Thermodynamic Asymmetry in Time

First published Thu Nov 15, 2001; substantive revision Fri Jul 29, 2011
Macroscopic processes appear to be temporally directed in some sense. Systems
spontaneously evolve to future equilibrium states, but they do not spontaneously
evolve away from equilibrium states. The nature of this directedness raises many
questions in the foundations of philosophy and science.
Thermodynamics is the science that describes much of the time-asymmetric
behavior found in the world. This entry's first tas, consequently, is to show how
thermodynamics treats temporally !directed" behavior. #t then concentrates on the
followin$ two questions. %&' (hat is the ori$in of the thermodynamic asymmetry in
time) #n a world possibly $overned by time-symmetric laws, how should we
understand the time-asymmetric laws of thermodynamics) %*' +oes the
thermodynamic time asymmetry e,plain the other temporal asymmetries) +oes it
account, for instance, for the fact that we now more about the past than the future)
The discussion thus divides between thermodynamics bein$ an e,planandum or
e,planans. #n the former case the answer will be found in philosophy of physics- in
the latter case it will be found in metaphysics, epistemolo$y, and other fields,
thou$h in each case there will be blurrin$ between the disciplines.
&. Thermodynamic Time .symmetry/ . 0rief 1uide
*. The 2roblem of the +irection of Time #
3. The 2roblem of the +irection of Time ##
0iblio$raphy
.cademic Tools
4ther #nternet 5esources
5elated 6ntries
1. Thermodynamic Time Asymmetry: A Brief Guide
7onsider the followin$.
2lace some chlorine $as in a small closed flas into the corner of a room. Set it up
so that an automaton will remove its cover in & minute. 8ow we now what to do/
run. 7hlorine is poison, and furthermore, we now the $as will spread reasonably
quicly throu$h its available volume. The chlorine ori$inally in equilibrium in the
flas will, upon bein$ freed, !rela," to a new equilibrium.
4r less dramatically/
2lace an iron bar over a flame for half an hour. 2lace another one in a free9er for
the same duration. 5emove them and place them a$ainst one another. (ithin a
short time the hot one will !lose its heat" to the cold one. The new combined two-
bar system will settle to a new equilibrium, one intermediate between the cold and
hot bar's ori$inal temperatures. 6ventually the bars will to$ether settle to rou$hly
room temperature.
These are two e,amples of a tendency of systems to spontaneously evolve to
equilibrium- but there are indefinitely more e,amples in all manner of substance.
The physics first used to systematically describe such processes is thermodynamics.
:irst developed in S. 7arnot's Reflections on the Motive o!er of Fire &;*<, the
science of classical thermodynamics is intimately associated with the industrial
revolution. Most of the results responsible for the science ori$inated from the
practice of en$ineers tryin$ to improve steam en$ines. 0e$un in :rance and
6n$land in the late ei$hteeth and early nineteenth centuries, the science quicly
spread throu$hout 6urope. 0y the mid-nineteenth century, 7lausius in 1ermany
and Thomson %later =ord >elvin' in 6n$land had developed the theory in $reat
detail.
Thermodynamics is a !phenomenal" science, in the sense that the variables of the
science ran$e over macroscopic parameters such as temperature and volume.
(hether the microphysics underlyin$ these variables are motive atoms in the void
or an imponderable fluid is lar$ely irrelevant to this science. The developers of the
theory both prided themselves on this fact and at the same time worried about it.
7lausius, for instance, was one of the first to speculate that heat consisted solely of
the motion of particles %without an ether', for it made the equivalence of heat with
mechanical wor less surprisin$. ?owever, as was common, he ept his
ontolo$ical beliefs separate from his statement of the principles of
thermodynamics because he didn't wish to %in his words' taint the latter with the
speculative character of the former.
@&A
. treatment of thermodynamics naturally be$ins with the statements it taes to be
laws of nature. These laws are founded upon observations of relationships between
particular macroscopic parameters and they are Bustified by the fact they are
empirically adequate. 8o further Bustification of these laws is to be found C at this
sta$e C from the details of microphysics. 5ather, stable, counterfactual-supportin$
$enerali9ations about macroscopic features are enshrined as law. The typical
te,tboo treatment of thermodynamics describes some basic concepts, states the
laws in a more or less rou$h way and then proceeds to derive the concepts of
temperature and entropy and the various thermodynamic equations of state. #t is
worth remarin$, however, that in the last fifty years the subBect has been presented
with a de$ree of mathematical ri$or not previously achieved. 4ri$inatin$ from the
early a,iomati9ation by 7aratheodory in &DED, the development of !rational
thermodynamics" has clarified the concepts and lo$ic of classical thermodynamics
to a de$ree not $enerally appreciated. There now e,ist many quite different,
mathematically e,act approaches to thermodynamics, each startin$ with different
primitive inds andFor observational re$ularities as a,ioms. %:or a popular
presentation of a recent a,iomati9ation, see =ieb and Gn$vason *EEE.'
#n the traditional approach classical thermodynamics has two laws, the second of
which is our main focus. %5eaders may have heard of a "third law" as well, but it
was added later and is not relevant to the present discussion.' The first law
e,presses the conservation of ener$y. The law uses the concept of the internal
ener$y of a system, ", which is a function of variables such as volume. :or
thermally isolated %adiabatic' systemsCthin of systems such as coffee in a
thermosCthe law states that this function, ", is such that the wor # delivered to a
system's surroundin$s is compensated by a loss of internal ener$y, i.e., d# H -d".
(hen Ioule and others showed that mechanical wor and heat were
interconvertible, consistency with the principle of ener$y conservation demanded
that heat, $, considered as a different form of ener$y, be taen into account. :or
non-isolated systems we e,tend the law as d$ H d" Jd#, where d$ is the
differential of the amount of heat added to the system %in a reversible manner'.
The conservation of ener$y tells us nothin$ about temporally asymmetric behavior.
#n particular, it doesn't follow from the first law that interactin$ systems quicly
tend to approach equilibrium %a state where the values of the macroscopic variables
remain appro,imately stable', and once achieved, never leave this state. #t is
perfectly consistent with the first law that systems in equilibrium leave equilibrium.
Since this tendency of systems cannot be derived from the :irst =aw, another law is
needed. .lthou$h 7arnot was the first to state it, the formulations of >elvin and
7lausius are standard/
>elvin's Second =aw/ There is no thermodynamic process whose sole effect is to
transform heat e,tracted from a source at uniform temperature completely into
wor.
7lausius' Second =aw/ There is no thermodynamic process whose sole effect is to
e,tract a quantity of heat from a colder reservoir and deliver it to a hotter reservoir.
>elvin's version is essentially the same as the version arrived at by both 7arnot and
2lanc, whereas 7lausius' version differs from these in a few ways.
@*A
7lausius' version transparently rules out anti-thermodynamic behavior such as a hot
iron bar e,tractin$ heat from a nei$hborin$ cold iron bar. The cool bar cannot $ive
up a quantity of heat to the warmer bar %without somethin$ else happenin$'.
>elvin's statement is perhaps less obvious. #t ori$inates in an observation about
steam en$ines, namely, that heat ener$y is a !poor" $rade of ener$y. 7onsider a $as-
filled cylinder with a frictionless piston holdin$ the $as down at one end. #f we put
a flame under the cylinder, the $as will e,pand and the piston can perform wor,
e.$., it mi$ht move a ball. ?owever, we can never convert the heat ener$y strai$ht
into wor without some other effect occurrin$. #n this case, the $as occupies a
lar$er volume.
#n &;K< 7lausius introduced the notion of the !equivalence value" of a
transformation, a concept that is the ancestor of the modern day concept of entropy.
=ater in &;LK 7lausius coined the term !entropy" for a similiar concept %the word
derives from the 1ree word for transformation'. The entropy of a state %, &%%' is
defined as the inte$ral &%%' H d$FTover a reversible transformation, where ' is
some arbitrary fi,ed state. :or % to have an entropy, the transformation
from ' to % must be quasi-static, i.e., a succession of equilibrium states. 7ontinuity
considerations then imply that the initial and final states ' and % must also be
equilibrium states. #n terms of entropy, the Second =aw states that in a
transformation from equilibrium state % to equilibrium state (, the inequality &%('
M &%%' is $reater than or equal to the d$FT. =oosely put, for realistic systems,
this implies that in the spontaneous evolution of a thermally closed system the
entropy can never decrease and that it attains its ma,imum value for states at
equilibrium. (e are invited to thin of the Second =aw as drivin$ the $as to its
new, hi$her entropy equilibrium state. Nsin$ this concept of entropy,
thermodynamics is able to capture an e,traordinary ran$e of phenomena under one
simple law. 5emarably, whether they are $ases fillin$ their available volumes, two
iron bars in contact comin$ to the same temperature, or mil mi,in$ in your coffee,
they all have an observable property in common/ their entropy increases. 7oupled
with the :irst =aw, the Second =aw is remarably powerful. #t appears that all
classical thermodynamical behavior can be derived from these two simple
statements %2enrose &DOE'.
@3A
There are a number of philosophical questions one mi$ht as about the the laws of
thermodynamics. :or instance, where e,actly is time-asymmetry found in the above
statement of the Second =aw) #f Nffin *EE& is correct, then this static Second
=aw does not encode any time asymmetry- the spontaneous movement from non-
equilibrium to equilibrium must be described as a new thermodynamic law.
.nother question is whether the Second =aw is universal) That is, does it apply to
the universe as a whole, so that we can say the universe's entropy is increasin$, or
does it only apply to select sub-systems of the universe) %See Nffin *EE& %4ther
#nternet 5esources' for an interestin$ historical discussion of this topic, too.' ?ow
are these laws framed in a relativistic universe) +o =orent9 boosted $ases appear
hotter or colder in the new frame) Surprisin$ly, the correct %special' relativistic
transformation rules for thermodynamic quantities, and thus the relativistic
understandin$ of thermodynamic time asymmetry, is still controversial. 6instein
himself answered the question differently throu$hout his lifeP (ith all the current
activity of physicists bein$ focused on the thermodynamics of blac holes in
$eneral relativity and quantum $ravity, it is amusin$ to note that special relativistic
thermodynamics is still a field with many open questions, both physically and
philosophically. %See 6arman &D;& and =iu &DD<.'
.nother important question concerns the reduction of thermodynamic concepts
such as entropy to their mechanical, or statistical mechanical, basis. .s even a
cursory $lance at statistical mechanics reveals, there are many candidates for the
statistical mechanical entropy, each the center of a different pro$ram in the
foundations of the field. Surprisin$ly, there is no consensus as to which entropy is
best suited to be the reduction basis of the thermodynamic entropy %see, for
e,ample, Slar &DD3- 7allender &DDD- =avis *EEK'. 7onsequently, there is little
a$reement about what the Second =aw loos lie in statistical mechanics. +espite
the worthiness of these issues, this article will focus on the particularly important
problem of the direction of time %thou$h as we'll see, many issues $o by this name.'
2. The Problem of the Direction of Time I
This !problem of the direction of time" has its source in the debates over the status
of the second law of thermodynamics between =. 0olt9mann and some of his
contemporaries, notably, I. =oschmidt, 6. Qermelo and 6. 7ulverwell. 0olt9mann
sou$ht the mechanical underpinnin$ of the second law. ?e devised a particularly
in$enious e,planation for why systems tend toward equilibrium. 7onsider an
isolated $as of N particles in a bo,, where N is lar$e enou$h to mae the system
macroscopic %N R &E
*3
J'. :or the sae of familiarity we will wor with classical
mechanics. (e can characteri9e the $as by the coordinates and momenta )
in
, p
in
of
each of its particles and represent the whole system by a point * H %+,p' in a LN-
dimensional phase space nown as S, where + H %+
&
T +
3N
' and p H %p
&
T p
3N
'.
0olt9mann's $reat insi$ht was to see that the thermodynamic entropy ar$uably
reduced to the volume in S piced out by the macroscopic parameters of the
system. The ey in$redient is partitionin$ S into compartments, such that all of the
microstates * in a compartment are macroscopically %and thus thermodynamically'
indistin$uishable. To each macrostate M, there corresponds a volume of S, US
M
U,
whose si9e will depend on the macrostate in question. :or combinatorial reasons,
almost all of S corresponds to a state of thermal equilibrium. There are simply
many more ways to be distributed with uniform temperature and pressure than
ways to be distributed with nonuniform temperature and pressure. There is a vast
numerical imbalance in S between the states in thermal equilibrium and the states
in thermal nonequilibrium.
(e can now introduce 0olt9mann's famous entropy formula %up to an additive
constant'/
&
(
%M%*'' H , lo$ US
M
U
where US
M
U is the volume in S associated with the macrostate M, and , is
0olt9mann's constant. &
(
provides a relative measure of the amount of S
correspondin$ to each M. 1iven the mentioned asymmetry in S, almost all
microstates are such that their entropy value is overwhelmin$ly liely to increase
with time. (hen the constraints are released on systems initially confined to small
sections of S, typical systems will evolve into lar$er compartments. Since the new
equilibrium distribution occupies al-ost all of the newly available phase space,
nearly all of the microstates ori$inatin$ in the smaller volume will tend toward
equilibrium. 6,cept for those incredibly rare microstates conspirin$ to stay in small
compartments, microstates will evolve in such a way as to have &
(
increase.
Thou$h substantial questions can be raised about the details of this approach, and
philosophers can ri$htly worry about the Bustification of the standard probability
measure on S, this e,planation seems to offer a plausible fra-e!or, for
understandin$ why the entropy of systems tends to increase with time. %:or further
e,planation and discussion see 0ricmont &DDK, 7allender &DDD, :ri$$ *EE;, *EED,
1oldstein *EE&, >lein &DO3, =avis *EEK and =ebowit9 &DD3, Nffin *EEL.'
0efore 0olt9mann e,plained entropy increase as described above, he proposed a
now notorious proof nown as the ?-theorem to the effect that entropy must
always increase %see 0rown, Myrvold and Nffin *EED'. =oschmidt and Qermelo
launched obBections to the ?-theorem. 0ut an obBection in their spirit can also be
advanced a$ainst 0olt9mann's later view setched above. =oosely put, because the
classical equations of motion are time reversal invariant %T5#', nothin$ in the
ori$inal e,planation necessarily referred to the direction of time. %See ?urley
&D;K.' Thou$h # Bust stated the 0olt9mannian account of entropy increase in terms
of entropy increasin$ into the future, the e,planation can be turned around and
made for the past temporal direction as well. 1iven a $as in a bo, that is in a
nonequilibrium state, the vast maBority of microstates that are antecedents of the
dynamical evolution leadin$ to the present macrostate correspond to a macrostate
with hi.her entrop/ than the present one. Therefore, not only is it hi$hly liely that
typical microstates correspondin$ to a nonequilibrium state will evolve to hi$her
entropy states, but it is also hi$hly liely that they evolved fro- hi$her entropy
states.
7oncisely put, the problem is that $iven a nonequilibrium state at time t
*
, it is
overwhelmin$ly liely that
%&' the nonequilibrium state at t
*
will evolve to one closer to equilibrium at t
3
but that due to the reversibility of the dynamics it is also overwhelmin$ly liely that
%*' the nonequilibrium state at t
*
has evolved from one closer to equilibrium at t
&
where t
&
V t
*
V t
3
. ?owever, transitions described by %*' do not seem to occur- or
phrased more carefully, not both %&' and %*' occur. ?owever we choose to use the
terms !earlier" and !later," clearly entropy doesn't increase in both temporal
directions. :or ease of e,position let us dub %*' the culprit.
The traditional problem is not merely that nomolo$ically possible %anti-
thermodynamic' behavior does not occur when it could. That is not
strai$htforwardly a problem/ all sorts of nomolo$ically allowed processes do not
occur. 5ather, the problem is that statistical mechanics seems to mae a prediction
that is falsified, and that is a problem accordin$ to anyone's theory of confirmation.
Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. 1enerally speain$, there are
two ways to solve the problem/ eliminate transitions of type %*' either with special
boundary conditions or with laws of nature. The former method wors if we
assume that earlier states of the universe are of comparatively low-entropy and that
%relatively' later states are not also low-entropy states. There are no hi$h-to-low-
entropy processes simply because earlier entropy was very low. .lternatively, the
latter method wors if we can somehow restrict the domain of physically possible
worlds to those admittin$ only low-to-hi$h transitions. The laws of nature are the
strai$htBacet on what we deem physically possible. Since we need to eliminate
transitions of type %*' while eepin$ those of type %&' %or vice versa', a necessary
condition of the laws doin$ this Bob is that they be time reversal noninvariant. 4ur
choice of strate$y boils down to either assumin$ temporally asymmetric boundary
conditions or of addin$ %or chan$in$ to' time reversal noninvariant laws of nature
that mae entropy increase liely. Many approaches to this problem have thou$ht
to avoid this dilemma, but a little analysis of any proposed !third way" ar$uably
proves this to be false.
2.1 Past Hypothesis
(ithout chan$in$ the T5# laws of nature, there is no way to eliminate transition %*'
in favor of %&'. 8evertheless, appealin$ to temporally asymmetric boundary
conditions, as we've seen, allow us to describe a world wherein %&' but not %*'
occur. . cosmolo$ical hypothesis claimin$ that in the very distant past entropy was
much lower will wor. 0olt9mann, as well as many of this century's $reatest
scientists, e.$., 6instein, :eynman, and Schroedin$er, saw that this hypothesis is
necessary $iven our laws. %0olt9mann, however, e,plained this low-entropy
condition by treatin$ the observable universe as a natural statistical fluctuation
away from equilibrium in a vastly lar$er universe.' 6arlier states do not have
hi$her entropy than present states because we mae the cosmolo$ical posit that the
universe be$an in an e,tremely tiny section of its available phase space. .lbert
*EEE calls this the 2ast ?ypothesis and ar$ues that it solves both this problem of
the direction of time and also the one to be discussed below. 8ote that classical
mechanics is also compatible with a :uture ?ypothesis/ the claim that entropy is
very low in the distant future. The restriction to distant is needed, for if the near
future were of low-entropy, we would not e,pect the thermodynamic behavior that
we see C see 7oce &DLO, 2rice &DDL and Schulman &DDO for discussion of two-
time boundary conditions.
The main dissatisfaction with this solution is that many do not find it
sufficiently e)planator/ of thermodynamic behavior. That a $as in the lab last
(ednesday filled its available volume due to special initial conditions may be
credible. 0ut that $ases everywhere for all time should e,pand throu$h their
available volumes due to special initial conditions is, for some, incredible. The
common cause of these events is viewed as unliely. 6,pressin$ this feelin$,
2enrose &D;D estimates that the probability, $iven the standard measure on phase
space, of the universe startin$ in the requisite state is astronomically small.
7allender &DDO, however, assimilates the problem to the $eneral one facin$ the
special sciences C all special science laws require conspiratorial initial conditions
for their $enerali9ations to hold. #f the problem really is a problem, accordin$ to
7allender, it is not necessarily one specific to thermodynamics and time's direction.
6choes of this debate resonate throu$h another distant question of interest to
philosophers/ is the 2ast ?ypothesis itself needy of e,planation) 2rice *EE< ar$ues
that it is, whereas 7allender *EE<a ar$ues that it does not.
(hile not denyin$ that temporally asymmetric boundary conditions are needed to
solve the problem, 6arman *EEL is very critical of many other claims made on
behalf of the 2ast ?ypothesis. The 2ast ?ypothesis is sometimes said to be
independently confirmed by modern cosmolo$y, but is that really so) ?ow does the
2ast ?ypothesis sit with modern inflationary cosmolo$y, especially with the
probability measures it places over the initial conditions of the universe) 4n these
questions see also 7allender *EE<b- *E&&.
.nother persistent line of criticism mi$ht be labelled the subsystem worry. #t's
consistent with the 2ast ?ypothesis, after all, that none of the subsystems on 6arth
ever display thermodynamically asymmetric behavior. ?ow e,actly does the $lobal
entropy increase of the universe imply local entropy increase amon$ the
subsystems %especially, amon$ the subsystems which $ave rise to us positin$ the
Second =aw anyway') See 7allender *EE,, :risch *E&E, 8orth *E&E, and (insber$
*EE< for further discussion.
2.2 lectroma!netism
The physicist 6. 5it9 and others have claimed that electroma$netism accounts for
the thermodynamic arrow. The wave equation for both mechanical and
electroma$netic processes is well-nown to include both !advanced" and !retarded"
solutions. The retarded solution
$ives the field amplitude W
ret
at r,t by findin$ the source density r at rX at earlier
times. The advanced solution
$ives the field amplitude in terms of the source density at rX at later times. +espite
this symmetry nature seems to contain only processes obeyin$ the retarded
solutions. %This popular way of statin$ the electroma$netic asymmetry is actually
misleadin$. The advanced solutions describe the radiation sin's receivin$ waves,
and this happens all the time. The asymmetry of radiation instead lay with the form
%concentrated or dispersed' the sources tae.'
#f we place an isolated concentrated $as in the middle of a lar$e volume, we would
e,pect the particles to spread out in an e,pandin$ sphere about the center of the
$as, much as radiation spreads out. #t is therefore temptin$ to thin that there is a
relationship between the thermodynamic and electroma$netic arrows of time. #n a
debate in &DED, .. 6instein and 6. 5it9 disa$reed about the nature of this
relationship. 5it9 too the position that the asymmetry of radiation had to be Bud$ed
lawlie and that the thermodynamic asymmetry could be derived from this law.
6instein's position is instead that irreversibility is e,clusively based on reasons of
probability %6instein and 5it9 &DED, quoted from Qeh &D;D, &3'. #t is unclear
whether he meant probability plus the ri$ht boundary conditions, or simply
probability alone. #n any case, 5it9 believes the radiation arrow causes the
thermodynamic one, whereas 6instein seems to hold somethin$ closer to the
opposite position.
#f this is correct, then it seems that 6instein must be ri$htCor at least, closer to
bein$ correct than 5it9. 5it9' position appears implausible if only because it implies
$ases composed of neutral particles will not tend to spread out. That aside, it is
plausible to thin that the wave asymmetry must ori$inate in asymmetric boundary
conditions, Bust as the statistical mechanical asymmetry may. 5ecall the statistical
version of the Second =aw. #t implies that with the ri$ht %improbable' initial
conditions a system will under$o improbable-to-probable transitions rather than the
reverse. The crucial point to see is that the usual retarded radiation is a ind of
improbable-to-probable transition. . concentrated source is improbable, but $iven
its e,istence, a system will evolve toward more probable re$ions of the phase
space, i.e., the waves will spread. .dvanced radiation is liewise a species of
improbable-to-probable transitions. 1iven an improbable source in the past, it will
spread bacwards in time to more probable re$ions of the phase space too. Nsin$
2opper's famous mechanical wave e,ample as an analo$y, throwin$ a roc into a
pond so that waves on the surface spread out into the future requires every bit the
conspiracy that is needed for waves to conver$e on a point in order to eBect a roc
from the bottom. 0oth are equally liely, pace 2opper- whether one or both happen
depends upon the boundary conditions. The real asymmetry lies in the fact that in
the past there are concentrated sources for waves, whereas in the future there tend
not to be. These considerations do not mean the radiation arrow reduces in any
sense to the thermodynamic arrow. 5ather, the thin$ to say is that the radiation
arrow Bust seems to be the statistical mechanical one, with the qualification that the
media sustainin$ the improbable-to-probable transition is electroma$netic.
:or further discussion of this controversial point, see the articlesFchapters by
.rnt9enius &DD3, 6arman *E&&, :risch *EEE, *EEK, 8orth *EE3, 2rice &DDL, *EEL,
5ohrlich *EEL and Qeh &D;DF*EEK.
2." #osmolo!y
7osmolo$y presents us with a number of apparently temporally asymmetric
mechanisms. The most obvious one is the ine,orable e,pansion of the universe. #n
cosmolo$y the spatial scale factor a%t', which $ives the distance between co-
movin$ observers, is increasin$. The universe seems to be uniformly e,pandin$
relative to our local frame. Since this temporal asymmetry occupies a rather unique
status it is natural to wonder whether it mi$ht be the !master" arrow. The
cosmolo$ist T. 1old &DL* proposed Bust this. 0elievin$ that entropy values covary
with the si9e of the universe, 1old asserts that at the ma,imum radius the
thermodynamic arrow will !flip" due to the re-contraction. ?owever, as Tolman
&D3L has shown in some detail, a universe filled with non-relativistic particles will
not suffer entropy increase due to e,pansion, nor will an e,pandin$ universe
uniformly filled with blacbody radiation increase its entropy either. #nterestin$ly,
Tolman demonstrated that more realistic universes containin$ both matter and
radiation !ill chan$e their entropy contents. 7oupled with e,pansion, various
processes will contribute to entropy increase, e.$., ener$y will flow from the !hot"
radiation to the !cool" matter. So lon$ as the rela,ation time of these processes is
lar$er than the e,pansion time scale, they should $enerate entropy. (e thus have a
purely cosmolo$ical method of entropy $eneration.
4thers %e.$., +avies &DD<' have thou$ht inflation provides a ind of entropy-
increasin$ behavior C a$ain, $iven the sort of matter content we have in our
universe. The inflationary model is an alternative of sorts to the standard bi$ ban$
model, althou$h by now it is so well entrenched in the cosmolo$y community that
it really deserves the ta$ !standard". #n this scenario, the universe is very early in a
quantum state called a !false vacuum", a state with a very hi$h ener$y density and
ne$ative pressure. 1ravity acts lie 6instein's cosmolo$ical constant, so that it is
repulsive rather than attractive. Nnder this force the universe enters a period of
e,ponential inflation, with $eometry resemblin$ de Sitter space. (hen this period
ends any initial in-homo$eneities will have been smoothed to insi$nificance. .t this
point ordinary stellar evolution be$ins. =oosely associatin$ $ravitational
homo$eneity with low-entropy and inhomo$eneity with hi$her entropy, inflation is
ar$uably another source of cosmolo$ical entropy $eneration. %:or a distinct and
recent version of an inflation-inspired e,planation, see 7arroll and 7hen *EE<,
4ther #nternet 5esources.'
There are other proposed sources of cosmolo$ical entropy $eneration, but these
should suffice to $ive the reader a flavor of the idea. (e shall not be concerned
with evaluatin$ these scenarios in any detail. 5ather, our concern is about how
these proposals e,plain time's arrow. #n particular, how do they square with our
earlier claim that the issue boils down to either assumin$ temporally asymmetric
boundary conditions or of addin$ time reversal non-invariant laws of nature)
The answer is not always clear, owin$ in part to the fact that the separation between
laws of nature and boundary conditions is especially slippery in the science of
cosmolo$y. .dvocates of the cosmolo$ical e,planation of time's arrow typically
see themselves as e,plainin$ the ori$in of the needed low-entropy cosmolo$ical
condition. Some e,plicitly state that special initial conditions are needed for the
thermodynamic arrow, but differ with the conventional !statistical" school in
deducin$ the ori$in of these initial conditions. 6arlier low-entropy conditions are
not viewed as the boundary conditions of the spacetime. They came about,
accordin$ to the cosmolo$ical schools, about a second or more after the bi$ ban$.
0ut when the universe is the si9e of a small particle, a second or more is enou$h
time for some ind of cosmolo$ical mechanism to brin$ about our low-entropy
!initial" condition. (hat cosmolo$ists %primarily' differ about is the precise nature
of this mechanism. 4nce the mechanism creates the !initial" low-entropy we have
the same sort of e,planation of the thermodynamic asymmetry as discussed in the
previous section. 0ecause the proposed mechanisms are supposed to mae the
special initial conditions inevitable or at least hi$hly probable, this maneuver seems
lie the alle$ed !third way" mentioned above.
The central question about this type of e,planation, as far as we're concerned, is
this/ #s the e,istence of the low !initial" state a consequence of the laws of nature
alone or the laws plus boundary conditions) #n other words, first, does the proposed
mechanism produce low-entropy states $iven an/ initial condition, and second, is it
a conse+uence of the laws alone or a consequence of the laws plus initial
conditions) (e want to now whether our question has merely been shifted bac a
step, whether the e,planation is a dis$uised appeal to special initial conditions.
Thou$h we cannot here answer the question in $eneral, we can say that the two
mechanisms mentioned are not lawlie in nature. 6,pansion fails on two counts.
There are boundary conditions in e,pandin$ universes that do not lead to an
entropy $radient, i.e., conditions without the ri$ht matter-radiation content, and
there are boundary conditions that do not lead to e,pansion, e.$., matter-filled
:riedmann models that do not e,pand. #nflation fails at least on the second count.
+espite advertisin$, arbitrary initial conditions will not $ive rise to an inflationary
period %6arman &DDK, pp. &K*Y3'. :urthermore, it's not clear that inflationary
periods will $ive rise to thermodynamic asymmetries %2rice &DDL, ch. *'. The
cosmolo$ical scenarios do not seem to mae the thermodynamic asymmetries a
result of nomic necessity. The cosmolo$ical hypotheses may be true, and in some
sense, they may even e,plain the low-entropy initial state. 0ut they do not appear to
provide an e,planation of the thermodynamic asymmetry that maes it
nomolo$ically necessary or even liely.
.nother way to see the point is to consider the question of whether the
thermodynamic arrow would !flip" if %say' the universe started to contract. 1old, as
we said above, asserts that at the ma,imum radius the thermodynamic arrow must
!flip" due to the re-contraction. 8ot positin$ a thermodynamic flip while
maintainin$ that entropy values covary with the radius of the universe is clearly
inconsistent C it is what 2rice &DDL calls the fallacy of a temporal double
standard. 1old does not committ this fallacy, and so he claims that the entropy
must decrease if ever the universe started to re-contract. ?owever, as .lbert *EEE
writes, there are plainly locations in the phase space of the world from which T
the world's radius will ine,orably head up and the world's entropy will e,orably
head down. Since that it is the case, it doesn't follow from law that the
thermodynamic arrow will flip durin$ re-contraction- therefore, without chan$in$
the fundamental laws, the 1old mechanism cannot e,plain the thermodynamic
arrow in the sense we want.
:rom these considerations we can understand what 2rice &DDL calls the basic
dile--a/ either we e,plain the earlier low-entropy condition 1old-style or it is
ine,plicable by time-symmetric physics %;*'. 0ecause there is no net asymmetry in
a 1old universe, we mi$ht paraphrase 2rice's conclusion in a more disturbin$
manner as the claim that the %local' thermodynamic arrow is e,plicable Bust in case
%$lobally' there isn't one. ?owever, notice that this remar leaves open the idea that
the laws $overnin$ e,pansion or inflation are not T5#. %:or more on 2rice's basic
dilemma, see 7allender &DD; and 2rice &DDK.'
2.$ %uantum #osmolo!y
Zuantum cosmolo$y, it is often said, is the theor/ of the universe's initial
conditions. 2resumably this entails that its posits are to be re$arded as lawlie.
0ecause theories are typically understood as containin$ a set of laws, quantum
cosmolo$ists apparently assume that the distinction between laws and initial
conditions is fluid. 2articular initial conditions will be said to obtain as a matter of
law. ?awin$ &D;O writes, for e,ample, we shall not have a complete model of
the universe until we can say more about the boundary conditions than that they
must be whatever would produce what we observe, %&L3'. 7ombinin$ such
aspirations with the observation that thermodynamics requires special boundary
conditions leads quite naturally to the thou$ht that the second law becomes a
selection principle for the boundary conditions of the universe @for quantum
cosmolo$yA %=aflamme &DD<, 3K;'. #n other words, if one is to have a theory of
initial conditions, it would certainly be desirable to deduce initial conditions that
will lead to the thermodynamic arrow. This is precisely what many quantum
cosmolo$ists have sou$ht.
@<A
Since quantum cosmolo$y is currently very
speculative, it has been ar$ued that it is premature to start worryin$ about what it
says about time's arrow %7allender &DD;'. 8evertheless, there has been a substantial
amount of debate on this issue %see ?aliwell et al, &DD<'.
2.& Time Itself
Some philosophers have sou$ht an answer to the problem of time's arrow by
claimin$ that time itself is directed. They do not mean time is asymmetric in the
sense intended by advocates of the tensed theory of time. Their proposals are firmly
rooted in the idea that time and space are properly represented on a four-
dimensional manifold. The main idea is that the asymmetries in time indicate
somethin$ about the nature of time itself. 7hristensen &DD3 ar$ues that this is the
most economical response to our problem since it posits nothin$ besides time as the
common cause of the asymmetries, and we already believe in time. . proposal
similar to 7hristensen's is (ein$ard's &DOO !time-orderin$ field". (ein$ard's
speculative thesis is that spacetime is temporally oriented by a !time potential," a
timelie vector field that at every spacetime point directs a vector into its future
li$ht cone. #n other words, supposin$ our spacetime is temporally orientable,
(ein$ard wants to actually orient it. The main virtue of this is that it provides a
time sense everywhere, even in spacetimes containin$ closed timelie curves %so
lon$ as they're temporally orientable'. .s he shows, any e,plication of the !earlier
than" relation in terms of some other physical relation will have trouble providin$ a
consistent description of time direction in such spacetimes. .nother virtue of the
idea is that it is in principle capable of e,plainin$ all the temporal asymmetries. #f
coupled to the various asymmetries in time, it would be the !master arrow"
responsible for the arrows of interest. .s Slar &D;K notes, (ein$ard's proposal
maes the past-future asymmetry very much lie the up-down asymmetry. .s the
up-down asymmetry was reduced to the e,istence of a $ravitational potential C
and not an asymmetry of space itself C so the past-future asymmetry would reduce
to the time potential C and not an asymmetry of time itself. 4f course, if one
thins of the $ravitional metric field as part of spacetime, there is a sense in which
the reduction of the up-down asymmetry really was a reduction to a spacetime
asymmetry. .nd if the metric field is conceived as part of spacetime C which is
itself a hu$e source of contention in philosophy of physics C it is natural to thin
of (ein$ard's time-orderin$ field as also part of spacetime. Thus his proposal
shares a lot in common with 7hristensen's su$$estion.
This sort of proposal has been critici9ed by Slar on methodolo$ical $rounds. Slar
&D;K claims that scientists would not accept such an e,planation %&&&Y*'. 4ne
mi$ht point out, however, that many scientists did believe in analo$ues of the time-
orderin$ field as possible causes of the 72 violations.
@KA
The time-orderin$ field, if
it e,ists, would be an unseen %e,cept throu$h its effects' common cause of
striin$ly ubiquitous phenomena. Scientists routinely accept such e,planations. To
find a problem with the time-orderin$ field we need not invoe methodolo$ical
scruples- instead we can simply as whether it does the Bob ased of it. #s there a
mechanism that will couple the time-orderin$ field to thermodynamic phenomena)
(ein$ard says the time potential field needs to be suitably coupled %p. &3E' to the
non-accidental asymmetric processes, but neither he nor 7hristensen elaborate on
how this is to be accomplished. Nntil this is addressed satisfactorily, this
speculative idea must be considered interestin$ yet embryonic.
2.' Inter(entionism
(hen e,plainin$ time's arrow, many philosophers and physicists have focused their
attention upon the unimpeachable fact that real systems are open systems that are
subBected to interactions of various sorts.
@LA
(e can not truly isolate
thermodynamic systems, and even if we could, it would probably not be for all
time. To tae the most obvious e,ample, we can not shield a system from the
influence of $ravity. .t best, we can move systems to locations feelin$ less and less
$ravitational force, but we can never completely decouple a system from the
$ravitational field. 8ot only do we i$nore the wea $ravitational force when doin$
classical thermodynamics, but we also i$nore less e,otic matters, such as the walls
in the standard $as in a bo, scenario. (e can do this because the time it taes for a
$as to reach equilibrium with itself is vastly shorter than the time it taes the $as
plus walls system to reach equilibrium. :or this reason we typically discount the
effects of the bo, walls on the $as.
#n this appro,imation many have thou$ht there lies a possible solution to the
problem of the direction of time. #ndeed, many have thou$ht herein lies a solution
that does not chan$e the laws of classical mechanics and does not allow for the
nomolo$ical possibility of anti-thermodynamic behavior. #n other words, advocates
of this view seem to believe it embodies a third way.
The idea is to tae advanta$e of what a random perturbation of the representative
phase point would do to the evolution of a system. #n phase space there is a
tremendous asymmetry between the volume of points leadin$ to equilibrium and
points leadin$ away from equilibrium. #f the representative point of a system were
noced about randomly, then due to this asymmetry, it would be very probable
that the system at any $iven time be on a traBectory leadin$ toward equilibrium.
Thus, if it could be ar$ued that the earlier treatment of the statistical mechanics of
ideal systems i$nored a random perturber in the environment of the system, then
one would seem to have a solution to our problems. 6ven if the perturbation were
wea it would still have the desired effect. The wea !random" previously i$nored
nocin$ of the environment is the sou$ht after cause of the approach to
equilibrium. 2rima facie, this answer to the problem escapes the appeal to special
initial conditions and the appeal to new laws.
0ut only prima facie. . number of criticisms have been leveled a$ainst this
maneuver. 4ne that seems on the mar is the observation that if classical mechanics
is to be a universal theory, then the environment must be $overned by the laws of
classical mechanics as well. The environment is not some mechanism outside the
$overnance of physical law, after all, and when we treat it too, the !deus e,
machina" C the random perturber C disappears. #f we treat the $as-plus-the-
container walls as a classical system, it is still $overned by time-reversible laws that
will cause the same problem as we met with the $as alone. .t this point one
sometimes sees the response that that combined system of $as plus walls has a
ne$lected environment too, and so on, and so on, until we $et to the entire universe.
#t is then questioned whether we have a ri$ht to e,pect laws to apply universally
%5eichenbach &DKL, ;&ff'. 4r the point is made that we cannot write down the
?amiltonian for all the interactions a real system suffers, and so there will always
be somethin$ !outside" what is $overned by the time-reversible ?amiltonian. 0oth
of these points rely, we suspect, on an underlyin$ instrumentalism about the laws of
nature. 4ur problem only arises if we assume or pretend that the world literally is
the way the theory says- droppin$ this assumption naturally !solves" the problem.
5ather than further address these responses, let us turn to the claim that this
maneuver need not modify the laws of classical mechanics.
#f one does not mae the radical proclamation that physical law does not $overn the
environment, then it is easy to see that whatever law describes the perturber's
behavior, it cannot be the laws of classical mechanics if the environment is to do
the Bob required of it. . time-reversal noninvariant law, in contrast to the T5# laws
of classical mechanics, must $overn the e,ternal perturber. 4therwise we can in
principle subBect the whole system, environment plus system of interest, to a
=oschmidt reversal. The system's velocities will reverse, as will the velocities of
the millions of tiny perturbers. !Miraculously", as if there were a conspiracy
between the reversed system and the millions of !anti-perturbers", the whole system
will return to a time reverse of its ori$inal state. (hat is more, this reversal will be
Bust as liely as the ori$inal process if the laws are T5#. . minimal criterion of
adequacy, therefore, is that the random perturbers be time reversal noninvariant.
0ut the laws of classical mechanics are T5#. 7onsequently, if this !solution" is to
succeed, it must e,ercise new laws and modify or supplement classical mechanics.
%Since the perturbations need to be $enuinely random and not merely unpredictable,
and since classical mechanics is deterministic, the same sort of ar$ument could be
run with indeterminism instead of irreversibility. See 2rice *EE* for a dia$nosis of
why people have made this mistae, and also for an ar$ument obBectin$ to
interventionism for offerin$ a "redundant" physical mechanism responsible for
entropy increase.'
@OA
2.) %uantum *echanics
To the best of our nowled$e, our world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, not
classical mechanical. +oes this chan$e the situation) !Maybe" is perhaps the best
answer. 8ot surprisin$ly, answers to the question are affected by one's
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Zuantum mechanics suffers from the
notorious measurement problem, a problem which demands one or another
interpretation of the quantum formalism. These interpretations fall broadly into two
types, dependin$ on their view of the unitary evolution of the quantum state %e.$.,
evolution accordin$ to the Schroedin$er equation'/ they either say that there is
somethin$ more than the quantum state, or that the unitary evolution is not entirely
correct. The former are called !no-collapse" interpretations while the latter are
dubbed !collapse" interpretations. This is not the place to $o into the details of these
interpretations, but we can still setch the outlines of the picture painted by
quantum mechanics %for more see .lbert &DD*'.
Modulo some philosophical concerns about the meanin$ of time reversal %.lbert
*EEE, 7allender *EEE, 6arman *EE*', the equation $overnin$ the unitary evolution
of the quantum state is time reversal invariant. :or interpretations that add
somethin$ to quantum mechanics, this typically means that the resultin$ theory is
time reversal invariant too %since it would be odd or even inconsistent to have one
part of the theory invariant and the other part not'. Since the resultin$ theory is time
reversal invariant, it is possible to $enerate the problem of the direction of time Bust
as we did with classical mechanics. (hile many details are altered in the chan$e
from classical to no-collapse quantum mechanics, the lo$ical $eo$raphy seems to
remain the same.
7ollapse interpretations are more interestin$ with respect to our topic. 7ollapses
interrupt or outri$ht replace the unitary evolution of the quantum state. To date,
they have always done so in a time reversal noninvariant manner. The resultin$
theory, therefore, is not time reversal invariant. This fact offers a potential escape
from our problem/ the transitions of type %*' in our above statement of the problem
may not be lawful. .nd this has led many thiners throu$hout the century to
believe that collapses somehow e,plain the thermodynamic time asymmetry.
Mostly these postulated methods fail to provide what we want. (e thin $ases
rela, to equilibrium even when they're not measured by 0ohrian observers or
(i$nerian conscious bein$s. This complaint is, admittedly, not independent of
more $eneral complaints about the adequacy of these interpretations. 0ut perhaps
because of these controversial features they have not been pushed very far in
e,plainin$ thermodynamics.
More satisfactory collapse theories e,ist, however. 4ne, due to 1hirardi, 5imini,
and (eber, commonly nown as 15(, can describe collapses in a closed system
C no dubious appeal to observers outside the quantum system is required. .lbert
%&DD<- *EE&' has e,tensively investi$ated the impact 15( would have on
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. 15( would $round a temporally
asymmetric probabilistic tendency for systems to evolve toward equilibrium. .nti-
thermodynamic behavior is not impossible accordin$ to this theory. #nstead it is
tremendously unliely. The innovation of the theory lies in the fact that althou$h
entropy is overwhelmin$ly liely to increase toward the future, it is not also
overwhelmin$ly liely to increase toward the past %because there are no dynamic
bacwards transition probabilities providied by the theory'. So the theory does not
suffer from a problem of the direction of time as stated above.
This does not mean, however, that it removes the need for somethin$ lie the 2ast
?ypothesis. 15( is capable of e,plainin$ why, $iven a present nonequilibrium
state, later states should have hi$her entropy- and it can do this without also
implyin$ that earlier states have hi$her entropy too. 0ut it does not e,plain how the
universe ever $ot into a nonequilibrium state in the first place. .s indicated before,
some are not sure !hat would e,plain this fact, if anythin$, or whether it's
somethin$ we should even aspire to e,plain. The principal virtue 15( would
brin$ to the situation, .lbert thins, is that it would solve or bypass various
troubles involvin$ the nature of probabilities in statistical mechanics.
More detailed discussion of the impact quantum mechanics has on our problem can
be found in .lbert *EEE, 8orth *EE*, 2rice *EE*. 0ut if our superficial review is
correct, we can say that quantum mechanics will not obviate our need for a 2ast
?ypothesis thou$h it may well solve %on a 15( interpretation' at least one
problem related to the direction of time.
2.+ ,a-li.e Initial #onditions/
(ithout some new physics that eliminates or e,plains the 2ast ?ypothesis, or some
satisfactory !third way", it seems we are left with a bald posit of special initial
conditions. .$ain, one can question whether there really is anythin$ unsatisfactory
about this %Slar &DD3- 7allender &DDO, *EE<b'. 0ut perhaps we were wron$ in the
first place to thin of the 2ast ?ypothesis as a contin$ent boundary condition. The
question !why these special initial conditions)" would be answered with !it's
physically impossible for them to be otherwise," which is always a conversation
stopper. #ndeed, :eynman %&DLK, &&L' speas this way when e,plainin$ the
statistical version of the second law.
.bsent a particular understandin$ of laws of nature, there is perhaps not much to
say about the issue. 0ut $iven particular conceptions of lawhood, it is clear that
various Bud$ments about this issue follow naturally C as we will see momentarily.
?owever, let's acnowled$e that this may be to $et matters bacwards. #t mi$ht be
said that we first ou$ht to find out whether the boundary conditions are lawlie,
and then devise a theory of law appropriate to the answer. To decide whether or not
the boundary conditions are lawlie based merely on current philosophical theories
of law is to preBud$e the issue. 2erhaps this obBection is really evidence of the
feelin$ that settlin$ the issue based on one's conception of lawhood seems
particularly unsatisfyin$. .nd it is hard to deny this. 6ven so, it is illuminatin$ to
have a brief loo at the relationships between some conceptions of lawhood and the
topic of special initial conditions.
:or instance, if one a$rees with Mill that from the laws one should be able to
deduce everythin$ and one considers the thermodynamic part of that !everythin$,"
then the special initial condition will be needed for such a deduction. The modern
heir of this conception of lawhood, the one associated with 5amsey and =ewis %see
=oewer &DD<', sees laws as the a,ioms of the simplest, most powerful, consistent
deductive system possible. #t is liely that the specification of a special initial
condition would emer$e as an a,iom in such a system, for such a constraint may
well mae the laws much simpler than they otherwise would be.
(e should not e,pect the na[ve re$ularity view of laws to follow suit, however. 4n
this sort of account, rou$hly, if .s always follow 0s, then it is a law of nature that
. causes 0. To avoid findin$ laws everywhere, however, this account needs to
assume that .s and 0s are instantiated plenty of times. 0ut the initial conditions
occur only once.
:or more robust realist conceptions of law, it's difficult to predict whether the
special initial conditions will emer$e as lawlie. 8ecessitarian accounts lie
2ar$etter's &D;< maintain that it is a law that in our world iff obtains at every
possible world Boined to ours by a nomic accessibility relation. (ithout more
specific information about the nature of the accessibility relations and the worlds to
which we're related, one can only $uess whether all of the worlds relative to ours
have the same special initial conditions. 8evertheless some realist theories offer
apparently prohibitive criteria, so they are able to mae ne$ative Bud$ments. :or
instance, !universalist" theories associated with .rmstron$ say that laws are
relations between universals. Get a constraint on initial conditions isn't in any
natural way put in this form- hence it would seem the universalist theory would not
consider this constraint lawlie.
2hilosophical opinion is certainly divided. The problem is that a lawlie boundary
condition lacs many of the features we ordinarily attribute to laws, e.$., multiple
instances, $overnin$ temporal evolution, etc., yet different accounts of laws focus
on different subsets of these features. (hen we turn to the issue at hand, what we
find is the disa$reement we e,pect.
". The Problem of the Direction of Time II
. completely different problem $oin$ by the name !problem of the direction of
time" is the question of $roundin$ various non-thermodynamic temporal
asymmetries %to be described in detail below'. #n this problem, we tae the
thermodynamic arrow as $iven and use it to e,plain other temporally asymmetric
features of the world, e.$., causation, nowled$e. 0olt9mann famously su$$ested
that many of these asymmetries are $iven by the direction of entropy increase. .nd
5eichenbach &DKL modified this to some of these temporal asymmetries bein$
$iven by the direction of dominant entropy increase amon$ all so-called branch
systems.
Slar &D;K provides a useful discussion of this topic. ?e points out that conceivin$
of the reduction of these temporal asymmetries to that of the entropic arrow evades
many of its obvious shortcomin$s if we conceive of it as a potential a posteriori
scientific reduction of the ind now very familiar. The question is then whether it is
so reduced %as for instance, the up-down plausibly reduces to the local $ravitational
$radient' or whether there is merely a correlation between the two %as, for e,ample,
there is between left-ri$ht and parity violations in hi$h-ener$y particle physics'.
The question is not easily answered partly due to va$ueness about what is meant by
both the concept to be reduced and the reducin$ concept. (hat temporal
asymmetries are we concerned with, and e,actly what ind of entropic relation do
we intend)
The temporal asymmetries with which we are concerend are all the phenomena that
we associate with the past and future directions bein$ different. #n addition to all of
the temporal asymmetries from physics %thermodynamic arrow, electroma$netic
arrow, ?ubble e,pansion, etc.', there are a number of different asymmetries with
which we are all familiar. The !direction of time" mi$ht then be a broad umbrella
coverin$ the followin$/
&. The psycholo$ical arrow. This controversial arrow is actually many different
asymmetries. 4ne, thou$h much disputed, is that we seem to share a psycholo$ical
sense of passa$e throu$h time. .lle$edly, we sense a movin$ !now", the motion of
the present as events are transformed from future to past. .nother is that we have
very different attitudes toward the past than toward the future. (e dread future but
not past headaches and prison sentences.
*. The mutability arrow. (e feel the future is !open" or indeterminate in a way the
past is not. The past is closed, fi,ed for all eternity. 5elated to this, no doubt, is the
feelin$ that our actions are essentially tied to the future and not the past. The future
is mutable whereas the past is not.
3. The epistemolo$ical arrow. .lthou$h we believe that we now some facts about
the future, the vast maBority of propositions we claim to now about the past. #
now that yesterday's broen e$$ on the floor had a similar outline to 7hile's
boundaries, but # have no idea what country tomorrow's broen e$$ will loo lie.
There are many more traces of events in the future than in the past. (hen # say
somethin$ embarrassin$, information representin$ that event is encoded on sound
and li$ht waves that form a continually increasin$ spherical shell in my future
li$ht-cone. # am potentially further embarrassed throu$hout my whole future
li$htcone. Get in the bacward li$htcone stretchin$ from the event there is little or
no indication of the unfortunate event.
<. The e,planation-causation-counterfactual arrow. This arrow is actually three,
thou$h it seems plausible that there are connections amon$ them. 0acwards
causation may be physically possible, but if it is, it seems either to never happen or
be e,ceedin$ly rare. 7auses typically occur before their effects. 5elated to the
causal asymmetry in some fashion or other is the asymmetry of e,planation.
Nsually $ood e,planations appeal to events in the past of the event to be e,plained,
not to events in the future. #t may be that this is Bust a preBudice that we ou$ht to
dispense with, but it is an intuition that we frequently have. :inally, and no doubt
this is a$ain related to the other two arrows as well as the mutability arrow, we C
at least naively C believe the future depends counterfactually on the present in a
way that we do not believe the past depends counterfactually on the present.
:or e,ample, consider a body movin$ uniformly from point % to point 0 in accord
with 8ewton's first law of motion.
@;A
. force is impressed on the body at ( and the
body chan$es direction and proceeds uniformly towards 0.
(e will assume the body is a molecule travellin$ in a relative vacuum, and that the
only trace left by the force is the altered path of the body. The solid lines in the
dia$ram represent what we tae to be the actual path of the body, the broen lines
the alternative paths. 8ow consider two competin$ subBunctive conditionals/
#f no force had been impressed upon the body at (,
%i' it would have moved uniformly in the ri$ht line %(1.
%ii' it would have moved uniformly in the ri$ht line 2(0.
The problem is to find an obBective reason for our preference of %i'. #t seems
that %( is co-tenable with the counterfactual antecedent. #f the antecedent were
true, it seems the body would have continued from ( to 1. 0ut (0 is also a le$ of
the actual path of the body, and to what do we appeal besides temporal asymmetry
to reBect (0 as co-tenable with the counterfactual supposition) 2erhaps after our
intuitions have been tutored by physics we should say that either %i' or %ii' is
correct. 4r perhaps the asymmetry relies on thermodynamics %and our intuitions on
thermodynamics', in which case the world described above is too bare to support
our asymmetry.
Some authors C particularly defenders of the tensed theory of time C dismiss out
of hand the idea of $roundin$ the direction of time on the direction of material
processes in time. 0ut with so many asymmetric processes in the world, and with
homo sapiens bein$ Bust a part of this world, there are stron$ reasons to favor a
connection between the two in many cases. 0ut what is the connection)
Many authors have e,plicitly or implicitly proposed various !dependency charts"
that are supposed to e,plain which of the above arrows depend on which for their
e,istence. ?orwich &D;O, for instance, ar$ues for an e,planatory relationship
wherein the counterfactual arrow depends for its e,istence on the causal arrow,
which depends on the arrow of e,planation, which depends on the epistemolo$ical
arrow, which in turn depends on the for asymmetry that he associates with some
chaotic conditions in the early universe. 4ne can ima$ine other ways to plausibly
arran$e the dependency chart. =ewis &DOD thins an alle$ed over-determination of
traces $rounds the asymmetry of counterfactuals and that this in turn $rounds the
rest. The chart one Bud$es most appropriate will depend, to a lar$e de$ree, upon
one's $eneral philosophical stance on realism and ?umeanism, etc., and one's
understandin$ of the above arrows. The reader can consult 6arman *EEL for some
of the reasons one mi$ht be dissatisfied with an entropy-based e,planation of most
of the arrows described above.
(hich chart is the correct one is not our concern here. 5ather, returnin$ to our
main topic, the 0olt9mann entropic reduction of time-direction, we now have a
somewhat clearer question/ do any or all of the above temporal asymmetries
depend for their e,istence upon the thermodynamic time-asymmetry) .t the end of
his &DOD, for instance, =ewis hints that the asymmetry of traces is lined to the
thermodynamic arrow, but he can offer no further e,planation. 5eichenbach &DKL,
1ruenbaum &DL3, and Smart &DLO have developed entropic accounts of the
nowled$e asymmetry. \arious people, for instance +owe &DD*, have tied the
direction of causation to the entropy $radient. .nd some have also tied the
psycholo$ical arrow to this $radient %for a discussion see >roes &D;K'. .lbert *EEE
ar$ues that the 2ast ?ypothesis accounts for the nowled$e asymmetry and also the
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.
4ne can thin of reasons for bein$ pessimistic about any strai$htforward positive
lin between these temporal asymmetries and the entropy $radient. +o we really
now how to brid$e the $ap between the thermodynamic arrow and the other
arrows) The $ap is hu$e when you start thinin$ about the science of
thermodynamics. Thermodynamics is a science with very precise and definite
restrictions on the applicability of its concepts. . system has an entropy, for
instance, only when it is thermally isolated and in equilibrium. Get it is clear that
our e,perience of the above temporal asymmetries carves up the world much
differently than thermodynamics does. System %'s doin$ f at time t mi$ht cause
system ('s doin$ . at time t] %where t] ^ t', yet % and ( may not, and typically will
not, have well-defined entropies.
The obBections %see 6arman &DO<, ?orwich &D;O' to the entropic account of the
nowled$e asymmetry are worth recallin$. The entropic account claimed that
because we now there are many more entropy-increasin$ rather than entropy-
decreasin$ systems in the world %or our part of it', we can infer when we see a low-
entropy system that it was preceded and caused by an interaction with somethin$
outside the system. To tae the canonical e,ample, upon seein$ a footprint in the
sand, we can infer, due to its hi$h order, that it was caused by somethin$ previously
also of hi$h %or hi$her' order, i.e, someone walin$. The entropic account faces
some very severe and basic challen$es. :irst, do footprints on beaches have well-
defined thermodynamic entropies) To describe the e,ample we switched from low-
entropy to hi$h order, but the association between entropy and our ordinary concept
of order is teneuous at best and usually completely misleadin$. To describe the
ran$e of systems about which we have nowled$e, the account needs somethin$
broader than the thermodynamic entropy. 0ut what) .nd why e,pect whatever it is
to behave lie entropy in some respects but not %in terms of its definability' in
others) Second, the entropic account doesn't license the inference to a human bein$
walin$ on the beach. .ll it tells you is that the $rains of sand in the footprint
interacted with its environment previously, which barely scratches the surface of
our ability to tell detailed stories about what happened in the past. Third, even if we
have a broader understandin$ of entropy, it still doesn't seem that this broader
concept always wors. 7onsider 6arman's &DO< e,ample of bomb destroyin$ a city.
:rom the destruction we may infer that a bomb went off- yet the bombed city does
not have lower entropy than its surroundin$s or even any type of intuitively hi$her
order than its surroundin$s.
To escape some of the above obBections, 5eichenbach famously abandoned literal
entropy in favor of what he called !quasi-entropy". .lbert, by contrast, doesn't
claim to $round the temporal asymmetries on entropy itself. Still 5eichenbachian in
spirit, his idea is to $round the temporal asymmetries on what he thins $rounds
thermodynamics C and more. ?e ar$ues that the temporal asymmetries follow
from the 2ast ?ypothesis %already mentioned', a uniform probability distribution
over this macrostate in the appropriate state space', and the dynamical laws of
motion. .lbert seems to thin this paca$e e,plains the e,istence of all
counterfactual-supportin$ $enerali9ations, narrowly thermodynamic or not. #n this
way it by-passes some of the above obBections. 7ritics of .lbert tar$et either his
claim that the above paca$e recovers thermodynamics %=eeds *EE3, 6arman *EEL,
(insber$ *EE<' or his claim that it e,plains some of the above temporal
asymmetries %6arman *EEL, :risch *E&E'.
0olt9mann's su$$estion that the temporal asymmetries discussed above are
e,plained by the direction of increasin$ entropy, thou$h attractive at an abstract
level, is hard to maintain when one loos at the details. Still, the more $eneral idea,
that these temporal asymmetries are due to the asymmetric behavior of physical
processes in our world %whatever their ori$in ,law or 2ast ?ypothesis' as opposed
to more metaphysical sources seems very plausible. Much wor remains to be done
on this problem.
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