin's there is a significant gulf etween classical
culture and ilical revelation on the origin of the world and
the 'ind of causality which the Creator exercises. Jne
2K. ibid., :oo' =. G5. E5$E2, pp. 242$G.
scholar has noted that for Saint Augustine it was precisely with respect to the
eternity or non$eternity of the world that we find the frontier etween
paganism and Christianity.
2D
Another reason underlying the commitment of the Church 1athers to
the doctrine of creation out of nothing was the necessity of re)ecting every
temptation to identify matter or the world with evil. To protect 7od from
eing the author of evil, some thin'ers were ready to accuse matter. If
matter is evil, it must not e dependent upon 7od. it must not e created. it
must e eternal. The arguments were varied, ut from the #arcionites to the
#anichees to the 7nostics, the claim was essentially the same- matter is evil.
The 7nostics experienced the physical universe as a hostile, fragile place,
hardly attriutale to the creative act of the true 7od- rather, it must e the
wor' of heavenly eings of lower ran' and limited power, which did not
'now the true 7od or reelled against ;im. 1or the 7nostics, the prolem of
the origin of evil is ultimately inseparale from the question of the origin of
the universe.
24
The #anichees were radical dualists- the spiritual world,
including the human soul, is created y 7od, the principle of all good. the
material world, including the human ody, is created y the evil principle.
In contradistinction to such views, the doctrine of creation captures the core
2D. 8Au I=
e
siRcle aprRs %@sus Christ, le prolRme de l!@ternit@ du monde touche presque S
tous les autres- tout y est de quelque maniRre impliqu@- la @atitude de l!Tme et la r@alit@ du
mal, la solidit@ du monde physique et la signification de l!histoire, les attriuts et la science
de ?ieu, la rationalit@ de la religion de l!Evangile, l!@ternit@ de Come, la fid@lit@ S C@sar.
Saint Augustin pouvait se repr@senter avec maladresse la nature exacte de son diff@rend
avec les platoniciens- il ne se trompait pourtant pas en pensant que la question de l!@ternit@
du monde )alonnait leur frontiRre.9 %ean 7uitton, Le temps et l!3ternit3 che+ Plotin et Saint
"ugustin *6aris- %. =rin- 2342
E
+, p. G54.
24. 7. #ay, op. cit., pp. I3$D2. 8The doctrine of the creation of the world y angelic
powers seems to elong to an earlier stage of gnosticism. Jnly later is the 7od of the Jld
Testament distinguished from the highest 7od and seen as the actual creator of the world,
while the demiurgical function of the angels recedes.9 *p. K2+ #arcion, for example, urges a
radical distinction etween the 7od of the Jld Testament and the 7od of the Bew
Testament. The creator$god of the Jld Testament fashioned the world out of eternal matter,
a matter 8ad and hateful.9 pp. KF$3.
of the Christian faith- 7od alone is the source of all that is.
;e rings everything, including matter, into existence. all
that ;e creates is good. It is Augustine who, in the late
fourth century, provides the classic response to the prolem
of evil while affirming the goodness of all that is. ;is
exposition of evil as privation is, of course, another story.
the point to re$emphasi&e here is that the doctrine of creation
out of nothing, forged in the early centuries of Christian
history, served to distinguish what Christians elieved aout
the ultimate origin and goodness of the world, from
;ellenistic philosophy, from 7nosticism, and from
#anicheanism. At least in these early centuries Christian
thin'ers were convinced that there was a fundamental
incompatiility etween the pagan affirmation of an eternal
universe and Christian faith in creation- therefore, for them,
to affirm that the universe is created y 7od necessarily
means to deny that the universe is eternal.
The classical philosophical argument for the eternity of the world
received an important challenge in the sixth century when, in Alexandria
*Egypt+, %ohn 6hiloponus responded to attac's on the Christian elief that
the universe had a eginning, found in the writings of 6roclus *ca. E22$EFK+,
the famous head of the Beoplatonic Academy in Athens. 6roclus, it seemed,
had argued that although the present orderly arrangement of the universe
might have had a eginning, still it was asurd to thin' that matter itself had
a eginning. 6roclus suggested that one may conceive of a succession,
indeed an endless succession, of worlds. In De aeternitate mundi contra
Proclum, written in KG3,
2F
6hiloponus not only restates the Christian doctrine
of an asolute temporal eginning to the universe. he also argues that on
philosophical *i.e., scientific in the roadest sense+ grounds one must
conclude that the universe is temporally finite. This treatise represents a
significant shift in the history of the doctrine of creation out of nothing, for
6hiloponus contends that on the asis of the principles of 7ree' thought,
especially Aristotle!s arguments for the impossiility of an actual infinity,
one 'nows for sure that the universe could not e eternal. 6hiloponus points
out that were the universe to e infinite there would have to e an infinity of
past days. 1urthermore, if past days were infinite, what sense could one
ma'e of adding today to this past series, since one cannot increase the
infinite" 6hiloponus was convinced that he had found a contradiction 8at the
heart of paganism, a contradiction etween their concept of infinity and their
denial of a eginning.9
23
Although 6hiloponus remained more or less
2F. Cichard Sora)i points out that 8KG3 was an annus mirabilis for Christianity. St.
:enedict, on the usual dating, founded the monastery at #onte Cassino, the Council of
Jrange settled outstanding matters on free will, %ustinian /the Christian Emperor0 closed the
Beoplatonist school at Athens, and 6hiloponus produced his oo' of eighteen arguments
MJn the Eternity of the ,orld Against 6roclus.!9 C. Sora)i *ed.+, Philoponus and the
2e4ection of "ristotelian Science, *Cornell Lniversity 6ress, 23F4+, p. 2D4. See also,
Philoponus/ "gainst "ristotle on the Eternity of the World, translated y Christian ,ilderg
*Cornell Lniversity 6ress, 23F4+.
23. ibid., p. 244. Sora)i has written two oo's of particular importance for the
understanding of creation in the light of traditional philosophical reflection- ,ime Creation5
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation F
un'nown in the <atin #iddle Ages, the arguments he
advanced can e found in texts of many medieval Islamic,
%ewish, and Christian thin'ers. As we shall see, Thomas
Aquinas su)ects these arguments to a trenchant analysis.
:. Creation in Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides
G5
Aquinas! development of his understanding of creation
depends heavily upon the wor' of medieval #uslim and
%ewish thin'ers. The reception of 7ree' philosophy in the
Islamic world is a complex story.
G2
As early as 3IG there
was a famous pulic deate in :aghdad over the merits of
the 8new learning.9
GG
7ree' philosophy seemed particularly
challenging to many of the muta6allimun *theologians+ who
came to view it with suspicion as an alien way of thin'ing.
The wor' of al$1arai *F45$3K5+, who estalished in Cairo a
curriculum for the study of 6lato and Aristotle, and of
Avicenna *3F5$25I4+, whose writings in medicine, natural
and the Continuum *Cornell Lniversity 6ress, 23FI+ and .atter5 Space5
and .otion/ ,heories in "nti7uity and ,heir Se7uel *Cornell Lniversity
6ress, 23FF+.
G5. 7enerally, we have used <atini&ed versions of the names of #uslim
and %ewish thin'ers such as In Sina, In Cushd, and #oses en
#aimon, since our primary concern is the influence they had on
Aquinas, and Aquinas read them in <atin translations.
G2. Jliver <eaman, "n Introduction to .edieval Islamic Philosophy
*Camridge Lniversity 6ress, 23FK+. ;erert A. ?avidson, Proofs for
Eternity5 Creation and the E0istence of -od in .edieval Islamic and
8e$ish Philosophy *Bew Aor'- Jxford Lniversity 6ress, 23F4+. and
1adlou Shehadi, .etaphysics in Islamic Philosophy *?elmar, B.A.-
Caravan :oo's, 23FG+.
GG. The specific deate concerned whether Aristotelian logic
transcended the 7ree' language and was, thus, appropriate to use y
those who spo'e and wrote in Araic. See Shehadi, op. cit., pp. GI$E.
philosophy, and metaphysics proved to e extraordinarily influential, offers
an excellent example of the way in which 7ree' thought was appropriated in
the Islamic world.
GI
Avicenna, translated into <atin, will prove to e
especially important for Thomas Aquinas, as we shall see. Avicenna!s
understanding of the relationship etween 7od, the asolutely necessary
eing, and the created order of things which are, in themselves, only possile
will contriute to Aquinas! understanding of creation. In his monumental
al*Shifa!/ al*Ilahiyyat, Avicenna writes- 8This is what it means that a thing is
created, that is, receiving its existence from another . . . . As a result
everything, in relation to the first cause, is created. . . . Therefore, every
single thing, except the primal Jne, exists after not having existed with
respect to itself.9
GE

,hen some thing through its own essence is continuously a
cause for the existence of some other thing, it is a cause for it
continuously as long as its essence continues existing. If it
/the cause0 exists continuously, then that which is caused
exists continuously. Thus, what is li'e this /cause0 is among
the highest causes, for it prevents the non$existence of
something, and is that which gives perfect existence to
something. This is the meaning of that which is called
(creation( /ibda(0 y the philosophers, namely, the ringing
into existence of something after asolute non$existence. 1or
it elongs to that which is caused, in itself, that it does not
GI. Jn al$1arai, see Ian C. Betton, "l*)arabi and %is School *<ondon and Bew Aor'-
Coutledge, 233G+. An excellent survey of Avicenna can e found in the Encyclopedia
Iranica *Coutledge, 23F3+, =ol. I, pp. DD$225. Also <. E. 7oodman, "vicenna *Coutledge,
233G+.
GE. al*Shifa!/ al*Ilahiyyat, =III.I, translated in 7eorges Anawati, La .3taphysi7ue du
Shifa! *6aris, 234F+, =ol. II, pp. FI$FE. 8C!est ce qui veut dire que la chose est cr@@, i.e.,
recevant l!existence d!un autre. . . . 6ar cons@quent le tout par rapport S la Cause premiRre
est cr@@. . . . ?onc toute chose, sauf l!Ln premier, existe aprRs n!avoir par exist@ eu @gard S
elle$mUme /bistih7a7 nafsihi0.9
exist /laysa0, while it elongs to it from its
cause that it does exist /aysa0. That which
elongs to something in itself is prior,
according to the mind, in essence, not in time
to that which comes from another. Thus,
everything which is caused is existing after
non$existing y a posteriority in terms of
essence. . . . If /an effect!s0 existence comes
after asolute non$existence, its emanation
from the cause in this way is called ibda!
*8asolute origination9+. This is the most
excellent form of the estowal of existence,
for *in this case+ non$existence has simply
een prevented and existence has een given
the sway ab initio.
GK
In explaining the 'ind of efficient causality which
creation involves, Avicenna notes that there is an important
difference etween the ways in which metaphysicians and
natural philosophers discuss efficient cause-
. . . the metaphysicians do not intend y the
agent the principle of movement only, as do
the natural philosophers, ut also the
GK. al*Shifa!/ al*Ilahiyyat, II.GDD, quoted in :arry >ogan, "verroes and
the .etaphysics of Causation *:inghamton, BA- State Lniversity of
Bew Aor' 6ress, 23FK+, p. G4D, n. KF. See also 1. Cahman, 8In Sina!s
Theory of the 7od$,orld Celationship,9 in -od and Creation, edited y
?avid :urrell and :ernard #c7inn *Lniversity of Botre ?ame 6ress,
2335+, pp. IF$KD.
principle of existence and that which estows existence, such
as the creator of the world.
GD
The recognition that creation is properly a su)ect of metaphysics and
not of physics *i.e., of natural philosophy+ will e particularly important for
Aquinas, as will Avicenna!s insistence on the distinction etween essence
and existence. ,ith respect to the latter topic, Avicenna oserves that a
reflection on what it means for something to e reveals that what something
is $$ i.e., its essence $$ is different from whether a thing exists. Jn the asis
of the ontological distinction etween essence and existence, Avicenna
argues that all eings other than 7od *in whom this distinction disappears+
require a cause in order to exist.
G4
Avicenna(s distinction etween existence and essence is part of his
contriution to a long standing intellectual pro)ect which sought to
understand the relationship etween existing individuals and their
Qintelligile natures.Q Those schooled in the Beoplatonic tradition gave
ontological priority to the intelligile nature. hence, the attraction of an
emanationist scheme according to which all existing things flow from a
primal source of eing and intelligiility. The immediate context of
Avicenna(s distinction is his discussion of necessary and possile eing.
Aquinas follows Avicenna!s lead ut comes to recogni&e a rather different
sort of creaturely contingence from that of Avicenna. 1or Avicenna, essence
is something prior and to which existence 8happens9 or comes as an
GD. al*Shifa!/ al*Ilahiyyat, =I. 2, quoted in A. ;yman and %. ,alsh *eds.+, Philosophy in
the .iddle "ges, second edition *;ac'ett, 23FI+, p. GEF.
G4. 8Il n!y a donc pas d!autre quiddit@ *mahiyya+ pour le n@ceessairement existant que le
fait qu!il est n@cessairement existant. Et c!est cel l!Utre *al*anniya+.9 al*Shifa!/ al*Ilahiyat,
=III. E, tranlsated y 7eorges Anawati, op. cit.5 =ol. II, p. F4. The classic wor' on
Avicenna!s analysis of essence and existence is Amelie$#arie 7oichon, La distinction de
l!essence et l!e0istence d!apr9s Ibn Sn *6aris, 23I4+.
accident.
GF
According to Avicenna, 8real existence9
emerges as a new attriute for the contingent eing of the
created world *which was originally present as an essence or
8possiility9 in the divine mind+. it is 8a 'ind of added
enefit estowed y 7od upon possile eing in the act of
creation.Q
G3
As ?avid :urrell oserves, Aquinas will use
Avicenna(s distinction etween essence and existence ut
develop the notion of radical dependency in such a way that
creaturely existence is understood not as something which
happens to essence ut as a fundamental relation to the
Creator as origin.
I5
GF. ?avid :urrell, 8Aquinas and Islamic and %ewish Thin'ers,9 in
,he Cambridge Companion to "7uinas, edited y Borman >ret&mann
and Eleonore Stump *Camidge Lniversity 6ress, 233I+, p. D3. 7eorges
Anawati, in his introduction to the Shifa!5 puts it this way- 8C!est en
partant de l!essence qu!Avicenne aoutit forc@ment S consid@rer l!esse
qui l!affecte comme un accident. S. Thomas par contre part de l!Utre
existant et il fait de l!esse ce qu!il y a de plus intime et de plus profond
dans cet Utre.9 7eorges Anawati, op. cit.5 =ol. 2, p. 4F. 1or an extensive
discussion of the 8accidentality of existence9 in Avicenna, see Shehadi,
op. cit., pp. 3I$22E.
G3. Charles >ahn, Q,hy Existence ?oes Bot Emerge as a ?istinct
Concept in 7ree' 6hilosophy,Q in Philosophies of E0istence/ "ncient
and .edieval, ed. y 6. #orewedge *BA- 1ordham, 23FG+, p. F.
I5. QIn one fell swoop, Aquinas has succeeded in restoring the primacy
Aristotle intended for individual existing things, y lin'ing them directly
to their creator and y granting Avicenna(s (distinction( an unequivocal
ontological status. Aet as should e clear, this is more than a
development of Avicenna. it is a fresh start requiring a conception of
e0isting that could no longer e confused with an accident, and which
has the capacity to lin' each creature to the gratuitous activity of a free
creator. Jnly in such a way can the radical ne$ness of the created
universe find coherent expression, for the e0isting (received from 7od(
will e the source of all perfections and need not presume anything at all
An eternal world, as we have seen, was often viewed as a necessary
world. Avicenna sought to e faithful to 7ree' metaphysics *especially in
the Beoplatonic tradition+ and also to affirm the contingency of the created
order.
I2
Although the world proceeds from 7od y necessity and is eternal,
it differs fundamentally from 7od in that in itself it is only possile and
requires a cause in order to exist. 7od, on the other hand, is necessary in
;imself and, thus, requires no cause. A 'ey to science, in the sense set forth
y Aristotle in his Posterior "nalytics, is the 'nowledge of a necessary
nexus etween cause and effect. only such necessary 'nowledge truly
deserves the name science *episteme+. Contingent existence, although not
necessary in itself *per se+, is necessary throughHy another.
IG
Avicenna
thought that the contingency of the world he descried did not deny natural
necessity.
II
A world without necessary relationships is an unintelligile
$$ e it matter or (possiles.(Q ?avid :urrell, 8Aquinas and Islamic and %ewish Thin'ers,9
op. cit., pp. D3$45.
I2. Avicenna, in his philosophic argumentation, 8fused the Aristotelian metaphysics of
self$sufficiency with the monotheistic metaphysics of contingency. . . . The 'ey to In
Sina!s synthesis of contingency with the metaphysics of necessity lies in the single phrase-
considered in itself. Considered in itself, each effect is radically contingent. It does not
contain the conditions of its own existence. and, considered in itself, it need not exist. . . .
:ut considered in relation to its causes, not as something that in the astract might never
have existed, ut as something concretely given efore us. . . . considered in relation to its
causes, this o)ect must exist, in the very Aristotelian sense that it does exist, and must have
the nature that it has in that its causes gave it that nature.9 <. E. 7oodman, "vicenna, op.
cit., pp. DI, DD$D4.
IG. See Emil l. 1ac'enheim, 8The 6ossiility of the Lniverse in Al$1arai, In Sina, and
#aimonides,9 in Proceedings of the "merican "cademy of 8e$ish 2esearch, =ol. xvi
*23E4+, pp. I3$45. 7eorge 1. ;ourani, 8In Sina on Becessary and 6ossile Existence,9 in
Philosophical )orum, E *234G+, pp. 4E$FD
II. 81inite things were contingent in themselves ut necessary with reference to their
causes and ultimately to 7od, who is the Cause of causes. Thus the natural order retains its
integrity and the continuity of its categories $$ time, space, causality, the wholeness of
human intelligence, and moral sense.9 7oodman, op. cit., p. 4E.
world. Aet, at the same time, the fear was that a necessary
world is a self$sufficient world, a world which cannot not
e- the opposite, so it seemed of a world created y 7od. At
est a necessary world would only e a world which must
surge forth from a primal source of eing. The explanation
of the asolute origin of the world in terms of a necessary
emanationist schema was attractive since it seems to do
)ustice to oth necessity and dependence. Creation for
Avicenna is an ontological relationship $$ a relationship in
the order of eing $$ with no reference to temporality. In
fact, Avicenna accepted the estalished 7ree' view that the
universe is eternal. Jviously, his view of the emanation of
existing things from a primal source $$ a view which
excluded the free act of 7od $$ only made sense in an eternal
universe. :ut, does an emanationist metaphysics do )ustice
to creation" Is it consistent with the 7od revealed in the
>oran or the :ile"
It was precisely such questions which led al$7ha&ali
*25KF$2222+, a )urist, theologian, and mystic, to argue
against what he considered to e threats to Islam in the
thought of philosophers such as Avicenna. In ,he
Incoherence of the Philosophers /,ahafut al*)alasifah0 al$
7ha&ali sets forth a wide$ranging critique of 7ree' thought
and defends what he considers to e the orthodox Islamic
doctrine of creation versus Avicenna!s emrace of an eternal
world. Such a world, al$7ha&ali thought, was the very
antithesis of a created one. An eternal world cannot e
dependent upon an act of 7od.
IE
In fact, al$7ha&ali claims
IE. ,ahafut al*)alasifah, discussions 2$E. 7oodman summari&es al$
7ha&ali!s central point- 8The philosophers /li'e Avicenna0 wanted to
show the world!s timeless dependence upon 7od, ut the idea of
timelessness demands that of self$sufficiency, and In Sina!s conception
that, even on philosophical grounds, all the arguments advanced for an
eternal world fail.
<ater in the twelfth century Averroes /ca. 22GD$223F0, in ,he
Incoherence of the Incoherence /,ahafut al*,ahafut0 defended the 7ree'
philosophical tradition against al$7ha&ali.
IK
Averroes argued that eternal
creation is not only intelligile, ut is 8the most appropriate way to
characteri&e the universe.9
ID
Al$7ha&ali thought that for 7od to e the cause
of the world, that is, for 7od to e the agent who rings aout the existence
of the world, such causality required a temporal eginning. In other words,
the world cannot e oth eternal and the result of 7od!s action, since
whatever is the result of an action of another must come into existence after
the initiation of the action of the other. Thus, what exists eternally cannot
have another, not even a divine other, as its originating source. In reply,
Averroes draws a distinction etween two different senses of an eternal
world- eternal in the sense of eing unlimited in duration, and eternal in the
sense of eing eternally self$sufficient, without a first cause-
If the world were y itself eternal and existent . . . then,
indeed the world would not have an agent at all. :ut if it is
eternal in the sense that it is an eternal /process of0 origination
and that its origination has neither eginning nor end, then
certainly that which conveys the meaning of eternal
origination has a greater right to e called Mcreation! than that
of creation as contingent in itself and necessary with reference to its cause only papers over
a contradiction.9 7oodman, op. cit., p. FI.
IK. 1or a rief summary of Averroes, see ?eorah <. :lac', 8AverroVs,9 in Dictionary of
Literary 'iography *233G+, vol. 22K, pp. DF$43. Also, %ean %olivet *ed.+, .ultiple "verro9s/
"ctes du Collo7ue International organis3 : l!occasion du ;<=e anniversaire de la naissance
d!"verro9s5 Paris >=*>? septembre5 @ABC *6aris- :elles$<ettres, 234F+. ?ominique Lrvoy,
Ibn 2ushd D"verroesE, translated y Jliva Stewart *<ondon- Coutledge, 2332+, and :arry
>ogan, "verroes and the .etaphysics of Causation, op. cit.
ID. :arry >ogan, op. cit., p. G5I.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2G
which conveys the meaning of limited
creation. In this way the world is 7od!s
creation and the name Morigination! is even
more suitale for it then the word Meternity.!
The philosophers only call the world eternal
to safeguard themselves against /eing
identified with those who elieve in0
the 'ind of creation which is from something,
in time, and after a state of non$existence.
I4
As we have seen, the early Church 1athers who
argued so strongly against the 7ree' notion of the eternity of
the world were convinced that that notion was oviously
incompatile with the doctrine of creation. Averroes notes
that a world which is eternal only in the first sense of
eternal, that is, unlimited in duration, would still require an
external agent which ma'es it what it is. Thus, what ma'es
the world eternal $$ in this first sense of eternal $$ could e
identified with that which causes it to e. Jn the other hand,
a world which is eternal not only in the sense of unlimited
duration ut also in the sense of eing completely self$
sufficient would e entirely independent of any external
cause. Its eternal existence would e rooted simply in what
it is- it would exist necessarily, without cause. Averroes
contends that philosophers, such as Aristotle, are committed
to the eternity of the world only in the sense of unlimited
duration and not in the sense of the world!s eing wholly
self$sufficient. The distinction he draws, thus, is etween a
world which is eternally existent in itself and a world which
is eternally existent y eing made so.
I4. Wuoted in >ogan, p. G5K.
Even though Averroes claimed that an eternal, created universe was
indeed proale, he re)ected the idea of creation out of nothing in its strict
sense. ;e thought that creation consisted in 7od!s eternally converting
potentialities into actually existing things. 1or Averroes, the doctrine of
creation out of nothing contradicted the existence of a true natural causality
in the universe-
/al$7ha&ali!s0 assertion /in defense of creation out of
nothing0. . . that life can proceed from the lifeless and
'nowledge from what does not possess 'nowledge, and that
the dignity of the 1irst consists only in its eing the principle
of the universe, is false. 1or if life could proceed from the
lifeless, then the existent might proceed from the non$
existent, and then anything whatever might proceed from
anything whatever, and there would e no congruity etween
causes and effects, either in the genus predicated analogically
or in the species.
IF
Earlier in the ,ahafut Averroes oserves that in a universe without
real natural causation, 8specific potentialities to act and to e acted upon are
reduced to shamles9 and causal relations 8to mere happen$stance.9
I3
Thus,
for Averroes, there could e no science of nature if the universe were created
out of nothing. In several long commentaries on various treatises of
Aristotle, Averroes re)ects Avicenna!s theory of emanation and argues that
7od!s connection to the universe ought to e understood in terms of final
causality.
E5
Averroes is critical of what he considers to e Avicenna!s
confusion of metaphysics and physics, in particular, the introduction of the
IF. ,ahafut al*,ahafut, trans. y Simon =an den :ergh *<ondon- <u&ac, 23KE+, p. EKG.
also quoted in >ogan, op. cit., p. IKI.
I3. Wuoted in >ogan, p. G2F.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2I
argument for the prime mover into metaphysics.
E2
Also, in
defense of real causality in nature, Averroes is trouled y
Avicenna!s reliance on the immediate action of immaterial
agents *separated forms+ in the various changes in the
physical world.
Averroes! interpretation of 7ree' philosophy,
particularly in his commentaries on the texts of Aristotle,
EG

plays an important role in discussions in the thirteenth
century concerning creation and the eternity of the world.
Also important is the thought of another twelfth century
thin'er, the %ewish theologian and philosopher, #aimonides
/22IK$2G5E0.
EI
In his monumental ,he -uide of the
E5. 6articularly in his Long Commentary on "ristotle!s &.etaphysics!
*ca. 2235+. ?eorah :lac', op. cit., p. 44.
E2. Coger Arnalde& oserves that 8unli'e Avicenna who strives to
deduce, at least theoretically, the physical from the metaphysical,
Averroes is essentially a philosopher of nature. In a passage of
commentary on :oo' X of the .etaphysics, he writes, in express
opposition to Avicenna, that unless the metaphysician instantly
requested of the physicist that he pass on to him the idea and the reality
of movement, he would have no 'nowledge of it. 6hysics is therefore
fundamental, and metaphysics simply crowns the whole structure of the
positive sciences.9 8<!;istoire de la pens@e grecque vue par les
Araes,9 'ulletin de la societe francaise de philosophie 4G, no. I
*234F+, p. 2DF.
EG. Aquinas will refer to Averroes as 8the Commentator.9
EI. 1or a comparison of Avicenna, #aimonides, and Aquinas, see-
?avid :urrell, Fno$ing the (n6no$able -od *Lniversity of Botre
?ame 6ress, 23FD+, )reedom and Creation in ,hree ,raditions
*Lniversity of Botre ?ame 6ress, 233I+, and 8Aquinas and Islamic and
%ewish Thin'ers,9 op. cit. Also, Coger Arnalde&, G la crois3e des trois
monoth3ismes/ (ne communaut3 de pens3e au .oyen Hge *6aris- Alin
#ichel, 233I+. Cecent studies of #aimonides include- #arvin 1ox,
Perple0ed, #aimonides argues that on the asis of reason alone the question
of the eternity of the world remains unresolvale. ;is arguments on this
topic, as well as his interpretation of the thought of Aristotle, influence
thirteenth century Christian thought.
Along with Averroes, #aimonides was critical of the 'alam
theologians who assign all causal agency to 7od. ,ithout the necessary
nexus etween cause and effect, discoverale in the natural order, the world
would e unintelligile and a science of nature would e impossile. The
'alam theologians, as #aimonides represents them, give no consideration to
how things really exist, for this is 8merely a custom,9 and could )ust as well
e otherwise.
EE

They /the 'alam theologians0 assert that when a man moves a
pen, it is not the man who moves it. for the motion occurring
in the pen is an accident created y 7od in the pen. Similarly
the motion of the hand, which we thin' of as moving the pen,
is an accident created y 7od in the moving hand. Jnly, 7od
has instituted the hait that the motion of the hand is
concomitant with the motion of the pen, without the hand
exercising in any respect an influence on, or eing causative
in regard to, the motion of the pen.
EK
Interpreting .aimonides- Studies in .ethodology5 .etaphysics5 and .oral Philosophy
*Lniversity of Chicago 6ress, 2335+. S. 6ines and A. Aovel *eds.+, .aimonides and
Philosophy *?ordrecht- #artinus Bi)hoff, 23FD+. various essays in #eoplatonism and
8e$ish ,hought, edited y <. E. 7oodman *State Lniversity of Bew Aor' 6ress, 233G+.
Alfred Ivry, 8#aimonides on Creation,9 in Creation and the End of Days/ 8udaism and
Scientific Cosmology, edited y ?avid Boa' *Lniversity 6ress of America, 23FD+, pp. 2FK$
G2I. Avital ,ohlman, ,homas d!"7uin et .aImonide/ un dialogue e0emplaire *6aris- Cerf,
23FF+, and ;. ?avidson, op. cit.
EE. #oses #aimonides, ,he -uide of the Perple0ed, translated y S. 6ines *The Lniversity
of Chicago 6ress, 23DI+, :oo' I, c. 42, p. 243.
EK. -uide . . .5 I. 4I, sixth premise, p. G5G.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2E
;e is also critical of their claims to demonstrate that the
world is not eternal ut has een created out of nothing.
#aimonides thin's that whether the universe is eternal or
8temporally created9 cannot e 'nown y the human
intellect with certainty. The most a eliever can do is to
refute the 8proofs of the philosophers earing on the eternity
of the world.9
ED
#aimonides critici&es the methods of the
'alam theologians, who claim first to demonstrate the
temporal creation of the world out of nothing and then to
argue from such a creation to the existence of 7od. In fact,
he suggests that the etter method is to prove that 7od
exists, is Jne, and is incorporeal, on the assumption that the
universe is eternal.
E4
#aimonides was particularly alert to what he
considered to e the dangers of Beoplatonic emanationism
in which the doctrine of creation and the eternity of the
world are comined in such a way that would deny the free
activity of 7od.
As we have seen, an eternal universe is a natural
corollary to the view of creation as emanation. 1urthermore,
#aimonides recogni&ed that the theory of emanation means
that it is necessary that creation occur, that reality pour forth
spontaneously and immediately from 7od- a view which
denied 7od!s freedom. In fact, he thought that the
Aristotelian commitment to an eternal universe emraced a
necessity which was incompatile with divine freedom.
Against what he considered to e Aristotle!s view,
ED. -uide . . ., I. 42, p. 2F5.
E4. -uide . . ., I. 42, pp. 2F5$2F2.
#aimonides claims that 8all things exist in virtue of a purpose and not of
necessity.9
EF
#aimonides is clear to distinguish his position from the
positions he attriutes to the Aristotelians and to the 'alam theologians-
#y purpose . . . is to explain to you, y means of arguments
that come close to eing a demonstration, that what exists
indicates to us of necessity that it exists in virtue of the
purpose of Jne who purposed. and to do this without having
to ta'e upon myself what the #uta'allimun have underta'en
$$ to aolish the nature of that which exists and to adopt
atomism, the opinion according to which accidents are
perpetually eing created /which they adopt in order to
maintain their position of divine causation0. . . .
E3
If in faith we affirm that 7od is truly a free agent, then we must
re)ect an eternal universe since, according to #aimonides, such a universe
denied 7od!s freedom and eliminated purpose. :y the time the thirteenth
century opens, discourse aout the origin of the world $$ and in particular
aout how to understand creation $$ is already part of a rich intellectual
legacy which incorporates the traditions not only of 7ree' and ;ellenistic
thought, ut also of #uslim, %ewish, and Christian theology.
C. Creation in the 13th Century
EF. -uide . . ., II. 23, p. I5I.
E3. ibid.. #arvin 1ox oserves- 8It is clear that #aimonides is trying to preserve what he
perceives as the est of two worlds. ;e is not willing to yield to the extreme results of
either the >alam or the Aristotelians. <i'e the >alam he wants to preserve the doctrine of
creation in time, and li'e Aristotle he wants to preserve the fixed order of nature in the
sulunar world. Against the >alam, he re)ects their atomism and its concomitant denial of
the order of nature, and against Aristotle, he re)ects the extension of sulunar necessity to
the supralunar world and its concomitant denial of a purposive creator.9 1ox, op. cit., p.
GFG.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2K
Centuries of theological speculation on the first verse of
7enesis had firmly estalished, well efore the thirteenth
century, at least four tenets in the Christian doctrine of
creation- that 7od alone created the universe. that ;e
created the universe out of nothing. that ;e created the
universe immediately without any secondary causes. that ;e
created the universe with a temporal eginning. The
sustained discussion concerning the doctrine of creation
which occurred in the thirteenth century is part of the wider
encounter etween the heritage of classical antiquity and the
doctrines of Christianity- an encounter etween claims to
truth founded on reason and on faith.
Bo matter how certain each of these four tenets was, each of them
was the o)ect of some contention in the early thirteenth century. The fact
that 7od alone is the creator of the universe was challenged y the ancient
#anichean heresy which had reappeared as Aligensianism and had spread
to southern 1rance y the middle of the twelfth century. <i'e their ancient
counterparts, the Aligenses elieved that there were two ultimate and equal
principles of the universe, one good and one evil. The fact that 7od creates
out of nothing was challenged y the doctrine of pantheism, which was
condemned at the Council of 6aris *2G25+ in %ohn Scotus Erigena!s De
divisone naturae, ecause of the use made of this wor' y Amaury of :Rne
and ?avid of ?inant.
K5
The attraction of Beoplatonism, especially in the
school of Chartres, seemed to ma'e the creator too much li'e the ?emiurge
in 6lato!s ,imaeus. The fact that 7od creates all things immediately was
challenged y the arrival in the <atin ,est, already y the twelfth century, of
wor's which taught the doctrine of emanationism, wor's such as the Liber
de causis.
K2
These wor's would soon e supplemented y those of al$1arai
and Avicenna so that the <atin ,est had a thorough exposure to the doctrine
K5. In the late twelfth century there was considerale confusion as to what constituted the
real Aristotelian corpus. Amaury tried to use Aristotle!s Physics to explain the nature of
7od!s existing in all things. ;e had at his immediate disposal Erigena!s De divisione
naturae *Peri physeon+, in which the <ogos and all creation were seen to emanate from 7od
as from the nihil 8from which all things are made9 and 8in which all things exist.9 1or him,
the nihil was li'e the neo$6latonic non$eing which is eyond all eing and also something
li'e Aristotle!s prime matter from which all things come. ?avid of ?inant egan teaching
Aristotle!s Physics in the arts faculty at 6aris in the first decade of the 2Ith century, and he
explicitly identified Aristotle!s pure potentiality of prime matter with the nothingness of
7od, which transcends all human understanding. Jviously, if Aristotle teaches that 7od is
prime matter his views are incompatile with Christianity. In 2G25 the archishop of Sens
convo'ed a council of ishops in 6aris to discuss the matter. In the decree issued y the
council, the ody of Amaury was to e exhumed and uried in unconsecrated ground. he
was to e excommunicated. the writings of ?avid of ?inant were to e urned. and 8the
oo's of Aristotle on natural science or any commentaries on them were not to e read at
6aris pulicly or privately.9 Chartularium (niversitatis Parisiensis, E vols., ed. y ;.
?enifle and E. Chatelain *6aris- 2FF3$2F34+, 22, vol. 2 , p. 45. See E. 7ilson, %istory of
Christian Philosophy in the .iddle "ges *<ondon- Sheed and ,ard, 23KK+, pp. GE5$GEE.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2D
that 7od!s creative causality was necessarily mediated
through suordinate causes *various levels of
8intelligences9+. 1inally, against the fact that the world had
a temporal eginning, came the doctrine, especially from
Aristotle, that the world is eternal.
In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries there
was considerale disagreement aout the position of
Aristotle on the eternity of the world. Bot only was there
the authority of #aimonides who denied that Aristotle had
claimed to demonstrate that the world is eternal,
KG
ut there
were proems of accurate translations, spurious and
amiguous texts *e.g., from Aristotle!s ,opics+, as well as
the predisposition to read Aristotle in the est light, an
e0positio reverentialis, according to which Aristotle would
not e construed as contradicting a fundamental Christian
doctrine. Coger :acon, one of the early interpreters of
Aristotle, noted that the idea of an eternal world was so
oviously asurd that it could not e attriuted to Aristotle.
K2. The Liber de causis /'oo6 of Causes0 was ta'en largely from
6roclus! Elements of Philosophy and presented a Beoplatonic view of
emanationism. The wor', however, was thought y many in the #iddle
Ages to have een written y Aristotle. ,hen Aquinas wrote his own
commentary on the text *2G42$G+, he recogni&ed that the wor' could not
have een written y Aristotle. ,hen Aquinas comments on the
Sentences of 6eter <omard he still thin's that the Liber de causis is
authentically Aristotelian.
KG. #aimonides distinguishes etween Aristotle and Aristotelians. The
latter assumed that Aristotle had demonstrated the eternity of the
universe. Jn the contrary, according to #aimonides, despite the various
arguments Aristotle advances in favor of the eternity of the universe,
Aristotle was well aware that he 8possesses no demonstration9
concerning the eternity of the universe. ,he -uide of the Perple0ed, op.
cit.5 II. 2K, p. GF3.
;ow could Aristotle, who denied the possiility of an actual infinity, thin'
that there was an unending numer of past days"
KI
Cegardless of what early thirteenth century Christians thought aout
Aristotle, there was no disagreement that, in fact, the universe is not eternal
and that it has een created e0 nihilo y 7od. In 2G2K the 1ourth <ateran
Council proclaimed as much, a proclamation which was directed, at least in
part, against Aligensianism-
,e firmly elieve and simply confess that there is only one
true 7od, . . . one origin /principium0 of all things- Creator of
all things, visile and invisile, spiritual and corporeal. who
y ;is own omnipotent power from the eginning of time /ab
initio temporis0 all at once made out of nothing /de nihilo
condidit0 oth orders of creation, spiritual and corporeal, that
is, the angelic and the earthly. . . .
KE
The decree of 2G2K is the first formal counciliar statement y the
Church that the world had a temporal eginning. The question of the
world!s temporal finitude occupied the attention of theologians and
philosophers throughout the century. In 2G44 the :ishop of 6aris, Etienne
Tempier, issued a list of propositions condemned as heretical, among them
the claim that the world is eternal.
KK
As Chancellor of the Lniversity of
KI. The same argument was used y 6hiloponus. See <uca :ianchi, L!errore di "ristotele/
La polemica contro l!eternit: del mondo nel JIII secolo *1iren&e- <a Buova Italia Editrice,
23FE+, pp. G5$GE. See also Cichard C. ?ales, .edieval Discussions of the Eternity of the
World *<eiden- E.%. :rill, 2335+ and %.:.#. ,issin' *ed.+, ,he Eternity of the World in the
,hought of ,homas "7uinas and %is Contemporaries *<eiden- E.%. :rill, 2335+.
KE. ;. ?en&inger *ed.+, Enchiridion Symbolorum, EGF.
KK. In 2G45 Tempier issued a smaller list of condemned propositions. Articles FI to 3G of
the 2G44 list concern propositions which in various ways affirm that the world is eternal.
See Coland ;issette, En7uKte sur les >@A articles condamn3s : Paris le B mars @>BB
6aris, the ishop was well aware of the deates aout
creation and the eternity of the world which raged
throughout <atin Europe in the thirteenth century. The
recently translated treatises of Aristotle *and his #uslim
commentators+ in the natural sciences and metaphysics
provided an arsenal of arguments which appeared, at least,
to e contrary to the truths of Christianity. In particular,
how is one to reconcile the claim, found throughout
Aristotle, that the world is eternal with the Christian
affirmation of creation, understood as meaning that the
world is temporally finite"
:ishop Tempier!s condemnations reflect the concern
that he and other theologians had concerning heterodox
views on the su)ect of creation eing taught in the arts
faculty of the university. These condemnations are evidence
of the extent and intensity of the deate concerning the
relationship etween faith and reason. 1or example, is the
'nowledge that the world is not eternal exclusively a matter
of faith" Surely, if it is true that the world has a eginning
of its duration there can e no truly demonstrative argument
for its eternity. one truth cannot contradict another truth.
Since the world has a temporal eginning, can reason
*<ouvain- 6ulicationes Lniversitaires, 2344+. <uca :ianchi, Il vescovo
e i filosofi/ La condanna parigiana del @>BB e l!evolu+ione
dell!"ristotelismo scolastico *:ergamo- 6ierluigi <urina, 2335+. >.
1lasch, "uf6lLrung im .ittelalterM Die Nerurteilung von @>BB. Das
Do6ument des 'ischofs von Paris Oberset+t und er6lLrt *#ayence,
23F3+. %ohn #urdoch, 8The Condmenation of 2G44, 7od!s Asolute
6ower, and 6hysical Thought in the <ate #iddle Ages,9 in Niator 25
*2343+, pp. G22$GEE. and %. ,ippel, 8The Condemnations of 2G45 and
2G44 at 6aris,9 in 8ournal of .edieval and 2enaissance Studies, 4
*2344+, pp. 2D3$G52.
demonstrate that this must e so" ,hat can reason demonstrate aout the
fact of creation itself, as distinct from the question of a temporal eginning
of the world" Indeed, can one spea' of creation distinct from a temporally
finite universe" These are some of the questions which thirteenth century
Christian theologians and philosophers confronted.
1rom his earliest to his last writings on the su)ect, St. Thomas
Aquinas maintains that it is possile for there to e an eternal, created
universe.
KD
Jn the asis of faith Thomas holds that the universe is not
eternal. :ut he thin's that 7od could have created a universe which is
eternal. Although reason affirms the intelligiility of an eternal, created
universe, Aquinas thought that reason alone leaves unresolved the question
of whether the universe is eternal. The development y St. Thomas of an
understanding of creation e0 nihilo, and, in particular, his understanding of
the possiility of an eternal, created universe, offers one of the est examples
of his account of the relationship etween faith and reason. In fact, his
magisterial treatment of the doctrine of creation is one of the enduring
accomplishments of the thirteenth century. It is an accomplishment which
sets him apart from his predecessors and his contemporaries.
Contrary to the claims of Averroes, for example, Aquinas thought
that a world created e0 nihilo *whether that world e eternal or temporally
finite+ was susceptile to scientific understanding. Creation so understood
does not destroy the autonomy of that which is created- created eings can
and do function as real secondary causes, causes which can e discovered in
the natural sciences. Bor does an eternal universe have to mean, as
#aimonides, al$7ha&ali, and others argued, a necessary universe, a universe
which is not the result of the free creative act of 7od. An eternal, created
KD. %ohn ,ippel argues that Aquinas only late in his life stated e0plicitly that an eternal,
created universe is possile. ,ippel, 8?id Thomas Aquinas ?efend the 6ossiility of an
Eternally Created ,orld" *The De aeternitate mundi Cevisited+,9 in 8ournal of the %istory
of Philosophy G3, 2 *%anuary 23F2+, pp. G2$I4. Even if ,ippel is right, however, it does not
mean that Aquinas has changed his position on the question.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation 2F
universe would have no first moment of its existence, ut $$
as Avicenna had noted $$ it still would have a cause of its
existence.
Alert the 7reat *ca. 2G55$2GF5+, Aquinas! own
teacher, denied that reason could come to a satisfactory
understanding of creation-
It ought to e said that creation is properly a
divine wor'. To us, moreover, it seems to e
astounding in that we cannot conclude to it
ecause it is not su)ect to a demonstration of
reason. And so not even the philosophers
have 'nown it, unless perchance some
/should have 'nown something0 from the
sayings of the 6rophets. :ut no one ever
investigated it through demonstration. Some,
to e sure, have found certain proale
reasons, ut they do not prove /creation0
sufficiently.
K4
K4. Super Sententiarum libros, li. 2, A, F *:orgnet, G4.GG+ ,hen
Alert in his commentaryHparaphrase of the Liber de causis, a wor' of
his maturity, states that esse is a created thing and that all of the ancients
held that esse is created e0 nihilo, his explanation is in terms of formal
not material causality. 1or Alert, here, esse is the ultimate formality of
a thing. /Liber de causis G.2.24 *:orgnet, 25.ED2$I+. If one resolves a
thing into its ever more universal formalities, along the lines say of a
6orphyrian tree, one ultimately resolves to the most universal formality
of all, namely, esse. #an, for example, can e considered as rational, as
animal, as material sustance, and finally, the most common formality of
all, as eing. There is literally nothing /nihil0 intrinsic to a thing that is
prior to the formality of esse. Thus esse is created e0 nihilo in the sense
that there is nothing prior formally to esse. Jnly esse is said to e
created. none of the formalties susequent to esse is said to e created.
Thus, in man, the formalities of vivere, sentire, and ratiocinari are not
Aet, in the text we have translated, Aquinas claims- 8Bot only does
faith hold that there is creation, ut reason also demonstrates it.9
KF
Central to
Aquinas( philosophical explication of creation is his understanding of the
real distinction etween existence and essence in creatures and their real
identity in 7od. Aquinas( discussion of this theme has een the su)ect of
considerale scholarly reflection in the twentieth century. Etienne 7ilson,
for example, argued that the inspiration for Aquinas( analysis of creation is to
e found in the passage in Exodus in which 7od reveals ;imself as QI am
,ho am.Q It is this Qmetaphysics of Exodus,Q according to which 7od
claims to e eing itself, the unique possessor of eing, eyond all temporal
conditions, which 7ilson finds first in Augustine and then rought to its
most sophisticated form in the thought of Aquinas. According to 7ilson, the
revelation in Exodus Qlays down the principle from which henceforth the
whole of Christian philosophy will e suspended . . . . There is ut one 7od
and this 7od is :eing, that is the corner$stone of all Christian philosophy,
created ut merely caused, or informed, for they are not e0 nihilo. The Christian doctrine of
creation, on the other hand, holds that the entire thing $$ all of what a thing is in any way $$
is created. In De scientia mirabili Dei Alert explains that the philosophers ta'e the word
8creation9 to mean something quite different from what Christians mean- 8Creation $$
understanding- what comes to e from a pure nothing $$ they /the ancient philosophers0
could not 'now through reason.9 /2.2I.KI *:orgnet, I2.KEE$K+
Steven Snyder argues that, although Alert early in his career thought that creation
was not demonstrale, y the time he completed his paraphrase on Aristotle(s .etaphysics
he concluded that there was such a demonstration for the origination of all things out of
nothing. Alert, according to Snyder, came to recogni&e that the ma'ing of something after
nothing /faciens ali7uid post nihil0 does not require that QafterQ have any temporal
connotation. QAlert the 7reat- Creation and the Eternity of the ,orld,Q in Philosophy and
the -od of "braham, edited y C. %ames <ong *Toronto- 6I#S, 2332+, pp. 232$G5G. 1or an
alternate view, see <awrence ?ewan, QSt. Alert, Creation, and the 6hilosophers,Q in Laval
th3ologi7ue et philosophi7ue E5 *23FE+, pp. G3K$I54.
KF. Article Two, solution.
and it was not 6lato, it was not even Aristotle, it was #oses
who put it in position.Q
K3
7ilson claimed that the eternal and necessary world
of 7ree' philosophy was fundamentally different from the
created world of Christian revelation. 1or him, Aristotle(s
first cause explains why the universe is the way it is, not
why it is.
<awrence ?ewan, in a recent article critical of
7ilson(s interpretation of Aquinas,
D5
argues that 7ilson(s
commitment to the importance of Christian philosophy and
its unique understanding of ens in7uantum est ens *eing as
eing+ led him to misunderstand several 'ey texts in which
Aquinas attriutes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle. In
Appendix ? we have translated a few of the passages from
Aquinas in which the attriution is clear. ?ewan also notes
that whereas 7ilson emphasi&es the contingent character of
eing a creature, Aquinas refers to the creation of oth
necessary and contingent eings.
D2
K3. ,he Spirit of .ediaeval Philosophy *Bew Aor'- Charles Scriner(s,
23E5+, p. D3.
D5. 8Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two ;istorians,9 Laval
th3ologi7ue et philosophi7ue K5, G *)uin 233E+, pp. IDI$IF4. Cornelia %.
de =ogel has argued, against 7ilson, that 7ree' philosophy did identify
7od with eing $$ an identification which Christianity appropriated. See
Q(Ego sum qui sum( et sa signification pour une philosophie chr@tienne,Q
2evue des sciences religeuses IK *23D2+, pp. II4$IKK. ,alter
:eierwaltes thin's that Beoplatonic ontology, especially in the thought
of Augustine and :oethius, was particularly important in setting the
intellectual foundations for the Christian 7od(s eing viewed as ipsum
esse subsistens. See, Platonismus in der Philosophie des .ittelalters
*?armstadt- ,issenschaftliche :uchgesellschaft, 23D3+0.
D2. Aquinas distinguishes the necessary from the contingent y noting
*following Aristotle+ that to e necessary means 8cannot e otherwise.9
1or Aquinas, reason alone can arrive at an understanding of the
essential features of the doctrine of creation $$ of everything, that is, ut the
temporal eginning of the world. Aquinas also thin's that the causality of
Aristotle(s unmoved mover is ale to e understood $$ or perhaps expanded
to include $$ the causality of creation. ?espite the difficulties that the
attriution of an understanding of creation to Aristotle raises for Aristotelian
scholars, it reveals the extent to which Aquinas finds a complementarity
etween reason and faith.
DG
In fact, Aquinas generally distinguishes etween necessary and contingent eings in the
created order- 8Among the parts of the whole universe, the first distinction to e oserved is
etween the contingent and the necessary. 1or the highest eings are necessary,
incorruptile, and immoile.9 /Summa contra -entiles III, c. 3E0 1or Aquinas there are
eings which are asolutely necessary ecause in them there is no potency to non$eing.
#aterial eings, on the other hand, possess a potency with respect to other forms and thus
8can e other9 than they are. Aquinas often oserves that 8to e simply necessary is not
incompatile with the notion of created eing.9 /Summa contra -entiles II, c. I50 8Things
are said to e necessary and contingent according to a potentiality that is in them, and not
according to 7od!s potentiality.9 /Summa contra -entiles II, c. KK0 7od, as necessary
eing, is necessary per se. created necessary eings have a cause of their eing, and hence
of the fact that they cannot e otherwise. 1or a good discussion of contingency and
necessity in Aquinas, and how they relate to his notion of creation, see %an Aertsen, #ature
and Creature/ ,homas "7uinas!s Way of ,hought *<eiden, E.%. :rill, 23FF+, pp. GID$GEF.
Ceferring to the last passage cited from the Summa contra -entiles, Aertsen oserves that
for Aquinas- 8Becessity and contingency in things are distinguished not with reference to
the first cause, 7od, ut in relation to their next causes, the intrinsic principles of form and
matter. :oth modes of eing do find their ultimate origin in 7od. 1or ;e is the universal
cause of eing, thus also of the differences of eing, the contingent and the necessary. In
'eeping with the Mle0 necessitatis vel contingentiae! *In NI .etaph., lec. I, 2GGG+ set y
;im, the causality of finite things is ordered. The creating cause itself transcends this
order.9 p. GEI.
DG. Coert So'olows'i thin's that Aquinas( elaoration of the Qmetaphysics of esse . . .
does not focus sufficiently on the contrast etween such metaphysics and the pagan
philosophy of eing.Q 1or So'olows'i, the doctrine of creation is at the oundary etween
reason and faith in that it requires a radical distinction etween the Creator and creature, a
distinction un'nown, indeed un'nowale, to pagan thought. ,he -od of )aith and 2eason
*Lniversity of Botre ?ame 6ress, 23FG+, pp. 22I ff. See also, %ohn 1.O. >nasas, 8Aquinas!
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation G5
?. Aquinas as Bachelor of the Sentences of Peter
om!ard
:y the time the young Thomas Aquinas *. 2GGE+, a memer
of the new Jrder of 6reachers, came to 6aris in 2GEK to live
in the ?ominican priory of Saint$%acques and to study with
Alert the 7reat,
DI
already a #aster
DE
in theology, the
Lniversity of 6aris was recogni&ed as a center of theological
and philosophical learning.
DK
;e also arrived at a time when
tension was mounting etween the secular masters and the
memers of the mendicant orders.
DD
In 2GEF Aquinas
accompanied Alert to Cologne where the latter was to help
to estalish a new studium generale
D4
of the ?ominican
Jrder. Jn Alert(s recommendation, Thomas returned to
Ascription of Creation to Aristotle,9 in "ngelicum, 4I *233D+, pp. EF4$
K5D.
DI. 1or an excellent recent survey of the thought of Alert the 7reat,
see the special issue of the "merican Catholic Philosophical Puarterly,
=ol. 45, Bumer 2 *,inter 233D+, and %ames ,eisheipl, 8The <ife and
,or's of St. Alert the 7reat,9 in "lbertus .agnus and the Sciences/
Commemorative Essays, edited y %ames ,eisheipl *Toronto- 6ontifical
Institute of #ediaeval Studies, 23F5+, pp. 2I$K2.
DE. #aster was the highest academic ran' at the mediaeval university.
DK. ,hen Thomas arrived in 6aris to study it was only thirty$five years
after the first ?ominicans had arrived 8to study, preach, and estalish a
priory.9 See, %ames ,eisheipl, )riar ,homas D!"7uino/ %is Life5
,hought and Wor6s *Bew Aor'- ?ouleday, 234E+5 pp. KI$E.
DD. Secular masters were memers of the secular clergy, that is, the
clergy of a particular diocese. the mendicant masters were memers of
either the ?ominican or 1ranciscan orders- they are 8regular9 clergy in
that they followed a special rule *including, for example, a vow of
poverty+.
6aris in 2GKG to complete the second stage on the road to his ecoming
#aster of theology. At Cologne Thomas had given cursory
DF
lectures on the
:ile. his teaching at 6aris egan with lectures on the Sentences of 6eter
<omard. As baccalarius Sententiarum /or Sententiarius0 Aquinas was only
twenty$seven when he arrived in 6aris in 2GKG,
D3
and over the next four years
as he lectured on the Sentences he compiled a commentary 'nown as
Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. The wor' is not strictly a commentary
ut rather writings *scripta+
45
or elaorations of the text in the form of
questions and discussions of themes which arise from the text. As Qachelor
of the Sentences,Q Aquinas read aloud a passage from the text, which he then
analy&ed. ;e explained riefly the meaning of the points made and then
addressed a question or series of questions arising from the su)ect of the
text.
6eter <omard *ca. 253K$22D5+ was a twelfth century scholar and
ishop of 6aris *22K3$D5+ who rought together a systematic collection of
patristic texts designed to explore the central tenets of the Christian faith.
42

<omard taught in 6aris for more than twenty years and y 22K4HKF he
completed the final version of his Sentences.
4G
There were many collections
D4. A ?ominican studium generale was a house of studies for the education, in theology, of
memers of the order.
DF. ;e was cursor biblicus, and, as such, provided students with a rapid, introductory
reading *or 8run$through9+ and commentary on the :ile.
D3. #ost of Aquinas! predecessors in their role as Sententiarius had een in their forties.
See ,eisheipl, )riar ,homas D!"7uino, op. cit., p. KI.
45. Although scriptum is singular in <atin, we have chosen to translate it as 8writings9
since we thin' this is the proper English idiom for what Aquinas is doing.
42. The most extensive treatment of 6eter <omard is the recent wor' of #arcia Colish,
Peter Lombard, G vols. *<eiden and Bew Aor'- E.%. :rill, 233E+.
4G. A modern edition of 6eter <omard!s Sentences has een edited y Ignatius :rady,
Sententiae in IN Libris distinctae, G vols. *Come- Collegium S. :onaventurae -2342$23F2+.
of such QsentencesQ in the early twelfth century, originating
largely from the school of <aon under Anselm and Calph.
4I

In addition to texts from the Church 1athers, <omard also
drew upon ilical texts to assemle a four part wor'
organi&ed in the following way- 2+ the Trinity *essence of
the Trinity and the relations among the Three 6ersons+ with
some consideration of trinitarian presence in the world and
in the life of Christians. G+ 7od as creator and creatures
*creation in general, the creation and fall of angels, the
creation and fall of man, grace, and original and actual sin+.
I+ the Incarnation of the ,ord and Christ(s wor' of
redemption, to which is annexed a discussion of the virtues
and the gifts of the ;oly Spirit. E+ the doctrine of the
sacraments and a discussion of the last things.
4E
In the preface to his wor', <omard said that his aim
was to present sacred doctrine Qin a small volume consisting
of patristic views /Patrum sententias0 together with their
testimony so that the inquirer would not have to search
through numerous tomes, for the synthesi&ed revity which
he see's is offered here without much laor.Q
4K
Some
theologians attac'ed <omard and other authors of
sententiae for preferring scholastic sutleties to the
simplicity of the :ile.
4D
Bevertheless, y the early
4I. ,eisheipl, )riar ,homas D!"7uino, op. cit., pp. D4$F.
4E. Ignatius :rady, Q6ierre <omard,Q Dictionnaire de spiritualit3 2GHG
*23FD+, col. 2D5F.
4K. Wuoted in ,eisheipl, )riar ,homas D!"7uino, op. cit., p. DF.
4D. <omard!s wor' is representative of the development of theology
as a science in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. #.$?. Chenu
provides an excellent account of the distinction etween the traditional
collatio of the monastic schools and the disputations of the new masters.
thirteenth century <omard(s four oo's of sentences had ecome a standard
text at the new Lniversity of 6aris and, as a result, they were the su)ect of
lectures and commentaries.
In many ways Aquinas( Writings on the Sentences contain the ma)or
themes of his entire intellectual life as theologian and philosopher. %ames
,eisheipl, the noted iographer of Aquinas, oserved-
In this earliest wor' y Thomas, all of his principal
conclusions are estalished- the real distinction etween esse
and essence in creatures and their real identity in 7od.
re)ection of the hylomorphic composition of separated
sustances, or angels. the pure potentiality of prime matter.
the unicity of sustantial form in corporeal creatures.
consideration of the agent and possile intellects in man as
powers of the individual soul. insistence that matter
designated y quantity is the sole principle of natural
individuation. insistence that nature is not the (efficient cause(
At the heart of the new scholastic methods was the search for causes and reasons, which the
defenders of the traditional monastic approach to the :ile re)ected. Jne such defender,
Aot Cupert of ?eut&, as'ed rhetorically why 8men would drin' out of mere cisterns /of
the new scientific learning0 when already they had the living fountain of Christ.9 Chenu
also notes a difference etween the masters of the twelfth century who, 8employing
Beoplatonic metaphysics ased on Augustine or on pseudo$?ionysius, maintained a more
spontaneously religious orientation than their successors, who were equipped with Aristotle
as their guide to reason and eventually also their guide to an understanding of nature and of
man himself.9 See #.$?. Chenu, 8The #asters of the Theological MScience,!9 in #ature5
.an5 and Society in the ,$elfth Century, trans. %erome Taylor and <ester >. <ittle
*Chicago- The Lniversity of Chicago 6ress, 23DF+, pp. G45$I53. The quotations are from
pp. I5G$I5I. Cecently #arcia Colish has descried extensively the development of
systematic theology in the twelfth century and the place of scholastic sentence collections as
an innovative genre of theological literature. #arcia Colish, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. II$35. See
also, %ames ,eisheipl, 8The #eaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa theologiae I, q. 2,9in
,he ,homist IF *234E+, pp. E3$F5. and #arc Aillet, Lire la 'ible avec S. ,homas, *1riourg-
Yditions Lniversitaires, 233I+, pp. I$E5.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GG
ut only the active principle in the free fall of
natural odies. and defense of the possiility
of natural motion in a void. In theology also
his asic principles stand out clearly- e.g., the
hypostatic union of human nature in Christ.
transustantiation of read and wine into the
:ody and :lood of Christ. the infinite
difference and distinction etween what is of
nature and what is of grace.
44
Aquinas will refine, reformulate, and aandon views set
forth in this early text, ut it stands, nevertheless, as an
impressive monument to his s'ills as theologian and
philosopher.
Jne of the notale features of Aquinas( Writings on
the Sentences is how he divides the material into two
categories- the first two oo's treat of the e0itus of all things
from 7od, and the second two oo's, the reditus of all
things to 7od $$ an ovious influence of the ?ionysian and
6lotinian cycle of emanation and return.
4F
%ean$6ierre
Torrell oserves that there is a deeper theological
significance to the structure of e0itus and reditus. That all
creatures come from 7od as first principle finds an analogue
in the Trinity- the procession of the Son from the 1ather.
The efficient causality of 7od, the creator, can e seen as
analogous to the eternal generation of the Son, )ust as the
formal causality of grace, which will permit the return of
44. ibid., p. 4D.
4F. ibid., p. 42. The Summa theologiae is organi&ed in the same way.
creatures to 7od is comparale to the spiration of the ;oly Spirit. Thus, one
is ale to see that the divine mission ad e0tra $$ creation and redemption $$ is
explained according to the order of the processions of the divine persons ad
intra.
43
The point is that the structure of Aquinas( Writings on the Sentences
is chosen not so much for pedagogical purposes, ut ecause it reflects a
profound spiritual intuition. The entire universe of creatures, spiritual and
material, possesses a dynamic character- analogous to the internal dynamism
of the divine persons of the Trinity.
F5

The text we have translated for this volume is in the first part of the
second oo', the discussion of creation. In the prologue to the entire second
oo',
F2
Aquinas distinguishes the way in which a philosopher considers
creatures from the way a theologian does. The philosopher *or roadly
spea'ing the individual who investigates nature with reason alone+ examines
creatures as natural eings and see's to discover their causes and properties.
The theologian, however, considers creatures 8as they come from the first
principle and as they are ordered towards their ultimate end, which is 7od.Q
6hilosophical and theological modes of inquiry are complementary. 7od,
after all, is the author of all truth. The first question of the second oo'
concerns the reality and nature of creation, the exposition of which leads to a
proper reading *Article Six+ of the opening line of 7enesis. Although the
43. %ean$6ierre Torrell, Initiation : Saint ,homas D!"7uin/ Sa Personne et Son Oeuvre
*6aris- Cerf, 233I+, pp. DG$E. See, also, 1rancis Cuello, 8Saint Thomas et 6ierre <omard.
<es relations trinitaires et la structure du commentaire des sentences de saint Thomas
d!Aquin,9 in Studi ,omistici 2, s.d. *234E+, pp. 24D$G53. 7. Emery, 8<e 6Rre et l(oeuvre
trinitaire de cr@ation selon le Commentaire des Sentences de S. Thomas d(Aquin,Q in Ordo
sapientiae et amoris. Image et message de saint ,homas dQ"7uin : travers les r3centes
3tudes histori7ues5 herm3neuti7ues et doctrinales, edited y C. %. 6into de Jliveira
*1riourg, Swit&erland, 233I+, pp. FK$224. 7. #arengo, ,rinit: e Crea+ione. Indagine sulla
teologia di ,ommaso dQ"7uino *Coma, 2335+
F5. 6. 6hilippe, Q<e plan des sentences de 6ierre <omard d(aprRs S. Thomas,Q in 'ulletin
thomiste I *23I5$23II+, pp. 2I2$2KE.
F2. Appendix E contains a translation of the prologue.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GI
wor' efore us is part of a larger theological text, Aquinas
employs many philosophical arguments in it. In fact, one of
the significant accomplishments of Aquinas is the distinction
he draws etween creation understood philosophically and
theologically. Aquinas( understanding of the relationship
etween reason and faith $$ and etween nature and grace $$
remains a crowning feature of his wor'.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GE
An Analysis of Aquinas" Writings on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard,
Boo# II, Distinction I, $uestion I
Aquinas discusses creation in an extensive, magisterial way
three other times in addition to our text- in Summa contra
-entiles II, cc. D$IF *2GK3$DE+. in Puaestiones disputatae
de potenia Dei, q. I *2GDK$DD+. and in Summa theologiae Ia,
qq. EE$ED *2GDD$DF+.
FG
Although in a few instances, which
we will note, Aquinas does change elements of his doctrine
in later wor's, the text from his Writings on the Sentences is
a particularly good source. Aquinas( exposition of creation
here is fuller than that in the Summa theologiae, ut it does
not include so many dialectical arguments, as do his
discussions in the Summa contra -entiles and in the De
potentia Dei. There is not as yet $$ nor li'ely to e soon $$ a
critical <atin edition of Aquinas( Writings on the Sentences.
?espite the difficulties in not having an estalished text
which meets the critical demands of the <eonine
Commission, we feel that an English translation of the
existing text
FI
meets an important need.
Aquinas divides his treatment of creation in this
question of the Writings into six articles. It is a division of
the prolem of creation done in typical scholastic fashion-
FG. 1or a catalogue of Aquinas! wor's, including dating, see ,eisheipl,
)riar ,homas D!"7uino, op. cit., pp. IKK$E5K and Torrell, op. cit., pp.
EFI$KGK.
FI. ,e have used Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,
E vols., edited y 6. #andonnet and #. 1. #oos *6aris- 6. <ethielleux,
23G3$23E4+. Jur text is found in volume G, pp. 25$EI, edited y
#andonnet in 23G3. ,e have completed Aquinas! references to
Scripture and to Aristotle in the translation itself. ,e have completed in
the notes all other references Aquinas cites in the text.
first, the question an sit, whether there is creation, i.e., the proofs of creation
*Article Jne+. next, the question 7uid sit, the definition of creation *Article
Two+. finally, the question de modo, how does creation proceed *Articles
Three, 1our, and 1ive+. Article Six is the culmination of the entire 7uaestio-
the first five articles elaorate the philosophy and the theology needed for an
exposition of the first line of Scripture, which exposition is given in Article
Six. Thus, the entire question may e seen as a good example of the use of
the scholastic method for the exposition of one line of Scripture- In principio
creavit Deus caelum et terram. Each article starts with the formulation of a
prolem to e considered. Aquinas then provides a series of o)ections to
one possile solution. In a section called Qon the contraryQ /sed contra0,
Aquinas riefly sets out the opposing position, usually supported y
references to the :ile, to the Church 1athers, or to short philosophical
arguments. In the QsolutionQ Aquinas gives his own position. 1inally, he
returns to the o)ections, offering a response to each. It is a mista'e to s'ip
over the o)ections and Aquinas( responses to them. The o)ections reveal
the range of deate on a given topic *as well as Aquinas( desire to e fair to
views he opposes+, and more often than not Aquinas( responses contain
important amplifications of the position found in the solution.
Article One
In the initial o)ections in Article Jne, Aquinas explains the twofold
nature of the #anichean prolem- the fact that there is oth good and evil in
the world seems to indicate that there must e two ultimate principles of
things, one supremely good and the other supremely evil. and the fact that
there is contrareity and diversity in the world suggests that there should e a
multitude of first principles from which such contrareity and diversity flow.
1or either reason *or for oth+ it seems that one must affirm that there is
more than one first principle of the world. Against the #anichean position,
however, the very nature of a first principle seems to demand that there e
only one first principle, for plurality always presupposes unity, and a
diversity among first principles can only e accounted for y the fact that the
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GK
first principles are either composites or not self$sufficient $$
either of which is repugnant to the nature of a truly first
principle.
FE
Aquinas egins his solution to this prolem y
ma'ing a distinction. If y QfirstQ one means, Qfirst in some
category or in some order,Q then it is certainly true that there
is more than one first principle of the world- there are as
many of these QfirstsQ as there are orders to e examined. If,
however, y QfirstQ one means that which is first without
qualification or asolutely /primum principium simpliciter0,
then there can only e one first principle of the world.
Aquinas argues in three ways that there must e only
one first principle, and in so doing his arguments amount to
proofs that there is a Creator, or proofs for the existence of
7od. It might, however, e pressing the arguments in the
text too far to suppose that )ust as they are given they
constitute Aquinas( philosophical way of coming to 'now
that there is a 7od. In later wor's, such as the Summa
contra -entiles /I, 2I0, the Summa theologiae /I, q. G, a. I0,
and the Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle /:oo's =II
and =III0, Aquinas will give his philosophical arguments for
the existence of 7od on the asis of a careful analysis of
nature, especially, of motion, change, and efficient causality.
In Article Jne we do find the same approach to 7od, ut the
approach is much more areviated here, ecause of the
context. In this context, Aquinas is arguing against those
who recogni&e some sort of first principle, some sort of
transcendent cause or source of the world, ut they do not
recogni&e that there is only one, asolutely first cause of all.
FE. Any composite is necessarily dependent upon something prior, out
of which it is composed, and therefore cannot e a truly first principle.
Aquinas( concern here is not so much to estalish that there is an immaterial
cause of the universe, for that is already conceded y his opponents,
FK
ut to
show that there can only e one such cause.
1irst, the very order of the universe, an order ovious to our
oservation, would e impossile unless all the parts of the universe sought
one ultimate principle. The important point for this argument is that the
universe as a whole exhiits one order- )ust as the parts of an animal serve
one whole order, so the parts of the universe serve one whole order.
Aquinas would have thought aout the movements of the heavenly odies
which, according to him and to his o)ectors, are moved, not randomly, ut
intelligily and, therefore, y intelligent movers. As these movers are
intelligent creatures, they move for the sa'e of ends. as the end of the
universe is one and not many, for the motions of all the heavenly odies are
all coordinated, there must e one end, and not many. In our own day, we
re)ect the cosmology of the heavenly movers, ut many physicists would
recogni&e that the precise coordination of the laws of physics shows a degree
of order and hence of intelligiility, which affirms an underlying purpose in
the universe. Some even go so far as to claim that the laws of nature are
precisely the laws necessary to produce a universe that can sustain our own
lives and the world that we 'now.
FD
This Qanthropic principle,Q as it is
sometimes called, is a modern version of what Aquinas recogni&ed- the final
causality in the universe as a whole. The specific arguments for an anthropic
FK. That there is an immaterial cause of the universe is not, of course, conceded y some of
Aquinas! opponents, for it is not conceded y the early 7ree' natural philosophers who
were materialists. The materialists, however, were not very sophisticated philosophically
and were not Aquinas! primary antagonists.
FD. %ohn 6ol'inghorne, the distinguished physicist and theologian, puts it this way-
QLnless the fundamental physical laws were more or less precisely what they actually are,
the universe would have had a very oring and sterile history. In other words, it(s only a
very special universe, a finely tuned universe, a universe in a trillion, you might say, which
is capale of having had the ama&ingly fruitful history that has turned a all of energy into a
world containing human life.Q 6ol'inghorne, QSo 1inely Tuned a Lniverse of Atoms, Stars,
Wuanta, and 7od,Q in Common$eal *August 2D, 233D+, p. 2E.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GD
principle, such as those found in %ohn <eslie
F4
and others,
may well fail to convince contemporary scientists and
philosophers. Jur point is simply to note that there is a
similarity in approach characteristic of those of argue for an
anthropic principle and of Aquinas, and, more generally, that
contemporary science does not demand a re)ection of the
view that there is purpose to e discovered in nature.
In the second way of proving that there is only one
first principle, Aquinas argues from the recognition of an
order of levels of eing. Aquinas thin's that it is ovious
that the whole of reality is a hierarchy of perfection in eing-
lower eings are of a nature that is less perfect than higher
eings. This does not refer to individual differences, ut to
differences of species or of natures. Thus, roadly, a plant is
more perfect *in the order of eing+ than a roc', ecause a
plant has its own principle of life and growth. An animal is
more perfect than a plant, ecause it has not only a principle
of growth ut also a principle of sensation and motion.
#an, next, is superior to animals in possessing rationality
and an incorruptile soul. Angels, finally, are more perfect
than man in that they are not su)ect to the mutaility and
corruptiility of the ody and in that their mode of 'nowing
is superior to man(s.
FF
There cannot e such an order of eings unless there
is a highest and a lowest. :ut it is an order of beings, that is,
F4. %ohn <eslie, (niverses *<ondon and Bew Aor'- Coutledge, 23F3+.
FF. The differences among angels themselves can only e accounted for
y recogni&ing the different levels of eing, for each angel as an
immaterial eing is its own unique species. A diversity among
immaterial eings can only e the result of differences in the perfection
and actuality of the different eings. Such differences must e caused
y a first instance of perfection. See Summa theologiae I, q. K5, a. E.
an order from what has the least of eing to what has $$ or, rather, is $$ the
most of eing.
F3
,hen there is more or less of something in some order, and
when there is a first instance of the order, then it is the case that the first
instance is the cause of the other instances. The heat in a cain that is heated
y one wood stove, for example, is an order of more and less, in which there
is a first instance. The differences in degrees of heat in the cain, hotter near
the stove, cooler farther away, are attriutale to the fact that there is a first
instance which is the cause of the many secondary instances. Aquinas
recogni&es the same principle in the order of eings in the world- since there
are degrees of eing and since there is a first eing, the first eing must e
the cause of the differences in the levels of eing among the secondary
eings. That is, the first is the cause of eing in all other instances of eing.
:ut what does it mean to say that the first eing is the cause of eing
in all of the secondary eings" It means that the first eing must truly e
ale to cause eing, and to e ale to do so it must not itself stand in need of
a cause of eing, for if its own eing needed to e caused then something
else would e the first eing. :eing *existence+ is essential to that which
needs no cause of eing. Bow it is true that for all creatures eing is not
essential, for any creature, any secondary eing, can e thought of without
thin'ing that it exists.
35
It is possile, therefore, to thin' of the non$
F3. As Etienne 7ilson has shown, what is distinctive of Aquinas! metaphysics is its focus
on being, rather than, say, on essence, form, sustance, or 7od. This metaphysical focus is
rought out y 7ilson in many places, ut see, especially, 'eing and Some Philosophers, G
nd
edition *Toronto- 6ontifical Institute of #ediaeval Studies, 23KG+. and Christian Philosophy,
translated y Armand #aurer *Toronto- 6ontifical Institute of #ediaeval Studies, 233I+.
This point has also een rought out in many places in the wor' of %oseph Jwens, ut for an
introductory treatment of the prolem see "n Interpretation of E0istence *#ilwau'ee, ,I-
:ruce, 23DF+.
35% As %oseph Jwens has shown, however, it is not enough for the metaphysics of Thomas
Aquinas to hold that eing is accidental for creatures, for if eing is considered in another
way it is essential to all created things. It is wrong, Jwens has argued, to reduce Thomistic
metaphysics either to the claim that creaturely existence is accidental or to the claim that
creaturely existence is essential. :oth claims are true, ut neither one is exclusively true.
existence of any creature. It is not, however, possile to
thin' that the first eing e non$existent. The eing and
essence, therefore, of the first eing are identical.
At the very end of this second way of showing that
there is only one first principle, Aquinas adds that the cause
of eing can only e one since the effect is one. Aquinas is
responding to the #anichean affirmation of the plurality of
principles. ;e says that, in a real sense, we are considering
the cause of one effect, eing, which is the same by analogy
in all creatures.
32
These words, by analogy, are very
See, 8The Accidental and Essential Character of :eing9 in St. ,homas
"7uinas on the E0istence of -od/ ,he Collected Papers of 8oseph
O$ens5 edited y %ohn C. Catan *Alany, BA- SLBA 6ress, 23F5+, pp.
KG$3D. See our discussion of this prolem in the analysis of Article
1our.
32. Even in the study of nature we must use terms analogically- terms
such as Qmotion,Q Qmatter,Q Qform,Q Qcause,Q and the li'e, when
predicated of many different 'inds of things, have only a reasonale
similarity. In each case of analogical usage there is always some prime
analogue, which is est 'nown to us. It is y stretching, expanding, and
extending our original definitions and meanings $$ made possile
ecause of some reasonale similarity $$ that we form truly analogical
concepts. Jnly y analogy to material things can human eings acquire
a glimmer of what immaterial things are li'e, or, more often, understand
what they are not. Thus, we can see why for Aristotle and Aquinas there
can e no fully developed metaphysics without a sound physics, ecause
many terms and meanings employed in metaphysics are derived y
analogy from what we 'now much etter, namely, the nature of material,
sensile things. Similarly, there can e no natural moral law without a
well$grounded concept of nature and human nature. All the carefully
refined terms and distinctions of natural philosophy are further enlarged
analogically in moral philosophy and metaphysics. These refined
analogical terms of metaphysics are further expanded throughout the
whole of Aquinas( theology to serve to illumine the truths of Christian
faith. 1or a rief, insightful discussion of Aquinas( understanding of
important, for they indicate that, although QeingQ means something vastly
different for an angel from what it means for a roc', still all things other than
7od have the same sort of relation to their eing. :eing is the actuality of an
angel, given y 7od, )ust as eing is the actuality of a roc', given y 7od.
There is a 'ind of proportionality here etween the eing of an angel and the
eing of a roc', for an angel(s eing is to an angel what a roc'(s eing is to a
roc', even though it may e nearly impossile to compare the eing of an
angel with the eing of a roc'.
The second way, thus, estalishes that the order of eings requires a
first, and that the first is different from all others in eing the unique instance
of the identity of essence and existence.
The third way ma'es a similar point, ut in different terms. ,e
'now already, from proofs in the Physics, that there is some sort of
immaterial cause of the world. Suppose, however, that there are several
immaterial causes of the world. ;ow will they differ" They will differ in
that some will e more actual, have more actuality and less potentiality, than
others. Jne immaterial eing will e different from another in that it will
have some aility that another will not have. one might, for example, 'now
more than another. This is the crucial point. In order for immaterial eings
to differ from one another, one must have some actuality that the other does
not. The summit of all such eings will e held y that eing that is fully or
completely actual, that has all possile actuality in itself and no possiilities
unfulfilled or unactuali&ed. In order to e different from this eing another
eing would have to lac' some of the actuality of the highest, most actual
eing. ;ence, there can only e one most actual eing.
It only remains for Aquinas in this first article to discuss the reasons
y which some have een led to thin' that there must e a plurality of first
principles and to respond to the initial o)ections, which mostly concerned
the prolem of evil. Thomas(s responses constitute an excellent short treatise
analogy, see %ohn 1. ,ippel, Q#etaphysics,Q in ,he Cambridge Companion to "7uinas, op.
cit., pp. FK$2G4, especially, pp. F3$3I, and Calph #cInerny, ,he Logic of "nalogy *The
;ague- Bi)hoff, 23D2+.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation GF
on the prolem of evil. The first deals with the prolem of
whether evil can exist as a principle, the second with the
prolem of how evil has a cause, and the third with the
prolem of whether evil exists for the most part in this
world.
Article Two
:y the end of the first article, Aquinas has only
concluded that the first principle 8gives eing.9
3G
In the
second article, Aquinas( main concern is to explain )ust what
it means for the first principle to give eing, that is, his
concern is to give a definition of creation e0 nihilo. The
context of the article is the o)ection, given in a variety of
ways, that creation out of nothing is impossile.
1undamentally, each o)ection contains the assumption,
which it is the purpose of this article to refute, that creation
is a 'ind of change. The solution which is at the center of
the second article contains another proof of creation, similar
to that advanced in Article Jne, and a long definition of
creation out of nothing. The analysis in the solution is
Aquinas( finest contriution to the discussion of creation. it
contains the essence of his understanding of creation.
Aquinas points out that there are two senses of
creation out of nothing, one philosophical, the other
theological. The philosophical sense simply means that
7od, with no material cause, ma'es all things to exist as
entities that are radically different from ;is own eing yet
completely dependent upon ;is causality. This
philosophical sense has two essential elements- 2+ there is no
material cause in creation. G+ the creature is naturally non$
eing rather than eing, which means that the creature is
3G. 8/;0oc est quod dat esse omnius.9
completely dependent, throughout its entire duration, upon the constant
causality of the creator. This is the sense in which creation out of nothing
can e proven philosophically *in metaphysics+, and this is precisely what
Aquinas claims to prove. This is also the sense in which philosophers, such
as Avicenna and Aristotle, have proven creation, according to Aquinas.
3I

The theological sense of creation denies nothing of the philosophical sense
ut merely adds to it the notion that the created universe is temporally finite.
This theological sense of creation cannot e proven philosophically. it can
only e 'nown through revelation.
The creature(s dependence upon the cause of its eing is precisely the
same at the eginning of the creature(s duration as it is all throughout its
duration. The creature is always of itself literally nothing and therefore is in
constant need of eing created out of nothing. Creation is not merely some
distant event. it is the on$going, complete causing of the existence of
whatever is. 1or Aquinas, there is really no difference etween creation and
what is called conservation. conservation is simply the continuation of
creation. In :oo' I of his Writings on the Sentences, Aquinas remar's that
the relation of a house to its uilder is very different from the relation of a
creature to the Creator. Jnce the coming$to$e of the house is complete, the
3I. <ater, in his Commentary on "ristotle!s .etaphysics, Aquinas oserves that if
8contingent events are traced ac' further to the highest, divine cause, it will e impossile
to find anything that lies outside its /the first cause!s0 sphere of influence, since its causality
extends to all things insofar as they are eings. ;ence its causal activity cannot e thwarted
as a result of the matter eing indisposed, ecause matter itself and its dispositions do not lie
outside the domain of this agent, since ;e is the agent who gives things their eing and not
merely moves and changes them.9 In JII .etaph., =I, lec. I, 2G2K. Jn the general su)ect
of Aquinas! attriuting a doctrine of creation to Aristotle, see- Steven E. :aldner, 8The
?octrine of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Eternity of the ,orld,9 unpulished <icentiate
Thesis, 6ontifical Institute of #ediaeval Studies *2343+. ,illiam E. Carroll, 8San
Tommaso, Aristotele e la crea&ione,9 "nnales ,heologici F, G *233E+, pp. IDK$I4D.
<awrence ?ewan, 8St. Thomas, Aristotle, and Creation,9 Dionysius 2K *2332+, pp. F2$35,
and 8Thomas Aquinas, Creation, and Two ;istorians,9 op. cit. and #ar' %ohnson, 8?id St.
Thomas Attriute a ?octrine of Creation to Aristotle"9 ,he #e$ Scholasticism DI *23F3+,
pp. 2G3$2KK.
house ceases to have any relation of dependence upon its
uilder. the uilder could die, and the house would continue
to stand. :ut the case is quite otherwise with the creature
7ua creature. The Creator(s causality must e continual, and
of the same 'ind, all throughout the creature(s existence. All
things would fall into non$eing, Aquinas says, unless 7od(s
omnipotence supported them. Q,hence, it is necessary that
;is /7od(s0 operation, y which ;e gives eing, not e
ro'en off, ut e continual.Q
3E
In De potentia Dei, Aquinas
notes that the operation y which 7od creates and conserves
is the same-
It ought to e said that 7od does not produce
things into eing y one operation and
conserve them in eing y another. The eing
/esse0 of permanent things is not divisile,
except accidentally as it is su)ect to some
motion. eing, however, exists in an instant.
,hence the operation of 7od does not differ
according as it ma'es the eginning of eing
and as it ma'es the continuation of eing.
3K
The reason given here for the fact that creation and
conservation are the same is not that in 7od all things are
one in ;is perfect simplicity, ut that the effect of 7od(s
causality, the eing of the creature, is the same effect all
throughout the existence of the creature.
3E. In I Sent., dist. I4, q. 2, a. 2, resp.
3K. De potentia Dei, q. K, a. 2, ad. G.
It is of particular importance to note that Aquinas does not interpret
the expression e0 nihilo, as so many others did in the thirteenth century, to
mean necessarily that 7od ma'es the eing of the creature to exist
temporally after non$eing. In the theological, revealed sense of e0 nihilo, it
is true that the created world has a temporal eginning. :ut there is nothing
in the are meaning of the expression e0 nihilo, apart from revelation, to
indicate that the created world has a temporal eginning. Thus, according to
Aquinas, there is nothing in the very meaning of creatio e0 nihilo that
demands that the world have a temporal eginning. ;e sees no contradiction
in the notion of eternal creation out of nothing. In this, Aquinas stands
squarely against the position of :onaventure and of his followers and of
most thin'ers in the thirteenth century. :onaventure
3D
and Alert the
7reat,
34
and most of their contemporaries, hold that the very meaning of
creatio e0 nihilo is rationally incompatile with the notion of eternal past
duration on the part of the creature. Thin'ers such as :onaventure and
Alert were following the analysis of the expression e0 nihilo that came
from Anselm(s .onologion *c. F+. According to Anselm, if the expression
e0 nihilo is to have any positive meaning, if it is to mean anything more than
a mere denial of material causality, then it must indicate a temporal
eginning. It was the genius of Aquinas, who ac'nowledged a considerale
to det to Avicenna on this point, to see that the positive meaning of e0
nihilo is that the creature is of itself really nothing $$ its non$eing is
naturally prior to its eing $$ and that, therefore, the creature is completely
dependent upon the creator for its eing. Bear the end of his career, in De
aeternitate mundi, Aquinas will ta'e up, in his most sophisticated treatise on
the su)ect, the intelligiility of an eternal, created universe. There he will
write- Qto say that something has een made y 7od and that it has always
existed, is not logically inconsistent.9
3F
,e have included a translation of
this rief ut important treatise in Appendix :.
3D. :onaventure, Commentaria in IN libros sententiarum, li. G, dist. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. I.
34. Alert the 7reat, In II Sent., dist. 2, A, a. I, ad. 2.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation I5
In addition to the definition of creation given in the
solution in Article Two, Aquinas ma'es clear two points
aout creation in his responses to the initial o)ections.
1irst, creation is not any 'ind of change *mutatio+. There is
no ecoming *fieri+ that precedes the eing of the creature.
no passive potency precedes the ma'ing of the creature.
Jther thin'ers, most notaly :onaventure,
33
will hold that
creation is a 'ind of change, not ecause they thin' that
there is some ecoming or some passive potency in creation,
ut ecause they thin' that creation must mean a temporal
eginning. They ta'e the QeforeQ and QafterQ of creation to
e sufficient to indicate a 'ind of change. Aquinas, on the
other hand, resolutely refuses to call creation a change, for
he recogni&es that a change must always have a material
cause or a passive potency of some 'ind.
Second, although creation is not in the category of
change, it can e placed in a category, the category of
relation. It is a peculiar type of relation, however, for
although the creature is really related to the Creator, the
Creator is not really related to the creature. The non$mutual
character of creation is essential ecause 7od possesses no
accidents. If 7od were really related to the creature, 7od
3F. 1or an excellent discussion of this text, see %ohn 1. ,ippel, 8?id
Thomas Aquinas ?efend the 6ossiility of an Eternally Created ,orld"
*The De aeternitate mundi Cevisited+,9 op. cit., and %ames ,eisheipl,
8The ?ate and Context of Aquinas! De aeternitate mundi,9 in -raceful
2eason/ Essays in "ncient and .edieval Philosophy Presented to
8oseph O$ens, edited y <loyd 7erson *Toronto- 6ontifical Institute of
#ediaeval Studies, 23FI+, pp. GI3$G42. See Appendix : for the full text
of De aeternitate mundi.
33. :onaventure, In II Sent., dist. 2, p. 2, a. I, q. 2. See Steven :aldner,
8St. :onaventure on the Temporal :eginning of the ,orld,9 in ,he #e$
Scholasticism DI, G *23F3+, pp. G5D$GGF.
would undergo an accidental change at the temporal eginning of creation.
If x and y are really related to each other, then changes in one necessarily
involve changes in the other. Aquinas oserves in many places that 7od is
asolutely immutale.
255
Although it is correct to call creation a relation, we
must not forget that the foundation of the relation is 7od(s efficient causality
/i.e., ;is agere0. ,e must also rememer that the 'ind of efficient causality
exercised in creation does not involve wor'ing with a prior su)ect.
Elsewhere Aquinas explains that the relation of a 'nower to the thing
'nown is li'e the relation of a creature to its Creator. i.e., the relation is non$
mutual.
252
The 'nower is really related to, and really dependent *for
'nowledge+ upon the 'nowale thing, ut the 'nowale thing is not in any
way affected y the 'nower. The 'nowale thing may have a relation of
reason *relatio rationis+ to the 'nower, ut it is not really related to the
'nower. Similarly, 7od is not really related to the creature, i.e., ;e does not
depend upon the creature in any way, nor is ;e affected y the creature, ut
the creature is completely and constantly dependent upon the creator. In the
255. 87od who moves all things, must ;imself e unmovale. If ;e, eing the first
mover, were ;imself moved, ;e would have to e moved either y ;imself or y another.
;e cannot e moved y another, for then there would have to e some mover prior to ;im,
which is against the very idea of a first mover. If ;e is moved y ;imself, this can e
conceived in two ways- either that ;e is a mover and moved according to the same respect
or that ;e is a mover according to one aspect of ;im and is moved according to another
aspect. The first of these alternatives is ruled out. 1or everything that is moved is, to that
extent, in potency, and whatever moves /i.e., changes0 is in act. Therefore if 7od is oth
mover and moved according to the same respect, ;e has to e in potency and in act
according to the same respect, which is impossile. The second alternative is li'ewise out
of the question. If one part were causing motion and another were eing moved, there
would e no first mover himself as such, ut only y reason of the part of him which causes
motion . . . Accordingly, the first mover must e altogether unmovale.9 Compendium of
,heology, c. E. See also Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 2. 1or a thorough discussion of 7od!s
immutaility, see #ichael %. ?odds, J.6., ,he (nchanging -od of Love/ " Study of the
,eaching of St. ,homas "7uinas on Divine Immutability in Nie$ of Certain Contemporary
Criticism of ,his Doctrine *1riourg, 23FD+.
252. Summa theologiae I, q. 2I, a. 4.
creature, the real relation to the creator has two elements- it
is ad aliud, i.e., dependent upon 7od, and it is an attriute
inhering in the creature as in a su)ect. The fact that
creation is a real relation in the creature, therefore, indicates
oth that the creation is prior to the creature and that
creation is posterior to the creature. In one sense, creation is
prior to the creature, for the creature(s relation ad aliud is a
relation of complete dependence upon the creator, and such
dependence is asolutely prior to everything else in the
creature. In another sense, creation is posterior to the
creature, for creation inheres in the creature li'e an essential
attriute.
25G
Creation in the creature, i.e., creation in the
passive sense, is oth the activity that the creature is
constantly receiving in order to exist and the result of that
activity, which forms part of the essential ma'e$up of the
creature.
Article Three
In Article Three, Aquinas ta'es up the prolem of
emanationism. Specifically, as he puts it, the prolem is
whether 7od can communicate the power of creating to
creatures. In other words, can 7od use creatures as
instruments in creation" This article reveals something of
Aquinas( personal intellectual history, for later in his life he
re)ects the position he adopts here. In this article, and only a
little latter in his Puaestiones disputate de veritate *2GKD$4+,
Aquinas allows that it is philosophically possile for 7od to
use some creatures as intermediaries or instruments in the
creation of other creatures. Thus, in these two early wor's,
25G. 1or a good discussion of this general topic, see 1rederic' ?.
,ilhelmsen, 8Creation as a Celation in Saint Thomas Aquinas,9 in
.odern Schoolman KD *2343+, pp. 254$2II.
Aquinas grants that the doctrine of emanationism is philosophically
plausile, although contrary to the faith, which teaches that 7od created all
things immediately.
Soon after he completed the De veritate, Aquinas changed his mind
on this question. In the Summa contra -entiles *2GK3$DE+, the De potentia
Dei *2GDK$DD+, the prima pars of the Summa theologiae *2GDD$DF+, and the
Puodlibetum tertium *2G45+,
25I
he argues that it is philosophically
impossile for 7od to communicate in any way the power of creating to
creatures. 1irst, the wor' of creation is a wor' that requires infinite power.
since all creatures are, y nature, finite, they cannot receive, even
instrumentally, the infinite creative power.
25E
Second, an instrument is only
ale to cause an effect *instrumentally+ that is commensurate with its own
form.
25K
Thus, for example, a saw can cut wood ecause the action of cutting
is commensurate with the properties of the form of the saw. ;aving sharp,
metal teeth elongs to the very essence of a saw. a saw can therefore produce
*instrumentally+ an effect, the cutting of wood, that is commensurate with its
own essence. :ut since eing does not elong essentially to any creature, no
creature can e the instrument of the giving of eing.
Although Aquinas says clearly, from the Summa contra -entiles on,
that no creature can serve as an instrument of creation, he does spea' at
times as though creatures can e instrumental causes in the conservation of
eing.
25D
:ut it is clear that Aquinas means only that secondary causes, such
as the heavenly odies, produce motions that result in conditions that are
favorale to creatures on the earth elow. ,hen Aquinas spea's of heavenly
odies as conservers of earthly eings, he is careful to point out that the
causality of heavenly odies can never extend eyond motion to the very
25I. Summa contra -entiles II, cc. G5$2. De potentia Dei q. I, a. E. Summa theologiae I, q.
EK, a. K. Puodlibetum tertium q. I, a. 2. see Appendix A.
25E. De potentia Dei, q. I, a. E, sol.
25K. Summa theologiae I, q. EK, a. K, sol.
25D. Summa theologiae I, q. 25E, a. G.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation IG
eing of things.
254
Insofar as one creature is the cause of the
well$eing of another creature, we may say that the one is
the conserver of the other, ut one creature can never give
eing itself to another.
Article Four
In the fourth article, Aquinas corrects an imalance
that may e present in the reader(s understanding of creation.
In the first three articles, Aquinas spo'e aout the eing of
the creature as though it were something quite accidental to
the creature, something that must e entirely caused y 7od.
Jf its own nature $$ that is, left completely to itself $$ the
creature is non$eing rather than eing, and it must e
caused y 7od continuously lest it return to the non$eing
which it properly is. It is true to say that the creature is
literally nothing without the creative causality of 7od.
Bevertheless, we must rememer that the eing of
creatures, far from eing an accident, is the ultimate
perfection or actuality of the creature.
25F
#ost profoundly,
in the depths of any creature is its eing. a creature is
nothing so much as its own eing. The creature, thus, far
from eing an insustantial, quasi$nothing, is a real
something, existing on its own. In giving eing to the
creature, 7od does not merely ma'e the creature to e an
extension of ;imself. rather ;e gives the creature an
inherent staility in eing, i.e., a tendency to exist. 7od
gives eing in such a way that the tendency of the given
eing is not to lapse into non$eing ut precisely to remain
254. De potentia Dei, q. K, a. 2, ad. 4.
25F. In I Sent., dist. F, q. 2, a.I.
in eing. 7od so constitutes the eing of creatures that they tend to exist and
not to fall into nothingness.
253
Jn this point it is helpful to compare the doctrine of St. :onaventure
who, li'e Aquinas, does not hold that created eings have a tendency to non$
existence, ut who, unli'e Aquinas, thin's that since creatures are temporal
they need a maintenance in eing, called conservation, that is different from
their eing created in the first place. It is true for oth Aquinas and
:onaventure that creatures will cease to exist if 7od should cease to cause
their existence. 1or Aquinas, however, 7od gives eing, and no other act is
required in order to 'eep creatures in existence. 1or :onaventure, on the
other hand, 7od must perform two different acts- ;e gives eing initially
and, since the creature cannot naturally maintain its own existence, ;e
conserves the creature in existence.
225
In other words, according to
:onaventure, if we loo' at the natural principles of a creature, form and
matter, the creature is not mutale into asolute non$eing. If, however, we
loo' at the fact that creatures are made out of nothing, we find an inherent
emptiness *vanitas+, instaility *instabilitas+, and mutaility *vertibilitas+.
;ence, y nature creatures are mutale into non$eing, ut y 7od(s grace
they are conserved in eing.
222
An illustration of the fact that in Aquinas( doctrine eing elongs
essentially to the creature can e found in the De potentia Dei *q. K, a. I+,
where he as's whether 7od can return the creature to nothing. ,hen
Aquinas answers this question he re)ects the view of Avicenna, who had
argued that the essence of the creature is of itself a pure possiility toward
either eing or non$eing. Aquinas agrees with Averroes in thin'ing that
253. 8The natures of creatures manifest that no creatures are degenerating into nothing,
either ecause they are immaterial eings, in which there is no potency to non$eing, or
ecause they are material eings, and these remain in existence, at least in their matter,
which is incorruptile.9 Summa theologiae I, G. 25E, a. E, sol. See also De potentia Dei, q.
K, a. E.
225. :onaventure, In II Sent., dist. I4, a. 2, q. G, sol.
222. :onaventure, In I Sent., dist. F, part 2, a. G, q. G, sol. and ad 4$F.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation II
some creatures, such as immaterial sustances and heavenly
odies, have an inherent necessity for existing, for there is in
them no possiility for corruption. Aquinas, however,
carries Averroes( point further, and argues that no creature,
whether material or immaterial, has any sort of potency for
non$eing- Q. . . in the whole of created nature, there is no
potency through which it is possile for something to tend
into nothing.Q
22G
It is true that material odies tend to
corrupt, ut matter itself, prime matter, is incorruptile. The
whole of the universe, considered in itself, has its own eing
and tends to continue in eing. Jf itself, it has no potency,
or tendency, to non$eing. ;owever true it may e to say
that the creature would e asolutely nothing without the
creative causality of 7od, still, the creature really, and even
essentially, has its very own eing.
Since creatures do have their own eing, they are
ale to e true, autonomous causes. The prolem for article
four is to explain how it is that, although 7od is the
immediate cause of all eing, creatures are still true causes
of effects. Aquinas( explanation is that creatures are the true
causes of whatever comes to e either through motion or
generation and that 7od is the cause of the eing of all
things, even of that which is produced through motion or
generation. 7od is the constant cause of all eing. creatures
cause, as it were, only the determinations of eing. The
creature causes this form to e in this matter, y ringing the
form into actuality from the potency of matter, ut 7od
causes the matter to e and thus gives it a potency to form.
Creatures, thus, are the true causes of most
22I
sustantial and
22G. De potentia Dei, q. K, a. I, sol.
22I. Aquinas points out that creatures cannot e the causes of angels or
human souls or heavenly odies *the latter were not, according to
accidental changes in that they produce the new form, ut as to the
production of eing, 7od is always the only cause.
<ater, in De potentia Dei /q. I, a. F0, Aquinas investigates in greater
detail the relationship etween creation and 8the wor' of nature.9 The issue
concerns the general prolem of how one sustance can ecome another
sustance and how anything can cause this to happen. ,here does the form
of the new sustance
22E
come from" Either the new form always existed, in
which case it does not come into eing. or it never existed, in which case it
cannot come into eing. Aquinas descries two erroneous accounts of how
new things come to e. According to one view, forms pre$exist in matter.
thus generation is ut the extraction of one thing from another. The forms of
new things are actually present in matter, ut hidden, and natural agents
produce new things only in the sense that they serve to reveal what is already
there. Aquinas thin's that such a view suffers from an 8ignorance of matter,9
a failure to distinguish etween potency and act. The forms of things which
are produced y nature exist in matter, ut only potentially, not actually.
Such a distinction etween potency and act is essential for ma'ing sense of
real generation, real novelty, in the world.
Jthers thought that forms cannot proceed from matter ecause forms
are immaterial realities, and matter is not part of form. Thus, the forms of
new things must, quite literally, come from nothing. Batural agents lac' the
power to produce forms from nothing, and thus a supernatural agent is
necessary for the generation of new forms. Ceal ecoming in the world is
reduced to an extrinsic dator formarum *giver of forms+. This is the view of
Avicenna, for whom natural forms flow from the lowest of the spiritual
mediaeval cosmology, su)ect to contrareity+, nor of temporally first memers of every
species *since no prior memers of the species were present to generate these first
memers+.
22E. Aquinas accepts Aristotle!s understanding of change, in the categories of oth
sustance and accident, which refers to the loss and acquisition of form *sustantial andHor
accidental+.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation IE
sustances. Batural agents only prepare matter for the
reception of forms. the forms come to e per viam
creationis,
22K
and creation is always mingled with the
activity of natural agents. Aquinas claims that this view
arose ecause of an 8ignorance of forms-9 the view that the
form of a thing is a susistent entity /a 7uod est0. Aquinas
was always alert to avoid the the reification of form or
matter. they are principles of things, not things in
themselves. 1orm, for Aquinas, is that wherey a thing is /a
7uo est0. Those things which come to e are composites of
form and matter. it is not, strictly, the form which comes to
e. it is the substance, which has a certain form, which
comes to e, susists, and whose coming$into$eing must e
explained.
1or Aquinas, following Aristotle, forms pre$exist in
the potency of matter and they are rought into actuality y
natural agents. Bew forms are not generated y nature out
of nothing. they are educed from the potency of matter.
:ecoming involves natural agency. it is not 8mingled9 with
22K. The dator formarum is also the 8agent intellect9 y which the
human mind 'nows all reality. This agent intellect is immaterial and
separated from matter, and therefore one for all man'ind. The
individual human mind, although capale of 'nowing reality, of itself
has no form or concept of anything. the new form or concept is infused
in the mind y the agent intellect when the mind is disposed toward it.
As ,eisheipl oserves, 8It was Avicenna!s asic inaility to explain
how the potential can ecome actual that made him postulate an
extrinsic dator formarum to explain the wor's of nature.9 8Aristotle!s
Concept of Bature- Avicenna and Aquinas,9 in "pproaches to #ature in
the .iddle "ges, edited y <awrence ?. Coerts *:inghamton, B.A.-
State Lniversity of Bew Aor' 6ress, 23FG+, p. 2K5. See Summa contra
-entiles III, c. D3.
creation, even though ecoming presupposes creation.
22D
1or Avicenna, the
natural agency of fire is sufficient to dispose water to ecome warmer and
warmer, ut at the precise moment when the water is sufficiently hot, the
dator formarum infuses into the water the new form of air to replace the
form of water, thus producing a sustantial change. 1or Aquinas, fire is
sufficient in itself not only to dispose water to its oiling point *an accidental
change+, ut even to cause water to ecome air.
The natural sciences see' to discover real causes in the world. In
Article 1our Aquinas has shown that a doctrine of creation e0 nihilo, which
affirms the radical dependence of all eing upon 7od as its cause, is fully
compatile with the discovery of causes in nature. 7od!s omnipotence does
not challenge the possiility of real causality for creatures, including that
particular causality, free will, which is characteristic of angels and men. The
relationship etween divine action and the world $$ oth with respect to the
natural sciences and human freedom $$ continues to e a topic of extended
commentary and deate.
224
Some views refer to a divine withdrawal from the
world so as to leave room *a metaphysical space+ for the action of creatures.
Thus, 7od is said to allow or to permit human freedom. Jther views
emrace a process theology which denies 7od!s immutaility and ;is
omnipotence *as well as ;is 'nowledge of the future+ so that 7od is said to
e evolving or changing along with the universe and everything in it. 1or
Aquinas, such views fail to do )ustice either to 7od or to creation. Creatures
are and are what they are *including those which are free+ precisely ecause
7od is present to them as cause. ,ere 7od to withdraw, all that exists
would cease to e. Ceal causality in nature $$ that which Averroes and
#aimonides recogni&ed must e protected against the views of certain of the
'alam theologians $$ is not challenged y divine omnipotence or divine
omniscience. Creaturely freedom and the integrity of nature, in general, are
22D. See Aertsen, op. cit., pp. I23 ff.
224. See Coert %ohn Cussell, Bancey #urphy, and Arthur C. 6eacoc'e, Chaos and
Comple0ity/ Scientific Perspectives on Divine "ction *=atican City- =atican Jservatory
6ulications, 233K+.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation IK
guaranteed y 7od!s creative causality, i.e., y 7od!s
intimate presence in all that ;e creates. As Simon Tugwell
aptly puts it- 8The fact that things exist and act in their own
right is the most telling indication that 7od is existing and
acting in them.9
22F
1or Aquinas, 7od is at wor' in every operation of
nature, ut the autonomy of nature is not an indication of
22F. Simon Tugwell, "lbert and "7uinas/ Selected Writings *Bew
Aor'- The 6aulist 6ress, 23FF+, p. G2I. 8Some have understood 7od to
wor' in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect
in things, ut that 7od alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought.
for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, ut 7od in the fire, and so
forth. :ut this is impossile. 1irst, ecause the order of cause and effect
would e ta'en away from created things, and this would imply lac' of
power in the Creator, for it is due to the power of the cause, that it
estows active power on its effect. Secondly, ecause the active powers
which are seen to exist in things, would e estowed on things to no
purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things
created would seem, in a way, to e purposeless, if they lac'ed an
operation proper to them, since the purpose of everything is its
operation. . . . ,e must therefore understand that 7od wor's in things in
such a manner that things have their proper operation. . . . Thus then
does 7od wor' in every wor'er, according to these three things. 1irst as
an end. 1or since every operation is for the sa'e of some good, real or
apparent. and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far
as it participates in a li'eness to the supreme good, which is 7od. it
follows that 7od ;imself is the cause of every operation as its end.
Again it is to e oserved that where there are several agents in order,
the second always acts in virtue of the first, for the first agent moves the
second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of 7od ;imself. and
therefore ;e is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must
oserve that 7od not only moves things to operate, as it were applying
their forms and powers to operation, )ust as the wor'man applies the axe
to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form. ut ;e
also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in eing.
Therefore ;e is the cause of action not only y giving the form which is
the principle of action. . .. ut also as preserving the forms and powers
some reduction in 7od!s power or activity. rather, it is an indication of ;is
goodness. To ascrie to 7od *as first cause+ all causal agency 8eliminates
the order of the universe, which is woven together through the order and
connection of causes. 1or the first cause lends from the eminence of its
goodness not only to other things that they are, ut also that they are
causes.9
223
Article Fie
In the fifth article, Aquinas ta'es up the prolem of the temporal
eginning of the world, and his solution is unique in the thirteenth century.
2G5
As we noted aove, Aquinas held that it would have een possile for the
created world to e eternal ut that de facto, as we 'now from revelation, the
world had a temporal eginning. Jthers, including :onaventure,
2G2
did not
see anything contradictory in the idea of mere eternal past duration, ut
Aquinas was alone in recogni&ing that Qeing createdQ is fully compatile
with Qeternal past duration.Q
of things. . . . Since the form of the thing is within the thing, since /form0 is of more
importance as it is prior and more universal, and since 7od is properly the cause in all things
of universal eing, which is the most intimate reality in things, it follows that 7od operates
intimately in all things.9 Summa theologiae I, q. 25K, a. K.
223. De veritate 22, 2. see also Summa theologiae I, q. GG, a. I, q. GI, a. F, ad. G.
8Creation is not mingled in the wor's of nature ut is presupposed for the operation of
nature.9 Summa theologiae I, q. EK, a. F.
2G5. Cichard C. ?ales, op. cit.. %.:.#. ,issin' *ed.+, op cit.. C. =ollert, et al. *eds.+, St.
,homas "7uinas5 Siger of 'rabant5 and St. 'onaventure On the Eternity of the World
#ilwau'ee, ,isconsin- #arquette Lniversity 6ress, 23DE+, <uca :ianchi, L!errore di
"ristotele . . ., op. cit.. ;. ?avidson, and C. Sora)i, op. cit.
2G2. :onaventure did not find it self$contradictory to suppose that something should exist
eternally in past time, nor even to suppose that something should e eternally caused in the
past. ,hat :onaventure did find to e self$contradictory was to suppose oth the eternal
past duration of creatures and their having een created out of nothing. :onaventure, In II
Sent., d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. G. See :aldner, op. cit.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation ID
As we have already seen, Aquinas recogni&ed the
possiility of an eternally created world ecause he saw that
there was nothing in the concept of Qeing created out of
nothingQ that indicates the necessity of a temporal
eginning. Since there is nothing at all in the meaning of
creatio e0 nihilo to indicate a temporal eginning, ecause
the act of creation does not ta'e any time *it is not li'e a
change that ta'es place in matter+, and since actual causes
are always simultaneous
2GG
with their effects, it would not e
unreasonale to say that the created world had eternal
duration. Aquinas was ale to distinguish etween the
question of the ultimate origin of the world and whether the
world had a temporal eginning. As we saw in Article Two,
Aquinas thin's that the philosopher can show that the world
has an origin $$ in that it is dependent upon 7od as creator $$
ut the philosopher cannot show that the world has a
eginning of its duration.
2GI
In defending his own position, Aquinas responds to
two extreme positions- that the world is necessarily eternal
and that the world necessarily had a temporal eginning. In
this article, Aquinas summari&es the arguments for and
against each position. Those arguments for the eternity of
the world Aquinas divides into four groups.
2GG. Actual, as distinct from potential, causes are always simultaneous
with their effects. ?avid ;ume, for example, while asleep, is only the
potential cause of ,he En7uiry Concerning %uman (nderstanding, ut
when sitting at his des' and writing the text, he is the actual cause. See
Aquinas, In II Post. anal. 2G, lectio 25, a. G. and ,illiam A. ,allace,
QAquinas on the Temporal Celation :etween Cause and Effect,Q in
2evie$ of .etaphysics G4 *234I$4E+, pp. KD3$KFE.
2GI. See also, De potentia Dei, q. I, a. 2E /?e ratione vero creationis
est haere principium originis, non autem durationis. nisi accipiendo
creationem ut accipit fides.0
2.+ All generation and corruption presuppose a material sustrate.
#atter itself, therefore, or prime matter, is ungenerale and incorruptile.
#atter, thus, must e eternal. #atter, however, cannot exist apart from form
$$ that is, apart from eing informed or determined as some particular thing
$$ so matter and form together must e eternal. Aquinas responds that,
although it is true that matter is ungenerale and incorruptile, it does not
follow that it always existed, for its primal coming$to$e was not through
generation ut through creation out of nothing. The error underlying this
sort of argument is to thin' that what is true for all natural, physical change
must also e true for the act of creation.
G.+ It is the nature of time to e a flowing reality, always )oining the
past to the future. If there were a eginning of time, then there would e a
time, namely, the very eginning of time, when time did not )oin the past to
the future. Thus, an impossiility would result- there would e a a time
when time was not really time. Aquinas responds that such an argument is
circular, for it defines time in such a way as to preclude the very possiility
of what is in question, namely, a temporal eginning, and then it concludes
that time could not have a eginning. It is true that, once time has egun,
time will always )oin the past to the future, ut it is not true that there must
always have een time.
Jne o)ection to the intelligiility of a temporal eginning of
creation is that it involves the notion of a time efore time. In the Summa
contra -entiles /II, ID, 40, Aquinas descries the sense of 8efore9 and
8after9 involved in spea'ing aout the world!s coming$into$existence after it
did not exist-
. . . the before we spea' of as preceding time implies nothing
temporal in reality, ut only in our imagination. Indeed,
when we say that time exists after not existing, we mean that
there was no time at all prior to this designated now. even so,
when we declare that above the heavens there is nothing, we
are not implying the existence of a place
outside the heavens which can e said to e
above in relation to it, ut that there is no
place at all aove it. In either case, the
imagination can add a certain dimension to
the already existing thing. and )ust as there is
no reason for attriuting infinite quantity to a
ody, as is said in Physics III /G5DG50, so
neither does it )ustify the supposition that
time is eternal.
I.+ All motion that ta'es place can only ta'e place
ecause some prior motion has ta'en place, either in the
mover or in the thing moved. Therefore, all motion must
always have een preceded y some motion, and there can
e no new motion without a previous motion. Since motion
must always e preceded y motion, motion must e eternal.
If motion is eternal, that which is moved must e eternal.
Therefore, some movale thing has existed eternally.
Aquinas responds that creation is not a change and does not
involve any sort of motion. If one wishes to call creation a
change, however, it is a change that is preceded not y a
change in the mover ut only in the movale thing. :ut
since the Qmovale thingQ in the case of creation is really
non$eing, there cannot e any motion or change of any 'ind
prior to creation. The arguments for the eternity of the
world, ased on an analysis of time and motion, have their
source in Aristotle(s Physics. In Appendix C we have
provided excerpts from Aquinas( Commentary on the
Physics, in which he examines and re)ects the demonstrative
character of these arguments. In Article 1ive, Aquinas,
following #aimonides, claims that Aristotle himself never thought that there
was a demonstration for the eternity of the world. there were only proale
arguments. :y the time *late 2GD5(s+ that Aquinas examines in detail
Aristotle(s Physics he comes, perhaps reluctantly, to the conclusion that
Aristotle does claim that he demonstrates that the world is eternal. :ut even
here, as the texts in Appendix ? show, Aquinas thin's that Aristotle holds
that the world is created.
E.+ If the first cause of the world, either the Creator or the first mover,
causes the world to egin in some way, either in eing or in motion, it would
imply that the first cause underwent a change. There would have to e a
QtimeQ when the first cause was not causing the world, and then a QtimeQ
later when the first cause was causing the world. 1or the first cause to go
from non$causing to causing would imply that the first cause went from
potency to act, i.e., that it underwent a change. The first cause, however, is
entirely immutale and could not have undergone a change. The first cause,
therefore, causes the world eternally. Aquinas responds y distinguishing
among different 'inds of efficient causes. An efficient cause that acts
necessarily, according to its nature, is determined to its action y the
principles of its nature. If it produces something new, it must undergo a
change. An efficient cause that acts through will can e one of two 'inds-
either it acts through an action that is not the very essence of the agent itself,
and in such an agent, producing a new effect always implies a change in the
agent. or it acts through an action that is its very own essence, and in such an
agent *7od+, producing a new effect does not imply a change in the agent.
Since 7od(s willing is ;is action *suum velle est sua actio+, 7od can and
does eternally will that certain things have a eginning in time, and ;e does
not have to perform any additional action, other than ;is eternal willing, to
ring aout the effect that ;e has willed. The implication of 7od(s perfect
simplicity is that once ;e has willed to do something ;e has already done it.
if 7od has willed from all eternity that an effect egin to e at some time,
7od has ipso facto already caused from all eternity the effect to egin to e
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation IF
at its appointed time. 7od can, therefore, without changing
;imself at all, will eternally that a new effect, such as the
eginning of the world, egin to e.
2GE
Although these four arguments presented a radical
challenge to the truth as understood y the Church, it was
not difficult for Aquinas to respond to them y showing that
none of them is demonstraly true. Aquinas, the theologian,
also finds that the various arguments which purport to prove
what he elieves to e true *vi+., that world has a temporal
eginning+ lac' proative force. Even though the
conclusion each of these arguments reaches is, according to
Aquinas, true, he does not thin' it wise to defend the truths
of faith with faulty reasoning. Aquinas analy&es five
different sets of arguments which conclude that the world
must have a temporal eginning.
2.+ To e created is to e made out of nothing. To e
made out of nothing is to have eing temporally after non$
eing. Therefore, if the world is created, it cannot e
eternal. ,e have already seen Aquinas( response to this
type of argument. To e created out of nothing does not
necessarily mean to have eing temporally after non$eing.
:eing created out of nothing means having non$eing prior
to eing, ut such priority does not imply a temporal
2GE. This response indicates that, according to Aquinas, )ust as the
existence of 7od can e proven, so also can the freedom of 7od(s action.
Since 7od is proven to e susistent eing, we 'now that there is no
difference among 7od(s willing, ;is nature, and ;is actions.
1urthermore, since we 'now that eing is the perfection of all
perfections, the ultimate instance of eing must e the instance of
ultimate perfection. Since freedom is a perfection, we 'now that 7od
must e perfectly free. The fact that 7od(s freedom is demonstrale
indicates that the position of the emanationists, namely, that 7od causes
necessarily, is demonstraly false.
priority. it is simply a priority of nature. A priority of nature means that the
creature is of itself *i.e., y nature+ nothing, or, in other words, it means that
the creature is completely dependent upon the Creator.
G.+ All sound natural philosophers agree that an actual infinite is
impossile. If the world is eternal, however, we would have to conclude that
there has een an infinite numer of past days. It is clear that there cannot
have een an infinite numer of past days ecause, on the one hand, it will
have een impossile to have reached the present day, y starting from a day
infinitely distant in the past, for one cannot traverse an infinite series, and,
on the other hand, no more past days could e added to those already past,
for the infinite does not admit of addition. As Aquinas points out, the
fundamental mista'e of such an o)ection is the failure to distinguish
etween things that are successive and things that exist in a complete
actuality, totum simul. A material thing that is a complete actuality, li'e a
mountain, cannot e infinite, ecause it has all of its actuality at once *totum
simul+. If a mountain were infinite, an actually infinite amount of matter
would e required $$ which is an impossiility. :ut for time to e infinite
does not mean that anything must e actually infinite. ,hat is actual of time
is only the present moment. QThere is nothing of time ut the present
moment,Q as Aquinas will say in his Summa theologiae *I, q. ED, a. I, ad. I+.
Time never exists in actuality as a whole *totum simul+. rather, time is
successive and hence has potentiality mixed with act.
2GK
Thus, y its very
nature, time can never e actually infinite. Time is not fully an actual thing,
and therefore cannot e an actually infinite thing. ;ence, to spea', as the
o)ection does, aout Qan infinite numer of past daysQ is to reify what does
not actually exist. Aquinas( response, therefore, to the o)ection that if the
world is eternal no new days could e added to the already actually infinite
past, is clear. If the world is eternal, the past would not constitute an actual
infinity, and therefore it would always e possile to add more days.
2GK. Summa theologiae I, q. 4, a. I, ad. E.
To the o)ection that it would e impossile to
traverse the series etween a day infinitely in the past and
the present day, Aquinas must explain an error aout the
measuring of time that is contained in the o)ection. To
measure time we must always select two distinct moments
of time, and measure the duration from one to the other.
:etween any two moments the interval must, as the o)ector
reali&es, e finite. ,hen the o)ector urges that we pic' a
day Qinfinitely in the past,Q he is proposing what is
inherently contradictory. To pic' a day in the past, i.e., a
moment that is measurale with respect to the present
moment, is necessarily to pic' a day that is not Qinfinitely in
the past.Q If it is impossile to traverse an infinite series,
then it is impossile to traverse the infinite series *even in
the imagination+ from the present moment to some infinitely
past moment. It is, therefore, impossile to ma'e the
supposition that the o)ector wishes to ma'e, namely, the
pic'ing of a day infinitely in the past. The o)ection,
therefore, fails ecause it depends upon the ma'ing of a
supposition that is inherently impossile.
I.+ If the world is eternal, there would have een an
infinite numer of generations of animals. :ut an infinite
numer of generations of animals means that there were an
infinite numer of causes that produced this present
generation of animals. An infinite numer of causes,
however, is impossile. Aquinas responds y distinguishing
etween causes that are essentially ordered and causes that
are accidentally ordered. It is true that there cannot e an
infinite numer of essentially ordered causes, ut it is quite
possile that accidentally ordered causes e infinite. The
'ey to understanding the distinction etween these two types
of ordered causes is to recogni&e that essentially ordered causes must all
exist simultaneously at the precise moment of causing. accidentally ordered
causes need not e simultaneous and need not exist at the moment of
causing. Thus, the essentially ordered causes of the generation of an animal
are the causes that are simultaneously present at the conception of the new
animal- the male, the female, the heat from the sun,
2GD
and whatever other
causes are necessary for the act of conception. These causes must e finite
in numer and all present simultaneously. the asence of any one of them
would prevent the conception from ta'ing place. Accidentally ordered
causes, on the other hand, need not exist at the time of conception- the
previous generations of animals can all e non$existent, at the time of
conception, and the conception will still ta'e place. Since accidentally
ordered causes do not have to exist at the time of the actual causing, there is
nothing to prevent an infinite multiplication of such causes.
E.+ If the world is eternal, and if men have always existed in the
world, there would have een y now an infinite numer of men. :ut an
infinite numer of men would mean that there are now an actually infinite
numer of human souls. Since an actual infinity is impossile, the world can
not e eternal. This, Aquinas concedes, is the strongest argument against the
possiility of an eternal world. It is a )udgment he maintains throughout his
career. he raises the o)ection in the final part of his last wor' on this
su)ect, his De aeternitate mundi. It is the strongest argument precisely
ecause, unli'e the arguments aout past time, it argues that something
actual from the past is Qleft over.Q 6ast time is no longer actual, and
therefore it ma'es no sense to spea' aout an eternal past as an Qactual
infinity.Q ;uman souls, however, are immortal, and hence all the souls of all
the men who have ever lived are now actual. If men have existed from all
eternity, there would surely now e an actual infinity of human souls.
2GD. ;ere Aquinas is following Aristotelian emryology $$ we might thin' of the heat
from the sun as some more general source of energy in the universe.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation E5
To such an argument Aquinas( strongest response is
to say, as he does in the Summa theologiae *I, q. ED, a. G, ad.
F+ and in the De aeternitate mundi, ut not here in the
Sentences, that the argument aout an infinite numer of
human souls is strictly irrelevant to the question of the
possiility of the eternal duration of the world. It would
have een possile for 7od to have created the world as
eternal and to have created the species man as having a
temporal eginning. The argument, thus, would hold only in
the particular case of an eternal world in which men always
existed. The general prolem, however, is what is most
important- could any creature, of any sort, have een
created eternally"
7iven the particular nature of the argument that
Aquinas is analy&ing, we may still as' whether it is
demonstrative. Is, for example, an actual infinity of
immaterial sustances, li'e human souls, possile" In his
early wor's, Aquinas has not decided that an actual infinity
of human souls is impossile. The most he will say is that it
Qseems to e more trueQ that an actual infinity of human
souls is impossile.
2G4
In the Summa theologiae *I, q. 4, a. E,
resp.+ he does argue that an actual infinity of human souls is
impossile, although there may e some dout as to whether
the argument he gives is really demonstrative. At the end of
the De aeternitate mundi he remar's that it has not een
demonstrated that 7od could not ma'e an actual infinity of
things.
K.+ If the world is eternal, the world would e equal
to 7od, at least in duration, or the world would have to have
an infinite power, which is inappropriate to a creature.
Aquinas responds y noting that 7od(s eternity is completely
2G4. Puodlibetum nonum, q. 2, a. 2.
different from eternal temporal duration. 7od(s eternity is not successive ut
is, rather, the perfect, simultaneous possession of all eing. An eternity of
time, since it is successive and never complete, could not e equal to 7od(s
eternity in any way. <i'ewise, the world, if it existed eternally, would not e
li'e 7od in having infinite power, for the power through which the world
exists is not from itself ut from 7od.
:y the end of the fifth article, Aquinas has refuted the two extreme
positions- that necessarily the world is eternal and that necessarily the world
has a temporal eginning. Ceason alone, he thin's, cannot conclude
definitively to either position. If reason remains silent on the question, and
faith were to spea' $$ as Aquinas thin's it does $$ there would e no
possiility of any conflict etween the claims of reason and faith on the
question of the eternity or the temporal finitude of the world.
Article Six
;aving explained that the created world did have a temporal
eginning and that it is impossile to demonstrate such a temporal
eginning, Aquinas turns finally, in Article Six, to an exposition of the
revelation of the temporal eginning of the world- In principio creavit Deus
caelum et terram. The first line of 7enesis, however, indicates more than
merely the temporal eginning of the world. Aquinas ta'es in principio to
mean Qin the eginning of time,Q ut he also accepts the traditional gloss that
in principio means in )ilio Dei *inHthrough the Son of 7od+. ;e explains
this gloss y saying that the notion of efficient causality is appropriated to
the 1ather, the notion of exemplar causality is appropriated to the Son, and
the notion of conservation is appropriated to the ;oly Spirit. Creation,
however, is properly the wor' of the entire Trinity, and thus in principio also
means in uno principio effectivo. In addition, the fact that 7od created oth
the heavens and the earth in principio means that 7od could not have
created, as some have thought, material eings through the mediation of
spiritual creatures. The revelation of in principio, therefore, contradicts
three errors aout creation- the error of those holding the eternity of the
world. the error of those holding that there is more than one
first principle of the world *e.g., the #anichees+. the error of
those holding that material eings were created through the
mediation of spiritual eings *the emanationists+. Thus,
Aquinas( preceding discussions of the eternity of the world,
of #anicheanism, and of emanationism have prepared the
way for the exegesis of in principio. The first five articles
constitute the theological and philosophical preparation
necessary for understanding the first line of 7enesis.
The immense achievement of Aquinas is to have
explained so much of the Christian teaching on creation in
philosophical terms. Bearly everything essential to the
Christian idea of creation $$ the existence of the Creator, the
uniqueness of the Creator, the fact that the Creator creates
without intermediaries,
2GF
the fact that the creation is
properly out of nothing, the fact that the Creator creates
freely $$ is not only philosophically comprehensile,
according to Aquinas, ut also philosophically
demonstrale. Jnly one ma)or element of the Christian
teaching, the temporal eginning of the world, is not
philosophically demonstrale, although it is certainly
comprehensile philosophically. In the doctrine of Aquinas,
philosophy and theology are perfect wor'ing partners- what
philosophy can 'now only incompletely is completed y the
revelation of faith. True philosophical 'nowledge is never
re)ected y theology, ut only perfected and rought to
completion.
2GF. As we have noted, Aquinas, in Article Three of the text we have
translated, does not thin' that reason can definitively exclude creation
through intermediaries, although in faith we 'now that 7od does not act
in this way. :y the time Aquinas composes the Summa contra -entiles
*and in all wor's thereafter+, he has concluded that creation through
intermediaries is philosophically impossile.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation EG
&t% 'homas Aquinas
Writings on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
Boo# '(o, Distinction One, $uestion One)
O* C+,A'IO*
To investigate this matter, six /articles0
2G3
are required /on
the following topics0- 2+ whether there is only one principle.
G+ whether from that principle things come forth y way of
creation. I+ whether things are created only y that one
principle, or whether they are also created y secondary
principles. E+ whether one thing is ale to e the cause of
another in some way other than y way of creation. K+
whether things have een created from eternity. D+ on the
supposition that things have not een created from eternity,
in what way 7od is said to have created the heavens and the
earth Qin the eginning.Q
A+'IC, O*,)
-.,'.,+ '.,+, I& O*/ O*, 0I+&'
P+I*CIP,
J)ections-
It seems that there are several first principles.
2G3. ,e have added words or phrases in rac'ets, throughout the
text, to aid the reader in following Aquinas! presentation.
2. :ecause, according to the 6hilosopher,
2I5
On the %eavens, G.I
*GFDaGI$GE+, if one of a pair of contraries should e found in nature, then the
other must e, too. :ut the highest evil is the contrary of the highest good,
)ust as evil is the contrary of good. Therefore, since there is a highest good,
which is the first principle of all good things, it seems that there is also a
supreme evil eing, which is the first principle of all evil things. There will
thus e two first principles.
G. 1urthermore, whatever comes to e is either itself the first
principle or comes from some principle, as is said in the Physics I.E *G5ID$
4+. :ut some evil thing does come to e in the world. If, therefore, it is not
the first principle *for if it were, the conclusion of this argument would have
een reached+, it must e from some principle. :ut it cannot e from
something good, ecause good is destructive of evil and not the cause of it,
)ust as a hot thing is destructive of a cold thing and not the cause of it. 1or
the same reason, if the evil thing is not itself the first principle, there will e
some other evil first principle. There cannot, however, e an infinite regress
in principles or in causes, as is proven in .etaphysics G.G *33Ea2$2F+. It
seems, therefore, that we must come to a first evil thing which is the
principle of all evil. And thus the conclusion is reached.
I. If one should say that evil does not have a principle ut is
something that happens eyond the intention of the principal agent, against
this /the o)ection is that0 everything that happens eyond the intention of
the agent is y chance and happens for the least part. :ut evil occurs for the
most part, as is said in the ,opics G.22 *22K2E$23+. Therefore, it seems that
evil is intended and has an essential principle.
2I2
E. 1urthermore, the things that come from )ust one principle are
all ali'e, ecause what is caused y a principle imitates the principle. :ut in
2I5. Aquinas refers to Aristotle as 8the 6hilosopher9 and to Averroes as 8the
Commentator.9
2I2. If evil has an Qessential principleQ *per se principium+, this means means a principle
whose intention is to produce evil, rather than an accidental principle of evil, whose
intention is to produce good ut which accidentally produces evil.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation EI
reality we find a great contrariety
2IG
and diversity. There
must, therefore, e contrary principles for this diversity.
K. 1urthermore, the material and the efficient
causes are never identical,
2II
as is said in the Physics G.4
*23FaGI$I2+, nor are the efficient and formal causes
numerically the same.
2IE
:ut things have formal, material,
and efficient principles, and each category should e traced
ac' to one principle, as is proved in the .etaphysics G.G
*33Ea$33EI5+. There must, therefore, e several first
principles.
Jn the contrary-
2. Jn the contrary, unity precedes every
multitude, ecause plurality comes to e from unity. If,
2IG. Jn Aquinas( understanding of chemistry, the asic elements are
only four *earth, water, air, and fire+ and they possess properties that are
opposed to other properties as contraries. The properties in question are
two pairs of contraries- hotHcold and wetHdry. Earth has the properties
of eing cold and dry, water of eing cold and wet, air of eing hot and
wet, fire of eing hot and dry. As all material things are composed of
some, at least, of these four elements, all material things have an
inherent contrariety, and the world is a diversity of different 'inds of
material eings.
2II. <iterally, Qmatter and agent never fall together in the same
thing.Q Aquinas is referring to two of Aristotle(s four causes, the material
cause and the efficient cause. ;e is saying that the material causes *that
out of which something is made+ and the efficient cause *the ma'er+ are
not the same eing. In the uilding of a house, for example, the lumer
*material cause+ and the carpenter *efficient cause+ are different things
*i.e., they are different in eing+.
2IE. Again, two of Aristotle(s four causes. The formal cause is what
something is *its structure, its intelligile nature, its 'ind, its species+,
and the efficient cause is the ma'er. Aquinas is saying that the ma'er
and what is made are not the same thing *i.e., not the same in eing+.
therefore, many principles are posited, there must e one prior principle for
them. :ut nothing is prior to the first. It is impossile, therefore, to posit
several first principles.
G. 1urthermore, whatever things are ali'e in one way ut
different in another must e composite things. If several first principles are
posited, they must e ali'e in some way, ecause they are all principles, ut
they must also differ, ecause they are many. They must, therefore, e
composed. :ut no composite thing can e first. Therefore, it is impossile
that there e several first principles.
I. 1urthermore, if there were several first principles, they would
either e ali'e or they would e contraries. If they were ali'e, either each
one would e a sufficient principle y itself, and thus the rest would e
superfluous, or each one would e y itself an insufficient principle and all
together would e sufficient for causing things. :ut in this case, they would
not e first principles, oth ecause they would lac' some unifying principle
which would e prior to them all and ecause each would act y means of
something added to its essence, that is, y eing con)oined to others, and no
such /con)oined0 thing is a first principle. If, however, the principles were
contraries, /such would e asurd ecause0 every contrary destroys and
impedes its contrary. If, therefore, they were of equal power, each one
would loc' the other so that no one would e ale to produce an effect. :ut
if one were more powerful than another, it would destroy the other
completely. It is therefore impossile that there e several first principles.
Solution-
I answer that QfirstQ is said in two ways, namely, first asolutely and
first in some category or in some order. If the word is ta'en in the second
way, then there are as many first principles as there are 'inds of causes, as
the first material cause is prime matter, the first formal cause is eing, and so
on with the rest. :y specifying further the different categories of things,
different first principles in each category can e found, even if these
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation EE
categories are within the same 'ind of cause. Thus in
liquids, the prime matter is water, and in dry things the
prime matter is earth, and in animals it is the semen or the
menstrum.
The first principle asolutely, however, can only e
one. This is shown in three ways. 1irst, it is shown from
the order itself of the universe, whose parts are found to
have een ordered to one another, li'e the parts of the
animal in the whole, which serve the purposes of one
another. Such a coordination, however, of many parts
cannot happen unless the parts are aimed at one goal. There
must, therefore, e one supreme final good, which is desired
y all.
2IK
This is the first principle.
It is also apparent from the very nature of things.
The nature of eing is found in all things, in some more
noly, in other less noly, such that the natures of the things
themselves are not the very eing which they have.
Jtherwise, eing would elong to the concept of the
quiddity
2ID
of any thing, which is false, since the quiddity of
any thing can e understood without understanding whether
the thing exists.
2I4
Batures must, therefore, have eing from
2IK. If many parts are coordinated to serve one goal or end, such a
coordination cannot happen y chance. If it does not happen y chance,
then this one goal is really the goal of each of the parts $$ the goal is the
goal of the whole and of each of the parts. If the many parts are each
intelligent, they can only wor' toward the goal y understanding it. To
understand the goal, however, is to understand the goodness of it and,
therefore, to desire it.
2ID. QWuiddityQ here is used as a synonym for Qnature.Q Either term
in this context means Qwhat the thing isQ or the formal cause of the thing.
2I4. This sentence expresses a crucial point in Thomistic
metaphysics. The eing of things, their existence, does not elong to the
something /else0, and there must e ultimately a nature which is its own
eing, otherwise there would e an infinite regress. And this it is which
gives eing to all, and there can only e one /such eing0, since the nature of
eing is of the same meaning in all, according to analogy. The unity of the
effect requires the unity of its essential cause. And this is the way of
Avicenna, .etaphysics F.I.
2IF
The third way is from the immateriality of 7od ;imself. The cause
that moves the heavens must e a power that is not in matter, as is proved in
the Physics F.K *GK4aII$GKF3+. Among immaterial things, there can only
e a diversity if the nature of one is more complete and more existent in
actuality than the nature of another. That, therefore, which comes at the
summit of completeness and the purity of actuality must e only one, from
which comes anything that is mixed with potentiality, ecause actuality
precedes potentiality, and the complete precedes the incomplete, as is proved
in .etaphysics 3.F *25E3E$25K2aI+.
There have een three sorts of error on this matter. Some, such as
the early natural philosophers,
2I3
recogni&ed nothing ut the material cause.
;ence, those
2E5
among them who recogni&ed several material principles, said
that there were several asolutely first principles.
Some, however, along with the material cause also recogni&ed the
efficient cause, and they said that the two first agents are contraries.
Empedocles, Physics F.2 *GK5GE$GK2aK+, for example, /called the two first
nature, essence, or quiddity of things. There is nothing aout what things are that indicates
that they must exist. The eing of things is in some way distinct from the essence of things.
This fact is true for all creatures and is not true for 7od.
2IF. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, edited y S. =an Ciet
*<ouvain and <eiden- E. 6eeters and E. %. :rill, 23F5+, pp. I3K$I34.
2I3. Aquinas means pre$Socratic natural philosophers, such as Thales, who held that the
primal stuff of all reality is water, or Anaximenes who held that it is air.
2E5. Empedocles, for example, recogni&ed earth, water, air, and fire as the ultimate
material principles.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation EK
agents0 friendship and strife. The opinion of 6ythagoras,
.etaphysics 2.E *3FEIG$3FKa25+, 2.K *3FKGI$3FDF+ is in
accord with this. 6ythagoras divided all eings into two
orders, and he attriuted one order to Qgood,Q as to a
principle, and the other to Qevil.Q And from this sprouted the
heresy of the #anicheans, who hold that there are two gods,
one the creator of good things, of the invisile and
incorporeal things, and of the Bew Testament. the other the
creator of visile things, corporeal things, and the Jld
Testament.
The third error was of those who recogni&ed that
there is an agent and material cause, ut that the agent is not
the source of matter, although there is only one agent. And
this is the opinion of Anaxagoras and of 6lato, except that
6lato added a third principle, namely, the forms separate
from things, which he called exemplars. They also held that
each of these causes is uncaused y the others ut that
through all three the world and the things that compose the
world were caused.
Ceplies to J)ections-
2. To the first it ought to e said that the highest
evil is the contrary of the highest good, not really ut only
verbally. This is so for two reasons. 1irst, the Qhighest evilQ
is not ale to exist, ecause nothing is so evil that there is
not something of good in it, at least its own eing.
Accordingly, the 6hilosopher says, Ethics E.K *22GDa2G$2I+,
that if something completely evil should come aout
ecause of the corruption of everything aout it, it itself
would not e ale to exist. Second, nothing is opposed,
either as a privative or as a contrary, to that good which is
not ale to e destroyed or diminished in any way. So it is that any
particular evil thing is opposed, not directly to the highest good, ut to some
particular /limited0 good which is negated y it. I mean that something is
directly opposed to another, when it is opposed to it )ust ecause of the 'ind
of thing that it is. The lac'ness of a hand, for example, is opposed directly
to the whiteness of a hand, ut indirectly it is opposed also to the whiteness
of a wall, not insofar as it is the lac'ness of this thing or the whiteness of
this thing, ut insofar as they are simply lac'ness and whiteness. In this
/indirect0 way, any evil is opposed to any good, not according to the nature
of this thing or of that thing, ut according to the general nature of good and
evil. If, therefore, the highest evil should e opposed to the highest good,
this will e indirectly, ecause it is not opposed insofar as /the highest good0
is the 'ind of good that it is ut insofar as it is good.
G. To the second it ought to e said that evil does not have a
cause except accidentally, and this in two ways. In the first way, an agent is
said to e an accidental agent of that which is eyond the intention of the
agent, ecause every agent acts for the sa'e of an end and intends the good
which elongs to the end, and no negation
2E2
is intended, even though a
negation is implied y the form which is rought aout. 1ire, for example,
does not intend to negate the form of air in the matter, ut rather to
propagate its own form. :ut y propagating its own form it does negate the
form of air. <i'ewise, the sinner intends pleasure, which is a good of one
part of him, namely, of his concupiscile appetite,
2EG
and he does not intend
the negation of grace.
In a second way an agent is said to e an accidental agent insofar as it
removes something preventing something else. ,hat prevents something
else is a form or a thing of some sort. ;ence whatever removes that thing is
2E2. ,e translate privatio here as negation. ,hen Aquinas says that no negation is
intended, he means that the agent does not intend something negative ut rather something
positive. The negation results accidentally, eyond the intention of the agent.
2EG. The concupiscile appetite is the power that human eings and animals have of
desiring odily pleasures, especially the pleasures of eating, drin'ing, and sexual union.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation ED
said to cause a negation, as he who extinguishes a candle or
carries it out of the house is said to cause dar'ness.
Therefore, the dictum that whatever is is either a principle or
is from a principle, should e understood concerning that
which is a real thing, ut evil is a negation of sorts and does
not indicate any positively existing nature.
I. To the third it ought to e said that if we
spea' aout evil in nature /malum naturae0,
2EI
evil can e
considered either with respect to the whole of nature or with
respect to some individual agent in nature. If with respect to
the whole of nature, it is clear that evil is for the least part,
ecause it is only ale to exist among those things that are
su)ect to generation and corruption, the whole of which
ma'es up a small amount of the universe in comparison to
the heavens, where there is no evil.
2EE
2EI. The phrase Qevil in natureQ is the translation for Aquinas(
malum naturae, literally, Qevil of nature.Q The English word, Qevil,Q is
not usually applied to nature. An earthqua'e or a flood might e called a
disaster or something very ad, ut we would not normally call it Qevil,Q
ecause we apply the word only to human agents. English has QevilQ
and Qad,Q ut <atin uses malum to serve for oth. ,hen Aquinas tal's
of the Qevil in natureQ he means something ad, destructive, or
disastrous. he does not attriute moral qualities to the su$human.
2EE. According to the cosmology that Aquinas accepted, it is only on
the earth and in the earth(s atmosphere that things are generated and
destroyed. :eyond the moon in the entire rest of the universe, the
heavenly odies move ut they do not come into existence or go out of
existence, and they are not altered in any way *they do not change their
shape, color, temperature, etc.+. Thus, nothing ad can happen to
anything in the vast heavens eyond the moon, and hence QevilQ of the
natural 'ind can only occur in the earthly sphere. Aquinas, therefore,
concludes that if we thin' aout the universe as a whole, we reali&e that
evil can only occur in a small part of it.
If, however, evil is considered with respect to some individual agent
in nature, it is clear that the action of the agent is always in accord with what
elongs to its nature, unless it is at some time loc'ed, and this occurs rarely.
1rom a defect in a thing(s nature evil occurs, as in the case of monstrosities
that are orn.
Jn the other hand, if we should spea' aout the evil that implies
guilt, which is found in that 'ind of thing that is not determined to act in only
one way, that is, in all things which act from freedom of the will, this /sort of
evil0 elongs either to a thing with a mixed nature or to a thing with )ust one
nature. If /we consider this sort of evil as elonging0 to a thing with )ust one
nature, such as an angel, it is clear that for the most part the operation of
angels is in accord with what is proper for their nature and that the sin of
angels occurs for the least part.
If, however, /we consider the evil that elongs to a eing0 of a mixed
nature, such as man, who is composed of an intellectual nature and a
sensitive nature,
2EK
this can e considered in two ways. If we /consider0 the
whole nature of the species, it is clear that for the most part the action of man
proceeds according to that nature the activity of which is more varied and the
goods of which are more ovious to us. And since the activity of the
sensitive nature is ordered to the pleasurale things of the senses, which are
more varied than the pleasure of reason, which is more hidden to us who
receive our 'nowledge from sensation, most men, therefore, follow those
activities /of the sensitive nature0. 1rom this fact evil occurs to man, not
insofar as he is man, ecause man is not man insofar as he has sensation, ut
insofar as he has reason.
2EK. Aquinas says that man has a 8mixed nature,9 literally, several natures */homo0 est
plurium naturarum+. Aquinas does not mean that there are several different natures in man,
for man has only one nature, ut he means that man has very different powers, such as the
power of reason and the power to desire physical pleasures *concupiscile appetite+. The
power of reason sets man apart from other animals, whereas the concupiscile appetite is
found in oth animals and in man. ;ence, one may say that man is composed of two
natures, although in fact human nature is one nature, not two, and it encompasses oth the
power of reason and the concupiscile appetite.
If some individual of the species is considered, it
happens that someone is determined y his own will to
follow activities of reason according to the hait of virtue.
Such a man will operate well for the most part and will e
deficient only for the least part. ,hen, however, he clings
to his other nature, he ecomes as though a stranger /to his
own nature0, as is said in the Ethics 3.E *22DDa25$22DDGE+.
The )udgment made aout such a man is li'e the )udgment
made aout animals, in whom there is only the sensitive
nature- he will operate for the most part for the good for
which he was made, as the lion acts through cruelty, the dog
through anger, the pig through excess, and so forth, as
:oethius says, ,he Consolation of Philosophy E.I.
2ED
;ence
it is clear that evil occurs for the least part, whether it is seen
in relation to the principle of all nature or to some individual
agent.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that things
have a contrariety among themselves in their proximate
effects, ut nevertheless even contraries are in accord in the
ultimate end to which they are ordered when they are
harmoniously put together, as is clear in compounds that are
composed of contraries. 1rom this it follows that, even
though the proximate agents are contraries, the first agent is
one, ecause the agent and the end must e identical, since
these two causes coincide in the same eing.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that, although
7od is not material in any sense, nevertheless the very eing
which matter has imperfectly, as it is called a eing in
2ED. :oethius, ,he Consolation of Philosophy, text and translation
y S.%. Tester *Camridge, #A- ;arvard Lniversity 6ress, 234I+, oo'
E, prose I, pp. IIE$IIK.
potency,
2E4
it has from 7od and is traced ac' to ;im as to its principle.
<i'ewise also form, which is a part of a thing, is the li'eness of the first
agent and flows from ;im. So it is that all forms are traced ac' to the first
agent as to the exemplar principle. And so it is clear that there is one
asolute principle, which is the first agent, the exemplar, and the ultimate
end.
A+'IC, '-O)
-.,'.,+ '.I*1& COM, 0+OM '., O*, P+I*CIP,
B/ -A/ O0 C+,A'IO*
O!2ections-
It seems that nothing can be made by -od to go into being by $ay of
creation.
2. Everything which comes to e was possile efore it came to
e, ecause if it were not possile to come to e, it is necessary that it could
not come to e, and therefore, it would not have een made. :ut whatever is
possile to come to e or to e moved, is possile through a passive potency,
which, since it /the passive potency0 is not a eing existing y itself, must
e in some other eing, which is in a state of potency. :ut nothing is a eing
in potency to something without also eing something in act. Therefore,
whatever comes to e, comes to e from some eing that is actually pre$
existing. :ut no such thing is created, ecause to create is to ma'e
2E4. Every physical thing is a composite of matter and form. #atter is the principle of
potentiality. form the principle of actuality. That something can potentially e changed it
has from its matter. that something actually is what it is it has from its form. #atter and
form are oth principles of eing. hence, matter could e called Qeing in potency,Q and
form could e called Qeing in actuality.Q 1urthermore, the whole sustantial composite of
matter and form must e made to exist, that is, it must e given eing *esse+ y 7od. There
is, thus, a two$fold composition in all physical sustances- form and matter are composed to
ma'e up the sustance. the sustance and eing are composed to ma'e sustance actually to
exist.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation EF
something from nothing, as is said in /<omard(s0 text.
2EF

Therefore, nothing is ale to e created y 7od.
G. 1urthermore, in every change there is
something from which the change essentially /comes0,
ecause every change is etween two end$points. :ut that
from which something comes to e essentially must remain
in that which comes to e, either as a whole, as when the
matter remains in what comes to e *as a 'nife is made out
of iron+, or /it remains0 in some material way, as when some
whole thing is said to e made from some other whole thing
*as flesh is made from food+.
2E3
:lac'ness is not said to
come to e from whiteness except accidentally, that is, after
whiteness, )ust as day is also said to come to e from night.
If, therefore, eing is said to come to e from non$eing, the
non$eing or some part of it, although it does not have a
part, must remain in the eing, and it must e that it would
e simultaneously eing and non$eing, which is impossile.
Therefore, whatever comes to e, comes to e from some
eing. It seems impossile, therefore, that something e
created y 7od.
I. 1urthermore, no enduring thing is
simultaneously in a state of ecoming and in a state of
having een made. ,hile it is ecoming, it is not /yet0, and
2EF. 6eter <omard, Sententiae in IN libris distinctae, *Come-
Collegium S. :onaventurae, 2342+, edited y Ignatius :rady, vol. 2, li.
G, dist. 2, cap. G, p. II5.
2E3. If the material out of which something new is made remains as
a $hole in the new thing, we have one 'ind of change *an accidental
change+. if the material out of which something new is made remains in
some material way *ut not as a whole+, we have another 'ind of change
*a sustantial change+, a change in which a whole new thing is made out
of an old thing which no longer exists after the change.
when it has een made, it is. It is not simultaneously existent and non$
existent. If, therefore, some enduring thing should e caused to e y 7od,
its ecoming must e efore its eing. :ut ma'ing, since it is an accident,
cannot exist without a su)ect.
2K5
Therefore, everything which comes to e
must come to e from something in which there is a ma'ing as in a su)ect.
:ut no such thing is created. Therefore, nothing is ale to come to e y
way of creation.
E. 1urthermore, if creation is something, it must e an accident,
since it is not a sustance. Every accident, however, is in some su)ect, ut
/creation0 cannot e in the created thing as in a su)ect, ecause the created
thing is the result of creation. ;ence, the created thing would e prior to
creation, insofar as it is the su)ect of creation, ut also posterior /to
creation0, insofar as it is the result. Therefore, /creation0 must e in some
matter, out of which the created thing is made. ut this is against the
meaning of creation. Therefore, creation is nothing.
K. 1urthermore, if creation is something, it is either the Creator
or a creature. :ut it is not the Creator, ecause, if it were, it would exist
from eternity and hence creatures would exist from eternity. It is, therefore,
a creature. Every creature, however, is created y a creation, and thus there
is a creation of creation, and so on, to infinity. :ut this is impossile, as is
clear in Physics K.G *GGKII$GGDaD+, where it is shown that there is not an
action of an action into infinity. Creation, therefore, is impossile.
On the contrary-
2. Jn the contrary is what is said in 7enesis /2-20- QIn the
eginning 7od created the heavens and the earth.Q
2K5. The action of ma'ing is an accident, that is, it must elong to some su)ect. There
cannot e a ma'ing apart from a thing made. the ma'ing is the accident and the things made
is the su)ect. 8Accident9 means that which cannot exist on its own, or, must inhere in a
su)ect. 8su)ect9 means that which exists on its own and, hence, can e the su)ect of
accidents.
G. 1urthermore, every agent acts insofar as it is
in actuality. :ut what is partially in actuality and partially in
potentiality produces a thing only partially, namely, y
ringing form into matter. Therefore, since the first eing,
7od, is actual without any potentiality mixed in, it seems
that ;e is ale to produce a thing in its entirety, that is, the
whole sustance of a thing. To do this, however, is to
create. It seems, therefore, that 7od is ale to create.
&olution-
I answer that not only does faith hold that there is
creation ut reason also demonstrates it. It is clear, for
instance, that whatever is imperfect in some category arises
out of that in which the nature of the category
2K2
is found
primarily and perfectly. In /the category of0 hot things, for
example, /the degrees of0 heat arise from fire.
2KG
Since every
thing and whatever is in the thing shares in being in some
way, and since every thing has imperfection mixed in, every
thing must, in its entirety, arise from the first and perfect
eing. This, however, we call to create- to produce a thing
into eing according to its entire sustance.
It ought to e 'nown, moreover, that the meaning of
creation includes two things. The first is that it presupposes
2K2. Any category or genus of eings is a category ecause all of
the memers of it share the same nature. If the memers of the category
share the same nature ut do so to different degrees, then the fact that
there are less perfect memers indicate that there is a most perfect
memer. The nature that is shared y all the memers of the category $$
the 8nature of the category9 $$ is found in its most perfect instance in one
memer.
2KG. Aquinas regarded fire in its elemental, pure form to e the
hottest of things. The fire of a urning match or of a camp fire would e
a derivative fire and would e less hot than pure fire.
nothing in the thing which is said to e created. In this way it differs from
other changes, ecause a generation presupposes matter, which is not
generated, ut rather which is transformed and rought to completion
through generation. In other changes a su)ect which is a complete eing is
presupposed. ;ence, the causality of the generator or of the alterer does not
extend to everything which is found in the thing, ut only to the form, which
is rought from potency into actuality. The causality of the Creator,
however, extends to everything that is in the thing. And, therefore, creation
is said to e out of nothing, ecause nothing uncreated pre$exists creation.
The second thing is that non$eing is prior to eing in the thing
which is said to e created. This is not a priority of time or of duration, such
that what did not exist efore does exist later, ut a priority of nature, so that,
if the created thing is left to itself, it would not exist, ecause it only has its
eing from the causality of the higher cause. ,hat a thing has in itself and
not from something else is naturally prior in it to that which it has from
something else. *In this way creation differs from eternal generation,
2KI
for it
cannot e said that the Son of 7od, if left to ;imself, would not have eing,
since ;e receives from the 1ather that very same eing which the 1ather has,
which is asolute eing, not dependent upon anything.+
:ecause of these two points, creation is said to e Qout of nothingQ
/e0 nihilo0 in two ways. Jn the one hand, the negation /in the word
QnothingQ0 denies the relation implied y the preposition Qout ofQ /e00 to
anything pre$existing. Thus, the creature is said to e Qout of nothingQ
ecause it is Qnot from something pre$existing.Q And this is the first point.
Jn the other hand, the order of creation to a pre$existent nothing remains
affirmed y nature, such that creation is said to e Qout of nothingQ ecause
the created thing naturally has non$eing prior to eing. If these two points
2KI. QEternal generationQ descries the relation etween the Son and the 1ather in the
Trinity- the Son is Qeternally egottenQ of the 1ather, not created y the 1ather. Since the
Son is not a creature, it is not true to say that non$eing is prior to eing in the Son, since the
eing of the Son and the 1ather is )ust the same. The Son is Qone in eing with the 1atherQ
and Qnot madeQ.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation K5
are sufficient for the meaning of creation, creation is ale to
e demonstrated and in this way philosophers have held /the
doctrine of0 creation.
If, however, we should add a third point to the
meaning of creation, that the creature should have non$eing
prior to eing /even0 in duration, so that it is said to e Qout
of nothingQ ecause it is temporally after nothing, in this
way creation cannot e demonstrated and it is not granted y
philosophers, ut is ta'en on faith.
+e3lies to O!2ections-
2. To the first it ought to e said that, according
to Avicenna, Physics 2.25
2KE
and .etaphysics D.2,
2KK
there
are two 'inds of agents. Jne is a natural agent, which is an
agent involving motion, and the other is divine, which is the
giver of eing, as was said. <i'ewise, we must recogni&e
two 'inds of act or effect. Jne is accomplished through the
motion of a natural agent, and all such ecoming must e
preceded temporally not only y active potency ut also y
passive potency, ecause motion is the actuality of that
which exists in potency.
2KD
There is another sort of effect,
2KE. Avicenna, Sufficientia in Opera philosophica *=enice 2K5F+,
23ra.
2KK. Avicenna latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia
divina N*J, edited y S. =an Ciet *<ouvain and <eiden- E. 6eeters and
E.%. :rill, 23F5+, trac. D, cap. 2, p. G3G.
2KD. QActive potencyQ is the power or aility that something has to
e an efficient cause. it is the power to ma'e or to do something.
Q6assive potencyQ is the receptive capaility or capacity of something. it
is the characteristic of a thing that it could e used or that something
could e done to it. In terms of the four causes, active potency is the
aility to e an efficient cause, and passive potency is the aility to e a
however, insofar as /something0 receives eing from the divine agent
without motion. Bow if this effect should e new, active potency, ut not
passive potency, must /temporally0 precede its eing. Such an effect is said
to e possile ecause of the active potency. If, however, the effect is not
new, then the active potency does not precede it in duration ut only in
nature.
G. To the second it ought to e said that creation is not the sort of
ma'ing that is properly spea'ing a change, ut is rather a certain receiving of
eing. ;ence it need have no essential relation except to the giver of eing,
and in this way it is not Qout ofQ non$eing, except insofar as it is after non$
eing, as night is Qout ofQ day.
I. To the third it ought to e said that no enduring thing is ale
simultaneously to ecome and to have een made, if Qto ecomeQ is ta'en
properly. :ut there are some expressions that indicate the Qhaving een
madeQ as though it were a Qecoming,Q as when it is said that motion is
ended, for at the same time motion Qis endedQ and Qhas een endedQ. And
li'ewise at the same time /something0 is illuminated and has een
illuminated, ecause illumination is the end of motion, as the Commentator
says, Physics E.
2K4
And li'ewise also, sustantial form at the same time is
received and has een received. and li'ewise, something at the same time is
created and has een created.
If it is o)ected that efore something has een made there is always
a ecoming in the proper sense of the word, I say that this is true in all things
that come to e through motion, as generation follows upon alteration, and
illumination follows upon local motion, ut it is not so in creation, as was
said.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that creation can e ta'en
actively and passively. If it is ta'en actively, since creation signifies the
material cause. Botice that motion is defined in terms of potency- it is the actuality of that
which exists in potency as it is in potency.
2K4. "ristotelis opera cum "verrois commentariis *=enice- Apud %unctas, 2KDG$2K4E+ 3
vols., vol. E, li. E, text. 2G3, G52ra$.
divine operation, which is /nothing ut0 ;is essence with a
certain relation, in this way creation is the divine sustance.
If, however, it is ta'en passively, then it is a certain accident
in the creature and it signifies a certain reality which is not
in the category of eing passive properly spea'ing, ut is in
the category of relation.
2KF
Creation is a certain relation of
having eing from another following upon the divine
operation. It is, thus, not inappropriate that it e in the
created thing, which is rought into eing through creation,
as in a su)ect. In the same way, sonship is in 6eter insofar
as he receives human nature from his father, ut /sonship0 is
not prior to 6eter himself, ut rather follows upon the action
and motion which are prior. The relation of creation,
however, does not follow upon motion, ut only upon the
divine action, which is prior to the creature.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that, as was
said in the 1irst :oo' /of Aquinas! Writings on the
Sentences0,
2K3
when the creature is related to the Creator, the
relation is really founded in the creature, ut is in 7od as a
mental construct only. ,hence the relation implied y the
name of creation does not indicate something in the Creator
ut only in the created thing.
2D5
Bevertheless, creation need
not e created y another creation, ecause the relation itself
is not related to some other thing y another intermediate
2KF. Aquinas refers to the nine categories of accidents, according to
Aristotle(s logic- quantity, quality, relation, acting, eing acted upon,
when, where, eing in a position, and possessing. Creation in the
passive sense would seem to e in the category of Qeing acted upon,Q
ut if this were so it would imply that the creature is something apart
from its eing created.
2K3. St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Petri
Lombardi, edited y 6. #andonnet and #. 1. #oos *6aris- <ethielleux,
23G3$23E4+, E vols., li. 2, dist. F, q. E, a. 2, ad I, vol. 2, p. GG5.
relation, except y a mental construct, as was said in the 1irst :oo'. And
relations of this sort, since they are only mental constructs, can e multiplied
infinitely.
A+'IC, '.+,,)
,;ET;EC T;E ACT J1 CCEATIB7
CAB :E ?JBE :A A7EBTS JT;EC T;AB 7J?
O!2ections-
It seems that the act of creating can be done by agents other than -od.
2. Everything, in fact, which is not produced in eing through
generation and which comes to e as something new is created. The rational
soul does not come into eing through generation. It is created, therefore, y
whatever causes it to e. The rational soul, however, comes into eing y
the power of the /separate0 intelligences.
2D2
for this reason 6lato has 7od
saying to the secondary gods, QTa'e ac' to yourselves the money that you
have lent out,Q spea'ing aout the rational soul. And li'ewise in the 'oo6 of
Causes, proposition I,
2DG
it is said that the soul has een created through the
agency of an intelligence. It seems, therefore, that angels or intelligences are
ale to create.
G. 1urthermore, whatever power a creature is capale of is given
to it y the one who is supremely generous. The power of creating,
however, can e given to a creature, as the #aster /<omard0 says elow,
2D5. The text followed here is the 6arma edition *Opera omnia, 6arma- 1iaccadori,
2FKG$4I+ rather than #andonnet(s.
2D2. The QintelligencesQ or Qseparate intelligencesQ are spiritual eings, li'e angels,
which are ale to exert some causality on our world. The intelligences, for example, might
move heavenly odies such as the planets or the stars.
2DG. Le Liber de causis, edited y Adrien 6attin *<euven- Ti)dschrift voor 6hilosophie,
23DD+ p. KG, ZIG. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, translated y ?ennis %. :rand *Biagara, BA- Biagara
Lniversity 6ress, 23F2+ p. 24.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KG
oo' E, dist. K.
2DI
It seems, therefore, that it can e given to
some creature that it create.
I. 1urthermore, as matter is more resistant to the
agent, /so0 it is more difficult for something to e made y
/the agent0. Bow a contrary is more resistant than asolute
non$eing. It is, therefore, more difficult for something to
e made from a contrary than from non$eing. A natural
agent, however, does ma'e one contrary from another. It
seems, therefore, that /a natural agent0 would e ale also to
ma'e something from asolute non$eing, and thus it is ale
to create.
E. 1urthermore, as things go forth from 7od, so
also are they ordered ac' to ;im. :ut according to
?ionysius, in many places,
2DE
the law of divinity is that the
extremes are never )oined together except through
intermediaries. It seems, therefore, that the lowest of eings
are not immediately created y 7od, ut y intermediate
causes.
K. 1urthermore, the primary cause never acts
upon the effect of the secondary cause, unless it acts with
the action of the secondary cause. :ut 7od, who is the
primary cause of all things, is the creator of everything. Any
secondary cause, therefore, y /means of0 which 7od creates
through ;is operation, ought to e called a creator. And so
the act of creating elongs not to 7od alone.
On the Contrary-
2DI. 6eter <omard, Sententiae, li. E, dist. K, cap. I, vol. G, p. GD4.
2DE. See, for example, ,he Celestial %ierarchies, c. E, in ,he
.ystical ,heology and ,he Celestial %ierarchies of Dionysius the
"reopagite *Borth 7odalming, Surrey, England- The Shrine of ,isdom,
23E3+, pp. II$IE.
2. Jn the contrary, %ohn ?amascene, On the Orthodo0 )aith, '.
G, ch. I,
2DK
anathemati&es all those who say that angels create something, and
it would seem to e within their power more than others. It seems, therefore,
that the act of creating elongs to 7od alone.
G. 1urthermore, eing and non$eing are separated y an
asolute infinity. To cause motion, however, through an infinite distance
requires infinite power, such as only the divine power is. The act of
creating, therefore, elongs to divine power only.
&olution-
I answer that there are three opinions on this matter. Some
philosophers, for instance, have held that from the first cause there comes
immediately one first effect, from which thereafter come others, and so
forth. Accordingly, they have held that one intelligence is caused y an
intermediate intelligence,
2DD
that the /human0 soul is caused y an
intermediate intelligence, and that corporeal things are caused y an
intermediate spiritual eing. This opinion is condemned as heretical,
ecause it gives the honor which is owed to 7od to a creature. Such an
opinion can lead to idolatry.
;ence others have said that the act of creation can e performed y
no creature, nor can it e given to a creature, )ust as infinite power, which the
wor' of creation requires, cannot e given to a creature.
2D4
2DK. 67 3E, F4I. Saint %ohn ?amascene, De fide orthodo0a, edited y E.#. :uytaert
*St. :onaventure, BA- The 1ranciscan Institute, 23KK+ cap. 24, p. 4E. St. %ohn ?amascene,
Writings, translated y 1.;. Chase *Bew Aor'- 1athers of the Church, Inc., 23KF+ p. G5F.
2DD. That is, y an intelligence intermediate etween the intelligence eing caused and
7od.
2D4. This is the position Aquinas adopts in Summa theologiae I, q. EK, a. K. see
Appendix A.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KI
Jthers have said that the aility to create has een
given to no creature, ut nevertheless it could have een
given. The #aster /6eter <omard0 asserts this opinion in
oo' E, distinction K.
2DF
Each of these last two opinions seems to have some
foundation. Since it pertains to the meaning of creation that
there e nothing pre$existing, at least in the order of nature,
this can e ta'en either on the part of the creator or on the
part of the creature. If it is ta'en on the part of the creator,
that action is called creation which is not founded on the
action of some preceding cause. In this way it is the action
of the primary cause alone, ecause all action of the
secondary cause is founded on the action of the primary
cause. ;ence, )ust as it cannot e given to any creature that
it should e the primary cause, so it cannot e given to it that
it should e the creator.
If, however, it is ta'en on the part of the creature, the
proper effect of creation is that of which nothing preexists in
reality, and this is eing. ;ence it is said in the 'oo6 of
Causes, proposition E,
2D3
that the first of created things is
eing, and elsewhere in the same oo', proposition 2,
245
it is
said that eing comes through creation and other perfections
are added on through formal causality. In composite eings,
especially, the eing that elongs to them primarily is the
eing of matter. Ta'ing creation in this way, it is ale to e
given to a creature so that, y means of the power of the
primary cause operating in the creature, some simple eing
2DF. 6eter <omard, Sententiae, li. E, dist. K, cap. I, vol. G, p. GD4.
2D3. Liber de causis, 6rop. I=, ZI4, p. KE. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p.
2F.
245. Liber de causis, 6rop. I, Z4, p. E4. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p. 2K.
or matter could e produced. In this way, philosophers have held that the
intelligences create, although this is heretical.
2. To the first it ought to e said that the philosophical
authorities should not e accepted in this matter ecause they have gone
astray here. Bevertheless, all of these authorities can e interpreted in this
way- they mean that /the intelligences0 create souls )ust insofar as they
move the heavenly odies and so dispose /human0 odies for the reception
of souls. This, however, was not their meaning.
G. To the second it ought to e said that whatever can e given to
a creature which pertains to the perfection of its nature, is given to it. This,
however, is not true aout secondary perfections. 1or example, not every
man who is capale of receiving regal dignity is made y 7od a 'ing. And
so it is also with the power of creating, according to those who say that /the
power of0 creation can e given to a creature.
I. To the third it ought to e said that the resistance of a contrary
does not ma'e a difficulty for acting, except insofar as it separates the
potency from actuality. As one contrary is more intense, its potency to the
other contrary is reduced. That something should e made from non$eing,
however, requires asolutely more power than that something should e
made from a contrary, ecause in non$eing there is asolutely no potency.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that although the lower
eings are rought to the ultimate end through intermediaries, nevertheless
the power of the ultimate end is never given to any of the intermediaries
such that one of them would e desired as the ultimate end. In the same
way, the power of the primary agent, which is the power of creation, cannot
e given to any of the secondary principles.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that the proximate agent, such
as the generator, does not operate in this generated thing except y ringing
forth form from the potency of matter. The operation of the primary cause,
however, extends even to creating matter itself. ;ence, the proximate
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KE
natural agent is only the generator of this thing, ut the
primary divine agent is the Creator. And from this it is clear
that, )ust as the operation of art is founded on the operation
of nature, insofar as nature prepares the matter for the art, so
also the operation of nature is founded on creation, insofar
as creation provides the matter for nature.
A+'IC, 0O4+)
-.,'.,+ &OM,'.I*1 O'.,+ '.A* 1OD
I& AB, 'O CA4&, A*/'.I*1
O!2ections-
It seems that nothing other than -od is able to cause
anything.
2. An agent which acts without an
/instrumental0 means is a more perfect agent than one that
needs a means in its acting. 7od, however, is the most
perfect agent. It seems, therefore, that he produces all things
with no /instrumental0 means.
G. 1urthermore, angels are the most nole of all
creatures. :ut angels are not the efficient causes of things,
ecause one angel is not the cause of another, nor is an angel
the cause of a corporeal creature. It seems, therefore, that
creatures other /than angels0 would e even less li'ely to e
the causes of things.
I. 1urthermore, agents from different species do
not produce specifically the same effect. :ut the first
individuals of all species were created immediately y 7od,
on the supposition that the world did not always exist. It
seems, therefore, that nothing is ale to produce something
the same as itself in species.
242
242. The argument is that natural causes, since they are specifically
different from 7od, must produce effects that are specifically different
E. 1urthermore, that which does not come from some matter is
only ale to e made y creation. :ut forms and accidents do not have a
material part of themselves, for if they did there would e an infinite
regress.
24G
They, therefore, can only e made y creation, with the following
result. Every efficient cause of some thing gives to it either sustantial or
accidental form. These /forms0, however, are only produced y creation.
Bothing, therefore, is ale to e the efficient cause of anything except the
Creator, who is 7od alone, as was said.
K. 1urthermore, the efficient cause is never wea'er than the
effect. Batural agents, however, act only through active qualities, which are
accidents. This is shown y the fact that something cannot e a sustantial
form in one thing and an accidental form in another. ;eat,
24I
for example,
which is an accident in a man, cannot e the sustantial form of fire, and so
from those that 7od produces. :ut 7od, at the eginning, produced all effects. Therefore,
natural causes can produce none of these, and since there are no other effects eyond these,
natural agents can produce no effects.
24G. If a sustantial form or an accidental form had matter in itself, there would e an
infinite regress. If the form of a horse, for example, had its own matter, then the whole
horse would e a composite of *2+ the horse(s ody, *G+ the form of the horse, and *I+ the
matter of the form of the horse. Since, however, the horse(s ody no$ requires a form,
ecause no ody can exist without form *i.e., an informing principle which ma'es the thing
e what it is+, we will have to introduce another form. This new form, however, on the
supposition of the argument, will have to have its own matter, again leaving the horse(s ody
without form. Aet another form will then have to e introduced, and it will again have its
own matter, and so forth. The same sort of argument could e made aout accidents. The
general point is that sustantial form must e united immediately to prime matter and that
accidents, or accidental forms, must inhere immediately in sustances.
24I. The heat to which Aquinas refers is a 'ind of power or energy in an animal which
is instrumental in all the animal!s natural processes.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KK
forth. Bo natural agent, therefore, produces any sustantial
form.
24E
;ence, the same result follows as aove.
On the Contrary-
2. According to %ohn ?amascene, On the Orthodo0
)aith, '. G, ch. I4,
24K
there is a proper operation for every
thing. :ut every thing which has a proper active operation
is the cause of something y its own operation. It seems,
therefore, that fire y ma'ing heat is the cause of heat, and
so forth.
G. 1urthermore, if 7od were the immediate
cause of all things, one thing would not depend upon
another, as effect upon its cause. If such were the case, a
thing would not come to e y the agency of one thing
rather than y the agency of another. ,e see, however, from
experience that one thing is not made y )ust anything, ut
rather man is always generated from the seed of man. The
seed of the father, therefore, is the efficient cause of the son.
&olution-
I answer that there are three positions on this
question. Jne of which is that 7od immediately does all
things such that nothing else is the cause of anything.
Accordingly, they /who hold this position0 say that fire does
not cause heat ut rather 7od does, nor is the hand moved
24E. The o)ection runs as follows. Since natural agents cause their
effects through active qualities *hotHcold. wetHdry+, which are accidents,
the accidents ecome efficient causes. An accident, eing less of a
reality than a sustance, cannot e the cause of a sustance, and hence
an accidental form cannot e the cause of a sustantial form.
24K. St. %ohn ?amascene, De fide orthodo0a, cap. I4, p. 2EG. St.
%ohn ?amascene, Writings, p. GKG.
ut rather 7od causes its motion, and so forth. :ut this position is foolish,
ecause it does away with the order of the universe and the proper operation
of things, and it defies the )udgment of our senses.
The second position is of those philosophers who, in order to retain
the proper operations of things, deny that 7od immediately creates all things.
Cather, they say that 7od is the immediate cause of the first created thing,
and this is the cause of the second, and so forth. :ut this opinion is false,
ecause we hold on faith that angels are not creators ut only 7od is the
QCreator of all that is visile and invisile.Q
The third position is that 7od immediately causes all things and that
individual things have their own operations, through which they are the
proximate causes of things, not of all things ut only of some. According to
the faith, as was said, no creature is held to produce another into eing y
creation, not y its own power nor y the power of another.
7od alone is the immediate cause of all those things which come into
eing y creation, and these are things that cannot come into eing y
motion nor y generation. /This is so for three reasons.0 1irst, ecause of
the simplicity of a sustance(s essence, in the case that the essence is
susistent. ,hatever is generated must e composed of matter and form.
Thus, neither angels nor rational souls can e generated ut only created. *It
is otherwise, however, with other forms
24D
which, even if they are simple,
nevertheless do not have eing independently,
244
ecause they are not
susistent. ;ence, the coming into eing elongs not to the forms ut to the
composite /of form and matter0 which has a form, which is said to e
properly what is generated as something having a form. 1orms of this sort
are not said to e generated except in an accidental way.+
24F
The same
24D. Such as the sustantial forms of material things, li'e the form of water.
244. Qeing independentlyQ is our translation of esse absolutum.
24F. An angel is a susistent essence or, in other words, it is simply an existent form.
Lnli'e material things, it is not composed of matter and form. ;ence, material things are
generated, ecause a composite of form and matter is generated out of the potency of matter,
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KD
argument also applies to prime matter, which underlies
generation and, ecause of its simplicity, is not generated
ut created.
Second, /some things come into eing not through
motion nor through generation0 ecause of the fact that they
are not composed of contraries, such as the heavenly odies.
Everything which is generated, on the other hand, is
generated from contraries.
243
Third, /some things come into eing neither through
motion nor through generation0 ecause of the necessity that
generation always generates what is similar in species. 1or
this reason the first memers of the species were
immediately created y 7od, such as the first man, the first
lion, and so forth. #an, for instance, can only e generated
ut an angel, ecause it is not a composite, cannot e generated. An
angel can come into eing, therefore, only y eing created out of
nothing.
243. ,hatever is generated is made out of what is not that which is
made. in this sense, whatever is generated is generated from its contrary-
the non$living ecomes the living, the non$human ecomes the human,
and so forth. It is also true to say that the generated thing is composed
out of elements that are to some degree mutually repugnant or that are,
in their pure states, incompatile with one another. In Aquinas(
chemistry, this meant elements that were hot comined with elements
that were cold, and elements that were dry comined with elements that
were wet. ;ence, it was ovious to Aquinas that whatever is generated
is liale to degeneration or destruction. The heavenly odies, however,
such as the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars, did not appear to
the ancients and medievals to e undergoing any decomposition. Since
they did not thin' that such odies were to e liale to decomposition,
they concluded that these odies were not composed of contrary
elements, as everything on earth is. ;eavenly odies, thus, moved ut
were never generated or destroyed. If they did come into eing at all, it
could only have een y 7od(s creating them from nothing.
from man. It is, however, otherwise with those things which are not
generated y an agent that is similar to them in species. 1or these, rather, the
power of celestial odies along with appropriate matter is sufficient, as, for
example, those things which are generated y putrefaction.
2F5
Bow a creature is ale to e the cause of the things that are produced
through motion and generation, either ecause it exerts causality over an
entire species, as the sun is the cause of a man and of a lion, or ecause it
exerts causality on only one individual, as man generates man, and fire
generates fire. Bevertheless, 7od is also the cause of these things, operating
more intimately in them than do the other causes that involve motion,
ecause ;e ;imself gives eing to things. The other causes, in contrast, are
the causes that, as it were, specify that eing. The entire eing of any thing
cannot come from some creature, since matter is from 7od alone. :eing,
however, is more intimate to anything than those things y which eing is
specified. ;ence, it /eing0 remains even if those other things are removed,
as is said in the 'oo6 of Causes, proposition 2.
2F2
;ence, the operation of the
Creator pertains more to what is intimate in a thing than does the operation
of any secondary causes. The fact, therefore, that a creature is the cause of
some other creature does not preclude that 7od operate immediately in all
things, insofar as ;is power is li'e an intermediary that )oins the power of
any secondary cause with its effect. In fact, the power of a creature cannot
achieve its effect except y the power of the Creator, from whom is all
power, preservation of power, and order /of cause0 to effect. 1or this reason,
2F5. Aquinas, following the ancients, thought that worms, for instance, could e
generated from the rotting of garage. The garage had to have the appropriate matter *the
right active and passive qualities+ and the action of a celestial ody *the sun+ was required.
The iology here is incorrect, of course, ut the philosophical point is what is important.
Aquinas is saying that animal and plant generation need not, in principle, always ta'e place
from parent memers of the species. That such, in principle, could happen is needed for a
doctrine of evolution. Aquinas, of course, did not hold a doctrine of evolution, ut the point
that he is ma'ing here is important if his philosophy is to e held to e compatile with a
doctrine of evolution.
2F2. Liber de causis, 6rop. 2, Z22, p. EF. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, pp. 2K$2D.
as is said in the same place of the 'oo6 of Causes,
2FG
the
causality of the secondary cause is rooted in the causality of
the primary cause.
2. To the first it ought to e said 7od ma'es use of
other causes for creating, not from need, ut from ;is
goodness, for ;e wishes to give the power of causing to
others also.
G. To the second it ought to e said that, if we
suppose, according to the opinion of some, that the angels
help 7od y moving the heavenly odies, it is plain that
angels are the cause of generation and corruption through
the motion of the heavenly odies. Even if this causality is
not exercised y all angels, nevertheless it involves all of
them, ecause, according to ?ionysius, On the Celestial
%ierarchy, ch. I,
2FI
the higher angels instruct the lower
angels as to the duties they are to perform. If, however, this
supposition is not made, it could e said that, from the fact
that angels are more nole, it does not follow that they have
the power to cause generation and corruption in things.
rather /what follows is that angels have0 a higher power,
which consists in the 'nowing of 7od.
I. To the third it ought to e said that the
specifically same effect cannot come immediately from
different agents which have determinate operations to
2FG. Liber de causis, 6rop. 2, Z2D, p. E3. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p. 2D.
2FI. ?ionysius the Areopagite, La hierarchie c3leste,edited y
7[nter ;eil *6aris- Editions du Cerf, 23KF+ p. 3G. ?ionysius the
Areopagite, .ystical ,heology and ,he Celestial %ierarchies, translated
y the editors of the Shrine of ,isdom *1intry, L.>- The Shrine of
,isdom, 23DK+, pp. G3$I2.
determinate effects, for example, art and nature /cannot produce specifically
the same effect0.
2FE
:ut 7od does not have an operation that is determined to
some /one0 effect. Cather, y one operation alone, ;e is ale to produce all
effects that ;e wishes to produce. ;ence, 7od, without the operation of
nature, is ale to ma'e the same effect specifically that nature produces.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that there are three opinions
on the coming to e of things through generation. 1irst is the position of
those holding a Qhiddenness,Q such as Anaxagoras, Physics 2.E *2F4aG2$
2F44+, who held that all things are in all things, and generation comes aout
y drawing one /hidden0 thing out of another.
2FK
Thus, he did not hold true
generation, which occurs when a new sustantial form is acquired in matter.
Into this error also falls the opinion of all the old philosophers who held, not
true generation, ut that generation occurs y gathering and separating
/things0 or y altering them. This error arises ecause they do not recogni&e
a formal cause, ut only a material cause, or a material and efficient cause
only.
Another opinion, opposed to this one, is that of 6lato, who held that
there are separated forms, which he called QIdeas,Q that cause forms to exist
in matter. The opinion of Avicenna may e reduced to 6lato(s, ecause
Avicenna, On the Progression of 'eing, ch. E,
2FD
says that all forms are from
a /separate0 intelligence and that the natural agent merely prepares matter to
2FE. An agent that has a determinate operation to a determinate effect will always
produce that effect and will not produce some other. 1ire, for example, will always produce
heat. It will not produce cold.
2FK. Anaxagoras( position is that there are little its of everything hidden in everything.
Thus, for example, the food that a man eats ecomes his ones and flesh ecause there are
little its of one and flesh hidden in the food that he eats. The food does not sustantially
change into one and flesh. the one and flesh already present, ut hidden, in the food are
simply added to the man(s ones and flesh.
2FD. Avicenna, De causis primis et secundis et de flu0u 7ui conse7uitur eas in C. de
=aux, #otes et te0ts sur lQ"vicennisme latin au0 confins des JII
e
et JIII
e
si9cles *6aris- =rin,
23IE+, pp. 34$25G. Opera omnia, DKra$.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation KF
receive form. This opinion derives from the fact that he
thin's that everything is generated from that which is li'e
itself, even though this often does not happen in nature, as in
the case of those things that are generated y putrefaction,
and also from the fact that he thin's that what is generated is
form. This, however, cannot e, ecause generation
essentially is aimed at what has eing, for that is the end of
any ma'ing, and this is only the composite, not the form nor
the matter. ;ence, form is generated only accidentally.
Third is the opinion of Aristotle, .etaphysics F.2
*25EGaGE$I2+, 2G.G$I *25D44$2545a3+, intermediate
etween these other two, which is that all forms are
potentially in prime matter, ut they are not actually there,
as those who held the QhiddennessQ doctrine said. The
natural agent produces not the form ut the composite, y
ringing matter from potentiality to actuality. This natural
agent y its own action is, as it were, an instrument of 7od
;imself who, as agent, oth ma'es the matter and gives it
the potency for form. ;ence, if Aristotle(s position is held, it
is not necessary that the /natural0 agent create the form or
that it ma'e anything from nothing, ecause it does not
ma'e the form ut the composite.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that )ust as
natural heat acts y the soul(s power or as an instrument of
the soul, as is said in On the Soul G.E *E2D24$I5+, ecause
it not only causes heat ut also contriutes to the generation
of living flesh, so also the active quality acts y the power of
the sustantial form. ;ence y that action matter is not only
rought to the actuality of accidental form ut also to the
actuality of sustantial form.
A+'IC, 0O4+)
-.,'.,+ &OM,'.I*1 O'.,+ '.A* 1OD
I& AB, 'O CA4&, A*/'.I*1
O!2ections-
It seems that nothing other than -od is able to cause anything.
2. An agent which acts without an /instrumental0 means is a
more perfect agent than one that needs a means in its acting. 7od, however,
is the most perfect agent. It seems, therefore, that he produces all things
with no /instrumental0 means.
G. 1urthermore, angels are the most nole of all creatures. :ut
angels are not the efficient causes of things, ecause one angel is not the
cause of another, nor is an angel the cause of a corporeal creature. It seems,
therefore, that creatures other /than angels0 would e even less li'ely to e
the causes of things.
I. 1urthermore, agents from different species do not produce
specifically the same effect. :ut the first individuals of all species were
created immediately y 7od, on the supposition that the world did not
always exist. It seems, therefore, that nothing is ale to produce something
the same as itself in species.
2F4
E. 1urthermore, that which does not come from some matter is
only ale to e made y creation. :ut forms and accidents do not have a
material part of themselves, for if they did there would e an infinite
regress.
2FF
They, therefore, can only e made y creation, with the following
2F4. The argument is that natural causes, since they are specifically different from 7od,
must produce effects that are specifically different from those that 7od produces. :ut 7od,
at the eginning, produced all effects. Therefore, natural causes can produce none of these,
and since there are no other effects eyond these, natural agents can produce no effects.
2FF. If a sustantial form or an accidental form had matter in itself, there would e an
infinite regress. If the form of a horse, for example, had its own matter, then the whole
horse would e a composite of *2+ the horse(s ody, *G+ the form of the horse, and *I+ the
matter of the form of the horse. Since, however, the horse(s ody no$ requires a form,
ecause no ody can exist without form *i.e., an informing principle which ma'es the thing
e what it is+, we will have to introduce another form. This new form, however, on the
result. Every efficient cause of some thing gives to it either
sustantial or accidental form. These /forms0, however, are
only produced y creation. Bothing, therefore, is ale to e
the efficient cause of anything except the Creator, who is
7od alone, as was said.
K. 1urthermore, the efficient cause is never
wea'er than the effect. Batural agents, however, act only
through active qualities, which are accidents. This is shown
y the fact that something cannot e a sustantial form in
one thing and an accidental form in another. ;eat,
2F3
for
example, which is an accident in a man, cannot e the
sustantial form of fire, and so forth. Bo natural agent,
therefore, produces any sustantial form.
235
;ence, the same
result follows as aove.
On the Contrary-
2. According to %ohn ?amascene, On the Orthodo0
)aith, '. G, ch. I4,
232
there is a proper operation for every
thing. :ut every thing which has a proper active operation
supposition of the argument, will have to have its own matter, again
leaving the horse(s ody without form. Aet another form will then have
to e introduced, and it will again have its own matter, and so forth. The
same sort of argument could e made aout accidents. The general point
is that sustantial form must e united immediately to prime matter and
that accidents, or accidental forms, must inhere immediately in
sustances.
2F3. The heat to which Aquinas refers is a 'ind of power or energy
in an animal which is instrumental in all the animal!s natural processes.
235. The o)ection runs as follows. Since natural agents cause their
effects through active qualities *hotHcold. wetHdry+, which are accidents,
the accidents ecome efficient causes. An accident, eing less of a
reality than a sustance, cannot e the cause of a sustance, and hence
an accidental form cannot e the cause of a sustantial form.
is the cause of something y its own operation. It seems, therefore, that fire
y ma'ing heat is the cause of heat, and so forth.
G. 1urthermore, if 7od were the immediate cause of all things,
one thing would not depend upon another, as effect upon its cause. If such
were the case, a thing would not come to e y the agency of one thing
rather than y the agency of another. ,e see, however, from experience that
one thing is not made y )ust anything, ut rather man is always generated
from the seed of man. The seed of the father, therefore, is the efficient cause
of the son.
&olution-
I answer that there are three positions on this question. Jne of which
is that 7od immediately does all things such that nothing else is the cause of
anything. Accordingly, they /who hold this position0 say that fire does not
cause heat ut rather 7od does, nor is the hand moved ut rather 7od causes
its motion, and so forth. :ut this position is foolish, ecause it does away
with the order of the universe and the proper operation of things, and it
defies the )udgment of our senses.
The second position is of those philosophers who, in order to retain
the proper operations of things, deny that 7od immediately creates all things.
Cather, they say that 7od is the immediate cause of the first created thing,
and this is the cause of the second, and so forth. :ut this opinion is false,
ecause we hold on faith that angels are not creators ut only 7od is the
QCreator of all that is visile and invisile.Q
The third position is that 7od immediately causes all things and that
individual things have their own operations, through which they are the
proximate causes of things, not of all things ut only of some. According to
the faith, as was said, no creature is held to produce another into eing y
creation, not y its own power nor y the power of another.
232. St. %ohn ?amascene, De fide orthodo0a, cap. I4, p. 2EG. St. %ohn ?amascene,
Writings, p. GKG.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation D5
7od alone is the immediate cause of all those things
which come into eing y creation, and these are things that
cannot come into eing y motion nor y generation. /This
is so for three reasons.0 1irst, ecause of the simplicity of a
sustance(s essence, in the case that the essence is susistent.
,hatever is generated must e composed of matter and
form. Thus, neither angels nor rational souls can e
generated ut only created. *It is otherwise, however, with
other forms
23G
which, even if they are simple, nevertheless
do not have eing independently,
23I
ecause they are not
susistent. ;ence, the coming into eing elongs not to the
forms ut to the composite /of form and matter0 which has a
form, which is said to e properly what is generated as
something having a form. 1orms of this sort are not said to
e generated except in an accidental way.+
23E
The same
argument also applies to prime matter, which underlies
generation and, ecause of its simplicity, is not generated
ut created.
Second, /some things come into eing not through
motion nor through generation0 ecause of the fact that they
are not composed of contraries, such as the heavenly odies.
23G. Such as the sustantial forms of material things, li'e the form of
water.
23I. Qeing independentlyQ is our translation of esse absolutum.
23E. An angel is a susistent essence or, in other words, it is simply
an existent form. Lnli'e material things, it is not composed of matter
and form. ;ence, material things are generated, ecause a composite of
form and matter is generated out of the potency of matter, ut an angel,
ecause it is not a composite, cannot e generated. An angel can come
into eing, therefore, only y eing created out of nothing.
Everything which is generated, on the other hand, is generated from
contraries.
23K
Third, /some things come into eing neither through motion nor
through generation0 ecause of the necessity that generation always
generates what is similar in species. 1or this reason the first memers of the
species were immediately created y 7od, such as the first man, the first
lion, and so forth. #an, for instance, can only e generated from man. It is,
however, otherwise with those things which are not generated y an agent
that is similar to them in species. 1or these, rather, the power of celestial
odies along with appropriate matter is sufficient, as, for example, those
things which are generated y putrefaction.
23D
23K. ,hatever is generated is made out of what is not that which is made. in this sense,
whatever is generated is generated from its contrary- the non$living ecomes the living, the
non$human ecomes the human, and so forth. It is also true to say that the generated thing
is composed out of elements that are to some degree mutually repugnant or that are, in their
pure states, incompatile with one another. In Aquinas( chemistry, this meant elements that
were hot comined with elements that were cold, and elements that were dry comined with
elements that were wet. ;ence, it was ovious to Aquinas that whatever is generated is
liale to degeneration or destruction. The heavenly odies, however, such as the sun, the
moon, the planets, and the stars, did not appear to the ancients and medievals to e
undergoing any decomposition. Since they did not thin' that such odies were to e liale
to decomposition, they concluded that these odies were not composed of contrary
elements, as everything on earth is. ;eavenly odies, thus, moved ut were never
generated or destroyed. If they did come into eing at all, it could only have een y 7od(s
creating them from nothing.
23D. Aquinas, following the ancients, thought that worms, for instance, could e
generated from the rotting of garage. The garage had to have the appropriate matter *the
right active and passive qualities+ and the action of a celestial ody *the sun+ was required.
The iology here is incorrect, of course, ut the philosophical point is what is important.
Aquinas is saying that animal and plant generation need not, in principle, always ta'e place
from parent memers of the species. That such, in principle, could happen is needed for a
doctrine of evolution. Aquinas, of course, did not hold a doctrine of evolution, ut the point
that he is ma'ing here is important if his philosophy is to e held to e compatile with a
doctrine of evolution.
Bow a creature is ale to e the cause of the things
that are produced through motion and generation, either
ecause it exerts causality over an entire species, as the sun
is the cause of a man and of a lion, or ecause it exerts
causality on only one individual, as man generates man, and
fire generates fire. Bevertheless, 7od is also the cause of
these things, operating more intimately in them than do the
other causes that involve motion, ecause ;e ;imself gives
eing to things. The other causes, in contrast, are the causes
that, as it were, specify that eing. The entire eing of any
thing cannot come from some creature, since matter is from
7od alone. :eing, however, is more intimate to anything
than those things y which eing is specified. ;ence, it
/eing0 remains even if those other things are removed, as is
said in the 'oo6 of Causes, proposition 2.
234
;ence, the
operation of the Creator pertains more to what is intimate in
a thing than does the operation of any secondary causes.
The fact, therefore, that a creature is the cause of some other
creature does not preclude that 7od operate immediately in
all things, insofar as ;is power is li'e an intermediary that
)oins the power of any secondary cause with its effect. In
fact, the power of a creature cannot achieve its effect except
y the power of the Creator, from whom is all power,
preservation of power, and order /of cause0 to effect. 1or
this reason, as is said in the same place of the 'oo6 of
Causes,
23F
the causality of the secondary cause is rooted in
the causality of the primary cause.
234. Liber de causis, 6rop. 2, Z22, p. EF. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, pp.
2K$2D.
23F. Liber de causis, 6rop. 2, Z2D, p. E3. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p. 2D.
2. To the first it ought to e said 7od ma'es use of other causes
for creating, not from need, ut from ;is goodness, for ;e wishes to give the
power of causing to others also.
G. To the second it ought to e said that, if we suppose,
according to the opinion of some, that the angels help 7od y moving the
heavenly odies, it is plain that angels are the cause of generation and
corruption through the motion of the heavenly odies. Even if this causality
is not exercised y all angels, nevertheless it involves all of them, ecause,
according to ?ionysius, On the Celestial %ierarchy, ch. I,
233
the higher
angels instruct the lower angels as to the duties they are to perform. If,
however, this supposition is not made, it could e said that, from the fact that
angels are more nole, it does not follow that they have the power to cause
generation and corruption in things. rather /what follows is that angels have0
a higher power, which consists in the 'nowing of 7od.
I. To the third it ought to e said that the specifically same
effect cannot come immediately from different agents which have
determinate operations to determinate effects, for example, art and nature
/cannot produce specifically the same effect0.
G55
:ut 7od does not have an
operation that is determined to some /one0 effect. Cather, y one operation
alone, ;e is ale to produce all effects that ;e wishes to produce. ;ence,
7od, without the operation of nature, is ale to ma'e the same effect
specifically that nature produces.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that there are three opinions
on the coming to e of things through generation. 1irst is the position of
those holding a Qhiddenness,Q such as Anaxagoras, Physics 2.E *2F4aG2$
233. ?ionysius the Areopagite, La hierarchie c3leste,edited y 7[nter ;eil *6aris-
Editions du Cerf, 23KF+ p. 3G. ?ionysius the Areopagite, .ystical ,heology and ,he
Celestial %ierarchies, translated y the editors of the Shrine of ,isdom *1intry, L.>- The
Shrine of ,isdom, 23DK+, pp. G3$I2.
G55. An agent that has a determinate operation to a determinate effect will always
produce that effect and will not produce some other. 1ire, for example, will always produce
heat. It will not produce cold.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DG
2F44+, who held that all things are in all things, and
generation comes aout y drawing one /hidden0 thing out
of another.
G52
Thus, he did not hold true generation, which
occurs when a new sustantial form is acquired in matter.
Into this error also falls the opinion of all the old
philosophers who held, not true generation, ut that
generation occurs y gathering and separating /things0 or y
altering them. This error arises ecause they do not
recogni&e a formal cause, ut only a material cause, or a
material and efficient cause only.
Another opinion, opposed to this one, is that of 6lato,
who held that there are separated forms, which he called
QIdeas,Q that cause forms to exist in matter. The opinion of
Avicenna may e reduced to 6lato(s, ecause Avicenna, On
the Progression of 'eing, ch. E,
G5G
says that all forms are
from a /separate0 intelligence and that the natural agent
merely prepares matter to receive form. This opinion
derives from the fact that he thin's that everything is
generated from that which is li'e itself, even though this
often does not happen in nature, as in the case of those
things that are generated y putrefaction, and also from the
fact that he thin's that what is generated is form. This,
however, cannot e, ecause generation essentially is aimed
G52. Anaxagoras( position is that there are little its of everything
hidden in everything. Thus, for example, the food that a man eats
ecomes his ones and flesh ecause there are little its of one and
flesh hidden in the food that he eats. The food does not sustantially
change into one and flesh. the one and flesh already present, ut
hidden, in the food are simply added to the man(s ones and flesh.
G5G. Avicenna, De causis primis et secundis et de flu0u 7ui
conse7uitur eas in C. de =aux, #otes et te0ts sur lQ"vicennisme latin au0
confins des JII
e
et JIII
e
si9cles *6aris- =rin, 23IE+, pp. 34$25G. Opera
omnia, DKra$.
at what has eing, for that is the end of any ma'ing, and this is only the
composite, not the form nor the matter. ;ence, form is generated only
accidentally.
Third is the opinion of Aristotle, .etaphysics F.2 *25EGaGE$I2+,
2G.G$I *25D44$2545a3+, intermediate etween these other two, which is that
all forms are potentially in prime matter, ut they are not actually there, as
those who held the QhiddennessQ doctrine said. The natural agent produces
not the form ut the composite, y ringing matter from potentiality to
actuality. This natural agent y its own action is, as it were, an instrument of
7od ;imself who, as agent, oth ma'es the matter and gives it the potency
for form. ;ence, if Aristotle(s position is held, it is not necessary that the
/natural0 agent create the form or that it ma'e anything from nothing,
ecause it does not ma'e the form ut the composite.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that )ust as natural heat acts y
the soul(s power or as an instrument of the soul, as is said in On the Soul G.E
*E2D24$I5+, ecause it not only causes heat ut also contriutes to the
generation of living flesh, so also the active quality acts y the power of the
sustantial form. ;ence y that action matter is not only rought to the
actuality of accidental form ut also to the actuality of sustantial form.
A+'IC, 0I5,)
-.,'.,+ '., -O+D I& ,',+*A
O!2ections-
It seems that the $orld is eternal.
To show this, arguments can e made aout the nature of the heavens
/o)ections 2$E0, aout time /o)ections K$40, aout motion /o)ections F$250
and aout the agent or mover /o)ections 22$2E0.
2. /The following arguments are aout0 the nature of the
heavens. ,hatever is ungenerated and incorruptile has always existed and
will always exist. 6rime matter, however, is ungenerated and incorruptile,
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DI
ecause whatever is generated is generated from a su)ect,
and what is corrupted is corrupted into a su)ect. There is
no su)ect, however, of prime matter.
G5I
Therefore, prime
matter always existed and always will exist. #atter,
however, is never stripped of form. #atter, therefore, has
existed eternally, perfected y the forms y which the
species are constituted. The universe, therefore, of which
these species are parts, has existed eternally. This is the
argument of Aristotle in Physics 2.3 *23GaGK$II+.
G. 1urthermore, what does not have a contrary is
neither corruptile nor generale, ecause generation is from
a contrary and corruption is to a contrary. The heavens,
however, do not have a contrary, since nothing is opposed to
their motion. Therefore, the heavens are neither generated
nor corrupted. they, therefore, have always existed and will
always exist. This is the argument of the 6hilosopher, in On
the %eavens, 2.I *G45a2I$GI+.
G5E
I. 1urthermore, according to the faith, the
sustance of the world is considered to e incorruptile.
G5K

:ut whatever is incorruptile is ungenerated. The world,
therefore, is ungenerated. 6roof of the minor premise.
G5I. A su)ect is that which independently exists. in this world,
su)ects are sustances composed of form and matter. ,hen generation
occurs, a new su)ect or sustance comes into eing. when corruption
occurs, a su)ect ceases to exist. 6rime matter is neither the su)ect that
ceases to exist nor the su)ect that egins to exist. It itself is neither
generated nor corrupted ut underlies the change from one su)ect to
another.
G5E. See also Averroes, In I De caelo., text. G5, vol. K, 2Ev$2Kr.
G5K. Aquinas means that the world will continue on in existence.
See In NIII Phys., lec G, n. 3FD.
,hatever is incorruptile has the power to exist always. :ut that which has
the power to exist always is not found to e sometimes existent and
sometimes non$existent, ecause /if it were0 it would follow that at the same
time it would e existent and non$existent. This is so ecause something is
existent for the entire time for which its power of existing lasts. ;ence, if it
has the power to exist for all time, it exists for all time, ut if it should
happen to e non$existent at some time, it follows that it would
simultaneously exist and not exist. Bo incorruptile thing, therefore, is
sometimes existent and sometimes non$existent, ut every generale thing is
of this sort. Therefore, /the world is not generated0. This is the argument of
the 6hilosopher in On the %eavens 2.2G *GF2IG$GFGa2I+.
E. 1urthermore, whatever exists somewhere, where efore there
was nothing, exists in that which was a void efore, ecause the void is that
in which a ody can e when nothing is there now. If the world, however,
has een made from nothing, where the world is now there was nothing
efore. Therefore, efore the world, there was a void. A void, however, is
impossile, as is proven in Physics E.D$3 *G2Ia2G$G24GF+. Also many
sense experiences with different powers of sensation show that nature does
not allow a void. It is, therefore, impossile, that the world egan to exist.
This is the argument of the Commentator in On the %eavens I.G3.
G5D
K. The same thing can e argued aout time, as follows.
,hatever is always at its eginning and at its end has always existed and
always will exist, ecause there is /always0 something after the eginning
and efore the end. Time, however, is always in that which is the eginning
and the end of time, ecause there is nothing real of time except the present
moment, the definition of which is that it is the end of the past and the
eginning of the future. It seems, therefore, that time always existed and
always will exist, and therefore also motion, the movale thing, and the
G5D. Averroes, In III De caelo., text. G3, vol. K, 233r$G55r.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DE
whole world. This is the argument of the 6hilosopher in
Physics F.2 *GK225$GF+.
G54
D. 1urthermore, whatever can e shown to e
never at rest ut always flowing has something efore itself
from which it has flowed. The present moment, however,
can e shown to e never at rest, li'e a point, ut always
flowing, ecause the entire meaning of time is to e found in
flowing and in succession. Therefore, efore any present
moment there must have een a previous moment. it is
therefore impossile to imagine that time had a first
moment. Time, therefore, has always existed, and /the
conclusion follows0 as efore. This is the argument of the
Commentator, in the same text.
G5F
4. 1urthermore, the Creator of the world
precedes the world either in nature alone or in oth nature
and duration.
G53
If the Creator precedes the world in nature
alone, as the cause precedes its effect, then whenever the
Creator exists the creature exists, and in this case the world
will have existed from eternity. If the Creator precedes the
world in oth nature and duration, then, ecause priority and
G54. See also Averroes, In NIII Phys.5 text. 22, vol. E, IEDv$IE4r.
G5F. Averroes, In NIII Phys., text. 22$2G, vol. E, IEDv$IE4r.
G53. The Creator precedes the world in at least one of two senses. If
;e precedes the world in nature, this means that ;is nature is first or
highest in perfection. ut it does not mean that ;e exists temporally
efore the world. If ;e precedes the world in duration, this means that
the world had an asolute temporal eginning such that the Creator
would have existed QeforeQ the world, although there could not have
een time efore the world, properly spea'ing. Since the Creator, no
matter what is true aout the temporal eginning of the world, is the first
or highest in perfection, there are only two possiilities- either ;e
precedes the world in nature only or in oth nature and duration.
posteriority in duration implies the reality of time, there was time efore the
existence of the entire world. :ut this is impossile, ecause time is a
property of motion and does not exist without motion. It is impossile,
therefore, that the world has not always existed. This is the argument of
Avicenna in his .etaphysics 3.2.
G25
F. The same thing can also e shown from a consideration of
motion. It is impossile that there e a new relation etween two things
unless a change comes aout in one of them. This is clear in the relation of
equality, for example, ecause two things do not egin to e equal unless
one of them is either increased or decreased. #otion, however, always
implies a relation of the mover to the thing moved, which are relative to one
another. It is therefore impossile for motion to e new unless some change
should precede it, either in the mover or in the thing eing moved. 1or
example, the two must e rought together, or something of this sort.
Therefore, there is always motion efore motion, and hence motion, the
movale thing, and the world exist from eternity. This is the argument of the
6hilosopher in Physics F.2 *GK2aF$GK23+.
3. 1urthermore, whatever is sometimes in motion and sometimes
at rest is ultimately caused y some continuous motion which is perpetual.
A succession of the sort, which alternates etween motion and rest cannot e
caused y something that always remains the same, ecause what always
remains the same always causes the same thing. The cause of this
succession, therefore, must e some motion which, if it does not exist
always, must have some preceding motion. Since there cannot e an infinite
regress, there must e some motion that is perpetual. ;ence, the same
/conclusion follows0 as efore. This is the argument of the Commentator in
Physics F.
G22
The same argument can also e found in the words of the
6hilosopher.
G2G
The Commentator also invo'es this argument, in
G25. Avicenna, De philosophia prima, tract. 3, cap. 2, pp. EIE$EED.
G22. Averroes, In NIII Phys., text. 3, vol. E, IEEv$IEKv.
G2G. Aristotle, Physics F.2 *GK2aF$GK225+.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DK
.etaphysics 4,
G2I
to show that, if the world had een made,
this world must have een part of another world, y the
motion of which the change in this world was rought aout,
whether it was a change etween motion and rest or etween
eing and non$eing.
25. 1urthermore, the generation of one thing is
the corruption of another. Bothing, however, would e
corrupted if it were not generated first. Therefore, efore
every generation there was a generation, and efore every
corruption a corruption. :ut this could not have een if the
world were not existent. The world, therefore, always
existed. This is the argument of the 6hilosopher in On
-eneration and Corruption G.25 *IIDa2E$I2+
22. The same thing is ale to e shown aout the
mover or the agent. Every action or motion that comes from
an unmoved agent or mover must e perpetual. The first
agent or mover, however, is completely unmoved.
Therefore, ;is action and motion must e perpetual. The
first premise is proved thus. ,hatever acts or causes
motion, after not acting or not causing motion, goes from
potency to actuality, ecause everything acts only insofar as
it is in actuality. ;ence, if it acts after not acting, something
aout it must now e in actuality which was previously in
potentiality. :ut whatever goes from potency to actuality is
moved. Therefore, whatever acts after not acting is moved.
This argument can e ta'en from the words of the
6hilosopher in Physics F.E *GKKaG5$GKKI2+.
2G. 1urthermore, 7od acts either y free will or
y natural necessity. If ;e acts y natural necessity, since
such causes are determined to one effect, the same effect
must always e caused y ;im. ;ence, if the world were
G2I. Averroes, In NIII Phys.5 text. E4, vol. E, IFFv.
made at any time y ;im it is necessary that it e eternal. If, however, ;e
acts y free will, no will egins to do something new unless there was some
change in the one possessing the will, either ecause something previously
loc'ing the will has now ceased to do so, or ecause something now
persuades the will to act which was not persuading it efore. Since,
therefore, the will of 7od remains immovaly the same, it seems that ;e
does not egin to do something new. This argument is common to the
6hilosopher, in Physics F.2 *GKGaK$GKGD+, to Avicenna .etaphysics 3.2,
G2E

and to the Commentator.
G2K
2I. 1urthermore, for every volitional agent, which sometimes acts
and sometimes does not act, a succession of time must e imagined, so that
the time when it wills to act can e distinguished from the time when it wills
not to act. :ut to imagine a succession of time requires some 'ind of
change, either on the part of the imagination or, at least, on the part of the
thing imagined, ecause a succession of time is caused y a succession of
motion, as is clear in Physics E.22 *G2FG2$G23a25+. It is, therefore,
impossile that the will egin to cause some new motion which is not
preceded y some other motion. This is the argument of the Commentator in
Physics F.
G2D
2E. 1urthermore, the will to ring aout an effect immediately
produces that effect, unless something is lac'ing to the chosen action which
might come later. 1or example, if I now will to ma'e a fire tomorrow when
it will e cold, coldness is now lac'ing to prevent my chosen action, ut as
soon as the coldness comes I will ma'e the fire, unless something else
prevents me. 7od, however, has the eternal will to ma'e the world,
otherwise /;is will0 would e mutale. It is, therefore, impossile that ;e
should not have made an eternal world, except in the case that something
should have een lac'ing to the world which later came forth. Bothing,
G2E. Avicenna, De philosophia prima, trac. 3, cap. 2, pp. EEG$EEI.
G2K. Averroes, In NIII Phys.5 text. F \ 2K, vol. E, IEIv$IEEv. IE3v$IK2r.
G2D. Averroes, In NIII Phys., text. 2K, vol. E, IE3v$IK2r.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DD
however, could come forth except through some action.
Therefore, efore this /world0 was made as something new,
there must have een some action that produced a change.
;ence no new thing could e caused y an eternal will
unless it were aided y some eternal motion. Therefore, the
world must have existed eternally. This is the argument of
the Commentator, in the same place.
G24
On the Contrary- /Arguments to show that the world
necessarily had a temporal eginning0
2. 7od either is the cause of the sustance of the
world, or ;e is not and is the cause of its motion only. If
/7od is the cause0 of the motion only, then the sustance of
it /the world0 has not een created. /The world0 is, therefore,
a first principle, and hence there will e several first
principles and several uncreated things, which was argued
against aove.
G2F
If, however, ;e is the cause of the
sustance of the heavens, giving eing to the heavens, since
whatever receives eing from something follows it in
duration, it seems that the world did not always exist.
G. 1urthermore, every created thing has een
made from nothing. :ut whatever has een made from
nothing is a eing after it was nothing, since eing and non$
eing cannot e at the same time. Therefore, the heavens
must first have not existed and then later existed, and the
same for the whole world.
I. 1urthermore, if the world existed from
eternity, then an infinite numer of days have preceded this
day. An infinite numer of things, however, cannot e gone
G24. ibid.
G2F. Article Jne.
through. Therefore, it would never have een possile to arrive at this
/present0 day. :ut that is false. Therefore, etc.
E. 1urthermore, whatever can e added to can e greater or less.
:ut to the days that have passed there can e the addition of days.
Therefore, past time can e greater than it is. :ut there is nothing greater
than the infinite, nor can there e. Therefore, past time is not infinite.
K. 1urthermore, if the world existed from eternity, then there was
also generation from eternity oth of men and of animals. :ut every
generation requires a parent and an off$spring, for the parent is the efficient
cause of the off$spring. Thus there is an infinite regress in efficient causes,
which is impossile, as is proven in .etaphysics G.G *33Ea2$33EI2+. It is
impossile, therefore, that there was always generation and the world.
D. 1urthermore, if the world always existed, there were always
men. Therefore, an infinite numer of men have died efore us. :ut when
each man dies his soul does not die ut lives on. There are, therefore, now
actually an infinite numer of souls separate from odies. :ut it is
impossile that there e an actual infinity, as is proven in Physics I.K
*G5E25$G5DaF+. It is, therefore, impossile that the world have always
existed.
4. 1urthermore, it is impossile that something e equal to 7od.
:ut if the world always existed, it would e equal to 7od in duration. This,
therefore, is impossile.
F. 1urthermore, no finite power can perform an infinite
operation. :ut the power of the heavens is a finite power, since the quantity
/of the heavens0 is finite, and it is impossile that there e an infinite power
in a finite quantity. It is, therefore, impossile that the motion /of the
heavens0 exist for an infinite time, and li'ewise impossile that their
existence could last for an infinite time, ecause the duration of a thing does
not exceed the power that it has for existence. ;ence, /the heavens0 egan to
exist at some time.
3. 1urthermore, no one douts that 7od precedes the world y
nature. In 7od, however, ;is nature and duration are the same. 7od,
therefore, preceded the world in duration. The world,
therefore, did not exist from eternity.
&olution-
I answer that there are three positions on this
question. 1irst /is the position0 of the philosophers, who
have said that not only is 7od eternal ut so also are other
things. :ut /they have said this0 in different ways. Some,
efore Aristotle, have held that the world is generale and
corruptile and that, what is true of an individual in a
species, that one individual is corrupted and another is
generated, is true of the entire universe. This was the
opinion of Empedocles. Jthers have said that things were
dormant for an infinite time and that they egan to e moved
y an Intellect which drew them out and separated one thing
from another. This was the opinion of Anaxagoras. Jthers
have said that things were eternally in a random motion and
that, at some time, they were rought into order, either y
chance, as ?emocritus thin's that indivisile self$moving
odies form compounds y chance, or y a creator, which
6lato thin's, as is said in On the %eavens I.G *I553$GD+.
Jthers have said that things existed eternally in )ust the way
that they do now, and this is the opinion of Aristotle and of
all the philosophers who follow him. This last opinion is the
most proale of the opinions )ust given, ut they are all
false and heretical.
The second position is of those who say that the
world and everything other than 7od egan to exist after
they had not existed, and that 7od could not have made an
eternal world, not ecause of a lac' of ;is power, ut
ecause the world could not have een made eternally since
it was created. They also maintain that the fact that the
world egan to exist is not only held on faith ut can also e proven y a
demonstration.
The third position is of those who say that everything other than 7od
egan to exist, ut nevertheless the fact that the world has egun to exist
cannot e demonstrated ut is rather held and elieved to e so y divine
revelation. This position rests upon the authority of 7regory /the 7reat0,
who says, in %omilies on E+e6iel,
G23
that some prophecy concerns the past as
when #oses prophesied when he said in 7enesis,
GG5
QIn the eginning 7od
created the heavens and the earth.Q And I agree with this position, ecause I
do not elieve that we are ale to formulate a demonstrative argument for
this, )ust as /we are not ale to formulate a demonstrative argument0 for the
/existence of0 the Trinity, although it is impossile that the Trinity not exist.
In confirmation of this is the wea'ness of the arguments given as
demonstrations, all of which have een ta'en up and refuted y the
philosophers who maintain the eternity of the world. If someone should try
to prove the newness of the world y relying on such arguments against the
philosophers, his arguments would ecome rather a moc'ery of the faith
than a confirmation of it.
I say, therefore, that there are demonstrations for neither side of the
question ut proale or sophistical arguments on oth sides.
GG2
The
G23. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina *P6<+, edited y %. 6. #igne, GG2 vols.
*6aris- 2FEE$2FDD+. =ol. 4D, col. 4FD. CCS< 2EG, D.
GG5. It was the commonly accepted view in the #iddle Ages that #oses was the author
of the first five oo's of the :ile.
GG2. A demonstration is an argument that produces scientific 'nowledge, that is,
'nowledge which is necessarily so and cannot e otherwise. Bo reasonale person can deny
the truth of such an argument. A proale *or dialectical+ argument is an argument that
produces, not 'nowledge, ut opinion. Since opinions, even if true, are not necessarily true,
a reasonale person can deny the conclusions of such arguments. A sophistical argument is
not a real argument at all ut only an apparent argument. It is a defect of reasoning, with
premises that may e false, with a conclusion that may e false, and with no proper logical
order of premises to conclusion.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation DF
6hilosopher(s words indicate this when he says, ,opics 2.22
*25E2D+, that there are certain prolems for which we have
no argument, such as whether the world is eternal. ;ence,
he himself never intended to demonstrate this, as is clear
from his way of proceeding. ,henever he treats this
question he always adds some 'ind of rhetorical argument,
either y appealing to the opinion of the many or to the
proaility of his arguments, which is completely
inappropriate for someone giving a demonstration.
The reason this question cannot e demonstrated is
that the nature of a thing is quite different in its complete
eing from what it was when it was in its process of eing
made y its cause. 1or example, the nature of a man who is
already orn is different from that of the man while he is
still in his mother(s wom. ;ence, if someone should argue
on the asis of the full$grown man what must e true of the
man in an incomplete state in the wom of his mother, he
would e deceived. Accordingly, Cai #oses, ,he -uide
of the Perple0ed, ch. 24,
GGG
tells the story of a certain oy
whose mother died in his infancy, who was raised on a
solitary island, and who, at the age of reason, as'ed someone
whether and how men were made. ,hen the facts of human
generation were explained to him, he o)ected that such was
impossile, ecause a man could not live without reathing,
eating, and expelling wastes, so that it would e impossile
for a man to live for even one day in his mother(s wom, let
alone nine months. <i'e this oy are those who, from the
way that things happen in the world in its complete state,
wish to show either the necessity or the impossiility of the
GGG. #oses #aimonides, ,he -uide of the Perple0ed, 6art II, c. 24,
pp. G3E$G3F.
eginning of the world. ,hat now egins to e egins through motion.
hence what causes motion must always precede /the motion0 in duration and
in nature, and there must e contraries. ut none of these are necessary in the
ma'ing of the universe y 7od.
+e3lies to O!2ections /which conclude that the world is eternal0-
2. To the first, therefore, it ought to e said that matter is
ungenerated and incorruptile, ut it does not follow that it has always
existed. The reason for this is that it egan to exist, not through generation
from something ut from asolutely nothing. <i'ewise, the world could
cease to exist, if 7od should will it, y whose will eing is given to matter
and to the entire world.
G. And li'ewise it ought to e said to the second that that
argument applies to a eginning /rought aout0 y generation and motion.
;ence that argument is against Empedocles and others who have maintained
that the heavens are generated.
I. To the third it ought to e said that the potency for existing
which now exists in the heavens is not limited to some finite time, and hence
if the heavens should always have /the potency0, they are ale to exist
ecause of it for an infinite time in the past and future. The heavens,
however, have not always had this potency of existing. rather, it was given to
them y the divine will in creating them.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that efore the creation of the
world there was no void, as there is none after, ecause the void is not a
simple negation ut a privation. ;ence, in order that there e a void, as
those who suppose that there is one would say, there must e a place or real
dimensions, neither of which did exist efore the world. And if it should e
said that /the existence of the world0 was possile /efore the world actually
did exist0, I say, as was said aove, that /this possiility0 existed nowhere ut
in the power of the agent.
GGI
GGI. Article G, Ceply to 2.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that the
argument is circular, as is clear according to the 6hilosopher.
The prior and posterior in time come from the prior and
posterior in motion. Accordingly, when it is said that every
present moment is the end of the prior and the eginning of
the posterior, the supposition is that every part of motion
follows some motion and precedes another. ;ence, I say
that the proposition cannot e proven except on the
supposition of that which is concluded through it. It is thus
clear that it is not a demonstration.
D. To the sixth it ought to e said that the
present moment is never understood as something at rest ut
as always flowing. It is not, however, flowing from
something prior, unless a motion should precede it, ut it is
flowing to something posterior. or, on the other hand, it is
not flowing into something posterior, unless a motion should
follow, ut it is flowing from something prior. ;ence, if a
motion never followed or preceded, the Qpresent momentQ
would not e the present moment. This is plain in any
motion which is seen to have had a eginning. Any part of
it is flowing, ut nevertheless there is a eginning and an
end, the end$point from which /terminus a 7uo0 and the end$
point to which /terminus in 7uem0.
4. To the seventh it ought to e said that 7od
precedes the world not only in nature ut also in duration,
not, however, in a duration of time, ut in a duration of
eternity. :efore the world there was no time in reality, ut
in imagination only, ecause we now imagine that 7od
could have added many years earlier to this finite time, and
to all of these earlier years 7od(s eternity would have een
present. In this way it is said that 7od could have made the
world efore ;e had made it, or /;e could have made it0 greater or /;e
could have made0 more /worlds0.
F. To the eighth it ought to e said that a new relation comes
aout not from a change in the mover ut from a change in the thing moved,
if we ta'e creation as a change in the road sense of the term, although
properly it is not a change, as was said aove.
GGE
;ence, the creation of the
heavens precedes its motion, at least y nature, although no motion precedes
creation, since it is from non$eing asolutely. Bevertheless, if it should e
supposed that the heavens had existed efore they egan to e moved, still
the argument /o)ection F0 would not e sound, ecause two 'inds of
relations must e recogni&ed.
GGK
GGE. Article 2, Solution.
GGK. Suppose that the heavens existed for a time efore they were caused to move. If
they egan to move after not moving, would such a eginning imply a new relation etween
mover and thing moved and hence a change in the mover, that is, in 7od" Bo, says
Aquinas, ut to see why he must distinguish two sorts of relation. In order to understand
relations in general, let us recogni&e that the sub4ect is that which is related. the term is that
to which the su)ect is related, and the foundation is that with respect to which the su)ect is
related *or the cause of the relation+. Carroll, for example, is six inches taller than :aldner.
Carroll is the su)ect of the relation, :aldner is the term, and the quantity, six inches, is the
foundation. This is an example of the first sort of relation that Aquinas discusses. In this
sort of relation, the relation can e new if there is a change either in the su)ect or in the
term- either Carroll ecomes shorter or taller, or :aldner ecomes shorter or taller. If that
happens, oth the su)ect and the term are in a new relation. ,ith the second sort of
relation, however, in order for a new relation to occur, there must e a change in the su)ect,
ut there need not e a change in the term. ,hen a man egins to understand, for example,
there must e a change in him, and when a thing egins to move, there must e a change in
the thing moved, ut there need e no change in the thing that the man understands or in the
mover. ;ence, the heavens are in relation to 7od who is the mover, ut the new motion of
the heavens would not imply necessarily any change in 7od.
To put all of this another way, the first sort of relation is a genuinely reciprocal
relation *the su)ect is really related to the term, and the term is really related to the su)ect+,
ut the second sort of relation is asymetrical, for the su)ect is really related to the term, ut
the term is not really related to the su)ect. That is why in the second sort of relation, the
newness of the relation implies no necessary change in the term, ut only in the su)ect.
Jne 'ind of relation is asolute, as in all things
which are related to something else in eing, such as
fatherhood and sonship. Such a relation is not made new
except through the acquisition of that upon which the
relation is founded. ;ence if it is acquired through motion,
the relation follows upon motion, as, for example, the
li'eness of one thing to another follows upon an alternation
in quality upon which the relation is founded. If, however,
the relation is acquired through creation, it follows upon
creation, as, for example, the li'eness of the creature to 7od
is founded on the goodness which is acquired through
creation, y which the creature is compared to 7od.
Jther 'inds of relative things are those which at the
same time imply the relation and the foundation of the
relation. A newness, moreover, in such relations requires
the acquisition of the very thing which is signified y the
name, as, for example, the hait /of the intellect0 which is
science. It is li'ewise with the relation implied y the name
Qmotion,Q which is made new y the acquisition of that
motion which is caused y the mover in the thing moved.
3. To the ninth it ought to e said that the
efficient cause of the sort of alternation etween the world(s
not existing and later existing is not some motion, ut is
rather a thing that always remains the same, namely, the
divine will, which has willed from eternity that the world
should go into eing after non$eing. And if it should e
said that the same thing always ma'es the same thing, I say
that this is true for an agent if QagentQ is ta'en in the strict
sense of the term, meaning that it produces precisely )ust this
effect. 1or example, a natural agent is specified y its
proper form so that its action is always in accord with what
is appropriate to its form. <i'ewise, a voluntary agent is
specified to action through the proposal of the will. ;ence, if the will is not
liale to e loc'ed or moved, the effect of the will follows from the simple
proposal of the will. And this is true aout the divine will in that, forever
remaining the same, it forever accomplishes what it has willed eternally,
ecause it is never loc'ed /y something else0.
GGD
It does not, nevertheless,
ma'e to exist forever what it has forever willed, for it does not will /that
something should exist forever0. ;ence, if it did accomplish what it itself
does not will, it would e as though heat produced cold.
25. To the tenth it ought to e said that the first individuals of
those things which are generated and corrupted did not come into eing
through generation ut through creation. ;ence, there need not have pre$
existed something out of which they were created, and so on, infinitely.
22. To the eleventh it ought to e said that there are two 'inds of
agent. Jne 'ind acts y the necessity of nature, and this 'ind is determined
to action through that which is in its nature. It is, accordingly, impossile
that it egin to act unless it is rought from potency to actuality, whether this
actuality e essential or accidental. The other sort of agent acts y will, ut
here a distinction must e made. Jne sort /of agent that acts y will0 acts y
means of an action that is not the essence of the agent itself. 1rom such
agents, a new effect cannot come forth without a new action, and the
newness of action results in some change in the agent, as it goes from rest to
activity, as is said in On the Soul G.K *E24a2E$E24GF+. Another sort /of
agent that acts y will acts0 without any intermediate action or instrument,
and such an agent is 7od. ;ence ;is willing is ;is action, and since ;is
willing is eternal, so also is ;is action. Bevertheless, ;is effect is strictly in
accord with ;is will, which proposes that /something0 exist or e made in a
certain way, and thus /the agent, i.e., 7od0 does not go from potency to
actuality, ut rather the effect which was in the power of the agent is made to
e actually real.
GGD. As it is not caused y anything else, it is not dependent upon anything other than
itself to accomplish that which it wills. ;ence, the simple proposal of the divine will all y
itself is sufficient for it to accomplish what it wills.
2G. To the twelfth it ought to e said that for all
those agents which act for an end that is eyond their will,
GG4
their will is guided y that end. ;ence /such a will0 wills to
act at some times and not at others, according to those things
that help or impede attaining the end. The will of 7od,
however, did not give eing to the universe for the sa'e of
some end existing eyond ;is own will, )ust as ;e does not
cause motion for some other end, as the philosophers agree,
ecause the more nole thing does not act for the sa'e of
something less than itself. Therefore, the fact that 7od does
not always cause an effect is not due to something
persuading ;im to act or preventing ;im, ut to the
determination of ;is own will, which acts from a wisdom
that is eyond our understanding.
2I. To the thirteenth it ought to e said that the
divine intellect understands all things at once. Thus, from
the fact that /7od0 understands what is the case at this time
or at that time does not imply any change in ;is intellect,
although such could not happen in our intellect. It is, thus,
clear that the o)ection is sophistical. <i'ewise, there is no
implication of any motion on the part of a thing imagined,
ecause 7od has not willed to ma'e the universe after some
time, ecause the QtimeQ efore was nothing ut imaginary,
as was said.
2E. To the fourteenth it ought to e said that
something $as lac'ing to the chosen action, and for that
reason the divine will has not produced the universe
eternally. The suitaility of it /the chosen action0 to the end
GG4. That is, the end to e attained cannot e accomplished simply
y willing that the end e attained. If a student wills to attain a high
mar' in a class, his mere $illing that he should receive the grade is not
enough. ;e must also study, attend class, etc.
is what, in fact, can e understood to e lac'ing to the chosen act so that it
was delayed. The will of a man, for example, delays the ta'ing of medicine
when the medicine is not suitale to his health. And so I say that for this
universe to have een made eternally it would have lac'ed the suitaility to
the end, which is the divine will. 7od, in fact, has willed that it have eing
after non$eing, oth in nature and in duration. If it had een eternal, this
/eing after non$eing in duration0 would have een lac'ing to it. ;ence it
would not have een suitale to the divine will, which is its end.
+e3lies to the Arguments 6On the Contrary6 /which conclude that the
world necessarily has a temporal eginning0-
Since the philosophers have responded to the arguments given Qon
the contrary,Q which I have said are not demonstrations, we, too, should
respond to them as the philosophers themselves have done, lest someone
attempting to argue against those who maintain the eternity of the world
should unwisely rely upon them.
2. To the first, therefore, it ought to e said that, as the
Commentator says in On the Substance of the World, ch. G,
GGF
Aristotle never
intended that 7od was the cause of only the motion of the heavens.
/Aristotle also thought0 that ;e was the cause of its sustance, giving it
eing.
GG3
Since /the heavens0 are finite in power, ecause they are odily,
they require some agent of infinite power who could give them perpetual
motion and perpetual eing *)ust as /a cause is needed for0 motion, so also
for eing+. Bevertheless, it does not follow that 7od precedes the heavens in
duration, ecause ;e does not give eing through motion ut through eternal
causation, insofar as ;is 'nowledge is the cause of things. 1rom the fact
GGF. "verroesQ De substantia orbis, edited y Arthur ;yman, *Camridge, #A and
%erusalem- The #edieval Academy of America and The Isreal Academy of Sciences and
;umanities, 23FD+, pp. FI$F4.
GG3. This is one of several places in which Aquinas claims that Aristotle understands the
first cause as a giver of eing. See Appendix ?.
that ;e 'nows, eternal eing results, )ust as, on the
supposition that the sun exists eternally, its rays are eternal.
G. To the second, Avicenna responds in his
.etaphysics, tract. D, ch. 2 \G, tract. 3, ch. E.
GI5
;e says,
indeed, that all things have een created y 7od and that
creation is from nothing, that is, the creature has eing after
non$eing. This, however, should e understood in two
ways. If it indicates an order of duration, then it is false, ut
if it indicates an order of nature, then it is true. ,hat a thing
has in itself is prior y nature in the thing to what it has from
something else. Everything, however, other than 7od, has
its eing from another. :y nature, therefore, any thing
would e non$eing, if it did not have its eing from 7od.
In this way, 7regory also says, .agna .oralia
/Commentary on 8ob0, '. 2D, ch. I4,
GI2
all things would fall
into nothingness, if the hand of the Almighty did not hold
them. ;ence, the non$eing which things have y nature is
prior in them to the eing which they have from another,
even if it is not prior in duration. In this way the
philosophers grant that things have een created and made
y 7od.
I. To the third it ought to e said that an actual
infinity is impossile, ut an infinity in succession is not
impossile. Any given part, however, of an infinity in
succession is finite, and Qgoing throughQ can only e
understood from one determinate point to another. Since
any period of time is ta'en as something determinate, from
one point to another is always a finite time. In this way it is
GI5. Avicenna, De philosophia prima, trac. D, cap. G, pp. I5I$I5D.
trac. 3, cap. E, pp. E4D$E44.
GI2. 6< 4K, 22EI. CCS< 2EI, FGK.
possile to Qgo throughQ to the present time.
GIG
Jr it could e said that past
time is infinite earlier ut finite later, whereas future time is )ust the
opposite. A limit, eginning, or end can e put on anything if it is in some
way finite. ;ence, according to some, from the fact that past time is infinite,
it has no eginning, ut it does have an end. ;ence it follows that if a man
should egin to count days from this day, he could not count to a first day,
and the opposite would e true aout the future.
GII
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that an addition cannot e
made to an entire infinite succession, even if QinfiniteQ is ta'en as a potential
infinite, ut there can e an addition to some actually finite part. And
nothing prevents that finite part from eing greater or smaller. That the
o)ection is sophistical is clear from the fact that it would imply also that
there can e no addition of infinite numers, as if one said the following.
There are numers that are greater than ten which are not greater than one
hundred. There are, therefore, more numers greater than ten than are
greater than one hundred, and since there are already an infinite numer of
numers greater than one hundred, there will e something greater than the
infinite. It is clear, therefore, that Qgreater than,Q Qaddition,Q and Qgoing
through,Q only apply to what is actual, whether the actual exists in reality, or
whether it exists in the mind or in the imagination. ;ence, these arguments
sufficiently prove that there is no actual infinity, ut none is required for the
eternity of the world. This refutation is ta'en from the words of the
6hilosopher, Physics I.D, I.4 *G5Da3$G5DII, G54G4$IE+.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that one effect cannot have an
infinite numer of essential causes, ut it can have an infinite numer of
GIG. The argument is that it ma'es no sense to tal' aout Qgoing throughQ a period of
time, unless we tal' aout going from one determinate point of time to another determinate
point of time. In effect, Aquinas is saying that the o)ector is guilty of egging the question,
for y insisting that one Qgoes throughQ a period of time to arrive at the present moment, one
is implying already that time is finite, ecause the notion of Qgoing throughQ is a notion that
is applicale only to a finite period of time.
GII. That is, he could not count to a last day.
accidental causes. In other words, it is impossile that some
effect essentially require an infinite numer of causes, ut it
is possile that there e an infinite numer of causes which
do not essentially ear upon the effect. 1or example, in
order that a 'nife exist, some efficient causes are essentially
required, such as a craftsman and a tool, and it is impossile
that these e infinite in numer, ecause there would
consequently e an actual infinity of things. If, however, the
'nife is made y an old craftsman who many times replaces
his tools, there would e a successive multitude of tools,
/ut0 this is accidental. Bothing prevents an infinite numer
of tools from existing which come efore this 'nife, if the
craftsman should e eternal.
GIE
The same is true in the
generation of animals, ecause the semen of the father is the
efficient cause and the instrument of the sun(s power.
GIK

:ecause instruments of this sort, which are secondary
causes, are generated and corrupted, it can happen that they
are infinite in numer. In the same way it can also happen
that there were an infinite numer of days efore this day,
ecause the sustance of the sun is eternal, according to
them, and each revolution of it is finite. This is the
argument of the Commentator in Physics F.
GID
D. To the sixth it ought to e said that this
o)ection is the strongest of them all, ut Alga&el responds
GIE. Botice, however, that the ma'ing of this 'nife does not depend
upon the previous infinite numer of tools. the tools actually used in the
ma'ing of it are only finite in numer.
GIK. 1or Aristotelian emryology, which Aquinas accepted, animal
generation required the agency of oth the sun *as a 'ind of universal
cause+ and the male parent as a specific efficient cause.
GID. Averroes, In NIII Phys., text. E4, vol. E, IFFr$v.
to it in his .etaphysics,
GI4
where he distinguishes finite from infinite eing.
;e grants that there are an infinite numer of actual human souls, ut this is
accidental, ecause rational souls separate from odies have no dependence
upon one another.
GIF
The Commentator, on the other hand, responds that
souls do not remain individually many when separated from the ody, ut
that from all souls there remains one only, as will e clear elow.
GI3
Even if
this position, which /Averroes, the Commentator0 gives in On the Soul I,
GE5

had not een disproven earlier, the argument against him would not e
conclusive.
GE2
Cai #oses also touches on this argument, ,he -uide of the
Perple0ed, I, ch. 4I,
GEG
when he shows that the given argument is not a
demonstration.
GEI
GI4. "lga+elQs .etaphysics/ " .edieval ,ranslation, edited y %.T. #uc'le, *Toronto-
St. #ichael(s College, 23II+, pars 2, trac. 2, div. D, pp. E5$E2.
GIF. The impossiility of an actual infinity has een estalished concerning material
things which are essentially related to one another and dependent upon one another. Since
souls separate from odies have no dependence upon one another, even though, on the
supposition of the argument, there would e an actually infinite numer of them, such an
infinity would not e precisely the 'ind that has een shown to e impossile.
GI3. Thomas Aquinas, In lI Sent., d. 24, q. G, a. 2.
GE5. Averroes, Commentarium magnum in "ristotelis libros de anima, edited y 1.
Stuart Crawford, *Camridge, #A- The #ediaeval Academy of America, 23KI+, pp. EE5$
EEI.
GE2. That is, the argument to show that the world could not have een eternal in the past
ecause such a world would imply an actual infinity of human souls would not e a
conclusive argument, even if the position given y Averroes were not disproven. In other
words, Averroes cannot e refuted y an argument such as the one given as the sixth
o)ection in 8Jn the ContraryQ.
GEG. #oses #aimonides, ,he -uide of the Perple0ed, 6art I, c. 4I, QEleventh 6remise,Q
pp. G2G$G2I.
GEI. See Appendix :, our translation of De aeternitate mundi, where Aquinas gives a
slightly different response to the question of an actual infinity of human souls.
4. To the seventh it ought to e said that even if
the world always existed, it would not e equal to 7od in
duration, ecause the divine duration, which is eternity, is a
simultaneous whole, whereas the duration of the world is a
succession of time. :oethius explains this in ,he
Consolation of Philosophy, oo' K, prose D.
F. To the eighth it ought to e said that,
according to the 6hilosopher, in the heavens there is no
Qpotency for existingQ ut a potency for moving only. A
potency for existing, therefore, cannot e said to e either
finite or infinite, ut the potency for moving is finite. <ocal
motion, however, which is the 'ind of motion involved with
this potency, need not e finite, ecause motion receives /or
would receive0 its infinity of duration from the infinity of
the moving power, from which motion is given to the
movale thing. This is the argument of the Commentator, in
.etaphysics 2G.
GEE
Bevertheless, when he says that /the
heavens0 do not have a potency for existing, this should e
understood to apply to the acquiring of eing through
motion. they do have the power or potency for existing, as
is said in On the %eavens 2.2G *GFIaG$GE+, and this power is
finite. Infinite duration, however, is acquired from the
infinite separate agent, as he says in the oo', On the
Substance of the World, ch. I.
GEK
3. To the ninth it ought to e said that the
duration of 7od, which is ;is eternity, and ;is nature are
one thing. They are, however, distinguished intellectually or
in their meaning, ecause QnatureQ means a 'ind of
causality, as nature is said to e the principle of motion.
GEE. Averroes, In JII .etaph., text. E2, vol. F, IGIv$IGKr.
GEK. "verroesQ De substantia orbis, ch. I, pp. 255$25I.
Q?uration,Q however, means a 'ind of permanence. Accordingly, if the
excellence of the divine nature and duration over the creature is ta'en as a
'ind of reality, they are found to e the same excellence. %ust as the divine
nature precedes the creature in worth and in causality, so also the divine
duration precedes the creature in the same ways. Bevertheless, if 7od
precedes the world according to nature, as is meant when it is said that 7od
precedes the world naturally, it is not necessary that ;e also precede the
world according to duration, as is meant when it is said, 7od precedes the
world in duration. This is ecause QnatureQ and QdurationQ have different
meanings. <i'ewise, other similar o)ections can e answered, as was said
in the first oo'.
GED
A+'IC, &I7)
'., M,A*I*1 O0 6I! T"# $#%I!!I!%
89:
1OD C+,A',D '., .,A5,*& A*D '., ,A+'.%6
O!2ections-
It seems that it is $rong to e0plain RIn the beginning -od created the
heavens and the earthR to mean RIn the Son.R
GED. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. I5, q. 2, aa. 2$I.
GE4. The prolem for Thomas in Article Six is that the phrase from 7enesis 2-2, QIn the
eginning,Q in principio, can have at least three different meanings. *2+ It can mean Qin the
principleQ or Qin the cause.Q In this sense, the principle or cause would e the Second
6erson of the Trinity, ecause from %ohn 2-2, the principium is associated with the verbum,
and the ,ord is the Son of 7od. *G+ In principio can mean, Qin the eginning of time,Q that
is, at the very first moment. *I+ In principio can mean Qefore other thingsQ $$ not
necessarily at the first moment, ut in a period of time efore other things were created.
These different senses are possile ecause the <atin word, principium, can mean
Qprinciple,Q Qcause,Q or Qeginning.Q
2. The 1ather is the eginning of the whole
divinity, as Augustine says, in oo' E On the ,rinity,
chapter G5.
GEF
:y Qeginning,Q therefore, the 1ather should
appropriately e understood.
G. 1urthermore, as was said in the 1irst :oo' /of
the Sentences0,
GE3
Qfrom ;imQ refers to the 1ather, Qin ;imQ
refers to the ;oly Spirit. It therefore seems that y Qin the
eginningQ the ;oly Spirit and not the Son is meant.
It also seems that it is $rong /for Rin the beginningS0 to
mean Rin the beginning of timeR.
I. Time is dependent upon the motion of the
firmament, ut the firmament was not created until the
second day. The eginning of time, therefore, occurred after
the creation of the heavens and the earth. /The heavens and
the earth0, therefore, were not created in the eginning of
time.
E. 1urthermore, time is one of the four first
created things. :ut there is no time at the eginning of time,
ecause it is impossile that there should e time in an
indivisile moment. Beither, therefore, were the heavens or
the earth /created at the eginning of time.0
GK5
GEF. 6< EG, 35F. CCS< K5, 233$G55. Saint Augustine, ,he ,rinity,
translated y Stephen #c>enna *,ashington, ?.C.- The Catholic
Lniversity of America, 23DI+ , pp. 2D4$2DF.
GE3. 6eter <omard, Sententiae, li. 2, cap. K, vol. 2, p. DF.
GK5. Time could not have existed Qin the eginning,Q ecause the
QeginningQ is an indivisile, unextended moment, ut for time to exist
there most e an extension. If time cannot exist Qin the eginning,Q so
the o)ection runs, then neither can the heavens and the earth, which are
temporal creatures.
It also seems $rong that Rin the beginningR should mean Rbefore all things.R
K. As is said in the 'oo6 of Causes, proposition E, the first of
created things is eing, and there was nothing else created efore it.
GK2
:ut
the heavens and the earth did not exist efore their own eing. Therefore,
there was something created efore the heavens and the earth.
D. 1urthermore, in Ecclesiasticus /2F-20 it is said, Q;e who lives
for ever has created all things at the same time.Q Therefore, the heavens and
the earth were not created efore all things.
4. 1urthermore, the heavens and the angels were made at the
same time, as will e said elow.
GKG
Therefore, the heavens and the earth
were not made efore all things.
&olution-
I answer that holy men have given three different useful
interpretations to refute various errors. The first interpretation refutes the
error of the #anichees who hold that there are several creative principles,
ecause things are said /according to this first interpretation0 to e made y
one causal principle, and not y many. Through the second interpretation
the error of the eternity of the world is refuted, ecause the world is held /on
this interpretation0 to have a eginning of its duration. Through the third
interpretation the error is refuted of those holding that the visile things were
created y 7od through the mediation of spiritual creatures, for /on this
interpretation0 the heavens and the earth are held to have een created first.
2. To the first it ought to e said that the designation of eing the
efficient cause is appropriated to the 1ather, whereas the designation of
GK2. Liber de causis, prop. E, ZI4, p. KE. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p. 2F.
GKG. Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. G, q. G, a. I.
eing the exemplar cause for a wor' of art is appropriated to
the Son, who is the ,isdom and Art of the 1ather.
GKI
G. To the second it ought to e said that to e
QinQ as in that which holds and saves, is appropriated to the
;oly Spirit, ecause of the appropriation of goodness, ut to
e QinQ as the artifact is in the s'ill of the art, and as the
thing is in its li'eness, is appropriated to the Son.
I. To the third it ought to e said that, according
to the opinion that all things were created simultaneously in
their /complete0 matter and form, things are said /to exist0 in
the eginning of the time that measures the motion of the
first moile eing. Such time does not measure creation ut
is a y$product of creation, ecause the creation of things is
simultaneous with the eginning of time. According to
another opinion, however, which holds that things have een
formed over a period of time, /Qin the eginning of timeQ0 is
not understood with respect to the time that measures motion
or is the numer of motion, ut with respect to the time
which mar's the alternation y which the eing of the world
succeeds the non$eing of the world. Jr, some others ta'e
QtimeQ to mean an Qeviternity,Q
GKE
which was created
simultaneously with the heavens and the earth.
E. To the fourth it ought to e said that )ust as
numer is not numered y some other numer, so time is
not measured y some other time, nor is its coming$to$e,
GKI. Certain designations are QappropriatedQ to the various 6ersons
of the Trinity. This means that, whereas the designations are, really,
shared y all three 6ersons, they are thought to e more expressive of the
activity of one 6erson rather than of the other two.
GKE. QEviternityQ is the translation for aevum, the term used in
Scholastic <atin to designate the sort of duration, not time, that is
appropriate to angels.
since its entire eing is its coming$to$e. ;ence, time egins at its
eginning, not in that which is the measure of time, ut in that from which
its production egins, as, for example, an animal egins /to grow0 from its
heart,
GKK
and a house /egins to e uilt0 from its foundation, and a line
/egins to e drawn0 from its point.
K. To the fifth it ought to e said that the 6hilosopher is spea'ing
aout the order of nature, as QanimalQ is said to e prior to Qman,Q not aout
the order of duration, for the eing of the heavens and the earth did not
precede time itself.
D. To the sixth it ought to e said that, according to one opinion,
all things were created at the same time, not in their individual species, ut in
unformed matter. According to others, however, all things are created at the
same time even in their own forms. In this sense, however, some things
were created efore others, not in duration, ut in the order of nature, as in
the order of generation the incomplete comes efore the complete. #ore
will e said aout this elow.
GKD
4. To the seventh it ought to e said that y QheavensQ is
understood also the angelic nature, which is said to dwell in the heavens, and
y QearthQ is understood all generale and corruptile things.
APP,*DI7 A
Summa theologiae, 6art 2, question EK, article K
-.,'.,+ 'O C+,A', B,O*1& 'O 1OD AO*,
O!2ections-
It seems that to create does not belong to -od alone.
2. According to the 6hilosopher, Qwhat is perfect is ale to ma'e
something li'e itself.Q *.eteor., E.I *IF5a2E+. De anima G.E *E2KaGD++ :ut
immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which do
ma'e things li'e themselves. 1ire, for example, generates fire, and man
GKK. Aquinas, following Aristotelian iology, thought that the animal!s heart was the
first organ to e formed.
GKD. Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 2G, q. un., aa. 2$K.
generates man. An immaterial sustance, therefore, is ale
to ma'e a sustance li'e itself. An immaterial sustance,
however, cannot come to e except y creation, since it does
not have matter out of which it comes to e. Some creature,
therefore, is ale to create.
G. 1urthermore, a greater resistance on the part
of the thing made requires a greater power on the part of the
ma'er. A contrary, however, offers more resistance than
nothing. Therefore, more power is required to ma'e
something out of a contrary, which even a creature can do,
than to ma'e something out of nothing. A creature,
therefore, is even more ale to do this /to create out of
nothing0.
I. 1urthermore, the power of the ma'er is
proportionate to that which is made. The created eing,
however, is finite, as was proved aove, when the infinity of
7od was treated.
GK4
Therefore, to produce something
created y creation requires only a finite power. To have
finite power, however, is not contrary to a creature(s nature.
It is not, therefore, impossile for a creature to create.
On the Contrary-
Augustine says, in On the ,rinity '. I, ch. F,
GKF
that
Qneither the good nor the evil angels are ale to e the
creators of any thing.Q Jther creatures, therefore, are even
less /ale to create0.
&olution-
GK4. Summa theologiae I, q. 4, aa. G$E.
GKF. 6< EG, F4D. Saint Augustine, ,he ,rinity, translated y Stephen
#c>enna *,ashington, ?.C.- The Catholic Lniversity of America
6ress, 23DI+, The 1athers of the Church, vol. EK, p. 253.
I answer that, in accord with what has already een said, it is clear
enough at first glance that to create can only e the proper action of 7od
alone. #ore universal effects must e caused y more universal and prior
causes. Among all effects, the most universal is eing itself. ;ence, it must
e the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is 7od.
;ence, also, it is said in the 'oo6 of Causes
><A
that neither an intelligence nor
a Qnole soulQ gives eing, except insofar as it operates with the divine
operation. 7iving eing asolutely, not ma'ing this or that eing, is what
creation means. It is, therefore, clear that creation is the proper action of
7od ;imself.
It is, however, the case that something participates in the proper
action of something else, not y its own power ut in an instrumental way,
as it acts y the power of the other thing. Air, for example, y the power of
fire is ale to cause oth heat and fire. In this way, some have thought that,
although creation is the proper action of the universal cause, nevertheless
some of the lower causes, acting with the power of the first cause, are ale to
create. Thus Avicenna has held that the first separated sustance created y
7od creates another /sustance0 after itself and also a heavenly ody and its
soul. The heavenly ody then creates the matter of the lower odies. In this
way, even the #aster /6eter <omard0 says, in ' G, dist. E, ch. I of the
Sentences, that 7od is ale to communicate the power of creating to a
creature, so that it create as a minister, not on its own authority.
This, however, cannot e, ecause the secondary instrumental cause
participates in the action of the higher cause, only y virtue of that which
really elongs to the secondary cause and can e used y the principal cause
for its effect. If, therefore, it /a secondary cause0 were to act not with what
really elongs to itself, it would e used for the action in vain, nor would
instruments /then0 e properly proportioned to the effects. Thus, for
example, we see that a saw, y cutting wood, which /aility0 it has from its
own form, produces the form of the ench, which is the proper effect of the
principal agent. That, however, which is the proper effect of 7od the
GK3. Liber de causis, prop. I, ZIG, p. KG. ,he 'oo6 of Causes, p. 24.
Creator is that which is presupposed in all other things,
namely, eing asolutely. ;ence, nothing is ale to wor'
toward this effect either y the direction /of another0 or as an
instrument, since creation presupposes asolutely nothing
which could e directed y the action of an instrumental
agent. Thus, therefore, it is impossile that some creature
create, whether y its own power, or as an instrument, or as
a minister. It is especially wrong to say that some odily
thing creates, since no ody acts except y touching or
moving and, thus, requires in its action something pre$
existing that is ale to e touched and moved, which is
against the meaning of creation.
2. To the first it ought to e said that a complete
eing that participates in its nature
GD5
ma'es something li'e
itself, not y producing that nature asolutely ut y ma'ing
that nature come to e in something else. This man, for
example, cannot e the cause of human nature asolutely,
ecause he would then e the cause of himself, ut he is the
cause /as father0 of human nature!s coming to e in the man
whom he generates. ;e presupposes in his action
determined matter, through which a man is an individual.
:ut )ust as this /individual0 man participates in human
nature, so any created eing participates, so to spea', in the
nature of eing, ecause 7od alone is ;is eing, as was said
aove. Bo created eing, therefore, is ale to produce eing
GD5. It participates in its nature rather than is its nature. All creatures
participate in their natures. no creature is its nature. Jnly 7od is ;is
nature. 1ido is a dog. he participates in the nature of dog. ;e is not
dogness itself. If a thing were its own nature, rather than merely
participating in it, it would e a 6latonic 1orm. This is why 6lato spo'e
of dogs, on the one hand, and of 8?ogness Itself,9 on the other.
asolutely ut only eing in this /individual0. Thus that through which
something is this /individual0 must always e presupposed in the action y
which /a material creature0 ma'es something li'e itself. In an immaterial
sustance, however, something through which it is this /individual0 cannot
e presupposed, ecause it is this /individual0 through its own form, through
which it has eing, since /immaterial sustances0 are susistent forms. An
immaterial sustance, therefore, is not ale to produce the eing of another
immaterial sustance li'e itself, ut it is ale to produce some additional
perfection. 1or example, we might say that a superior angel illuminates a
lower angel, as ?ionysius says. In this way there is a 'ind of fatherhood
even among the heavenly eings, as is clear from the words of the Apostle,
Ephesians /I,2K0- Q1rom whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is
named.Q 1rom this it is also very clear that no created eing is ale to cause
something else, unless there e something presupposed, which is contrary to
the meaning of creation.
G. To the second it ought to e said that something comes to e
from contraries Qaccidentally,Q as is said in the Physics 2.4 *235G4+.
Essentially, however, something comes to e from a su)ect which is in
potency. A contrary, therefore, resists an agent insofar as it loc's the
potency from the actuality to which the agent intends to ring the matter.
1ire, for example, intends to ring water into the actuality which is similar to
itself, ut it is loc'ed y the form and contrary dispositions y which the
potency is as it were ound from eing rought into actuality. To the extent
that the potency is more ound, to that extent a greater power is required in
the agent to ring the matter into actuality. ;ence a greater power is
required in the agent if no potency pre$exists. It is thus, therefore, clear that
a much greater power is required to ma'e something out of nothing than to
ma'e something out of a contrary.
I. To the third it ought to e said that the power of the ma'er is
measured not only relative to the sustance of the thing made ut also to the
way in which it is made. 1or example, a greater heat /source0 produces not
only more heat ut does so more quic'ly. Thus, although to create a finite
effect does not require an infinite power, to create it out of
nothing does require an infinite power. This is clear from
what was said efore. Bow if the power of the agent must
e greater as the potency is farther away from actuality, the
power of the agent which presupposes no potency, which is
the creative power, must e infinite. /This is so0 ecause
there is no comparison etween no potency and some
potency, which is presupposed y the power of the natural
agent, )ust as /there is no comparison0 etween non$eing
and eing. Since no creature has asolutely infinite power,
nor infinite eing, as was proved aove,
GD2
it follows that no
creature is ale to create.
GD2. Summa theologiae I, q. 4, a. G.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation F5
APP,*DI7 B
St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World
GDG
Although we accept according to the Catholic faith that the
world had a eginning of its duration, nevertheless the
prolem has arisen of whether it could have always existed.
In order that the truth of this prolem e explained, first we
must distinguish that aout which we agree with our
adversaries from that aout which we differ from them. If,
on the one hand, it is thought that something other than 7od
could have always existed in the sense that something could
exist ut not /e0 made y 7od, this is an aominale error,
not only according to the faith ut also according to the
philosophers, who admit and prove that asolutely nothing
would e ale to exist unless it were caused y ;im who has
eing in the highest degree and most truly.
GDI
If, on the other
hand, it is thought that something has always existed and
still had een caused completely y 7od, an investigation
should e made whether this can e the case.
Bow if it is said that this is impossile, this will e
said either ecause 7od could not ma'e something which
always existed, or ecause, even if 7od could ma'e it, it
could not e made. Jn the first part, considering 7od(s
infinite power, everyone agrees that 7od could have made
something which always existed. It remains, therefore, to
see whether it is possile for something to e made which
always existed.
GDG. See p. F4, n. 2K for iliographical references.
GDI. The philosophers referred to here all agree that there is a first
cause who ma'es the world in some way. Aquinas had no experience of
a philosopher who did not recogni&e that there is some sort of first cause
of the world.
Bow if it is said that this cannot e, there are only two reasons or two
ways to understand why /this cannot e0- either ecause of a lac' of passive
potency, or ecause of a contradiction in terms. In the first way, it could e
said /that0 efore an angel was made, Qan angel is not ale to e made,Q
ecause a passive potency did not pre$exist its eing, since it was not made
out of pre$existing matter. Bevertheless, 7od was ale to ma'e an angel,
and ;e could ma'e it so that the angel came to e, ecause ;e has made /the
angel0 and /the angel0 has een made. Lnderstanding the prolem in this
way, it must asolutely e granted, according to the faith, that something
caused cannot always exist, ecause to hold this would e to hold that a
passive potency always existed, which is heretical.
GDE
Bevertheless it still
does not follow from this that 7od could not ma'e something which always
exists.
In the second way, it is said that something cannot e made ecause
of a logical inconsistency, as that it cannot e the case that an affirmation
and a negation e simultaneously true, although some say that 7od could
ma'e this so. Jthers, however, say that not even 7od can ma'e this so
ecause in fact it is nothing. It is, finally, clear that 7od cannot ma'e it to e
the case /that an affirmation and a negation e simultaneously true0, ecause
the very affirmation y which this is held to e so implies its own denial.
Still, if it should e held that 7od is ale to ma'e it that things of this sort
come to e, the position is not heretical, although I do elieve that it is false,
)ust as /to say0 that the past has not een includes in itself a contradiction.
Augustine, accordingly, in his oo' "gainst )austus, /says0, Q,hoever says
this, (if 7od is omnipotent, ;e could ma'e those things which have een
GDE. QTo hold that a passive potency always existedQ would e heretical ecause it
would e to hold that there was something other than 7od that was not created y 7od. A
pre$existent passive potency would exist efore creation. hence such a passive potency
would e uncreated. Aquinas 'new from the decree of the 1ourth <ateran Council /2G2K,
Q1irmiter credimus ...Q0 that 7od is the QCreator of all things, visile and invisile, spiritual
and corporalQ and that ;e created oth sorts of creatures Qat the eginning of timeQ and Qout
of nothing.Q ?en&inger *ed.+, Enchiridion symbolorum, EGF. See %ames ,eisheipl, QThe
?ate and Context of Aquinas( De aeternitate mundi5Q -raceful 2eason, p. GKI.
made not to have een made,( does not see that this means,
(if 7od is omnipotent, ;e could ma'e those things which are
true, y the very fact that they are true, to e false.(Q
GDK

Bevertheless, some great men have said piously that 7od is
ale to ma'e of the past that it was not the past, and it has
not een considered heretical.
It remains, therefore, to e seen whether there is a
contradiction etween these two ideas, that something is
created y 7od and that it, nevertheless, always existed.
,hatever is true in this matter, it will not e heretical to say
that 7od is ale to ma'e it to e the case that something
created y 7od always existed. I do elieve, however, that
if there were a contradiction, it would e false /to say that
7od is ale to create something that always existed0, ut if
there is no contradiction, it is not only not false ut also
/not0 impossile. It would e erroneous to spea' otherwise.
Since it is characteristic of the omnipotence of 7od that it
exceed all understanding and power, whoever says that some
creature can e thought of that is not ale to e made y 7od
expressly derogates from the omnipotence of 7od. The
example of sins is not to the point, ecause as such they are
nothing.
GDD
In this, therefore, is the entire question- whether
to have een asolutely created y 7od and not to have a
eginning of duration are mutually inconsistent or not.
GDK. 6< EG, EF2.
GDD. A sin seems to e a counter example, ecause it is something
that can e thought of ut that 7od cannot do. The sinful feature of an
act, however, is a lac6 of moral order rather than something that really
exists. Any action )ust in itself is something positive, something that can
and does really exist. The moral quality of the act, however, is
something eyond the act in that it concerns the relation of the act to an
order of goodness. A good action has the quality of moral goodness, ut
a ad action lac's this quality.
That they are not mutually inconsistent is shown as follows. If they
should e inconsistent, this could only e ecause of one of two reasons or
oth- *2+ either ecause the efficient cause must precede /its effect0 in
duration, *G+ or ecause the fact that the creature is said to e made out of
nothing requires that non$eing precede it in duration.
*2+ 1irst I shall show that it is not necessary that an efficient
cause, such as 7od, precede its effect in duration, if ;e ;imself had willed
/that ;e not precede his effect0. 1irst, /I argue0 as follows. Bo cause that
instantaneously produces its effect precedes its effect necessarily in duration.
:ut 7od is a cause that produces ;is effect, not through motion, ut
instantaneously. Therefore, it is not necessary that ;e precede his effect in
duration. The first /premise0 is clear through induction in all instantaneous
changes, li'e illumination
GD4
and things of this sort, ut nevertheless it is ale
to e proved through reason as follows.
At whatever moment a thing is assumed to exist, its action can e
assumed to egin, as is clear in all generale things, ecause in the very
moment in which fire egins to e it causes heat. :ut in an instantaneous
operation the eginning and the end of it are simultaneous, or rather, are
identical. At whatever moment, therefore, the agent is assumed to produce
its effect instantaneously, the end of its action can e assumed to exist. :ut
the end of action is simultaneous with the completed thing. Therefore, it is
not inconsistent if the cause producing its effect instantaneously does not
precede its effect in duration. It is inconsistent, however, in causes that
produce their effects through motion, ecause the eginning of motion must
precede the end of it. And ecause men are accustomed to consider
productions /of things0 that involve motion, they do not, therefore, easily
grasp that the efficient cause does not /necessarily0 precede its effect in
duration. So it is that those with little experience and ut superficial
oservations are the quic'est to ma'e pronouncements.
GD4. That is, as soon as there is light there is illumination. the latter is an effect of the
former. Aquinas also thin's that light travels distances instantaneously.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FG
The fact that 7od is an efficient cause through will
cannot wea'en the force of this argument, ecause it is not
necessary that even a will precede its effect in duration, and
an agent through will only /precedes its effect in duration0
when it acts from delieration, which we should never
attriute to 7od.
GDF
1urthermore, a cause which produces the entire
sustance of a thing does not accomplish less in producing
the entire sustance than a cause which produces the form
/accomplishes0 in producing a form. Jn the contrary, it
/accomplishes0 much more, ecause it produces not y
wor'ing from the potency of matter, as does that which
produces the form. :ut some agents which produce the
form alone are ale to produce the form whenever they exist,
as is clear when the sun is illuminating. Therefore, even
more, 7od, who produces the entire sustance of a thing, is
ale to ma'e ;is effect exist whenever ;e exists.
1urthermore, if there is a cause the effect of which
does not exist at the very same time that the cause exists,
this can only happen ecause something is lac'ing to the
cause that would ma'e it complete, ecause a complete
cause and its effect are simultaneous. There is, however,
never anything lac'ing /which is needed0 to complete 7od.
Therefore, as long as 7od is ta'en to exist, ;is effect can e
ta'en to exist, and it is thus not necessary that ;e precede
/;is effect0 in duration.
GDF. 7od does not deliberate in ma'ing a decision, that is, ;e does
not go through a successive process of reviewing, one y one, reasons
for a decision. 7od!s mind does not understand through a temporal,
successive process of reasoning, as the human mind does, and hence
there is no delieration in 7od!s mind.
1urthermore, the will of one who has a will does not diminish his
power, and this is certainly true of 7od. :ut all those who ta'e issue with
Aristotle(s arguments y which it is proved that things /caused0 y 7od have
always existed ecause what is always the same always does the same, say
that this would follow if ;e were not an agent through will. Therefore, even
if ;e is ta'en to e an agent through will, it follows that ;e is ale to ma'e it
the case that something caused y ;im always exists. And thus it is clear
that it is not inconsistent to say that the agent does not precede its effect in
duration, ecause 7od is /only0 not ale to do those things that are logically
inconsistent.
*G+ Bow it remains to e seen whether it is inconsistent that
something made has always existed ecause, since it is said to have een
made out of nothing, its non$eing must necessarily precede it in duration.
That there is no inconsistency is shown y what Anselm has said in his
.onologion, chapter F, where he explains how the creature is said to have
een made out of nothing. QThe third meaning,Q he says, Qaccording to
which something is said to have een made out of nothing is /that y which0
we mean that something has really een made ut there is not something
from which it has een made. Similarly, when a man is said to have een
saddened for no reason, he is said, it seems, to e saddened from nothing. It
will not e inconsistent, therefore, if what has een concluded is understood
according to this meaning, that other than the highest essence all things
which are have een made from nothing, that is, not from something.Q
GD3

;ence it is clear according to this explanation that no order is supposed
etween what has een made and nothing, as though what has een made
would have to have een nothing /first0 and later e something.
1urthermore, let it e supposed that the order to nothing implied in
the preposition /Qout ofQ0 remains affirmed, so that the sense is, the creature
has een made out of nothing, that is, has een made after nothing. This
GD3. S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, edited y 1. S. Schmitt *Edinurgh- Thomas Belson,
23ED$23D2+, vol. 2, p. GI. "nselm of Canterbury, vol. 2, translated y %. ;op'ins and ;. ,.
Cichardson *Toronto and Bew Aor'- #ellen 6ress, 234E+, p. 24
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FI
word QafterQ implies order asolutely. There are, however,
several 'inds of order, such as that of duration and that of
nature. If the proper and the particular is not implied y the
common and the universal, it would not e necessary that
nothing precede in duration that which comes later, )ust
ecause the creature is said to e after nothing, ut it is
enough that nothing e prior by nature to eing. ,hat is
naturally prior in every thing is what elongs to itself rather
than what it has only from another. Bow a creature has no
eing except /what it has0 from another, and if it is left to
itself it is nothing. ;ence nothing /itself0 in the creature is
naturally prior to eing. And this does not imply that
nothing and eing are simultaneous ecause /nothing0 does
not precede /eing0 in duration. If the creature has always
existed, it is not supposed that at some time it was nothing,
ut rather it is supposed that its nature is such that it would
e nothing if it were left to itself. 1or example, if we should
say that air has always een illuminated y the sun, it will e
right to say that the air has een made light y the sun.
Since whatever comes to e comes to e from an
incompatile, that is, from what cannot compatily exist at
the same time with that which is said to have come to e, it
will e right to say that what has een made light /has een
made so0 from the non$light or from the dar' $$ not that it
would ever have een not light or dar', ut that it would e
such if the sun left it to itself. This is very clear in stars and
heavenly odies that are always illuminated y the sun.
It is thus, therefore, clear that to say that something
has een made y 7od and that it has always existed is not a
contradiction. If there were a contradiction, it is a wonder
that Augustine did not see it, ecause this would have een
the strongest way of disproving the eternity of the world.
Bevertheless, when he argued against the eternity of the world with many
arguments in oo's 22 and 2G of ,he City of -od, he completely omitted this
way. Jn the contrary, he seems to suggest that there is no contradiction, for
he says in oo' 25, ,he City of -od, chapter I2, spea'ing aout the
6latonists, QThey have come up with their understanding of this, that there is
not a eginning of time ut /only0 of dependence. They say, for example,
that if a foot had existed from eternity in dust, there would always have een
a footprint there, ut nevertheless no one would dout that the footprint had
een made y the person putting his foot down. And one is not prior to the
other, although one was made y the other. Thus, they say, oth the world
and the gods created in it have always existed, provided that he who made
them always exists, and nevertheless they have een made.Q
G45
And
Augustine never says that this is a contradiction, ut he argues against them
in another way. ;e also says in oo' 22, chapter E, QThose who claim that
the world has een made y 7od ut do not grant it a eginning of time ut
only a eginning in the sense that it was created, so that, in a sense that can
hardly e understood, the world was always made, do say something
sensile.Q
G42
The reason it can Qhardly e understoodQ is given in the first
argument.
G4G
It is also a wonder that the most nole of philosophers have not
noticed this /alleged0 inconsistency. Indeed, Augustine says in the same
oo', chapter K, spea'ing against those aout whom mention was made in
the previous text, Q,e are dealing with those who agree with us that 7od is
the creator of all odies and of all natures which are not ;imself.Q
G4I
;e
later added aout them, QThese have surpassed other philosophers in noility
G45. 6< E2,I22. CC< E4, I53. Augustine, Concerning the City of -od "gainst the
Pagans, translated y ;enry :ettenson *;armondsworth, L>- 6enguin, 234G++, '. 25, ch.
I2, p. EG5.
G42. 6< E2, I23. CC< EF,IGE. Augustine, ,he City of -od, '. 22, ch. E, pp. EIG$EII.
G4G. See aove, pp.2FE$2FD.
G4I. 6< E2, I23$IG5. CC< EF, IGK. Augustine, ,he City of -od, '. 22, ch. K, p. EIE.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FE
and authority.Q This same thing will also appear to anyone
who carefully considers what has een said y those who
thin' that the world has always existed and nevertheless has
een made y 7od, and who see no contradicition in this.
Those, therefore, who have so sutly seen the inconsistency
are the only ones /who have done so0, and with them /so
they might thin'0 arises all wisdom]
Bevertheless, ecause some authorities seem to agree
with them, it ought to e shown that /such authorities0
provide very wea' support for them. ?amascene, for
example, says in oo' 2, chapter F, QIt is not naturally
suitale that what is rought from non$eing to eing e co$
eternal with that which is without eginning and is
always.Q
G4E
Also, ;ugh of Saint =ictor, in the eginning of
his oo' On the Sacraments, says, Qthe power of the
ineffale omnipotence does not allow anything to e co$
eternal with ;imself, so that ;e would e helped in ;is own
activity.Q
G4K
The way, however, to understand these and similar
authorities is clear in what :oethius says in the last oo' of
,he Consolation of Philosophy- Q,hen some hear that the
world was not understood y 6lato to have had a eginning
of time nor that it would have an end, they do not rightly
)udge /when they conclude0 that the world has een uilt in
this way to e co$eternal with the uilder. Indeed, it is one
thing to have an unending life, which 6lato attriutes to the
world, ut it is another to have the entire presence of an
G4E. De fide orthodo0a, li. 2, cap. F *67 3E, F2E:+. Saint %ohn of
?amascus, ,he Orthodo0 )aithful Writings, translated y 1rederic' ;.
Chase *Bew Aor'- 1athers of the Church $$ vol. I4, 23KF+, p. 243.
G4K. ;ugh of St. =ictor, De sacramentis, li. 2, cap. 2 *6< 24D,
2F4:+.
unending life all at once, which is clearly the property of the ?ivine
#ind.Q
G4D
It is hence clear also that the o)ection of some people does not
follow, namely, that the creature /even if always existing0 would e equal to
7od in duration.
That it may thus e said that nothing can e in any way co$eternal
with 7od, ecause nothing is immutale except 7od alone, is clear y what
Augustine says in oo' 2G, ,he City of -od, chapter 2D. QSince time is
always flowing it cannot e co$eternal with the immutale eternity. ;ence,
even if the immortality of angels does not run in time, nor is their past as
though no longer existent, nor their future as though not yet existent, still
their actions, y which times are mar'ed, run from what will e into what
has een. ;ence they are not ale to e co$eternal with the Creator, in
whose action it cannot e said that what was is not any longer, or that what
will e is not yet.Q
G44
<i'ewise also he says in oo' F, On the Literal
.eaning of -enesis, Q:ecause the nature of the Trinity is completely
unchangeale, it is therefore eternal such that something can not e co$
eternal with it.Q
G4F
;e says something similar in the 22th oo' of the
Confessions.
G43
/Some o)ectors0 also add arguments on their own, which the
philosophers touch upon and answer, among which the most difficult is that
aout the infinity of souls. If the world always existed, it is necessary that
now there are an infinite numer of souls. :ut this argument is not germane,
ecause 7od could have made a world without men and without souls and
without animals, or ;e could have made men to e when in fact ;e did
ma'e them, even if ;e had made the whole world from eternity. Thus there
G4D. :oethius, ,he Consolation of Philosophy, :oo' K, 6rose D, pp. EGE$EGK *6< DI,
FK3:. CC< 3E, 252+.
G44. 6< E2, IDE$IDK. CC< EF, I4G.
G4F. C. GI *6< IE, IF3+.
G43. 6< IG, FGD. Augustine, Confessions, translated y C.S. 6ine$Coffin
*;armondsworth, L>- 6enguin, 23D2+, ' 22, ch. I5, p. G43.
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FK
would not remain an infinite numer of souls after /the death
of0 odies. 1urthermore, it has not yet een demonstrated
that 7od could not ma'e an actual infinity of things.
GF5
I omit for the present a response to other arguments,
oth ecause I have responded to them elsewhere and
ecause some of them are so wea' that, y their wea'ness,
they seem to give plausiility to the other side of the deate.
GF5. 8 . . . non est adhuc demonstratum quod ?eus non possit facere
ut sint infinita actu.9
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FD
APP,*DI7 C
St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on 'oo6 NIII of
"ristotleQs Physics
/selections0
<ecture G
/34D. Aristotle argues as follows.0 If motion has not
always existed, one must say either that movers and the
things moved were made at some time, efore which they
did not exist, or that they are eternal. If it should e said that
every movale o)ect has een made, one must say that
efore the first change there was another change and a
motion, y which the moile thing itself was made. The
reasoning for this depends upon what has een said. If it is
granted that motion has not een eternal, ut that there is
some first change efore which there was no change, it will
follow that that first change involved some movale o)ect,
and that the movale o)ect was made ecause it did not
exist efore, since all movale o)ects are considered to
have een made. ,hatever comes to e which was not in
existence efore, comes to e through some motion or
change. The motion or change through which the movale
o)ect comes into eing is prior to the change y which the
movale o)ect is moved. Therefore, efore the change
which is supposed to e first there is another change, and so
on infinitely. . . .
If it is granted that there are movale o)ects and
movers and that at some time the first mover egins to move
something which was resting and not moving efore, we
must say that there is another change made in the mover or
in the movale o)ect efore the first mover egan to move.
This is clear as follows. Cest is the privation of motion. 6rivation, however,
is not in that which is receptive of a hait or of a form except through some
cause. There was, therefore, some cause either on the part of the mover or
on the part of the movale o)ect which was the cause of the rest. The state
of rest remained, therefore, as long as the cause endured. If, therefore, at
some time the mover egins to move, this cause of rest must e removed. It
cannot e removed, however, except through some motion or change. It
follows, therefore, that efore the change which was said to e first, there
was another earlier change y which the cause of rest was removed.
/3FG. Aristotle advances a supporting argument
from time.0 It is impossile to say or to thin' that there is
time without the present moment, )ust as it is impossile for
a line to exist without a point. #oreover, the present
moment is an intermediate of sorts, having the nature of
eing oth a eginning and an end, that is, the eginning of
the future and the end of the past. 1rom this it seems that
time must e eternal, for whatever time is ta'en, its limit on
either side is a moment. This is clear ecause no part of
time is actual except the present moment. ,hat has passed
has already gone, and what is future is not yet. The moment,
however, which is ta'en as the limit of time is oth a
eginning and an end, as was said. Therefore, on either side
of any given time there must always e time. Jtherwise, the
first moment would not e an end, and the last moment
would not e a eginning. 1rom the statement that time is
eternal, /Aristotle0 concludes that motion must e eternal,
ecause time is a property of motion insofar as it is the
numer of motion, as was said.
/3FI0 It seems, however, that Aristotle(s argument is
not sound. 1or the present moment is related to time )ust as
a point is related to a line, as was said in the sixth oo' /of
the Physics0. It is not, however, in the nature of a point that
it e an intermediary. Indeed, in a line, one point is only the
eginning, and another is only the end. If it were the case
that every point were a eginning and an end, then the line
would have to e infinite. It could not, therefore, e proven
that a line is infinite from the claim that every point is a
eginning and an end. It would e, rather, the other way
around- from the given that a line is infinite, it could e
proved that every point was a eginning and an end.
Similarly, the claim that every moment is a eginning and an
end is only true if time is supposed to e eternal. In the assumption of this
intermediate /nature of any moment0, therefore, Aristotle seems to e
supposing the eternity of time, which is what he ought to e proving. . . .
/3FD0 These then are arguments y which Aristotle intends to prove
that motion always existed and never ceases. Jne part of his position
conflicts with our faith, namely, /Aristotle(s position0 that motion always
existed. According to our faith, nothing is supposed to have always existed
except 7od alone, who is completely immovale, unless someone should
wish to call the divine act of understanding a 'ind of motion, although that
would e to understand it equivocally. Aristotle does not intend such
motion, ut rather motion in the proper sense of the word.
The other part of his position, however, is not completely contrary to
the faith, ecause, as was said aove, Aristotle does not deal with the motion
of the heavens ut with motion in general. ,e hold, according to our faith,
that the sustance of the world at some time has egun to exist ut that,
nevertheless, it should not cease to exist. ,e also hold that some motions
will always exist, especially those in men, who will always remain, living an
incorruptile life, whether of misery of or lessedness.
Some, vainly attempting to show that Aristotle has not spo'en
against the faith, have said that Aristotle does not intend to prove here, as
something true, that motion was eternal, ut rather /intends0 to give
arguments on oth sides, as though on a doutful matter. :ut this seems
foolish, given /Aristotle(s0 mode of proceeding. And furthermore, the
eternity of time and motion is used as a foundation /y Aristotle0 to prove
that the first principle /7od0 exists. :oth here in the eighth oo' /of the
Physics0 and in the twelfth oo' of the .etaphysics he clearly supposes this
/the eternity of time and motion0 as something proven.
/3F40 :ut if one correctly considers the arguments given here, it can
e seen that the truth of the faith cannot e refuted with arguments of this
sort. There are, to e sure, sound arguments of this sort for proving that
motion has not egun through natural causes, as is supposed y some. :ut it
cannot e proven with these arguments that motion egan from a first
William Carroll - Aquinas on Creation FF
principle such that, as our faith holds, all things were
produced anew. This is clear to anyone who considers the
individual inferences given here.
If one as's, given that motion has not always existed,
whether or not movers and movale things have always
existed, the answer should e that the first mover has always
existed, ut that all other things, whether they are movers or
movale things, have not always existed. Cather, the
eginning of their existence was caused y the universal
cause of all eing. It has een shown aove that the
production of all eing from the first cause of eing is not a
motion, whether this is supposed to have een an eternal
emanation of things or not. It does not, therefore, follow
that efore the first change there was some other change. It
would follow, however, if the movers and movale things
were rought into eing y some limited agent, which would
act y transforming a pre$existing su)ect from non$eing to
eing, or from privation to form. Aristotle(s argument
concerns this 'ind of eginning.
/3FF0 :ut since we suppose that at least the first
mover has always existed, an answer should e made to his
next argument, namely, that if movers and movale things
pre$existed, and if motion egins to e anew, the movers or
the movale things could not have een in the same state
efore as they are when there is motion, and hence there
must have een a change efore the QfirstQ change.
Bow if we should spea' aout the motion itself, the
answer is easy, for the movale things were not in the same
state efore in which they now are, ecause efore they did
not exist. ;ence they were not ale to e moved. As has
een said, they did not receive eing itself through a change
or a motion, ut through an emanation from the first
principle of things. Thus it does not follow that efore the first change there
was another change.
:ut there still remains the question aout the first production of
things. If the first principle, which is 7od, is not in a different state now
from efore /;e produced things0, ;e does not produce things now rather
than efore. If, on the other hand, ;e is in a different state, there will e at
least a change on ;is part that will e efore the change which is supposed
to e first.
Bow if ;e were an agent that acts only through nature, and not
through will and intellect, the argument would e necessarily sound. :ut
ecause ;e acts through will, ;e is ale through ;is eternal will to produce
a non$eternal effect, )ust as with ;is eternal intellect ;e is ale to understand
a non$eternal thing. This is so, ecause the thing understood is, in a certain
way, the principle of action in those agents that act through will, )ust as the
natural form /is the principle of action0 in those agents that act through
nature.
/3F30 :ut let us proceed further. ,e thin' /so the
o)ection would contend0 that a will delays doing what it
wishes only ecause it expects something in the future
which is not yet present. 1or example, I wish to uild a fire,
not now ut later, when I expect the cold, which is the cause
of my ma'ing the fire. or so I expect at the present.
:ecause, however, time is successive, this /my delaying
something0 cannot occur without motion. Thus a will, even
if it is supposed to e immutale, cannot delay doing what it
wishes unless there is some motion intervening. And thus
there cannot e a new production of things that comes from
an eternal will, unless there should e some intermediary
motions that follow that will infinitely.
It escapes the notice of those who o)ect in this way,
however, that this o)ection concerns the temporal agent,
which acts in a presupposed time. In an action of the sort
that occurs in time, we must recogni&e a determinate relation
to a particular time, or to something that elongs to a
particular time, so that the action occurs in one time rather
than in another. :ut this argument is irrelevant to the
universal agent, which produces oth time itself and all
other things.
,hen we say that things have not always een
produced y 7od, we do not understand that an infinite time
preceded, in which 7od did not act, and after at a
determined time ;e egan to act. Cather, 7od rought into
eing oth time and things together after they had not
existed. And hence it is not fitting to thin' that the divine
will wished to ma'e things not then ut later, as though
there were a lapse of time. rather we should thin' simply
this- that ;e wished that things and time have a eginning
of their duration after they had not existed.
If, moreover, one should as' why ;e wished it this way, the response
should doutless e that ;e wished it ecause of ;imself. 1or )ust as he
made things for ;imself, so that a li'eness of ;is goodness might e
manifested in them, so ;e wished that they have not always existed, so that
;is self$sufficiency e manifested, in that, without the existence of all other
things, ;e ;imself has had complete sufficiency of lessedness, and also of
power for the production of things.
This, at least, can e said, as far as human reason can grasp the
divine, ut we must always recogni&e that the divine wisdom cannot e
comprehended y us.
/335. Aquinas responds to Aristotle(s arguments concerning the
eternity of time.0 . . .Aristotle(s argument that there can e no efore and
after without time is not sound. ,hen we say that the eginning of time is
Qefore which there is nothing,Q it does not follow that the moment itself
which is the eginning of time e preceded y a time which is signified y
saying Qefore.Q If, for example, I should say that the eginning of a spatial
magnitude is Qthat outside of which there is nothing of it,Q it does not follow
that Qoutside of that eginningQ signifies some place that exists in reality, ut
rather /it signifies a place0 in the imagination only. Jtherwise, we should
have to suppose a place outside of the heavens, the magnitude of which is
finite, with a eginning and an end. <i'ewise, no really existing time, ut
only time in our imagination, precedes the first moment which is the
eginning of time. And this time is meant when it is said that the first
moment is the eginning of time, Qefore whichQ there is nothing of time.
Jr, it could e said, when the eginning of time is said to e Qefore
which there is nothing of time,Q that the QeforeQ is not affirmative ut
negative. In this way one need not suppose a time efore the eginning of
time. In temporal matters, something always pre$exists a eginning of time,
as when it is said that the eginning of youth is that Qefore which there is
nothing of youth,Q the QeforeQ remains affirmative, ecause the period of
youth is measured y time. Time, however, is not measured
y time. Accordingly, no time precedes its eginning. Thus
the Qefore,Q which is supposed in the definition of the
eginning of time, need not e affirmed ut rather negated.
Bevertheless, there is efore time a duration, namely,
the eternity of 7od, which has no extension, and no efore
and after, as does time, ut is a simultaneous whole. /The
divine duration0 cannot e compared with time, )ust as the
divine magnitude cannot e compared with a corporeal
magnitude. ,hen we say, therefore, that outside of the
world there is nothing ut 7od, we do not mean that there is
some /real0 dimension outside of the world. in li'e manner,
when we say that efore the world nothing existed, we do
not mean that there is some successive duration efore the
world.
APP,*DI7 D
St. Thomas Aquinas! Attriution of Creation to Aristotle
GF2
Aquinas, Commentary on 'oo6 NIII of "ristotle!s Physics-
<ecture I
GF2. The following, given in chronological order, are texts in which
Aquinas attriutes a doctrine of creation to Aristotle. This list was
compiled y Steven :aldner, 8The ?octrine of St. Thomas Aquinas on
the Eternity of the ,orld,9 unpulished <icentiate Thesis *Toronto-
6ontifical Institute of #ediaeval Studies, 2343+, pp. 3D$255. See also
#ar' %ohnson, 8?id St. Thomas Attriute a ?octrine of Creation to
Aristotle,9 op. cit.
In II Sententiarum, d. 2, q. 2, a. K, ad 2 in contrarium *c. 2GKI+.
In II Sententiarum, d. 2, expositio textus *c. 2GKI+.
De articulis fidei *2GD2$2GDK+.
Puaestiones disputate de potentia Dei, q. I, a. K *2GDK$2GDD+.
E0positio super primam decretalem *2GD2$2GD3+.
In NIII Physicorum, lec. G, n. E *2G45$2G42+.
In NIII Physicorum, lec. G, n. K *2G45$2G42+.
In NIII Physicorum, lec. I, n. D *2G45$2G42+.
In II .etaphysicorum, lec. G, n. 4 *2GD3$2G4G+.
In NI .etaphysicorum, lec. 2, n. G2 *2GD3$2G4G+.
De substantiis separatis, cap. 3 *2G42$2G4I+.
In I De caelo et mundo, lec. F, n. 2E *2G4G$2G4I.
/33D0 %ust as some things are always true and nevertheless have a
cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that some eings have always
existed, namely, the heavenly odies and separated sustances, and
nevertheless have had a cause of their eing.
<ecture G2
/22KE0 Everything which is not its own eing participates in eing
from the first cause, which is its own eing. ;ence, even Averroes in the
oo', On the Substance of the World, admits that 7od is the cause of the
heavens, not only of their motion, ut even of their very sustance $$ and this
could only e ecause they have their eing from 7od. #oreover, the only
eing they have from ;im is perpetual eing. therefore, they have their
perpetuity from another. The words of Aristotle are also in accord with this,
ecause he says in the fifth and eighth oo's of the .etaphysics that certain
eings are necessary which have a cause of their necessity. ,ith this eing
supposed, the solution according to the mind of Alexander is clear, namely,
that )ust as a heavenly ody has its eing$moved from another, so also it has
its eing from another. ;ence, )ust as perpetual motion manifests the
infinite power of the mover, although not of the movale thing, so also the
perpetual duration of it manifests the infinite power of the cause from which
it has eing.
On Separated Substances, chapter 3-
/2550 It ought not to e thought that 6lato and Aristotle, ecause
they supposed that immaterial sustances or even heavenly odies have
always existed, denied that such things had a cause of existing. 1or they do
not deviate from the position of the Catholic faith ecause they have
supposed these things to e uncreated ut ecause they have supposed them
to have always existed.
APP,*DI7 ,
St. Thomas Aquinas5 Writings on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard
:oo' Two, 6rologue
Q;is spirit has decorated the heavens
and y ;is mid$wife(s hand the twisted
sna'e has een rought forth.Q%o /GD-2I0
:oth theologians and philosophers consider creatures, ut
they do so in different ways. 6hilosophers consider
creatures as they exist in their own proper natures. hence,
they investigate the proper causes and attriutes of things.
The theologian, however, considers creatures as they come
from the first principle and as they are ordered to their
ultimate end, oth of which are 7od. Theology, therefore, is
rightly called divine wisdom, ecause it considers the
highest cause, which is 7od. It is fittingly said in
Ecclesiasticus /or the :oo' of Sirach, EG-240, Q;as not the
<ord made his saints to tell all ;is marvelous deeds"Q In
this Second :oo' /of the Sentences0, creatures are discussed
in the theological way. In the verse given aove /from %o0,
three ma)or topics for our su)ect can e noticed, namely,
the principle of things, the act of this principle, and the
effect of this act.
Jn the part of the principle two things are touched
upon, namely, QspiritQ and QhandQ- the spirit of goodness or
of 7od(s will, and the hand of power. Concerning this spirit
it is said in 6salm /25I-I50, QSend forth your Spirit and they
will e created.Q According to ?ionysius, On the Divine
#ames, chapter E,
GFG
)ust as the sun sends forth its rays for illuminating
odies, so the ?ivine 7oodness pours forth its rays, that is, its causality, for
the creation of things. And in the same way Augustine, On Christian
Doctrine, oo' 2, chapter IG,
GFI
says that insofar as 7od is good we exist.
The ones who have denied this spirit are those who have held that 7od had
produced things out of the necessity of nature and not from the freedom of
the will. Against these ?ionysius, On the Divine #ames, chapter E,
GFE
says
that ?ivine <ove has not allowed itself to e without fruit.
Concerning the QhandQ of ;is power, this is said in 6salm /25I-GF0,
Q,hen you opened your hand, all things were filled with goodness.Q To e
sure, in ;is hand were all the ends of the earth, ecause nothing existed from
all eternity except y ;is power. ,hen the hand has een opened, y the
'ey of love, the creatures have come forth. This is the hand aout which
Isaiah /K3-20 says, Q:ehold, the <ord(s hand has not een shortened,Q
ecause ;e produces the sustance of things into eing y ;is infinite
power. Those who have taught that 7od is not ale to ma'e something to
exist from nothing have wished Qto shortenQ this hand.
And thus the Trinity of 6ersons appears in the production of
creatures. QSpiritQ indicates the ;oly Spirit, aout whom it is said in the
:oo' of ,isdom /2-40, QThe Spirit of the <ord has filled the whole earth.Q
Q;andQ indicates the Son, who is also called the arm of the 1ather /%o E5-E0,
Q?o you have an arm li'e 7od(s and do you thunder with a voice li'e
7od(s"Q ecause ;e is the power and the wisdom of 7od. The pronoun
Q;imQ in QAll things have een made through ;imQ /%ohn 2-I0 refers to the
1ather, ut the Son and the ;oly Spirit are also indicated, aout whom it is
GFG. 67 I, D3I. /6seudo$0 ?ionysius Areopagite, ,he Divine #ames and .ystical
,heology, translated y %ohn ?. %ones *#ilwau'ee- #arquette Lniversity 6ress, 23F5+, p.
2II.
GFI. CCS< IG, GD.I$E. St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, translated y ?. ,.
Coertson *Indianapolis, IB- :os$#errill, 23KF+, p. G4.
GFE. 67 I, 45F. ?ionysius, ,he Divine #ames, p. 2EI.
said in 7enesis /2-20, QIn the eginning 7od created the
heavens and the earth.Q
Jn the part of act %o touches on two things- the
QdecorationQ and the )o of the Qmid$wifeQ. ?ecoration
pertains to the ordering of things, ecause 7od has
decorated them with different 'inds of eauty. As is said in
Ecclesiasticus /EG-G20, QThe <ord has decorated the great
wor's of his wisdom.Q :oethius *On the Consolation of
Philosophy, oo' I, meter 3+ says aout this eauty- Q/Aou
eing0 most eautiful produce the eautiful world y your
mind.Q
GFK
#id$wifery pertains to the governing of
providence, y which, since creatures are not ale to susist
y themselves, 7od, li'e a mid$wife, conserves them in
eing, provides what is needful for their end, and drives
away what is harmful, even using evil to further good ends.
,hence it is said in %o /IF-F0, with a similar metaphor,
Q,ho has closed the sea with doors when it urst forth as
though coming from the wom"Q
Jn the part of effect, %o touches two things, namely,
Qthe heavensQ and the Qtwisted sna'e.Q Aout the heavens
we are ale to consider two things, firmness, as in 6rovers
/I-230, Q;is wisdom has made the heavens firm,Q and
unending luminosity, aout which it is said /Ecclesiasticus
GE-D0, QI have made to rise in the heavens a light that will
not fail.Q ;ence y QheavensQ we can understand creatures
which will persist firmly in their own eauty.
<i'ewise y Qtwisted sna'eQ we can consider two
things, namely, dar'ness and croo'edness. The first is
indicated in the name of Qsna'eQ /coluber0, ecause Qsna'eQ
indicates Qaiding in the shadesQ /coluber P colens
umbram0, which signifies the lac' of light. Croo'edness is
GFK. :oethius, ,he Consolation of Philosophy, pp. G4G$G4I.
indicated y QtwistedQ, for what is twisted *or distorted+ is ent from
rightness. ;ence, y Qtwisted sna'eQ those creatures can e understood of
whom the eauty and rightness have een dar'ened y sin. The ?evil is
chiefly meant, Qy whose envy death has entered into the world,Q /,isdom
G-GE0, aout whose dar'ness it is said /%o E5-2D0, Qhe sleeps in the shade, in
the hidden place eneath the reed,Q and aout whose twistedness it is said
/Isaiah G4-20 QThe <ord will ring down his sword, hard, great, and fearful,
upon the <eviathan, the swift serpent, and ;e shall 'ill the twisted serpent.Q
Cightly, therefore, 7od is said to have decorated the heavens,
ecause he has 'ept creatures in their order and the divine goodness shines
forth clearly and the decoration of eauty has not een lost. Cightly also the
twisted sna'e is said to have een rought forth y the mid$wife(s hand,
ecause the divine power shines forth even among the wic'ed in the fact that
they are held ac', and the divine providence shines forth through the fact
that their evil deeds are turned into good. And so the material of this Second
:oo' /of the Sentences0 is manifest, in which is treated the ma'ing of
creatures and the fall through sin of the angel and of man.
APP,*DI7 0
1O&&A+/
Jf Some Important Terms in Aquinas(
Writings on the Sentences G.2.2
accident see substance and accident
act, actual, or actuality. potency, potential, or potentiality.
That which is, is Qactual.Q That which can e, ut is
not, is Qpotential.Q 1or example, the oiling water is
actually hot, ut is potentially cold. A man with
little money is, in actuality, poor, ut, in potentiality,
he is rich, for he may win the lottery. The flowers
are growing now in act, ut in potency they are
nutrients in the soil. All things that we experience in
this material world are oth actual and potential-
they actually are whatever they are, ut they are
potentially something else, for they may change.
The fact that all such things are oth actual and
potential means that all things are composed of two
different principles- form, the principle of actuality,
and matter, the principle of potentiality.
active potency and passive potency
6otency, in general, indicates what can e, ut this
can e understood in two different ways. Actively, a
thing may have a potency ecause it is ale to
perform some operation or activity. A normal adult
has the active potency to learn the 7aelic language.
such a person has the aility or the power to learn the
language. So an active potency can e understood to
e a power or an aility, which may or may not e
put to use. A passive potency, on the other hand, is a
characteristic a thing has to have something done to
it. A pile of lumer could e uilt into a wor' ench. a compound
could e changed into its elements. the ham in the refrigerator could
e turned into human sustance.
alteration see change
angel, separated substance, intelligence, separate intelligence
These terms have different meanings, ut they have a meaning in
common. They all can e used to indicate a sustance that has no
matter. such a eing would e a pure sustantial form that exists
without matter. Its activity would e primarily the activity of
'nowing, and hence it is often referred to as an intelligence or a
separate intelligence. The term QseparatedQ or QseparateQ indicates
separate from matter.
appropriation
This term is used to express the fact that a certain operation is
associated more with one 6erson of the Trinity than with others, even
though the operation in question is really performed y the 7odhead
as a whole. The wor' of creation, for example, is said to e
appropriated to the 1ather, even though the wor' of creation is the
wor' of the entire Trinity.
being
In the roadest sense, whatever is or is real is eing. #any 'inds of
realities can e said to e or to e real- a sustance such as a roc' or
an accident such as the shape of the roc'. the principles of natural
sustances, act and potency, or, form and matter. logical entities such
as definitions, mathematical entities such as numers and circles, and
imaginary entities such as the Easter :unny. material eings such as
minerals, and immaterial eings such as angels. 7od, who is pure or
susistent eing. All of the foregoing are examples of beings, and
hence the term 8eing9 or forms of the ver 8to e9 may e
predicated of all of them. This shows us that the term 8eing9 is used
in very different ^ analogical ^ senses. The metaphysician comes
to reali&e that eing *esse+ is the ultimate act wherey all creatures
are really existent and that this act is not essential to
any of the creatures, that is, that this act must e
given to the creature from something other than the
creature. The source of all created eing, therefore,
must e 7od who does not possess, receive, or
participate in eing, as creatures do, ut who simply
is ;is own eing. The fundamental distinction,
therefore, is etween the eing of creatures, which is
always caused, and the eing of 7od which is eing
that is simply pure, susistent eing.
categories of being
There are ten asic categories of eing, the category
of sustance and nine categories of accidents. These
categories are the asic terms in which all things can
e defined. As the asic terms of all definitions, they
are not themselves definale. The nine categories of
accidents are- quantity, quality, relation, eing
active, eing passive, when, where, position, and
possessing. See substance and accident.
cause and effect. causality. see also principle
A cause is that upon which something else, its effect,
depends for its eing or for its coming to e. ,hen
we as' the question Qwhy"Q the answer that we are
loo'ing for is a cause. There are four main 'inds of
causes.
2. efficient cause. This is the cause that
produces something, ma'es something, moves
something. It is the answer to the question, Qwho or
what caused or made this"Q Synonym- agent. The
carpenter who uilds the house, the heat that
evaporates the water, and the roc' that produce the ripples in the
pond are all examples of efficient causes.
G. final cause. The goal or end of some process or activity.
It is the answer to the question, Qfor what reason is this done"Q A
man eats ecause he is hungry. irds have hollow ones in order to
e light in weight for flight. eavers uild dams to supply themselves
with water for the protection of their lodges. and an acorn grows in
order to ecome an oa' tree. These are all examples of final causes.
I. formal cause. The form, intelligile structure, act,
actuality of some thing. See act. form. The formal cause is an
intrinsic principle of a thing that ma'es it to e what it is. It is the
answer to the question, Qwhat is it"Q The shape of a tale, the atomic
structure of a molecule, the definition of any natural thing are all
examples of formal causality.
E. material cause. The matter, the stuff, the passive potency,
the potentiality, the materials. See act and potency. form and matter.
The material cause is the intrinsic principle that allows a thing to e
changed into something other than it is. It is the answer to the
question, Qout of what is the thing made"Q The lumer out of which
the tale is made, the hydrogen and oxygen of water, and the
chemicals of any living thing are all examples of material causes.
change and motion
These terms are used synonymously. Change or motion really exists,
ut as it is not a fixed thing it is very hard to define. The est
definition is given in terms of actuality and potentiality- motion is
the actuality of something in potentiality while it is in potentiality.
#otion is neither actuality alone, for then the motion would e over
and done with, nor is it potentiality alone, for then the motion would
not yet have occurred. hence the aw'ward ut really accurate
definition given aove. The motion of an arrow shot from a ow, for
example, is the actuality of the potentiality of the arrow to stri'e the
target as a reali&ed potentially *and thus the arrow is no longer in the
ow nor as yet has reached the target+. There are
three main 'inds of change or motion.
2. local motion. This is motion from one
place to another place.
G. alteration. This is the change in a quality,
as when something changes color.
I. increase or augmentation and decrease.
This is a change in the quantity of a thing as when a
thing grows or expands.
E. generation and corruption. This is the
most radical sort of change. it is not in the strict
sense a motion, for it occurs instantaneously, ut in
the road sense it is a 'ind of change. 7eneration is
the coming into eing of a sustance, as when a
chemical compound comes into eing from its
elements or when an animal comes into eing from
the seed and egg of the parents. Corruption, on the
other hand, is the going out of eing of a sustance,
as when a compound is reduced to its elements or
when an animal dies. Corruption here is not used in
a moral sense. See also corruptible and
incorruptible.
contraries and privatives
These terms are used to express different ways in
which two things may e opposed to one another,
that is, two ways in which one thing is the
contradictory of another. A privative is the lac' of
something that can or should e present in
something. Thus, lindness is the privative of sight,
evil is the privative of good. A contrary is the
opposite end of a scale from another contrary. Thus,
the color lac' is the contrary of the color white, for
there are many colors in etween, and hot is the contrary of cold, for
there are degrees of heat and cold inetween the two.
corruptible and incorruptible
That which is corruptile is liale to generation and corruption. that
is, it is a sustance that can e made out of something and can cease
to exist y decaying into its constituent elements. All material things
are, thus, corruptile, for they are all made out of something and they
will all decay into the elements out of which they were made. An
incorruptile sustance, on the other hand, is one that is not made out
of anything and that, therefore, cannot decay into its elements.
Spiritual sustances *angels, human souls+, are incorruptile.
demonstration
An argument that produces true scientific 'nowledge. It shows how
something is true and how it cannot e other than it is. It is an
argument in the strongest sense of the term. Contrast this with a
probable or dialectical argument, which produces not 'nowledge ut
opinion. A proale argument may produce a very reasonale
conclusion, ut it may yet e a conclusion that someone could
reasonaly have some douts aout. Bo reasonale person, however,
could dout the conclusion of a demonstration. A sophistical
argument, finally, is no argument at all, ut the mere appearance of
an argument. It is faulty or deceptive reasoning.
dialectical argument see demonstration
effect see cause
efficient cause see cause
emanation
Emanation is a term used to designate a doctrine that 7od is the
ultimate cause of the existence of all things. In this general sense,
emanation is li'e creation. Emanation, however, can differ from
creation in at least one of three ways. 2+ Emanation can mean that
7od ma'es things, not out of nothing, ut out of ;imself. In this
sense, the creatures are not really independently existing eings ut
are extensions of 7od!s eing. G+ Emanation can
mean that 7od creates out of nothing ut creates only
one creature immediately. all other creatures are
created through the intermediate causality of the first
and of some susequent creatures. In this sense,
emanation means that 7od uses instrumental causes
in creating creatures out of nothing. I+ Emanation
can mean that 7od creates, not y ;is own free
choice, ut necessarily, ecause it is a necessary
consequence of ;is nature that ;e do so. This sort
of causality is usually called necessary emanation
and implies that the world is eternally caused y
7od.
essence, 7uiddity, or nature
These terms can all e used synonymously, and they
can mean the same also as form. They are the terms
used to express what a thing is. the answer given to
the question, Qwhat is it"Q is an expression of the
essence, quiddity, or nature of the thing. These
terms, however, can differ from the term QformQ in
indicating not )ust the form alone ut the form and
matter together. The form alone is not what the thing
is, for the thing is a composite of form and matter. to
express the thing completely as a composite of form
and matter, the term essence, quiddity, or nature is
used. So the essence of man, for example, is to e
oth soul *form+ and ody *matter+. The form of
man alone would not e the essence of man. In this
sense, Qessence,Q Qquiddity,Q or QnatureQ is often
contrasted with e0istence or being. The essence of
all creatures is really distinct from their existence or eing. In 7od,
however, essence and eing are one and the same.
eternity
In the strict sense, eternity means the sort of duration that is 7od(s- a
non$successive, totally actual existence. There is no prior or
posterior, efore or after, in 7od(s eternal duration. In the looser
sense, eternity means the unending duration of time. This may e
considered in the past or in the future. hence one may spea' aout an
eternal past *as a hypothetical possiility+ or aout an eternal future.
In addition, some theologians will tal' aout a 'ind of eternity,
sometimes called Qaeviternity,Q etween 7od(s eternity and eternal
time, that is appropriate to the duration of angels.
faculty see po$er
faith
An o)ective, definale doctrine, which tells us aout 7od and man(s
relation to 7od, which in principle cannot e 'nown y reason alone,
and to which the intellect of man may assent. Such assent of the
intellect is the result of 7od!s grace.
final cause see cause
form and matter
All physical things, or all things in the material world, are composed
of two principles, form and matter. This is so ecause all things have
two fundamental ways of eing. Jn the one hand, things are actual
and intelligile. ,hat ma'es the thing actual and intelligile is its
form. ,e 'now, for example, a ee y 'nowing its form. Jn the
other hand, things are potentially other than they are, and they are
unique individuals that resist our understanding, since understanding,
properly spea'ing, concerns universals. ,hat a ee is, for example,
is not what this ee is. The potentiality and individuality of a thing is
caused y its matter. That a thing is real or actual, and that a thing
can e understood, classified, and analy&ed $$ this is all caused y its
form and esse. That a thing is potentially changed, that it is different
from all others, that it is incomprehensile $$ all this
is from its matter. All physical things have oth
sorts of characteristics, oth those that derive from
the form and those that derive from the matter, and
hence all physical things must e composites of form
and matter. 1orm and matter are not things ut are,
rather, correlative principles of things. In the
physical world there is no such thing as form without
matter or matter without form. #atter in its most
asic sense is called prime matter, the asic
underlying sustrate of all sustantial change.
Lsually, however, we refer to matter in a secondary
sense, according to which we mean the identifiale
elements or materials out of which something is
made.
formal cause see cause
genus and species
These are terms to indicate categories relative to one
another. Thus, a genus is the roader category and
the species is the narrower category or the su$
category. A chemical element, for example, is a
genus, and hydrogen, gold, or sulphur are examples
of species within the genus. Jr, we could divide
things differently and say that metal is the genus and
that gold, silver, aluminum, etc. are species. A genus
and a species express essences, quiddities, natures, or
forms. the genus is the more general essence, and the
species is the more specific essence.
immaterial see material
incorruptible see corruptible
infinite
That which has no limits, or that of which there may always e more.
Aristotle argues that no physical thing can e actually infinite.
6otentially, a physical thing may e considered infinite only in the
sense that matter is infinitely divisile *in principle, though not in
practice+ or in the sense that time might e infinite. In actuality, only
7od is infinite.
infinite regress
A defect in arguing or in explaining such that the argument or
explanation given has no logical conclusion. If someone says that A
is caused y :, and that : is caused y C, and that C is caused y ?,
and so forth, such that there is no end to the causes, then an infinite
regress is eing proposed. Such, however, is really no explanation at
all.
intelligence see angel
local motion see change
material and immaterial
That which is material is made out of matter. that which is
immaterial is not made out of any matter. Thus a material sustance
is a composite of form and matter. An immaterial sustance, as it has
no matter, is simply a form.
material cause see cause
matter see form
metaphysics
The most general philosophical science of all of reality. ,hatever is
real is eing. hence metaphysics is the science of eing. Since what
is real includes material and immaterial eings, metaphysics teaches
what is true aout eing, in a general way, for oth material and
immaterial things. Aristotle and Aquinas understood metaphysics to
e a science, that is, to give real demonstrations.
motion see change
natural philosophy see physics
nature see essence
necessary or necessity
In general, that which is necessary cannot e
otherwise. There are a numer of senses of this term
that are philosophically important, ut two are
particularly relevant here. Something may e
necessary in itself or necessary through another.
Asolutely, only 7od is necessary through ;imself,
for only 7od exists necessarily *or cannot not exist+.
All creatures exist through 7od(s causality, and,
given that causality, they must necessarily exist. In
that sense, creatures are all necessary through
another. ;owever, considered in themselves,
without reference to 7od(s causality, it is possile to
say that some creatures are necessary through
themselves, for there is nothing aout them that
would ma'e them liale to dissolution. Thus,
immaterial sustances are necessary in themselves,
for they are not liale to dissolution.
necessary emanation see emanation
order of duration, order of nature. *or priority in nature,
priority in duration+
Things can e ordered in duration, that is, ordered in
time. If so, something may e prior to something
else ecause it is earlier. Jn the other hand, things
can e ordered in nature, in the sense that one thing
is more important or more asic or more
fundamental than something else. In other words,
the terms Qefore and after,Q or Qprior and posteriorQ
can apply either to duration *temporal+ or to nature
*importance in eing+.
passive potency see active potency
physics or natural philosophy
The general science of material eings which, ecause they are
material, are capale of motion. ;ence, physics is the science of
movale eing. Aristotle and Aquinas understand physics to e a
general science of nature, concerned with nature, time, motion, and
the li'e *and not an experimental science that requires speciali&ed
techniques and equipment+, and yet to e a science, for it offers
demonstrations. Today, the term physics is used more narrowly to
mean a mathematical and experimental science.
potency, potential, potentiality see act
po$er or faculty
The aility that something has for doing something. Synonym-
active potency.
prime matter
The asic underlying sustrate of all sustantial change. 6rime
matter is not 'nowale or identifiale in itself. It is matter in its most
asic sense. See also matter.
principle
A principle is that from which something else comes in some way or
another. it is a QfirstQ in some sense. The term principle is a genus in
which the term cause is a species. All causes are principles, ut not
all principles are causes. 7od is the first principle of the world,
which means that ;e is the first cause of the whole world, ut it also
means that ;e is the first eing. Some principles are not causes- a
point, for example, is the principle of a line, in the sense that it is a
more asic reality needed for the reality of a line, ut a line is not
caused y a point *or even y a set of points+. A line is not made up
of points. See also cause.
priority in duration see order of duration
priority in nature see order of nature
privative see contraries
probable argument see demonstration
7uiddity see essence
science
Any organi&ed ody of 'nowledge that gives
demonstrative 'nowledge through causes is a
science. Thus metaphysics and natural philosophy
are sciences, contemporary mathematical physics is a
science, iology is a science, and theology is a
science. To e a science, a doctrine must give
fundamental explanations of why things are as they
are.
separate intelligence see angel
separated substance see angel
sophistical argument see demonstration
species see genus
sub4ect see substance
substance and accident
A sustance is that which exists independently in the
sense that it does not exist in something as in a
su)ect, or it does not inhere in something else. Thus
a human eing, a tree, a roc', or a drop of water are
all examples of sustances. An accident, on the
other hand, can only exist in or inhere in some
su)ect or sustance. Thus, a color, a shape, a
quantity, a relation, when something is, where it is,
etc. are realities that inhere in independently existing
sustances. An accident is that which exists in
something else as in a su)ect. The term sub4ect may
often e used as a synonym for sustance, ut it can
e used in a more restricted sense to mean a part of a
sustance. Thus, a person(s ideas are in his intellect,
as in a su)ect, ut his intellect is not a sustance.
Bote that according to Thomas Aquinas, a sustance
is a sustance ecause it possesses a substantial
form, and an accident is an accident ecause of an accidental form.
Sustances, therefore, are composites of matter *prime matter+ and
sustantial form, and accidents are accidental forms that inhere in
sustances.
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Preface

Explanations of the origin of the universe have

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