"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

“LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS,
IF NOT THE TRUTH”

Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times and the
Whitewash of General McChrystal’s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman’s Death
By GuyMontag425, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com
September 11, 2009
“Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly
whispered to the media … And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining
beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts, if not the truth.”
--- James Webb, “Something to Die For” (1991)

“LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH”
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PDF Page #:
September 11th 2009 Letter to New York Times Public Editor Clark Hoyt 4
...
Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of General 17
McChrystal’s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman’s Death
Rebuttal of Thom Shanker’s Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35

“Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case”
Rebuttal of Thom Shanker’s Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60

“Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety”
& “U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes”
...
Senator James Webb and the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal’s Role 77
in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman’s Death
May 25th 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from “Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?) 89
April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from larger untitled document) 99
APPENDICES:
A: “Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?” (refer to separate Volume II binder):
Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)

Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report)
Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)
Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag425 5-17-08)
Transcript of General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from “Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)
B: E-Mail Correspondence Between Guy Montag & The New York Times
C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:
(5-12-09) “Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War”

(5-13-09) “A General Steps from the Shadows”
(5-14-09) “New Commander for Afghanistan” (NYT Editorial)
(5-15-09) “Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes”
(5-26-09) “Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case”
(6-01-09) “Questions for General McChrystal” (NYT Editorial)
(6-02-09) “Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety”
(6-02-09) “U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes”
D: “5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue”
LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH
APPENDIX A:
From Appendices of “Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?”
(refer to separate binder):
Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report):
**
Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report):
**
Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report):
**
Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag, 5-17-08):
Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification Notes (Guy Montag, 5-17-08):
Transcript of General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony:
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf
Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from “Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)
5-20-08; Revised 7-17-08
TIMELINE OF TILLMAN FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70- 76): From Testimony & IG Report:
April 22:
Tillman killed in action in Afghanistan. Col [?] (McChrystal’s Chief of Staff)

approves causalty report KIA.
PFC O’Neal tells 1SG of possibility of friendly fire
April 23:
CSM Birch informs LTC Bailey of suspected fratricide, CSM Birch: “I would say I was probably.
recommends an investigation. 70% sure it was fratricide”. (Jones, CS)
LTC Bailey verbally assigns CPT Scott to conduct 15-6
LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon suspects fratricide and Bailey tells Nixon “I was certain we had
investigation initiated. killed him … we need to do the 15-6, So
from that time forward I never doubted
whether or not we had killed Pat Tillman”
.
COL Nixon calls GEN McChrystal to inform OR McChrystal: “about a day or two after the
him of Tillman’s death. incident … [Nixon] told me he suspected
fratricide … and was investigating it.”
Note: Wouldn’t Nixon tell McChrystal of (no later than 25th)
suspected fratricide & investigation the same day
Nixon was told? Wouldn’t Chief of Staff have already
told him of KIA? Or seen it on CNN?
GEN McChrystal while meeting with GEN Abizaid McChrystal tells Abizaid while in
tells him that Tillman had been killed in action. Qatar for a meeting “that Tillman had
been killed in combat, and that the
circumstances surrounding his death were
heroic.” (Abizaid, Waxman 8/07)
OR
Note: Wouldn’t McChrystal tell Abizaid of McChrystal informs GEN Abizaid “of
suspected fratricide and investigation the same Tillman’s death while they were in Qatar for
day he learned of it? (not “death” or “KIA”) a meeting at the time of Tillman’s death…
but he received no details and did not know
Abiziad says “no details” but later “heroic” death? that friendly fire was suspected” (Abizaid,
IG 3/07)
Abizaid “called the Chairman and discussed

that with the Chairman.” (Waxman, 8/07)
IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70- 76): From Testimony & IG Report:
April 23 (continued): Nixon said he told Kensinger “almost

immediately” of the possibility of
friendly fire and beginning investigation.
Yellen testified that he told Kensinger of the

possibility of friendly fire the day after
Tillman’s death [23rd].
OR
Yellen testified that told of death by Nixon
on 23rd and friendly fire investigation on the
24th.
McChrystal calls Brown “shortly after –

perhaps a few days after the death - to say it
was a possibility that this was friendly fire
and that he was investigating”
April 24:
2nd Platoon returns to battalion FOB. CPT Scott takes statements and begins
interviews.
Bailey: “After the first day [of interviews]

… there was no doubt about it.” … I
Note: CPT Scott and LTC Bailey confirmed confirmed it.” “So, after [Scott] did the first
fratricide and told Nixon on the 24th! Nixon five interviews, he came back to me and said
never passed this information up his chain “Sir, I’m certain. I’m sure. And then I
of command?! called [Nixon]”
Nixon: “… I believed it was my

responsibility to tell the family once I had
the facts involved with that. … it took a
considerable time [2 days!] to get truth or
the best level of truth that we could get out
of the investigation.”
Nixon told Yellen that possible fratricide.

April 25:
No later than April 25th, COL Nixon informs GEN Yellen: “… just a few days after the
MG McChrystal and BG Yellen of suspected incident Nixon called me … doing the
fratricide and that investigation was initiated. investigation … may be friendly fire.”
Platoon AAR conducted GEN Brown: “[McChrystal] called shortly

after – perhaps a few days after death -
… possibility friendly fire … investigating”
Note: It was COL [?]’s responsibility as Joint Task McChrystal and COL [?] (Joint Task Force
Force Chief of Staff to transmit supplemental casualty Chief of Staff) “were aware of friendly fire
report after learning of friendly fire. (see IG p. 80) as early as [NLT?] 25th.”
IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70 – 76): From Testimony & IG Report:
April 27:
Autopsy conducted by AFME.

COL Nixon approves Silver Star
April 28:
MG McChrystal approves Silver Star. Abizaid in Afghanisatan. Claims no one

told him of fratricide. Visits LT Uthalut in
hospital on the 29th.
April 29:
Written appointment of CPT Scott’s 15-6 by COL Nixon Scott’s “AR 15-6 Final Report 4-29-04”
submitted to Nixon?
MG McChrystal sends P4 to Abizaid, Brown, and P4 drafted by Nixon.

Kensinger that friendly fire likely outcome of pending
investigation. However, the fratricide should not take
away from the valorous Silver Star award.
Silver Star approved by Acting Secretary of the Army.

Note: Recipients of P4 already knew about
fratricide and investigation. The only news
was that the Silver Star was going through.
It appears to me that the P4’s purpose was

just to cover McChrystal’s butt by providing
a paper trail that even knowing about the
fratricide he still felt the Silver Star was
deserved.
April 30:
PA press release announcing Silver Star award Premature release of Silver Star draft
Regimental JAG does not disclose fratricide

to CID acting on request by medical
examiner.
May 3:
Tillman memorial service

IG Report, Appendix B, Chronology (p 70 – 76): From Testimony & IG Report:
May 4:
CPT Scott submits his AR15-6 recommendations GEN Kensinger says [Nixon] informed him
of possible fratricide and they were going to
do investigation. (Jones; AN)
May 6: GEN Abizaid “probably” received P4

message. Called Chairman Myers and told
Note: Are we to believe that McChrystal never him that “possibility of fratricide” and
picked up the phone to tell Abizaid about the “McChrystal has appointed people to
fratricide and investigation when he learned about investigate…” Said that important that the
it on the 23rd? leadership know, i.e. Rumsfeld and
President.
Note: Possible fratricide & investigation begun
information not in P4 memo! (see Brown Meyers can’t recall specifically how told.
Notification) about potential fratricide & investigation.
Meyers cannot recall if he informed
Secretary Rumsfeld.
May 8:
COL Nixon appoints LTC Kauzerich to conduct

2nd 15-6 investigation
May 16:
LTC Kauzerich completes 15-6 investigation.
Sometime between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid

Receives P4 message sent by GEN McChrystal on
April 29th.
May 18: Around the 18th to 20th Abizaid informed

Rumseld about investigation and looked like
friendly fire (Waxman 8/07).
Note: Abizaid told IG that he never told Rumsfeld
about possible fratricide.
May 20: Rumsfeld says he assumes he was told on

May 20th. Doesn’t recall when told or who
told him.
May 26:
.
LTC Bailey informs Kevin Tillman of fratricide. COL Bucci tells Rumsfeld of fratricide
sometime between 5/24 and 5/29.
May 28:
GEN Abizaid approves 15-6 investigation. GEN Abizaid approves report as being
“definite proof” of friendly fire. Doesn’t
recall mentioning it to the President until
after he signed off on report.
5-17-08; Revised 7-18-08
COLONEL NIXON’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From the IG Report, Appendix B “Chronology” (pp. 70 -76):
April 23, 2004: LTC [Bailey] … and CSM [Birch] … tell COL [Nixon] … that he
suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.
COL Nixon calls GEN McChrystal to inform him of Tillman’s death.
MG McChrystal … while meeting with GEN Abizaid … tells him that

Tillman was killed in action.
April 25, 2004: No later than April 25th, Nixon tells McChrystal that fratricide is
suspected and an investigation initiated.
NOTE: How is it that Nixon is notified of possible fratricide and investigation, yet did
not pass that information up to McChrystal that same day? Or if he learned later that day,
why didn’t Nixon pick up the phone and give McChrystal an update?
...
Sworn Statement of CSM Birch (Jones, CS):
“… by 1000 on the morning of the 23rd, I spoke with [Bailey] face-to-face and said, “This
looks like it might be fratricide. You need to do an investigation and get to the bottom of it
and find out the facts, sir.” (p. 2)
“… probably when I left that canyon to link up with [1SG?] in my mind, I would say I was
probably 70 percent sure it was fratricide, sir.” (p. 8)
Sworn statement of LTC Bailey (Jones, Z):
“So you talked to [Nixon] on the 23rd and told him that it was your initial indication that he
had been killed by fratricide? -- “Yes, sir.” (p.18)
“Sir, there’s no doubt about it [fratricide]. It can’t be anything but that. … I think that
after the first day [of interviews, 24th] after [Scott] talked to … the main kind of players out
there … there was no doubt about it. It was a case where there were 6 or 7 Rangers that
saw this vehicle shooting at them.” (p. 21)
“Sir, within 3 or 4 hours of being out here on the ground by the incident [23rd], I went back
and told [Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. I mean, there’s some doubt and
we need to do the 15-6. So, from that time forward, I never doubted whether or not we had
killed Pat Tillman. In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that.” (p. 52)
“And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I confirmed it.
Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, “Sir, I want you to know
now, after getting the first five interviews” in fact, that was, I guess, the next day.” … “So,
after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and said, “Sir, I’m certain.
I’m sure.” And then I called [Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th. (p. 53)
, 5-17-08

(continued)
Sworn statement of COL Nixon (Jones, AM):
“…I believed it was my responsibility to tell the family once I had the facts involved with
that. …And it took a considerable time to get truth or the best level of truth that we could
get out of that investigation.” (p. 9 -10)
NOTE: “Considerable time” being two days! Scott “was certain. I’m sure” on the 24th!
This fratricide confirmation was passed up to Nixon, and presumably up the chain of
command!
“The night after or probably the day after the actual incident [I learned of possibility of
fratricide]. … I think on the day of the 23rd I got some indication that there might have
been some fratricide.” (p. 2)
“Sir, I believe it was on the [23rd?] 24th [that I directed Bailey to conduct an initial 15-6]”
(p. 3)
NIXON’S NOTIFICATION TO CENTCOM
From IG, p. 12:
“The operational chain of command for CPL Tillman’s unit … was:

1. Headquarters, Operations Team [LTC Bailey?]
2. Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment [COL Nixon]
3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force [GEN McChrystal]
4. CENTCOM [GEN Abizaid]
From IG, p. 59:
“COL Nixon failed to initiate, through the chain of command, timely notification to …
CENTCOM of suspected friendly fire in CPL Tillman’s death.”
From IG, p.26:
“… without timely notification that friendly fire was suspected, GEN Abiziad and his staff
at CENTCOM could not convene a legal investigation as required ….”
From IG, p. 43:
“COL Nixon ‘compartmented’ the information flow to prevent outside communication …

“this meant that the people that needed to know … in … 2nd Ranger Battalion, the Ranger
Regiment, or the Joint Task Force [McChrystal] were the people [who] continue[d] to be
informed throughout.”
NOTE: How could Nixon have “failed” to notify CENTCOM when McChrystal, the link
between Nixon and Abizaid, was “informed throughout” and notified of fratricide on the
23rd or no later than the 25th?! Are we to believe McChrystal never told Abizaid?
, 5-17-08

(continued
From GEN McChrystal sworn statements (Jones 15-6, AP):
NOTE: Testimony was taped, but “defective and unintelligible”. How curious this was
the only Jone’s interview that was “lost.”
“[Nixon] called me and told me he was going to conduct an investigation into this incident.
I told him I agreed an investigation needed to be done and I was comfortable with his
decision to do an investigation”
“I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a day or two after the
incident. [23rd or 24th] No more than three days later [25th]. [Nixon] told me that they
suspected fratricide at that time – no later than 25 April. He gave me a brief overview of
the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed there was a potential
for fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred with him that an initial
15-6 investigation was appropriate.”
“No one has ever shied away from saying this was a fratricide, but we did want to make
sure we were correct before we said it. I did send a P4 message to GEN Brown, GEN
Abizaid, and LTG Kensinger about this, telling them we suspected fratricide, which I can
provide to you”
NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GENERALS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
AP Lindlaw, 5-13-08:
“Col. James Nixon … said he recalled telling Kensinger almost immediately [23rd?] of the
possibility of friendly fire. ‘I thought I did notify LTG Kensinger that there was a potential
for fratricide and that we were beginning an investigation but can not recall the specific
conversation.”
. . . “Nixon also recalled telling Kensinger’s deputy, BFG Howard Yellen. Yellen has
testified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the day after
Tillman’s death [23th].”
, 5-17-08
MG MCCHRYSTAL’S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
From the IG Report, Appendix B “Chronology” (pp. 70 -76):
April 22nd: The Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] approved
transmission of the casualty report of CPL Tillman’s death.
April 23rd: LTC [Bailey] … and CSM [Birch] … tell COL [Nixon] … that
he suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.
COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillman’s death.
MG McChrystal meeting with GEN Abizaid, tells him Tillman was

killed in action.
April 25th: No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon … informs MG McChrystal
… and BG Yellen … that fratricide is suspected and that an
investigation was initiated. MG McChrystal concurs with this
decision.
April 29th: MG McChrystal … sends a “Personal For” message to GEN Abizaid,

… GEN Brown …, and GEN Kensinger … telling them friendly fire
would be the likely outcome of the pending investigation, however, the
fratricide should not take away from the valorous Silver Star award.
NOTE: How is it that Nixon knew of probable fratricide on the 23rd , yet did not tell
McChrystal? Or if McChrystal was told later on the 23rd, why didn’t he update Abiziad?
They were both in Qatar for a meeting! Or he could have picked up the phone. How is it
possible McChrystal waited six days to send his P4 if he wanted to “timely” inform his
chain of command?
...
From IG Report (p.43):
“The Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] approved transmission of the casualty report
of CPL Tillman’s death at about 10:30 PM local time, April 22, 2004.”
NOTE: There was no need for Nixon to inform McChrystal of Tillman’s death on the
23rd. McChrystal’s Chief of Staff would have told him on the 22nd. Or he would have
seen in on CNN!
From IG Report (p. 47):
“COL Nixon failed to comply with the requirements of AR 600-8-1 in not ensuring that a
supplemental casualty report was filed as soon as he suspected friendly fire.”
NOTE: If you examine the “Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Proccess”
timeline (IG, p. 80), the Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] was responsible for
submitting a supplemental casualty report and never did. It’s also noted that both
McChrystal and COL [?] “were aware of friendly fire as early as [NLT] 25 April 2004.”
(Wallace report claims supplemental casualty report was Kensinger’s responsibility).
, 5-17-08

(continued)
NOTE: testimony was taped, but “defective and unintelligible”; i.e. no transcript!
“[Nixon] called me and told me he was going to conduct an investigation into this incident.
I told him I agreed an investigation needed to be done and I was comfortable with his
decision to do an investigation”
“I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a day or two after the
incident. [23rd or 24th] No more than three days later [25th]. [Nixon?] told me that they
suspected fratricide at that time – no later than 25 April. He gave me a brief overview of
the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed there was a potential
for fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred with him that an initial
15-6 investigation was appropriate.”
“On interview with us, GEN Abizaid testified that MG McChrystal informed him of CPL
Tillman’s death while they were in Qatar for a meeting at the time CPL Tillman was killed.
GEN Abizaid said that the action resulted in other casualties, but he received no details and
did not know friendly fire was suspected.”
“GEN Abizaid told us there was a delay of 10-20 days in his receipt of the (P4) message
because he was in Iraq.”
From Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007:
GEN Abizaid: “I believe about the 23rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that
Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his
death were heroic. I called the Chairman and discussed that with the Chairman.” (p. 23)
McChrystal? Or if McChrystal was told later on the 23rd, why didn’t he update Abiziad?
They were both in Qatar for a meeting! Or he could have picked up the phone. How is it
possible McChrystal waited six days to send his P4 if he wanted to “timely” inform his
chain of command?
(continued)
...
From GEN Brown’s testimony (Jones 15-6, AQ):
“[McChrystal?] called shortly after – perhaps a few days after the death – to say that it
was a possibility that this was a friendly fire incident and that he was investigating.”
From Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007 hearing:
Question: “But the actual investigation … was begun promptly … is that correct?” GEN
Brown: “That is my understanding from Gen. McChrystal. He called me the day [23rd?]
that he was going to initiate the 15-6.” (p.122)
...
“No one has ever shied away from saying this was a fratricide, but we did want to make
sure we were correct before we said it. I did send a P4 message to GEN Brown, GEN
Abizaid, and LTG Kensinger about this, telling them we suspected fratricide, which I can
provide to you”
GEN Abizaid: “Clearly, Gen. McChrystal knew by the 28th that there was a high
probability … that there was friendly fire. … When I discovered the problem, I relayed it
to the Chairman [Meyers] in as timely a manner as I could, given the circumstances. …
Gene. McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion.” (p. 142 -143)
“… so again Gen McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely message in a
timely fashion through the most secure channels.” (p. 155)
NOTE: McChrystal knew on the 23rd (NLT 25th) of fratricide yet it was “timely” to wait
6 days to send a P4 instead of merely picking up a phone to call Abizaid?
Recipients of P4 already knew about fratricide and investigation. (McChrystal had already
called Brown a week earlier). The only news was that the Silver Star was going through.
It appears to me that the P4’s purpose was just to cover McChrystal’s butt by providing a
paper trail that even knowing about the fratricide he still felt the Silver Star was deserved.
If pressed, he could show that he had informed his superiors.
, 5-17-08
GENERAL ABIZAID’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From IG, Appendix B, Chronology (pp. 70 – 76):

killed in action.

May 16th: Some time between May 16 and 20, Abizaid … receives the P4
message transmitted by MG McChrystal on April 29, 2004.
McChrystal? Or if McChrystal was told later on the 23rd, why didn’t he update
Abiziad? They were both in Qatar for a meeting!
...
“On interview with us, GEN Abizaid testified that MG McChrystal informed him of CPL
Tillman’s death while they were in Qatar for a meeting at the time CPL Tillman was killed.
GEN Abizaid said that the action resulted in other casualties, but he received no details and
did not know friendly fire was suspected.”
“GEN Abizaid told us there was a delay of 10-20 days in his receipt of the (P4) message
because he was in Iraq.”
GEN Abizaid: “I believe about the 23rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that
Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his
death were heroic. I called the Chairman and discussed that with the Chairman.” (p. 23)
From 1/15/07 Written Response to Waxman Committee:
When General McChrystal called on or about 23 April he did not mention any possibility
of friendly fire. He told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed in a fire fight in
Afghanistan.

“The incident took place on the 22nd. The chain of command
[Meyers/Rumsfeld/President?], through me [Abizaid], was notified of CPL Tillman’s
death.” (p. 154)
, 5-17-08

(continued)
Note: testimony taped, but “defective and unintelligible” (only interview “lost”!)
GEN McChrystal: “I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a day
or two after the incident [23rd or 24th]. No more than three days later. [Nixon] told me that
they suspected fratricide at that time – no later than 25 April. He gave me a brief overview
of the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed there was a
potential for fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred with him that
an initial 15-6 investigation was appropriate.”
NOTE: Did Abizaid meet with McChrystal in Qatar or talk on the telephone?
How does Abizaid go from received “no details” to “heroic” death?
How is it possible that McChrystal did not tell Abizaid of possible fratricide and
investigation on the 23rd after he was told by Nixon? Both in Qatar!
From 1/15/07 Written Response to Waxman Committee:
While in Afghanistan, did anyone inform you that Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible
fratricide? Answer: NO
Did anyone inform you that Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible fratricide at any time
prior to your receipt of the P4 memo? Answer: NO
Did you inform anyone else that Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible fratricide prior to
your receipt of the P4 memo? Answer: NO
...
“… probably the sixth [of May, Abizaid received the P4] … (p. 24)
“… the sixth is the logical day. It is not “the day”; the day is somewhere between 10 and
20 days [5/2 to 5/12] after the event.” (p. 157)
“… probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] … I [Abizaid] called the Chairman
[Meyers]. I told the Chairman about having received McChrystal’s message that friendly
fire was involved.” (p. 24)
“I [Abizaid] contacted General Myers. And my responsibility is to report to the Secretary

[Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. … I said it is clear there is a possibility of fratricide
involving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary people to
investigate to determine precisely what happened; and that while it is likely that there is
fratricide, we will know for sure after the report is finalized …” (p.24)
, 5-17-08

(continued)
NOTE: “McChrystal has appointed the necessary people to investigate” and “possibility
of fratricide” is not in the P4 memo! The P4 refers to “a 15-6 investigation nearing
completion …” Instead, Abizaid’s response sounds like the 4/24 phone call from GEN
McChrystal to GEN Brown: “possibility that this was a friendly fire” … “he [McChrystal]
was investigating.
“… I [Abizaid] said [to Meyers after receiving P4] that it was important that the leadership
know. And between the Chairman [Meyers] and me – I mean, it’s clear that the leadership
up above us is the Secretary and the President.” (p. 155)
...
“On the 28th [of May] I approved the report that came from Gen. McChrystal’s command
as being definite proof of friendly fire.” (p135)
“I don’t recall mentioning it to the President except perhaps after the period where I signed
off on the report that said it was absolutely friendly fire. Once we confirmed the friendly
fire, which was on the 28th.” (p. 76)
, 5-17-08
GENERAL MEYER’S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
From IG, Appendix B, Chronology (pp. 70 -76):

killed in action.

...
May 16th: Some time between May 16 and 20, Abizaid … receives the P4
...
“I [Abizaid] believe about the 23rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal
Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death were
heroic. I called the Chairman [Meyers] and discussed that with the Chairman.” (p. 23)
...
“… probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] … I [Abizaid] called the Chairman
[Meyers]. I told the Chairman about having received McChrystal’s message that friendly
fire was involved.” (p. 24)
“I [Abizaid] contacted General Myers [about sixth]. And my responsibility is to report to

the Secretary [Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. … I said it is clear there is a possibility of
fratricide involving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary
people to investigate to determine precisely what happened; and that while it is likely that
there is fratricide, we will know for sure after the report is finalized …” (p.24)
...
GEN Meyers: “I can’t recall specifically, but it is entirely likely that it is exactly as he
[Abizaid] recalls it.”
GEN Meyers: “What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary [Rumsfeld] did not
know that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot recall whether or not I did that.” (p.
29)
, 5-17-08
SECRETARY RUMSFELD FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

killed in action.

May 16th: Some time between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid … receives the P4
...
GEN Abizaid’s testimony from Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007 hearing:
“I believe about the 23rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal Tillman
had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. I
called the Chairman [Meyers] and discussed that with the Chairman.” (p. 23)
...
“The incident took place on the 22nd. The chain of command
[Meyers/Rumsfeld/President?], through me, was notified of CPL Tillman’s death.” (p.
154)
...
“… probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] … I called the Chairman [Meyers]. I
told the Chairman about having received McChrystal’s message that friendly fire was
involved.” (p. 24)
“I contacted General Myers. And my responsibility is to report to the Secretary

[Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. … I said it is clear there is a possibility of fratricide
involving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary people to
investigate …” (p.24)
“… I said [to Meyers after receiving P4] that it was important that the leadership know.
And between the Chairman [Meyers] and me – I mean, it’s clear that the leadership up
above us is the Secretary and the President.” (p. 155)
...
, 5-17-08

(continued)
Testimony from transcript of Waxman August 1, 2007 hearing:
GEN Meyers: “What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary [Rumsfeld] did not
know that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot recall whether or not I did that.” (p.
29)
“I [Abizaid] did not talk to the Secretary [Rumsfeld] that I can recall directly about it until
I was back in D.C. Around the time period of the 18th to the 20th. And at the time I
informed him that there was an investigation that was ongoing, and it looked like it was
friendly fire.” (p. 26)
From Waxman Report 7-14-08:
Yet when asked by the Defense Department IG whether he spoke with the Secretary upon
learning of the fratricide, General Abizaid stated, “No. I didn’t speak to the Secretary of
Defense about it.”
NOTE: Abizaid told Waxman’s committee that he told Rumsfeld between May 18th and
20th. Yet he previously testified that he never spoke to Rumsfeld about it!
...
Testimony from transcript of Waxman August 1, 2007 hearing:
Davis: “Do you remember when you learned that this was a possible fratricide?”
Rumsfeld: “Well, I don’t remember.” … he assumes I was told on or after May

20th. Whether I was told before that, I just don’t have any recollection.
… I don’t recall when I was told, and I don’t recall who told me …”
(p.32-33)
“I [Rumsfeld] simply do not know when I first learned of the possibility of

fratricide” (p157)
“I [Rumsfeld] don’t remember precisely how I learned that he was killed. It could have
been internally, or it could have been through the press.” (p. 30)
From Rumsfeld Letter to Waxman 7-26-07:
“I am told I received word of this development sometime after May 20, 2004, but my
recollection reflects the fact that it occurred well over two years ago. As a result, I do not
recall when I first learned about the possibility that Corporal Tillman’s death might have
resulted from fratricide.”
, 5-17-08

(continued)
From Waxman Interview Col Bucci 9-20-07:
… Col Bucci, who returned to the Secretary’s personal office on Monday, May 24, 2004
… Sometime during that week [5/24 – 5/29], he said he received a call … you need to let
the Secretary know. … he shared this information with Secretary Rumsfeld within 15
minutes …. “And it was clear to me from his reaction … that this was the first time
anyone had heard anything about it being a fratricide.”
NOTE: Did Rumsfeld learn about the fratricide by Abizaid between the 18th and 20th (or
not at all from Abizaid) or from Bucci between the 24th and 29th? I’d assume he actually
was told much sooner, a month before!
, 5-17-08
GENERAL KENSINGER’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

… and BG Yellen … that fratricide is suspected and than an
decision.

...
AP Laidlaw, 5-13-08:
conversation.”
. . . “Nixon also recalled telling Kensinger’s deputy, BFG Howard Yellen. Yellen has
testified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the day after
Tillman’s death [23th].”
From IG, p 39:
BG Yellen … testified that COL Nixon advised him of CPL Tillman’s death on April 23,
2004, and the initiation of an investigation into friendly fire about 24 hours later [24th]. BG
Yellen stated that he informed LTG Kensinger about the initiation of an investigation that
same day that he learned of it from COL Nixon.”
From IG, p. 44:
“LTG Kensinger’s Deputy Commander [Yellen] informed him [Kensinger] on

approximately April 25, 2004, that friendly fire was suspected, after receiving notice from
COL Nixon.”
From IG, p.25:
“Evidence established that no later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon notified BG Howard
Yellen … who in turn notified LTG Kensinger of suspected fratricide.
...
From GEN Kensinger’s testimony (Jones 15-6, AN):

“It was mentioned this was a possible fratricide on 4 May, … and that they were going to
do an investigation.”
, 5-17-08
GENERAL YELLEN’S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
decision.
...
AP Laidlaw, 5-13-08:
conversation.”
From IG, p 39:
“BG Yellen … testified that COL Nixon advised him of CPL Tillman’s death on April 23,
2004, and the initiation of an investigation into friendly fire about 24 hours later [ 24th].
BG Yellen stated that he informed LTG Kensinger about the initiation of an investigation
that same day that he learned of it from COL Nixon.”
From IG, p. 44:
“LTG Kensinger’s Deputy Commander [Yellen] informed him [Kensinger] on

approximately April 25, 2004, that friendly fire was suspected, after receiving notice from
COL Nixon. … Nixon also recalled telling Kensinger’s deputy, BG Howard Yellen.
Yellen has testified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the
day after [23rd] Tillman’s death.
From IG, p.25:
“Evidence established that no later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon notified BG Howard
Yellen … who in turn notified LTG Kensinger of suspected fratricide.
...
From GEN Yellen’s testimony (Jones 15-6, AO):
“It was just a few days after the incident. I mean, [Nixon] called me and said … “Well,
we’re doing the investigation. We think it may be friendly fire, was his theory. And he
said he’d get back to me and he told me he had put [Scott] as the investigating officer”
(p.1)
, 5-17-08
GENERAL BROWNS’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
decision.

...
From GEN Brown’s testimony (Jones 15-6, AQ):
“[McChrystal] called shortly after – perhaps a few days after the death – to say that it was
a possibility that this was a friendly fire incident and that he was investigating.”
Question: “But the actual investigation … was begun promptly … is that correct?”
Brown: “That is my understanding from Gen. McChrystal. He called me the day [April
23rd?] that he was going to initiate the 15-6.” (p. 122)
QUESTIONS ABOUT TILLMAN FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION
There was no need for Nixon to inform McChrystal of Tillman’s death on the
23rd. McChrystal’s own Chief of Staff approved the KIA report and would have told him on the 22nd. Or
he would have seen in on CNN! Who said Nixon told McChrystal of KIA on 23rd? Nixon?
McChrystal? Both? (Need to compare IG interviews!)
How is Nixon notified of possible fratricide and investigation on the 23rd (or NLT 25th), yet did not pass
that information up to McChrystal? Or that McChrystal knew and did not pass it on to Abizaid on the 23rd
when they were both in a meeting at Qatar? Who is lying here? (Need to compare the IG transcripts!)
McChrystal’s testimony to Jones was taped, but “defective and unintelligible”. How curious this was the
only Jone’s interview that was “lost.”
Did Abizaid meet with McChrystal in Qatar or talk on the telephone? How does Abizaid go from
received “no details” to “heroic” death?
Why does Yellen say notified of KIA on 23rd and investigation on 24th? Were there two notifications
passed up the chain of command? Even so, Scott had already confirmed fratricide on the 24th!
It took Nixon a “considerable time to get truth”; all of two days! Scott “was certain. I’m sure” on the
24th! This fratricide confirmation was passed up by Bailey to Nixon on the 24th, and presumably up the
chain of command to McChrystal, Abizaid, etc.!
The IG said Nixon “failed” to notify CENTCOM of fratricide. Yet, Nixon said McChrystal, the link
between Nixon and Abizaid, was “informed throughout” and notified of fratricide on the 23rd (or no later
than the 25th?!) Are we to believe McChrystal never told Abizaid? That he merely sent the P4 a week
later that was “misplaced”!
Secretary of the Army Geren claimed that it was Kensinger’s responsibility for submitting the
supplemental causalty report for possible fratricide. Yet, if you examine the “Casualty Reporting and
Next of Kin Notification Proccess” timeline (IG, p. 80), the Joint Task Force [McChrystal’s command]
Chief of Staff COL [?] was responsible for submitting a supplemental casualty report and never did. It’s
also noted on that timeline that both McChrystal and COL [?] “were aware of friendly fire as early as
[NLT] 25 April 2004.”
Abizaid said that “McChrystal has appointed the necessary people to investigate” and “possibility of
fratricide”. Yet, this information is not in the P4 memo! The P4 refers to “a 15-6 investigation nearing
completion …” Instead, Abizaid echos the 4/24 phone call from GEN McChrystal to GEN Brown:
“possibility that this was a friendly fire” … “he [McChrystal] was investigating.
Recipients of P4 already knew about fratricide and investigation. (McChrystal had already called Brown a
week earlier). The only news was that the Silver Star was going through. It appears to me that the P4’s
purpose was just to cover McChrystal’s butt by providing a paper trail that even knowing about the
fratricide he still felt the Silver Star was deserved. If pressed, he could show that he had informed his
superiors.
Abizaid told Waxman’s committee that he told Rumsfeld between May 18th and 20th. Yet he previously
testified that he never spoke to Rumsfeld about it!
Did Rumsfeld learn about the fratricide by Abizaid between the 18th and 20th (or not at all from Abizaid)
or from Bucci between the 24th and 29th? I’d assume he actually was told much sooner, a month before!
Transcript of General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009
Senate Confirmation Hearing Testimony:
armed-services.se http://nate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE’S
CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL
(JUNE 2nd 2009)
Summary of Newspaper Coverage of Senate Hearing:
Note: This section is largely edited & rearranged quotes from various newspapers articles, with
no specific annotation provided. My following response was written hastily after the hearing.
[Postscript 9-01-09: My response has been updated using the transcript of the Senate Hearing
now available from the Armed Services Committee website.]
...
Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the Tillman episode emerges between
now [5-26-09] and his confirmation hearing, the question is not expected to figure heavily in the
Senate debate, Congressional officials said. Congressional officials said senators would have to
explain why they confirmed him then [May 2008] but were challenging his qualifications now to
receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.
In his first public testimony before a congressional committee, McChrystal testified about his
handling of the aftermath of Tillman’s death. Yesterday's hearing was the first to address such
concerns, because the Senate held a closed executive [secret] session last spring [5-15-08] to
confirm McChrystal in his current position as director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff
Note: It’s curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both mentioned this secret hearing
at the beginning of their remarks:
From Chairman Senator Levin’s opening remarks (p. 3 transcript) “You [McChrystal]
may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening statement. Both subjects
were discussed in executive session of the Armed Services Committee last year in
connection with your nomination to your current position as director of the Joint Staff.
From General McChrystal’s opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): “You gave me the
opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed
session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director of the
Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any additional questions you
may have.”
Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they were
keeping the existence of the hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-09 hearing, I spoke
briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Levin). He implicitly confirmed the existence of the
hearing, but would say nothing further in response to my questions except “it was in executive
session.”
The senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing, and the
Senate is expected to confirm him as early as Thursday. Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort
should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more about his true nature, his
true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse and Pat's situation.”
On PBS’s NewsHour, David Corn commented:
“And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought
seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button
issues”. … “You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but,
again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicans
had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan”
...
Mary Tillman criticized Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the ranking Republican on the committee,
who questioned McChrystal on Tuesday, for "playing dumb" by not following up on
McChrystal's explanations.
She also says she declined a personal invitation from McCain to submit questions to him to ask
at Tuesday's confirmation hearing. Mary Tillman says she was put off by McCain's public
endorsement of McChrystal and did not want her questions used as part of the confirmation
process.
"If the Army chain of command didn't know what happened to Pat, why did it present us with a
false story" at the memorial service? Tillman asked. "That is not an error; that is not a misstep;
that is deliberate deception. "What's very disturbing is that Senator McCain himself was present
at Pat's memorial and I would think he would be outraged that he was not told ahead of time or
that he was lied to like everyone else.” Did he know all along?"
...
Sen. Jim Webb said he had been contacted by members of the Tillman family when
McChrystal's nomination Afghanistan was announced. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat
who has championed the Tillman’s family case, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a
heartfelt exchange in which the Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that
Corporal Tillman was killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit.
Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with Gordon
Peterson (Webb’s Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous chapter how
Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As a “gate keeper,” he
probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.
Sen. Jim Webb pressed McChrystal, prompting the general to agree that the Army had failed the
Tillman family, "You failed to properly notify the family of the investigation and the
inaccuracies," … "You have not been on the record, and I don't know how you feel about it."
...
General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister
than "mistakes" made to honor the famous GI. "They were well-intentioned" but created "doubt
and the sense of mistrust.”. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said.
McChrystal said the Army's handling of the case "produced confusion at a tragic time, and I'm
very sorry for that." "I was a part of that, and I apologize for it.”. "I would do this differently if I
had the chance again," "There is nothing we can do to automatically restore the trust which was
the second casualty.” "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He earlier expressed his
"deepest condolences" to Tillman's family and fellow rangers.
...
McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but that
he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott’s 4/29/04 15-6?] before
coming forward with that information [sending P4?]. "It was a well-intended intent to get some
level of proof before we went out," he said.
Within days of the incident, McChrystal approved a Silver Star for Tillman, signing off on a
citation praising his valor "in the line of devastating enemy fire. Asked whether he believed that
Tillman earned the Silver Star before his death, “Sir, I absolutely do. I did then; I do now … I
don't believe that the circumstance of death detracts from the courage and commitment of his
contribution.”
“My own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure that I
compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes. They were well intentioned, but
they created, they added to the doubt and the sense of mistrust. And we didn't get it right.”
McChrystal said the Silver Star citation was "not well written" and could have left the
impression that Tillman was not killed by fratricide.
“What we have learned since is, it is better to take your time, make sure you get everything right
with the award, and not rush it. And I'm very sorry for that, because I understand that the
outcome produced a perception that I don't believe was at all involved, at least in the forces that
were forward.”
...
Mary Tillman says she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology
"McChrystal was lying," she said of his comments Tuesday. "He said he didn't know for certain
Pat was killed by fratricide. That isn't true in and of itself, but the fact is, it doesn't matter
whether he knew it for certain." Army protocol at the time required families to be told of
possible fratricide, whether or not it had been confirmed, she said.
"The whole point was to lie to the public," Tillman's mother Mary told ESPN.
...
My Response to General McChrystal’s Testimony :
1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation after
returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about April
23rd:
“Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan from a
meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at that point, that
they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that they had initiated
what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.” (p.18 transcript)
But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told, about
a day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23rd, but was he in
Qatar or Afghanistan?].
During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him of
CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no details and
did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to believe McChrystal
didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in Qatar on the same day! Or,
Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]
And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about the
23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed in combat
and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told “no details” or
“heroic”?]
But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of
possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the "death" of
Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's "death". [But
McChrystal said on Tuesday hearing he was told of fratricide on the 23rd! McChrystal
either failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being informed
about it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal about Tillman’s “death” and/or
McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of “death”.]
So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about “suspected”
fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General and before Congress.
A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve this question [Scott
Laidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I haven’t seen them].
2.) McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but
that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott’s 4/29 15-6] before
coming forward with that information [sending P4]:
“And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]
before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some level
of truth before we went up.” (p. 18 transcript)
There was never anything speculative or “potential” or "suspected" about Tillman’s

friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately what had
happened. On the 23rd word was passed up “70% sure” by the CSM to LTC Bailey and
on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on
verbal confirmation (“I’m certain, I’m sure”) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon
(McChrystal was next in the chain of command).
McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillman’s death! (If this isn’t
“some level of proof”, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never told McChrystal of
confirmation during the following days they were working together on the Silver Star
package?
McChrystal’s “outcome of an initial review” refers to CPT Scott’s “15-6 Final Report”
dated April 29th. Isn’t it curious the 29th’s the same date as McChrystal’s P4? And
further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th as well? Why? Perhaps,
McChrystal could say he just got some “emerging evidence” and started the investigation
after he approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then CPT Scott’s April 29th 15-6
report literally disappeared!
3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he
believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service “which in retrospect looks
contradictory.” (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the Secretary of
the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his “timely” P4 memo to alert his
superiors on the 29th):
“I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide, and
we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial services.”
And “… when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up my chain of
command so that nobody would be surprised.’ (p. 18 transcript).
During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6
investigation on the 23rd . Yet he didn’t send out his P4 until the 29th? How is waiting six
days considered “timely”? [and as I pointed out, he actually had verbal confirmation of
fratricide on the 24th!] Of course, in reality McChrystal told Abizaid on the 23rd, and
then it was passed onward to the Secretary of Defense and White House.
And notice that McChrystal wasn’t concerned about Tillman’s family being surprised.
He wrote in his P4, “I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as
we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country’s leaders
which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s
death become public.” (P4 Memo)
Note the “if” not “when” it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th “as
soon as we detected it” when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd?
Further, McChrystal wasn’t concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he had just
forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had already been
approved.
4.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only “signed off’
on the Silver Star and “had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation that came up
endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand knowledge of the
circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.”:
But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the officers (ie Nixon,
Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a whiteboard to satisfy himself
that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star!:
“I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver Star]. …
and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield, and I queried
the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even though there was a
potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly fire.” (p. 18 transcript)
General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what
happened! McChrystal lead the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn’t
removed from the process. He didn’t just sign off on a piece of paper that just dropped
onto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process.
“Potential… friendly fire.” As previously mentioned, all the Ranger officers and
McChrystal had been told of confirmed friendly fire on the 24th!
5.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read it
close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:
“… my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure that
I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes.” (p. 48 transcript). “… in
retrospect, they [Silver Star and P4 memo] look contradictory, because we sent out a Silver Star
that was not well written – and, although I went through the process, I will tell you now I didn’t
review the citation well enough to capture – or, I didn’t catch that if you read it, you can imply
that it was not friendly fire.” (p.18 transcript)
Absolute bull. The IG report discussion section (Appendix E) on the Silver Star
concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillman was killed by enemy
fire: “… we concluded that an uninformed reader could reasonably infer that CPL
Tillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful review of the narrative and
citation show no direct assertion that he was killed by enemy fire. As a result, the
narrative justification and citation were misleading.” (p.55 IG report)
In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't mention
friendly fire!: “Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared the narrative to avoid
stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly remembered removing a
phrase asserting that CPL Tillman ‘died by enemy fire.” (p.51 IG report).
And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon,
McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). “PFC [O’Neal] stated that he did not sign the valorous
award witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not write and parts that
were not accurate.” … Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts that were inaccurate, in that
he was unable to see CPL Tillman’s actions from his location.” IG Gimble preferred not
to “speculate” as to who was responsible while testifying before the House Oversight
Committee in April 2007.! “… we were not able to identify the specific drafter.” (p.53
IG report).
General McChrystal should not be confirmed as a four star general. First, he's got to learn how
to prevaricate better (or follow General Meyers or Secretary Rumsfeld’s example from the April
2007 House hearing of simply saying, “I don’t recall”). Or, he should’ve just stuck to his story.
Don't change it, keep it simple. McChrystal's testimony yesterday at the Senate hearing shows
that he and/or General Abiziad lied during their testimony before Congress.
Yesterday's Senate hearing was just the final layer of fertilizer upon the high mound of Army
and Congressional "investigations" of Tillman's death. The hypocrisy of the Senators is
disgusting. It's a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family were handed a tarnished Silver Star,
while General McChrystal will be confirmed, promoted to the highest rank in the Army, and
handed his fourth star.
And it’s a further travesty that Thom Shanker, Washington Pentagon Reporter for The New York
Times, had the initial version of this book the week before the hearing and did nothing with it,
especially since he had just written a May 26th article “clearing General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing in the handling of the Tillman case!
[For more information on the hearing, see my 9-11-09 binder sent to the NYT Public Editor
Clark Hoyt, “Lies, Denials, Dissembling, Distortions … Borne Out by Facts If Not the Truth”]
LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS IF NOT THE TRUTH
APPENDIX B:
EMAIL EXCHANGES BETWEEN
THOM SHANKER (NYT PENTAGON REPORTER)
& GUY MONTAG
WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 about 9PM:
Thom Shanker,
I just read your May 26th article, “Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in
Tillman’s Case.”
This past week I’ve been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write that Congress
and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from close scrutiny and
protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webb’s Armed Services
Committee review, General Wallace’s review, and Congressman Waxman’s House Oversight &
Reform Committee investigation.
I’d like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point raised in
your article. In addition, I’ve uncovered new information about the Tillman case not mentioned
at all in your article.
Here’s a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):
1. Senator Webb did a “thorough review” last year of the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide at
the request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee. (In retrospect, I
realize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystal’s confirmation last year as Director of
the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th 2008 on the Diane Rhem NPR radio
show (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up, Webb’s Military Affairs aide,
Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and referred me to Gary Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counsel
for Senator Levin)
2.) Congressman Waxman “invited” McChrystal to testify on August 1st 2007. The Committee
permited McChrystal to “decline” to appear at the hearing despite his key role in notifying senior
leadership, writing the misleading P4 memo, and approving the fraudulent Silver Star. And the
Committee never interviewed McChrystal during the next year until their report was issued. .
3.) General Kensinger was blamed for failing to notify the family because he supposedly had the
“administrative” responsibility to do so. Yet, if you look at “Appendix D: Casualty Reporting &
Next of Kin Notification Process” in the IG report, the flowchart clearly shows that McChrystal
had that responsibility (and it’s noted both he and his Chief of Staff failed to make that
notification despite knowing about fratricide NLT April 25th.
4). There was nothing “potential” about Tillman’s friendly fire death. Most of the troops on the
ground knew immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up “70% sure” to
Nixon. But, if you look at the IG report’s “Appendix B: Chronology,” its noted that LTC Bailey
tells COL Nixon of potential fratricide on the 23rd yet Nixon supposedly only tells McChrystal of
Tillman’s “death” (no mention of fratricide). How is that possible? And then supposedly
McChrystal tells General Abizaid only of Tillman’s death. It looks as though Abizaid wasn’t
being truthful when he testified before Congress about when he learned about fratricide.
5.) And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on confirmation (“I’m
certain, I’m sure”) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the
chain of command). The Army knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman’s death!
6.) McChrystal is praised for his “timely” P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th. There was
nothing timely about it. Even if you accept his own testimony at face value, he knew about
friendly fire on the 23rd, 24th, or 25th. Yet he didn’t send out his P4 until the 29th? How is
waiting four to six days “timely”?
7.) No one seems to have carefully read McChrystal’s P4 memo. The contents are damning.
For example, He says “IF the circumstances of CPL Tillman’s death become public.” Not when,
IF.
Anyhow, I believe you will find it worth your time to read through my letter.
Could send me your e-mail address? Then, I could simply send my documents as “attachments”
to an email. Could you also give me a mailing address? (I’ll Fed Ex a hardcopy of letter
tomorrow).
If you have any further questions, I can be reached at my email: dparish@grcity.us. I can also
be contacted at my home phone, 616-866-0314. (Unfortunately, I’m a dinosaur who still doesn’t
have a cell phone, so that option is out!) I’ll be home tomorrow in the afternoon and evening.
Sincerely,
...
WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 10:39 PM:
Please feel free to send me your material, as I would be eager to review it. Above is my direct e-
mail address. Thanks for writing.
Regards,
Thom
THURSDAY 5/28/09 7:27 AM:
Thom,
Thanks for sending your direct contact info.
I’ve just finished up things (a bit of a all-nighter!)
Could you also send me the best “snail mail” address to send you a package tomorrow? I would
like to send you my material in a binder by Fed Ex, hopefully get to you by Friday. And a hard
copy form would be easier for you to read thru.
But, I’ll send you my Word documents in the morning.
THURSDAY 5/28/09 8:07 AM:
Thom,
Here is a download of the Appendices material that I wrote included in “Did They Teach You to
Lie Yet?” I’ll send the rest in a hardcopy form.
I tried to condense a lot of my information into the “Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification.”
FRIDAY 7:25 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I sent my document “Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?” by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon. It’s
supposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of what I
emailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of appendices. ….
FRIDAY 5/29/09 8:14 AM:
I very much look forward to reviewing you documentary file this weekend, and I thank you for
sending it.
Regards,
Thom
FRIDAY 5/29/09 2:42 PM:
Thom,
I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just thought
I'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.
FRIDAY 5/29/09 3:59 PM:
Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.
SATURDAY 5/30/09 6:59 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath of Tillman's
death. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of Tillman Notification" which
compares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide Notes has supporting details). I just wanted
to point out a couple corrections:
1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. He informs
McChrystal:
"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".
"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystal only of

"death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon didn't mention
potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaid only of "death"!
Not likely.
And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then Abiziad lied
in testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviews of Nixon,
McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).
2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:
This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPT Scott
who verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th who passed it onto
COL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April 29th concluding
friendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's 15-6 disappeared, there is
no copy! Although the IG said they managed to reconstruct it somehow.)
You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General Wallace.
Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd appreciate you
sending me a copy if possible.
Thanks,
MONDAY 6/1/09 06:33 AM:
Thom Shanker,
I just read today's NYT editorial "Questions for General McChrystal."
Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case? There
wasn't one, except perhaps an obscure reference in the last line "The overall performance of the
Special Operations Command under General McChrystal's leadership -- both acts of heroism and
acts of abuse -- ...".
Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th article before the confirmation
hearing?
Sincerely,
MONDAY 6/1/09 6:56 AM:
As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and important
institutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, any question
about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom
reporter.
Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?
Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well researched and
quite thorough.
Regards,
Thom
MONDAY 6/1/09 11:08 AM:
Thom,
Thanks for pointing out the separation of newsroom and editorial board. Obvious, in retrospect.
Do I have any sense that the Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case? I don't see why they
would bring up the subject. They'll probably just ask a few questions about "enhanced
interrogation" at Camp Nama (sp?) in Iraq which will go nowhere. If Tillman is mentioned,
they'll probably say he's gotten cleared by Wallace etc (without mentioning Senator Webb's
review last year).
Could you please answer my question? Are you going to publish a follow-up to your May 26th
piece based on my document or any other information you've received? If not, why not? Why
did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal and Tillman in your May 26th article?
Sincerely,
MONDAY 6/1/09 11:10 AM:
David,
At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the hearing,
although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.
Regards,
Thom
MONDAY 6-01-09 2:00 PM (sent many several NYT email addresses):
June 1st 2009
New York Times Editorial Board,
I was surprised that your editorial today, “Questions for General McChrystal,” did not mention
General McChrystal’s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman’s fratricide.
I’ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since last
Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article “Nomination of US Afghan Commander Revives
Questions in Tillman’s Case.” Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100 page document to him
detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal’s central role in the whitewash of Tillman’s
death.
However, it doesn’t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I think the
NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this document
before tomorrow’s June 2nd confirmation hearing of General McChrystal before the Senate
Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).
Below, you can read my May 27th letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb. If you
would like more information, I’ve also “attached” many of the documents in the package I sent
to Thom Shanker.
Feel free to contact me with any questions. Unfortunately, I won’t be able to respond to emails
until after 9 PM since my home computer is out (until my wife gets home with her laptop). But,
I’ll be home most of the day if you wish to call my home phone.
Sincerely,
...
No emails sent or received between Tuesday 6-02-09 and 6-05-09
...
FRIDAY 6-05-09 9:11 PM:
Thom Shanker,
First, I thought I’d pass on my comments about General McChrystal’s testimony at his
confirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeper hole
with his own words on Tuesday:
1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and 15-6 investigation after
returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about April
23rd:
During the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told, about a
day or two after the incident ...". [OK, that matches the 23rd, but was he in Qatar or
Afghanistan?].
During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him of
CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no details and
did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to believe McChrystal
didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in Qatar on the same day! Or
Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]
During his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about the 23rd,
Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed in combat and
that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told “no details” or “heroic”?]
And, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of
possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the "death" of
Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's "death". [But
McChrystal said on Tuesday he was told of fratricide on the 23rd! McChrystal failed to
tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being informed about it. And
Nixon or McChrystal lied about only telling about “death”]
So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about “suspected”
fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General. A quick check of their
IG interviews would be illuminating.
2.) McChrystal testified that he waited for the outcome of the investigation before making
conclusions, he "wanted some level of truth" before he sent the information on a week later with
his P4:
As I wrote to you before, there was never anything “potential” or "suspected" about
Tillman’s friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew
immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up “70% sure” by the
CSM to LTC Bailey and onto COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial investigating
officer CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (“I’m certain, I’m sure”) to LTC Bailey,
who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command).
McChrystal knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman’s death! Or, are we to believe
Nixon never told McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were
working together on the Silver Sta r package?
Perhaps McChrystal’s “level of truth” refers to CPT Scott’s “15-6 Final Report” dated
April 29th. Isn’t it curious the 29th’s the same date as the P4? And further that Nixon
only officially appointed Scott on the 29th as well? So McChrystal could say he just got
some “emerging evidence” and started the investigation after he approved the Silver Star
on the 29th? And then CPT Scott’s 15-6 disappeared!
3.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only signed off on
the Silver Star and had no reasonable basis to question a recommendation by commanders in the
field with firsthand knowledge:
But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the
Ranger officers (Nixon, Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a
whiteboard to satisfy himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star! McChrystal
wasn't just signing a piece of paper that dropped on his desk! He was in the field with the
commanders and discussing their firsthand knowledge!
4.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read it
close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:
Absolute bull. The IG concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillman
was killed by enemey fire. In fact, Maj Hodne even said that he edited the narrrative to
ensure it didn't mention friendly fire! And the witness statements were altered by
"someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich) to remove
references to friendly fire. IG Gimble preferred not to “speculate” as to who was
responsible!
Finally, I still don’t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week
“Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.” You wrote that
“Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode emerges between now and
his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd, the question is not expected to figure heavily in the
Senate debate."
Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document “Did They Teach You To Lie Yet?”
(with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing “new disclosures” about
McChrystal’s role in the Tillman case.
Could you please explain to me why my document wasn’t sufficient to prompt you to write a
follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article about the
hearing?
I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts contained in my document.
Sincerely,
SATURDAY 6-06-09 9:58 AM:

Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive.
My question back to you would be:
Why are even senators who were most outspoken in criticism of the handling of the Tillman case
-- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your research and in comments by
the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the public resolution of the inquiries and
now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal next week? Remember, as I know you
do, that the legislative branch is a key check and balance not only of the executive, but of the
military. It controls funding and confirmation to senior general officer jobs.
Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.
Regards,
Thom
SUNDAY 6-07-09 9:30 AM:
Thom,
You asked why even Senator Webb has expressed satisfaction with the public resolution of the
inquiries into the Tillman case and is now ready to confirm General McChrystal?
I would stress "public" inquiries. General McChrystal appeared in "executive session" (i.e.
closed, secret) during the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15, 2008 for
his confirmation to Director of the Joint Staff. I would assume he was a bit more frank with the
senators during that discussion. I talked to Gerald Leeling on June 1st about that meeting. He
would say nothing in response to my questions except "it was in executive session" and "we did
as thorough a review given the information available to us at the time." I would assume Senator
Webb knows McChrystal and the Army have been lying about their handling of the Tillman
case.
But, I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to lead
the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of Tillman's
fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from Rumsfeld and the
White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.). Besides, now the senators are
stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the chain of "investigations" into the handling
of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their own ass now.
Bu my question for you still remains unanswered:
Despite your praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched" none
of my findings appeared in your following articles concerning the Tillman case. Wouldn't my
100 page document qualify as "new information"? (or are only official government leaks
considered authoritative enough to appear in print?)
Could you please explain to me why my document wasn’t sufficient to prompt you to write a
follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in your June 2nd
article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government position?
Thanks,
...
No further response from Shanker as of Tuesday 6-09-09
LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS IF NOT THE TRUTH

APPENDIX C:
NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES ABOUT

GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL
Pentagon Ousts Top Commander In Afghan War
By ELISABETH BUMILLER AND THOM SHANKER; ERIC SCHMITT AND JEFF ZELENY CONTRIBUTED
REPORTING.
Published: New York Times May 12, 2009
The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, was forced out
Monday in an abrupt shake-up intended to bring a more aggressive and innovative approach to
a worsening seven-year war.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced the decision in terse comments at the Pentagon,
saying that ''fresh eyes were needed'' and that ''a new approach was probably in our best interest.''
When asked if the dismissal ended the general's military career, Mr. Gates replied, ''Probably.''
The move reflects a belief that the war in Afghanistan, waged against an increasingly strong
Taliban and its supporters across a rugged, sprawling country, is growing ever more complex.
Defense Department officials said General McKiernan, a respected career armor officer, had
been removed primarily because he had brought too conventional an approach to the challenge.
He is to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint

Special Operations Command. He served in Afghanistan as chief of staff of military operations
in 2001 and 2002 and recently ran all commando operations in Iraq.
Forces under General McChrystal's command were credited with finding and capturing Saddam
Hussein and with tracking and killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in
Mesopotamia. His success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and
his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made
him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan, Defense Department officials said.
At the same time, he will be confronted with deep tensions over the conduct of Special
Operations forces in Afghanistan, whose aggressive tactics are seen by Afghan officials as
responsible for many of the American mistakes that have resulted in the deaths of civilians.
Pentagon officials have begun to describe Afghanistan as the military's top priority, even more
important than the war in Iraq. President Obama announced a major overhaul of American
strategy in Afghanistan in March. Planned troop levels are expected to reach more than 60,000
Americans.
Pentagon officials said it appeared that General McKiernan was the first general to be dismissed
from command of a theater of combat since Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War.
At a Pentagon news conference on Monday, Mr. Gates praised General McKiernan for what he
called his ''long and distinguished'' service, but said of Afghanistan, ''Our mission there requires
new thinking and new approaches by our military leaders.'' General McKiernan served in his
current command for only 11 months, about half the length of such tours.
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined Mr. Gates in making the
announcement.
The change also reflects the influence of Gen. David H. Petraeus, who took over last fall as
the top American commander for Iraq and Afghanistan. General Petraeus served under General
McKiernan in Iraq only to surpass him quickly in his rise through the ranks. The defense
officials said the two men did not develop a bond after General Petraeus inherited General
McKiernan as his Afghanistan commander.
While his unblemished record included service in the former Yugoslavia, General McKiernan
found himself unable to win support from the two most recent defense secretaries. As the
commander of allied ground forces during the invasion of Iraq, General McKiernan differed with
the Pentagon leadership and with his commander, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, when he joined a
circle of Army officers who advocated many more troops than were ordered to the region.
Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary, said Mr. Obama agreed with the
recommendation from Mr. Gates and Admiral Mullen that ''the implementation of a new strategy
in Afghanistan called for new military leadership.'' The president praised General McKiernan's
leadership, but said it was time for a ''change of direction in Afghanistan.''
The president met with Mr. Gates in the Oval Office on Monday, but aides declined to provide
details of their discussions.
A senior administration official said that last week, Mr. Gates asked the president for his
approval to remove General McKiernan and the president agreed. Mr. Gates then officially
delivered the news of his final decision over dinner last Wednesday night with General
McKiernan at Camp Eggers, the American military headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan.
Mr. Gates said General McChrystal would be assisted by a deputy commander, Lt. Gen. David
M. Rodriguez, who is to serve in a new position with responsibility for the day-to-day
management of the war. General Rodriguez had a previous tour in eastern Afghanistan as
commander of the 82nd Airborne.
A West Point graduate from the class of 1976, General McChrystal is himself a Green Beret and
a Ranger, as well as a veteran Special Operations commander. One spot on General
McChrystal's generally sterling military record came in 2007, when a Pentagon
investigation into the accidental shooting death in 2004 of Cpl. Pat Tillman by fellow Army
Rangers in Afghanistan held General McChrystal accountable for inaccurate information
provided by Corporal Tillman's unit in recommending him for a Silver Star.
The information wrongly suggested that Corporal Tillman, a professional football player
whose decision to enlist in the Army after the Sept. 11 attacks drew national attention, had
been killed by enemy fire.
In recent work as director of the Joint Staff, General McChrystal has developed a plan to select a
group of some 400 troops and officers to go back and forth from assignments in the region and
the United States. While at home, the troops and officers would continue in their military jobs
and work on some aspect of Afghan strategy, training or operations. The troops would remain in
the cadre for three to five years, depending on the job. The approach is similar to the way
General McChrystal ran Special Operations forces.
Most troops now deploy to Afghanistan for about a year or less without any formal training in
the region before they go. They often move on to unrelated jobs when their Afghan tours end.
''The idea is to develop a group of people who give you continuity, expertise and relationships.
They know each other plus the people they're going to work with,'' said a senior military official
who has worked closely on the plan. ''As they build relationships among themselves,
relationships with Afghan partners and relationships with Afghan units, their relative
effectiveness is just going to go up.''
The official said that the program, which Admiral Mullen has approved, should be up and
running within 60 days after details are worked out, and its effects would be noticeable in
Afghanistan within six months.
May 13, 2009 The New York Times
MAN IN THE NEWS: General Steps From Shadow

By ELISABETH BUMILLER AND MARK MAZZETTI
Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the ascetic who is set to become the new top American
commander in Afghanistan, usually eats just one meal a day, in the evening, to avoid
sluggishness.
He is known for operating on a few hours' sleep and for running to and from work while
listening to audio books on an iPod. In Iraq, where he oversaw secret commando operations for
five years, former intelligence officials say that he had an encyclopedic, even obsessive,
knowledge about the lives of terrorists, and that he pushed his ranks aggressively to kill as many
of them as possible.
But General McChrystal has also moved easily from the dark world to the light. Fellow officers
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he is director, and former colleagues at the Council on
Foreign Relations describe him as a warrior-scholar, comfortable with diplomats, politicians and
the military man who would help promote him to his new job.
''He's lanky, smart, tough, a sneaky stealth soldier,'' said Maj. Gen. William Nash, a retired
officer. ''He's got all the Special Ops attributes, plus an intellect.''
If General McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, as expected, he will take over the post
held by Gen. David D. McKiernan, who was forced out on Monday. Obama administration
officials have described the shakeup as a way to bring a bolder and more creative approach to the
faltering war in Afghanistan.
Most of what General McChrystal has done over a 33-year career remains classified, including
service between 2003 and 2008 as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, an
elite unit so clandestine that the Pentagon for years refused to acknowledge its existence. But
former C.I.A. officials say that General McChrystal was among those who, with the C.I.A.,
pushed hard for a secret joint operation in the tribal region of Pakistan in 2005 aimed at
capturing or killing Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden's deputy.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld canceled the operation at the last minute, saying it was
too risky and was based on what he considered questionable intelligence, a move that former
intelligence officials say General McChrystal found maddening.
When General McChrystal took over the Joint Special Operations Command in 2003, he
inherited an insular, shadowy commando force with a reputation for spurning partnerships with
other military and intelligence organizations. But over the next five years he worked hard, his
colleagues say, to build close relationships with the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. He won praise from
C.I.A. officers, many of whom had stormy relationships with commanders running the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
''He knows intelligence, he knows covert action and he knows the value of partnerships,'' said
Henry Crumpton, who ran the C.I.A.'s covert war in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks.
As head of the command, which oversees the elite Delta Force and units of the Navy Seals,
General McChrystal was based at Fort Bragg, N.C. But he spent much of his time in Iraq
commanding secret missions. Most of his operations were conducted at night, but General
McChrystal, described nearly universally as a driven workaholic, was up for most of the day as
well. His wife and grown son remained back in the United States.
General McChrystal was born Aug. 14, 1954, into a military family. His father, Maj. Gen.
Herbert J. McChrystal Jr., served in Germany during the American occupation after World War
II and later at the Pentagon. General Stanley McChrystal was the fourth child in a family of five
boys and one girl; all of them grew up to serve in the military or marry into it.
''They're all pretty intense,'' said Judy McChrystal, one of General McChrystal's sisters-in-law,
who is married to the eldest child, Herbert J. McChrystal III, a former chaplain at the United
States Military Academy at West Point.
General McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976 and spent the next three decades
ascending through conventional and Special Operations command positions as well as taking
postings at Harvard and the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a commander of a Green
Beret team in 1979 and 1980, and he did several tours in the Army Rangers as a staff officer and
a battalion commander, including service in the Persian Gulf war of 1991.
One blot on his otherwise impressive military record occurred in 2007, when a Pentagon
investigation into the accidental shooting death in 2004 of Cpl. Pat Tillman by fellow Army
Rangers in Afghanistan held General McChrystal accountable for inaccurate information
provided by Corporal Tillman's unit in recommending him for a Silver Star. The
information wrongly suggested that Corporal Tillman had been killed by enemy fire.
At the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, where General McChrystal directs the 1,200-member group,
he has instituted a daily 6:30 a.m. classified meeting among 25 top officers and, by video,
military commanders around the world. In half an hour, the group races through military
developments and problems over the past 24 hours.
Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brought General McChrystal back
to Washington to be his director last August, and the physical proximity served General
McChrystal well, Defense officials said. In recent weeks, Admiral Mullen recommended General
McChrystal to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates as a replacement for General McKiernan.
One other thing to know about General McChrystal: when he was a fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations in 2000, he ran a dozen miles each morning to the council's offices from his
quarters at Fort Hamilton on the southwestern tip of Brooklyn.
''If you asked me the first thing that comes to mind about General McChrystal,'' said Leslie H.
Gelb, the president emeritus of the council, ''I think of no body fat.''
The New York Times
May 14, 2009
EDITORIAL
New Commander for Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan is not going well. And President Obama has the right to choose his own top commander. We hope that his
decision this week to fire Gen. David McKiernan and replace him with Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal means that the president and his
team have come up with a strategy that will combine aggressive counterinsurgency tactics with economic development. That is the only
chance for turning around a must-win war that America isn’t winning.
We also hope that General McChrystal, who is an expert in special operations, will do a better job at limiting the number of civilian
casualties that are helping to drive more Afghans into the Taliban camp.
Continued Taliban gains would bring even greater suffering to the Afghan people. It would also mean wider sanctuaries for terrorists
plotting attacks against the United States and Europe and even greater instability in Pakistan. General McChrystal, a hard-driving and
talented officer, impressed his superiors during his five years running Special Operations commando missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
That’s a strong résumé. But other qualities are needed as well.
Success in Afghanistan will also require effective training for the Afghan Army and police forces so they can stand on their own,
strengthened local institutions and an effort to rein in the officially condoned corruption and drug trafficking that have turned so many
Afghans against their own national and local governments. And it will require skillful diplomacy with other NATO generals to ensure
the best use of tens of thousands of allied troops in Afghanistan and with Pakistani military leaders who must do a lot more to deny
cross-border sanctuaries and infiltration routes to Taliban fighters.
General McKiernan does not deserve the blame for the dismal military situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban had been gaining ground
long before he took charge, in large measure because the Bush administration — focused on its misguided war in Iraq — failed for so
many years to invest adequate troops, resources or attention to the Afghan fight.
General McKiernan publicly argued that many more American troops were needed. He was right, and more are on the way. But that
apparently wasn’t enough for either Defense Secretary Robert Gates or for the top American regional commander, Gen. David Petraeus.
The challenges now fall to General McChrystal, whose impressive military reputation rests in part on such stunning exploits as the
capture of Saddam Hussein and the location and killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Both were
carried out by special forces under his command.
Less impressively, some of his commando units were implicated in abusive interrogations of Iraqi prisoners. And it was General
McChrystal who approved the falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in
Afghanistan.
These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year for his present job as director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Before confirming him in his new command, senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard lessons
from these mistakes and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.
THE NEW YORK TIMES
May 15, 2009
Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Strikes

By CARLOTTA GALL and TAIMOOR SHAH
FARAH, Afghanistan — The number of civilians killed by the American airstrikes in Farah
Province last week may never be fully known. But villagers, including two girls recovering from
burn wounds, described devastation that officials and human rights workers are calling the worst
episode of civilian casualties in eight years of war in Afghanistan.
“We were very nervous and afraid and my mother said, ‘Come quickly, we will go somewhere
and we will be safe,’ ” said Tillah, 12, recounting from a hospital bed how women and children
fled the bombing by taking refuge in a large compound, which was then hit.
The bombs were so powerful that people were ripped to shreds. Survivors said they collected
only pieces of bodies. Several villagers said that they could not distinguish all of the dead and
that they never found some of their relatives.
Government officials have accepted handwritten lists compiled by the villagers of 147 dead
civilians. An independent Afghan human rights group said it had accounts from interviews of
117 dead. American officials say that even 100 is an exaggeration but have yet to issue their own
count.
The calamity in the village of Granai, some 18 miles from here, illustrates in the grimmest terms
the test for the Obama administration as it deploys more than 20,000 additional troops here and
appoints a new commander, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, in search of a fresh approach to
combat the tenacious Taliban insurgency.
It is bombings like this one that have turned many Afghans against the American-backed
government and the foreign military presence. The events in Granai have raised sharp questions
once again about the appropriateness and effectiveness of aerial bombardment in a guerrilla war
in which the insurgents deliberately blend into the civilian population to fight and flee.
Taliban insurgents are well aware of the weakness and are making the most of it, American and
Afghan officials say. Farah, a vast province in the west, contains only a smattering of foreign
special forces and trainers who work among Afghan police and army units. Exploiting the thin
spread of forces, the insurgents sought to seize control of Granai and provoke a fierce battle over
the heads of the civilian population, Afghan and American officials say.
After hours of fighting and taking a number of casualties, the American forces called in their
heaviest weapon, airstrikes, on at least three targets in the village.
The rapid mass burial of the victims and the continuing presence of insurgents in the area have
hampered investigations. Journalists were advised against visiting Granai. Villagers were
interviewed here in Farah, the provincial capital, where they came to collect compensation
payments, and in the neighboring province of Herat, where some were taken for treatment.
Much of the villagers’ descriptions matched accounts given by the United States military
spokesman, Col. Greg Julian, and the provincial police chief, Col. Abdul Ghafar Watandar. But
they differed on one important point: whether the Taliban had already left Granai before the
bombing began.
There was particular anger among the villagers that the bombing came after, they say, the
Taliban had already left at dusk, and the fighting had subsided, so much so that men had gone to
evening prayers at 7 p.m. and returned and were sitting down with their families for dinner.
The police chief said that sporadic fighting continued into the night and that the Taliban were
probably in the village until 1 a.m.
Whatever the case, American planes bombed after 8 p.m. in several waves when most of the
villagers thought the fighting was over; and whatever the actual number of casualties, it is clear
from the villagers’ accounts that dozens of women and children were killed after taking cover.
One group went to a spacious compound owned by a man named Said Naeem, on the north side
of the village, where the two girls were wounded. Only one woman and six children in the
compound survived, one of their fathers said.
Another group gathered in the house of the village imam, or religious leader, Mullah Manan.
That, too, was bombed, causing an equally large number of casualties, villagers said. Colonel
Julian, the American military spokesman, said that the airstrikes hit houses from which the
Taliban were firing. The enormous explosions left such devastation that villagers struggled to
describe it. “There was someone’s legs, someone’s shoulders, someone’s hands,” said Said
Jamal, an old white-bearded man with rheumy eyes, who lost two sons and a daughter. “The
dead were so many.”
A joint government and United States military delegation visited Granai last week but came back
sharply divided in their conclusions. The Afghan government said that 140 civilians were killed
and 25 wounded, and that 12 houses were destroyed.
The United States military said the Afghan numbers were far too high. This week, a senior
military investigator, Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III of the United States Army, arrived to
conduct an in-depth inquiry for the region’s overall military commander, Gen. David H.
Petraeus.
An independent Afghan organization, Afghanistan Rights Monitor, said Wednesday that at least
117 civilians were killed — including 26 women and 61 children — drawing on interviews with
21 villagers and relatives of the dead. The group criticized both the Taliban for fighting among
civilians, and the United States military for using excessive force.
The police chief, Colonel Watandar, confirmed much of the villagers’ accounts of the fighting. A
large group of Taliban fighters, numbering about 400, they estimated, entered the village and
took up positions at dawn on May 4. By midmorning, the Taliban began attacks on police posts
on the main road, just yards from the village, they said.
The fighting raged all day. The police called in more police officers, Afghan Army units and an
American quick reaction force from the town of Farah as reinforcements.
By midafternoon, the exchanges escalated sharply and moved deeper into the village. Taliban
fighters were firing from the houses, and at one point a Marine unit called in airstrikes to allow
Marines to go forward and rescue a wounded Afghan soldier, said Colonel Julian, the United
States military spokesman. After that, Taliban fire dropped significantly, he said.
A villager named Multan said that one house along the southern edge of the village was hit by a
bomb and that one Taliban fighter was killed there. But villagers did not report any civilian
casualties until the American planes bombed that night.
Tillah, the 12-year-old girl, whose face bears the scars of a scorching blast, still twisted in pain
from the burning in her leg at the provincial hospital in Herat, where she and other survivors
were taken to a special burn unit. Her two sisters, Freshta, 5, and Nuria, 7, were barely visible
May 26, 2009
Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman Case
By THOM SHANKER New York Times
Note: See my following rebuttal of Thom Shanker’s assertions that General McChrystal was
“cleared of wrongdoing” in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. I dispute the truth of every
substantive assertion Thom Shanker made in his article.
Each assertion discussed in my rebuttal has been high-lighted and numbered for easy reference
(Italics within bold-face are mine).
...
WASHINGTON — One was a football hero who roused the nation when he quit a
high-paying job as star safety for the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army and become
a Ranger after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The other is a three-star Special Operations general who has spent most of his career
in the shadows, commanding secret counterterrorism missions carried out by the
military’s most elite capture-or-kill units.
But the lives of Cpl. Pat Tillman and Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal became
entwined in a most public way after Corporal Tillman died in Afghanistan in 2004. [2]
General McChrystal, commander of a Special Operations task force in
Afghanistan at the time, was among 10 officers singled out for scrutiny after
details belatedly emerged that Corporal Tillman was killed not by an insurgent
ambush, as the Army originally asserted, but by fire from his own team of
Rangers.
The four-star general who was the final judge of the case ordered punitive action
against seven officers, including four generals. General McChrystal was among
the three cleared of wrongdoing.
[3] But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s nomination to
be the top American commander in Afghanistan, the latest step in an urgent
effort by the Obama administration to put together a new strategy and salvage
the faltering mission.
[1] The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star commendation
and the initial, false information released to the family and the public were the
subjects of multiple investigations. Among them were inquiries by the Army’s
Criminal Investigation Command, the Defense Department’s inspector general
and a Congressional committee, as well as the final four-star review by Gen.
William S. Wallace, then in charge of the Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command.
[11] Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General

McChrystal for signing a Silver Star commendation that “erroneously implied
that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.”
[12] But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General
McChrystal “had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendation
that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had
firsthand knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.”
[7] General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded “reasonably
and quickly” — being the first to alert the three generals who were his superior
officers at Central Command, Special Operations Command and Army Special
Operations Command that there was emerging evidence that Corporal Tillman
had been killed by fellow Rangers.
[6] General McChrystal’s memorandum, sent a week after the episode, warned
that “it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire,”
according to the Pentagon inspector general’s report.
[9] In his message from the field, General McChrystal also asked his three
superiors to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary
“about comments they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment if the
public found out friendly fire was involved.”
[10] General McChrystal’s message was sent not through standard reporting
channels, but through a “Personal For” message system. Investigators ruled that
while it was an unusual choice for communications, the general could reasonably
have assumed that this specialized report would be acted upon urgently.
[8] “General McChrystal did exactly the right thing: he sent a timely message in a
timely fashion through the most secure channels,” said Gen. John P. Abizaid,
then the top officer of Central Command, overseeing forces in the Middle East.
He spoke during 2007 testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform.
Even so, Corporal Tillman’s family was not informed of the true cause of death until
35 days after he was killed, and some family members voiced doubts that the full truth
had emerged about who in the Pentagon knew what, and when.
The puzzle was compounded by the fact that it took three years and three months for
the Army and the Defense Department to finish the array of investigations and mete
out punishment for the events, which took place outside Manah, Afghanistan, on April
22, 2004.
Even the Army’s top civilian conceded at the conclusion of the investigations in July
2007 that damage had been done to the service’s reputation. Pete Geren, the Army
secretary, voiced regret for the “errors and failures of leadership that confused and
misinformed the American people and compounded the grief suffered by the Tillman
family.”
[5] A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made public
after the inquiries showed that General McChrystal was cleared in part because
he was not serving in the chain of command for personnel issues or administration,
the part of the Army responsible for investigating Corporal Tillman’s death and
notifying the family and the public of details.
[4] Officers in administrative headquarters of the Army were most severely

criticized and punished for the confusion and incorrect information released to
the family and the public.
[5] In contrast, General McChrystal was part of the separate, war-fighting Army
in the field, with responsibilities for commanding Corporal Tillman’s Ranger
unit and other Special Operations forces in combat — but not for the
administrative actions faulted by investigators.
A detailed forensics inquiry by the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command found

that Corporal Tillman’s death came after a day of heavy combat in eastern
Afghanistan. Hobbled by a broken-down vehicle and faulty radios, the Rangers had
split into two groups, and in the chaos of combat one team of Rangers fired on the
other, killing Corporal Tillman and an Afghan soldier.
[14] Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode emerges
between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the question is not
expected to figure heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said.
[13] The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in a
vote taken long after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the Tillman
case was not expected to affect the general’s new confirmation, Congressional
officials said senators would have to explain why they confirmed him then but
were challenging his qualifications now to receive a fourth star and take over the
Afghan mission absent new disclosures.
*** Add link to timeline 34

The New York Times
June 1, 2009
EDITORIAL
Questions for General McChrystal
The Senate owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, President Obama’s choice to be the next United States military commander in Afghanistan.
General McChrystal, who goes before the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, built an impressive
reputation as commander of the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations teams in Afghanistan and Iraq from
2003 to 2008. Highly trained and motivated task forces under his command captured Saddam Hussein
and called in the air strikes that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
Successes like these could help turn the tide in Afghanistan.
But there are other, more disturbing aspects of that record that the Senate also must consider. Special
Operations task forces operated in secret, outside the normal military chain of command and with
minimal legal accountability, especially during the years Donald Rumsfeld ran the Pentagon. General
McChrystal’s command substantially overlaps this troubled period.
In 2004, for example, a Special Operations unit converted one of Saddam Hussein’s former torture
centers near Baghdad into its own secret interrogation cell, where detainees were subjected to a range of
physical and psychological abuses.
This was not an isolated incident. In 2006, The Times reported on field outposts set up by Special
Operations units in Baghdad, Falluja, Balad, Ramadi and Kirkuk where detainees were stripped naked
and subjected to simulated drowning.
At least 34 Special Operations soldiers were eventually disciplined by the Pentagon for these abusive
interrogations. Many more cases had to be dropped because the specific interrogator could not be
conclusively identified or because crucial computer records were lost.
While there is no suggestion that General McChrystal was personally involved in any misconduct, he has a
clear responsibility to illuminate what went wrong, what if anything was done to stop these horrors, and
what he intends to do to ensure that they are not repeated under his command in Afghanistan.
The overall performance of the Special Operations Command under General McChrystal’s leadership —
both acts of heroism and acts of abuse — is an essential part of measuring General McChrystal’s fitness for
his new assignment. He needs to be rigorously questioned.
“Nominee To Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces
Stresses Civilian Safety “
New York Times June 2nd 2009, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt
2009-06-02 16:02:50 (18 hours ago)

Posted By: Intellpuke
(Read 59 times || 0 comments)
[Note: This article was changed before the evening of June 2nd to the version that appears on
June 3rd, “ U.S. Report finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes”. This is a cached copy from a website.]
Submit to Digg
The Special Operations general nominated to be commander of American and allied troops
in Afghanistan testified on Tuesday that coalition forces must reduce civilian casualties, a step
that is “essential to our credibility.”
The commander, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said that “how we conduct operations is
vital to success,” and warned that any victory would be “hollow and unsustainable” if allied
operations created popular resentment among Afghanistan’s citizens.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General McChrystal said the
measure of American and allied effectiveness would be “the number of Afghans shielded from
violence,” not the number of enemies killed.
Even so, strikes by warplanes and Special Operations ground units would remain an essential part
of combat in Afghanistan, said General McChrystal. He pledged to make sure these attacks would
be ordered only based on solid intelligence, and would be as “precise” as possible.
General McChrystal formerly served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command,
whose hunter-killer units scored significant successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and he was
questioned about reports of abuse of detainees held by his commandos.
When he took command of these units in 2003, the general said, the Special Operations detention
facilities in Afghanistan were limited and disorganized, and the forces involved in the detention
mission lacked experience.
Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee
chairman, General McChrystal said that he “was uncomfortable” with some of the harsh
techniques that were officially approved for interrogations. At the time, the approved techniques
included placing detainees in stress positions, sleep deprivation and use of attack dogs.
He said that while he was in command, all reports of abuse were investigated, and all
substantiated cases resulted in disciplinary action. He pledged to “strictly enforce” American and
international standards for treatment of battlefield detainees if he is confirmed to the post in
Afghanistan.
“I do not and never have condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will,” said General
McChrystal.
“Unfortunately, criminal acts take place on the battlefield, just like they do in normal society,”
General McChrystal said in separate, prepared answers to questions submitted by the committee.
“Fortunately, through improved training and education, substantiated allegations of abuse have
decreased over time.”
If confirmed, General McChrystal said, he would take a number of steps to improve detention
operations.
Among them, he said, would be efforts to “separate and segregate the extremists,” and to “impart
basic education and vocational skills” to detainees. Troops would be ordered to “develop a
moderate understanding of Islam,” the general said, and he would continue the use of extended
family members and tribal groups “to aid in a released detainee’s abstention from violence.”
Under questioning from Sen. John McCain, of Arizona, the committee’s ranking
Republican, General McChrystal discussed his actions following the friendly-fire death of
Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001.
General McChrystal expressed his “deepest condolences” to the Tillman family and to
Corporal Tillman’s fellow Rangers, and acknowledged that he would do things differently if
presented again with such a tragedy.
[1] A four-star Army review cleared General McChrystal of any wrongdoing, but it
punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for administrative mistakes in
the days following the death of Corporal Tillman.
[2] General McChrystal explained that he signed a Silver Star recommendation, even
though he already suspected death by friendly fire, because Corporal Tillman’s valor in the
field earned him the honor regardless of the manner of his death. However, the general
acknowledged that the recommendation produced confusion.
[3] At the time, Army policy was to rush those medals of valor so they could be received by
the family at the time of the honored soldier’s funeral; that policy has been changed to
allow more thorough evaluations.
[4] General McChrystal said that within a week of Corporal Tillman’s death, he sent an
urgent message to his three senior commanders specifically to inform them of mounting
evidence of death by friendly fire, and to push the Army to quickly halt any misinformation
regarding Corporal Tillman’s death.
[5] Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat who has championed the Tillman’s family case,
returned to the topic late in the hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the Senator
chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was killed in an
insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit.
“The Army failed the family,” said Senator Webb.
[6] “We failed the family,” General McChrystal agreed. “I was a part of that, and I
apologize,” but the general repeatedly stated that any errors committed by soldiers and
officers in the field of combat in Afghanistan “were not intentional,” and he added, “I
didn’t see any activities by anyone to deceive.”
Senator Levin called for strong cooperation between General McChrystal and Adm. James G.
Stavridis, who also testified Tuesday; the admiral has been nominated to become NATO's
supreme allied commander and commander of American forces in Europe. If confirmed, Admiral
Stavridis would be the first Navy officer to hold that position.
NATO supplies the majority of the nearly 35,000 non-American troops in Afghanistan, but
Senator Levin said that “only a portion are in the fight where the fight mainly is - in the south and
east of Afghanistan.”
The NATO contribution to the Afghan mission “remains inadequate,” Senator Levin said. He
urged Admiral Stavridis to do all he could to press “NATO and other allies in Europe to do their
share for the Afghanistan mission.”
Under President Obama's new Afghan strategy, the number of American troops in the country
will double to about 68,000 this year.
Intellpuke: You can read this article by New York Times staff writers Thom Shanker and Eric
Schmitt, reporting from Washington, D.C., in context here:
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/world/asia/03military.html?_r=1&hp
U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes
By ERIC SCHMITT and THOM SHANKER NOTE: Version 2, version 1 drastically
modified with more about Tillman
WASHINGTON — June 3, 2009
A military investigation has concluded that American personnel made significant errors in
carrying out some of the airstrikes in western Afghanistan on May 4 that killed dozens of Afghan
civilians, according to a senior American military official.
The official said the civilian death toll would probably have been reduced if American air crews
and forces on the ground had followed strict rules devised to prevent civilian casualties. Had the
rules been followed, at least some of the strikes by American warplanes against half a dozen
targets over seven hours would have been aborted.
The report represents the clearest American acknowledgment of fault in connection with the
attacks. It will give new ammunition to critics, including many Afghans, who complain that
American forces too often act indiscriminately in calling in airstrikes, jeopardizing the United
States mission by turning the civilian population against American forces and their ally, the
Afghan government.
Since the raid, American military commanders have promised to address the problem. On
Tuesday, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, nominated to be the American commander in
Afghanistan, vowed that reducing civilian casualties was “essential to our credibility.”
Any American victory would be “hollow and unsustainable” if it led to popular resentment
among Afghanistan’s citizens, General McChrystal told the Senate Armed Services Committee
during a confirmation hearing.
According to the senior military official, the report on the May 4 raids found that one plane was
cleared to attack Taliban fighters, but then had to circle back and did not reconfirm the target
before dropping bombs, leaving open the possibility that the militants had fled the site or that
civilians had entered the target area in the intervening few minutes.
In another case, a compound of buildings where militants were massing for a possible
counterattack against American and Afghan troops was struck in violation of rules that required a
more imminent threat to justify putting high-density village dwellings at risk, the official said.
“In several instances where there was a legitimate threat, the choice of how to deal with that
threat did not comply with the standing rules of engagement,” said the military official, who
provided a broad summary of the report’s initial findings on the condition of anonymity because
the inquiry was not yet complete.
Before being chosen as the new commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal spent five years
as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, overseeing commandos in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Special Operations forces have been sharply criticized by Afghans for aggressive
tactics that have contributed to civilian casualties.
During his testimony, General McChrystal said that strikes by warplanes and Special Operations
ground units would remain an essential part of combat in Afghanistan. But he promised to make
sure that these attacks were based on solid intelligence and that they were as precise as possible.
American success in Afghanistan should be measured by “the number of Afghans shielded from
violence,” not the number of enemy fighters killed, he said.
The inquiry into the May 4 strikes in the western province of Farah illustrated the difficult, split-
second decisions facing young officers in the heat of combat as they balance using lethal force to
protect their troops under fire with detailed rules restricting the use of firepower to prevent
civilian deaths.
In the report, the investigating officer, Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, analyzed each of the
airstrikes carried out by three aircraft-carrier-based Navy F/A-18 strike aircraft and an Air Force
B-1 bomber against targets in the village of Granai, in a battle that lasted more than seven hours.
In each case, the senior military official said, General Thomas determined that the targets that
had been struck posed legitimate threats to Afghan or American forces, which included one
group of Marines assigned to train the Afghans and another assigned to a Special Operations task
force.
But in “several cases,” the official said, General Thomas determined either that the airstrikes had
not been the appropriate response to the threat because of the potential risk to civilians, or that
American forces had failed to follow their own tactical rules in conducting the bombing runs.
The Afghan government concluded that about 140 civilians had been killed in the attacks. An
earlier American military inquiry said last month that 20 to 30 civilians had been killed. That
inquiry also concluded that 60 to 65 Taliban militants had been killed in the fight. American
military officials say their two investigations show that Taliban fighters had deliberately fired on
American forces and aircraft from compounds and other places where they knew Afghan
civilians had sought shelter, in order to draw an American response that would kill civilians,
including women and children.
The firefight began, the military said, when Afghan soldiers and police officers went to several
villages in response to reports that three Afghan government officials had been killed by the
Taliban. The police were quickly overwhelmed and asked for backup from American forces.
American officials have said that a review of videos from aircraft weapon sights and exchanges
between air crew members and a ground commander established that Taliban fighters had taken
refuge in “buildings which were then targeted in the final strikes of the fight,” which went well
into the night.
American troop levels in Afghanistan are expected to double, to about 68,000, under President
Obama’s new Afghan strategy.
In his previous job as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, General
McChrystal oversaw units assigned to capture or kill senior militants. In his appearance before
Congress on Tuesday, he was questioned on reports of abuses of detainees held by his
commandos.
Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee
chairman, General McChrystal said he was uncomfortable with some of the harsh techniques that
were officially approved for interrogation. At the time, such approved techniques included stress
positions, sleep deprivation and the use of attack dogs for intimidation.
He said that all reports of abuse during his command were investigated, and that all substantiated
cases of abuse resulted in disciplinary action. And he pledged to “strictly enforce” American and
international standards for the treatment of battlefield detainees if confirmed to the post in
Afghanistan.
Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had “failed the
family” in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional
football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
A final review by a four-star Army general cleared General McChrystal of any
wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for
administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman’s death. Initially, Army
officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush, when in fact he had
been shot by members of his own Ranger team.
LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH

APPENDIX D:
5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media
Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue
Greg Mitchell 4-4-08 (editor, Editor & Publisher)
Precisely five years ago the U.S. media were transfixed on the heroic rescue of a captured
U.S. Army Pfc. named Jessica Lynch, who supposedly had emerged from her hellhole in Iraq,
guns blazing, in a daring operation to save her. The invasion of Iraq had just started to run into
some difficulties -- amid signs that Americans might not be greeted with flowers after all -- and
the Lynch rescue helped rally the country and had significant propaganda value.
And propaganda, as it turned out, was at the heart of it. News would shortly emerge -- after the
fall of Baghdad -- that the Lynch rescue was almost nothing like it was pictured in the press,
most notably in a Washington Post account which was headlined "She Was Fighting to the
Death." In fact, Lynch never fired her weapon. Two months later, on June 17, 2003, the Post ran
a 5,000-word front-page piece that admitted errors in the original account -- but also defended
much of it.
Twelve days after that, Michael Getler, then the paper's ombudsman, observed: "This was the
single most memorable story of the war, and it had huge propaganda value. It was false, but it
didn't get knocked down until it didn't matter quite so much."
Two weeks ago, around the 5th anniversary of the war, Lynch told U.S. News and World Report:
"I'm still confused as to why they chose to lie and try to make me a legend...They wanted to
make people think that maybe this war was a good thing," she said. "Instead, people were getting
killed, and it was going downhill fast. They wanted a hero."
Lynch had indeed been severely injured as her Humvee crashed during an ambush outside
Nasiriyah and was taken by captors to a hospital. When she was rescued on April 1 the Post and
other media claimed she had reportedly killed several Iraqis in a gun battle and sustained many
gunshot wounds herself. The Pentagon helpfully described the rescue as a brave Special
Operations raid, featuring battles with Iraqis and Black Hawk helicopters firing away.
A New York Times story on April 3, 2003, by Thom Shanker and John Broder followed the
outline, with Lynch suffering gunshot wounds in a dangerous rescue: "It was an Iraqi who
got word to the Americans, Bush administration officials said, launching a mission that
included Marine Corps artillery to distract enemy soldiers and Army Rangers securing the
hospital grounds while Navy Special Operations forces, called Seals, extracted Private
Lynch while being fired upon going in and coming back out."
Another April 3 story in the Times covered Lynch's hometown in West Virginia celebrating he
release. It carried the bylines of Douglas Jehl and -- Jayson Blair. The "Jessica Lynch" scandal
later got mixed up in the "Jayson Blair" scandal when it turned out he had lied about certain
aspects of his "coverage" of that episode.
But much of the media went wild over the story (as noted in my new book on Iraq and the
media), even as Lynch's father revealed that he had been told that no gunshot wounds had been
discovered.
It wasn't until early May that the story really fell apart, thanks largely to a Toronto Star reporter
named Mitch Potter, whose sources told him that actually Lynch had been well cared for at the
hospital, that her captors had left up to two days before the raid and that actually fire from U.S.
forces had prevented hospital staffers from loading her in an ambulance. The BBC soon
confirmed much of this scenario.
The Post corrective appeared a few weeks later. On June 20, Nicholas Kristof in his New York
Times column wrote: "Pfc. Jessica Lynch did not mow down Iraqis until her ammo ran out, was
not shot and apparently was not plucked from behind enemy lines by U.S. commandos braving a
firefight. It looks as if the first accounts of the rescue were embellished, like the imminent threat
from W.M.D., and like wartime pronouncements about an uprising in Basra and imminent
defections of generals. There's a pattern: we were misled...
"Ms. Lynch is still a hero in my book, and it was unnecessary for officials to try to turn her into a
Hollywood caricature. As a citizen, I deeply resent my government trying to spin me like a Ping-
Pong ball....
"The Iraqis misused our prisoners for their propaganda purposes, and it hurts to find out that
some American officials were misusing Private Lynch the same way." And the media went along
for the ride.
Lynch got hate mail for years from people accusing her of making of the story - when it was
really the Pentagon and the press. She told Diane Sawyer in a TV interview: "They used me to
symbolize all this stuff. It's wrong." She told Congress in testimony last year: "They should have
found out the facts before they spread the word like wildfire."
Greg Mitchell writes about the Lynch case and much more in his new book, So Wrong for So
Long: How the Press, the Pundits -- and the President -- Failed on Iraq. It includes a preface by
Bruce Springsteen and foreword by Joseph L. Galloway and has been hailed by our own
Arianna, Bill Moyers, Glenn Greenwald and others. He is editor of Editor & Publisher.

"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

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"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

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“LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS,

IF NOT THE TRUTH”

--- James Webb, “Something to Die For” (1991)

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker’s Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker’s Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag425 5-17-08)

Transcript of General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:

(5-12-09) “Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War”

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report):

Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report):

Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report):

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag, 5-17-08):

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification Notes (Guy Montag, 5-17-08):

Transcript of General McChrystal’s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony:

TIMELINE OF TILLMAN FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70- 76): From Testimony & IG Report:

Tillman killed in action in Afghanistan. Col [?] (McChrystal’s Chief of Staff)

LTC Bailey verbally assigns CPT Scott to conduct 15-6

Abizaid “called the Chairman and discussed

April 23 (continued): Nixon said he told Kensinger “almost

Yellen testified that he told Kensinger of the

McChrystal calls Brown “shortly after –

Bailey: “After the first day [of interviews]

Nixon: “… I believed it was my

Nixon told Yellen that possible fratricide.

Platoon AAR conducted GEN Brown: “[McChrystal] called shortly

Autopsy conducted by AFME.

MG McChrystal approves Silver Star. Abizaid in Afghanisatan. Claims no one

MG McChrystal sends P4 to Abizaid, Brown, and P4 drafted by Nixon.

Silver Star approved by Acting Secretary of the Army.

It appears to me that the P4’s purpose was

Regimental JAG does not disclose fratricide

Tillman memorial service

May 6: GEN Abizaid “probably” received P4

COL Nixon appoints LTC Kauzerich to conduct

LTC Kauzerich completes 15-6 investigation.

Sometime between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid

May 18: Around the 18th to 20th Abizaid informed

May 20: Rumsfeld says he assumes he was told on

COLONEL NIXON’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

COL Nixon calls GEN McChrystal to inform him of Tillman’s death.

MG McChrystal … while meeting with GEN Abizaid … tells him that

Sworn Statement of CSM Birch (Jones, CS):

Sworn statement of LTC Bailey (Jones, Z):

COLONEL NIXON’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

Sworn statement of COL Nixon (Jones, AM):

NIXON’S NOTIFICATION TO CENTCOM

From IG, p. 12:

“The operational chain of command for CPL Tillman’s unit … was:

From IG, p. 59:

From IG, p.26:

From IG, p. 43:

“COL Nixon ‘compartmented’ the information flow to prevent outside communication …

COLONEL NIXON’ S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From GEN McChrystal sworn statements (Jones 15-6, AP):

NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GENERALS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

MG MCCHRYSTAL’S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From the IG Report, Appendix B “Chronology” (pp. 70 -76):

COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillman’s death.

MG McChrystal meeting with GEN Abizaid, tells him Tillman was