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Industrial Relations in Malaysia: Some Proposals for Reform

Patricia Todd
University of Western Australia
Russell Lansbury
University of Sydney
Ed Davis
Macquarie University
In Malaysia there is consensus on the need to amend existing IR legislation but
there is much disagreement over the changes required. While the employers seek
greater flexibility and less protection for labour, the unions want greater
freedom to exert labours collective strength and a more comprehensive safety
net. The government is questioning the appropriateness of the current labour laws
for the achievement of their economic development goals, in particular, their
plans for a knowledge-based economy (k-economy). The government is
questioning the appropriateness of the current labour laws for the achievement of
their economic development goals, in particular, their plans for a k-economy.
One can only sympathise with the officials
in the Malaysian Ministry of Human
Resources charged with the responsibility
of amending the labour laws to ensure an
appropriate framework for economic
development. The achievement of the
governments economic goals requires a
more liberal IR regulatory system, which
does not appear to fit with the current
political context. In addition, while the
employers want increased flexibility and
less legislated protection for labour, the
unions want to increase their ability to
exercise power in the workplace and an
improved safety net to protect labour. The
demands of both parties need to be
understood within the context of the
existing IR system.
The government is questioning the
appropriateness of the current labour laws
for the achievement of their economic
development goals, in particular, their
plans for a knowledge-based economy (k-
economy).
The data for this paper was gathered from:
a review of the existing literature on IR
in Malaysia;
a series of 13 semi-structured
interviews with representatives of
government (6) (within the Ministry of
HR and the Economic Planning Unit),
employer associations (3), unions (3),
and an academic expert, conducted in
January 2003.
Government documents relating to
IR and economic policy.
Malaysia's industrial relations and the
context for change
Malaysia's IR has been characterised by
extensive state control guaranteeing a high
level of managerial prerogative within the
workplace, minimal reported conflict and
very little bargaining power for labour
(Suhanah 2002; Arudsothy and Littler
1993; Ariffin 1997; Jomo and Todd 1994).
Employers in Malaysia assume a very high
level of control in the workplace and this is
rarely challenged by employees. This
reflects past practice and the imbalance of
power between labour and capital in
Malaysia. The labour laws and their
administration are very supportive of
managerial prerogative but are often
considered to be inadequate in their
protection of labour's rights and interests
(Suhanah 2002).
Malaysia's IR policies and practices
continue to reflect past political history and
economic development patterns. Given the
high level of control that employers have
had in the workplace, it is not surprising
that their prescription for increasing
competitiveness is to increase their right to
manage labour, and thereby reduce labour
costs, even further. Similarly, given the
severe restrictions on unions to protect
labour within the current IR regulatory
framework, the unions' desire for
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

amendments to increase their capacity to
exercise power is also predictable.
The Malaysian Government's goal of
achieving developed nation status by 2020
- Vision 2020 - is well known. The
government indicated in its Third Outline
Perspective Plan: 2001-2010, that it
envisages a change of emphasis in the
drive for economic growth.
The knowledge-based economy will provide the
platform to sustain a rapid rate of economic growth
and enhance international competitiveness so as to
achieve the objectives of Vision 2020. It will also
strengthen Malaysias capability to innovate; adapt
and create indigenous technology; and design,
develop and market new products, thereby
providing the foundation for endogenously-driven
growth (Malaysia 2001a: 119).
Malaysia now needs to develop new
strategies to ensure its competitiveness
within the region. The k-economy is seen
as a critical change to the basis of
Malaysia's competitiveness and the means
to provide well-remunerated quality jobs
for Malaysia's workforce. The proposed
development of the k-economy is being
accompanied by rhetoric extolling the need
for a multi-skilled workforce, willing to
engage in lifelong learning, capable of
exercising their initiative and creativity in
the workplace. This has implications not
only for Malaysia's education and training
policies but also for IR policy for the
current 'high control' IR approach is
unlikely to be conducive to more highly
educated and skilled employees applying
their knowledge in an innovative way. It is
much more likely that knowledge workers
will deliver high levels of performance in
an environment in which they receive
information about their tasks, they are
consulted by their supervisors and are able
to influence workplace decisions.
Proposals for reform
The following model is pertinent to the
choices facing Malaysia at this point. The
linkages may be elaborated as follows. A
less developed country begins the process
of industrialisation by creating some initial
conditions, which are conducive to
investment. In IR terms this may include
low wages and low unionisation. This
attracts initial investment as businesses
(especially those that are foreign-owned)
can raise profits by taking advantage of the
low wages and lack of employee rights. As
investment increases over time, however,
the initial labour market conditions
inevitably change. There are pressures on
wages to rise as there are growing
demands for employee voice.
The result of secondary conditions
developing in the labour market may be to
reduce the initial advantage that attracted
new investment in the first place. The
secondary conditions present the state with
a critical juncture in the development
process. It faces a strategic choice. The
first option is to undertake a series of
measures that will maintain the advantages
of the initial conditions. These policies
may include the imposition by government
of controls over wage increases, severe
restrictions on unions and strict limitations
on collective bargaining. The second
option is to adapt to the secondary
conditions whereby the state permits the
operation of unions and collective
bargaining while also investing in human
capital by upgrading skills and expanding
education and training. At the enterprise
level, encouragement is given to employee
involvement in decision-making, flexible
work organisation and skills development.
This creates a virtuous cycle in which
businesses increase their value-added
production making them more profitable
and, hence, they are able to pay higher
wages to their workers. Although the two
responses to secondary conditions in the
labour market (shown in Figure 1) may
appear to be alternatives, governments may
choose to follow policies, which
incorporate elements of both.
Malaysia's goals of high levels of
workplace performance by knowledgeable
and skilled employees capable of
innovation and being adaptable to change
match the outcomes listed in Figure 1, that
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

is, Higher Skills, Higher Productivity,
Committed Workers. In the model, these
outcomes are achieved when the State and
employers adapt to secondary conditions in
the labour market, rather than suppressing
them.
The industrial relations literature (e.g.
Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986;
Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Piore and Sabel
1984) would suggest that the type of IR
that would accompany such a development
would include the following:
- mutual commitment between
management and workers reflected in
employment security, employee
involvement in decision making, co-
operative labour relations, equal
opportunity, high safety standards,
- the provision of ongoing training;
- flexible work organisation whereby
multi-skilled employees are grouped
into semi-autonomous work teams
moving between tasks.
This contrasts with the 'old IR' that
accompanied labour-intensive mass
production; that is low wage, highly
controlled de-skilled labour allocated to a
single task, centralised decision-making by
management, and limited investment in
occupational health and safety and
training. Malaysia's IR in 2003, still
reflects much of the 'old IR' although some
employers are embracing aspects of the
'new IR'. One critical aspect of the 'new
IR, which shows little sign of being
embraced by Malaysian employers, is the
issue of control in the workplace. There is
little evidence of genuine employee
participation in decision-making, as
employers prefer to retain their high levels
of managerial prerogative. Yet the concept
of a highly committed 'thinking'
workforce, responsive to change and
capable of innovation is dependent upon
employee participation in the decision
making process.
Let us now consider in greater detail the
changes needed in Malaysian IR, in line
with the model outlined above, to facilitate
the development of the k-economy.
Employment security
Employment security is a prerequisite for
employee commitment. The current
rhetoric on employment security in
Malaysia, however, reflects a lack of trust
and mutual commitment. Employers argue
the need for numerical flexibility seeking
greater freedom to terminate employees
but displaying disinterest in the position of
redundant labour. Not surprisingly, labour
is responding by both resisting any
changes to the labour laws, which would
facilitate terminations, and by advocating a
safety net to protect workers made
redundant. In addition, all parties
acknowledge problems in the processing of
unfair dismissal cases. The nature of
Malaysias planned economic development
presumes flexibility in the labour market.
On the other hand, the Malaysian
Government has previously sought to
balance free market forces with political
and social goals, urging employers to
adopt strategies to avoid layoffs wherever
possible (Peetz and Todd 2000). Thus we
would argue that if employers wish to
achieve legislative changes enabling
increased freedom to terminate employees
they will need to ensure that such changes
are accompanied by protective provisions
to assist employees who are made
redundant. This would include both a
degree of financial support for the ensuing
period of employment as well as assisting
the employee to obtain new employment,
thereby sharing the burden of adjustment.
Employee participation
The nature of decision-making in most
Malaysian workplaces is antithetical to
employee participation. The proposed
development of the k-economy challenges
traditional decision making practices for
unless the thinking and the doing are
integrated it is difficult to envisage the
desired achievement of employees
becoming innovative, exercising their own
initiative and thereby more self-motivated.
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

Historically, the concept of employee
participation is not without precedent in
Malaysia. In 1975 within the Code of
Conduct for Industrial Harmony and Areas
for Cooperation and Agreed Industrial
Relations Practices, negotiated between
the Malaysian Council of Employers
Organisations (the predecessor to the
Malaysian Employers Federation) and the
MTUC, included a commitment by
employers and detailed arrangements to
establish regular consultative arrangements
with employees and unions at the
enterprise level. However, as there was no
legislative foundation for joint consultation
and works committees, little activity of this
nature has occurred.
Thus in furthering employee participation
Malaysia can draw upon a model
developed within its own past. It can also
look to the works councils concept long
established in Germany and more recently
within the European Union. Within the
Asian region various forms of labour-
management councils, joint consultation
committees and works councils have been
established, including the Labour-
Management Council (LMC) system in
South Korea.
Tripartism
While the focus of the previous section
was on the workplace, similar comments
can be made about the involvement of
government, employers and unions at the
macro level. The existing National Labour
Advisory Council (NLAC) provides a
framework for tripartism in Malaysia but
there needs to be a much greater
commitment to the utilisation of NLAC as
a mechanism for the full participation of
representatives of employers and labour in
IR policy making. In addition, the role of
the social partners should be extended
beyond workplace issues to include input
into the key challenges facing the economy
and the strategic options available.
Co-operative labour relations
While issues raised in the preceding sub-
sections on employment security and
employee participation would contribute to
co-operative labour-relations, it
particularly raises questions in relation to
the notion of control in the workplace, the
role of trade unions, collective bargaining
and conflict resolution.
As was stated earlier, Malaysia's IR has
been characterised by a high level of
managerial prerogative within the
workplace, minimal reported conflict and
very little bargaining power for labour.
This perpetuates the practice of
management unilaterally deciding on
matters relating to employment and the
work process, contrary to the employee
participation practices generally associated
with prescriptions for high quality
production in contemporary workplaces.
This is resulting - in general - in
cooperative, low conflict labour relations
but on the basis of labour's acquiescence
rather than mutual commitment. This
stifles the potential to encourage a more
committed approach from labour in which
employees would be able to be more
responsible for their workplace behaviour
and take more initiative in responding to
changing circumstances.
The high control model also does not
encourage management in Malaysia to
relinquish their low cost, paternalist
management style of managing labour. The
perpetuation of this approach discourages
management from focusing on their
employees as an asset to be valued and
developed. It is plausible that this results in
significantly lower levels of employee
productivity.
Thus a more balanced collaborative
relationship needs to be developed
between labour and management in
Malaysia. This requires major changes in
the expectations and behaviour of both
parties but, particularly, on the part of
management. In turn, this requires
changes in the labour laws and their
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

implementation to enable labours voice to
be heard in the workplace.
Union rights and recognition
The current position of organised labour in
Malaysia is very weak. In 2002 there were
581 unions with a total membership of
807,802 amounting to approximately 9%
of employees (Malaysia, Ministry of
Human Resources, 2003). Legislation
restricts the activities of unions via
regulations on union recognition,
bargaining rights, the taking of industrial
action and political activities (Kuruvilla
1993). Union size and structure is heavily
regulated through laws administered by the
Director General of Trade Unions (DGTU)
resulting in a proliferation of small unions.
In 1992, 42% of union members were in
enterprise unions (BILA 1995:11).
The Malaysian Government has ratified
ILO Convention 98 concerning the Right
to Organise and Collectively Bargain, but
it has declined to ratify ILO Convention 97
concerning the Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise. In
addition, there have been complaints about
the violation of workers' rights and
abrogation of Convention 98 by the
Malaysian Government. There is evidence
of an array of tactics being utilised by
employers to prevent unionisation of their
workplaces including indefinitely delaying
union recognition applications,
victimisation or promotion of activists to
remove them from the shopfloor, and the
formation of company-sponsored unions
(Anantaraman 2002; Ariffin 1997; Bhopal
1997; Wad 2001).
In order to better protect the rights and
interests of labour and create the
foundation for developing a legislative
framework for co-operative labour
relations, the State needs to encourage
employers to recognise and work with
unions in their workplaces. The first step to
achieve this would be the ratification of
ILO Convention 97.
In addition, research has shown that
implementation of international labour
standards need not undermine economic
outcomes. A 2002 study found that the
Nordic countries had implemented
virtually all International Labour Standards
(ILS) and their economic and social
performance was among the strongest in
the world Sengenberger 2002:50).
Similarly, a 2002 United Nations
Development Project (UNDP) study
reported that the Nordic countries were
ranked at or near the top of the UNDPs
human development index (HDI) while
adhering most closely to the ILS, and
maintaining a strong welfare state (UNDP
2002).
By implication, ratification of the ILO
Conventions needs to be accompanied by a
regulatory environment supportive of
independent unions. This would require
substantial changes to the existing labour
laws and their administration including the
encouragement by the DGTU of the
formation of unions by interpreting
'industry' and 'similar industries' more
liberally, the prevention of the proliferation
of small unions by registering inhouse
groups as sub-branches of relevant
industry unions rather than as separate free
standing unions, the granting to public
sector employees the same right to belong
to a trade union as employees in the private
sector and the implementation of an
appropriate time limit (e.g. 21 days) on the
decision making process by the Director
General and the Minister when trade union
recognition issues are referred to them to
ensure timely resolution of recognition
disputes.
Collective bargaining
Despite a legal framework that purports to
enable collective bargaining, the basic
thrust has favoured managerial
unilateralism and the proportion of the
workforce covered by collective
bargaining is only about 12%.
The Industrial Relations Act greatly
restricts the role of unions in collective
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

bargaining by excluding items from
bargaining which are deemed to be
managerial prerogative (such as hiring,
firing, redundancy, promotion, transfer an
the allocation of duties). Furthermore, the
Promotion of Investments Act 1986
prohibits workers in pioneer industries
from negotiating working conditions more
favourable than the minimum standards
embodied in the Employment Act. Nor is
collective bargaining allowed to occur in
the public sector. By restricting the
operation of unions in the public sector as
well as growth areas of the economy, the
government prevents collective agreements
from benefiting many workers.
Even when a union has successfully
negotiated a collective agreement, there are
onerous procedures for gaining the
required recognition of that agreement by
the Industrial Court. The Court has
substantial discretionary powers and the
overall effect is to stifle free collective
bargaining where the Court has expressed
firm views on a particular issue. Some
examples where the Court has made a firm
stand have been in regard to issues of
bonus, union check-off and salary
adjustments. The parties thus become
inflexible in their bargaining when the
Court appears to be in their favour.
Thus the regulation of collective
bargaining is in need of major review and
revision to enable unions to negotiate on
behalf of workers and to bring about a
more balanced relationship in the
workplace between employers and
employees.
Conflict and conflict resolution
In general, co-operation rather than
conflict is the norm in Malaysian
workplaces. Legislation makes it very
difficult for unions to organise legal
strikes, with the potential consequences
including union deregistration and
detention of activists and, over the years,
employers have responded to striking
employees by sometimes dismissing them
or alternatively closing their workplaces
temporarily. There is, however, evidence
that conflict is still present within
Malaysian workplaces (Ramasamy 2002;
Bhopal 1997; Abdullah and Keenoy 1995;
Todd 2002; Casperz 1998). Sometimes
labour resistance emerges in the form of
sudden walkouts, wildcat strikes or
alternatively, to avoid repercussions labour
may take unofficial action, either
individually or collectively. Instances of
unofficial go-slows, unavailability for
overtime, increased medical leave and
even vandalism have been cited by
management and union leaders and
management acknowledges that workers
will simply resign when discontented
(Caspersz 1998; Todd 2002). Given that, at
times, conflict is inevitable, it is important
that mechanisms are provided for both the
expression of the conflict and its
resolution. Thus some of the restrictions on
the right to take industrial action need to be
modified.
Turning to conflict resolution, both
employer and union interviewees
expressed the need for speedier dispute
resolution procedures and suggested the
formation of a Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission, comprised of appointees
from both employers and employees, in
place of the Industrial Court.
To further facilitate the resolution of
conflict at the workplace level, all
organisations should be encouraged to
develop and implement grievance
procedures. Having made these
recommendations in relation to dispute
resolution mechanisms, however, it would
have to be noted that these would only
result in improved outcomes if both parties
were willing to negotiate and accept the
right of the other party to input into the
decision making process.
Equal opportunity
Employee commitment is dependent upon
employees' perception of equity in the
workplace. The changing nature of the
Malaysian economy has impacted
substantially on the composition of the
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

wage-paid workforce, in particular, in
relation to women, Malays and the
utilisation of foreign labour. While it has
created employment opportunities for these
groups, labour force segmentation has
resulted in unequal outcomes. In terms of
foreign labour, it is recognised by all
parties that they are not treated equally
with Malaysian workers. For example,
research suggests that the majority of
employers who are using foreign workers
in their workplaces are leaving it to the
contractors to ensure that their wages and
conditions comply with the law (Lee and
Sivananthiran 1996:80) when it is well
known that most contractors fail to provide
many of the benefits to which the
employees are legally entitled.
Government recognition of the need to
address some of these inequities is
reflected in employment restructuring
strategies to better reflect the ethnic
composition of the population and the
introduction of the Code of Practice on
Preventing and Eradicating Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace. Similarly,
both the 8th Malaysia Plan and the Third
OPP 2001-2010 reiterate the need for
employment restructuring to create
opportunities in employment without
gender bias and to better reflect the ethnic
composition of the population.
The continuing inequitable outcomes,
however, highlight the need for the
government to implement more extensive
policies so as to accelerate the change
process. Such changes should include the
ratification of ILO Convention 111 relating
to non-discrimination in employment and
the introduction of anti-discrimination,
affirmative action and sexual harassment
legislation. The introduction of anti-
discrimination laws is necessary to give a
clear message that discrimination will not
be tolerated while the government could
use affirmative action laws to improve the
position of specific groups within the
workplace as is being done currently for
Bumiputras.
Occupational health and safety
Interviewees suggested that OHS had been
slowly improving in Malaysia as
evidenced in the significant decline in
reported accidents from approximately
125,000 in 1994 to approximately 85,000
in 2003 (Interviews DG of OHS 28/1/03,
MTUC 29/1/03). They did, however, cite
numerous problems in relation to
compliance with the legislation. The
quality of safety at smaller workplaces was
viewed as being less certain.
Malaysias OHS Act 1994 makes
provisions for stakeholder involvement at
both the national and workplace levels.
The union interviewees, however,
questioned the effectiveness of the
workplace OSH committees due to
problems such as the selection of
committee delegates, lack of training, lack
of action on the committees
recommendations. Committees are
functioning within a workplace
environment in which management
dominate decision-making and therefore it
requires a substantial change in behaviour
to enable employee representatives to be
empowered sufficiently to enable the OSH
committees to function successfully.
Training
The Malaysian Government recognised the
need to accelerate the level of skill
development when it introduced the
Human Resources Development Fund in
1992. It is not the intention here to
articulate the training needs associated
with the economic development process in
Malaysia but more to comment on the
training necessary to achieve the advocated
changes in IR. Such changes will
necessitate substantial training within the
Ministry of HR, management, unions and
amongst employees.
To achieve the changes, the State would
need to play a vital role in both developing
appropriate policies and legislation and
persuading employers to change their
management style. Thus employees in the
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

HR Department would need intensive
training not only in the detail of such
practices as employee participation but
more broadly about the nature of
commitment-oriented IR systems.
Management will play a critical role
determining the style of IR within their
workplace, thus programs to lift levels of
understanding and skill in relation to
people management are essential.
Employees and union officials also need to
be trained, for example, in relation to
employee participation schemes and the
implementation of team-based work.
Collectively bargained agreements may be
used as vehicles to highlight the
importance of training. Industrial relations
institutions may then act as a force to
counter efforts to avoid training. In
addition, employees and unions may well
develop their own training regimes, which
may supplement the training being
developed (Lansbury and Pickersgill 2002:
287).
Flexible work organisation
The introduction of flexible work
organisation whereby multi-skilled
employees are grouped into semi-
autonomous work teams moving between
tasks and taking collective responsibility
for their work is a critical component of a
high performance workplace. It should
achieve efficiencies in production,
potentially improve the quality of the
goods or services produced as well as
offering potential benefits to employees.
There is evidence of some employers
introducing more modern management
techniques to Malaysian workplaces,
particularly amongst the larger companies.
There has, for example, been considerable
restructuring of the production processes
within the electronics industry to increase
flexibility and efficiency. New methods of
work organisation, inventory management
and quality control have been introduced,
the team concept of production is being
used in some plants, multiskilling is more
prevalent, and the working week made
more flexible in some workplaces to match
the needs of production (OConnor 1993;
Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1996; Abdullah
1994). This transition, however, is far from
being the norm; in many companies the
production process remains primitive, with
operators performing a single task
repetitively (Peetz and Todd 2000).
The changes needed to achieve more
flexible work organisation are intertwined
with the concept of employee participation
and, again, need to be addressed through
management training.
Can these changes occur?
Ideally the initiative for such
transformation should emanate from the
workplace. This would require a complete
change of philosophy for most managers in
Malaysia and theres no evidence to
suggest that they would be persuaded thus.
To the contrary, management are arguing
the need for greater control over labour to
be able to manage labour more flexibly. At
the same time, labour is not well-organised
and therefore unable to pressure for such
changes.
Thus this change would need to be driven
primarily by the government, if it is to
occur. It will require new labour
legislation, rather than line-by-line
amendments of existing laws. It will
require new policies to be articulated and
implemented strongly by the government.
This, in turn, would require a revamped
Ministry of HR with far greater skills and
political influence than displayed
currently. When one considers the broader
economic and political context, however,
such change seems rather unlikely.
Politically, there is nothing to suggest a
move to liberalise Malaysias high control
society, despite the recent change in
leadership (Turner 2003). The political
elite have used labour laws to control
labour and deter labour organising
politically. The changes proposed here to
workplace regulation would inevitably run
counter to this labour control strategy.
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

Economically, one has to consider how
pervasive the k-economy is likely to be,
given that its development is the principle
motivator for the governments
reconsideration of its labour regulation
policies. The occupations most likely to be
critical to the k-economy are the
professional, technical and managerial
categories; these will be the workers who
are required to be appropriately trained and
capable of exercising their own initiative.
Yet these groups are estimated to
constitute only 17% of the workforce by
2005 (Malaysia 2001, Table 4-2). One
might anticipate more enlightened
management practices at the heart of the k-
economy, at the very least to ensure
retention of valuable employees, but it is
difficult to see why IR in such sectors as
manufacturing and agriculture would
change unless the Malaysian Government
determined to abandon low value-added,
labour intensive operations.
Conclusion
Employers, unions and government all
question the suitability of the current IR
regulatory arrangements in Malaysia. Not
surprisingly, their agendas differ. We have
outlined a model of 'high commitment' and
'high performance' IR for Malaysia in
which a high control approach is replaced
by mutual commitment between
management and workers. The model also
assumes the provision of ongoing training
and the re-organisation of work along more
flexible lines to enable greater efficiency.
We view this model as more appropriate to
advance Malaysias economic
development and to enable fairer outcomes
at the workplace level. While employers
may reject the greater opportunity such a
model provides for labour to participate in
decision making in the workplace, and
therefore to exercise greater control, they
need to reflect more broadly on how they
intend to increase employee productivity.
The Malaysian Government would appear
unlikely to accede to the employers
demands for increased flexibility as such
reforms would impact on employees job
and income security. The government has
previously rejected a deregulated labour
market approach and has provided a degree
of ongoing protection for workers to
discourage political activism. Thus
employers would be well advised to
consider alternative strategies to increase
employee productivity such as this model,
which encourages more labour
commitment and enables employees to be
more responsive to workplace change.

Fig 1: Workplace performance, HR development and the legal framework governing ER

















References
Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

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Patricia Todd, Russell Lansbury and Ed Davis

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