Amigo vs.

CA
Doctrine:
The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised
Facts:
Lolita Amigo (Lolita) and Estelita vda. de Salinas (Estelita) leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo (Mercedes), a parcel of land located along Leon Garcia
St., Agdao District, Davao City, registered in Mercedes name. Lolita and Estelita constructed their houses on the lot.
The following transactions ensued:
(1) Mercedes sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit (Bosquit) and Jesus Wee Eng (Wee).
(2) Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City Government of Davao. (subdivided into two; exchanged)
(3) Bosquit sold his rights and interests over the lands to Wee.
Wee filed an action for reconveyance with the RTC against Lolita and Estelita to which Lolita and Estelita filed their answer.
After the Lolita and Estelita had filed their answer, the court appointed Orville 0. Bueno, a duly licensed geodetic engineer, its commissioner to conduct
a relocation survey of the boundaries of the land. Bueno reported that a portion of about 2/3 of the house of Lolita and Estelita is inside the boundaries
of Wees land while the remaining 1/3 lies on the road widening and the creek.
Wee sought an amendment of the complaint praying not only for the recovery of real property and damages but also for an abatement of nuisance over
the portion of their house that allegedly encroached the sidewalk of Leon Garcia Street.
Lolita and Estelita filed their amended answer denying the material allegations of the amended complaint.
RTC: ordered Lolita and Estelita to vacate the land occupied by them.
CA: dismissed appeal for failure to file appeal brief.
Wee moved for execution of the judgment
RTC: granted the motion
Lolita and Estelita filed an action to annul the trial courts decision with the CA for want of jurisdiction.
CA: dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Lolita and Estelita.
Held: Yes;
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority
or by service of summons. In this case, by their filing of an answer and later an amended answer, Lolita and Estelita must be deemed to
have formally and effectively appeared before the lower court.
As early as 1918, the essence of voluntary appearance has been explained by this Court; thus, in Flores v. Zurbito, we have said:
"A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While
the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to
enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or
answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary." (Italics supplied.)
Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however, as has been so held lately inLa Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. The
records bear out the fact that Lolita and Estelita have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the rendition of the
judgment. It is now too late in the day for Lolita and Estelita to assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over their person.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.




La Naval Drug Corporation vs. CA (Courts and their jurisdiction)
Doctrine: The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the
lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has not bearing thereon.
Facts:
Wilson Yao (Yao) is the owner of a commercial building a portion of which is leased to La Naval Drug Corporation (LNDC) under a contract of lease executed with
the former owner La Proveedora, Inc.
At the expiration of the contract of lease, LNDC exercised its option to lease the same portion of the building for another five years.
However, LNDC and Yao cannot agree on the rental rate.
To resolve the controversy, Yao, thru written notices to LNDC, expressed his intention to submit their disagreement to arbitration in accordance with R.A. 876
(Arbitration Law) and paragraph 7 of their lease contract which provides: Should the parties fail to agree on the rate of rentals, the same shall be submitted to a
group of Arbitrators composed of three (3) members, one to be appointed by LESSOR, another by LESSEE and the third one to be agreed upon by the two
arbitrators previously chosen and the parties hereto shall submit to the decision of the arbitrators.
In accordance to the said agreement, Yao appointed Domingo Alamarez, Jr. as his arbitrator while LNDC chose Atty. Casiano Sabile as its arbitrator.
The confirmation of the appointment of Aurelio Tupang, as third arbitrator, was held in abeyance because LNDC instructed Atty. Sabile to defer the same until its
Board of Directors could convene and approve Tupang's appointment.
Yao theorizes that this was LNDCs design to delay the arbitration proceedings, in violation of the Arbitration Law, and the governing stipulation of their contract of
lease.
Yao prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Section 6 of the Arbitration Law, Atty. Casiano Sabile and Domingo Alamarez be directed to proceed with
the arbitration in accordance with Section 7 of subject Contract of Lease and the applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the
appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it, pursuant to
Section 12 and the succeeding sections of the Arbitration Law.
LNDC, in its answer with counterclaim, claimed that the petition was premature (since Yao has not yet formally required arbitrators Alamarez and Sabile to
agree on the third arbitrator); therefore, Yao has no cause of action against LNDC.
Yao filed an amended petition for "Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with Damages" praying that LNDC be ordered to pay interest on the unpaid rents.
LNDC answered the amended petition; contending, among others, that the amended petition should be dismissed on the ground of non-payment of the requisite
filing fees therefor; and it being in the nature of an ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial, is necessary; so that Yao's proposition for a
summary hearing of the arbitration issue and separate trial for his claim for damages is procedurally untenable and implausible.
LNDC presented a "Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing" of its special and affirmative defenses, which are grounds for a motion to dismiss.
RTC: preliminary hearing of the special and affirmative defense to show that Yao has no cause of action against LNDC's claim for damages is denied; a resolution
on this issue is deferred after the trial of the case on the merits.
CA: agreed with LNDC that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine
the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration. BUT considered LNDC in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court
to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings Yao's claim for damages, LNDC having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the
RTC.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether LNDC is in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of the court brought about by its filing a counterclaim (Issue in the case text: Whether or
not the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense in an answer would necessarily foreclose and have the effect of
waiver of the right of a defendant to set up the courts lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant)
(2) Whether the RTC, in its special jurisdiction in accordance with R.A. 876, had jurisdiction to hear the claim of damages of both parties
Held:
(1) No
Jurisdiction over the person
Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may, as further set forth in Section 5 of the same rule, be pleaded as an affirmative
defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. An answer itself contains the negative, as well as affirmative,
defenses upon which the defendant may rely (Section 4, Rule 6, Rules of Court).
In the same manner that the plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule 8,
of the Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to mean
that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person, all other possible
defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to so raise them, that can result in waiver or
estoppel. By defenses, of course, we refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of
affirmative defenses in an answer.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil.
957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by
law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
Doctrine: The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the
lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has not bearing thereon.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action
Lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action is the situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily would have the authority and competence to take a
case, is rendered without it either because a special law has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction on a particular matter or because the type of action has
been reposed by law in certain other courts or quasi-judicial agencies for determination. Nevertheless, it can hardly be questioned that the rules relating to
the effects of want of jurisdiction over the subject matter should apply with equal vigor to cases where the court is similarly bereft of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
Rules on Jurisdiction
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
(2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at
any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in
character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
(2) No;
The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing
providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the
arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed." The
proceedings are summary in nature.
The court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate
regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial court in question are SET ASIDE. The court a quo, in the
instant proceedings, is ordered to DESIST from further hearing private respondent's claim, as well as petitioner's counterclaim, for damages. No costs.
Additional Notes: Discussion on Jurisdiction over the person
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by
this Court (Wang Laboratories, Inc., vs. Mendoza , De Midgely vs. Judge Ferandos , Republic vs. Ker and Companry ) would likewise seemingly apply estoppel to
bar the defendant from pursuing that defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the action.





Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative Inc. vs. NLRC
Doctrine:
While jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party
from assailing such lack of it.
Facts:
Engr. Egdon Sabio (Sabio) was employed as Manager of the Engineering Department of Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative (ISECO) in May 1982.
On 8 June 1989, Sabio wrote to the ISECO Board of Directors, thru its President, Atty. Manuel Agpalo, about the expenses incurred by Acting General
Manager, Atty. Efren Bautista, in the total amount of P131,788.79 from May 1988 to May 1989 for his travel to the office of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) and places outside the area serviced by the cooperative. Sabio revealed that in one year, Bautista was away for two hundred
twenty (220) days, while in contrast the previous Acting General Manager, Genaro Cada, who stayed out of the cooperative for not more than thirty
(30) days for the same length of time spent not more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On June 9, 1989, Bautista summoned Sabio to his office and asked him (1) to file a letter of irrevocable resignation with the assurance that separation
benefits will be granted to him or (2) to apply for leave. Instead of filing either, Sabio on 10 June 1989 sent a letter of apology to Bautista with copies
furnished to the Board of Directors, Department Managers and Sub-Area Managers, but maintaining that he had not violated any of the cooperative's
rules and regulations.

However, on that same day Sabio received Memo No. 47-80 from Bautista, relieving him from his position as Engineering
Manager without giving any reason.

Subsequently,

Bautista placed him under preventive suspension which prompted Sabio to file a complaint for illegal suspension and claim for
representation/travel allowances before the Labor Arbiter.
Bautista created an ad hoc committee to investigate the case against Sabio. (It was Bautista who chose the members of the committee)
Ad Hoc Committee: recommended that Sabio be dismissed.
ISECO Board of Directors: adopted the recommendation
Consequently, Sabio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim of damages against ISECO with the NLRC which was assigned to
Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen of the Regional Arbitration Branch, DOLE, for compulsory arbitration.
Labor Arbiter: ordered to reinstate Sabio because he was illegally dismissed
NLRC: dismissed the appeal for having been filed out if time. (ISECO appealed to the President; Sabio filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
execution; ordered Sabio to be reinstated)
Issue: Whether the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case of Sabio
Held: Yes;
Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended by P.D. 1645, relied upon by ISECO, does not apply in this case. Said Decree pertains to NEA 's exercise of its
power of supervision and control over electric cooperative. There is nothing said law which provides that the NEA administration has the
power to hear and decide termination cases of employees in electric cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter.
In the present case, there is no dispute that Sabio is an employee of ISECO whose services as manager of the Engineering Department of ISECO were
terminated. The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC. Thus, Section. 217 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination of disputes;
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the NLRC 's jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in this petition. ISECO did not question the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. In fact, ISECO participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, as well as in the
NLRC to which they appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision. It has been consistently held by this Court that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such
lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.


Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.



































Andaya vs. Abadia
Doctrine/s:
(1) Mere allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations do not necessarily call for the application of the provisions
of the Civil Code in place of AFPSLAI By-Laws.
(2) Remedial rights and privileges under the Rules of Court are utterly useless in a forum that has no jurisdiction over the case.
Facts:
Noe Andaya (Andaya), former President and General Manager of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI), filed a
complaint of injunction and damages with restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court against directors of the
AFPSLAI claiming that the said directors concertedly convened as a body and illegally reorganized the management of AFPSLAI resulting to the ouster of
Andaya from his positions.
The directors of AFPSLAI filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint raised intra-corporate controversies over which the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and not the Regional Trial Court, has exclusive original jurisdiction.
Andaya opposed such motion arguing that the case is mainly based not on petitioner's attempted removal per se but rather on the manner of his
removal and the effect thereof, which was done anti-socially, oppressively, in gross violation of the norms of human relations and without giving
petitioner his due.
Before the trial court could rule on the motion to dismiss, Andaya filed an amended complaint impleading as additional defendants then Central bank
Governor Jose L. Cuisia, Jr., Central Bank SRDC Managing Director Ricardo P. Lirio and Central Bank SES Acting Director Candon B. Guerrero. On 13
November 1991, the directors of the AFPSLAI filed an Omnibus Motion contending that the filing of an amended complaint seeking to confer
jurisdiction on the court was improper and should not be allowed.

RTC (acted only on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss in relation to the original complaint): dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in so far as the
directors of the AFPSLAI are concerned; causes of action covered by AFPSALI By-Laws; PD 902-A defines and vests jurisdiction over
corporate matter in the Securities and Exchange Commission; damages sought as a consequence of the alleged corporate wrongs
committed by the directors of AFPSLAI becomes merely incidental. (Andaya filed M.R. alleging that the newly impleaded defendants in the
amended complaint removed the corporate element of the case)
RTC (M.R.): substance and essence of the complaint against the directors of the AFPSLAI in both the first and the amended complaint are the same
that the directors are being held civilly liable for their corporate acts in the AFPSLAI.
Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case
Held: No;
Jurisdiction of SEC
The allegations against the directors in the amended complaint unquestionably reveal intra-corporate controversies cleverly concealed,
although unsuccessfully, by use of civil law terms and phrases. The amended complaint impleads the directors of AFPSLAI who, in their capacity as
directors of AFPSLAI, allegedly convened an illegal meeting and voted for the reorganization of management resulting in Andaya's ouster as corporate
officer. While it may be said that the same corporate acts also give rise to civil liability for damages, it does not follow that the case is
necessarily taken out of the jurisdiction of the SEC as it may award damages which can be considered consequential in the exercise of
its adjudicative powers. Besides, incidental issues that properly fall within the authority of a tribunal may also be considered by it to avoid multiplicity
of actions. Consequently, in intra-corporate matters such as those affecting the corporation, its directors, trustees, officers,
shareholders, the issue of consequential damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC.
Moreover, mere allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations do not necessarily call for the application
of the provisions of the Civil Code in place of AFPSLAI By-Laws.
The determination of the rights of Andaya arising from the alleged illegal convening of the meeting of AFPSLAI Board of Directors and his subsequent
ouster from corporate offices as a result of the voting for the reorganization of management are obviously intra-corporate controversies subject to the
jurisdiction of SEC as provided in P.D. No. 902-A which states:
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations . . . it
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving . . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate
. . . relations . . . . (c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations
. . . .
The same may also be said of Andayas prayer for damages, considering that his right thereto either depends on, or is inextricably
linked with, the resolution of the corporate controversies. For instance, the prayer for moral damages is grounded on "directors' gross and
evident bad faith, insidious machinations and conspirational acts, false and derogatory misinterpretations and imputations against Andaya and other
malevolent and illegal acts calculated to realize and accomplish the threatened illegal removal of Andaya from his positions aforesaid . . . .;" while the
prayer for exemplary damages is dependent on alleged directors "concerted illegal effort to maliciously set him up for, and fraudulently consummate,
his illegal ouster from his positions in the AFPSLAI
Even the supposed allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, as in par. 7 of the Complaint which
states that "certain parties, including defendant SANTOS, "masterminded a plot to degrade plaintiff and to denigrate his accomplishments in the
AFPSLAI by spreading false and derogatory rumors against plaintiff," are all treated in the complaint as mere components of the general
scheme allegedly perpetrated by respondents as directors to oust him from his corporate offices, and not as causes of action
independent of intra-corporate matters. Moreover, the injunction prayed for in the complaint is within the jurisdiction of SEC pursuant to
Sec. 6, par. (a), of P.D. 902-A which states: "(i)n order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers . . . .
(t)o issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction . . . ."
Dismissal through the Omnibus Motion
Previous hearing of the Urgent Motion to Dismiss cured the defect of the absence of hearing on the Omnibus Motion but ONLY insofar as said issue is
concerned (lack of jurisdiction over intra-corporate matters)
Remedial rights and privileges under the Rules of Court are utterly useless in a forum that has no jurisdiction over the case. It should
be noted that the court a quo dismissed the case against the directors on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof which
mainly involves intra-corporate controversies.
Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings
the court might have had. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is
not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. It is elementary that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action."
We note that Sec. 2, Rule 9 uses the word "shall," leaving the court no choice under the given situation but to dismiss the case. The same Rule also
uses the phrase "whenever it appears," which means at anytime after the complaint or amended complaint is filed, because the lack of jurisdiction may
be apparent from the allegations therein. Hence, from the foregoing, even if no answer or motion to dismiss is filed the court may dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction. In this sense, dismissal for lack jurisdiction may be ordered by the court motu propio. Applying this notion to the case at
bar, with the dismissal of the case against respondents for lack of jurisdiction, it then becomes inconsequential whether the court acted on the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the requisite notice as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The
determination of lack of jurisdiction over respondents being apparent from the face of the amended complaint, the defect of want of
prior notice and hearing of the Omnibus Motion could not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the court a quo, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of
14 November 1991 and 10 February 1992 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.



















The Andresons Group, Inc. vs. CA
Doctrine:
As worded, the rule on lis pendens does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action.

It is not required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens should apply.
Facts:
Willie Denate entered into an agency agreement with the Andresons Group, Inc. (Andresons) as its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits
(wines and liquors) in Davao city, three Davao provinces and North Cotabato.
On 18 November 1991, Willie Denate and Myrna Lo Denate (Denates) and filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against
Andresons before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 21, 061-91. In the complaint, Willie Denate alleged that he was
entitled to the amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions from Andresons but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused to pay the same.
A month later, or on 19 December 1991, Andresons likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the Denates with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-15214. Andresons alleged in the complaint that the Denates still owed it the sum of P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances.
On 5 February 1992, Willie Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with the Kalookan RTC on the ground that there was
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao City.
On 14 February 1992, Andresons filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.
RTC (Kalookan): denied motion to dismiss;
CA: set aside the decision of the RTC of Kalookan
Issue: Whether the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens
Held: Yes; (Davao Court in the better position)
Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action.

To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same
but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought.

Further, it is required that the identity be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the case on
hand.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan cases are the same. They are suing each other for
sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and
there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.
In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity
of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be
a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending action.

Neither is it required that the party be served with summons
before lis pendens should apply.
In Salacup v. Maddela, we said:
The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts only upon the filing of a complaint in court.
The fact that when appellant brought the present case, it did not know of the filing of a previous case against it by appellees, and it received
the summons and a copy of the complaint only after it had filed its own action against them, is immaterial. Suffice it to state that the fact is,
at the time it brought the present case, there was already another pending action between the same parties seeking to assert identical rights
with identical prayers for relief based on the same facts, the decision in which would be res judicata herein.
It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier. The criterion used in
determining which case should be abated is which is the more appropriate action

or which court would be "in a better position to
serve the interests of justice."
Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in
a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.






































Ramos vs. Peralta
Doctrine:
(1) Requisites of Litis Pendentia:
(a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

(2) Rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case.

Facts:
Benedicto Ramos (Ramos) started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his favor by spouses Juvencio and
Juliana Ortanez (Sps. Ortanez). The original lease for a term of five (5) years from 1 January 1964 to 1 January 1, 1969, was renewed several times,
the last renewal being on 28 June 1974 under a "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa" for a period of three (3) years starting January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1977.
Unknown to Ramos, title to said property was in the name of Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-
owned by the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., said corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation
on 20 June 1968 in Civil Case No. Q-10664 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, upon application of Insurance Commissioner Gregoria Cruz-
Ansaldo who was appointed receiver.
Thereafter on 23 February 1976, P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond for P950,000.00. The deed of
sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court.
Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from Ramos the advance rentals on the fishpond due on 15
March 1976 in the amount of P30,000.00.
On or about 1 May 1976, Ramos received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman informing him of the latter's acquisition of the fishpond and
intention to take possession thereof on 16 May 1976. In his letter-reply, Ramos reminded Mr. Roman of his lease contract over the fishpond and
refused to consent to the intended take over. Notwithstanding Ramos' objection, P. R. Roman, Inc. took over possession of the fishpond.
On 2 August 1976, Ramos filed before the CFI of Manila the aforesaid complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 103647, against Sps.
Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the
fishpond.
On 13 August 1976, P.R. Roman instituted an action to quiet title with the CFI of Bataan over the Salgado fishpond against Ramos. (Civil Case no. 4102)
P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss because of (1) a pending action before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102; (2) improper venue;
(3) complaint states no cause of action; and (4) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit.
CFI (of Manila): granted the motion to dismiss; dismissed the complaint;
Issue: Whether the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before the CFI of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 103647.
Held: Yes; (Bataan Court in the better position)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
These requisites are present in the case at bar. Ramos admitted the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil Case No. 103647,
particularly as he filed a third party complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance.
Anent the second element, we agree with P.R. Roman, Inc.'s observation that Ramos' approach to his consignation case is quite constricted. His
contention that the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not P.R. Roman, Inc. is willing to accept the proffered payment is true only where
there is no controversy with respect to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While
ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the ultimate
purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. In the last
analysis, therefore, the issue involved in Civil Case No. 103647 is the right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the validity
and effectivity of the lease contract.
This is the same issue involved in Civil Case No. 4102. Although an action for quieting of title refers to ownership, P. R. Roman, Inc. in its
complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 claimed its right of possession over the fishpond.
That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102 would constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond
cavil. Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., Ramos can compel it to accept his proffered
payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so.
Ramos was not deprived of his right to choose the venue of his action. Verily, the rules on the venue of personal actions are laid down generally for the
convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses. But, as observed by Sps. Ortanez, this right given to the plaintiff is not immutable. It must yield to the
greater interest of the orderly administration of justice, which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of an action on the basis
of litis pendentia to obviate the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two different courts. Even the Rules of Court has
hierarchy of values; thus, the choice of venue may bow to dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia.
Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that
there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No. 4102
and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 27, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, is
AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory, with costs against petitioner.



























Vda. De Cruzo vs. Carriaga
Doctrine/s:
(1) The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules:
(a) bar by former judgment (Rule 39, Section 49 (b))
(b) conclusiveness of judgment (Rule 39, Section 49 (c))
(2) Requisites of Res Judicata(a prior judgment may bar a subsequent action)
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

Facts:
Lot No. 1131 of the Misamis Cadastre, subject matter of this case, was originally registered in the name of Gabina Machoca (Gabina), as her
paraphernal property, under Original Certificate of Title No. 682.
On 4 February 1954, Gabina mortgaged Lot No. 1131 for P 425.00 to Franklin Ang (Ang) and delivered to him her aforesaid certificate of title in
connection therewith.
On 4 October 1954, Gabina again borrowed an additional sum of P 175.00 from Ang as a result of which her total obligation to the latter was in the sum
of P 600.00.
The children of the late spouses Leonardo Arcadio and Gabina Machoca (Heirs) claim that on the same date, Ang caused the preparation of a deed of
sale over the subject lot to which document Gabina Machoca, being illiterate, affixed her thumb-mark in the belief that this second instrument was
similar to the deed of mortgage executed by her on 4 February 1954. When Gabina went home, her children, informed her that the second document
was not a deed of mortgage but a contract of sale.
On the following day, Gabina went back to Ang and demanded the reformation of the aforesaid instrument. Franklin Ang, instead of reforming the
instrument, prepared a deed of agreements which granted Gabina the right to repurchase the said land within 3 years for the same
amount paid (P600).
Pursuant to the provisions of said deed of agreement, Gabina's right to repurchase the property was to expire on October 4, 1957, that is,
three years from 4 October 1954 when the deed of sale was executed.
As early as 10 June 1955, however, Ang caused the registration of the deed of sale, resulting in the subsequent cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 682 and the consequent issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-161 for the same property in the name of
Franklin Ang.
On 24 June 1963, no redemption having been made, Ang sold said Lot No. 1131 to Melecio Suarez (Suarez) who then obtained Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-945 therefore in his name. Gabina Machoca died on 21 April 1966 leaving herein petitioners as her only heirs.
Melecio Suarez (Suarez) and Pilar de los Reyes (de los Reyes) filed an action against the Heirs before the City Court of the City of Ozamiz (Civil Case No.
C-1) for unlawful detainer with damages.
RTC (Civil Case C-1): declared Suarez and de los Reyes to be the real owners of Lot No. 1131 and ordering the Heirs to vacate the premises and pay the
costs.
CA (Civil Case C-1): dismissed (became final)
During the pendency of the Civil Case C-1, on 6 September 1977, the Heirs filed a petition for prohibition (Civil Case No. OZ-665) with the Court of First
Instance of Mizamis Occidental, Branch II, Ozamiz City, against City Court Judge Ceferino Ong and Suarez and de los Reyes to restrain Judge Ong from
further proceeding with the trial in Civil Case No. C-1 for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
RTC (Civil Case OZ-665): dismissed (no appeal was taken)
During the pendency of the Civil Case C-1, the Heirs filed an action to quiet title and to annul the title (Civil Case No. OZ-648) with the same CFI,
Branch II, Ozamiz City involving Lot No. 1131 against Ang, Longayan, Suarez, and de los Reyes.
RTC (Civil Case No. OZ-648): dismissed for failure to prosecute (order of dismissal became final)
On 14 December 1985, the Heirs filed Special Civil Case No. OZ-0751 with the RTC, Branch XV, Ozamiz City for conventional redemption and damages
against Suarez and de los Reyes.
Suarez and de los Reyes filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
RTC (Special Civil Case no. OZ-0751): dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of Special Civil Case No. OZ-0761 due to res judicata was proper
Held: Yes;
The principle of res judicata in actions in personam is found in Section 49 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
x x x
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. These two main rules mark the
distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first
general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section 49, is referred to as "bar by former
judgment" while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section, is known as "conclusiveness of
judgment.
Stated otherwise, when we speak of res judicata in its concept as a "bar by former judgment," the judgment rendered in the first case is
an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain
that judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged
therein. This is the concept in which the termres judicata is more commonly and generally used and in which it is understood as the bar by prior
judgment constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
On the other hand, the less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the
situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which
were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevant matters which the parties in the second action could properly
offer are not concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to or a ground for dismissal of the second action.
At bottom, the other elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference between the rule of res judicatas a bar by former
judgment and as merely a rule on the conclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the cause of action in both
cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of action in the first case is different from that in the second case.
The following requisites must concur in order that a prior judgment may bar a subsequent action, viz: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and
of cause of action.
There is no question that the order of dismissal rendered in the prior action, Civil Case No. OZ-648, had become final for failure of the heirs to appeal
the same after their motions for reconsideration were denied. Furthermore, while the dismissal was for failure to prosecute, it had the effect of
an adjudication on the merits, and operates as res judicata, since the court did not direct that the dismissal was without prejudice.
The fact remains that Civil Case No. OZ-648 for removal of clouds on title has, as parties, the same set of plaintiffs and defendants as Special Civil Case
No. OZ-0751 for conventional redemption and damages, and both cases involve Lot No. 1131 only.
It is elementary that, in adjective law, a cause of action is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. In all these cases, the Heirs have imputed to Suarez and de los Reyes and their predecessor in interest the
same alleged wrongful act, that is, acts of evident bad faith and fraud which supposedly divested the heirs' mother of her rights and
title to the property in dispute. There is, consequently, an identical cause of action claimed by the Heirs in these cases.
A well-entrenched rule declares that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. In fact, authorities tend to
widen rather than to restrict the doctrine of res judicata on the ground that public interest, as well as private interest, demand the ending of suits by
requiring the parties to sue once and for all in the same case all the special proceedings and remedies to which they are entitled.
In determining whether causes of action are identical so as to warrant application of the rule of res judicata, the test most commonly
stated is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent
action; otherwise it is not. It has been said that this method is the best and most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in
subsequent proceedings between the same parties, and it has even been designated as infallible.
In their motion to dismiss filed in Special Civil Case No. OZ-0751, Suarez and de los Reyes made a comparative analysis of the reliefs prayed for therein
and those in Civil Case No. OZ-648 which became the criterion in the court's order of dismissal. A perusal thereof reveals that both actions seek to have
the deed of agreement of October 5, 1954 considered as a mere equitable mortgage and to have the titles issued in the name of Suarez and de los
Reyes declared null and void on the ground of fraud. Although ostensibly of different forms, the inescapable conclusion is that the parties
are in effect litigating for the same thing and seeking the same relief, that is, to recover possession and ownership of Lot No. 1131. It
is of no moment that the later remedy is for conventional redemption while the former case was for removal of clouds on the title,
since both actions are anchored on exactly the same cause of action, are based on identical facts, and even claim the same relief. The
present petition is, therefore, although presented in a different form, barred by the former decision in the case for removal of clouds
on the title.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued pursuant to the resolution of
August 3, 1987 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.























San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. vs. CA
Doctrine/s:
(1) If any of the elements of a cause of action are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
(2) A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
Facts:
Almeda Development and Equipment Corporation (ADEC) is the owner of that parcel of land with building and other improvements situated at Pasay Road, San
Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47348. ADECs ownership is evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by
Ponciano L. Almeda, married to Eufemia Perez-Almeda.
However, Entry No. 59599 is annotated in TCT 47348 subjecting the owner, including the said property, to certain restrictions. (mandatory membership to the San
Lorenzo Village Association and dues)
Because of the said entry, ADEC filed a petition for cancellation of the restrictions annotated in TCT 47348 against the San Lorenzo Village
Association, Inc. (SLVAI). ADEC claims that the condition prevailing along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) on 10 July 1958, the date when the restrictions
were imposed by the San Lorenzo Company, Inc. to lot and house owners in San Lorenzo Village and on 11 July 1958, when the Deed of Restrictions was
annotated on TCT No. 60143/T-577 (the certificate of title from where TCT No. 47448 originated), is no longer the same compared today. Moreover, ADEC claims
that Entry 59599 is an unlawful limitation to the rights of the ADEC protected by the Constitution and prescribed in Art. 428 of the Civil Code.
Likewise, ADEC prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the San Lorenzo Company, Inc. and its agents "to cease and desist from making
ADEC a member of the San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. and prohibiting ADEC from constructing a taller building on its lot and the San Lorenzo Village
Association, Inc. from collecting membership fee and monthly dues and other assessments." It likewise prayed that the Register of Deeds of Makati be ordered to
cancel Entry No. 59599 in TCT No. 47348 and that SLVAI pay actual damages of P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P30,000.00 plus P500 allowance per attendance in
court hearings and the costs of suit.
Subsequently, SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of ADEC's personality to sue. It
alleged that ADEC was not a registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 47348; that the sale of the property by Ponciano L. Almeda to ADEC could
not bind third parties; that ADEC had no reason to pray for the cancellation of Entry No. 59599 not being the owner of the land nor a member of SLVAI but simply
a stranger that had no demandable right against the SLVAI. ADEC opposed the motion to dismiss contending that it had a cause of action against
SLVAI because as the (new) owner of the lot involved, it cannot be compelled to become a member of the SLVAI for to do so would unduly
limit its use of the property.
RTC: denied motion to dismiss; ADEC had the capacity and the legal personality to file the case being the successor in interest of the original registered
owner. (SLVAI filed motion for reconsideration)
RTC (M.R.): denied motion for reconsideration; (SLVAI filed petition for certiorari)
CA: denied petition for certiorari; citing Galeon vs. Galeon, the allegation of ADEC that it is the owner of the property on the strength of the deed of sale
should be deemed hypothetically admitted, giving it capacity to file the proceedings; whether or not ADEC validly acquired title to the property is one which is a
matter more by way of defense which may be properly threshed out during the trial.
Issue: Whether lower court validly denied the motion to dismiss
Held: Yes;
The Rules of Court requires that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. A complaint states a cause of action
where it contains the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation
of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. If the allegations are vague, indefinite, or in the
form of conclusions, the defendant's recourse is not a motion to dismiss but a bill of particulars.
A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deductible
therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial
notice."
However, it should be pointed out at the outset that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint,
but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of action".

The ruling in De Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. is not applicable in the case at bar. (said case gave examples of allegations not within the
hypothetical-admission rule. In the instant case, the complaint asserts that ADEC purchased the property in question from the person admittedly holding title
thereto. It then infers that by this mode, it became the successor-in-interest of the vendor, if not indeed the owner of the property. Hence, the restrictions in the
title should be nullified not only because it is contrary to law but also because the conditions under which they were imposed had ceased to exist.
In fact, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADEC's vendor, the execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latter's status as
the vendor's successor-in-interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well within the hypothetical-
admission principle. These averments satisfy the three (3) elements of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint did state a cause of action.
Additional Notes
SLVAI puts in issue whether ADEC possess a tenable right of action. (the said ground is not one of the grounds in motion to dismiss under Rule 16; it
should be raised in the answer)
ADEC is a real party in interest being the successor-in-interest of the original vendor.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition should be DISMISSED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED.


































Spouses Calalang vs. IAC
Doctrine:
(1) In a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, the question submitted for determination is sufficiency
of allegation in the complaint itself.

(2) The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano
vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217). HOWEVER, the said rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.
(3) As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the merits with
the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." (People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111).
Facts:
Erlinda Gruta (Erlinda), 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as househelper in the household of the spouses Dr. Fidel Calalang and
Dra. Maria Gener Calalang (Sps. Calalang) and their son Ferdinand Calalang (Ferdinand), in Bulacan.
On 31 October 1981, Erlinda died of malathion poisoning. Ferdinand, who brought Erlinda first to the Calalang's Clinic and then to Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital where she died, was charged with murder for allegedly poisoning her through a complaint filed by Erlindas Parents.
However, the Investigating Fiscal Liberato Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged.
Juanita Gruta, mother of Erlinda, did not file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice.
On 8 June 1983, nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda and over a year after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dated 27 May 1982,
dismissing the murder charge, a complaint for damages was filed by the Heirs of Erlinda against Ferdinand Calalang impleading the
spouses Calalang docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18019 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On 2 August 1983, Sps. Calalang and Ferdinand filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.
On 27 February 1984, a preliminary hearing was conducted by the trial court on the affirmative defenses of the Sps. Calalang and Ferdinand.
RTC: dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
CA: reversed the order of the RTC; remanded the case to the RTC
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the complaint for damages should be dismissed because of lack of cause of action
(2) Whether the trial court can dismiss the complaint motu propio on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against the defendant.
Held:
(1) No;
Under Section 5, Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense,
and preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been Med." This is to save the expense involved in the preparation and trial
when the case can be otherwise disposed of. The preliminary hearing should be conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be
allowed to present evidence and the evidence recorded (Asejo vs. Leonosa, 78 Phil. 467), except when the affirmative defense is based
on par. g., Section 1, Rule 16 "that the complaint states no cause of action." In determining sufficiency of cause of action, only the
facts alleged in the complaint should be considered. (De Jesus, et al., vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365; Dimayuga vs. Dimayuga, 96 Phil. 859).
It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, the question submitted
for determination is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of
the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217). This rule applies when the only
affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon by way of
affirmative defenses state other matters. Thus the trial court, in the case at bar, did not commit any error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses of Sps. Calalang and Ferdinand.
A perusal of the preliminary hearing indicates that the cause of action of the Heirs of Erlinda is based on the crime of murder allegedly committed by
Ferdinand Calalang.
(2) No;
The pleadings, memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition, thereto, might show that there is no valid cause of action against
Ferdinand Calalang; still, the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint
itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated." (People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111).
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision remanding this case to the court a quo for further proceedings is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the case against Dr. and Mrs. Fidel Calalang is hereby DISMISSED.



































Perpetual Savings Bank vs. Fajardo
Doctrine/s:
(1) The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not,
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the
complaint.
(2) In determining the existence of a cause of action, the court is not limited to what had been expressly and directly alleged but it may also
consider allegations which may be impliedly made.
(3) In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to
take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. (Rava Development Corporation vs. CA)
Facts:
On 29 December 1982, J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation (J.J. Mining) executed and delivered to Perpetual Savings Bank (PSB) a
promissory note in the amount, of P750,000.00 payable in one lump sum upon maturity on 29 January 1984, with interest at 23% per
annum. The promissory note was executed for J.J. Mining by respondents Jose Oro B. Fajardo (Fajardo) and Emmanuel F. Del Mundo
(Del Mundo). Messrs. Fajardo and Del Mundo are said to be officers of J.J. Mining; Del Mundo was apparently also counsel for J.J. Mining.


Upon maturity of the promissory note, neither J.J. Mining nor anyone else paid the amount of the indebtedness, notwithstanding PSB's
repeated written demands for payment.
On 31 July 1986, PSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 14501) against J.J. Mining, Jose Emmanuel
Jalandoni (in his personal capacity) and Fajardo and Del Mundo (in their representative and personal capacity), for collection of the amounts
due under the promissory note.
Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint had failed to state a cause of action against them. Subsequently, PSB
filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, citing paragraph 1.6 of its complaint and invoking, among other things, Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court (Re: Alternative Defendants).
RTC: denied motion to dismiss; grounds raised are not indubitable. (Fajardo and Del Mundo filed directly to SC; SC refered to CA)
CA: reversed and set aside orders of the RTC; no evidence had been presented to support such alleged liability on the so called alternative cause of
action which results to a complaint failure to state a cause of action against Fajardo and Del Mundo.
Issue: Whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Fajardo and Del Mundo which would warrant its dismissal
Held: No;
Fajardo and Del Mundo were, in the same complaint, and in the alternative, sued in their personal and individual capacities. In this respect, the
complaint alleges two (2) distinguishable bases for sustaining the suit. Firstly, Fajardo and Del Mundo are being sued as tort-feasors
who contracted the loan although they allegedly knew that the apparent principal obligor, J.J. Mining, would never be able to pay the
loan upon maturity. The cause of action here is basically fraudulent inducement, concealment or misrepresentation exercised upon
PSB which was misled into granting and releasing the loan. The second basis for suing Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and
individual capacities is that they allegedly used the proceeds of the loan for their own personal benefit, rather than for the benefit of
the borrower corporation.

In respect of these twin, related, bases for personal liability to the creditor, the Bank stated in paragraph 2.1 of its
complaint that J.J. Mining had "received value" "thru Fajardo and Del Mundo." Thus, the Bank has alleged that the proceeds of the loan were delivered
to the borrower corporation by delivering them to Fajardo and Del Mundo. The Bank has also stressed, in paragraph 3.1 of its complaint, that the paid-
up capital of the borrower corporation, was only P100,000.00 which, according to PSB, was obviously disproportionately small compared to the
P750,000.00 borrowed from the Bank.
However, there is a third possible basis for seeking to hold Fajardo and Del Mundo liable in their personal capacities: that they acted
without or in excess of their authority as agents or representatives of the borrower corporation. This third basis, however, was not
explicitly set out by the Bank in its complaint. The complaint did not directly allege that Fajardo and Del Mundo had acted without or
in excess of their authority as agents and representatives of J.J. Mining, in executing the Promissory Note for J.J. Mining and
receiving the proceeds thereof. However, such an allegation may be said to have been implicitly made along with the allegation that
Fajardo and Del Mundo had knowingly induced PSB to grant the loan though J.J. Mining had no capacity to pay, or with the allegation
that Fajardo and Del Mundo had converted the loan proceeds to their personal benefit.
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not,
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in
the complaint.
In Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner:
The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having
hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause
of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
the prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).
In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered.
It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (supra).
It was an error for the Court of Appeals to have dismissed the complaint because it did not state a cause of action on the ground that
no evidence had been presented to support the liability of Fajardo and Del Mundo. It was quite premature for the Court of Appeals to
consider evidence (or lack of evidence) outside the four corners of the complaint and to reach the above conclusion, since the fraud consisting of false
representations has yet to be proved by PSB in the course of the trial before the court a quo. By the same token, Fajardo and Del Mundo's
innocence and non-utilization, or fraud and conversion, of the loan proceeds for their private and personal benefit are precisely
defenses to be proved by Fajardo and Del Mundo in the course of the trial. Evidently, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
trial has yet to begin; for it assumed as real and established the defenses which need to be proved during that trial.
Having examined the record here carefully, and while the complaint filed in the trial court is not exactly a model of draftmanship, the Court considers
that it substantially meets the established test and that the complaint does state cause(s) of action not only against the borrower
corporation, J.J. Mining, but also against Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 August 1987 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 11547 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court dated 9 October 1986 and 22 December 1986 in Civil Case No. 14501 are hereby REINSTATED.
This case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Decision. Costs against respondents.



























City of Cebu vs. CA
Doctrine:
General Rule: When the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be allowed and the
issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint.
Exception: In exceptional circumstances, where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with
counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission, the Court may consider these evidence in addition
to the allegations in the complaint
Facts:
Merlita Cardeno (Cardeno) is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,019 square meters located at Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 116692. On 25 February 1992, the City of Cebu, filed a complaint for eminent domain against
Cardeno with Branch II of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City seeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. The complaint was
initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No. 1418, dated 17 February 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the
City Mayor to expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income city residents.
Subsequently, Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action claiming that the allegations
contained in paragraph VII of the complaint, to wit: That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have the aforementioned
property purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed. do not show compliance
with one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit as enunciated in Section 19 of R.A.
7160 (That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer
was not accepted ).
The City of Cebu sought to establish compliance with the requirement under Section 19 of R.A. 7160 by alleging in its "Comment and
Opposition" to Cardeno's Motion to Dismiss the fact that the City of Cebu actually made another offer to Mrs. Cardeno on 28 October
1991, through her lawyer, Atty. Omar Redula, for the purchase of her property in the amount of Four Hundred Seventy Eight
Thousand (P478,000.00) Pesos but the said offer was again refused by Cardeno.
RTC: dismissed the complaint; the City of Cebu has not complied with the condition precedent, thus, the complaint does not state a cause of action;
disregarded the City of Cebus allegation in its Comment and Opposition invoking the rule that the sufficiency of the complaint where the ground for
dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action is that its sufficiency can only be determined from the facts alleged in the complaint.
CA: affirmed; it is procedurally unacceptable to ascertain the existence of a cause of action from any source other than the allegations in the City of
Cebus complaint
Issue: Whether the City of Cebu had properly alleged a cause of action in its complaint.
Held: Yes;
Without necessarily delving into the parties' semantical arguments, this Court finds that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action. What may
perhaps be conceded is only the relative ambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of the complaint. However, as We have previously held, a
complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated therein
for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars. And, though the allegations in the complaint are
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a cause of action can, in any manner, be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover in any aspect of the facts or any combination of the facts alleged, if they were to be proved, then the
motion to dismiss should be denied.
In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein.
The error of both the RTC and Court of Appeals in holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action stems from their inflexible application of
the rule that: when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be
allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint. However, this rule is not without
exceptions. In the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry, this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and held that, ". . . although the evidence of
the parties were on the question of granting or denying the petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly
applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss." Likewise, in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, we sanctioned the act of the trial
court in considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. This Court deemed such course of action but logical where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the
merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for
admission. The same liberality should be applied in the instant case where an examination of the City of Cebu's "Comment and
Opposition" to Cardeno's Motion to Dismiss leaves no room for doubt that the City of Cebu had indeed made "a valid and definite
offer" to Cardeno as required by law.
Furthermore, a closer scrutiny reveals that even on the face of the complaint alone, there is extant a cause of action. The second
whereas clause of the said ordinance which was incorporated into Paragraph I of the said complaint provides that the city government has made a
valid and definite offer to purchase subject lot(s) for the public use aforementioned but the registered owner Mrs. Merlita Cardeno has rejected such
offer which is deemed to be admitted because by Cardenos filing of a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint including the ordinance which was annexed to the complaint.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered
remanded to the RTC which shall proceed to the hearing and final determination thereof.



































Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED
Doctrine:
Facts:
Sometime in October 1996, Dr. Reynaldo B. Vera, Chairman, Technical Panel for Engineering, Architecture, and Maritime Education (TPRAM) of [CHED],
received a letter dated 18 October 1998 from Douglas R. Macias, Chairman, Board of Aeronautical Engineering, Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) and Chairman, Technical Committee for Aeronautical Engineering (TPRAME) inquiring whether Indiana Aerospace University (IAU),
formerly Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc., had already acquired university status in view of the latter's advertisement in the Manila
Bulletin.
In a letter dated 24 October 1996, Dr. Vera formally referred the aforesaid letter to Chairman Alcala with a request that the concerned
Regional Office of [CHED] be directed to conduct appropriate investigation on the alleged misrepresentation by IAU.
As a consequence of said Report, Legal Affairs Service of CHED was requested to take legal action against IAU. Subsequently, on 3 February 1997,
CHED directed IAU to desist from using the term University, including the use of the same in any of its alleged branches.
CHED published an announcement in the 21 March 1998 issue of Freeman, a local newspaper in Cebu City, that there was no
institution of learning by that name (IAU). Likewise, the counsel of CHED was quoted as saying in the 28 March 1998 issue of the
newspaper Today that IAU had been ordered closed by CHED for illegal advertisement, fraud and misrepresentation of itself as a
university.
In the course of its investigation, CHED was able to verify from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that IAU filed a proposal to amend its
corporate name from Indiana School of Aeronautics to Indiana Aerospace University, which was supposedly favorably recommended by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) per its Indorsement dated 17 July 1995, and on that basis, SEC issued to IAU a
Certificate of Registration No. AS-083-002689.
Surprisingly, SEC Chairman Perfecto R. Yasay, Jr. wrote a letter to the chairman of CHED informing the latter that IAU has not filed any amended
articles of
In reaction to CHEDs order for IAU to desist from using the word 'University', Jovenal Toring, chairman and founder of IAU wrote a letter appealing for
reconsideration of the said order, with a promise to follow the provisions of CMO No. 48.
The appeal of IAU was however rejected by CHED and CHED subsequently ordered IAU to cease and desist from using the word
'University.' However, prior to the said rejection by CHED, IAU had already filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against CHED.
On 7 April 1998, CHED filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, based on 1) improper venue; 2) lack of authority of the
person instituting the action; and 3) lack of cause of action.
RTC: denied Motion to Dismiss; issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of IAU; ordered CHED to file its answer within 15 days from receipt of
order (15 August 1998)
On 22 September 1998, IAU filed before the RTC a Motion to Declare CHED in default. However, CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File its
Answer, until 18 November 1998.
On 17 November 1998, CHED filed its Answer. However, the RTC still declared CHED in default. (CHED filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
arguing that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in denying its Motion to Dismiss, (b) in issuing a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and (c) in declaring it in default despite its filing an Answer.)
CA: dismissed the complaint; IAU had no cause of action; writ of preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued; CHED should have not been
declared in default.
Issue: Whether it was proper for CHED to file a petition for certiorari in order to challenge the order denying its motion to dismiss
Held: No;
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ
of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its
jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed
to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's denial of the Motion to Dismiss, as contained in the 14 August
1998 Order. The CA erred in ruling otherwise. The trial court stated in its Decision that petitioner was an educational institution, originally registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission as the "Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc." That name was subsequently changed to "Indiana Aerospace
University" after the Department of Education, Culture and Sports had interposed no objection to such change.
CHED issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing petitioner to stop using the word "university" in its corporate name. The
former also published an announcement in the March 21, 1998 issue of Freeman, a local newspaper in Cebu City, that there was no
institution of learning by that name. The counsel of respondent was quoted as saying in the March 28, 1998 issue of the
newspaper Today that IAU had been ordered closed by the respondent for illegal advertisement, fraud and misrepresentation of itself
as a university. Such acts, according to the RTC undermined the public's confidence in IAU as an educational institution. This was a
clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a
procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART, and the assailed Decision MODIFIED. The trial court
is DIRECTED to SET ASIDE the Order of Default of December 9, 1998; to ADMIT the Answer dated November 5, 1998; to LIFT the preliminary
injunction; and to CONTINUE, with all deliberate speed, the proceedings in Civil Case NO. 98-811.





























Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. CA
Doctrine/s:
General Rule: An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari.
Exception: The special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court
Facts:
Leonida Umandal-Bausas (Bausas) had been maintaining a Savings Account as depositor of Bangko Silangan Development Bank (BSDB), Nasugbu
Branch, Batangas since 1985. As of April 1990, she had Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) deposited under her Savings Account No. 04-3652. 23 On
April 1990, Bausas attempted to withdraw Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) from her savings account but, to her surprise, the bank teller told her that
the withdrawal could not be done because her brother, Antonio Umandal, had already withdrawn the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
allegedly with her written authorization and that her remaining balance was only Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00). Bausas then inquired about the
withdrawal slip and found that the signatures appearing thereon were not hers and neither that of her brother.
Dismayed by the turn of events, Bausas sought the assistance of a family friend, Edmundo Villadolid (Villadolid), who was then the President-Manager
of the Rural Bank of Nasugbu, Batangas. Villadolid, through a letter, warned BSDB that he would be constrained to elevate the matter to "higher
authorities" should there be no "reasonable and convincing results at the earliest possible time" regarding the said matter.
After resorting to different venues for airing her complaint (Central Bank, BDSB Main Office, NBI), it appears that Bausas sought another venue - the
press. Thus, in the 17 September 1990 issue of the People's Journal Tonight, the following headline appeared: "Bank Money Withdrawn
w/o Depositor's Knowledge". Aside from that publication, Bausas and Villadolid reproduced by xerox machine the said news item and
posted the xerox copies in conspicuous places within the municipal hall of Nasugbu.
Aggrieved by such publications, BSDB filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages (Civil Case 91-56185) against Bausas, Villadolid, the Philippine
Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr. (publisher), Alfredo M. Marquez (managing editor), Franklin Cabaluna (news editor), Benjamin Ayllon (city editor)
and Raul S. Beltran (reporter) alleging that the "series of publications" were "clearly defamatory and libelous", and that the publication constituted the
crime defined and penalized under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code that damaged the "goodwill, integrity and good reputation" of the 21-year old
bank.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaiim, Bausas and Villadolid alleged that the withdrawal slip was a forgery and that Villadolid's actions were
moved by a "sense of moral duty" to Bausas and her family.
While Civil Case No.91-56185 was pending in the RTC of Manila, or on February 13, 1992, Bausas, joined by her husband Ricardo, filed Civil Case
No. 221, a complaint for a sum of money, with damages, against BSDB before the RTC of Batangas, Branch 14 in Nasugbu, Batangas.
Instead of filing a responsive pleading to the complaint, BSDB filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that (a) there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same case (sic); (b) the action caused the splitting of the cause of action raised in the answer and
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 91-56185; (c) the action violated the principle of multiplicity of suits, and; (d) the filing of the
complaint constituted forum-shopping.
RTC: denied motion to dismiss; (BSDB filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA)
CA: dismissed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari; there is no litis pendentia
Issue: Whether an order denying BSDBs motion to dismiss can be a subject of a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
Held: No;
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by BSDB before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to
question the denial of its motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 221. The Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion
to dismiss are merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may be modified or
rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or
that no injustice results thereby. These limitations were not transgressed by the trial court in the case at bar when it denied the BSDB's motion to
dismiss. The alleged "chaos and confusion" arising from conflicting decisions that BSDB purportedly seeks to avert by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 221
are actually far-fetched and contrived considering that any adverse decision of the CTA can be made the subject of a proper appeal.
Our recent ruling in Espao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar, to wit:
"We find occasion here to state the rule, once more, that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not
appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of
law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to
trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. This is exactly what petitioner should
have done in this case after his prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21-88 was denied by the trial court. Although the special civil
action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court, that vitiating error is indubitably not present in the instant case."
Moreover, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

More particularly, it must conform to the following
requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Clearly, the issue in Civil Case No. 221 is whether or not BSDB was negligent in validating the withdrawal slip and the alleged authority to withdraw of
Bausas' brother so that it could be held responsible for the amount withdrawn. Basically, that case is a collection suit founded on a contract of bank
deposit. On the other hand, the issue in Civil Case No. 91-56185 is whether or not the alleged publications of the incident made by Bausas and Villadolid
are defamatory so as to warrant BSDB's entitlement to damages. What is essential in litis pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under
consideration. There being no similarity of issues in Civil Cases No. 91-56185 and 221, the filing of the latter case was not barred by litis
pendentia.
There is neither identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought by the parties in the two (2) cases. BSDB asserts its right to be compensated
for alleged damage to its goodwill and reputation in Civil Case No. 91-56185 of the RTC of Manila. Bausas, on the other hand, asserts her right to be
reimbursed the amount illegally withdrawn from her savings bank account in Civil Case No. 221 of the RTC of Batangas. As to the reliefs sought,
while both BSDB and Bausas seek damages, the reasons for such reliefs prayed for are divergent. Thus, there is no identity of causes of
action in the two (2) cases.
While it is true that the two (2) cases are founded on practically the same set of facts, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
it cannot be said that exactly the same evidence are needed to prove the causes of action in both cases. Thus, in Civil Case No. 91-56185
of the RTC of Manila, the evidence needed to prove that BSDB sustained damage to its reputation and goodwill is not the same evidence needed in Civil
Case No. 221 of the RTC of Batangas to prove the allegation that a substantial amount of Bausas' bank deposit in BSDB's bank was illegally withdrawn
without her consent or authority. The RTC of Batangas and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not abuse their discretion in denying
BSDB's motion to dismiss which was based on the ground of litis pendentia..
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED; and the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas, is hereby directed to proceed with dispatch to resolve
Civil Case No. 221.



















Yutingco vs CA
Doctrine:
(1) The recourse of a petitioner who has been denied of his/her/its motion to dismiss is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the
objections raised in their motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course.

(2) Exceptions:
(a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction,
(b) when there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, or
(c) when appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the
injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendants to needlessly go
through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets with another futile case.
Facts:
DBP granted a credit accommodation for One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000) to Nikon Industrial Corporation (Nikon) under the terms and
conditions of the Credit Line Agreement dated 11 December 1996 with an agreement that Nikon would be considered in default among others if: (1) it
fails to pay an instalment or principal or interest on the due date and (2) in case of death, dissolution, bankruptcy, reorganization, winding-up or
liquidation or any other proceedings analogous to the foregoing or proceedings for the collection of borrowed money.
In consideration of the credit accommodation, Yutingco and Kuan, as the controlling stockholders of Nikon, bound themselves as primary obligors on
any availment thereon. Nikon executed promissory notes as guarantees.
Nikon defaulted on the payment of the interest. Moreover, on 16 September 1997, Nikon with other corporations, filed a petition for suspension of
payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed a complaint against Eulogio Yutingco (Yutingco) and Wong Bee Kuan (Kuan) for the collection of a sum
of money with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. DBP defaulted in the
payment of the interest and that the filing of the petition for suspension of payments with the SEC constituted another default as stipulated in the
agreement.
On 11 March 1998, Yutingco and Kuan filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) a condition
precedent for the filing of the claim was not complied with; and (3) the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RTC: denied motion to dismiss; court has jurisdiction; issue of default raised by DBP is a factual one which must await trial.
On 7 July 1998, Yutingco and Kuan received a copy of the aforementioned Order dated 7 May 1998. On September 7, 1998, Yutingco and Kuan filed
before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for an additional period of
fifteen (15) days, or until 22 September 1998.
On 22 September 1998, Yutingco and Kuan filed a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.
CA: denied motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari, on the propriety of the lower courts denying their motion to dismiss, should have not been dismissed on
mere technicality.
Held: No;
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or
mandamus. Yutingco and Kuans recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in their motion to
dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the entire case by appeal in due course.
Of course, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule. Among them are: (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction, (b) when there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, or (c) when appeal would not prove to be a speedy
and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken
order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendants to needlessly go through a protracted trial and
clogging the court dockets with another futile case. In the present case, however, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss since it
perceived the issue therein was one of default, a factual issue which must await trial. Clearly, DBPs cause is not covered by any of the
recognized exceptions. They should proceed to trial and if the result is unfavorable to them, then their recourse is to elevate the entire
case on appeal in accordance with the rules. For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is
essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted.
Additional Notes
Period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari is out to be considered inextendible. (Heavy Workload alone would not be a sufficient
reason to deviate from the 60-day period)
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 9, 1998 and January 13, 1999
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, is ordered to proceed and resolve Civil Case No. 97-2653 with dispatch.