Nietzsche Affirmative Morality

Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue
Author(s): Thomas H. Brobjer

Source: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 26 (AUTUMN 2003), pp. 64-78
Published by: Penn State University Press
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Nietzsche's Affirmative
Morality:
An Ethics of Virtue
Thomas H. Brobjer
In
this article I shall
attempt
to
give
a
birds-eye
view of Nietzsche's
ethics,
with
special emphasis
on its affirmative
aspect.
I will also
attempt
to show
that there exists one
relatively simple aspect
of Nietzsche's ethics that has
not been
realized,
but that makes it much more consistent and
comprehensi
ble. In
summary:
Nietzsche's
ethics,
unlike almost all
thinking
about ethics
in the nineteenth
century
and the first half of the twentieth was not act-ori
ented but character- or
person-oriented.
This
kinship
of Nietzsche's affirma
tive ethics with ethics of virtue has not been
realized,
but the interest in ethics
of virtue
during
the last
twenty years
now also makes it easier to
grasp
Nietzsche's ethics.
Let me
begin by summarizing
Nietzsche's
profound critique
of
morality.
One
of the most common dichotomies made in
respect
to moral
judgments
is that
they
must be based on either the
consequences
of an act or the intentions of
the
acting person.
Nietzsche
rejects
both these
possibilities.
We have no knowl
edge
of the
future,
and hence we can never know the
consequences
of an act.
Perhaps
we can know the immediate
consequences,
but the chain of
causality
never
ends,
and that which at first
appears
as a
good
result
may
well in the
long
run turn out to have
negative consequences: "any
action at
all,
it is and remains
impenetrable;
that our
opinions
about
'good'
and 'noble' and
'great'
can never
be
proved
true
by
our actions because
every
action is unknowable."1
Those who
emphasize
that
morality
is based on the intentions of the act
ing person
are not bounded
by
the
consequences
of the act.
However,
Nietzsche
denies that we can ever know the intentions of
any
other human
being.
In
fact,
Nietzsche
emphasizes
the relative
unimportance
of conscious
thinking,
"consciousness is a
surface,"2
in favor of subconscious
thinking
and instincts.
Hence,
Nietzsche
argues,
not
only
can we not know the motives of other indi
viduals,
we cannot even know our own motives. This is a
frequent
theme in
Nietzsche's
writings,
for
example,
"the most common lie is the lie one tells
to
oneself;
lying
to others is
relatively
the
exception."3
Journal
of
Nietzsche Studies,
Issue
26,
2003
Copyright
? 2003 The Friedrich Nietzsche
Society.
64
Nietzsche s Affirmative Morality 65
Furthermore,
Nietzsche claims that we have no free will4 and hence we
have no moral
responsibility. Closely
associated to this
argument
is his view
that man is an animal and
part
of the natural world in which there is no moral
ity.
In his
genealogical
discussions Nietzsche often
attempts
to show that the
original
reasons for
many
of our moral values were different
(and
often had
a nonmoral
origin)
than
they
are
today.
Moral
principles,
even relativistic moral
principles,
assume or
presuppose
moral
opposites, presuppose good
and evil
things, thoughts
and deeds.
Nietzsche, however,
rejects
the belief in moral
opposites.
"Between
good
and
evil actions there is no difference in
kind,
but at the most one of
degree.
Good
actions are sublimated evil ones;
evil actions are
coarsened,
brutalized
good
ones."5 Nietzsche does not
only reject
moral
opposites
as
opposites,
but he
also claims that that which is
conventionally regarded
as
good
and evil in fact
belongs together
and cannot be
separated.
Both
good
and evil are
necessary
in the
development
of
personality
and in the
development
of whole cultures:
there is a
personal necessity
for
misfortune;
that
terror, want,
impoverishment,
midnight
watches, adventures,
hazards and mistakes are as
necessary
to me
and to
you
as their
opposites [.
.
.]
for
happiness
and misfortune are brother
and
sister,
and
twins,
who
grows
tall
together,
or,
as with
you,
remain small
together!6
I have mentioned above a number of
aspects
of Nietzsche's
thinking
that are
contrary
to
many
of the
assumptions
and
presuppositions
of
morality.
I have
referred to his claim that we cannot know the
consequences
of
actions,
or the
motives behind those
actions,
his denial of free
will,
his denial of moral
oppo
sites and his belief that man is
part
of
nature,
and that in the natural world
there is no
morality.
Nietzsche not
only rejects specific presuppositions
of
morality,
but fre
quently
he also
rejects
the whole
concept
of
morality
as
being
an
error,
a fatal
error. "Thus I
deny morality
as I
deny alchemy,
that
is,
I
deny
their
prem
ises"7 and Nietzsche calls Zarathustra "the annihilator of
morality."8
In
G?tzen
D?mmerung,
Nietzsche summarizes much of what he has stated
previously
about
morality:
One knows
my
demand of
philosophers
that
they place
themselves
beyond
good
and evil?that
they
have the illusion of moral
judgement
beneath them.
This demand follows from an
insight
first formulated
by
me: that there are
no moral
facts
whatever. Moral
judgement
has this in common with
religious
judgement
that it believes in realities which do not exist.
Morality
is
only
an
interpretation
of certain
phenomena,
more
precisely
a
misinterpretation.9
Apart
from the
frequent rejection
of
morality
as
such,
Nietzsche often calls
himself an immor?list.10
66 Thomas H. Brobjer
Nietzsche furthermore denies the
applicability
of
general principles,
abstrac
tions,
and the unconditional. General
principles
are
necessarily,
like con
sciousness and
rationality, merely
surface
interpretations
and abstractions.
Nietzsche's interest and
emphasis goes deeper,
to the instinctual and the non
intentional and nonrational.
Hence,
much of Nietzsche's
critique
of moral
ity goes
outside what is
conventionally regarded
as
morality
and he
questions
even the
possibility
of
generalizations.
After such an extreme
critique
and
rejection
of
morality
and the
presup
positions
of
morality,
can Nietzsche be
anything
other than a nihilist? Can
he
possibly
have an affirmative
morality?
However,
Nietzsche
rejects
nihilism,11
and he
emphasizes
the
importance
of values. He
regards
values and
evaluating
as the ultimate nature of man:
"the
problems
of
morality
[.
.
.]
there seems to be
nothing
more worth tak
ing seriously"12
and "no
people
could live without
evaluating
[.
.
.] 'Man,'
that is: the evaluator. Evaluation is creation: hear
it, you
creative men!
Valuating
is itself the value and
jewel
of all valued
things. Only through
evaluation is
there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow."13
Nietzsche's demand of the
philosophers
of the future is not that
they
should
destroy
values but that
they
create new values.
Nietzsche's
project
is not that of a
nihilist,
not a
rejection
of all
values,
but
rather
a revaluation of all values. Much of this revaluation is concerned with
a
rejection
of Christian
values,
and of unconditional
values,
and with an affir
mation of ancient Greek values.
Nietzsche does have an alternative affirmative
morality,
but it differs
pro
foundly
from that of conventional
morality
as it has been understood
during
the
past
two hundred
years,
in
being
almost indifferent to acts and instead
emphasizing persons.
The fundamental
aspect
of Nietzsche's moral
judgment
and
thinking
is his concern and
emphasis
of
personality
and character. Not
principles,
but
personality
and character are the
determining
criteria
of
value
according
to this
morality.
I call this
aspect
an ethics
of
character,
but it could
also be called an ethics of virtue. We will see below how this central tenet of
Nietzsche's ethics to a
large degree
is able to
bring together
the different
aspects
of Nietzsche's
morality
to some sort of consistent whole.
Ethics in
general
refers to a set of standards
by
which a
particular group
or
community
decides to
regulate
its behavior. In a more
philosophical
sense,
ethics or moral
philosophy
is the
discipline
that concerns itself with
judg
ments of
approval
and
disapproval, judgments
of the
Tightness
and
wrong
ness,
goodness
or
badness,
virtue or vice of
actions,
dispositions,
ends,
or
objects.
The word "ethics" comes from the Greek ta ethika
(or ethikos),
which
originally
comes from the word
ethos,
which means character. Nietzsche was
undoubtedly
aware of this
original meaning
of the word.
He,
for
example,
states: "Personal distinction?that is
antique
virtue"14 and it is not
surprising
that he with his
high regard
for Greek
thinking
would connect back to this
ancient sense of the word.
In the not
quite
finished and never
published
book Die
Philosophie
im
tragischen
Zeitalter der
Griechen,
which Nietzsche worked on at about the
same time as Die Geburt der
Trag?die,
he writes: "For us
[modern men],
even the most
personal
is sublimated back into an
abstraction;
for them
[the
ancient
Greeks],
the
greatest
abstraction
kept running
back into a
person."15
Although
he does not here state this
explicitly,
I think that there can be little
doubt that Nietzsche's
sympathy
is with the ancient
practice,
as I will
try
to
show below. This is somewhat clearer in a section called "The un-Hellenic
in
Christianity"
in
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches:
The Greeks did not see the Homeric
gods
as set above them as
masters,
or
themselves set beneath the
gods
as
servants,
as the Jews did.
They
saw as it
were
only
the reflection of the most successful
examplars
of their own
caste,
that is to
say
an
ideal,
not an antithesis of their own nature.16
Nietzsche,
like the
Greeks,
wanted to set
up personality,
character,
or "the
most successful
examplars"
as ideals and these ideals were to him much more
important
and related to life than
any
abstract
principles.
This is made clear
in a note from 1886:
"You seem to me to have bad intentions for the
future,
one could believe that
you
wanted mankind to
go
under?"?I once said to the
god Dionysos.
"Perhaps,"
answered the
god,
"but so that
something
for it comes out of it."?
"What then?" I asked
curiously.?"Who
then?, you
should ask." Thus
spoke
Dionysos.17
It follows
naturally
from this ethics of
character-perspective
that
Nietzsche's
concept
of the ?bermensch in one sense is a modern version
of the Greek
gods
and in another sense is
merely
an
example
and an
ideal,
i.e.,
a natural extension of his ethics of character. This can be seen in
Nietzsche's use of "the word '?bermensch' to
designate
a
type
that has
turned out
supremely
well,
in antithesis to 'modern'
men,
to
'good'
men,
to Christians and other nihilists."18 These two senses of the word ?ber
mensch
actually merge
into one.
I want first to show the close connection that Nietzsche sees between cre
ative work and
man;
between the
philosophy
and the
philosopher,
between
the books and the
author,
and between the music and the
composer.
Thereafter
I will demonstrate the
importance
of
personality
and character for Nietzsche.
I will show that he
places
the man
(the character)
above the
works,
and I
hope
to indicate that the
concept
of the ?bermensch is a natural
consequence
and
aspect
of this.
In a letter to Lou
Salom?,
Nietzsche writes in 1882:
Your idea of
reducing philosophical systems
to the status of
personal
records
of their authors is a veritable "twin brain" idea. In Basel I was
teaching
the
history
of ancient
philosophy
in
just
this
sense,
and liked to tell
my
students:
"This
system
has been
disproved
and it is
dead;
but
you
cannot
disprove
the
person
behind it?the
person
cannot be killed."
Plato,
for
example.19
About three
years later,
Nietzsche writes in Jenseits von
Gut und B?se: "It
has
gradually
become clear to me what
every great philosophy
has hitherto
been: a confession on the
part
of its author and a kind of
involuntary
and
unconscious
memoir; moreover,
that the moral
(or immoral)
intentions in
every philosophy
have
every
time constituted the real
germ
of life out of
which the entire
plant
has
grown."20
As Nietzsche indicates in the
letter,
this
belief that the works are
only
a reflection of the character of the man was not
new to him. It can
clearly
be seen in both
prefaces
to Die
Philosophie
im
tragischen
Zeitalter der Griechen and in the
Unzeitgem?sse Betrachtungen,
where he claims: "To understand the
picture
one must divine the
painter."21
Similar statements can also be found in the works of the middle
period:
"However far a man
may
extend himself with
knowledge,
however
objective
he
may appear
to
himself?ultimately
he carries
away
with him
nothing
but
his own
biography."22
Nietzsche
pointed
at the close connection between the
man and the
works,
and he
strongly emphasized
the
importance
of character
or
personality (as
I will
shortly show) throughout
the whole of his adult life.
It is Nietzsche's belief that
"assuming
that one is a
person,
one necessar
ily
also has the
philosophy
that
belongs
to that
person,"23
which is the cause
not
only
of his
many
references to other thinkers but also of the often ad
hominem
(directed
at the man?rather than at the
principles)
nature of so
many
of his statements about them. These ad hominem statements have often
been
regarded by
commentators as
unjustified
and unfair attacks on other
persons. However,
for
Nietzsche,
to
carry
an
argument
back to the
person
is
the essence of
philosophy
and
morality,
while most modern thinkers believe
that the man should be
kept separate
from his belief and
philosophy.
For
Nietzsche,
the value of a man is determined
by
the order of rank of his
drives,
that
is,
by
his character.
According
to the Christian and the "modern"
view,
man has an inherent
value,
more or less
independent
of his
character,
his abil
ity,
his
values,
and his deeds.
Nietzsche uses
persons, examples,
and ad hominem
arguments
because he
does not
accept philosophy
as an
essentially
abstract field of
inquiry.
This
means that for Nietzsche ad hominem
arguments
are the
strongest possible
form of
argument.
Most other forms of
arguments
are
merely
abstractions?
effective for
winning
dialectical debates but in the end not
very convincing?
since
they only
involve
part,
and the smaller
part,
of the
disputants.
Nietzsches Affirmative Morality 69
Nietzsche's use of ad hominem
arguments
is not a minor aberration but a
consistent
strategy
or
approach
that reflects what he thinks
morality
is and
ought
to be.
The close connection between man and works is a theme Nietzsche stresses
again
and
again. Why
is this theme so
important
for him? Because
philoso
phy
and other "works"
are,
like
morality, really only symptoms
of the under
lying
character?"moralities too are
only
a
sign-language of
the emotions"24?
which is Nietzsche's true interest.
Character,
personality,
or "the man" is one
of the fundamental units of Nietzsche's
philosophy,
and he
repeatedly
claims
that he
goes through
the works to the
man,
to the character. "This sensitiv
ity
furnishes me with
psychological
antennae with which I feel and
get
hold
of
every
secret: the abundant hidden dirt at the bottom of
many
a character?
perhaps
the result of bad
blood,
but
glossed
over
by
education?enters
my
consciousness almost at the first contact."25 This
general approach
can be
exemplified
with,
for
example,
Nietzsche's statement:
"Quite apart
from the
value of such assertions as 'there exists in us a
categorical imperative'
one
can still ask: what does such an assertion
say
of the man who asserts it?"26
and instead of
asking
for what is truth and what is the will to
truth,
Nietzsche
asks: "What
really
is it in us that wants 'the truth'?" He continues and asks
for "the value of this will"27 and the answer reconnects it to a
personality,
to
a character.
Nietzsche's interest in the character behind the work is also
clearly
stated
in both the
early prefaces
to Die
Philosophie
im
tragischen
Zeitalter der
Griechen:
On the other
hand,
whoever
rejoices
in
great
human
beings
will also
rejoice
in
philosophical systems,
even if
completely
erroneous.
They always
have one
wholly
incontrovertible
point: personal
mood,
colour.
[.
.
.]
The task is to
bring
to
light
what we must ever love and honour and what no
subsequent enlight
enment can take
away: great
individual human
beings. [.
.
.]
But I have selected
those doctrines which sound most
clearly
the
personality
of the individual
philosopher.28
This continues to be Nietzsche's method for the rest of his life.
It is well known that Nietzsche
rejects
the idea of
philosophical systems
as
being
in
any
sense true or valuable
per
se. Hence he
rejects
all
attempts
at
systematization.291
will not
dispute
this claim as
such,
but Nietzsche does
nonetheless,
in a
sense,
believe in the existence of
"systems."
In Jenseits von
Gut und
B?se,
Nietzsche claims that
philosophical concepts
are related to
one another and he
argues
for the existence of a sort of
"Zeitgeist."30
More
important
for
my argument
is that Nietzsche also believes in another sort of
"system":
the human
being.
That our
thoughts
and values are all connected
and constitute a
whole,
a
character,
that forms a sort of
"system," though
not
a conscious one:
For this alone is
fitting
for a
philosopher.
We have no
right
to isolated acts of
any
kind: we
may
not make isolated errors or hit
upon
isolated truths. Rather
do our
ideas,
our
values,
our
yeas
and
nays,
our ifs and
buts, grow
out of us
with the
necessity
with which a tree bears fruit?related and each with an
affinity
to
each,
and evidence of one
will,
one
health,
one
soil,
one sun.31
Not
only
does Nietzsche
emphasize
the close connection between man and
works
(which
leads him toward an interest
in,
and use
of,
psychology),
but
he also
clearly
means that it is man who is the more fundamental and inter
esting
and the one he holds
highest
in value. "If one is
something
one
really
does not need to make
anything?and
one nonetheless does
very
much."32
Not
only
is the man of
higher
interest and value than the
works,
the value of
the man is
(or rather,
can
be) independent
of his actions and his works. "The
value of a human
being
[. ..]
does not lie in his usefulness: for it would con
tinue to exist even if there were
nobody
to whom he could be useful."33 Here
it can
clearly
be seen that Nietzsche is not
emphasizing utility,
but
something
that can be called character. The value of a man is determined
by
his attitude
toward life?he must not be filled with resentment and
vanity
but should have
a full and
overflowing personality.
It is not the
works,
it is the
faith
which is decisive
here,
which determines the
order of rank
here,
to
employ
an old
religious
formula in a new and
deeper
sense: some fundamental
certainty
which a noble soul
possesses
in
regard
to
itself,
something
which
may
not be
sought
or found and
perhaps may
not be
lost either.?The noble soul has reverence
for itself.?34
Nietzsche's
strong emphasis
on man
(or character)
can further be seen in the
fact that Nietzsche
regards
culture?a
very important concept
for him?basi
cally
as
great
men and their works and "thus
only
he who has attached his
heart to some
great
man is
by
that act consecrated to culture."35
For
Nietzsche,
the answer to the
problem
of
value,
like for
Oedipus
before
the
Sphinx,
is man!36 A
large part
of Nietzsche's
philosophical
endeavor con
sists of an
attempt
to
improve
man and to increase the value of man. The ref
erences to this in Nietzsche's
writings
are
frequent.37
This concern for character led Nietzsche to an interest in the more
perfect
man who can
justify
mankind: "This man of the future
[.
.
.]
he must come
one
day?."38
It is not ideas and
principles
that
justify
our
existence and
improve
it and
us,
but human
beings,
the best human
beings,
who
by
their
mere existence both
justify
and
improve
man because
they
are
examples
who
show man what man
really
can be. It is not a coincidence that Nietzsche
Nietzsche"s Affirmative Morality 71
speaks
of the
philosophers
of the
future,
not
philosophies
of the future. The
purpose
of
philosophy
is,
according
to
Nietzsche,
not
primarily
the con
struction of new
philosophies
but the
production
of "new Platos" as he
says
early
in his
development,
or "new
philosophers"
as he
says
later.39
Nietzsche sees himself as
fighting
for the
improvement
of man?but not
so much the abstract
concept
of man as of individual men and of man's
per
sonality
and character. This can be seen as much in what he attacks as in what
he
praises.
His
critique
of God and
Christianity
is not due
primarily
to the
fact that God does not
exist,
but because the belief in such a
god
as the
Christian God makes man smaller.40 "The church sends all
'great
men' to
hell,
it
fights against
all
'greatness
of man.'"41
A
consequence
of Nietzsche's ethics of character is that his references to and
opinions
of other men are not
merely
scattered and
vague
statements of lit
tle
importance.
The
opposite
is the case. In Nietzsche's discussion of other
men,
such as
Goethe,
Napoleon,
Plato,
and
Rousseau,
we are
perhaps
closer
to the Archimedian
point
of his
philosophy
than at
any
other time. When
Nietzsche in
G?tzen-D?mmerung,
in the
longest chapter, "Expeditions
of an
Untimely
Man,"
expounds
his
opinions
of different thinkers and men in short
disconnected
statements,
this is not idle
prejudice.
Nietzsche
is,
in
fact,
here
expressing
his
morality,
his
values,
more
clearly
than at almost
any
other
time. He is here
illuminating
not ideas or
principles
but the kinds of men
(character
or
personality)
he finds
worthy
of veneration and numerous exam
ples
of the
opposite
to this.42
For the
past
ten or
twenty years,
the view that three main ethical traditions
can be
regarded
as
constituting
the
larger part
of Western ethical
thinking
has
become standard: the ethics of
virtue,
utilitarian
ethics,
and
deontological
ethics. In a
simplified
form,
one can
say
that the ethics of virtue is charac
ter-oriented,
while the two other forms are act-oriented. Utilitarianism is act
and
goal-oriented,
in the sense that it is
mainly
concerned with acts
leading
to,
or
resulting
in,
a certain
goal,
and is therefore often referred to as conse
quentialism.
In this ethical
theory,
the
goal
is
primary,
and the most
frequent
goal
has been
pleasure
or
happiness,
but others have also been
suggested.
In
utilitarianism "the
goal"
or "the
good"
comes before "the
right,"
in that the
goal (for example, pleasure)
determines what is
right
(as
that which increases
pleasure). Deontological
ethics is act- and
right-oriented.
In this ethical tra
dition,
right
is
primary,
and
right
determines the
good.
This tradition is con
cerned with
acting according
to
rules,
duty,
and the moral law. The moral
law,
and hence
morality,
is seen as
being
autonomous.
According
to the utilitarian
tradition,
morality
is not autonomous. The
moral content of an act
depends
on how the
good
is defined?and the most
frequent
definition of the
good
is to define it as a natural
quality, usually
as
pleasure
or
happiness.
Hence,
an act that increases
pleasure
or
happiness
is
moral,
while one that decreases it is immoral. Thinkers in this tradition set
the
consequences
of acts at the center of their
interest, and,
in one form or
another,
they
stress that one will have to calculate the
consequences
of alter
native acts and
sequences
of acts to determine which acts are most moral and
useful.
Deontological thinking,
which
emphasizes
"the
right"
and hence rules and
moral
laws,
including
"natural
law,"
is based on
intuition,
rationality,
and
obedience. This tradition
strongly emphasizes
the distinction between facts
and values and claims that
morality
is
autonomous, i.e.,
that
morality
can in
no sense be determined
by,
or
depend
on,
nonmoral
aspects.
The moral con
tent of an
act,
or of a human
being,
is
independent
of
any consequences
or
physical properties.
Both utilitarianism and
deontological
ethics are normative in the sense that
they attempt
to show us which acts should and should not be done. Virtue
ethics,
which is less
act-oriented,
is also normative in a much
vaguer
sense,
basing
its
"prescriptions" mostly
on mutual
values,
persuasion,
and
example.
Modern
ethics,
independent
of whether it is
goal-
or
rule-oriented, attempts
to inform us about how we should act in certain situations. It is
essentially
problem-oriented
and tries to solve moral
queries?"What
is the correct
way
to act in these or those circumstances?" Ethics of virtue is a
response
to a
very
different
question:
"How should one live one's life? What sort of
per
son should I be and become?" An ethics of virtue is hence not act-oriented
(or rule-oriented)
but
agent-oriented
or character-oriented. It follows that in
this tradition one
judges persons
or character traits rather than acts. An ethics
of character will seem alien to
many
modern readers because it fundamen
tally
and
primarily judges
character and character traits and
only
secondar
ily
acts. Acts will not so much be
regarded
as
good
or
evil,
or
right
or
wrong,
but will be
judged
rather as
worthy
or
unworthy,
or sometimes more
directly
related to character traits
(virtues),
for
example,
as
brave, dishonest,
or
unjust.
According
to an ethics-of-virtue
perspective,
one does
not,
or should
not,
act
"immorally"
because it is
unworthy,
because it decreases one's
self-respect,
and because often it is
cowardly.43
In other
words,
the criteria of action are
flourishing,
esteem,
and self-esteem.44 We can note that these are also of fun
damental
importance
in Nietzsche's
thinking.
During
the nineteenth
century,
there was no awareness of ethics of virtue.
When ethics was discussed or
systematized
more
generally,
it was done in terms
of utilitarianism and
deontology.
For
example,
Nietzsche read and
heavily
anno
tated William Edward
Hartpole Lecky's History of European Morality
in a
German translation
(Sittengeschichte Europas,
1879,
2
volumes),
where this
dichotomy
of
morality
is
very explicit?but
this is also true for
essentially
all
the books about ethics Nietzsche read. Thus it is not
altogether surprising
that
Nietzsche
regarded
himself as an immor?list and
destroyer
of morals.
Almost all
philosophers
have
primarily
been concerned with the
questions:
"What is truth?" "What is to be done?" "What actions are to be condoned or
condemned?" etc. For Nietzsche the
questions
are
consistently rephrased
as:
"Who is to be created?" "Whose actions are to be condoned?" "Who is most
valuable?" Nietzsche's
strongly person-oriented approach
to evaluations and
morality
is
radically
different from that of modern moral
philosophy.
His atti
tude seems to
go against
the
grain
of
objectivity.
Most of modern moral
phi
losophy?not
to
speak
of
jurisprudence?claims
that we must
judge
the deeds
independently
of the
performer
and this is reflected in such
proclamations
as: "it is
wrong
to steal" or "thou shalt not
murder,"
which is often seen as
being special
cases of the
golden
rule: "Do not to others what
you
would not
wish them to do to
you."
Nietzsche,
to the
contrary,
claims that "an action in
itself is
perfectly
devoid of value: it all
depends
on who
performs
it. One and
the same 'crime' can
be in one the
greatest privilege,
in another a
stigma,"45
and he denies the
golden
rule because men are different and should be treated
differently.46
It follows
naturally
from this
person-centered
view that not
only
is all
morality merely symptoms
but so also is all
philosophizing.47 Symptoms
of the
person
behind the
philosophy.
The character behind the
philosophy
is
more
interesting?and
relevant?than his
philosophy.48
With this in
mind,
Nietzsche's use of ad hominem
arguments
becomes
understandable;
they
are
merely
a
special
case of his character-oriented
perspective.
There are a number of reasons
why
Nietzsche both can and does use this
psychological
ad hominem
approach
to
philosophy.
It becomes
especially
important
to
bring
forward the reasons for this since so few other
philoso
phers
have chosen to use
it,
or
accept
it as a valid
approach.
Two factors are of foremost
importance.
First,
Nietzsche's ethics of char
acter, i.e.,
his belief that individual human
beings
or
characters are the ulti
mate telos or
value,
rather than truth or actions or
beliefs or social reforms.
This leads Nietzsche to
analyze,
for
example,
a book not
primarily
in terms
of
truth, actions, beliefs,
but in terms of character. This could be done within
the framework of the
text, i.e.,
to
analyze
and discuss what the text
actually
says,
if it is consistent and without self-contradictions and what effect it
might
have on
character?and to some extent Nietzsche does
this, often,
for exam
ple,
when
referring
to the Bible?but more
frequently
he choses to use the
text as
symptom (of
the author's character or of the time in which it was
writ
ten)
and thus makes a
diagnosis
rather than an
analysis.
The reason for this
is his belief in the limited nature and
importance
of reason and conscious
ness. These are
only
surface
phenomena
and
symptoms
and
ought
not to con
stitute the end of
analysis.
The second factor that
explains why
Nietzsche
uses the ad hominem
approach
to
philosophy
can be summarized as
Heraclitus's famous
saying:
"Man's character is his fate" or
"Character for
man is
destiny."49
More
specifically,
in the case of
Nietzsche,
this factor can
be broken down into several beliefs:
(i)
that human nature or human character on the fundamental level is
difficult to
change.50
(ii)
that human character constitutes a sort of
(consistent) system.51
(iii)
that there is a close connection between character and the beliefs and
values that it
encompasses.52
(iv)
that the direction of influence between character and the
philosophy
associated with that character is
stronger upward (from
character to
the
philosophy)
than in the reverse direction.53 This last
point
follows
from,
or is consistent
with,
the first
point.
Nietzsche also
explicitly
claims to be
using
ad homonem
arguments
and meth
ods: "Much
depends upon
their
persons:
the
point
of
my
considerations of
their
teachings
is to divine their
persons,"54
and "from the
lengthy experience
afforded
by
such a
wandering
in the
forbidden
I learned to view the
origin
of
moralizing
and
idealizing very differently
from what
might
be desirable:
the hidden
history
of the
philosophers,
the
psychology
of their
great
names
came to
light
for me."55 A further
example,
which also illustrates some of the
reasons
why
Nietzsche
so often refers to himself as a
physiologist: "Insight
into the
origin
of a work
[by
means of the character of its
creator]
concerns
the
physiologists
and vivisectionists of the
spirit."56
Furthermore,
Nietzsche's
frequent
references to values and beliefs as
symptoms
is of course also a
reflection of his
application
of the ad hominem method.57 A clear and rela
tively typical example
of this is his refusal to
accept
rational
arguments
and
objective
claims as such and instead to ask: "What does such a claim tell us
about the man who makes it?"58 This
type
of
questioning
is of
course
wholly
consistent with Nietzsche's
general psychological approach.59
Nietzsche's belief in the ultimate
importance
of character in combination
with his belief that there is a
strong
connection between a character and the
philosophy
that
belongs
to this character leads him to the ad hominem
approach:
to
analyze
books,
people, philosophies,
and
ideologies
in terms of
character. Such an
analysis,
however,
is more akin to a
diagnosis
than to a
conventional
philosophical analysis?and
such
diagnoses appear
to most read
ers as invalid or irrelevant ad hominem
arguments.
Summary
Nietzsche's
critique
of
morality
has received much
attention,
but his affir
mative ethics has received
little,
and it has been
badly
understood.
However,
the
prevailing
interest in ethics of virtue and in Aristotle's ethics
during
the
last ten to
twenty years
makes it easier to
comprehend
Nietzsche's view of
ethics?although
this
kinship
with ethics of virtue has not
yet
been
realized,
either
among
Nietzsche scholars or
among
those interested in ethics of virtue.
Nietzsche,
like the
Greeks,
did not
regard
deeds and actions
(neither
the
intentions behind them nor their
consequences)
as the central
question
of
ethics as has
generally
been done in modern
philosophy;
instead he
empha
sized that ethics is related to the sort of
character,
the sort of
person
one is.
"Restoration of 'nature': an action in itself is
perfectly
devoid of value: it all
depends
on who
performs
it."60
Nietzsche
points
out that "it is obvious that moral
designations
were
every
where first
applied
to human
beings
and
only
later,
derivatively,
to actions."61
He wanted to set
up personality,
character,
or "the most successful exem
plars"
as
ideals,
and these ideals constituted to him the essence of ethics. It
is not ideas and
principles
that
justify
our existence and
improve
it and
us,
but human
beings,
the best human
beings,
who
by
their mere existence both
justify
and
improve
man because
they
are
examples
of what man can be.
Furthermore,
Nietzsche's
concept
of
great
men and even of the ?bermensch
can be seen as a natural extension of his ethics of character.
Man,
the
high
est
conception
of
man,
takes the
place
of God. For
Nietzsche,
the answer to
the
problem
of
value,
as for
Oedipus
before the
Sphinx,
is thus man!
Department of Philosophy
University of Uppsala
Notes
1.
GS,
335. See also "we
deny accountability,
77,
"The Four Great
Errors," 8,
and
D,
208.
2.
EH,
"Why
I Am So
Clever,"
9.
3.
A,
55. One
especially
clear
example
of Nietzsche's
argument
for our lack of self-knowl
edge
can be found in
TI,
"The Four Great
Errors,"
4 where he
argues
that when we hear a dis
tant canon-shot while
sleeping
and
dreaming
it often
happens
that "the canon-shot enters
[the
story
of the
dream]
in a causal
way,
in an
apparent
inversion of time. That which comes
later,
the
motivation,
is
experienced
first,
often with a hundred details which
pass
like
lightning,
the
shot
follows.
. . .
What has
happened?
The ideas
engendered by
a certain condition have been
misunderstood as the cause of that condition.?We do
just
the same
thing,
in
fact,
when we are
awake." See also
HH,
107.
4.
See,
for
example,
BGE,
18 "the hundred times refuted
theory
of 'free
will'";
GS V
345,
"the
superstition
of free
will,"
and
AOM, 50,
"The
strongest knowledge
(that
of the total unfree
dom of the human
will)."
See also
77,
"The Four Great
Errors,"
3 and
7,
which includes a one
page
section called "The error
of free
will."
5.
HH,
107.
6.
GS,
338. For the
development
of whole
cultures, see,
for
example,
WS,
67. See
also,
for
example,
GS,
1 and 4.
7.
D,
103. See
also,
for
example,
D, 3, 9, 14,
563. Much of the first
part
of
Morgenr?te
deals with the
problem
of
morality.
8.
EH,
"Why
I Write Such Excellent
Books,"
1.
9.
77,
"The
'Improvers'
of
Mankind,"
1.
10. For
example,
in Ecce
Homo,
Nietzsche
says
of himself: "I am the first immor?list: I am
therewith the
destoyer par
excellence"
(EH,
"Why
I Am a
Destiny," 2.)
11. Almost all of Nietzsche's
many
references to nihilism are
critical,
for
example:
"values
of
decline,
nihilistic values hold
sway
under the holiest names"
(A, 6).
Other
examples
can be
found in
A, 7, 20,
and 58. In Der Wille zur Macht,
they
abound. The first occurrence in his
pub
lished
writings
seems to be in
BGE,
10 and 208.
Already
here it is used as a
negative concept.
12.
GM, Preface,
7.
13.
Z.T,
"Of the Thousand and One Goals."
14.
D,
207.
15.
Philosophy
in the
Tragic Age of
the
Greeks, 3,
trans. Marianne Cowan
(Chicago: Regnery,
1962),
41-42. See
also,
for
example,
the
preface
to Jenseits von Gut und
B?se,
where Nietzsche
plays
with a version of this idea when he
says: "Supposing
truth to be a woman."
16.
HH,
114.
17. '"Du scheint mir Schlimmes im Schilde zu
f?hren,
man m?chte
glauben,
du wolltest den
Menschen zu Grunde
richten?'?sagte
ich einmal zu dem Gotte
Dionysos. 'Vielleicht,
antwortete
der
Gott,
aber
so, da? dabei Etwas f?r ihn heraus kommt.'?'Was denn?
fragte
ich
neugierig.?
Wer denn? solltest du
fragen.'
Also
sprach Dionysos."
KSA
12:4[4] Anfang 1886-Fr?hjahr
1886.
Compare
also note 37 below.
In Der
Antichrist, 3,
Nietzsche writes: "The
problem
I raise is not what
ought
to succeed
mankind in the
sequence
of
species (?the
human
being
is an
end?):
but what
type
of human
being
one
ought
to
breed,
ought
to
will,
as more
valuable,
more
worthy
of
life,
more certain of
the future."
18.
EH,
"Why
I Write Such Excellent
Books,"
1.
19. Letter to Lou
Salom?,
September
16,
1882.
20.
BGE,
6.
Compare
also
BGE,
5:
"They pose
as
having
discovered and attained their real
opinions through
the self-evolution of a
cold, pure, divinely unperturbed
dialectic
[.
.
.]
while
what
happens
at bottom is that a
prejudice,
a
notion,
an
'inspiration,' generally
a desire of the
heart sifted and made
abstract,
is defended
by
them with reasons
sought
after the
event?they
are one and all advocates who do not want to be
regarded
as
such,
and for the most
part
no bet
ter than
cunning pleaders
for their
prejudices,
which
they baptize
'truths'";
and
BGE,
8: "In
every philosophy
there is a
point
at which the
philosopher's
'conviction'
appears
on the scene."
21. UM III 3.
Compare
also section 2.
22.
HH,
513.
Compare
section 198. See also
D,
553:
"nothing
other than the intellectual cir
cuitous
paths
of similar
personal
drives?" and
GS,
241:
"ultimately,
his work is
merely
a
mag
nifying glass
that he offers
everybody
that looks his
way."
23.
GS,
Preface
(1886),
2. See also section 3 of the
preface.
24.
BGE,
187.
25.
EH,
"Why
I Am So
Wise,"
8. See also
A,
44.
26.
BGE,
187.
27.
BGE,
1.
28. From "Preface" and "A Later Preface" to
Philosophy
in the
Tragic Age of
the
Greeks,
23-25.
29. "I mistrust all
systematizers
and avoid them. The will to a
system
is a lack of
integrity."
77,
"Maxims and
Arrows,"
26.
30. "That individual
philosophical concepts
are not
something arbitrary, something growing
up autonomously,
but on the
contrary grow up
connected and related to one
another; that,
how
ever
suddenly
and
arbitrarily they appear
to
emerge
in the
history
of
thought, they
none the less
belong just
as much to a
system
as do the members of the fauna of a continent"
(BGE, 20).
31.
GM, Preface,
2.
32.
HH,
210.
Compare
this with a
quotation
that I have been unable to locate: "The errors
of
great
men are more
important
than the truths of little men." It is not
truth,
objective
truth,
that Nietzsche
emphasizes,
but man, in
particular
the
great
man,
and
only secondarily
his rela
tion to the
world,
his truth. See
also, Z.TV,
"The
Greeting": "Nothing
more
gladdening grows
on
earth,
O
Zarathustra,
than an
exalted,
robust will: it is the earth's fairest
growth.
A whole
N?ETZscHi s Affirmative Morality 77
landscape
is refreshed
by
one such tree." 77,
'
." 44: "The
great
human
being
is a terminus"
[Der gro?e
Mensch ist ein
Ende].
33.
WP,
877.
34.
BGE,
287. For Nietzsche's
rejection
of moralities that
deny
the
importance
of
personal
ity,
see,
for
example,
EH,
"Why
I Am a
Destiny,"
7: "The
morality
of
unselfing
is the
morality
of decline
par
excellence
35. ?/MIII6.
36. In
77,
"Morality
as
Anti-Nature," 6,
Nietzsche asks what
advantage
could there be in the
law of
life,
and he answers "?But we
ourselves,
we
immoralists,
are the answer to that."
37. For
example,
in
BGE, 295,
Nietzsche lets
Dionysos say:
"I often
ponder
how I
might
advance him
[man]
and make him
stronger,
more evil and more
profound
than he is."
Zarathustra,
in
Z.TV,
"Of the
Higher Man,"
teaches the same: '"Man must
grow
better and more evil'?thus
do 7 teach."
Many
other
quotations
about Nietzsche's concern
for,
and the wish to
improve,
the
health of man can be
given:
for
example,
BGE,
269 and
295;
GM I 11 and
12,
and GM III 14.
38.
GM,
II 24.
39. UM III
8,
for "new Platos"
and,
for
example,
GS,
289 and
BGE, 2, 44, 203, 210,
and 229
for "new
philosophers."
40. This is
explicit
in
A,
47: "not
merely
an error but a crime
against life!'
41.
WP,
871.
Compare
also
A, 5,
and a note from 1875: "Christus f?rderte die
Verdummung
der
Menschen,
er hielt die
Erzeugung
des
gro?en
Intellekts auf.
Consequent!
Sein
Gegenbild
w?rde vielleicht der
Erzeugung
von Christus' hinderlich sein.?Fatumtristissimum
generis
humani!" KSA
8:5[188].
42. This is true not
only
when he is
discussing
the
highest
forms,
for
example,
Goethe in
sections
49-51,
and the lowest
forms,
for
example,
Rousseau in section
48,
but also in all the
numerous short ad hominem
(positive
and
negative)
statements with which the
chapter
is filled.
43.
See,
for
example,
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics IV
(1124b):
"The
high-minded
man
[megalopsychos] [.
.
.]
will also be
outspoken concerning
his hatreds and
friendships,
for
secrecy
is a mark of fear
[.
.
.]
he will
speak
and act
openly,
because he has
contempt
for
secrecy
and
falsity."
44. It follows from an ethics-of-virtue
perspective
that individuals with little
self-esteem,
or
societies that
yield
such
members,
will be
approximately morally equivalent
to how
egoists
are
regarded
in modern
morality.
45.
WP,
292.
46. "Moralities must first of all be forced to bow before order
of
rank, [.
.
.]
it is immoral to
say:
'What is
good
for one is
good
for another'"
(BGE, 221). Compare
also "that what is fair
for one cannot
by any
means for that reason alone also be fair for
others;
that the demand of
one
morality
for all is detrimental for the
higher
men; in
short,
that there is an order of rank
between man and
man,
hence also between
morality
and
morality" (BGE, 228).
For
critique
of
the
golden
rule,
see also KSA
13:22[1]
=
WP,
925 and KSA 13:11
[127]
=
WP,
926.
47.
"Morality
is
merely sign-language, merely symptomatology:
one must
already
know
what it is about to derive
profit
from it"
(TI,
"The
'Improvers'
of
Mankind,"
1.
48. "Plato ist mehr werth als seine
Philosophie!
Unsere Instinkte sind besser als ihr Ausdruck
in
Begriffen.
Unser Leib ist weiser als unser Geist! Wenn Plato
jener
B?ste in
Neapel glich,
so
haben wir da die beste
Widerlegung
alles Christenthums!" KSA
11:26[355]
Summer-Autumn
1884.
49.
Diels-Krantz,
fragment
22B 119. Translations
by
Charles
.
Kahn,
The Art and
Thought
ofHeraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
and Kathleen
Freeman,
Anelila
to the Pre-Socratic
Philosophers (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University
Press, 1948, 1983),
respectively.
50. For
example,
Nietzsche's references to "that eternal basic text homo natura"
(BGE, 230)
and states:
"Learning
transforms
us,
it does that which all nourishment does which does not
merely 'preserve'?:
as the
physiologist
knows. But at the bottom of us,
'right
down
deep,'
there
is,
to be
sure,
something unteachable,
a
granite
stratum of
spiritual fate,
of
predetermined
deci
sion and answer to
predetermined
selected
questions. [.
.
.]
'convictions.' Later?one sees them
only
as
footsteps
to
self-knowledge, signposts
to the
problem
which we are?more
correctly,
to
the
great stupidity
which we
are,
to our
spiritual fate,
to the unteachable
'right
down
deep'"
{BGE, 231).
51. For
example:
"In a
philosopher, conversely,
there is
nothing
whatever that is
impersonal:
and above
all,
his
morality
bears decided and decisive witness to who he is?that
is,
in what
order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other"
{BGE, 6).
Already
in UM III
1,
Nietzsche had written:
"everything
bears witness to our
being?our
friendships
and
hatreds,
the
way
we
look,
our
handshake,
the
things
we remember and
forget,
our
books,
our
handwriting."
52. For
example:
"A human
being's
evaluations
betray something
of the structure of his soul"
{BGE, 268).
53. For
example:
"A
philosopher [. ..] simply
cannot
keep
from
transposing
his states
every
time into the most
spiritual
form and distance: this art of
transfiguration
is
philosophy" {GS,
Preface, 3),
and in his claim that "all
philosophers
were
building
under the seduction of moral
ity" {D, Preface, 3).
54. The
Struggle
between Science and
Wisdom, p.
129 in
Philosophy
and Truth: Selections
from
Nietzsche's Notebooks
of
the
Early
1870s,
ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale
(London, 1979,
1991).
55.
EH, Preface,
3. Nietzsche continues
by stating
that error and falsehood is not an intel
lectual mistake but an 'error' of character or
virtue,
"error is cowardice." In his notebooks
{KSA
13:16[32]),
Nietzsche had written almost the same words as those
quoted
in the
text,
and these
have later been
published separately
in
WP,
1041.
56. GM III 4. Further
example
of Nietzsche's claim to be
using
this
approach
are:
"But I had discovered him
[Schopenhauer]
in the form of a
book,
and that was a
great
deficiency.
So I strove all the harder to see
through
the book and to
imagine
the
living
man"
(t/M
III
2).
"Once one has trained one's
eyes
to
recognize
in a
scholarly
treatise the scholar's idio
syncracy?every
scholar has one?and to catch it in the
act,
one will almost
always
behold behind this the scholar's
'prehistory,'
his
family,
and
especially
their
occupa
tions and crafts"
{GS
V
348).
57.
"My attempt
to understand moral
judgements
as
symptoms"
{WP, 258).
Other
examples
of
this can be found in
WP, 254; BGE, 187; 77,
"The
'Improvers'
of
Mankind," 1,
and
GS, Preface,
2.
58.
BGE,
187.
59. Which can be
exemplified by
statements such as: "What I am concerned with is the
psy
chological type
of the redeemer"
{A, 29).
60.
WP,
292
=
KSA
12:10[46+47]
Autumn 1887.
Compare
also: "Es
gibt
also keine
tadelnsw?rdigen Handlungen,
sondern Lob und Tadel trifft nur
Menschen,
nicht
Dinge" {KSA
9:1
[69] Early 1880).
61.
BGE,
260.

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Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue

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