Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Since 4it is usually difficult to c'ange policies @uic.ly) i--ediate effects of e(ternal c'anges
generally reflect sensitivity dependence5 and since vulnera,ility dependence 4can ,e -easured only
,y t'e costliness of -a.ing effective adEust-ents to a c'anged environ-ent over a period of ti-e5)
we can co-,ine t'e effects of t'ese two concepts w'en t'ey interact1
sensi,ility G
dependence in al-ost pure
t'e s'ort run dependence
H
dependence in
al-ost sy--etry t'e long run
: G
vulnera,ility
Iulnera,ility is particularly i-portant for 4understanding t'e political structure of interdependence
D
As far as 4sensi,ility5 is concerned) t'ere is also a clear analogy wit' t'e econo-ic concept of 4s'ort run5) in w'ic'
t'e fir- <in t'is case t'e State= cannot c'ange or su,stitute every factor of production <in t'is case) policies=6 on t'e
ot'er 'and) 4vulnera,ility5 re-inds us of t'e 4long run5 concept) in w'ic' t'e fir- <t'e State= can c'ange every factor
of production <can see. alternative policies=
H
Jurely 'ypot'etical case <li.e 4al-ost sy--etry5= ,ecause it is very rare to o,serve it in t'e real world
relations'ips In a sense) it focuses on w'ic' actors are t'e definers of t'e ceteris paribus clause) or
can set t'e rules of t'e ga-e5
/
An t'e ot'er 'and) sensitivity interdependence can provide t'e ,asis
for significant political influence only w'en t'e rules and nor-s in effect can ,e ta.en for granted)
or w'en it would ,e pro'i,itively costly for dissatisfied states to c'ange t'eir policies @uic.ly
After 'aving dealt wit' t'is two -aEor concepts) *eo'ane and +ye present t'e .ey @uestion of t'e
entire wor.1 4w'at are t'e c'aracteristics of world politics under conditions of e(tensive
interdependenceK5 In order to e(plain t'is) t'e two aut'ors give us t'e definition of w'at t'ey
consider as t'e reflection of interdependence) na-ely 4international regi-es51 4networ. of rules)
nor-s) and procedures t'at regulari0e ,e'avior and control its effects5
$
Regi-es) li.e -any t'eoretic concepts in international relations) -ay differ under -any varia,les
and conditions) suc' as t'e rules w'ic' coordinate t'e regi-e;s way of acting) t'e geograp'ical area
in w'ic' t'e regi-e operates) t'e issues w'ic' concern t'e regi-e) its sources of legiti-acy and so
fort'6 w'en t'ere are no agreed nor-s and procedures or w'en t'e e(ceptions to t'e rules are -ore
i-portant t'an t'e istances of ad'erence) t'ere is a nonregime situation 2o understand t'e .ey role
of international regi-es t'at affect patterns of interdependence) 4one -ust loo. at structure and
process in international relations56 defining 4structure5 as t'e distri,ution of capa,ilities a-ong
si-ilar units and 4process5 as referring to allocative or ,argaining ,e'avior wit'in a power
structure) t'e role of international regi-es is si-ilar to t'e one depicted in t'e figure ,elow1
international
structure regi-es process
in t'e sense t'at 4international regi-es are inter-ediate factors ,etween t'e power structure of an
international syste- and t'e political and econo-ic ,argaining 8ie t'e process9 t'at ta.es place in
/
We can understand t'is state-ent wit' t'ose econo-ic -odels t'at are price:setter <-onopoly) Ion Stac.el,erg
-odel of oligopoly=
$
2'is definition 'as to ,e co-pared wit' *rasner;s one <4institutions processing nor-s) decision rules and procedures
around w'ic' actors; e(pectations converge in a given area of international relations5=
wit'in it5 2'e -ost i-portant @uestion posed ,y *eo'ane and +ye in t'eir te(t is 'ow and w'y
regi-es c'anges) given deter-ined issues6 ,ut ,efore presenting t'eir four -odels <or 4intellectual
constructs5) for t'e sa.e to @uote t'e aut'ors=) we s'ould give a loo. at t'e t'ree -ain
c'aracteristics of international regi-es in a fra-ewor. of 4co-ple( interdependence5
%
1 na-ely)
-ultiple c'annels) a,sence of 'ierarc'y a-ong issues and -inor role of -ilitary force6 t'ese t'ree
features will ,e) -oreover) co-pared to so-e realistic assu-ptions) in order to evaluate t'eir
potential ad'erence to t'e present situation
& "#ltiple channels$ infor-al -eetings or discussion t'at wor. as 4tras-ission ,elts5 a-ong
govern-ents and) -ore in general) societies6 t'ey ta.e place at t'ree different level1
& interstatal) ie t'e nor-al c'annel assu-ed ,y t'e realists
" intergovern-ental) or 4transgovern-ental5
7 international) or 4transnational5
We -ust notice t'at ,ureaucrats fro- different countries deal directly wit' one anot'er at
-eetings and on t'e telep'one as well as in writing
&#
6 -oreover) it is a date of reality
<especially nowadays= t'at 4-ultinational fir-s and ,an.s affect ,ot' do-estic and
interstate relations5
" %bsence o hierarchies amon& iss#es$ w'ereas 4t'e Cold War period was so do-inated ,y
t'e issue of -ilitary security t'at ot'er i-portant issues were al-ost neglected5
&&
) nowadays
foreign affairs agenda 'ave ,een widening -ore and -ore every day6 as) again) *issinger
pointed out in &%/D) 4t'e pro,le-s of energy) resources) environ-ent) population) t'e uses
of space and t'e seas now ran. wit' @uestions of -ilitary security) ideology and territorial
rivalry w'ic' 'ave traditionally -ade up t'e diplo-atic agenda5 2'is factor 'as got also a
strong i-plication1 4w'en t'ere are -ultiple issues on t'e agenda) 89 t'e pro,le-s of
for-ulating a co'erent and consistent foreign policy increase5 In su-) we are assisting) as
%
2'e word 4co-ple(5 'as not got any intellectual i-plication6 it Eust stands for 4interrelated5) as t'e original gree.
ver, -ay suggest
&#
Af course t'e aut'ors couldn;t even i-agine t'e recent develop-ents of -odern tec'nology1 w'at a,out I:J'ones
and we,:conferences and net:-eetingsK
&&
LW Rees) International politics in Europe: the new agenda) &%%7
far as de-ocratic developed pluralistic countries are concerned) to an overlapping process of
integration ,etween do-estic and foreign policies
&"
7 "inor role o military orce$ as -ilitary resources are getting -ore and -ore costly) and as
particularly 4a-ong industriali0ed) pluralist countries t'e perceived -argin of safety 'as
widened5) States 'ave understood t'at using force on one issue against an independent state
wit' w'ic' one 'as a variety of relations'ips is li.ely to rupture -utually profita,le relations
on ot'er issues6 -oreover) 489 in Western de-ocracies) popular opposition to prolonged
-ilitary conflicts is very 'ig'5
2'ese t'ree features t'at we 'ave Eust enu-erated can ,e put in co-parison wit' t'ree -ain
assu-ptions of t'e realist tradition) na-ely t'e 4state:as:sole:actor5 -odel) a 'ierarc'y of issues in
w'ic' security is t'e pri-ary tas. and finally t'e consideration of force as t'e -ost effective
instru-ents Moo.ing at t'e world today) we -ay t'in. t'at t'ese t'ree realistic assu-ption -ay
see- @uite o,solete6 'owever) according to *eo'ane and +ye) t'ere is one 4case:li-it5 in w'ic'
realist assu-ptions would regain accounta,ility and via,ility1 4if 8an9 issue ,eco-es a -atter of life
and deat' N as so-e people t'oug't oil -ay ,eco-e N t'e use or t'reat of force could ,eco-e
decisive again5
&7
2o conclude) t'ere is a negative relations'ip
&>
a-ong t'e nu-,er on issues
-anaged ,y two countries and t'e possi,ility to use -ilitary force <or) if you prefer) convenience=
+u-,er of
issues
Jossi,ility <convenience= to use force
&"
In t'e words of Anne:Marie Slaug'ter) 4in a networ.ed world t'e issue is not longer relative power ,ut centrality in
an increasingly dense glo,al we,56 AM Slaug'ter) America's edge) in Foreign Affairs) Banuary / Fe,ruary "##%
&7
2erroris- -ay ,e considered as an incu-,ent 4life:or:deat'5 issue
&>
2'e grap'ic ,elow 'as not to ,e -eant as e(planatory) nor as -at'e-atically precise6 it wants Eust to convey t'e
general idea e(pressed in t'e te(t
2'e t'ree c'aracteristics enu-erated ,efore lead us to consider t'ree different .ind of strategies t'at
states) in a co-ple( and interdependent wor.) -ay pursue) w'ic' translates power resources into
power as control of outco-es1 t'e lin.age strategy) defined as t'e a,ility to -anage and predict t'e
pro,a,ility) given t'e varia,le distri,ution of power resources) of t'e political processes fro- one
set of issues to anot'er <ie) groups of issues are treated as sources of power=6 t'e agenda:setting) or
t'e a,ility to predict s'ifts in t'e distri,ution of power resources in order to -anage t'e
politici0ation of certain issues6 finally) transnational and transgovern-ental relations) ie t'e a,ility
not to get lost in a -ultifaceted and even sc'i0op'renic di-ension of t'e political ,argaining arena)
as 4national interests will ,e defined differently on different issues) at different ti-es) and ,y
different govern-ental units5
Before dealing) as stated ,efore) wit' t'e @uestion w'y do regi-es c'ange and 'ow) we s'ould
analyse ,riefly t'e role of international organi0ations <IA=) w'ic' in t'e realistic tradition were
considered as perip'eral ,odies 2'ey 'ave a triple role in t'e relations'ips wit' t'e states1
,y defining t'e salient issues and deciding w'ic' issues can ,e grouped toget'er) IA 4-ay
'elp to deter-ine govern-ental priorities and t'e nature of interdepart-ental co--ittees56
,y ,ringing officials toget'er) IA 4'elp to activate potential coalitions in world politics56
finally) ,y allowing s-all and wea. states to entern t'e international arena) IA per-it t'e-
to pursue lin.age strategies
International organi0ations
create affect
States
+ow t'at we 'ave depicted and analysed t'e political actors t'at lay in a conte(t of co-ple(
interdependence and t'e processes t'at ta.e places wit'in it) we are now a,le to study t'e causes of
international regi-es c'anges using *eo'ane an +ye;s 4four -odels5 -odel
'conomic process e(planation$ starting fro- t'e consideration t'at in t'e postwar period trade 'as
,een rapidly e(panding and ,eco-ing nondiscri-inatory) wit' rapid -ove-ents of funds) *eo'ane
and +ye state t'at 4a -odel of regi-e c'ange ,ased on econo-ic processes would ,egin wit' t'is
century;s -any tec'nological and econo-ic c'anges56 -oreover) as tec'nology 'as ,een
consistently reducing transport costs) t'ree pre-ises 'ave to ,e -ade1
& tec'nological c'anges and increases in econo-ic interdependence will -a.e e(isting
international regi-es o,solete6
" national econo-ic welfare will usually ,e t'e do-inant political goal6
7 c'anges at all levels of econo-y will give govern-ents strong incentives to -odify
international regi-es to restore t'eir effectiveness
2'e pro,le- wit' t'is -odel is t'at is neit'er convincing <it is a long:ter- prediction= nor
e(planatory <it does not tell us 'ow to for- a new e@uili,riu-) and it does not e(plain variations=
O!erall power str#ct#re e(planation <or) ,y contrast) t'e 4erodin& he&emony5 -odel=$ t'is
-odel assu-es so-e realist i-plications) and is ,ased on t'e principle t'at 4as power of states
c'anges 89 t'e rules t'at co-prise international regi-es will c'ange accordingly56 'owever) t'is
-odel is una,le to e(plain clearly w'y international regi-es c'ange) ,ecause of t'ree reasons1
& -ilitary force and econo-ic develop-ent are not always proportional <t'in. of US in t'e
&%H#s=6
" t'e -odel does not differentiate a-ong issue areas6
7 t'e -odel 4ignores t'e co-plications introduced ,y -ultiple c'annels of contacts a-ong
societies5) w'ic' -ay want t'eir econo-ic interests to ,e saved
Iss#e str#ct#re$ t'is -odel is varia,le and co-ple() since it assu-es t'at power resources a-ong
different issues -ay vary
&D
6 anot'er i-portant assu-ption is t'at -ilitary force is usa,le only at
'ig' costs) and t'at it 'as not to ,e ta.en for granted t'at it well ,e effective6 -oreover) it infers t'at
4lin.ages will not ,e drawn regularly and effectively a-ong issue areas5 A ,asic assu-ption of t'is
-odel is t'at 4alt'oug' states -ay ,e te-pted to draw lin.ages a-ong issues) suc' lin.ages will ,e
&D
For Walt0) instead) as power is fungi,le) t'e is no differentiation ,y issue areas
generally unsuccessful5
&H
If on t'e one 'and t'is -odel can ,e considered powerless co-pared to
t'e previous two -odels) on t'e ot'er and it is -ore discri-inating) 4since it can distinguis' a-ong
issue areas t'at are crucial in analysing -uc' of conte-porary world politics5 3owever) t'is -odel
reveals its si-plicity w'en it is not a,le to Eustify1
& effective lin.ages fro- ,elow
" do-estic and transnational political actors
International or&ani)ation model$ to -a.e t'e -odel appropriate and -ore co-ple() in order to
e(plain all t'e patterns of issue differentiation and all t'e s'ifts in t'e distri,ution of capa,ilities
<ie t'e structure= in international regi-e) *eo'ane and +ye draw up a new structure) na-ely t'e
4international organi0ation5) defined as 4-ultilevel lin.ages) nor-s and institutions) govern-ental
and transgovern-ental ties5 2'e concept of international relations) -oreover) is 4a ,roader
category t'an regi-e) ,ecause it also includes patterns of elite networ.s 895 2'is -odel 'as got
two i-portant virtues1
& it is sta,le) as international organi0ations are very difficult to ,e eradicated
&/
6
" it puts <,etter) international organi0ations put= ,ureaucratic) te-poral and ,e'avioral
constraints to states; ways of action
2'us) *eo'ane and +ye;s international organi0ation -odel 4will 'elp to account for failures of t'e
,asic structural -odels of regi-e c'ange56 regi-es are ,orn according to distri,utions of
capa,ilities) 4,ut su,se@uently t'e relevant networ.s) nor-s and institutions will t'e-selves
influence actors; a,ilities to use t'ese capa,ilities5
&$
2'is is) in -y opinion) a crucial t'eoretical
point) as fro- t'is state-ent Eust -entioned we can discern 'ow power s'ifts and is e(ercised1
4power over outco-es will ,e conferred ,y organizationally dependent capabilities) suc' as voting
power) a,ility to for- coalitions) and control of elite networ.s5
&H
A clear e(a-ple -ay ,e t'e recent refusal) -ade ,y president Sar.o0y and pri-e -inister Mer.el) to president
A,a-a;s proposals to solve t'e incu-,ent econo-ic crisis) alt'oug' t'ese t'ree states are close:-inded on -any
ot'er issues
&/
Ane case -ig't 'appen w'en t'e treaty t'at is at t'e ,ase of t'e organi0ation is li-ited in duration) eg ?CSC <&%D&
N "##&=
&$
2'is state-ent -ay re-ind us of one of t'e -ost i-portant assu-ptions of Walt0;s t'eory1 4actors -ay perceive t'e
structure t'at constraints t'e- 895 in *+ Walt0) Theory of international politics) &%/%) c' D page %"
3owever) as we .now t'at no t'eory is perfect) t'ere are four factors t'at li-it t'e international
organi0ation -odel;s application1
& it is -ore co-plicated) re@uiring -ore infor-ation6
" it is -uc' less deter-inistic t'at t'e ,asic structural -odels6
7 it can ,e applied Eust under co-ple( interdependence conditions6
> 4a,ove a certain level of conflict t'e international organi0ation -odel and sensitivity
interdependence ,eco-e largely irrelevant5
In t'e final part of t'e te(t) *eo'ane and +ye tell us t'at none of t'e -odels is sufficient alone to
e(plain t'e world political ,e'avior of suc' -any actors6 t'e ,est way t'ey suggest for investigating
t'e dyna-ics t'at ta.e place in a conte(t of co-ple( interdependence is to proceed step ,y step)
starting fro- t'e si-plest -odel <t'e econo-ic eplanation= and adding a percentage of co-ple(ity
to our -odel as soon as it reveals to ,e insufficiently e(planatory) 4co-,ining e(planations5
2o conclude) we can say t'e world is now 4do-inated not ,y one or two or even several states ,ut
rat'er ,y do0ens of actors possessing and e(ercising various .inds of power5
&%
) and t'at 4t'e
e-erging networ.ed world of t'e "&
st
century 89 e(ists a,ove t'e state) ,elow t'e state and
t'roug' t'e state5
"#
In t'e lig't of t'ese consideration) w'at we -ay suggest is t'at ,ot' politicians
and international relations t'eorists) considered all t'e issues t'at are affecting t'e world dyna-ics)
s'ould provide t'e-selves a co-pass) in order to understand w'ic' role are t'ey going to play)
w'en and) -ost i-portant) 'ow
&%
R 3aass) The age of unpolarity) in Foreign Affairs) May / Bune "##$
"#
AM Slaug'ter) ibidem