The pork barrel system in public sector budgeting has earned the right alongside patronage in the administration- politics nexus studies. The phenomenon, despite notoriety, has proven resilient to reform and remains impervious to the popularity of new public management and good governance movements. This resiliency is due to its efficacy in facilitating particularistic interests, both satisfying the local population’s demand for public goods, and elected officials’ agenda. In the way that the practice defied economic sense, so it appeared efficient politically.
The pork barrel system in public sector budgeting has earned the right alongside patronage in the administration- politics nexus studies. The phenomenon, despite notoriety, has proven resilient to reform and remains impervious to the popularity of new public management and good governance movements. This resiliency is due to its efficacy in facilitating particularistic interests, both satisfying the local population’s demand for public goods, and elected officials’ agenda. In the way that the practice defied economic sense, so it appeared efficient politically.
The pork barrel system in public sector budgeting has earned the right alongside patronage in the administration- politics nexus studies. The phenomenon, despite notoriety, has proven resilient to reform and remains impervious to the popularity of new public management and good governance movements. This resiliency is due to its efficacy in facilitating particularistic interests, both satisfying the local population’s demand for public goods, and elected officials’ agenda. In the way that the practice defied economic sense, so it appeared efficient politically.
Ernesto E. Tomas J r. UP-National College of Public Administration and Governance October 20, 2008 INTRODUCTION The pork barrel system in public sector budgeting has earned the right alongside patronage in the administration- politics nexus studies. The phenomenon, despite notoriety, has proven resilient to reform and remains impervious to the popularity of new public management and good governance movements. This resiliency is due to its efficacy in facilitating particularistic interests, both satisfying the local populations demand for public goods, and elected officials agenda. In the way that the practice defied economic sense, so it appeared efficient politically. Most literature on the pork barrel, empirical and otherwise, and on pork barreling for that matter, have regarded the phenomenon in almost the same manner, that it is inefficient, graft and corruption- ridden, and wasteful in all aspects (Vidallion- Cario, 1966; Weingast, et.al.,1981; Wildavski, 1992; Coronel, et.al., 1998, 2003). The judgment was, when politicians (but legislators in particular) get their way, tendencies toward particularistic interest takes over and distort the budgets direction. Essentially, scarce public funds are redirected to pet projects for favored clients. In the analytical plane, narrow interests and short- run gains are substituted for social- developmental outcomes originally aspired by the budget framers. But even the practice of patronage saw its decline in history, and its purpose and use (as advanced by functionalists) reduced. The pork barrel system, it is shown, have met the same fate, or at the least, pork barreling has submitted to some tweaking, i.e. rules that reduce the discretion given to politicians. The barrage of criticisms directed to the practice did have results, only not as great or as far reaching as critics would like.
1 Paper submitted to Prof. J . Prospero de Vera III, in partial fulfillment of the course PA 208. 1 The paper is basically an account of the recent changes concerning the pork barrel in the Philippines. The author examined pork barrel expenditures of Senators over a 5-year period, specifically for fiscal years 2002-2006 when rules have changed as a result of pressure to rationalize expenditures. Owing to the Asian crisis, the countrys precarious fiscal situation, and then newly elected and popular President J oseph Ejercito Estrada, pork as known before underwent change that undermined legislators power and effective control of the purse. This paper skips the many stories on pork barrel, from the seminal study by Cario (1966) on the dynamics of pork practice (The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel), to the horrific accounts of the Philippine Center for Investigative J ournalism (Pork and Other Perks, 1998 and The Rule Makers, 2004). The author emphasizes that the mentioned works were instrumental to establishing the present negative perception. The reader is advised to consult these texts. The report is presented as follows: first, budgeting theory and the preferred dominance of the executive over the legislative branch on matters of planning and spending; second, the introduction by the Executive Branch of National Budget Circular No. 476 (s.2001) and No. 479 (s.2002) that gave the menu of projects to be funded under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in the process severely constraining legislative decision on the choice of project; and finally, discussion on the benefit and costs of such arrangement, and some development concerns. PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR DEVELOPMENT A vital role of government is to improve its capacity to respond to the needs of the people it governs. This role relates to the ability of government to adjust its structures and functions according to the ever-changing needs of society. Governments existence, therefore, is justified by its ability to give an efficient, effective and responsive machinery for the implementation of programs and services that would directly promote the welfare of the people. One way to 2 effectively carry out this role is through the budget. The budget, as an instrument of policy, is the concrete manifestation of governments priorities. What was once a word that originally meant a pouch for carrying money has, through the years, taken on a larger meaning. Today, we hear frequently about the budget package put together by Congress and the President. Unfortunately, with the lack of transparency in the process of making it, its meaning has become rather obscure and its implications, tedious. No single document completely represents "the Philippine Budget". The only document that resembles a formal budget is a book representing the President's preferences --- her wish list, so to speak. When we hear that the budget is "unrealistic", we learn that many of these preferences conflict with those of others. Other documents comprising the budget are the House and Senate budget resolutions specifying how much should be spent on programs, as well as how much revenue should be raised. However, these too are incomplete. In the end, we are left with a variety of pieces of legislation--- spending through appropriations, subsidies, debt, tax preferences, and more--- that, taken together, constitute the budget. Skepticism surrounding the budget is disturbing, considering that it is, as many have pointed out, the most important tool for the improvement of social and economic well-being of the public. Taken as a whole, the budget is a representation, in monetary terms, of government activity. If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences shall prevail, then the budget records the outcomes of this struggle. V.O. Keys famous words, "Who gets what of scarce resources and by how much" is one question whose answer lies in the budget. In the most integral sense, budgeting attempts to allocate scarce financial resources through political processes in order to realize different visions of the "good life". That these visions of good life conflict mean that not all promises can be kept. However, this should not be 3 the reason for disbelief in the instrument and the process. Rather, in this paper, we treat it as a cause for renewed vigilance. Budgeting practice holds that the Executive Department (Article VII- Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution) takes the lead in the crafting of the budget, while the principle of checks-and- balance placed the power of the purse, i.e. of authorizing the appropriation of all public funds to Congress (Article VI- Sec. 24-25, 1987 Constitution). The Executive branch basically has six months to prepare the budget, from J anuary to J une of each year. With its vast amount of resources, i.e. professionals, experts, and frontline employees, it is expected to have a solid plan responding to the many demands of the people. The Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) composed of the DBM, NEDA, BSP and DOF, is in aid of the President in coming up with the full blown budget proposal, contained in 4 documents namely the Presidents Budget Message (PBM), the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF), the National Expenditure Program (NEP), and Government Staffing Summary (GS). Herein lies the problem. Although with enough time to formulate, the Executive committee in its 6-month preparation of the financial document goes without consulting Congress, not until submission as prescribed by the Constitution. And while deferring to the DBCC and respective national government agencies (NGA) mandate and perceived competence in determining the needs of the nation, the reality is many national and regional programs and projects are actually local in scope and application. Furthermore, substantial functions and services have already been devolved to local government units which complicate matters in that the financing and supply of services between national and local units simply do not add up. Bottom line, the determination of projects and activities are made by central agencies who want to maintain control over public funds and despite the devolution trend, much of public resources still rest with the national government . Service needs can be best met with local 4 offices providing front line and many other services. Local government units are in the best position to identify and implement projects deemed local in scope. Congress and the pork barrel system, the focus of this paper, rest at the center. Subject to constant criticism, and hereby presented is but an undeniable truth: Legislative pork spending serves a political and not a developmental objective (Chua and Cruz, 2004; Parreno, 1998; Gutierrez, 1998, Rocamora, 1998). In most extreme terms, it was referred as a fountain of evil by the late Senator Gaudencio Antonino in a privilege speech in 1925. Senator Panfilo Lacson, early this 2008, had the same picture in his mind when he exclaimed moral ascendancy sacrificed in exchange for billions in commissions while commenting on pork funds shared between the executive and legislative branches contained in the 2008 National Budget. Yet if truly determined to tip the scale, reformers can do so tilt the balance: exercising restraint and imposing rules transforming the practice into a progressive one. And it may have been already, to wit: the pork barrel that was condemned decades ago is not the same as the discretional PDAF that exists now. PDAFS PREDECESSORS: DARK SHADOWS Pork barrel funds, as they are commonly known, are allocations for who-knows-what projects our legislators want to be known for. In the past these included the CDF and the Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA), the legal name given to insertions made during the budget deliberation. Considering they are not even in the governments public investment program (MTPDP and MTPIP), such projects have priority and protection. Despite not having much impact on the economy, their allocation is a priority in the sense that its one most sought by legislators whenever the DBCC and different NGAs present their budget proposals. Most protected in the manner in which NGAs make advances, i.e. headroom in their budgets on expectations of requests coming from legislators. Thus, the pork barrel issue continues to agitate 5 everyone, and denunciations of the fund have become a yearly exercise. Anti-pork barrel advocates have achieved much with their exposes but not one elected official has really taken serious action on the issue. So why is Congress bent on holding on to the practice? Pork barrel practice or the politicians use of discretionary funds traces back to the (American- Southern) practice of bringing home the bacon to servants, the bacon now referring to funds and projects which legislators take back to their constituencies. Although denounced by many, it remains true that many voters also want their representatives to bring home the projects. Cario (1966:10), in her systemic analyses of the phenomena, gives us the details of the process: The pork barrel process in the Philippines starts when local government councils, civic groups and or interested individuals petition their legislators for a certain portion of their pork barrel fund. These are in the form of either formal resolutions or verbal communications which legislators either accommodate or refuse. Petitions that are accommodated form part of a solons allocation, a certain sum of money which he may consider as his for distribution purposes. The amount each one gets is determined in the majority caucus in the congressional chamber to which he belongs; the set amount usually corresponds to the minimum a legislator may obtain. These items are added to the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Highways, which leaves the pork barrel sections unfilled but for the words To be inserted in the House ... (see the Pork Barrel Process Map, ANNEX-A).
The finalization and approval of the Appropriations Bill do not stop in Congress. The President may exercise his veto powers on provisions that she considers less important and or uncalled for. Furthermore, the Office of the Chief Executive in its final act, can reassert the governments spending priorities when it releases the funds. It has always been understood that if money were appropriated for a purpose that turned out to be unnecessary, or if the funds could not be spent usefully and immediately, the executive does not have to spend it and can impound it. Through the Department of Budget and Management, the President lords over the allotment advice which is needed for the funds release. Looking at the process, one sees the interaction among legislators, other elected officials and their constituencies. Like a good drama, 6 roles are played accordingly: groups of sponsors are identified, they are the elected officials who are instrumental in including the pork barrel item in the budget. Local officials and constituents act as clientele - recipients of goods and services who put pressure on the sponsors. The object of struggle is the nations purse and the unwieldy process to access public funds provides much opportunity for politicization. The terms of the trade are also known to the sponsor: he must secure a strategic position (i.e. membership in the appropriations committee, high office in political party or relationship with someone in high office) to get the most pork. It was already been established in the works of Cario (1966) and Gutierrez (1998) that the chairpersons of the Senate Committee on Finance and his counterpart at the Lower House, the Committee on Appropriations, get the most. Accordingly, the President (with numerous special purpose funds, e.g. Calamity Fund, Pole Vaulting Strategy Fund, Contingency Fund, Kalayaan Fund, etc.) is considered the biggest pork- eater in the land. For the citizens as clientele, the larger the force it can mobilize (votes), the more likely that it will be accommodated. Since visibility is a key factor in obtaining political clout, sponsors therefore take seriously those projects that serve the greatest number of clientele: roads, bridges, covered courts and waiting sheds. Never mind that the services provided do not correspond with the more pressing needs of the clientele, as long as they are highly visible and tangible. In the final analysis, neither planning nor feasibility counts while politics govern the Presidents relation to Congress, legislators with one another, and between legislators and bureaucrats. The underside is, politicization of the budget process completely undermines the technical and developmental considerations of allotting public funds. With such a criterion, no wonder that pork projects end up as wasteful endeavors, neither economically benefiting nor growth-enhancing. 7 THE PDAF OF 2002: MENU AS BINDING CONSTRAINT The DBM owe to former President Estrada the momentum of reeling over legislators on the pork issue. Upon Estradas election and announced as part of his SONA in 1998 was the abolition of the practice, which he depicted as if reading directly the PCIJ reports. Given his high popularity, he butted head with Congress but the risks proved too much even for Erap. Luckily, DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno was able to sell a reformed version of the notorious CDF and CIA, which was called PDAF, which stands for Priority Development Assistance Fund. On hindsight, this may be considered the first effort to modify the legislator- controlled fund by prescribing rules that limit the choice of projects a legislator can charge against his pork barrel account. Compared to the guidelines governing the Public Works Act of 1995 and the CDF, the PDAF have a more specific list of projects that are allowed to be funded. The former pork fund had general guidelines, i.e. referred to infrastructure projects and livelihood projects, with all- purpose statements that read projects that shall contribute to the development thrusts geared towards improving the health, social and economic conditions of a community(NBC no. 444, s.1995- Sections 3.1-3.3). The PDAF guidelines on the other hand prepared project menu, which is divided into 2 parts: Annex A- Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and Annex B- Listing of Programs and Projects to be funded from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, i.e. a continuing Public Works allocation (NBC no. 476 -s.2001 and no.479 -s.2002). The project menu can be considered a binding constraint on legislators discretion in the nature of their projects. It will not be possible then under these new directives to purchase services and goods not in the list, and consequently took both legislators and constituents to a narrower but hopefully higher level of relationship. Also, unlike the projects and pork purchases in the past, i.e. KBL services, waiting sheds, basketball courts, useless name-bearing landmarks, 8 etc., reformed pork definitely has a higher economic value and potential. (Please see ANNEX B- National Budget Circular no. 479, dated March 1, 2002, Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and Annex B- Listing of Programs and Projects to be funded from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation). PDAF RULES AND OUTCOMES The issuance of a project menu concerning PDAF and DPWH Lumpsums have certainly made pork access more manageable for the DBM, the agency in charge of consolidating pork requests and release. The projects spent on by the Senators are remarkably (predictably and understandably) in keeping with the list. Monitoring has also become easier since 2001 when the DBM under Secretary Boncodin (2001-2006) began publishing the list of PDAF and DPWH funded pork projects. For the period under study, expenditure data showed that the Senates PDAF have reached Php 0.57 billion in 2002, Php 1.65 billion in 2003, Php 1.53 billion in 2004, Php 0.92 billion in 2005, and Php 0.23 billion (partial mid-2006). Altogether, this is Php 4.9 billion during the period. On the nature of PDAF expenses, almost all were given as financial assistance to LGUs, LGUs that otherwise will have little or no capacity on its own to fund development activities. TABLE 1. PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOCATIONS, 2002-2006. SENATE PDAF DPWH Total FY 2002 576,085,393 2,280,478,200 2,856,563,593 FY 2003 1,651,700,000 2,308,081,000 3,959,781,000 FY 2004 1,529,800,000 2,314,711,000 3,844,511,000 FY 2005 919,700,000 683,000,000 1,602,700,000 FY 2006 230,000,000 - 230,000,000 5-yr Total 4,907,285,393 7,586,270,200 12,493,555,593 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php. The Senate DPWH Lumpsum Allocation makes the bigger part of the pork and from 2002 to 2005, Senators accessed Php2.28 billion, 2.30 billion, 2.31 billion, and 0.68 billion respectively. The data for 2006 is partial, and it will be until 2008 to get the full access picture. Nonetheless, the figures give us an idea of how much pork is used (or given) to the Senate. A 9 partial total of Php12.49 billion for the 5-year duration, or an average of Php 2.5 billion annually. Now Php2.5 billion annually is minuscule as a proportion of the total national budget (FY2006 National Budget is Php 907 billion), but broken down and handed to local governments makes a large difference. On the kinds of projects funded under the DPWH appropriation, the data showed the following: a. That the Senators projects fall on five (5) main categories, namely: (1) road and bridges, (2) flood control infrastructures, including aqueducts, and canal and river rehabilitation, (3) water supply systems, (4) school buildings, and (5) multipurpose buildings. b. Of the 5 categories, roads and bridges is by far the favorite choice, followed by multipurpose buildings, school-buildings, and flood control, with water supply systems at bottom. c. The statement above was based on the 5-year average allocation data, but the choice of project varies greatly with respect to each Senator, regardless of the amount accessed. To illustrate, a full FY2003 accounting of DPWH allocated pork will show on average that 60.93% of it went to Roads and Bridges, and a far second with 17.56% are Multipurpose buildings. However, specific to a legislator, Senator Honasan, for example used all his Php120 million for improving and rehabilitating roads along the NCR, Regions 3, 4-A, and 13; while Senator Drilon spent around 31% of his Php126 million in building classrooms and rehabilitating school buildings. d. Finally, on a per- item basis, the largest single item expenses are Php 50 million for the construction of a wing at the Baguio City General Hospital (Senator 10 Flavier), Php 27 million for the construction of a road in Las Pinas (Senator Villar). On average, most senators make a spread of their allocation in Php5 million, 1 million, and 500 thousand denominations (see ANNEX C1-C3 and links). The least expense recorded was for a dug well in Camalaniugan, Cagayan (Senator J aworski). SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION From the perspective of an impoverished local government, the Municipality of Adams in Ilocos Norte for example, with an annual income of Php 20 million (BLGF, 2006), a financial assistance of Php 1 million already is a big help. Add to it a multipurpose building and a 2-km. road, Php 1 million and 2 million respectively. Altogether, Adams would have received Php 4 million, or equivalently, 20% addition to the municipalitys income. The above example may be hypothetical, but the fiscal as well as many other problems of municipalities and provinces especially in the countryside, are real. The analyses offered here is this: if allocation and the identification of needs are left with the national (central) government alone, then the status quo of inequity and the problems we now face can only continue. Pork barreling can be seen as an alternative to the current system of gaps and discrepancy in a nationally governed spending. While it may be true that the national government agencies have experts and consultants and agents spread across the country, it can be argued just the same that the setup will never be enough, and their information not complete, and some pockets are bound to be missed. Aside from the disrepute of Congress, and the pork systems dark past, there is nothing essentially wrong with legislators having a hand in identifying government projects. Legislators are elected representatives. Each member of the House of Representatives have around 250,000 constituents, while the Senators have the nation as a whole. 11 It is also true that the pork barrel system is a political tool, but a mechanism that turns both ways. Evans (2004) has documented the use of the pork to convince legislators to align with the Presidents agenda. The author also argued that the use of pork was instrumental in passing laws of general interest and wider significance, something that may not be possible if pork had not grease the system. What is left in this exposition is the assertion that the pork barrel system has several elements changed in the duration of existence post EDSA that make it different and less contemptible. Compared to the Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) and Countryside Development Fund of the 90s, more ex ante rules (control) are in place. Legislators are now limited to a project menu, to be negotiated and planned with national government implementors. The PDAF Soft was also designed to resemble a block grant for local government units, even though it passes Congress hands, it remains a source of finance that is available to local units. Almost all projects identified and funded from PDAF Soft and the DPWH Lumpsum are local projects, i.e. local in scope and benefits. The counterfactual question that needed answering and the discussion throughout ran on this is: In the absence of the pork barrel system, will the same expenses be made? Could the Baguio City General Hospital have received funding (from the DoH) for their much needed wing if not for Senator Flavier? How about the measly Php 50,000 for the dug well in Cagayan as granted by Senator J aworski? The answer is obvious. If economy and efficiency considerations are key to development, then the following criteria are non-negotiable. By all means, let the President and the executive departments identify the requirements for national development, and plan and allocate resources as they see fit. But their scope is naturally limited to the nation as a whole, the citizens in the aggregate. This severely clouds their lenses. The President and the NGAs may have longer and wider horizons but looses view of the immediate, short-term demands. The economist Keynes was famous for 12 making the remark, In the long- run, we are all dead, a comment directed to economists obsession with averages and long-term planning for efficiency and growth but lost sight of domestic sentiments, with the Great Depression of 1929 driving the point. The Presidential- Unitary system that we have may be defective, but it is all that we have (or at least, up until a constitutional change to parliamentary and federal system). The setup prescribes a top-down planning and budgeting system, with the President and executive departments in the drawing boards. A century of central planning with little participation from other stakeholders have shown great gaps, one that was recognized with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, empowering local units, communities and citizen stakeholders in matters of government and governance. Decentralization is not enough, not with the central agencies holding on to financial resources. The checks and balance principle between branches of government was under a Madisonian tradition whose orientation is based on confrontation (the famous quote, ambition must be countered with ambition). It can be reinterpreted and practiced the other way, that of cooperation and complementation. Applied to budgeting, the President and executive agencies are expected to plan and allocate with economy, efficiency and long term objectives in mind; theirs is to lift the welfare of the nation as a whole. Again, not all segments of society will be pleased. Members of Congress on the other hand are elected for the following purpose: parochial and personal. It is part of the duty, as district representatives to cater to their constituencies. Under a presidential-unitary setup, the local unit can be the link to national government, but only to a certain degree. It remains a part that is under the national government. District representatives or legislators are different for the reason that it is a coequal branch of government. But unlike the President and central agencies, it has mandate and license to spend and respond to its constituency. The pork barrel system is the financial mechanism that makes this possible under the current setup. 13 The Senate is in a slightly different level. They are nationally elected officials, but remain faithful to the practice of grant making and pork barreling. Their pork barrel exist more so as part of the political balance, but can also be instrumental as conduit of funds between national government and constituents. Non-access does not affect the Senators standing (Senator Lacson is a case in point), but access of the same can make certain constituents happy (Senator Recto for example spent his 2003 DPWH Lumpsum all in Batangas where his wife, then Lipa City Mayor and now Governor Vilma Santos- Recto ran). In conclusion, at the Senate level (the focus of the study), the pork barrel system remain in effect. And although there is no account and evidence of malfeasance in the use of the pork since it was made infamous by the media (i.e. PCIJ) in the 1990s, many still call for its abolition. But as shown, the practice has changed. Rules handed down by the DBM in 2001 and 2002 have firmly restricted the porks allotment and use. Many of the projects spent on are needs that, in the point of view of the locality, are very much needed. And as argued, budget rules can bind the pork barrel system. If access can be limited to a given project menu, the same rules can cause that menu to be equitable and progressive. A small procedural alteration, such as the one used on the pork barrel system, when continued and enhanced, presents a simple way of making pork palatable in the future.
-END- 14 REFERENCES
Books, J ournals, Manuscripts Carino, Ledivina (1966). The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel, Local Government Studies No.3, UPCPA: Manila. Chua, Y. and Booma Cruz (2004). For the Love of Pork, in Coronel, S. et. al. (2004). The Rulemakers: How the Wealth and Well- Born Dominate Congress, PCIJ : Quezon City. Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998). Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ : Quezon City. Coronel, S. et. al. (2004). The Rulemakers: How the Wealth and Well- Born Dominate Congress, PCIJ : Quezon City. De Vera, J . Prospero (2004). In Defense of the Pork, in the column Yellow Pad- Business World, September 13, 2004. Evans, Diana (2004). Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Gutierrez, Eric (1998). The Public Purse, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ : Quezon City. Parenno, Earl (1998). Pork, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ : Quezon City. Rocamora, J oel (1998). Introduction- Corruption in the Philippines: A Beginners Guide, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ : Quezon City
Statutes, Promulgations, Circulars The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Rex Publishing. Executive Order No. 182 (s. 1987) Rationalizing Public Works Measures, Appropriating Funds For Public Works, and For Other Purposes. Republic Act No. 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991. Republic Act No. 8150 Public Highways and Infrastructure Act of 1995. DBM National Budget Circular No. 437-A (s. 1995). Supplemental Rules and Regulations in the Release of CY 1995 Infrastructure Funds, J anuary 13, 1995. DBM National Budget Circular No. 444 (s.1995). Guidelines on the Release and Monitoring of Funds Chargeable Against the Countryside Developmen Fund, J uly 1, 1995. DBM National Budget Circular No. 477 (s. 2001). Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, September 20, 2001 . DBM National Budget Circular No. 479 (s. 2002). Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, March 1, 2002. DBM National Budget Circular No. 493 (s. 2004). Clarrification on Certain Provision of National Budget Circular No. 479 (s. 2002), March 16, 2004. 15 ANNEX A. THE PORK BARREL PROCESS MAP
16 ANNEX B. LISTING OF PROGRAMS/ PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED FROM THE PDAF LUMP-SUM APPROPRIATIONS UNDER THE DPWH BUDGET (DBM National Budget Circular No. 477 (s.2001) and No. 479 (s.2002).
LISTING OF PROGRAMS/ PROJ ECTS TO BE FUNDED FROM THE PDAF I. Financial Assistance to the following a. Education i. State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) ii. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) iii. Commission on Higher Education (CHED) iv. National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) b. Health Regional/ Specialty Hospital and Medical Centers c. Social Welfare i. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the implementation of the following: 1. Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDDS) 2. Social protection and promotion of rights and welfare of the poor and the disadvantaged ii. National Food Authority (NFA) d. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization (AFMA) Department of Agriculture (DA) and Corporations implementing AFMA e. Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) f. LGUs Provinces/ Cities. Municipalities/ Barangays II. Livelihood and Employment Generation a. Livelihood Program i. Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) ii. NCIP iii. Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) b. Emergency Employment Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) III. Science Technology and Information/ Communications Equipment a. Department of Education (DepEd) b. Department of Science and Technology (DOST) c. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) IV. Social and Economic Infrastructures a. Construction/ Repair/ Rehabilitation of the following 17 i. Roads and Bridges/ Farm to Market Roads Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) ii. Flood Control DPWH iii. Water Supply DPWH iv. School Buildings DPWH/DepEd v. Post Harvest Facilities (Food Terminal, Market, warehouse and Solar Dryer) DPWH vi. Day Care Centers, Senior Citizen Centers DPWH vii. Police, J ail and Fire Stations DPWH, DILG viii. Multi-Purpose Buildings DPWH ix. Court Houses DPWH, Department of J ustice (DOJ ) x. Pier, Ports and Airports DOTC b. Rural Electrification National Electrification Administration (NEA) c. Irrigation DA/ National Irrigation Administration (NIA) d. Resettlement/ Housing - National Housing Authority e. Acquisition of Infrastructure Equipment DPWH
LISTING OF PROJ ECTS TO BE FNDED FROM THE LUMP-SUM APPROPRIATIONS UNDER THE DPWH BUDGET A. Construction / Repair, Rehabilitation of the following: 1. Roads and Bridges/ Farm to Market Roads 2. Flood Control (Dredging, etc.) 3. Water Supply 4. Multi-Purpose Buildings (Day Care Center, Senior Citizen Center, Police, J ail and Fire Stations and Other Public Buildings) 5. School Buildings B. Acquisition of Infrastructure Equipment
18 ANNEX C-1. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005
FY 2003 Congressional Allocation Chargeable Against PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF-Soft +DPWH) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) APPROPRIATIONS
SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL Edgardo J . Angara 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Robert Z. Barbers 79,999,000 120,001,000 200,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 79,550,000 120,450,000 200,000,000 Renato L. Cayetano 74,500,000 55,500,000 130,000,000 Noli L. De Castro 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Franklin M. Drilon 71,000,000 126,850,000 197,850,000 Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 53,500,000 146,500,000 200,000,000 J uan M. Flavier 30,000,000 100,000,000 130,000,000 Gregorio B. Honasan 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Robert S. J aworski, Sr. 59,000,000 100,000,000 159,000,000 Loren Legarda-Leviste 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Panfilo M. Lacson Blas F. Ople J ohn Henry R. Osmea 172,681,000 172,681,000 Teresa Aquino-Oreta 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Sergio R. Osmea, III 37,970,000 148,780,000 186,750,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 69,500,000 110,000,000 179,500,000 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, J r. 109,000,000 60,000,000 169,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Ramon B. Revilla, Sr. 70,000,000 120,000,000 190,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Manuel B. Villar, J r. 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 J oker P. Arroyo 80,000,000 80,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, J r. 65,000,000 100,000,000 165,000,000 TOTAL, Senate 1,651,700,000 2,308,081,000 3,959,781,000 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php. 19 ANNEX C-2. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005 FY 2004 Congressional Allocation Chargeable Against PDAF-Soft +DPWH DPWH APPROPRIATIONS
SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, J r. 75,400,000 93,100,000 168,500,000 Blas F. Ople J ohn Henry R. Osmea 40,000,000 40,000,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 93,400,000 95,000,000 188,400,000 Loren Legarda-Leviste 40,000,000 40,000,000 Manuel B. Villar, J r. 82,000,000 118,000,000 200,000,000 Cayetano, Pia S. 40,000,000 40,000,000 Gordon, Richard J . 200,000 200,000 Lim, Alfredo 200,000 200,000 Madrigal, J amby A.S. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, J r. 87,000,000 110,000,000 197,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Edgardo J . Angara 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 J oker P. Arroyo 100,000,000 100,000,000 200,000,000 Robert Z. Barbers 100,000,000 100,000,000 Revilla, Ramon J r. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Noli L. De Castro 55,064,000 44,936,000 100,000,000 Franklin M. Drilon 128,296,000 50,000,000 178,296,000 Enrile, J uan Ponce 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 J uan M. Flavier 150,000,000 50,000,000 200,000,000 Ejercito Estrada, J inggoy 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Lapid, Manuel M. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Gregorio B. Honasan 100,000,000 100,000,000 Ramon B. Revilla, Sr. 90,000,000 90,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 100,000,000 100,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Santiago, MiriamDefensor 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Roxas, Manuel A. 100,000,000 100,000,000 Renato L. Cayetano 32,500,000 32,500,000 Panfilo M. Lacson Sergio R. Osmea, III 55,740,000 113,675,000 169,415,000 Teresa Aquino-Oreta 10,000,000 90,000,000 100,000,000 Robert S. J aworski, Sr. 100,000,000 100,000,000 TOTAL, Senate 1,529,800,000 2,314,711,000 3,844,511,000 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php.
20 ANNEX C-3. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005
FY 2005 Congressional Allocation Chargeable Against PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF- Soft +DPWH) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) APPROPRIATIONS
SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL Aquilino Q. Pimentel 10,000,000 10,000,000 Edgardo J . Angara 60,000,000 60,000,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 J inggoy Ejercito-Estrada 60,000,000 30,000,000 90,000,000 J oker P. Arroyo 95,000,000 25,000,000 120,000,000 J uan Flavier 60,000,000 60,000,000 J uan Ponce Enrile 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 60,000,000 30,000,000 90,000,000 Manuel M. Lapid 60,000,000 42,000,000 102,000,000 Manuel Villar 60,000,000 60,000,000 Miriam Defensor-Santiago 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Pia S. Cayetano 30,000,000 30,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, J r. 60,000,000 60,000,000 Ramon Revilla, J r. 45,000,000 75,000,000 120,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 M.A "J amby" Madrigal 19,700,000 60,000,000 79,700,000 Robert Z. Barbers 94,000,000 94,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 27,000,000 27,000,000 TOTAL, Senate 919,700,000 683,000,000 1,602,700,000
Strengthening You Organization A Series of Modules and Reference Materials For NGO and CBO Managers and Policy Makers Monitoring and Evaluation and MIS