Civ1 Digest Compilation Version4 Celles

08
2013-2014
Fall
SUMMER TERM
CASE DIGESTS IN PERSONS AND

FAMILY RELATIONS
A COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
SUBMITTED TO ATTY. DEMETRIO CUSTODIO IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
SUBMITTED BY: CELLES, CUA, DE LEMOS, MARONILLA,

MOJICA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. AND MICHELLE S. YBANEZ VS. SHIRLEY G. QUINIONES
CARIDAD SEGARRA SAZON VS. LETECIA VASQUEZ-MENANCIO AND EDGAR S.
SEGARRA
TOPIC: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM(GSIS), HERMOGENES D.
CONCEPCION ET AL. VS .COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), AMORSONIA B.
ESCARDA, MA. CRISTINA D. DIMAGIBA, AND REYNALDO P. VENTURA
TOPIC: MARRIAGE LICENSE AND ANNULMENT
SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
TOPIC: SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER V. JUDGE ANATALIO
NECESSARIO, JUDGE GIL ACOSTA, JUDGE ROSABELLA TORMIS, JUDGE
EDGEMELO ROSALES, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS
TOPIC: ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS
TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN- LEE
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES
FUJIKI V. MARINAY
QUIAZON v. BELEN
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, COMPLAINANT, VS. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO, RESPONDENT.
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGIGAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC V. ENCELAN
AURELIO v. AURELIO
OCHOSA v. ALANO
MARABLE v. MARABLE
YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
Republic v. Quintos,
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
DEATH
REPUBLIC V. NARCEDA
TOPIC: BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
NOLLORA V. REPUBLIC
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMOCAPILI
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, VS. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO
TOPIC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
BEUMER V. AMORES
DEWARA v. LAMELA
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA AND OFELIA FORTALEZA VS. SPOUSES RAUL
LAPITAN AND RONA LAPITAN
Dewara v. Lamela
Aguete v. PNB
Orpiano v. Tomas
TOPIC: CONJUGAL VS. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY
DE LA PENA v. AVILA
TOPIC: CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP
PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE
FLORES v. LINDO
TOPIC: LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES
QUIAO V. QUIAO
DINO v. DINO
YU v. REYES-CARPIO
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY IIIvs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
TOPIC: Causes for dissolution of ACP

Heirs of Go v. Servacio
TOPIC: Unions under FC 148
Lacbayan v. Samoy
TOPIC: THE FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA AND ERNESTO S. DE MESA VS. SPOUSES
CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. AND MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE AND REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS
TOPIC: FILIATION
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., VS. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER,
JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, AND RIGOBERTO GILLERA
TOPIC: SUPPORT
LIM LUA V. LUA
ANTONIO PERLA, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA,
TOPIC: DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
BECKETT V. SARMIENTO
CORRECTION OF ENTRY- BIRTH CERTIFICATE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

California Clothing, Inc. and Michelle S. Ybanez vs. Shirley G. Quiniones
GR No. 175822 | October 23, 2013 | PERALTA., J.:
FACTS:
The case involves a Guess USA (California Clothing, Inc.) employee petitioner Ybanez and a
reservation ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific Air respondent Quinones. Respondent bought a pair
of jeans from a Guess boutique in Robinsons Department Store, where petitioner is employed.
After paying at the cashier, respondent went on her way but was later on approached by a Guess
employee informing her that she failed to pay the said jeans. Respondent insisted that she made
such payment showing the receipt issued in her favour and suggested that they talk in her
office located at the basement of the same mall. Petitioner came in the said venue. There both
petitioner and respondent exchanged a heated conversation regarding the non-payment of the
said jeans in the amount of Php 2,098.00. After the said confrontation, petitioner sent two
demand letters addressed to the Director of Cebu Pacific narrating the said incident and imputing
an allegation of non-payment against respondent, which was twice refused receipt by said office
on the ground that it was not privy to the transaction and that respondent was off duty during the
said incident. The HRD of the mall was also furnished with the same letter, prompting it to
conduct an investigation on the matter. However, respondent was not given a copy of the
damaging letters involved in the case. On the basis of the foregoing facts, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against the erring employees Guess USA, including petitioner, and
California Clothing, Inc. on the basis of failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in hiring and
selection of its employees. Petitioners answered that the issuance of the receipt in favour of
respondent was on the erroneous assumption by them that payment had already been made. RTC
dismissed the complaint, which was reversed by the CA holding petitioners liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners, in the exercise of their right to claim payment from respondent,
should be held liable for damages in favour of the latter.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative

The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the
exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in
the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price
of the black jeans was missing. . . It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is
whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause
of action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. . . Good faith. . . consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. . . Malice or bad faith, on the
other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance,
petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing it of the
incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. Petitioners claimed that after
receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent was noted to hurriedly left
(sic) the store. They also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when
she was asked about the circumstances of payment. . .
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability. . . The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. . . In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.

CARIDAD SEGARRA SAZON VS. LETECIA VASQUEZ-MENANCIO AND EDGAR S.
SEGARRA (FEBRUARY 22 2012)
Facts:
1) Respondent, a resident of the United States of America, entrusted the management,
administration, care and preservation of her properties to the petitioner. However, the petitioner
never rendered a full accounting of the fruits and income derived from the properties and used
these for her own benefit. The petitioner denied these allegations. In 1997, the respondent filed a
complaint with preliminary injunction, praying that the RTC order the petitioner to render an
accounting and remit all the fruits and income that was received from the properties.
2) Petitioner (administrator) claims that since the expenses for the maintenance of the properties
exceeded whatever income they generated, then what is left of the income should now belong to
her as compensation.
Issue: What is the total amount to be paid to the administrator (petitioner) for her services in
administering the respondents properties?
Held: Since there was no exact amount agreed upon, and she failed to fix her own salary despite
the authority given to her, the RTC correctly applied the doctrine of quantum meruit. The
doctrine of quantum meruit (as much as one deserves) prevents undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. Being an
equitable principle, it should only be applied if no express contract was entered into, and no
specific statutory provision is applicable. Although petitioner was given the authority to set the
amount of her salary, she failed to do so. Thus, she should at least be given what she merits for
her services. The rate of 1000 Pesos per month for 15 years was considered to be a just,
reasonable and fair compensation to give the administrator.
TOPIC: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM(GSIS), HERMOGENES D.
CONCEPCION ET AL. VS .COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), AMORSONIA B.
ESCARDA, MA. CRISTINA D. DIMAGIBA, AND REYNALDO P. VENTURA
(SEPTEMBER 11 2012).
Facts:
1) The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to an earlier order of the court ordering them
to return the benefits that they had received from the GSIS. The petitioners claim that they have
received the proceeds in good faith and it would be an injustice to be ordered to refund the
retirement benefits they had received more than a decade ago.
2) The benefits involved here are retirement benefits. Retirement benefits belong to a different
class of benefits. All the cases cited by the Movants Federico Pascual, et al. involved benefits
such as cash gifts, representation allowances, rice subsidies, uniform allowances, per diems,
transportation allowances, and the like. Retirement benefits are given to one who is separated
from employment either voluntarily or compulsorily. Such benefits, subject to certain requisites
imposed by law and/or contract, are given to the employee on the assumption that he can no
longer work. They are also given as a form of reward for the services he had rendered. The
purpose is not to enrich him but to help him during his non-productive years.
Issue: Whether or not the payees should be compelled to return the retirement benefits they had
received under the GSIS RFP?
Held: Yes. The Courts earlier decision did not preclude Movants Federico Pascual, et al. from
receiving retirement benefits provided by existing retirement laws. What they are prohibited
from getting are the additional benefits under the GSIS RFP, which was found to have emanated
from a void and illegal board resolution. To allow the payees to retain the disallowed benefits
would amount to their unjust enrichment to the prejudice of the GSIS, whose avowed purpose is
to maintain its actuarial solvency to finance the retirement, disability, and life insurance benefits
of its members.
The statutory basis for unjust enrichment is found in Article 22 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.
The payees received the disallowed benefits with the mistaken belief that they were entitled to
the same under the GSIS RFP. Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which is applicable in this case,
reads: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary
relation.
The payees, who acquired the retirement benefits under the GSIS RFP, are considered as trustees
of the disallowed amounts, as although they committed no fraud in obtaining these benefits, it is
against equity and good conscience for them to continue holding on to them.
TOPIC: MARRIAGE LICENSE AND ANNULMENT

SYED AZHAR ABBAS V. GLORIA GOO ABBAS (JANUARY 30 2013)
Facts
1) Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage against his wife, Gloria Goo-Abbas, alleging the absence of a marriage license as a
ground. He testified that they were married in Taiwan and when he arrived in the Philippines, he
was told he was going to undergo a ceremony he later on knew was a marriage ceremony. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license and that he
had never resided in that area. The marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract
was the number of another marriage license issued to a different couple. It was also brought up
by the petitioner that Gloria filed bigamy cases against him.
2) The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner but in the Court of Appeals, Gloria was the winning
party. Hence the petition to the Supreme Court by Syed.
Issue: Was their marriage valid given the allegations of the petitioner with regards to the
marriage license?
Held: No. The marriage was not valid. The Regional Trial Court was correct in holding that no
valid marriage license was issued for the couple. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies
of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions to the rule that a marriage
license is necessary. Not having complied with the law under the Family Code, the marriage is
void ab initio for being solemnized without a valid marriage license.
TOPIC: SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER V. JUDGE ANATALIO

NECESSARIO, JUDGE GIL ACOSTA, JUDGE ROSABELLA TORMIS, JUDGE
EDGEMELO ROSALES, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS (APRIL 2, 2013)
Facts
1) This is an administrative case that stemmed from Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). It was found out by the judicial audit team that there were alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.
2) Apparently, certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators"
for instant marriages by the judges of the mentioned courts.
The Office of the Court Administrator therefore recommended the dismissal of the respondent
judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of the others accused.
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or
gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of
dismissal from service?
Held: The Judges were all found to be guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they
solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the
Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the
solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made
under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted
pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year
period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated
to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. Further,
according to the Family Code, the absence of a marriage license will render a marriage void ab
initio. The judges in this case solemnized without following the requirements laid down by the
law. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add
even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a
license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
TOPIC: ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE

RELEVANT PROVISION: (A RT. 35 FC)
GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN
GR No. 201061 | July 3, 2013, | CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. (Benjamin) and Azucena Alegre (Azucena) were married and had three
children. However, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan
(Sally). Shortly after Azucena left for the US, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife and signed a purported marriage contract despite Sallys knowledge of Benjamins prior
marriage. Sally promised Benjamin that the marriage contract entered would not be registered.
When the relationship between Sally and Benjamin ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with
her their two children. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin using their simulated marriage contract as an evidence.
Accordingly, Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid.
HELD: No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982,
the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. . .Oliveros further testified that
the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin
and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. . .The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made
only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from
expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by
the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and
void ab initio and non-existent.
Requisites for a valid marriage

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LlBERTY D. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 | 2013-10-16
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC was of the view that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception. CA affirmed.
Issue: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
Ruling:
Under Article 2 of the Family Code for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. But consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration
laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 4 7 (3 ),
the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case,
there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
is DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit.
TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
RELEVANT PROVISION: Art. 26
Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan- Lee

GR No. 183622 | 08 FEBRUARY 2012 | SERENO, J.
FACTS:
Orlando Catalan (Orlando), a naturalized American citizen, was married to Felicitas Amor
(Felicitas). While in the US, Orlando divorced Felicitas and married Merope Catalan (Merope).
Upon Orlandos death, Merope instituted an intestate proceeding praying that she be appointed
the administratix of Orlandos intestate estate. Louella Catalan-Lee (Louella), Orlandos
daughter from first marriage, opposed the petition on the ground that Merope is not a party-ininterest as she was charged with bigamy -- Merope is married to Eusebio before marrying
Orlando. RTC ruled that Merope is not married to Esuebio but since the divorce decree in the US
is not recognized in the Philippines, the marriage of Orlando and Merope is void. Thus, Merope
is not an interested party, not being validly married to Orlando. The CA affirmed RTCs
decision.
ISSUE: W/N the foreign divorce decree obtained by Orlando may be recognized in the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes. under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio, to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES

RELEVANT PROVISIONS: (A RT. 26, 35 FC)
FUJIKI V. MARINAY
GR No. 196049 | June 26, 2013, | CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Minoro Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national, married Maria Paz Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines. Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and the two eventually lost contact
with each other. Thereafter, Marinay remarried another Japanese national but claimed she was
being maltreated. She contacted Fujiki and re-established their relationship. Fujiki sought the
judgment from Japanese Courts for nullity of Marinays second marriage on the ground of
bigamy which the Japan Court granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage). RTC dismissed the petition based on Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
which provides that only the husband or wife may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
HELD: No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. . .
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. . .
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,
the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. . .
ISSUE: W/N Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD: Yes. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
ISSUE: W/N RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE

Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Janeth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon vs. Ma. Lourdes Belen, for
and in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
Facts:
On September 12, 1994, herein respondent in behalf of her daughter filed a petition for letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas concerning both the personal and
real properties left behind by the deceased Eliseo. In her petition, Elise attached a copy of her
birth certificate duly signed by Eliseo as the father. Additionally, the petition seeks to impugn the
marriage of the deceased with the petitioner Amelia for being bigamous as the marriage between
Eliseo and petitioner was contracted while she still had a subsisting marriage to Filipito Sandico.
In response, the petitioners claim that the venue of the petition was improper as evidenced by the
death certificate of Eliseo showing that he was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pinas at
the time of his death. They argued that in accordance with Sec. 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for the settlement of the decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac.
Thus they claimed that there is no factual and legal basis for the respondent to be appointed
administratix.
In the decision issued by the Regional Trial Court, it directed the issuance of the Letters
of Administration prayed for by the respondent herein. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC in saying that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife in Las Pinas from 1975 up to the time of the formers death in 1992. Additionally the
CA also affirmed the finding that the marriage between Eliseo and Amelia was indeed bigamous
and therefore void ab initio. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
with the Supreme Court, among the issues raised by the petitioners in their appeal is the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia void ab initio.
Issue: Is the marriage of the Eliseo and Amelia void ab initio?

Held: Yes, the Supreme Court held that there was indeed sufficient basis established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage, issued by the Diocese of Tarlac, signed by the officiating priest
of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino, the marriage certificate was considered by the court as
competent evidence of marriage, along with the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the
entries therein. The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago and the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
In this regard the Supreme Court adds that in a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. Therefore it was proper for Elise, as a compulsory heir, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, to impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it
as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
case at bar.
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, COMPLAINANT, VS. LOURDES TAJOLOSA

CIPRIANO, RESPONDENT. (OCTOBER 22 2012).
Facts
1) During the subsistence of Lourdes Ciprianos marriage with Socrates, she married Silverio
Cipriano. This lead to her filing a petition for annulment of marriage with Socrates on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC ruled in Lourdes
favour and declared her marriage with Socrates null and void in 2003.
2) In 2004, petitioner, Merlinda Montanez, Silverios daughter from the first marriafe, filed with
the MTC of Laguna a complaint for bigamy against Lourdes. She alleged that Lourdes failed to
reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
3) Respondent argued that since her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab
initio, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on 1983.
Issue: Whether the annulment of respondents first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity justifies the dismissal of the information for bigamy against her?
Held: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (Mercado v Tan). Even if the
accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled
(Abunado v People). The moment that the accused contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first
marriage which had not been declared null and void in a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting (Jarillo v. People).
In other words, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage.
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGIGAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC V. ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022 | January 9, 2013 | BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Cesar and Lolita Encelan were married on August 1979. They were blessed with two children.
On May 1984, Cesar left for work to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Cesar learned sometime on 1986
that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez while he was in Saudi. On
1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Cesar
instituted with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage
based on Lolitas psychological incapacity on 1995.
One of the evidences presented by Cesar was the psychological evaluation report on Lolita
prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found
that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable
to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";her
"transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as
well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship." RTC ruled
that Lolita was psychologically incapacitated. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Art 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: No. In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations";not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence
(i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar
testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment
of their home, as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he
learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and
her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesars
allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.
TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Danilo A. Aurelio vs. Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio
G.R. No. 175367
June 06, 2011
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio was married on March
23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002,
respondent filed with the Quezon City RTC, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. In her petition, she alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and
even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of
financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his
working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His
moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance
of the family. On the other side of the coin, the wife is described as being effusive and displays
her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to
despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She
was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity
to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their
marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Danilo principally
argues that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set
by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC
denied the petition. CA affirmed.
Issue: Did the court violate the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the facts in
Molina Doctrine are sufficient to grant the Petition for nullification of marriage?
Held: No, the decision was reaffirmed. It is the petitioners contention that the petition failed to
comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the noncomplied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
The Court held that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly
and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. That it should be interpreted on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by

decisions of church tribunals.
In disproving petitioners argument the Court held that first, contrary to his assertion, the root
cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The Court agreed with
the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent
were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. There was
even a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleges that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as
to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, the Court also held that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were
alleged in the petition. As can be observed from the totality of the petition, respondents
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa vs. Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011
Corona, C.J.
Facts:
Jose and Bona were married. The former is a member and an officer of the AFP, thus he was
often assigned to different parts of the Philippines. However, Jose was charged with rebellion
for his alleged participation in the failed coup dtat and was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Petitioner was not aware of his wifes unfaithfulness, who was having an affair with petitioners
driver. When petitioner learned of such illicit affair, he confronted respondent and his driver,
who in turn confessed to the deed. This resulted to Jose casting out Bona from their living
quarters, together with their adopted child, Ramona, who eventually left respondent and returned
to her adopted father.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was then filed by petitoner, seeking to nullify his
marriage to respondent on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. Despite service of summons, Bona failed to file her answer,
even before the prosecutor for the investigation of the existence of collusion. During the trial,
one of the witnesses presented was Dr. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after
conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder, and that her extra marital affair was an outlet for her to seek
attention and emotional support from other persons, not her husband, that leads to believe that
the respondent is not capable of fulfilling the basic responsibilites in a marriage.
According to Rondain, respondent's psychological disorder was traceable to her family history,
as her father was a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was
no possibility of a cure since the respondent did not have any insight of what is happening to her
and refused to acknowledge such facts. The RTC, in its decision granted the petition, while on
appeal to the CA it was reversed, hence the current petition before the Court.
Issue: Was the respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
Held: No, The Supreme Court affirms the reversal made by the CA. It was apparent that
Respondent had no manifest desire to abandon Petitioner at the beginning of their marriage and
was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973. It was only when
petitioner casted her out that she was really away from conjugal home. The Court held that the
record shows that, on the contrary, it was the petitioner who was constantly away from Bona by
reason of his military duties and his later incarceration.
It was also reasonable for respondent to refuse accompanying petitioner on his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao as they were known conflict areas in the seventies. Also
any doubt as to respondents desire to live with the petitioner was eliminated by the fact that she
lived with him in the conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. Lastly, the
badges of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, namely her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to
petitioner and not to the inception of the said marriage.

Rosalino L. Marable vs. Myrna F. Marable
G.R. No. 178741
January 17, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts:
The petitioners in this case were married. However, as the years went by, their marriage turned
sour which resulted to frequent quarrels. When petitioner could not bear anymore his relationship
with the respondent, he decided to leave the family home and then converted to Islam after
dating several women.
Petitioner then decided to sever his marital bonds with the respondent, prompting him to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with the latter on the ground that he is
psychological incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marital life. In his petition, he
averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at
an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven
other children. This caused his mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, he became
obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed. Petitioner further
alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined.
He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior
Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he
alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his
relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a
clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that
petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive
pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack
of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep
feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so
self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
RTC in its decision found for petitioner and granted the petition on grounds of psychological
incapacity. On appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General, the CA reversed the RTC decision,
hence this petition.
Issue: Is petitioners Antisocial Personality Disorder, tantamount to psychological incapacity
which will justify as grounds for his petition of nullification of his marriage with Myrna?
Held: No, the Supreme Court affirms the CA. The Court said that the CA was correct when it
held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity. The petitioner completely relied on the psychological
examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result
of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish
petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage.
The Court held that the term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he
or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

Cynthia E. Yambao vs. Republic of the Philippines and Patricio E. Yambao
G.R. No. 184063
January 24, 2011
Nachura, J.
Facts:
After 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed before the RTC of Makati, a petition praying that her
marriage, to private respondent, be declared void by reason of the latters psychological
incapacity. Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only
one who earned a living and took care of the children. Her husband, she alleges, did nothing but
eat and sleep all day, and spend time with his friends. She also claims that, Patricio became
insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see her talking to other people,
even to her relatives. It was when her husband started threatening to kill her that she decided to
leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who
concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. In answering his wifes petition, private respondent denied all the
allegations therein.
In resolving the issue in favor of the respondent, the RTC said that there was failure on the part
of the petitioner to substantiate her claims. Also the RTC took into account that despite the utter
irresponsibility of the respondent, he and petitioner were able to raise their children to adulthood,
got along with the petitioners parents and their marriage lasted well up to thirty years. On
Appeal to the CA the RTC decision was affirmed, additionally it held that petitioner failed to
show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support
his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures
were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered psychological
incapacity as contemplated under the law. This now resulted in the appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Does the totality of the evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage?
Held: No, the Supreme Court denies the petition and affirms the CA. The Court held that there
was no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he
was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent's efforts,
though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his
family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his
own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear
is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many
failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Even in the psychological report of Dr. Tolentino it was never explained how the alleged
psychological incapacity manifested and if was present during the instance of marriage. All the
report stated was "because one's personality or character is formed early in life, it has a clear
ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the
expectations of the individual's culture," That respondent, according to petitioner, "lacked
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility" does equate to the incapability to meet
marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures,
and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty,
but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.
Lastly, the Court held that article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a

spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child,
Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, respondent Fernandez left the conjugal
home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, petitioner Kalaw started living with
Jocelyn, and they had three more children. In 1990, he went to the United States with Jocelyn
and their children.
It was on July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation, that petitioner filed for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleges that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleges the following:
1) She leaves the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all
day and all night;
2) She leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the
following day; and
3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw
half-naked in the hotel room.
Petitioner then presented Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Gerard Healy, S.J., to testify on respondents psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that
respondent Fernandez was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder and that it may have
been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated her ego to the point that she gave priority
to her needs, while that of her kids and her husbands became secondary. The RTC in its
decision granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio in accordance
with article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the RTC was reversed
and the CA held that both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their
immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most,
there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
Issue: Was the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent proven with the evidence
presented by the petitioner?
Held: No, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA in reversing the RTC. The
presented testimonies of the two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
The Court held that the evidence does not support the claim by the petitioner that respondent was
a mah-jong addict, as even the children testified to this. Also unproven was petitioners claim about
respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. The same also goes for the respondents alleged sexual infidelity was also
not proven because, Mario who was presented to testify on this matter only said that she only
appeared to be dating other men.
The Court even goes further by stating that, assuming the respondent had an extramarital affair
with another man; sexual infidelity per se cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men, it may be a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
Psychological Incapacity
Republic v. Quintos, G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16 1977. They were not able to have a child due to
Catalinas hysterectomy following her 2nd miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Catalinas psychological incapacity.
Catalina did not object to the petition. She only prayed to be given her share in the conjugal
residence. The public prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.
Eduardo testified that Catalina: (1) always left their house without his consent, (2) engaged in
petty arguments with him, (3) constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs, (4) spent most of
her time gossiping with the neighbors instead of doing her chores and caring for their adopted
daughter, (5) squandered his remittances as an OFW in gambling, and (6) abandoned their
conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
Eduardo presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation Dr. Reyes conducted on Catalina.
Dr. Reyes opined that Catalinas immaturity was due to an untreatable Borderline Personality
Disorder, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina
did not appear during the trial. Instead, she submitted her Answer where she: (1) admitted her
psychological incapacity, (2) insisted that she only had one live-in partner, (3) denied leaving the
conjugal home without Eduardos consent and flirting with different men, and (4) refused to give
up her share in the conjugal residence.
Considering Dr. Reyes evaluation as the best evidence, the RTC granted Eduardos petition and
declared their marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code because Catalinas infidelity,
more time for friends than family and her incessant gambling constituted psychological
incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that the existence of Catalinas
psychological was not proven. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
The Republic appealed and argued that: (1) marital unfaithfulness and gambling habit are not
symptoms of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, (2) Catalinas
ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear her
own children, (3) the neuropsychiatric evaluation and testimony of Dr. Reyes failed to establish
the cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas incapacity nor its existence at the inception of
marriage because Dr. Reyes did not exert effort to look into Catalinas history, and (4)
abandonment of ones family is only a ground for legal separation under Article 55 (10) of the
Family Code.
ISSUE/S:
WON the evidence presented were sufficient to warrant the declaration of nullity of Eduardos
marriage to Catalina based on the latters psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD:
No. The evidence presented were insufficient to warrant the declaration of nullity of Eduardos
marriage to Catalina based on the latters psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RATIO:
The case of Republic v. CA (Molina) provides the guidelines to determine whether or not one of
the spouses or both spouses have psychological incapacity. The case of Santos v. CA provides
that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code.
In the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the court held that there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitates the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations. This natal or supervening factor should be an adverse integral element
in the personality structure. Mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or immaturity are insufficient.
In the case at bar, the RTC and CA were liberal in appreciating Eduardos self-serving evidence
which did not conform to the guidelines. Also, Dr. Reyes evaluation: (1) was vague about the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas alleged psychological incapacity, (2) failed to
specify which of Catalinas acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and (3) lacked depth and objectivity as she only interviewed Catalina once and did
not personally seek out and meet with other persons who could help support Eduardos
allegation. Catalinas sexual infidelity was not proven to be a manifestation of a disordered
personality that made her completely unable to discharge her marital duties.
Hence, the only fact established was Catalinas abandonment of the conjugal home to live with
another man. Yet, this is not one of the grounds to nullify a marriage. It is however a ground for
legal separation under Article 55 (10) of the Family Code which provides that a petition for legal
separation may be filed on (among other grounds) abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than a year.
NOTE: Compare FC 101 (3) with Separation in Fact
Article 101 (3) of the Family Code provides A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when s/he has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left
the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention or
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
This provision refers to real abandonment, and not mere separation. Abandonment implies a
departure with the avowed intent to never return, followed by prolonged absence without just
cause, and without providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. There must be
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. This is not justifiable separation, therefore the spouse who left cannot demand
separate maintenance from the abandoned spouse.
On the other hand, Separation in Fact is actual and a justified separation. This may be caused by
the fact that one spouse maltreats the other. In this case, the abandoned spouse is obligated to
give separate maintenance to the spouse who left.

DEATH
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512 | JUNE 13, 2012 | SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) and Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) were married on March 1993.
They were blessed with a son. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Despite efforts to
locate him, Yolanda claimed she had not received any communication from her husband. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no
avail.
After nine years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
with the RTC Lipa City. On February 2005, the RTC declated Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and
thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied.
The OSG then elevated the appeal to CA. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a
summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code.
HELD: Yes. Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code. . .[t]aken together, Articles 41, 238, 247
and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
ISSUE: W/N present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that
the absent spouse is already dead to grant the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death.
HELD: No. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello
Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved
by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of
life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as
it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

DEATH
RELEVANT PROVISION: (A RT. 41 (2)FC)
REPUBLIC V. NARCEDA
G.R. No. 182760 | APRIL 10, 2012 | SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS:
Robert P. Narceda (Roberto) and Marina were married on 22 July 1987. The Marriage Contract
he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4
months old.
Roberto argues that Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since. There
was never any communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her.
Several years after she left, one of their town mates came home from Singapore and told Roberto
that Marina was already living with a Singaporean husband.
Roberto filed with the RTC a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or
absence of Marina which was granted. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed to the CA. OSG contends that Roberto failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded"
belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and that the
judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and
executory.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code is appealable.
HELD: No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not
an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari. . .
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As
a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was
not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief
that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.

Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 191425,
September 07, 2011
Carpio, J.
Facts:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora (fist wife) was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her
husband of two years, the accused herein, had another wife. Upon her return to the Philippines,
she confirmed that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain
Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001. On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor
Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P.
Geraldino for the crime of Bigamy.
In his defense, the accused now claims that he, before contracting the two marriages, was already
converted into Muslim, thereby, no such case of bigamy could be filed against him as he allowed
to have more than one wife.
On the other hand, co-accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She
claimed that she does not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She
insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and
a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim
convert, she and he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
The RTC in its decision, stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy:
Article 41(7) of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180(8) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. Accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with
the provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both
marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused
entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private
complainant. What is clear, therefore, is that a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case and
affirmed the RTC decision finding the accused guilty of bigamy.
Issue: Was the second marriage bigamous?
Held: Yes, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA and the RTC. The Supreme Court
held that bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second
marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married
to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3) that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Atilano due to his prior marriage.
The Court also held that the second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines that provides:
"[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted
to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or
wives, and should any of them objects; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage,
the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether or not to sustain her objection (Art.
162, Muslim Personal Laws)
The accused asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single."
Both of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood
of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage,
his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. These false declarations about his
civil status are thus further compounded by these omissions.
TOPIC: BIGAMY/ PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY
TISMO-CAPILI (JULY 3 2013)
Facts:
1) On June 8, 2004, James Walter Capili was charged with the crime of Bigamy for his
subsequent marriage with Shirley Tismo Capili even though he was still validly married with
Karla Medina Capili
2) James filed a petition to suspend proceedings stating that there is a pending case regarding the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of bigamy, and the result of that case may exculpate
him from the criminal charge of bigamy.
Issue: Whether or not the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage is a
prejudicial question?
Held: No. The criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the
second marriage with private respondent. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. The Supreme Court further held that the parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage may risk
being charged with the crime of bigamy.

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, VS. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN (JULY 17, 2013)
Facts:
1) The respondent married Jasmin Modina on July 2 1980. On October 28, 1993, respondent
married another woman, Eleanor A. Alagon.
2) Around August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. This was
granted by the RTC of Pasig City which declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for
lack of a valid marriage license.
3) Meanwhile, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon found out that
respondent previously married Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit alleging that there
was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon charging respondent with
Bigamy.
4) Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts
do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. An information was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent court judgment declaring respondents first marriage void,
filed even before contracting the second marriage, extinguishes the criminal liability of bigamy?
Held: No. The Supreme Court had already held in cases such as Montaez v. Cipriano, Teves v.
People, and Antone v. Beronilla that a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases
that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be take
the law into their hands and be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Further, it is also settled that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.
BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS
PER CURIAM: A.C. No. 6622
July 10, 2012
FACTS:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for
nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while
respondents first marriage was subsisting.
On the charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent,
contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in
the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in
Ermita, Manila.
Respondent informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion and with Pilar Lozano In both petitions, he
claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the
NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different
occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
Issue: Whether respondent committed bigamy to warrant his disbarment?
Ruling:
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women aside from his
wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death
of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent
has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein
treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any
grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton
disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to
take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions. What has been clearly established
here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.
Bigamous marriage
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L.
MACARUBBO, Respondent.
Adm. Case No. 6148
January 22, 2013
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
Facts:
The Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a
bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine
Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted
gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution. Eight years after, respondent filed
the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the
Roll of Attorneys
The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and
accordingly, denied it for lack of merit. The same petition was endorsed to this Court by the
Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive
merits of the case.
Issue: WON the petition should be granted.
Held: Yes. Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in
the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein
attached pictures. Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his
ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the
Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to
date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas
College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in sociocivic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office; (5) Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; (6) Certification
from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan; (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T.
Tuddao; (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; (9) Certification from the
Office of the Provincial Assessor; (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca
Multi-Purpose Cooperative; and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior
Citizens, Enrile Chapter. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has
no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office while the Office of the Human Resource
Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case. He is not known to be
involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev.
Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines
of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal
that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however,
reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid
standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are
continuing requirements.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law. 1 He is, however,
reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid
standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are
continuing requirements.
TOPIC: BIGAMY/ SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE

YASUO IWASAWA VS. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN
ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY (SEPTEMBER 11, 2013)
Facts
1) Yasuo, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to
the Philippines. The latter introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." They
both got married on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple lived in
Japan.
2) In July 2009, petitioner found out that the respondent had already been married before when
she revealed that she received word that her husband had passed away. Indeed, it was confirmed
by the petitioner that she was married to Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo. Petitioner thus filed a
petition for the declaration of his marriage on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one.
3) In the lower court, it was held that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondents prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered
the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified
about said marriage. The RTC chose not to believe the petitioners testimony because he had no
personal knowledge of private respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death.
Issue: Whether a judicial declaration of nullity is needed before a second marriage can be
contracted?
Held: Yes. It has been consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Further, the NSO documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits have
proven the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the
City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner
on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that
Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondents
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was
still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
TOPIC:PROPERTY RELATIONS
Elenita M. Dewara, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes vs. Sps. Ronnie
and Gina Lamela and Stenile Alvero
G.R. No. 179010
April 11, 2011
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married
before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations.
Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United
States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to (3)
months, and to pay civil indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos
and Seventy Centavos (P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Petitioners husband,
but was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name.
It was then that respondent Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy
on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand Four
Hundred Forty (1,440) square meters (sq m), under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T80054, in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo
Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of
the lot in the name of petitioner were done while she was away on work. Thus, petitioner Elenita,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case to annul the sale of the
said property and for damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff before the RTC
of Bacolod City. She claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was erroneous and
illegal because the said property was her paraphernal and should not be made to answer for the
personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she
received no notice of the execution sale. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, while on appeal
the CA reversed, hence this petition.
Issue: Is the subject property paraphernal in nature or is it considered as conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo?
Held: The property was considered by the Supreme Court as one that belonged to petitioner and
her husband, thus conjugal in nature. It is not disputed that the subject property was acquired by
spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. Also undisputed was the fact that their
marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married
before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to
their property relations.
The Court held that the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot
in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by
strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. This
petitioner failed to do as there was no other evidence that would convince the Court of the
paraphernal character of the property. Petitioner proffered no evidence of the market value or
assessed value of the subject property in 1975.
Finally, the Court held that in this case, it is just and proper that Respondent be compensated for
the serious physical injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle
that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said
criminal case. Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardos liability. Nevertheless,
their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property
in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case
No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita
and Eduardo, but not before the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code
have been complied with.
TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA AND OFELIA FORTALEZA VS. SPOUSES RAUL
LAPITAN AND RONA LAPITAN (AUGUST 15 2012)
Facts
1) Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses
Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest
per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los
Baos, Laguna.
2) When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties,
the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage.
3) At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged
as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a Certificate
of Sale which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City.
4) The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on
November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation of the old TCT and the registration of the
subject property in their names under a new TCT. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza
refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property.
5) The spouses Fortaleza maintain that the subject property is a family home exempt from forced
sale. Hence, in the spirit of equity and following the rulings in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals and
De los Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court should allow them to exercise the right
of redemption even after the expiration of the one-year period.
Issue: Whether or not the property is indeed a family home and should be be exempt from forced
sale even past the redemption period of one year?
Held: Spouses Fortalezas argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because
it is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt
from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from
forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.
Presumption of CPG
Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married
before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations.
Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United
States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City. On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while
driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie).
Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTCC and it became final and executor. The writ of execution on
the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no
property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on
Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand Four
Hundred Forty under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of
"ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of
Bacolod City," to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a
notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the
execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a
certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the decision
against Eduardo. Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal
because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to
answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the
property, she received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the annulment of the sale and
the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses. On the other
hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner
Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the
time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in
the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any
objection pending the levy on execution of the property. On September 2, 1999, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and declared the sale null and void. The RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property.
First, it was sold to her by her father and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot.
Second, the minimal and inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the
purpose of helping her expand her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was
essentially a donation and was therefore gratuitous in character. Having declared that the
property was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of
Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
(1)WON the property is Conjugal or exclusive.
(2) If conjugal WON it can be used to indemnify the victim of the criminal case.
HELD: It is an conjugal property, thus it can be subject to indemnification as explained in the
RATIO.
RATIO: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between
the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The
lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. There is no dispute that the
subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also
undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since
they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal
nature of the property applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is
conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence
there must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it. However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is
the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may
automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or
indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the
conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and
obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to
the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the
property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership
assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been
covered.In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical
injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was
registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she
may not be compelled to answer for Eduardos liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name.
What are included in CPG
Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
FACTS: In 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment
of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag
Branch. The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the RTC of Laoag City. The
averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of
P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch in 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch in 1978. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella
Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the
mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that
her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the
benefit of the family. In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees own acts of omission/connivance that
bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment
and prescription.
In 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners. PNB filed its Notice of
Appeal of the trial courts decision and paid the corresponding fees. In 2005, the appellate court
rendered its Decision and granted PNBs appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial courts
decision, and dismissed petitioners complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
(1): WON the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
(2): WON Aguete consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the subject property.
(3): WON the husband can alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The loan was used for the expansion of the familys business. Therefore, the debt
obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.
(2): Yes. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert,
who could authoritatively declare that Aguetes signatures were really forged.
(3): No. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife.
RATIO:
(1): The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is
thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code
provide:
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common
property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she
may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property
of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife,
and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional working
[capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros
engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also
aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within
the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if
in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
(2): The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they
are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law
may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The execution of
a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial
of the alleged signer. PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners omission to present other
positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners cause. Petitioners
did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could
authoritatively declare that Aguetes signatures were really forged.
(3): Art. 166 states that unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of
the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article
173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the
contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject property.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Orpiano v. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611, Jan. 14, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Estrella Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their conjugal
estate is a lot in Quezon City. In 1979, a decision was rendered declaring Estrella an
absent/absentee spouse and granting Alejandro the authority to sell the lot. The said decision was
annotated on the back of the lots TCT.
In March 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses Antonio and
Myrna Tomas. A new TCT was issued right after the sale despite not having paid the full price.
Eventually, Alejandro filed a collection case in the RTC for the balance with damages. During
the pendency of the case, Alejandro died. His heirs, Estrella included, were substituted in his
stead in the collection case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint to one of
rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title. But both were denied.
In June 2005, Estrella filed a civil case for the annulment of the March 1996 sale and
cancellation of the TCT. In her complaint, she claimed that Alejandro obtained the 1979
declaration of her absence and accompanying authority to sell the lot through misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit, adding that said decision was not published as required by law. Thus, the
declaration of absence and Alejandro's authority to sell the lot are null and void. Consequently,
the issuance of a new TCT to the spouses Tomas should be cancelled. Tomas spouses prayed for
dismissal on the ground of forum shopping as the filing of the annulment case Estrella's attempt
at securing a remedy which she could not obtain in the collection case.
In September 2006, the trial court dismissed the annulment case. In December 2006, Estrella
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the September 2006 decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision: a final judgment in the collection case
ordering the Tomas spouses to pay the supposed balance of the price will necessarily result in a
finding that the sale between Alejandro and the Tomas spouses is a valid sale. This then would
prevent a declaration of nullity of the sale in the annulment case.
Estrella argues that it was Alejandro and not she who initiated the collection case, and that she,
their two children, and Alejandro's four illegitimate children were merely substituted in the case
as his heirs by operation of law; thus, she should not be bound by the collection case. She claims
that in the first place, she was not privy to Alejandro's sale of the lot to the Tomas spouses.
Having been unwillingly substituted in the collection case, she forthwith moved to amend the
complaint in order to include, as one of the remedies sought therein, annulment of the sale
insofar as her conjugal share in the lot is concerned. But the court denied her motion.
Estrella then moved to be dropped or stricken out as plaintiff to the collection case, but again, the
trial court rebuffed her. Estrella maintains that on account of these repeated denials, she was left
with no other alternative but to institute the annulment case. She claims that since the collection
case does not further her interest which is to seek annulment of the sale and recover her
conjugal share and the collection court would not grant her motions to amend and to be
dropped or stricken out as party plaintiff therein, she thus has a right to maintain a suit to have
the sale annulled.
ISSUE/S: WON Estrellas interests in the conjugal properties be safeguarded and treated
separately from that of her husbands because she neither consented nor would be benefited by
her husbands action.
HELD: No. Estrellas interests in the conjugal properties cannot be safeguarded and treated
separately from that of her husbands because she neither consented nor would be benefited by
her husbands action.
RATIO: Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with
judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case
should be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was
fashioned to preclude. If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment
case, proceeds to finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered; an unfair situation, as envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after having
paid the balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and
return of the property could be decreed by the annulment court. Besides, allowing the two cases
to remain pending makes litigation simply a game of chance where parties may hedge their
position by betting on both sides of the case, or by filing several cases involving the same issue,
subject matter, and parties, in the hope of securing victory in at least one of them.
The Court realizes the quandary that Estrella motivated by the solitary desire to protect her
conjugal share in the lot from what she believes was Alejandro's undue interference in disposing
the same without her knowledge and consent finds herself in. While raring to file the
annulment case, she has to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by
necessity substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandro's heir; but the collection court
nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward such end. The collection court failed to comprehend
her predicament, her need to be dropped as party to the collection case in order to pursue the
annulment of the sale.
As plaintiff in the collection case, Estrella though merely succeeding to Alejandro's rights
was an indispensable party, or one without whom no final determination can be had in the
collection case. 12 Strictly, she may not be dropped from the case. However, because of her dual
identity, first as heir and second as owner of her conjugal share, she has been placed in the
unique position where she has to succeed to her husband's rights, even as she must protect her
separate conjugal share from Alejandro's perceived undue disposition. She may not seek to
amend the cause of action in the collection case to one for annulment of sale, because this
adversely affects the interests of her co-heirs, which is precisely to obtain payment of the
supposed balance of the sale price.
TOPIC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. No. 195670 | DECEMBER3, 2012 | PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, married in 1980. After several years, the
RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Consequently, Beumer filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership praying for the distribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Beumer testified that while four other lots were were registered in the name of Amores, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.
ISSUE:W/N Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the purchase of the real
properties subject to the dissolution proceedings.
HELD: No. The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation
of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim
for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner
Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that
Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
the subject properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable
intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who
has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful.
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he
likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently,
these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
TOPIC: CONJUGAL VS. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY

Antonia R. De la Pena and Alvin John B. De la Pena vs. Gemma Remilyn C. Avila and Far East
Bank and Trust Co.
G.R. No. 187490
February 8, 2012
Carpio, J.
Facts:
The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the improvements
thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R.
Dela Pea, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
On 7 May 1996, Petitioner obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
P250,000 with interest pegged at 5% per month. She then executed a promissory note and a
notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the
payment of the loan obligation. On November 4, 1997, petitioner executed a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila, for the stated
consideration of P600,000.00. Utilizing the document, respondent caused the cancellation of
TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT No.337834 of the Marikina City Registry of
Deeds, naming her as the owner of the subject realty. Respondent then constituted a real estate
mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit
of P1,200,000.
The petitioners now filed an adverse claim on the subject parcel of land with Antonia claiming
that she is the true owner of the said property. Then on May 18, 1998, petitioner and her son,
Alvin John B. Dela Pea, filed against respondent a complaint for annulment of deed of sale
docketed before Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City. Claiming that the
subject realty was conjugal property, the Dela Peas alleged, among other things, that the May 7,
1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Petitioner, Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not
consented to by her husband who had, by then, already died.
The RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the
property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was
acquired during Antonias marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are
upheld as valid and binding, hence the petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Was the Court of Appeals correct in its decision stating that the property is not part of the
congujal properties by the spouses De la Pena?
Held: Yes, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA. The Court held that the nature of
the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
Petitioners sale thereof in favor of the respondent, for lack of the liquidation required under
Article 130 of the Family Code. Furthermore it was observed by the Court that petitioner
Antonia, treated the realty as her own exclusive property in fact, it was apparent from her
utilization thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
Furthermore the Court held that proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who
asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. The presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal, was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a
strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. This, petitioners failed to do, as they
only presented their own bare and uncorroborated assertions.
Finally, on the issue of the phrase married to in the title, the Court in the case of Ruiz vs. CA
holds that such a phrase is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible
that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her
marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. Since
there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in
the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging
exclusively to said spouse.

PARTNERSHIP
PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE
G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012| ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others of murder before
RTC Surigao. The RTC acquitted Efren but found Melecia and another person guilty and
sentenced them to death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally, 50,000 as civil indemnity, 50,000 each as moral damages, and
150,000 actual damages.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua.
The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution by the
heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in
the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
ISSUE: W/N the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Yes. The Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the
conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed
on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121
of the Family Code have been covered. . .
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of
those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of
liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid
for the purposes above-mentioned."

PARTNERSHIP
Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico L Lindo Jr. and Edna C. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984
April 13, 2011
Carpio, J.
Facts:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained P400,000 from Petitioner payable on December
1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To
secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in her name
and that of her husband. She then issued three checks as partial payments for the loan which
were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for
Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents.
In its 2003 decision, the RTC (Br. 33) held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her husbands
consent and that the Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after the
Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan
from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner then filed a complaint for
Sum of Money with damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42. Respondents
admitted their loan but only in the amount of 340,000 pesos. They then moved for the dismissal
on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch 42 denied the
motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies:
either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but
not both
Issue: Was the issuance of the promissory note and deed of mortgage void?
Held: No, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
xxx
Article 124 of the Family Code applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on
October 31, 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on November 4, 1995. The
execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as
a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.

LIABILITIES
QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556 | July 4, 2012 | REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Rita Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody
of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to respective legitimes of the children and payment of the unpaid
conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because he is the offending spouse. After more than 9 months from the
promulgation of decision, petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for clarification, asking RTC
to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder
of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and
the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right
to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.
Brigido claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Art. 129 of the Family Code, instead
of Article 102. He argues that Art. 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUE: W/N Brigidos vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to
Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
HELD: No. Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community
regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared,
listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of
each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate
properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its
net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between
the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first find the market
value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the
market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,
which then results to the net profits. . . .Since both husband and wife have no separate
properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between
them is simply the net profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial
court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article
102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining net
profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family Code
applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for
under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her
own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. . . In the
instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered
part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

LIABILITIES
Alain M. Dino vs. Maria Caridad Dino
G.R. No. 178044

January 19, 2011
Carpio, J.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in
1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, they decided to live together again. Then in
1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. It was in 2001, that
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against the respondent, Caridad,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Extrajudicial service of
summons was sent to the respondent who was already living in the States. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not answer to the petition. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed
a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with him, which was granted by the Superior
Court of California on 2001. Petitioner also learned that respondent is already married to a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, long-lasting and incurable.
In its 2006 Decision, the court granted the petition, but ordered that the decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall issue only after liquidation of the properties of the parties. Petitioner appealed
this decision.
Issue: Did the trial court made a mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
Held: Yes, the Decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, but it also modified the same. The
Court also held that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of
the trial courts decision /without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. This is because petitioners marriage to
respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
The Court held that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, when read together with section 50 of the
Family Code applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code
does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the same Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

LIABILITIES
Eric U. Yu vs. Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio and Caroline T. Yu
GR. No. 189207
June 15, 2011
Velasco Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against private respondent, Caroline T. Yu
with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that petitioners
partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain
exhibits have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties. On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
The petitioner opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations. He also added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both
proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner. It was then that
private respondent caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to
another branch presided by the Respondent Judge.
While the case was being tried by the respondent Judge, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on
nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously.
To this the petitioner opposed. Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that
the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are
merely ancillary incidents thereto. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the
respondent Judge. Petitioner then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. The CA then
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, hence this petition.
Issue: Must the nullity of marriage be submitted for resolution first, before the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations?
Held: No, the Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the CA held that the orders which
were allegedly exercised with grave abuse of discretion were just interlocutory orders; an
interlocutory order is one which does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.
The Court also notes that respondent Judge did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property
relations. The trial judges decision was not one without basis as it finds support in the Court En
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
Sections 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of
judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
The Court in its resolution found that respondent Judge merely deferred the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued this act is undoubtedly consistent
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject
incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment
of marriage is issued. This was what the respondent Judge tried to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the petitioners assertion that ruling
the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous
and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Finally, the Court held that it cannot be said at all that the respondent Judge acted in a capricious
and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE:
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183053
October 10, 2012
Facts:
Decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate. Cristina was survived by her spouse,
Dr. Federico Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by
Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay, who predeceased his parents.
Respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate. Federico filed a
Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no
right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter
as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void. Federico nominated Emilio
III to administer the decedents estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico.
The trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristinas intestate estate.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked
the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
the subject estate, ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and Isabel.
Issue: Who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedents estate.
Held: Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the
estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after
Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after
the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the end in view of distribution to the
heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission and
inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as
it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is
the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to
work as co-administrators of their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her
siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears
hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedents estate to
appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to
facilitate the settlement of a decedents estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without
remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that
the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of
the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Causes for dissolution of ACP
Heirs of Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011
FACTS:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr.. Twenty three years later
Protacio, Jr. executed an Aaffidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr., not him, who had purchased the two parcels of land.
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of
the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the
property to Ester L. Servacio. The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued
Servacio and Rito in the RTC for the annulment of the sale of the property. The petitioners
averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio,
Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money. The
RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr. because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio
(namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had
been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the
law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly
insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the death of one of the spouses terminates absolute community.
(2) WON the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse.
HELD:
(1) Yes, Article 99 of the Family Code states that upon the death of either spouse, absolute
community is terminated.
(2) Yes, Article 126 of the Family Code states that conjugal partnership terminates upon the
death of either spouse.
RATIO:
(1) In the case at bar, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that: "xxx
As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the
final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach
upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is valid." After the death of one of the spouses, in case
it is necessary to sell any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding
obligation of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities
established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale,
transfer, alienation or disposition of said property affected without said formalities shall be null
and void, except as regards the portion that belongs to the vendor as determined in the
liquidation and partition. Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited
only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the particular property involved, but not
to the corpus of the property.
(2) In the case at bar, If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Unions under FC 148

Lacbayan v. Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978.
Despite respondent Bayani Samoy being already married, their relationship developed until
petitioner Betty Lacbayan gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979. During their illicit
relationship, Lacbayan and Samoy, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish
a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period
and were registered Lacbayan and Samoys names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
Eventually their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991, both
parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing
a partition agreement. Initially, respondent Samoy agreed to petitioner Lacbayans proposal that
the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent Samoy. However, when
petitioner Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the
said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. In resolving the issue on ownership, the
RTC decided to give considerable weight to Lacbayans own admission that the properties were
acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA
asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. CA denied the
appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON the court erred in dismissing the case filed by Lacbayan
HELD: No because in an action for partition, the existence of co-ownership must first be
established and the burden of proving the same by preponderance of evidence lies on the party
filing the action or Betty in this case
RATIO: Under Article 148 of the Family Code, only the properties acquired by both parties
during their co-habitation through their actual contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned in common, in proportion to their respective contribution. Thus, mere co-habitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual contribution must
be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that
he/she actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the property. This fact may be
proven in the form of bank account statements and bank transactions as well as testimonial
evidence proving the financial capacity of the party to purchase the property or to contribute to
the purchase of the property.
In this case Lacbayan did not present any evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the
funds used in the purchase of the subject properties came from her own earnings. On the contrary
she presented contradictory evidence when she admitted that the funds used to purchase the
subject properties came from the income of the manpower business which she managed and in
which she only had 3.33% share. Thus in the absence of a clear showing of co-ownership of said
properties, Bettys action for judicial partition has no legal basis. Samoy is really the sole owner
of the disputed properties.
TOPIC: THE FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA AND ERNESTO S. DE MESA VS. SPOUSES
CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. AND MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE AND REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS (JANUARY 16 2012).
Facts
1) This case involves the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa
(Ernesto). Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Claudio) in the amount of P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable
to Claudio. The check was dishonoured upon presentment and the petitioners failed to pay
Claudio. Thus, their property in Bulacan was levied upon which was registered in Aracelis
name. Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
2) It must be noted that the petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984
while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on
the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got
married sometime in January 1987.
3) Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a
certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent ofP5,500.00. However, the petitioners and
Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent.
4) Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero
(Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners and Juanito. In
their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property.
The petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the
subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
5) The petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M)
and other documents under Claudios name with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes
of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is indeed a family home and as such is exempt from
execution?
Held: Yes. The petitioners are correct. However, they are barred from claiming such an
exemption for failure to raise the fact to the Sheriff prior to the sale at public auction. The
following are the rules with regards to the constitution of a family home. First, family residences
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution. Second, family residences constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Third, family residences which were not judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were
existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no
showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the
subject property was a family home.
However, despite the fact that the family home was exempt from execution, this exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The settled
rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Having failed to set up and
prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estops them
from later claiming the said exemption.
TOPIC: FILIATION
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., VS. ELLEN JOHANNE
HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, AND RIGOBERTO GILLERA.
(AUGUST 29 2012).
Facts
1) Petitioner, Makati Shangri-la is being held liable for the murder of its hotel guest, Christian
Fredrik Harper, a Norwegian national. Respondents Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan
Christopher Harper are the widow and son of Christian Harper while Rigoberto Gilera is their
authorized representative in the Philippines. Harpers death was committed by still unknown
malefactors, and was discovered when the latter tried to use his credit cards but to no avail.
2) The alleged widow and son of Harper presented evidence to establish their heirship, namely:
the birth certificate of John Harper, the son, the marriage certificate of Harper and his wife Ellen,
the birth certificate of Christian Harper, the victims son with another woman, Eva, and a
certificate from the Oslo Probate Court that Ellen was married to the victim.
Issue: Whether or not a birth certificate is conclusive proof of filiation?
Held: Yes. However, while, It does not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an
official or public document. In fact, in US v. Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of
births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and
the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized
public officials. Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism such as the one herein
controversy is no longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as official records of birth.
Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical
certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or
a parents admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by
the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be
utilized in the instant case.
Howeve, this case has respondents presenting several documents, like the birth certificates of
Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne
Harper, and the probate court certificate, all of which were presumably regarded as public
documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence sufficed to competently
establish the relationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court.
TOPIC: SUPPORT
LIM LUA V. LUA
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 | June 5, 2013 | VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua and for support pendente lite in the amount of P500,000.00.
Respondent refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as much as 75,000 as support.
RTC ruled that based on the evidence presented the proper amount to be paid should be 11,500.
This was not assailed by any party thus it became final and executory.
Issues once again arose when respondent in complying with its obligation, he deducted from the
amount of support in arrears, the advances given by him representing the value of two expensive
cars he bought for his children plus their maintenance and cost, travel expenses and purchases
through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods.
ISSUE: W/N certain expenses incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears he owes to his wife and children.
HELD: No. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support
pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such
as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence,
the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite.
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance
to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is,
however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while
the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant,
considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity
of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support
fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondents financial resources, it is
but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of
petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as
monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
SUPPORT
ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY
PERLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Mirasol Baring and her then minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a
Complaint for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio
lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was
born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned
them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered
to support Randy.
Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy.
Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his commonlaw wife nor was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him
as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and
exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from respondents.
Mirasol gave birth to Randy. She presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth17 and
Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she
and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. Antonio supplied his name and
birthplace after Erlinda Balmori, the "hilot" who assisted in Mirasols delivery of Randy, went to
his house to solicit the said information. Mirasol also claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied
the date and place of marriage of the parents so that the latter can file the birth certificate
Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of
1981. When shown with Randys Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in
the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the negative.
RTC rendered a Decision ordering Antonio to support Randy. It ruled that Mirasol and
Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with
Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy testified, he categorically declared
Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of
exposing herself to humiliation, shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue.
CA upheld Randys illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate
and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father.
Issue: Whether an order for Antonio to support Randy is proper.

Held: The respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the
order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
Respondents Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is bereft of any
discussion regarding Randys filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the
applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of
Randys birth certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good
proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said
documents do not bear Antonios signature. "Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x x x support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which
provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father.
However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since
the latter had not signed the same. 60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." 61 We also cannot lend
credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside
from Antonios denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as
the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio
indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol
who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof
of Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the
supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent
to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not
the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same
TOPIC: DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

BECKETT V. SARMIENTO
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326| January 30, 2013 | VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Geoffrey Beckett an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett
(Eltesa), a Filipino citizen. Said marriage bore a child ,Geoffrey Beckett, Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.). The
couple were subsequently divorced and by virtue of a compromise agreement, custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. was grabted to Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey consented to have Geoffrey Jr.
stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
Hwever, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr., hence prompted Geoffrey to file a
petition for violation of RA 7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.
During the conference on the application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old,
displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of
Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s outburst,
Judge Sarmiento issued an Order directing Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. For some reason, the
turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett did not materialize.
Hence, Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of the Order. But instead of enforcing
said order, Judge Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. It is Geoffreys main contention that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant
provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it granted
provisional custody over the minor child to the mother despite a previously approved
compromise agreement and order granting custody to the father.
HELD: No. Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his
mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the
legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the
child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential
command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of
custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, "is not permanent and unalterable and can
always be re-examined and adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v.
Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple
reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking
to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense,
then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect
of res judicata.
In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child
under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the childs choice as
to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless the parent
chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in custody cases,
the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no
less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that "in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration."
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise,
the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be
respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a
parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY- BIRTH CERTIFICATE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY
PERALTA, J.: G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013
Facts:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of
Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged
that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her
school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and
passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother.
She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent.The RTC concluded
that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It also
held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person,
especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction.
Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as
"Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion.
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the
Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City
Prosecutors Office. Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible
for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Issue: Whether the failure to implead the indispensable parties in substantial correction in birth
certificate is cured by publication of notice of hearing?
Ruling:
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese
citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she
seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and
notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules
mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in
the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless
may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest
efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure
was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No.
00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction
of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is
NULLIFIED.

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08

CASE DIGESTS IN PERSONS AND

SUBMITTED BY: CELLES, CUA, DE LEMOS, MARONILLA,

TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS

TOPIC: Causes for dissolution of ACP

TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative

TOPIC: HUMAN RELATIONS

TOPIC: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

TOPIC: MARRIAGE LICENSE AND ANNULMENT

TOPIC: SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER V. JUDGE ANATALIO

TOPIC: ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE

Requisites for a valid marriage

Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan- Lee

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE

Issue: Is the marriage of the Eliseo and Amelia void ab initio?

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, COMPLAINANT, VS. LOURDES TAJOLOSA

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGIGAL INCAPACITY

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE

TOPIC: VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE

HELD: No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

TOPIC: BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

TOPIC: BIGAMY/ PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

TOPIC: BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

TOPIC: BIGAMY/ SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE

TOPIC: PROPERTY RELATIONS

Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

TOPIC: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

TOPIC: CONJUGAL VS. PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY

TOPIC: CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL

TOPIC: CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL

TOPIC: LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:

TOPIC: LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND

G.R. No. 178044

TOPIC: LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND

Unions under FC 148

Issue: Whether an order for Antonio to support Randy is proper.

TOPIC: DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

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