Asia Pacific 23, 2005

A S I A P A C I F I C
A RESEARCH JOURNAL OF FAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASIA

Volume 23, 2005
Publication of
AREA STUDY CENTRE
Far East & South East Asia
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
ASIA PACIFIC Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia is
published annually by the Area Study Centre, Far East & South East
Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. The major object of
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in the study of the Far East & South East Asia region, especially in
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ISSN 1810-035X
Composed By............ Mehmood Sharif
Assistant / Computer Operator
Far East & South East Asia Study Centre
University of Sindh, Jamshoro
EDITORIAL PANEL
PatroninChief
Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqi
Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh and
Chairman, Board of Governors
Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
Sindh Pakistan
Editor
Dr Lutfullah Mangi
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Dr Zhang Li
Director
Centre South AsiaWest China Cooperation
and Development Studies, Sichuan University,
Chengdu, 610064,
People s Republic of China
Dr Toshihiko Suda
Associate Professor
Faculty of International Relations
Daito Bunka University,
HigashimatsuyamaCity, Saitama, Japan.
Dr Guihong Zhang
Deputy Director
Institute of International Studies
Zhejiang University, Zhejiang
People s Republic of China.
Dr Shang Quanyu
Professor,
Department of Politics and History Studies,
Zhejiang University, Guangdong,
People s Republic of China
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed Choudhry
Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Sargodha University,
University Road, Sargodha
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah
Professor,
Area Study Centre,
Far East & South East Asia,
Ms Firdous Nilofer
Associate Professor
Area Study Centre
Dr Abdul Latif Tunio
Associate Professor,
Department of International Relations,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Mr Altaf Hussain Ansari
Assistant Professor,
Area Study Centre,
A S I A P A C I F I C
A RESEARCH JOURNAL OF FAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASIA
Volume 23, 2005
CONTENTS
Future of PakistanChina Relations
Ambassador (R) Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty .............................................. 01
Educate and Empower the People
Ambassador (R) Najmul Saqib Khan..................................................... 11
Indonesian Economy: An Appraisal of Major Sectors
Professor Dr Deedar Hussain Shah ...................................................... 16
The Traditional Role of Sangha in Thailand s Sacred
Religious Society
Firdous Nilofer ................................................................................... 36
U.S.-Japan Trade Relations in the post-cold war period: The
Problems and Prospects
Altaf Hussain Ansari............................................................................ 45
Southeast Asia: Impact of Separatist Movements
Naureen Memon................................................................................. 65
Japan s Bid for a Permanent Seat on the United Nations
Security Council
Murtaza Khoso ................................................................................... 83
Ethnic and Communal Conflicts in West Kalimantan: A
Sociological Analysis
Mukesh Kumar ................................................................................. 115
American Occupation of Japan (19451952): A Politico
Economic Perspective
Samreen Fatima............................................................................... 133
China s Policy Towards Central Asian Republics in the
Aftermath of their Independence
Dr Saifullah Joyo .............................................................................. 146
China s Energy Problem
Dr Muhammad Ijaz Butt.................................................................... 155
Educational Structure and Dynamics in Indonesia: An
Overview
Jamila Jarwar................................................................................... 163
FUTURE OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS
Ambassador (R)
Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty
The relationship between Pakistan and China has held up as a
model of friendly relations between two countries having different
social systems. Since 1963, when the two countries signed a
Boundary Agreement, thus removing only potential cause of
differences, their friendship and range of cooperation has grown
with each passing year. The two have stood together in the face of
many challenges, so that their friendship is described as an all-
weather friendship". This friendship has endured because it is
based on common principles and interests.
Pakistani leaders and policy makers describe the friendship with
China as the cornerstone of Pakistans foreign policy , since it
has assumed critical importance in safeguarding Pakistan's security
and in its facilitating its development. The Chinese leaders also
describe this relationship in superlative terms, calling Pakistan
Chinas best friend". Over the years, the two neighbours have laid
the foundation of trust and friendship through high level visits,
and by turning the mutual esteem into mutual cooperation in
nearly all walks of life. They have also shared perceptions and
policies on the whole range of regional and global issues.
While the strategic and political relationship reached great heights,
the economic relations and trade did not keep pace. Therefore, in
the new century, special attention was given to developing trade
and joint ventures. The 50th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations
in 2001 was marked by joint efforts to increase economic and
technical cooperation. China had achieved an economic miracle
since Deng Xiaopings reform programme was launched in 1978,
with an n annual growth rate averaging over 9 per cent. Premier
Zhu Rongji, who visited Pakistan in May 2001, announced a
ASIA PACIFIC, Vol.23, 2005 (2)
decision to invest in several mega-projects, including the building
of the Gwadar Port, utilization of the coal deposits in Sindh to
generate power, and the modernization of the railway system.
Recalling the vital role played by China in safeguarding its security,
and in facilitating its development, the people of Pakistan derive
great reassurance from the country's s friendship with the great
neighbour to the north. However, the very fact that China is
emerging as a superpower by virtue of its remarkable economic
and technical progress over the past 25 years, has tended to raise
doubts whether this intimacy can be maintained.
Grounds for Doubts about Future of Relations
Pakistan-China friendship had developed when both felt isolated.
In the early 60s, China was facing a hostile US, in the Cold War
context, while the Soviet Union had been alienated by Beijings
refusal to accept Moscows hegemony in the communist bloc. The
boundary dispute with India, that caused a conflict in 1962,
produced tension on Chinas southern border. Still relatively poor
and undeveloped, Peoples China felt the pressure of hostile
powers surrounding it, and welcomed the chance to develop
friendly relations with Pakistan, which was also feeling relegated
by the eagerness of its western allies to befriend India foil owing
its clash with China. The period between 1963 and 1978 marked
the heyday of Sino-Pakistan friendship, when China was
recognized by a relatively small number of countries.
The services Pakistan rendered over this period left a lasting
imprint on the Chinese leadership and people. In 1964, Pakistan
provided an airlink to China through its national airline, even
though this step displeased the US, which cancelled the aid it had
pledged for the improvement of the Dhaka airport. Pakistan was
helpful in transferring western technology that was unavailable to
China, and played a significant role in the restoration of China's s
seat in the UN. For its part, China provided vital military hardware
after the Western powers placed an embargo on the supply of
weapons after the outbreak of the 1965 war. Chinas diplomatic
support also proved invaluable in facing up to Indian pressure
after the 1971 war. China's commitment to the independence and
sovereignty has been a source of strength to Pakistan in facing up
to pressures and threats from India over the years.
Pakistan also played a major role in facilitating the rapprochement
between the US and China in 1971, that was followed by the visit
of President Nixon to China in 1972, and produced a strategic
convergence between Washington and Beijing to confront Soviet
militancy. This was reflected in their joint backing to the Afghan
struggle against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late
1979, in which Pakistan played the rote of a frontline state.
Since 1978, when it started its modernization programme that is
based on opening to the outside world China has been
transformed. Within a quarter of a century, a 9% annual growth
rate has led to a six-fold increase in its GDP, and a twenty-fold
increase in its international trade.
1
Chinas foreign policy revolves
around its economic reforms, based on adapting the free market
economy to its environment, while retaining the centralized single-
party control of internal affairs. This foreign policy requires the
cultivation of friendly relations with all countries, and to give low
priority to political disputes.
China no longer faces the problems and constraints that made the
friendship with Pakistan critically important. It has diplomatic
relations with most of the world, and no longer needs Pakistan as
an intermediary to deal with countries that do not recognize it.
More seriously, the internal situation within Pakistan has been
marked by upheavals, and even a certain deterioration, as reflected
in the law and order situation, in which even the Chinese experts
involved in major projects do not feel safe.
In many areas, Chinas cooperation with India has grown more
rapidly than with Pakistan, for instance in trade and cultural
cooperation. China seeks to maintain a balance in its relations with
India and Pakistan, even though Indian strategic thinkers relate
their plans to the assumption that China is the main threat to
Indian security. Last, but not least, China shares the current
perception in the West that terrorism and extremism constitute a
threat whose roots lie mainly in the Islamic countries, and the
Chinese government has moved firmly against Muslim
separatists in Xinjiang. China also supports the priority accorded
by the Shanghai Co operation Organization to fighting terrorism,
separatism and fundamentalism.
The corruption and inefficiency found among our petty
bureaucrats has tended to be a major obstacle to trade and
technical cooperation with Pakistan, though this problem is not
limited to Pakistan. In the Chinese calculations about the future,
on which they base their policies and plans, Pakistan's internal
instability is a cause for concern. Though our friendship and multi-
faceted cooperation with China is of unquestioned importance for
both our security and economic progress, their future cannot be
taken for granted. The current trends in many areas produce
legitimate doubts whether this "all-weather friendship can be
maintained.
We can draw reassurance from certain facts and traditions that
make a friendly relationship an imperative for both the countries.
But our primary focus should be on the measures that are needed
to safeguard this invaluable friendship. So far as China is
concerned, the regard for old friends is almost a national trait. To
promote regard for the achievements in fifty-three years of
diplomatic relations the Chinese make it a point to educate the
younger generation about what the friendship of Pakistan has
meant for China, so that the current order does not erase the
imprints of their understanding and cooperation.
We in Pakistan need to do likewise because China is progressing
so fast that by 2050, its GDP will be higher than the of the US.
Having started as a developing country, Chinas experience is
relevant to our challenges, audits identification with the
developing countries is an important lever to bring about a more
just international order.
Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy
Though there have been many changes of leadership and direction
over the past half century, the foundations Chinese foreign policy
have remained consistent, and are based on principles. China has
followed an independent foreign policy, and believes that
principles, and not power, should determine relations between
states. Premier Zhou Enlai identified the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-existence in 1953, and had them accepted in 1954
during visits to two of Chinas neighbours, namely India and
Myanmar (Burma) They are as follows:
2
1. Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.
These principles constitute the essence oft he UN Charter, which
is also regarded as the foundation of international relations.
Flowing from those principles is Chinas policy of opposing
hegemony, and of not seeking hegemony for itself.
From the beginning, both China and Pakistan have based their
relations on these principles, which is why their friendship has a
secure foundation, leaders of both used to say, in the early years,
that their relationship was not based on expediency. Such
statements are no longer considered necessary, as this friendship
not only conforms to principles but also to the interests of their
people. Their cooperation in virtually all fields, ranging from trade
and joint ventures to agriculture and peaceful uses of nuclear
technology, is flourishing, and its scope is being expanded to
achieve the shared objective of promoting the prosperity and well-
being of their people. Chinas peaceful rise is setting an example to
other developing countries to emulate. Pakistan stands out among
Chinas neighbours as one with which there are no problems and
disputes, and both the governments and the people have achieved
a high level of mutual trust and confidence.
Sino-Pakistan Relations in the Regional Context
Some of the questionings regarding the outlook for the relations
between Pakistan and China arise out of Chinas evolving attitude
towards South Asia, and other regional organizations, such as
ASEAN. As China has emerged as a regional and world power, its
perspective has doubtless changed somewhat, since bilateral
considerations can be subordinated to broader goals. in this
context, the reassuring fact is that there is broad convergence in
the policies and attitudes of the two neighbours indeed, as India
has tended to sideline regional cooperation under SAARC in the
interest of its own ambitions, China has been supportive of the
efforts of the other six members to activate the organization as a
vehicle for regional cooperation. South Asia has become important
for China also finds the regional grouping linking West and
Central Asia, ECO to be a useful concept, and has itself helped
found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (SCO) in 2001,
that links it to Russia and four Central Asian States. Pakistan,
already a member of SAARC and ECO, has expressed a desire to
join SCO as well, and expects to get Chinese support for
admission, while Russia is expected to sponsor India.
The multilateral diplomacy of China is being focused on the
regions surrounding it. As ASEAN has achieved rapid growth
China has] stepped up both political and economic ties with
member countries. The interaction with SAARC is also improving,
with Pakistan favouring membership for China while India is
pushing the admission of Afghanistan. East and South Asia are
strategically important to safeguard the sealanes to the Middle
East as Chinese requirements for oil increase. The threat of
encirclement by the US is a factor also, though the Chinese display
confidence that they can manage their relations with Washington.
Pakistan continues to have a special place of its own, being a
member of both SAARC and ECO. Thus, in the regional context
also, the comprehensive and all-weather relationship between
Pakistan and China has a bright future.
The Global Context
The global scenario has undergone two transformations in the
years since the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the
Soviet Union in 1991 left the US as the sole superpower, while
bringing into being several independent states in the heartland of
Eurasia. The US changed its perceptions dramatically, so that India
became a strategic partner while Pakistan was placed under
sanctions in 1990 for its nuclear programme. The Gulf War of
1991 brought the US military presence to the oil-rich Middle East
where it also bolstered Israels security and generally opposed
Islamic resurgence. South Asia went openly nuclear in 19.98,
resulting in additional sanctions on Pakistan that were also applied
to India. China became even more important as the only source of
technology and of military hardware for security.
The terrorist attack on the US on 11 September 2001, was the
other seminal event that transformed the global scene. Being the
most serious attack on the US mainland in its history, the
superpower responded by declaring war against terrorism, and the
base of the attack was traced to Afghanistan, where the Taliban
regime had provided sanctuary and support to Osama bin Laden,
the brain behind the outrage. Pakistan as well as China both joined
the coalition against terrorism, which had the effect of greatly
improving their relations with the US.
However, the Bush administration, which had adopted a
unilateralist foreign policy on the basis of its overwhelming power,
used the terrorist attack as the justification for adopting the policy
of pre-emption, and gave itself the right to intervene militarily,
whenever it felt that its security was threatened. The attack on
Afghanistan in October 2001 received the backing of the UN
Security Council, but the war on Iraq was launched despite the
refusal of the Security Council to authorize it till a further report
from its inspectors about the possession of weapons of mass
destruction by Iraq. The subsequent discovery that Iraq neither
possessed weapons of mass destruction nor did it have a link with
Al Qaeda, has further eroded the case for pre-emption.
Pakistan and China took a common stand on the US demand for
the Security Councils endorsement for its pre-emptive attack on
Iraq. Both have called for a greater role for the UN, and believe
that military intervention can be authorized only by the Security
Council under the Charter. Both have similar views on
strengthening the role of multilateral organizations, in a manner
that addresses the problems of the great majority of mankind
leading lives of deprivation in the developing countries. Thus, the
identity of views held by China and Pakistan on regional and
global issues reinforce the likelihood that their friendship and
cooperation will draw continuing strength from a shared vision on
regional and global issues.
Outlook for Bilateral Relations
The above background on shared principles, and on the common
vision on regional and global issues, provides a solid and durable
foundation for building a future of close friendship, and of
expanding cooperation. The scope for cooperation in the
economic field is constantly expanding as China continues its
remarkable growth. A phase of accelerated interaction in all fields
has been launched, by creating the Pak-China Friendship Forum,
that is actively engaged in motivating the private sector in Pakistan
to take advantage of the goodwill and financial facilities being
made available.
If the whole range of factors, bilateral, regional and global is kept
in view, the future of the all-weather and comprehensive
friendship cannot be in doubt. For the US, preoccupied with the
ambition to ensure that this century becomes the New American
Century , China is perceived as the only credible threat. The
Ballistic Missile Defence concept though justified on account of
the threat from rogue states is really aimed at containing China
3
.
The strategic partnership Washington is developing with India is
clearly based on the premise that by its size and location, India
would be a natural counterweight to China. The US has
developed strategic relationships with several states surrounding
China, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, ASEAN members,
and India, and has established its military presence in Afghanistan
and Central Asia. Pakistan is the only neighbour on whom China
can rely in its diplomacy against encirclement.
Pakistan itself has to keep in mind the threats that persist,
including that from India, whose elite has not really accepted the
break-up of mother India . Though Pakistan has become a major
ally of the West in the war against terrorism, it is seen as being at
the core of the threat from Islamic fundamentalism, whose nuclear
capability rankles and is not acceptable to the West. Our
friendship with China is thus truly the cornerstone of our foreign
policy, and is valued by all parties and schools of thought. All this
ensures that the relations between Pakistan and China have a
bright future.
References
1
Hu Shisheng, China South Asia Policy and its Regional Impact , in
Major Powers and South Asia, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, pp
311-314.
2
R.K.Jain, (ed), China-South Asia Relations 1947-80, Vol. 1, (India 1947-
80), Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, p 61.
3
Dr Maqbool A. Bhatty, Ballistic Missile Defence, China, and South
Asia , Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2003.
EDUCATE AND EMPOWER THE PEOPLE
Ambassador (R)
Najmul Saqib Khan
In discussions on development in Pakistan, the dominant emphasis
is on macroeconomic growth leading to the neglect of social
change and of providing substantive freedoms to those caught in
the trap of poverty. Rates of economic growth are undeniably
important indicators but what has to be really examined is whether
they meet the test of reality and are manifested in reducing
deprivation and increasing the capabilities that lend value and
meaning to the lives of around a third of the population barely
managing to exist on the subsistence level. Our indifference to
distributional aspects of economic planning has to be overcome
and the theme which sings of equality of opportunity has to be
perched on the front burner. The vital social dimension of
enhancing human freedom by providing greater access to
opportunities for dignified livelihoods is missing in our lopsided
concentration on the conventional economic aspects of growth. It
is revealing that the concept of social opportunities, inextricably
linked to implanting human feet on the first rung of the ladder of
development, is given scant attention by our policymakers. Social
opportunities have been viewed by economic analysts as the
preconditions for sustainable development which lift all boats.
Social opportunities, according to Nobel Prize Winner Amartya
Sen, refer to the arrangements that society makes for education,
healthcare and so on, which influence the individuals substantive
freedoms to live better... but also for more effective participation
in economic and political activities. Successive governments in
Pakistan, with the acquiescence of elected politicians, have averted
their gaze from the strategic sector of social opportunities and its
crown jewel of universal primary education.
Universal suffrage is a vital element in launching democratization.
Likewise, universal primary education inclusive of the female
population is to be viewed as the first rung on the ladder of
development. My assignment as Ambassador to Japan brought
about a profound change in my thinking and convinced me that
the development of human resource in late industrializing
countries is to be accorded the highest priority. A brief but
succinct look at Meji Japan of the 1870s is warranted while
keeping in mind the fact that Japan has virtually no natural
resources. The Ministry of Education in Tokyo was established in
1871 and promulgated the Fundamental Code in 1872. The Code
preamble has an authentic ring of conviction in declaring:
Education is the key to success and no man can afford to neglect
it... There shall in the future be no community with an illiterate
family or a family with an illiterate person. The young leaders of
modern Japan in the 1870s realized the supreme importance of
universal elementary education in attaining their lofty goal of
equality with the West which had imposed unequal treaties on it.
As the eminent Education Minister put it: our country must move
from the third to the second class and from the second class to
first; and ultimately to the leading position among the countries of
the world. The best way to do this is by laying the foundations of
universal primary education. The goal of universal compulsory
attendance in elementary schools was attained in thirty years of the
establishment of the modern school system in 1871 and universal
literacy achieved in another twenty years.
The linkage between basic education and faster development was
indisputably established by the impressive economic performance
of the East Asian countries until the slowdown in 1997. The high
rates of economic growth in China, after its switch to the fast
track in 1980, were sustained by the spread of education across the
country. Pre-reform China witnessed major educational
advancement. By 1982, literacy had climbed to 96 percent for
males in the 15-19 age group and 85 percent for females in the
same age group, laying the groundwork in the words of a
perceptive observer for participatory economic expansion
possible in a way it would not have been in India then and is
quite difficult in India even now.
Why in Pakistan, faced with the incontrovertible evidence that
educational achievement attested by universal literacy is the key to
modernization and sustainable development, we are continuing to
carry the debilitating and heavy load of illiteracy that is casting its
long shadow across the lives of ar6und 56 million of its citizens.
Our understanding of the role of social and non-economic factors
in development has serious gaps in it. We have a strong inclination
to ignore the lessons of economic history with the result that our
sense of reality has gaping holes in it. We are deluding ourselves in
thinking that we have a special immunity from the consequences
of our choices. Unlike East Asia, we are not an education-
conscious society. We have ignored the contemporary empirical
finding of the impact of female education on reducing fertility
rates. The gender gap is distressingly wide in the country: it
consigns virtually half of the population to cramped lives and
deprives the nation of their distinctive talents which remain
underdeveloped. Without institutionalized democracy and the rule
of law, political opportunism stalks the land and diverts attention
from nation-building issues of education dissemination and
poverty eradication. In an age of globalization, with knowledge-
centered economies, we have to make up for our long neglect of
learning by increased allocation of resources to diffusion of
education and instituting accountability for insuring that the
nation gets a satisfactory return from the investment in education.
The obscurantist and feudal thinking in our society is remote
from the realization that the eradication of illiteracy enbances
human capabilities and the quality of life. The elitist groups,
influenced by the British legacy, concentrate on university
education and express skepticism about the benefits of primary
education. The negative view concerning primary education
requires dispassionate examination. Regarded from the
unassailable imperative of grass roots development and keeping in
mind the formative phase of individual growth, primary education
is much vaster in its coverage than cloistered university learning
and implants habits of mind in the impressionable years of
children from the age of five to twelve. By the time the secondary
schooling is completed at the age of sixteen and university
education begins, it is more difficult to change attitudes and habits
acquired in earlier learning stage. The schooling age provides the
seeding times for inculcating values that retain relevance for a
lifetime. Elementary education has a socializing effect on children
through its egalitarian and unifying experience. The meaning of
the word primary in The Oxford Dictionary is: of the first
importance, fundamental, basic. We have the primary, secondary
and tertiary (university) stages in education and it is a distortion of
priorities to neglect the many languishing in misery in rural areas
where the vast majority of our population lives and mainly focus
on the relatively well-heeled minority engaged in university
education. The creation of social opportunities providing access to
basic education, health care and clean drinking water to all is a
road map to a progressive and prosperous Pakistan.
The quality and equity issues concerning public education in
Pakistan arise from widespread deterioration in public schools
brought about by lack of motivated and trained teachers, the
deficiencies in textbooks as well as in essential equipment, the lack
of core curriculum and glaring disparities in schooling standards.
Within the public schooling system, there are unacceptable
disparities between the well established schools in the main
districts and helter-skelter teaching institutions springing from
devolutionary exigencies in certain areas. Fairness and justice are
foundational societal values and should not be imperiled by
providing profoundly unequal opportunities to children with
different social backgrounds. Teacher absenteeism is a growing
problem. It is not a wild exaggeration that on single day more than
half the teachers are not taking classes. Even while taking classes,
quite a few teachers are just physically present but are not engaged
in teaching. A glaring malpractice is keeping teachers on the
payrolls of schools and letting them draw monthly salaries without
performing their allotted duties. The non-performing teachers act
with impunity in an environment of political patronage. Our public
schooling system is dysfunctional and remedial action is rendered
ineffectual by entrenched vested interests. It is crystal clear that
there is an urgent need for accountability with a view to ensuring
that public goods like basic education of good quality are delivered
to the recipients and the political considerations are not allowed to
muddy the learning stream.
In the new millennium, the greatest challenge facing countries,
where more than 25 percent of the population lives in extreme
poverty on less than one dollar per day, is the eradication of
poverty and the empowerment of the people through the
dissemination of education which plants the seeds of self-
improvement and of accepting responsibility for lifting themselves
to a higher and humane existence. We should draw inspiration
from the inimitable lines to provide the motivational fuel for the
spread of education in the country:
EDUCATE YOURSELVES BECAUSE WE WILL NEED ALL
YOUR INTELLIGENCE. ROUSE YOURSELVES BECAUSE
WE WILL NEED ALL YOUR ENTHUSIASM. ORGANIZE
YOURSELVES BECAUSE WE WILL NEED ALL YOUR
STRENGTH
INDONESIAN ECONOMY: AN APPRAISAL
OF MAJOR SECTORS
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. It is consisted of
five main islands (SumatraJava-KalimantanBorneoSulawesi),
thirty smaller archipelagos and 17508 (one third of this i.e 6000 are
inhabited only) islands and islets. Actually, the name Indonesia is
derived from the combination of two greek words, i-e Indos
meaning India and Nesos meaning islands. It is situated on the
cross road of two oceans viz Indian & Pacific, therefore bridges
between Asia and Australia. Due to strategic location, Indonesias
cultural, social, political and economic patterns are married with
diversifying attitudes. Here only main economic and specific
perspectives and salient features are emphasized upon.
Indonesias total areas is about 9.8 million sq. K.m spreading
between 1.9 million sq k.m and sea 7.9 million sq. k.m, territory.
Such division also includes Exclusive Economic zone EEZ.
The economic features of Indonesia are consisted of the following
major sectors of the economy.
1. Population
Population of Indonesia is composed of four main ethnic groups
viz, Melanesians, Proto-Austronesians, Polynesians and
Micronesians, these groupings are based on linguistic identities.
Because of further ethnic denominations, the whole archipelago is
just like a mushroom of more than 150 languages and dialects.
However its central official language is Bahasa Indonesia.
According to the census reports
1
of the year 2003, its population
rose to 215, 276, 000 (201.52 million), as compared to 205,843,000
(200.50 million) heads in the year 2000, ranking Indonesia the
fourth largest populated country in the world, after China, India
and USA and the first largest among the Muslim world. However,
its rate of population growth is declining to 1.49% per annum
during 1990-2000 period as compared to 1.97% during 1980
1990 period. Its density of population is 111 heads per sq. mile.
Such decrease has also brought down the number of average heads
per household from 4.5 heads in 1990 to 3.5 heads in the year
2000. In the year 2002, from the total working population of
91,600,000 (91.6 million), 44.34% were busy in agriculture, 19.2%
in trade, 13.21% in manufacturing industry, and 11.30% in services
sectors. Islam is the main religion of Indonesia, as 88.22% of the
population follows Islam in the year 2000, as compared to 87.51%
in the year 1971, reflecting an increase of 1.86%. Against this 8.9%
goes to the share of Christians, 1.60%to Hindus, 1.51% to
Buddhists and others, in the year 2000. therefore Indonesia may be
termed as the largest Muslim populated country of the world.
2. Agriculture,
2
Forestry and Fisheries
As mentioned above that 44.34% of the working population is
busy in agriculture, therefore it may be understood that 60% of
the population is depending on agriculture. Indonesian agriculture
grew from 3.39 % in 1967 1976 period to 5.72% in 1976 1986
period, making Indonesia self sufficient in food requirements,
during this decade. However, the food autarky ratio could not be
maintained continuously and it showed downward trends to
1
See reference No.1,PP 12-16 and others
2
See reference No-1, P.112 and others.
1.57% in 1997 due to natural calamities, i-e droughts, cyclones
,
soil erosion, global unsuitable and un-economic policies. Such
devastating cyclones had rigorously affected agriculture and played
havoc with its subsidies like forestry and fisheries.
Indonesias main food crops are rice, maize, corn, soybeans,
peanuts, cassava etc. In the field of horticulture, it includes,
vegetables, viz, onions, shallots, potatoes, cabbage, mustard green,
carrots etc, whils its main fruits are composed of avocado, mango,
lanzon, durain, orange, salaks, pine apple, rambutan, banana,
sapodilla and guava etc.
In addition to this, plantation of estates produce rubber, coconut,
palm oil, coffee, cacao, tea, kopak, quinine, jute bamboo trees,
sugar cane, tobacco, cashew nut etc.
Related to agriculture, livestock production includes dairy products.
Animals are consisted of cow, buffalo, horse, goats, sheeps, pigs,
poultry, ducks, etc.
As regards forestry, it may be mentioned that conservation and
preservation of forests has to be maintained for the improvement
of public welfare, securement of the forests for its existence,
optimization of forestry benefit and reinforcement of forestry
institutions. Steps are taken to look into the affairs of illegal
logging and eradication, protecting forests from fires,
reconstruction and fresh seedlings of forests alongwith
decentralization of forestry sector, to check and prevent the
smuggling and illegal trade of logs, international co-operation has
been maintained with the governments of China, Japan, South
Recent Tsunami cyclone, followed by less intensity rearing typhoons, is

the worst example of the same, has harshly ravaged Indonesian natural
resources, economy and its population.
Korea, U.K and others.
Schemes of socio-economic and ecological benefits are to be
attained by encouraging establishment of viable wood industries
and efficient wood industrial structures. This may help to produce
the products of high quality to gain edging superiority in the global
market. It paves the way for manifestation of sustainable forestry
development. It may cope with wood and trade requirement of
paper and pulp industry as well as of timber market demand. This
may boost up employment opportunities. By such conservation
and optimum use of forestry, functions, benefits and status of
forestry can be channelized through sound parameters, based on
viable, ecological, economical and social grounds. Simultaneously,
it may protect and preserve the animal population, types of plant,
genetic germs and ecosystems.
So far 300,000/- hectares in 27 river basins are maintained and
three million hectares of damaged forests have been reconstructed.
The government of Indonesia has provided RP. 134 billion to 182
district administrations till the year 2004. Forestry in Indonesia has
been decentralized. Regulation to govern forest management and
planning, utilization and use of forest areas, urban forest and
reforestation fund etc, have been enacted
3
.
Indonesia has a total forest area of 120.25 million hectares (i-e
63% of countrys total area). It may be divided into 20.5 million
hectares as parks and reservation forests, 33.52 million hectares
protection forests, 23.0 million hectares as limited production
forest, 35.2 million hectares as production forest and about 8.07
million hectares as convertible production forests.
Conservation of forests is divided into national parks (41 areas),
3
opt. cit. pp 119-123.
nature recreation parks (89 areas), major forest parks (13 areas),
hunting ground (15 areas), nature conservation (179 areas) and
wild life sanctuaries (51 areas).
Efforts are on the way to strictly check the menace of frequent
landslide, flood, pollution, drought, micro-seasonal changes,
excessive and indiscriminate timber cuttings. This may save the
degradation, depletion and damage to the forests in Indonesia.
As regards socio-economic benefits, it may be mentioned that
socially and economically, forests in Indonesia are not only
providing timber and wood but by-products like rattan, honey,
resin, aloe wood, sandal wood, paper etc are also fetched from
forests in Indonesia. It also prevents floods and provide
employment.
Total number of people directly or indirectly earning their
livelihood from forestry increased to 31 million in 2004 against 18
million in 1997. The number of saw mills and wood working,
plywood mills, pulp mills totalled to 1881 with installed capacity of
44.77 million cubic-meters of raw material was supplied in 2003, as
compared to 18.60 million cubic-meters in the year 2000. So far
the government earned RP. 13.5 billion through taxes, levies and
forest concession holders. Finding tourism attractive, more than
0.8 million persons visited nature parks and 3.5 million
4
visited
conservation areas. So far agriculture is contributing 17.44% to the
GDP.
As regards fisheries, it may be mentioned that Indonesian
archipelago has a total area of 5.8 sq. k.m and coast line of 81000
k.m, therefore it is rich in maritime natural, fresh water and
4
Ibid, p.104
cultural fish resources. Indonesia is proudly famous for quality,
quantity and variety of fish. Its production of sea fish is more than
6.4 million tons per annum with the total economic potential of
earning of $82.6 trillion. Its variety is consisted of demersal and
pelagic fish catch, sea-cultured fishery, brackish cultivated fish,
marine bio-technological fish and others. Presently it is
contributing 15.65% to the GDP per annum. Fish products
increased from 5.07 million tons in 2000 to 5.94 million tons in
2003, reflecting a rise of 5.21% per annum. It also earns more than
US$ 2 billion through exports, after meeting domestic
consumption of 5.3 million tons
5.
No. of fishing vessels rose from 450000 in 2000 to 474000 in 2003,
showing a surging rise of 1.83%. It employs about 4 million
fishermen and 2.2 million cultural fish farmers.
Efforts on the way to improve productivity through intensification
schemes and rural fish farming to produce cultural fish, shrimps,
kerapu, seaweed, mollusk, patin, nila fish etc. Synergic efforts by
communities, government and business circles are yielding hopeful
results to address all the problems of marine pollution and
environment betterment. It may attract international co-operative
development schemes. Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ) of 200
miles is also being maintained to check the theft and illegal fish
catching.
This may improve the living conditions of fisherman and fish
farms. It may help to create an atmosphere of sustainability. The
establishment of South East Asia Centre for ocean Research and
monitoring at Perancak, Bali Islands, helps to provide interaction
on fishery, cultured fishery, satellite monitoring on weather and
seasons, transport, marine tourism, sea pollution, marine
5
Ibid, p.134 and others.
technological innovations etc. It also transmits information on
marine resources management, maintenance of coastal and marine
environments, mining at the deep seas and coastal areas and
environment friendly energy. Relevant concerns of USA, Australia,
Japan, Canada, Germany, Korea and other countries have joined
this organization and are actively collaborating with Indonesia on
universal patterns.
3. Industry and Trade
Modern Industry of Indonesia is composed of micro, small,
medium, cottage and co-operative undertakings. It is being
developed on the basis of market mechanism, fair competition,
non-monopolistic practices, establishment of global oriented
socio-economic infra-structures, empowerment of small and
medium-scale enterprises (SMES), improved application of science
and technology and promotion of bilateral and multilateral
economic co-operation for augmenting exports and international
trade.
To gain these and other objectives, efforts are being made to
revitalize the whole industrial structure. Consequently, economic
growth has been surging upward with enhanced and improved
productivity, including saving and investment of foreign exchange,
boosting up of regional economic developments, improving
quality of life and alleviating poverty.
During the period from 2000-2004, the figures of industrial
development reflect that more than 65.3% of the utilization
capacity produced manufacturers was geared in production
increase, as compared to 61.7% in 2000. Chemical, agro and
forestry based industrial groups recorded 75.5% growth, with an
annual average growth of 1.9% during 2000-2004, whereas metallic
machinery, electronics and multi ferrous industrial group totally
utilized 55.2% of the utilization capacity, during the same period
of four years.
As regards manufactures
6
it may be mentioned that Indonesian
manufacturing industry contributes major share to the GDP. In
the year it contributed 25.01% against 24.9% in 2000 and 24.7% in
2003, of the total GDP, as compared to agriculture (17.47%) and
others (57.9%) in 2000 and (58.8%) in 2003.
Indonesian manufacturing industry may be classified into four
major groups, viz large, medium, small, cottage and household
industries. These industries manufacture publications, printing and
recording group (56 establishments), rubber and plastic production
group (50 establishments, motorized vehicles; auto-assembling
group (54 establishments).
These groups alongwith their sub-sectors such as food and
beverage group, machinery and accessories, leather and leather
goods industry, metal goods etc manufactures employed 4364 869
workers in 2002, indicating a decrease of 0.5% as compared to
2001.
Small and medium-scale industries (SMIS) include the production
of food stuffs, clothes, chemicals, metal, electronics, and
handicrafts. Small-medium enterprises and co-operatives (SMES)
contributed 56.7% of the total GDP in 2003. There industries are
busy in primary and tertiary sectors. SMES exploit the initialization
of natural resources, agricultural crop, plantation estates, livestock,
household consumptions, fishery, trade, hotels, and restaurants,
exports, etc. Large scale industry reflects the advanced processing
of electricity, urban gas, drinking water, services, communications
and minting etc.
6
Ibid, pp.109-110 and others.
Medium scale industries include business of hotels, finance leasing,
services, forestry, transport, trade, national demand of goods and
services. The large scale industries are just like pump-priming push
for economic growth, whereas small-scales play the role of
balancing element for income equity and absorption of labour
intensive methodology.
The following table reflects the comparative position of large,
medium and small scales industries in Indonesia.
Average investment of various
7
Establishments during 2002-2003
Scale Investment
(Billion RP)
No. of
Establishments
Investment per
Establishment
Small
Medium
Large
58,884
73,191
185,043
40,138,823
56709
2024
1.51
1.240
1.51424
Total 317118 40,197,556 7.9
The above table reflects that small scale group recorded
investment of growth by 2% against medium scale by 0.01% and
large scale by 2% respectively. These all are meant for utilization
of national resources, which produce goods and services of both
national and international demand.
As regards co-operatives, it may be mentioned, that it is the
backbone of peoples economic activity, alongwith SMES
production targets. Co-operative establishments increased form
110658 units in 2001 to 117806 units in 2002, showing an increase
of 6.46%. These co-operatives basically produce materials of
7
Ibid, P.110
cottage industries, and are spread all over the country (i-e more
than 391 districts and municipalities of Indonesia). More than
202949 workers were working in these industries in the year 2001,
which rose 209058 during 2002, reflecting growth by 3.01%,
whereas its membership increased from 23.6 million to 24.4
million in the corresponding period. In addition to this, saving-
credit scheme co-operatives provide finance to these co-operatives
to produce goods and services on local levels. BDS (Business
Development Services) also work as a Provider , for the financial
requirements of national and international agencies like JICA
( Japan International co-operation Agency) and others.
As regards trade and commerce, it may be noticed that, this sector
greatly performs the functions of the distributing goods and
services at internal and external frontiers. It also meets the
requirements of staple food and appropriates the stability of prices.
It is based on the products of agriculture, industry, manufactures,
mining, finance, transport and communications. It playas pivotal
role to cater to the trends of improvement and distribution of
income, retail and wholesale dealings, price stability, creating
employment opportunities and facilities, import and export of
technological advancements, as well as, it caters to the needs of
changing life styles, tastes, habits and diversifying living standards.
In the year 2002, there were 100 convenience stores, 802 super
markets including mini-markets and 37 hyper markets.
External trade of Indonesia takes the care of marketing both oil
and non-oil, as well as, gas and gas commodities.
8
Exports of non-
oil & gas generate 5.67% to GDP amounting to US $ 47.76 billion
in 2003 against 45.1 billion US $ dollars in 2001. Exports of oil
and gas grew by annual growth rate of 1.2%. Gross revenues from
selling of crude oil fetched $ 1150 billion in 2003, whereas from
8
Ibid, P.133
gas it amounted to US$ 8.615 billions in the same year. It may be
summed up that from the total amount of mineral wealth earnings,
oil and gas contributed 78507.4 billion RP. and other minerals
contributed RP. 1072 billion, during the year, 2003. All necessary
steps are on the way to further explore the mineral wealth.
Presently Indonesia have 20 oil refineries, one LNG and one LPG
refinery. The crude oil production has touched 1150 millions
barrels in 2003. Oil refining capacity was 987 billion MBCD or 360
thousand MBBL, in 2004. The gas production went up to 685
billion cubic feet (BCF) in 2004 against 628 (BCF) in 2003.
Indonesia exports gas to Singapore, South Korea, China and other
neighbouring countries through piped transmission. In the year
2003, government revenues from energy and mineral resources
amounted to RP 79579.4 billion or 110 times more than the
targeted quantum of production in the year 2002.
Domestic oil consumption of Indonesia totaling to 57.40 million
kilo liters is divided in 26.71 million kilo liters for transportation
of 7.58 million kilo liters for industry and 11.65 million kilo liters
for households. Besides, Indonesia is also very rich in other
minerals, like tin, copper, nickle, silver gold etc.
4. Transport and Communication
Like all other countries, of the world, Indonesia has also
developed means of transport and communications. Its basic aim
is to orient these services as more efficient, reliable, qualified and
affordable by the common masses of Indonesia. Indonesian
transport is consisted of river, lake, ferry, sea, air, road and
railways etc, to gain its benefits even at the remote areas of the
country. This has benefited both the rural and urban population,
as well as, inter-regional and intra-regional facilities. More than 92
bus pioneering routes were established in 2004, as compared to 50
in 2001, to cater to the transportation needs of the lower middle
class society. Public and private transportation
9
enterprises are
playing their vehicles on different routes, throughout the country,
on healthy and competitive grounds. In the year 2002, about 23
million vehicles were running on the roads of Indonesia for both
the passenger and freight traffic. From this 73.97% were passenger
cars, 8.12% trucks, 3.10% buses and 2000 vehicles as inter-city
passenger bus service. The total length of road net-work is more
than 4 lacs kilo-meters and 2000 meters of bridges along the roads,
heading to Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi routes.
Countrys road network is also connected with the neighbouring
countries, like Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Timor etc.
As regards railways, it may be mentioned that railway services are
limited in Indonesia, due to its geographical location and
archipelago. It is available only in Java, Sumatra islands and Jakarta.
The state run Indonesian Railways company (PT Kereta Api more
than 190.7 million persons travelled through rail services and 18
million tons of freight were handled in 2003.
Inland water ways and ferry crossings play pivotal role in Sumatra,
Kalimantan, Java and Papua, for both the passenger and freight
carrying services. In the year 2003, more than 36 million
passengers and 15 million tons of freight were transported through
ferry services.
The sea-transport operates on 174 Sea Shipping lines. In the year
2002, more than 164 million tons of freight was loaded through
sea shipping routes.
The Indonesian air travel services maintains the fleet of 545
aircraft to provide air services on 317 internal and external routes.
Both public and private airline companies provide air traffic
9
Ibid, P-125.
services in the country and abroad. In the year 2003, more than 14
million passengers travelled by air and 0.2 million tones of cargo
was handled by air services.
Meteorological services are also provided by the government as
guidelines for transport, strategic equipment, such as, agriculture,
irrigation, forestry, water resources and other public facilities.
As regards postal services, it may be mentioned that Indonesia has
7147 post offices to meet the requirements of the people.
As regards telecommunications, it may be added, that the whole
system has been renovated and rehabilitated. The infrastructures
have been weded with latest radio, television, telephone, etc
frequencies of 10.15 million telephone lines, covers the
requirement of public services. In the year 2003, mobile or cellular
subscribers crossed the figure of 12 million and one million for
internet uses. It is being further modernized, improved and
diversified with the dynamics of changing world.
5. Labour
Accordingly to international set-up Indonesia also aims at the
continuous provision of jobs, enabling masses to earn their
livelihood. This may save them from the menace of
unemployment and disguised unemployment. The government
strives for the comprehensive and integral development of man
power to improve its competence, better wages, welfare schemes
for betterment of labour, right to trade unionism, efforts to
envisage the improvement of quality, efficiency, skill, training and
quantity of manpower, export of labour to foreign countries,
legislation to promote the schemes of social security, social
insurance and check the exploitation of manpower etc, at the
hands of employer.
Total working population of Indonesia in 2003 was 152.6 million
and 60.37% of this was busy in Java Island only. Majority of the
Indonesian labour force i-e 76.78% is educated at primary and
partially secondary level whereas 23.22% is literate at college and
University level.
Indonesian employees numbered 23.8 million (26.25% of the total
working population), who were mostly busy is services,
manufacturing industries, trade and agricultural sectors, whereas
from the remaining proportion 40.23% comprised of self
employed, 35.23% were temporarily employed against 6.54% of
the employers, and 32.99% were unpaid workers.
Comparatively, the unemployed manpower numbered to eight
million in 2002, which rose to 9.5 million in 2003, comprising
59.68% of low level educated and 40.32% of higher level educated
unemployed. It is because of unbalanced growth of economy,
shattering natural disasters, cyclones, calamities, seasonal drought
unsuitable weather conditions and population growth.
In order to create more job opportunities, the government of
Indonesia has been increasing working hours to start double shift
production to encourage export of labour force and augment
foreign exchange resources, to create more skilled and
technologically well versed labour force, to enhance training
schemes with curriculum moderations, to provide information
about job market conditions. The government has also started a
programme of national campaign for handling unemployment in
the year 2004. This has partially eased the problem of professional
independent young manpower, volunteer manpower, educated
independent manpower. Expanded labour-intensive schemes also
help to seek jobs under the scheme of Inter-regional manpower
and special manpower placement etc. More than 171 service
companies are working in Indonesia to send workers in Middle
Eastern countries to perform formal and non-formal economic
activities. Against this 233 service companies are working to fetch
overseas employment in the 22 countries of Asia-Pacific region.
Presently more than one million workers are working abroad.
In order to maintain harmony, peace and tranquility among
employers and employees, steps have been taken to promote
constructive and healthy trade unionism, to improve vocational
safety and health provisions to enhance schemes of social security,
labour welfare and collective bargainism and implement various
ILO decisions.
Under social security scheme a new programme Jamsostek has
been started. It provides the workers credit and financial loans to
mortgage houses, to build worship houses, to participate in sports
and celebration of religious eve.
Scheme of social insurance is funded by individuals and companies
to provide the relief to the worker at the time of unemployment,
work accident, sickness and sudden death etc. Indonesian workers
have won praise worthy laurels and international reputation in the
performance of assignments in different fields, such as,
accountancy, oil drilling, construction, seamanship, nursing and
midwifery etc.
Besides, these salient features Indonesian economy is reflected in
many other reactors, such as tourism, overseas co-operation,
culture, music, carvings, traditional weaving and so many other
sectors of the economy.
Conclusion
While concluding it may be observed that Indonesian economy is
also moving towards the path of growth and development and
mounting towards economic recovery, after facing the disputing
factors like rising oil prices on international marketing, hike in
American interest rates, the tsunami disasters in Aceh earthquake
in Nias, and others. The formidable depressing and challenging
obstructions are being removed, to put the economy on the rails
of progress.
Macro-economy of Indonesia has been weded with stability.
Capital Market has been strengthened. Foreign exchange reserves
have been streamlined despite cyclical fluctuations, since 1997
economic and financial crisis.
In the year 2004, Indonesian economy grew by 5.13%. Foreign
indebtedness has been lowered to 53% of the GDP in the same
year. Inflationary trends are being decreased. Non-oil and gas
sector grew by an average of 7.5%. This have paved the way for
getting rid of the Asian Economic crisis, started in 1997.
Infra-structures are being renovated and newly constructed to
cope with the problems of unemployment, hyper inflation,
mismanagement and poor administrative performance.
Investments grew by 18.3% and exports increased by 13.7%.
Foreign capital and investment inflow has been encouragingly
attracted with domestic participation. This has promoted
establishment of new industries in large scale and heavy industrial
sectors, such as services industries, food processing industries,
plantations, utilities , trade, hotel and restaurant, chemical and
pharmaceutical industries, mining industries, transport and
communication industries etc.
In the overall assessment industrial sector has so far scored the
rise by 7.2% against agriculture by 1.9%, oil and gas sector went
up by 8%. The following table reflects the latest position of
economic growth in Indonesia.
Quarterly GDP by Industrial Origin (%)
Industrial Origin Q 3 from
Q 2 /2004
Q 4 from
Q 3 2003
Q 4/2004
Q from Q
4/2003
1. Agriculture, Livestock
forestry & fisheries
5.56 -20.00 1.86
2. Mining and quarrying 3.86 0.34 3.28
3. Manufacturing Industries 1.98 2.02 7.17
4. Electricity, Gas and Water
supply
1.26 2.53 7.87
5. Construction 4.71 2.08 8.31
6. Trade, hotel and restaurant 4.30 2.16 9.41
7. Transportation and
Communication
5.10 3.45 11.47
8. Financial Owner ship and
business
2.50 3.15 8.45
9. Services 0.72 1.33 5.04
GDP
GDP (excluding oil & gas)
3.336
3.43
-1.55
-1.48
6.65
8.03
Source: Indonesian Economic Performance, various
publications, issued by the co-coordinating Minister of
Economic Affairs, May 2005.
It may be understood that increase in power consumption, sale of
motor cars increasing to 520000 units in 2005, sale of motor cycles
rose by 35% etc reflect the improvement in standard of living.
Budgeting system of Indonesia is being inter knitted with
transparency and accountability in the use of public funds.
As regard financial management, it may be mentioned that,
Indonesians stock market is one of the best performers in Asia,
also experiencing with partial ups and downs. Maintaining the
stability of interest rate economy is enhanced by creating
conducive position. Credit extending position of the banks and
DFIs etc has been extended and widened. This has been
contributing for accelerating the rate of economic growth.
However sky-rocketed oil prices have adversely affected the
balancing position of the economy. The dollar-ruppiah exchange
rate has gone up from RP 9200 in September 2004 to 9500 in
March 2005 and 9800 in May 2005. It has weakened the currency
position of Indonesian ruppiah. Various economic measures are
being taken to check the inflationary trends, arising out of rising
oil prices and shattered dollar-ruppiah parity, global economic
show down and rising interest rates of the developed countries and
global imbalances. However, Indonesian economy is moving
steadily to the Millennium Development goals. The infrastructure
Summit (held on 17 18 January 2005), has set the following
targets to be achieved by natural unity cabinet in five year period.
1. To reduce the rate of unemployment from 9.5% in 2003 to
5.1% in 2009.
2. To reduce the rate of poverty from 16.6% in 2004 to 8.2%
in 2009.
3. To accelerate economic growth from 5% in 2004 to 7.9%
in 2009, in order to attain the annual growth rate of 6.6%
in 2009. This may be achieved to GDP ratio from the
present rate of 20.5% to 28.4% in 2009.
It may be summed up that well coordinated efforts are required to
achieve the set targets of economic development, aiming at the
prosperity of the common man the road map of infrastructure
build up sketched for 2004 2009, may emphasise upon regulatory
framework reform, investments communications and capacity
building. It may enhance the per-capita GDP of Indonesia from
US $ 660 in 2001 to 1000 dollars in 2009.
References and Reading
1
Asmal Asagiri et, al., Indonesia 2004: An Official Handbook, National
Agency, Jakarta, 2004.
2
David Bourchir and Vedi R. Hadiz, Indonesian Politics and Society ,
Rutledge Curzon, New York, 2003.
3
David, L. Bevan, Paul Colher and Jan Willem Gunning, Nigeria and
Indonesias Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth , published for
the World Bank, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.
4
Indonesian Economic Directory 2005, Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia, Islamabad, 2005.
5
Hal Hill, Indonesias New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic
Transformation, Allen & Unwin, 1994.
6
Madhur Gautam & others, Indonesia: The Challenges of World Bank
Involvement in Forests, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000.
7
Indonesias Economic Up-turn Facts and Figures, Ministry of Industry and
Trade, Jakarta, 2003.
8
A Brief Introduction to the Republic of Indonesia, National Information
Agency, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2003.
9
Peter Tumer, Indonesia, a Lovely Planet Travel Survey Kit, Lovely Planet
Publications, Australia, 1996.
10
Rizal Sukna, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, Rutledge Curzon, New
York, 2003.
11
Robert, B.Dickie and Thomas A., Laymain, Foreign Investment and
Government Policy in the Third World: Foreign Common Interests in Indonesia and
Beyond, Macmillan Press, Ltd. London, 1988.
12
Satish Chandra and Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesia, A New Beginning,
Starting Publishers Pvt., New Delhi, 2002.
13
A Brief Guide for Investment, The Investment Coordinating Board, The
Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004.
14
Various Monthly Indonesian Newsletters published by Consulate General
of the Republic of Indonesia, Karachi.
15
Internet Information, various journals, newspapers and magazines and
encyclopedia.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF SANGHA IN
THAILAND S SACRED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY
Firdous Nilofer
Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion of Thailand. Its
conspicuous traditional feature is the identification of Buddhism
with life. It is similar to the forms found in Sri Lanka, Burma,
Kampuchea and Laos and is professed by well over 90 percent of
the population including not only the core Thai but also the other
races living in Thailand.
1
Its conspicuous traditional feature is the
identification of Buddhism with life.
Among the Theravada countries of Southeast Asia, Thailand is the
sole exception that has managed to remain except from both
western colonial domination and the social and political turmoils
that have ravaged the area. For this reason, Thailand has been able
to perpetuate the Theravada tradition in modern social structures
to a higher degree them other neighbouring countries.
2
This article
focuses on the traditional role of the Sangha in Thai society.
The Sangha is an assembly of monks that has authoritatively
studied, taught and practiced the teachings of the Buddha since the
inception of Buddhism
3
.
In Thailand the Sangha is the center of religious life and it plays an
important role in society. The traditional ideal is that all males
will join the Sangha at some time during their lives. It is
customary for young men to enter monastic life for a while upon
the death of a relative or prior to marriage. The custom is
considered to be the proper way of repaying gratitude to ones
parents and of achieving recognition as a mature male. In many
rural societies today it is still believed that a man who has not
gone through the experience of monkhood is likely to be
immature.
It is estimated that currently some 50 percent of the countrys
male population over 20 years of age have been monks at least
once in their lives. Except for a few who commit themselves to
the Sangha for life, others spend only a limited time in a
monastery, ranging from a few weeks to a few months or years.
Most males become monks only for one lent period which
coincides with the Thai rainy season (between planting and
harvest), since it is a general belief that more merit is earned
during this three month period than in any other time of the year.
The Thai government even envisages this pattern by granting one
rainy seasons paid leave to civil servants who wish to have this
religious experience.
4
To become a monk a man must be at least 20 years of age and
healthy, be free from debt, have consent of his parents or wife, be
able to understand the rules of monastic life and have a token
knowledge of Pali. During his stay in the monastery (wat) he
learnes the Vinaya rules, the basic teachings of Buddha, and
memorizes a few Pali texts for the rituals.
Although ordination as a monk is usually regarded as a rite of
passage for young men before marriage, there are quite a few who
become monks towards the end of life, especially when they no
longer have family responsibilities. The long term monk may
remain in the order for a few years or a life time, depending upon
personal preferences and circumstances. A minority join the
Sangha as novices in their youth.
Besides the monks there are a large number of novices and temple
boys associated with the Sangha. Temple boys (dek wat) minister
to the needs of monks and novices. They are usually young boys
who learn the rudiments of reading and writing at the wat school
and live in the wat. However there are no definite age limits. A
number of adult men, for one reason or another choose to live in
wats and serve as temple boys.
5
Novices are youths of at least eight years of age. They live in the
monastery, wear monastic robes and have their heads shaved.
Under the tutorship of senior monks they are trained over the
years in the doctrinal knowledge, the ritual procedures, and the
rules of the monastic order.
6
In northern Thailand, which is largely rural, the prevailing custom
is for young boys between 10 and 18 years of age to become
novices. Many of them leave the wat before 20 years of age; only
one in four or five eventually continues to become a professional
monk. This practice provides many boys from poor rural areas
with the opportunity to acquire education and economic security,
which they could not secure otherwise. Today, as in the past,
though to a lesser extent, religious education in a wat still
continues to be for many disadvantaged youths an avenue of social
mobility.
In the past, the monasteries were the only available means for
pursuing education beyond the primary grades. Today, with the
increasing availability of secular education, a smaller number of
boys become novices. But the institution of novicehood is by no
means finished. Many villages still lack secondary schools, and
many families are unable to afford to educate their sons. In certain
places, such as northern part of Thailand secular schools are
inadequate in number or relatively inaccessible because of poor
communications. In all these cases the wat still continues to attract
boys of peasant background and provides them with intellectual
and moral education. A monks vocation is more often the result
of the novices experience of living in a wat rather than an
antecedent motivating factor. The most able monks eventually
find their way to important urban monasteries to pursue higher
education. Many of them disrobe upon the completion of their
education and take up secular jobs, usually going into teaching,
ecclesiastical and cranial service.
7
This relationship of monasteries to educational opportunity
explains the unbalanced regional distribution of monks in the
country. The northern region is characterized by a large presence
of novices.
Presently it is estimated that there are about 200,000 monks in
Thailand or approximately one percent of the male population and
some 120,000 novices distributed in approximately 30,000 wats.
Over one third of them are temporary monks i.e. for the Lenten
season. About 50 percent of longer term monks are estimated to
disrobe usually between 25 and 35 years of age.
With regard to the routine of monastic life, a monks daily activity
starts at 5.00 a.m. a monk sleeps on a straw mat wearing only a
waist cloak and a shoulder cloak. Upon rising, he performs his
ablutions and recites a Buddhist prayer in Pali, in which he thanks
the Buddha for showing him the way to nirvana and recalls to his
mind the caducity of life. Later, in the morning, monks and
novices carrying their alms bowls go into the village to beg for
food, except on holy days when food is served at the wat by the
women of the community. The temple boys accompany them and
help them to carry the pinto or a metal food container. Each monk
visits 15 to 20 houses on his route. When all the monks have
returned to the wat, all the food is pooled and redistributed.
After breakfast, the monks take religious instructions, practice
their chants, and attend to personal matters. At 11:00 a.m. at the
beating of the wats drum, lunch is served by the devotees (usually
women) who take turns donating a daily meal to the monks.
Following the traditional custom, a monk does not thank the
donors, since he is one confers merit by accepting the food. The
monks do not consume food after mid day. Liquids are allowed at
any time, tea is the most popular drink.
The afternoon is spent studying sacred books or in other activities.
The abbot himself instructs the monks and novices, and trains
those who have to take religious examinations. Evening prayers
take place at about 6:00 pm following by further practice of chants
before bedtime. Every evening a sermon is also given to the
devotees, each monk or novice taking his turn. The sermons are
read and are usually in Thai language or in the local dialects related
to stories concerning the life of the Buddha.
The organization and administration of the Sangha is hierarchal.
The head is the Sangha raja appointed by the king on
recommendation of the Supreme Sangha Council. This is the
Supreme executive body, appointed by the Sangharaja with the
consent of the Minister of Education. At the lowest level are the
wats or monasteries, each autonomous under the leadership of an
abbot.
8
From a social point of view the wat plays an important integrative
role in the village community in a number of ways, primarily by
the performance of religious rituals. The wat is first of all a centre
for religious ceremony much of which is regularly carried out
according to a ritual calendar. These rites involve the community
as a whole even if their ultimate goal is the acquisition of merit by
individuals. Other irregular held rites also take place there and
almost invariably include the community or some significant
segment of it. In addition the temple is the locus for astrological
activities important to the community and often carried out by
monks.
The temple committee often administers a loan fund where the
poor of the community may borrow in emergencies. It is also the
repository of mats, dishes and other material items that may be
borrowed by members of the community. If the aged have
nowhere else to go e.g (if the family system does not work for
what ever reasons) the wat is a refuge. But the wat is not resumed
for wholly serious matters: entertainment and dances open to the
community are also held there.
The traditional New Year (Sangkran) celebration (still practiced in
many villages) coincides with the end of the dry season when rains
are imminent. It falls around the middle of the April, and it lasts
three days. The youngsters of the village symbolically wash away
the community sins of the past year by bathing the statue of
Buddha in perfumed water. Everything is purified and rejuvenated
by the young who also indulge in fertility rituals and rains are
invoked. The dead are believed to visit the living and for this
purpose the monks perform rituals in the village cemetery. The
last day of the festival, which is the first day of the New Year, is
celebrated with sports and other forms of entertainment.
Another important recurrence is the Lent period which coincides
with the three months of the rainy season. Since there is little work
to do on the land the villagers tend to make frequent visits to the
wat, while the monks go into retreat. It is a period of piety and
asceticism. In June the young men of the village are ordained as
monks with the joyful participation of the entire community. With
the end of the rains, in October, Lent ends and monks come out
of seclusion. Then the Kathin ceremony takes place, when the
monks and novices are presented with new robes and gifts by the
villagers.
9
In February, the agricultural cycle comes to an end with the
solemn celebration of the harvest (a villages major festival) when
religious and secular interests blend together in the dedication of
both nature and community to a higher ethical purpose and in a
quest for prosperity and health. During these festivals boys and
girls have an opportunity to meet. Adults exchange news and
gossip, and farmers gather at the local wat to discuss with the
monks the matters pertaining to farming, loans, domestic troubles,
auspicious days for business or social undertakings. Children
receive their first education at the wats school. People suffering
from some illness may seek to be cured by the holy water. Elderly
male members who are no longer able to work on the farm may
join the monkhood in order to acquire merit and be assured of a
daily supply of food. Poor families may send their young sons to
serve as ternple boys in order to reduce the burden in the family.
Among the rites, funeral rites are considered to be the most
important, and require the participation of the entire village. The
rites are the most elaborate among the Buddhist ceremonies and
are assumed to secure good status for the dead by transferring
merit to them. Monks, by virtue of their religious status act as
mediators between death and rebirth. They are not allowed to
worship spirits.
Although monks do not participate in any aspect of spirit worship,
they indirectly provide legitimation for it. They bless charms,
armlets that are used to ward off the evil actions of the spirits.
Some of the charms are made by the monks themselves which are
more valuable.
Aside from its religious function in the community, the wat also
performs a large variety of social functions. Usually there is a wat
committee consisting of the abbot and his assistants and some
senior male laymen with the task of acting as lioson between the
wat and the community, and of creating interest among the
villagers for all wat activities.
As such the wat is the propelling center of community life. All
forms of entertainment take place in the wat compound in
connection with various religious events. The wat serves as the
news center of the community, for all notices of the district are
posted in its compound. It serves as the community chest where
various articles, such as musical instruments, lamps, kitchenware
etc. are deposited and borrowed by the members of the
community on several occasion. During the dry season wats are
also a reliable supplier of drinking water due to their large water
reservoirs.
In sum, in many rural areas, the entire life of a Thai villager
revolves around the wat i.e. from his birth till death. It is said that
these people can not conceive of their life without the monks. For
the monks are above all the source of merit and therefore a
guarantee of happiness, security, safety and prosperity regardless
of how modernized Thai society may be. Thus, Sanghas are an
integral part of Thailands Social Structure and no, social event is
considered complete without the participation of the Sanghas. Of
All the Theravada countries of Southeast Asia Thailand is the only
country that still perpetuates this tradition because it escaped
colomial occupation.
Similarly, the traditional value system supporting the Thai social
studies has remained unchanged. Thai tradition has consistently
emphasized, though in modified forms, the three traditional
institution of kingship, Sangha and nation as the basic triad of
social solidarity and identity. These there institutions have become
so intermingled in the course of history and are as deeply
meaningful to the hearts of the people as to form the core of the
Thai civic culture.
References
1
Frederick M. Bunge, Thailand: A Country Study, Washington D.C., 1981,
p-92.
2
Carlo Colderala, Religion and Societies, Menton Publishers, New York,
1982, p-373.
3
Ibid.
4
Mala Lasekera. G.P, Theravada Buddhism, Macmillan, New York, 1974,
p.182.
5
Bunnag Jane, Buddhist Monk, Buddhist Layman, Cambridge University
Press, London, 1973, p-212
6
Richard Maidment and Colin Mokenas, Culture and Society in the Asia
Pacific , Rutledge, London, 1998, p.186.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Carlo Colderela, op.cit, p.375.
U.S.-JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD
WAR PERIOD: THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Altaf Hussain Ansari
Introduction
United States and Japans economies are two largest economies of
the world. Both combined together constitute 30 to 40 percent of
global economy. The post-cold war period witnessed frictions
between two economic giants, as formerly both these economies
were connected for geopolitical reasons. The logic of economic
interests was dominated by security compulsion during cold war
period.
Collapse of Soviet Union 1991
After Second World War all US government head applied the
theory of absolute gains in economic relationship with its allies.
The absence of Cold War put American policy makers at liberty to
follow the theory of relative gains in economic affairs with other
states, receded the ideological threat to American primacy. In fact,
in late 1980s, American looked upon economic threat posed by
Japan. The manufacturing rivalry between two states starting from
1960 and onwards had created a wider gap in the exchange of
trade between United States and Japan. The aftermath of Soviet
decline brought a paradigm shift in US economic policy.
This paper attempts to explore what methodological tools applied
by US government to narrow the trade imbalance with Japan. This
paper will study that how the geo-economic consideration of
Clinton government dictated the terms of trade with Japan during
1990s. What factor interests have motivated the present US
government to apply the traditional policy to brighten the
prospects of trade relations with Japan?
U.S. Japan trade relations are intertwined in the web of global
security scenario in general and geo-politics of East Asia in
particular. In the aftermath of Second World War, the United
States helped Japan by design. During American occupation period
the foundation of Japanese economy was laid through
reconstruction. The phase came in 1952 when Mutual security
Assistance pact, it extended the US nuclear umbrella over Japan
and made Japan the Asian cornerstone of the cold war
contentment strategy. Japan became vital to the defense of Pacific
sea-lanes and hosts the largest US military base in the region.
Although trade issues were steadily emerging, they remained
secondary to security interests.
1
The last phase of trade relations cashiered from the early 1970s
until the end of cold war which was dominated by Japans trade
surplus between two countries. Aided by massive domestic saving
and an undervalued yen, Japan enjoyed a huge trade surplus with
the United States. The gap became so wide that many American
people felt economic challenge from Japan.
The Bubble Economy
The boom of Japanese bubble economy in late 1980s became a
major concern of American policy makers. In the 1970s and 80s, a
series of large and prominent US industries found themselves
under competitive assault by Japanese companies. These industries
included consumer electronics, automobiles, and semi-conductors;
in fact, Japan was experiencing continuing high growth and rapid
advancement because it was playing technological catch-up with
the West. Japan adopted a business friendly policy environment of
low taxes and low government spending.
2
The trade deficit with
Japan, as conceived by American, was result of Japans
protectionist policy.
In the United States, the debate was raised whether military threats
from the Soviet Union or the economic threat from Japan, be
considered on prime priority of policy making. In a series of polls
in 1989 and 1990, most respondents considered the challenge from
Japan a more serious. On the other hand Japanese opinion was
showing greater confidence in Japans orbital to handle its own
affairs without much reliance on Washington.
US government insisted upon Japan to open its markets to
American goods and companies. Japans export surplus with US
created a tension in their relationship. American looked upon
Japan an economic threat responsible for US trade deficit.
The Burst of Bubble Economy
The turning point in U.S. Japan relations came with burst of
Japanese economy in 1990. The recession of Japanese economy
after stock market shock in Japan brought a decade long
stagnation in its economic growth. The 1990s is labeled as lost
decade for Japanese economy. The crony capitalism paralyzed the
Japanese competitive edge in world trade. The poor financial
management created a bad debt problem in Japan. It ultimately
created friction and uncertainty in their trade relations.
U.S. Response
In the absence of Cold War lessened the strategic significance to
the centrality of US containment policy. After assuming
Presidency, Clinton adopted aggressive unilateralism in trade
policy. The United States became more inward looking in its
economic growth. There came a paradigm shift in US economic
policy from absolute gains to relative gains for development
purposes. The cooperation of allies on security issues lost much
significance. This radical change in US policy to put emphasis on
economics than on security matters undermined the importance of
geopolitical factors in inter-state relations.
The Clinton Administration insisted Japan for Liberalization of
trade and a managed trade. It demanded Japan governments
guarantee of market shares for US companies.
3
U.S. government
applied pressure on Japan to strengthen the Yen. They hoped that
the stronger yen would encourage Japanese imports and
discourage exports to reduce the trade deficit. The Clinton
government had negotiated 20 trade negotiations with Japan
including Uruguay Round Frame Work and other bilateral
agreements with Japan such as automobile, apples and US services
such as insurance and construction.
4
The July 1993 Frame work
agreement became the cornerstone of Washingtons trade policy
with Japan. US export to Japan rose to 120 percent in subsequent
years. Another agreement of auto and auto parts was signed in
1995. The rapid appreciation of Japanese yen in 1995 increased the
level of US export, which reached a record $64 in 1995. Moreover
the US anti-dumping measures in the same years antagonized
Japan.
Japan did not overtly challenge the US anti-dumping policy against
it, but handled this discontent strictly on bilateral level. Since the
establishment of the WTO, Japan actions concern the US more
directly.
5
Meanwhile, after the yen ducked below 80, (in a one US$)
in April 1995, the Washington shows the possible financial
collapse of Japan. The outbreak of financial crises in Southeast
Asia in 1997 made US policy makers apprehensive of capacity of
Japanese financial institutions to meet the challenge for merely it.
Americans were scaled of Japanese export drive but now they
became concerned about the weakness of Japanese economic
stability. The economic stagnation of Japan was seen as a problem
potentially causing a global recession.
6
Reflection of Trade Balance of Japan U.S.A
In 2003, Japans trade surplus expanded 3.1 percent from the year
2002 to 10.19 trillion yen, the second consecutive annual increase,
it excided 10 trillion yen for the first time in the three years.
Exports to the European Union increased 9 percent to 8.35 trillion
yens, backed by exports of mini-cars and digital cameras to the
region. The trade surplus also rose to the three percent to 2.68
trillion yens for the first time annual rise in the five years. Mean
while exports to the United States dropped by 9.8 percent to 1.34
trillion yen because Japanese companies moved their
manufacturing to the United States and other nations. The trade
surplus with the United State also slipped 13.7 percent to 6.59
trillion yen for the first time in two years.
7
In the year 2002 the total value of exports to United States was
14,873,326 million yen. Major commodities were transport
equipments, chemical product, electrical machinery general
machinery, metal and metallic product and textile etc. and the
total value of imports from U.S.A during the same year were
7,237,176 million yen. Major commodities were food stuffs,
chemical product raw material fuel machinery and equipment,
iron steel and textile.
Japans trade surplus grew to its highest level in almost five years
during January June, 2004 period. As a record surplus with Asia
Made up for Lackluster growth in the surplus with the U.S.A.
Japans trade surplus in the first six months of the year 2004 rose
to 42.4% from the year earlier corresponding year to 6.18
trillion (US$ 56.2 billion) i.e. topped the 6 trillion mark for first
time since the second half of 1999.
8
Japans trade surplus further jumped in May 2004. The Value of
Japans exports exceeded against its imports by 934 billion (US$
8.6 billion) in May, 2004 i.e. 35% a year. Because of recovery of
world economy, Japan got its trade surplus increased for eleven
months.
9
The following tables reflect the position of Japanese exports,
imports and position of balance of payment, during different years.
Table No.1
Value of Japan s Exports by Destination and Commodity, 2002
( Million)
Table No.2
Value of Japan s Imports by Destination and Commodity, 2002.
( Million)
Table No.3
Total Exports and Imports
( Billion)
Table No.4
Imports and Exports of Major Countries 2002
Table No. 5
Table No.6
United States Trading Partners 2003
(US$ Million)
Country/Region Total Trade Exports Imports
Canada 393,647 169,481 224,166
Mexico 235,530 97,457 138,073
Chinas 176,797 24,418 152,379
Japan 170,093 52,064 118,029
Germany 88,895 28,848 60,047
United Kingdom 76,562 33,895 42,667
South Korea 61,062 24,099 36,963
Taiwan 49,088 17,488 31,600
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Table No.7
Japan s Imports Exports With U.S.A 2002
Exports to U.S.A Imports from U.S.A Year
( Million) (US$) ( Million) (US$)
2002 14,873,326 124,598.52 7,237,176 60628.097
The Japanese economy is one of the strongest in the world, but
the USA is the only country which has a higher GNP,
comparatively.
Exports: Japan's main export goods are cars, electronic devices
and computers. Most important single trade partner is the USA
which imports more than one quarter of all Japanese exports.
Other major export countries are Taiwan, Hong Kong, South
Korea, China and Singapore.
Imports: Japan has a large surplus in its export/import balance.
The most important import goods are raw materials such as oil,
foodstuffs, and wood. Major suppliers are the USA, China,
Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia.
Industries: Manufacturing, construction, distribution, real estate,
services, and communication are Japan's major industries today.
Agriculture makes up only about 2% of the GNP. Most important
agricultural product is rice.
10
Resources of raw materials are very
limited and the mining industry rather small.
The global economic expansion appears to have been on a
reasonably firm path though the summer month the recent prices
undoubtedly be a drag from now on .
11
In the United States, Japan and elsewhere, the effect on growth
would have been greater had it not declined in importance as an
input to world economic activity since 1970s .
12
The impact of
high prices on economic growth and inflection was likely to the
less severe then during the 1970s oil price spikes.
Foreign Trade and Investment
Japans exports totaled 417 billion US dollars in the year 2002, the
third largest figure after United States and Germany. Its imports
totaled 338 billion US dollars. As a share of total world trade
Japanese exports accounted for 7.8 percent of global exports and
6.5% of global imports in 1996
13
as percentage of the countrys
GDP, exports accounted to 8.9 percent and imports 7.6 percent.
United States purchase 27 percent of Japans total export and
supplied 23 percent of its imports.
Japan is exporter of manufactured goods and importer of raw
materials.
Japans main trading partners are the United State, East & South
East Asian countries, and the countries of the European Union
(particularly Germany and the United Kingdom).
14
In 1996 the
United States purchased 27 percent of Japans exports and
supplied 23 percent of its imports.
U.S. direct investment in Japan since 1950 totaled dollars 15.6
billion as of March 1996. From FY 1988 through FY 1995 U.S.
inward investment averaged $1.4 billion year. A total of 463
transactions involving American capital were reported in 1995.
15
The typical investment was more then $4million, up substantially
from the $50,000 average of 1980. This growth indicates in
expending scale of business activity in Japan. One method of
investment is the acquisition of existing firms. Japan is notable for
its low level of mergers and acquisition, both by domestic and
foreign firms. A deliberate government policy in the postwar
period removed restrictions on mutual shareholding among
Japanese companies, expressly for the purpose of warding off
foreign acquisitions. A large proportion of company own shares
kept significant amounts of stock off the market making it difficult
for unrelated entries to acquire a controlling interest. The policy
worked as planned not only were acquisition-minded foreign
companies frozen out of the market but domestic transaction also
were held to low levels. Hostile takeovers were virtually unknown.
Domestic acquisition of domestic firms totaled only 392 in 1996,
according to Nomura Research Institute; the latest figure
however, was almost six times higher than the number just 10
years ago. The low share price of recent years and the serious
financial predicament of many Japanese have mad acquisition
more likely than in the past.
The same phenomenon has developed for acquisition by foreign
companies. Whereas only five accorded in 1986 and but a single
entry was recorded the following year, more than 30 foreign
takeovers of Japanese firms have transpired in each of the last four
years. American companies account for about half of these. While
not a very of the takeover field is a noticeable trend in Japan.
From 1986 through last year 226 Japanese companies become
foreign-owned.
Japanese firms used the trade surpluses to invest heavily in
overseas stocks, bonds, bank, loans, real state, and business
ventures. Beginning in the 1980s, many Japanese companies
established production facilities overseas, due to both the
increased value of the yen and growing resistance to Japanese
exports from Japans trading partners.
16
In general Japanese exports are consisted of manufactured goods
and imports of raw materials, food, and manufactured goods;
manufactures accounted for 93 percent of exports of compared
with 57 percent of imports in 2002 Japans leading exports include
general and electrical machinery, automobiles, chemicals, steel,
and textiles. Chief imports include machinery and equipment,
food, fuels, chemicals, ores and metals, and agricultural raw
materials.
As of the late 1990s, Japan had run a trade surplus (meaning its
exports exceeded its imports) every year since 1965, with the
exception of the oil shock years. In the 1980s and 1990s the size
of the surplus fluctuated up and down depending on the yen
exchange rate and the relative growth rates of Japan and its trading
partners.
17
The highest surplus was 4 percent of Japans GDP in 1986; the
lowest was 0.5 percent in 1996. In 1998 it was about 2 percent of
GDP. Japanese firms now produce more cars and consumer
electronics outside Japan than in Japan.
Foreign direct investment in Japan in 2002 registered as the
second highest on record next to 1999, jumping 48.1% from the
previous year to $92.5 billion. Investment from North America
decreased by 26.4% to $3.1 billion. This was due to the
investment recovery from Japanese subsidiary reorganization
carried out by US firms in December 2002.
U.S.A invested 657million yen in Japan in year 1999, and in the
year 2000, investment was 976million yen. In 2001 the amount of
investment of U.S.A was highest as compared to last few years i.e.
3,495 million yen and 2,564 million yen, respectively.
Meanwhile, Japan invested in U.S.A, 7094 US million dollars, in
the year 1999 proceeding year Japans investment in U.S.A was the
highest i.e. 14,112 million dollars.
18
In the year 2001 Japan invested
7,081 million dollars and in the years 2002, Japan invested 7,592
million dollars in United States of America.
Conclusion
While concluding it may be reflected that U.S. direct investment in
certain industries in Japan has been growing very rapidly.
Americas innovative strength in software is reflected in the area
tallying the largest number of U.S. investment activities in the last
year or so. (1997) liberalization of regulations restricting retail
trade has a positive effect in attracting American retailers and
merchandisers; they have been as innovative as software
developers in pioneering new approaches to marketing. If
deregulations continue as proposed by official rhetoric and in
political platforms, the prospects for profitable American direct
investment in Japan could be quite significant in areas as diverse as
finance, transportation, retailing and telecommunication.
Manufacturing of assembling goods at facilities in foreign
countries gave Japanese companies several advantages. The
companies were able to meet the foreign countries domestic
content requirements (which mandate that a certain percentage of
an item be produce within the foreign country), avoid quotas and
other restrictions, and in some cases, save money on land or labor
costs. Japanese firms now produce more cars and consumer
electronics outside Japan than in Japan.
In 1972 value of several Southeast Asian currencies fell sharply,
triggering an economic crisis in the region that affected Japans
trade balance. Japans exports to Southeast Asian countries fell
significantly, while its imports from these countries fell less
dramatically. Furthermore, as the Asian crisis developed, many of
Japans overseas investments proved unprofitable. Even though
Japans exports to other destinations continued to grow, the fall in
exports to Asia meant that, on a global, price-adjusted basis,
Japans exports in the fall of 1998 were down 2 percent from the
year before. At the same time, Japans ongoing recession caused its
imports to drop by 7 percent. The net result was that Japans
global trade surplus rose, but only because imports were even
faster than exports.
19
Therefore, the rising trade surplus did not
add any new economic vigor, it simply reflected economic
weakness.
Japan is an active member of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).
Population, and economic prosperity, the United States economy
can provide a higher quality of life for consumers and more
opportunity for business by trading with other nations. Foreign or
International trade enables the United States to specialize in
producing those goods that it is best suited to make ovens its
available resources. It then imports productions that other nations
can make more effectively, lowering prices of these goods for U.S.
consumers.
Non-agricultural products usually account about for 10 percent,
Machinery and transportation equipment make up leading
categories of exports. Other leading exports include electrical
equipments, Chemicals, precision instruments, and food products.
Beginning in the mid-1970s the nations imports of petroleum
from the Middle East and manufactured goods from Canada and
Asia (especially Japan) created a trade imbalance.
According to the views of US Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan one may understand that the world would have to
learn to live with high oil prices and their negative impact on
economic growth for some time to come . He said the recent
shutdown of US oil production and refinery facilities battered by
hurricanes was an accident waiting to happen . Although the
global economic expansion appears to have been on a reasonably
firm path through the summer months, the recent surge in energy
prices will undoubtedly be a drag from now on.
20
Greenspan told business leaders here. In the United States, Japan
and elsewhere, the effect on growth would have been greater had
oil not declined in importance as an input to world economic
activity since the 1970s, he said in a speech devoted to energy
issues.
We and the rest of the world doubtless will have to live with the
geopolitical and other uncertainties of the oil markets for some
time to come. Greenspan also said the impact of high oil prices
on economic growth and inflation was likely to be less severe than
during the 1970s oil price spikes. Taking into account inflation, the
average price of crude oil was still below the peak of February
1981 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, when oil hit the
equivalent of $75 a barrel in todays prices.
21
Oil is also only two-
thirds as important as an input in world gross domestic product
now as it was three decades ago, he noted. This meant the recent
surge in prices is likely to prove significantly less consequential to
economic growth and inflation than the surge in the 1970s .
22
There would be increases in oil efficiency in the rapidly growing
economies of East Asia along the lines of those seen in Japan, the
United States and Europe, he said. But as Chinas economy grows,
its rising oil consumption would offset energy efficiency savings
elsewhere in the world, Greenspan said, noting China uses
roughly twice as much, oil per dollar of output as the United
States. The price of crude hit an all-time record of $70.85 at the
end of August after Hurricane Katrina devastated production and
refining capacity in the Gulf of Mexico. Greenspan said that even
before this years hurricanes, world oil markets had been subject
to a degree of strain not experienced for a generation. Rising
demand and production constraints had wiped out significant
slack in supply that had contained oil prices between 1985 and
2000. These views express the latest reflection of US-Japan Trade
relations in a transparent way.
Reference
1
Edward J. Lin Colne, USJapan Trade Relations in 1990s, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1997, p.321.
2
Mastunduno, Michael, Setting Marketing Access Pirovities: The use of
Super 301 in US Trade with Japan. The World Economy, Vol.15 No.6,
November 1992, Washington D.C., pp. 729753.
3
Wood Robert Chapman, Japans Leading Imports Barriers are its Timing,
Houses Stories Policy Review, New York, 1987, p. 42.
4
Parkhas Aruind, U.S. National Security Export Controls: Implications for
Global Competitiveness of U.S HighTech Firms, Strategic Management
Journal, January / February, 1992, New York, pp.4766
5
Ostrom, Douglas USJapan Trade Relations: Bilateral Verses Multiletral
Options, Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 43 A, Tokyo, November 14,
1997, p.124
6
Simcon, Herman, Market Entry in Japan: Barriers, Problems and
Strategies, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Washington
D.C., 1986, pp.105116.
7
United States International Commission, Japans Distribution System and
Option for Improving U.S. Access, USITC Publishing No.2291, June,
Washington D.C., 1990, p.1125.
8
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 167, No. 31, August 5, 2005, Hong
Kong, p.10
9
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 167, No. 27, Hong Kong, July 8, 2004,
p.12
10
Facts and Figures of Japan, Foreign Press Centre Japan, Tokyo, 2004,
pp.8691
11
Hollerman, Loen, Japan and the United States Economics and Political
Adveraries, West View Press, Boulder, 1980, p.94
12
Klein, LawRence and Ohkawa, Kazushi, Economic Growth the Japanese
Experience Since the Meiji Era, United States of America, New York, 1998,
p.126.
13
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan Statistics, Tokyo, 2000,
pp.173175.
14
Kurt, Steincr, The Revision of the Crisis, The Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol.xxx, No. 36, August 10, 2005, Hong Kong, p.21
15
Zhang Yunlin, China-USJapan Relations in Transitions Social Science,
Publishing House, Beijing, 1997, p.211
16
Tariq Anwar Syed, The Impact of the Structural Impediments Initiative
on U.S.-Japan Trade Issues and Progress, Pakistan Management Review,
Pakistan Institute of Management (PIM), Islamabad, Vol. xxxiii No.34,
1992, p.163
17
Tung Rosalie, Global Orientation in the 21
st
Century in Robert Moran et.
al., Global Business Management in the 1990s, Beackman Publishing Inc.,
Washington D.C., 1990, p.113
18
Leonard J. Schoppa What America Pressure Can Do and Can not Do,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p.406
19
Hanns Gunther, Hil pert, Two American Views on Trade with Japan
Social Science Japan Journal, University of Tokyo, Vol5 No.1, April 2002,
p.26
20
Dawn, Karachi, October 19, 2005, www.dawn.com
21
Ibid.,
22
ITO, Takatoshi, The Japanese Economy, Combrige MIT, Press, Tokyo,
1992, p.44
SOUTHEAST ASIA: IMPACT OF
SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
Naureen Memon
Introduction
The name for the region Southeast Asia was first coined in the
20
th
century. It was previously known as Further India as
opposed to the Indian subcontinent. The Southeast Asia consists
of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
Southeast Asia has an area of approx. 4,000,000 km(1.6 million
sq miles). As of 2004, more than 550 million people lived in the
region. The distribution of the religions and people is diverse in
Southeast Asia and varies by country. Countries in mainland
South East Asia practices mainly Buddhism such as Thailand,
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Singapore's population
also largely practices Buddhism. In the Malay Archipelogo,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei are mainly Muslim. Christianity is
predominant in the Philippines and East Timor.
The Southeast Asian islands are one of the major source of world
petroleum supplies; the region is also a center for logging.
Southeast Asia has experienced great economic growth since the
1980s; Singapore was one of the four original "East Asian Tigers"
and in recent years Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand have often been considered a new brood of "tigers".
Tiger refers to the rapid growth of these economies. Much of this
growth has been driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) in local
industries; the money came from the U.S. and Japan and later
from international investment portfolios. This growth was
effected badly by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which
occasioned a period of more cautious, slower growth.
1
It was expected that the end of the Cold War will bring peace to
the world. Unfortunately, the miserable events in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and many more
shattered that hope by posing the most serious danger to national
and international stability.
3
Particularly, Southeast Asia
experienced a number of separatist movements and conflicts. For
instance, Moros conflict in the Philippines, Aceh movement in
Indonesia, and Muslim separatist movement in provinces of
Pattani, Yala, and Narithiwat in Southern Thailand. The demands
of these movements range from socio-economic and political
rights to regional autonomy to secession and independence. Some
of the more serious conflicts have witnessed human rights abuse,
created large number of refugees, and generated complex political
and humanitarian emergencies.
2
The separatist movements not only threaten the security of the
country of its origin but the region as a whole. As it results in
refugee flows, weapons flows, develop guerrilla bases, bring
terrorism, crimes and create insecurity in the region which
alternatively impacts the world peace. Separatist movement can be
defined as: the attempts to obtain sovereignty and to split a
territory or a group of people (usually a people with distinctive
national consciousness) from one another or (one nation from
another).
3
The success of a separatist movement encourages the other
separatist movements of the region directly or indirectly, to
follow the same activities and patterns of the violence to create
unrest in the particular country. Thus, they try to achieve targets
or fulfill their unlawful demands from the state. For instance,
independence to East Timor in Indonesia in 1999 encouraged
Moros in the Philippines to step up their war of independence.
4
The separatist movements in southern Thailand, the Philippines,
and Aceh represent the most visible signs of armed separatism in
Southeast Asia today. Some basic factors contribute to the ethno-
religious unrest in these regions like insensitivity to local concerns,
regional neglect, and military repression and forcible attempts to
impose uniformity of language and social behavior on entire
community. The purpose of the present research paper is to
review the separatist movements in Southeast Asia, particularly in
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines and to find out their
impacts.
The War in Aceh
Indonesia is the worlds largest archipelago in the Southeast Asia
having more than 17,000 islands. It has a land area of 752,400
square miles. It consists of more than 300 ethnic groups and 250
distinct languages. While the country is primarily agricultural, oil
deposits on the islands contribute to the economy as well.
Originally settled by the Dutch, Indonesia gained independence in
1949. At first a federation of individual states, Indonesia voted in
1950 to return to a republican form of government. Soon after
that, in 1953, Aceh was part of the Darul Islam rebellion, which
called for an Islamic state of Indonesia. Though this rebellion
didnt last long, it contributed to the feelings of resentment against
the capital in Jakarta that led to the founding of the Aceh
Independence Movement (Aceh Merdeka) in 1976.
The province of Aceh, rich in natural resources (oil and gas) and
with a population of around 5 million is located on the northern
part of Sumatra. Since Aceh was a Sultanate and not under Dutch
colonial rule, the Acehnese claim that it should not have been
included in the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. During the
Soeharto era, as a result of the unequal distribution of revenue
earned from the exploitation of the natural resources of this
province, the Free Aceh Movement known as Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka (GAM) came into being in 1976. The Indonesian
government has suppressed this movement for long with a heavy
hand through its military and with the help of its Anti Subversion
Law of 1963.
Economic jealousy is helping to keep alive the insurgency in this
province as wealth produced is among the highest while income
and consumption per person is perhaps among the lowest in the
national rankings. Though the insurgents may be fighting for an
independent Islamic state, economic inequality and regional
autonomy seem to be the major issue for the struggle. The
separatist rebels in Aceh pose the greatest internal security threat
in Indonesia. John B. Haseman stated it as the most serious
challenge to the territorial integrity of the Republic.
5
The Aceh movement gained sympathy and support from local
civilians as well as from the international community; since the
Indonesian army started public execution and murders of those
involved in Aceh movement. This unrest continued till the fall of
Soeharto regime in 1998.
After several unsuccessful ceasefire efforts, government of
Indonesia and GAM signed an agreement to end hostilities in
December 2002, facilitated by the Switzerland-based Henry
Dunant Centre, giving Acehnese greater autonomy. The
Government demanded that GAM withdraw its demand of
independence and accept the Special Autonomy Act, which gave
Acehnese a greater share of revenues from natural resources of
Aceh province.
6
This agreement couldnt bring peace to the country as
Government realized that GAM leaders consider this accord as the
first stage in their bid for independence. The GAM never stopped
pursuing a goal of independence in its propaganda and public
statements. The government never agreed to give Aceh separation
from Indonesia, as it did to East Timor. One of the reasons for
Indonesian reluctance to grant separation of Aceh when they have
given up East Timor is that Aceh is an area rich in oil giving
economic benefits to the Indonesia. For that reason most
Indonesians and political leaders support the military operations
and strongly oppose Acehnese demand of separation from the
republic. President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono who came into
power in 2004 is attempting to gain political settlement in Aceh
and might bring an end to separation demand by Acehnese by
both political as well as military means.
7
One of the aspects going against GAM is the attitude of
neighboring countries of this region regarding perceived
implications of Aceh independence. For example, Malaysia and
Singapore wont feel comfortable having in their backyard an
emerging Islamic state. Besides them, Australia and some Western
countries would feel their interests threatened in the straits of
Malacca, if Aceh broke off with Jakarta. Thus, there would be
great pressure from these nations against Aceh independence. The
success of East Timor might have inspired Acehnese to pursue
their struggle for self-rule, but international scenario has changed
after 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C.
World has become more cautious and to do anything to curb the
separatism with Islamic feelings.
Indonesia can never agree for secession of this province and it is
incorrect to compare Aceh with East Timor which was annexed
by Indonesia while Aceh was part of this nation from
independence. Hence, GAM cannot keep insisting on
independence but have to come to the negotiations table with the
commitment to remain part of Indonesia. While the Indonesian
government may have to strengthen the various aspects of the
provincial rule to make it a genuine autonomy and to formulate
adequate economic development plans. For this both sides have to
give in to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to get over the
impasse and usher in peace which has been eluding this state for
long.
Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand
Thailand's origin is traditionally tied to the short-lived kingdom of
Sukhothai founded in 1238, after which the larger kingdom of
Ayutthaya was established in the mid-14th century. Contact with
various European powers began in the 16th century but, despite
continued pressure, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country
never to have been colony of European power. A mostly bloodless
revolution in 1932 led to a constitutional monarchy. Known
previously as Siam, the country first changed its name to Thailand
in 1939. During that conflict Thailand was in a loose alliance with
Japan; after that Thailand became an ally of the United States. It
then saw a series of military coups d'tat, but progressed towards
democracy from the 1980s onward.
Thailand is exposed to the challenges arising from resurgent
extremism in its Muslim-majority provinces in the south. These
resurgent extremism centers on the activities of the Muslim
population in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narithiwat, which
constitute part of the form kingdom of Pattani. Thailands
Muslims are principally ethnic Malays and represent 3-5 percent of
the countrys total population.
8
Thailand is a devoutly Buddhist country. The secessionist by
Malay-Muslims has risen due to religious distinction coupled with
geographical remoteness. The southern provinces of Thailand are
economically underdeveloped as compared to rest of the country.
The Malay-Muslims also complain of few domestic religious
educational facilities and also demand the establishment of more
Islamic courts and Islamic banks.
Two Muslim separatist groups operate actively in Southern
Thailand: PULO (the Pattani United Liberation Organization) and
New PULO. PULO is operating in Southern Thailand since the
1960s with the goal to establish an independent Muslim state. It
consisted of more than 3,000 Muslim separatist fighters who have
waged a secessionist campaign since the 1970s. The group carries
out violent activities for its secessionist struggle and tries to gain
international support for Pattanis Malay Muslims. All the militant
insurgent activities are carried out by Pattani United Liberation
Army-a separate armed wing responsible for several bombs and
arson attacks against government establishments in the south.
PULO mostly attracts external support from northern Malaysia.
The Malaysian support to PULO was confirmed in 1997, following
an operation called Falling Leaves in Thailand which was
unlikely without Malaysian support. It created tensions between
Bangkok and Kuala Lampur. Thai government warned of
curtailing economic ties with Thailand if the support of PULO
didnt discontinue.
10
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Muhammad accepted the Thai governments offer of joint police
raids against secessionists believed to be hiding in northern
Malaysia in a fear that it might jeopardize Malaysia-Indonesia-
Thailand Growth Triangle (MITGT). This collaboration became
successful in shape of arrests of several PULO and New PULO
leaders in early 1998. As a result many PULO members gave up
the struggle and voluntarily joined government-sponsored
rehabilitation programme pledging to become active participants
in peaceful national development. But this development couldnt
end the armed separatism in the southern Thailand, as this part of
country is still underdeveloped, having less per capita income as
compared to other provinces of the country, and less Muslim
participation in the local business. These factors contribute to the
feelings of discontent and frustration, restricting the true growth
of country.
In 2004 there were attacks by Muslim separatists in Thailand's
three southern provinces; Muslims, who are in the majority in the
provinces, have complained of discrimination in education and
employment. The conflict there has been exacerbated by the
sometimes excessive response of the Thai police and military, and
the attacks continued into 2005.
9
Separatist Movement in the Philippines
The Philippines consists of archipelago of more than 7,000 islands
in Southeast Asia. With land area of 115,800 square miles and a
population of over 80 million. Economically, the country is
primarily agricultural, exporting rice and sugar, among other crops.
There is also fishing and mining of the many mineral resources of
the islands, but those industries are not as advanced. Influenced by
a history of Spanish and United States rule, the Philippines is the
only predominantly Christian nation in the region with 83%
Roman Catholics, 9% Protestants, 5% Muslim, and 3% Buddhist
and others religions.
The first Muslims came to the Philippines as traders from Malay
Peninsula and Indonesia in the 14
th
century to Sulu and Mindanao.
Through settlement and trading, influential Islamic communities
developed on those islands. Throughout the next few centuries,
the southern islands were home to a number of notable sultanates,
including the Sultanate of Maguindanao, which is said to have
ruled all the Muslims in Mindanao at one time.
When the Spanish conquerors arrived in the 16
th
century, their
initial efforts were focused on Luzon and the other northern
islands of what is now the Philippines. These were soon under
Spanish colonial control, and attention turned to Mindanao and
Sulu, but the sultanates there resisted Spanish rule successfully for
more than three centuries. The Spanish coined the term Moro to
refer to the Filipino Muslims, calling them after the Moors, the
North African Muslims who had once occupied the South of the
Iberian Peninsula.
10
After the Spanish-American War (1898) Manila came under U.S.
control, including the territories of Mindanao and Sulu. At the
time, the Filipinos had been fighting the War of Independence
against the Spanish. When the Americans replaced the Spanish, the
aggression of the freedom fighters turned towards the Americans.
To better handle this threat, the Americans signed the Bates Treaty
in 1899 with the Sultanate of Sulu, so that they would only have to
face the Catholic forces in the north. Under the treaty, U.S. was to
pay the Sultan and tribal chiefs for the right to occupy certain
lands. After World War II, it was decided that the Philippines
would be given independence. This first step towards
independence was a move to commonwealth in 1946, at which
point the question of whether Sulu and Mindanao should be
incorporated into the Philippines arose. While the majority of
Muslims on those islands protested against the planned integration,
they were ignored, partially because they were no longer
overwhelmingly the majority in those areas, due to an American
policy of aggressive settlement of Filipino Christians in formerly
Muslim-controlled areas. So, in 1946, Mindanao and Sulu were
incorporated into the commonwealth of the Philippines and
moved with the Philippines into independence on July 4
th
, 1948.
The separatist movements, in the southern Philippines, Centre
around the activities of the Moros the Muslims on the islands of
Mindanao and Sulu archipelago.The Moros have fought for
independence of the Mindanao-Sulu region for a long time
because of exploitative economic policies and uneven investment
flows, which benefits industries in the northern Philippines. Due
to this socio-political and economic reason, the separatist Islamic
insurgency in the southern Philippines has been fought since
1971.
11
In 1996, Moros succeeded in achieving partial autonomy and
established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao by an
agreement with government. The MNLF: the Moro National
Liberation Front, the largest of the Moro armed organization,
received a stake in the Philippines political process due to this
agreement. Two separatist groups remain active in Southern
Philippines: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). The main objective of the MNLF remains
the complete liberation of the Moro homeland; whereas the Abu
Sayyaf Group struggles for the establishment of an independent
and exclusive Islamic state in Mindanao.
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by
an alumnus of the University of Philippines named Nur Misuari
in 1972. He declared jihad against the government and gained great
support both from outside, and in Mindanao and Sulu. The
MNLF engaged in a civil war against Philippines Armed Forces
for the next 4 years claiming at least 100,000 lives. President
Marcos agreed to go to Tripoli to meet Misuari to negotiate an
agreement for ending the violence. The Tripoli Agreement
provided Mindanaos 13 provinces autonomy though not
independence. However, the peace didnt last long and violence
started again. Due to compromise between government and Nur
Misuari to bring an end to violence, a critical group separated
themselves from MNLF and created a more fundamentalist group
named Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). They never agreed
on any compromise on independence like Misuari did. Avoiding
dealing with the MILF, the government continued trying to
negotiate with the MNLF and Misuari, who they saw as more
reasonable and more willing to accept a compromise on
independence. But the conflict didnt end as Misuari lost popular
support of Mindanaos Muslims. Even his own men and the
MNLF soldiers refused to adhere to any agreement or ceasefire
and began bombing campaigns in the south. One particular group
that began to catch the notice of the international press was the
Abu Sayyaf, the Bearer of the Sword , a small, militant group that
had attracted some of the more extremist members of Misuaris
MNLF. ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) have been the group associated
with high profile kidnapping and ransom cases in the Philippines.
The government has attempted several times to resolve the
conflict but all in vain.
Misuari once again signed an agreement with government in 1996
that set up a Muslim Autonomous Region in Mindanao with
Misuari as the first Governor. It displeased both the Muslims and
the Christians in Mindanao and MILF publicly denounce the
agreement and stated that they would be taking over the Islamic
revolutionary movement. Violence has escalated since with such
incidents as the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings and beheadings.
12
Hence, it can be concluded that Mindanao-Sulu has long history of
separate state notion since the birth of the Philippines. It has
employed guerrilla tactics and violence in its campaign for the
creation of an independent democratic Islamic state.
International Terrorism and Southeast Asia
One of the major impacts of these conflicts in the Southeast Asia
is the U.S. pronouncement of this region as a second front in
global war on terrorism. All the militant groups in Southeast Asia
are condemned for having contacts with international terrorists
like Al Qaida. Many of the terrorists in Southeast Asia were
believed to be trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The MILF and
Abu Sayyaf Group are believed to have support from
fundamentalist Islamic organizations in a number of countries
including Egypt, Pakistan and Libya. Apart from financial
assistance they are provided with religious instructions and military
trainings.
Since Afghanistan war in the 1980s in which U.S-supported
Mujahidin guerillas fought the Soviet occupation have contributed
a lot in introducing new elements into terrorism in the region.
Some of the important factors are:
a) The Afghan experience is the main reason for bringing
radical Islamic separatism in Southeast Asia. The great
majority of Southeast Asias Muslims had moderate views
and was ready to live together with other religious groups
and secular institutions. However, the students from
madrasas (religious schools) of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
Afghanistan brought immense changes in the ideologies of
Muslims in this region. Many leaders of separatist
movements of Southeast Asia have trained or studied in
madrasas of countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan.
b) Islamic resistance in Afghanistan brought new dimension
to Southeast Asian separatist movements. Local groups
were provided with finances and assistance by well-funded
international movements.
c) Other factors contributing in bringing radical Islamic
separatism in this region are socio-economic factors. The
separatist groups have been denied of autonomy by
governments. The Asian financial crisis since 1997 played a
big role in making governments reluctant to give spending
in fields like education which encouraged the citizens to
rush towards religious schools.
d) Criminal activity like drug trafficking is on high scale in the
region and can assist resources movements by radical
groups.
13
International terrorism expert Rohan Gunantra argues that Al
Qaida is the major source of bringing new terrorism in Southeast
Asia. According to him, Osama Bin Laden has converted Islamic
resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan into a global jihad
against U.S. and its supporters. Osama Bin Laden was able to
create links with ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah members and created
a network of terrorists in Southeast Asia by providing financial
assistance and military trainings. Key Al Qaida operatives are
central actors fostering regional linkages between ASG, JI and
MILF.
Groups such as Mijahidin Council of Indonesia, Laskar Jihad,
Laskar Jundullah, Aceh Free Movement, Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, Pattani United Liberation Organization (both PULO and
New PULO) are declared as the regional terrorist groups and are
under the analysis of most of the regional security specialists. Due
to these groups Southeast Asia has become the epicenter of
terrorism globally.
14
It can be concluded that international terrorist groups like Al
Qaida exploited the economically deprived, politically instable and
socially discriminated parts of Indonesia (like Aceh province),
Thailand (such as Yala, Pattani, and Narithiwat) and the
Philippines Mindanao-Sulu region; and instigated separatist
movements in these regions against their governments by
providing military trainings and financial assistance.
Conclusion
It can be concluded from the above literature review that ongoing
internal conflicts have major potential economic and security
implications for the mentioned Southeast Asian nations
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. These conflicts have been
responsible for thousands of deaths in the past few years alone.
The conflict in province of Aceh in Indonesia has cost 15,000 lives
alone. Apart from huge cost in terms of human insecurity, internal
conflicts deter foreign investment and tourism. Continuing
conflicts may affect international trade with this region, create
security concerns in the form of refugees and affected sea-lanes.
These conflicts potentially have a number of serious implications
for Southeast Asia. These unresolved conflicts could possibly be
the cause of separation of the provinces from the countries of
their origin resulting in the creation of additional, possibly
unstable states lacking in resources and infrastructure.
The Aceh province in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, is subject to
civil unrest that can be traced back to the days of Dutch
colonialism, due to the country's wealth of natural resources. A
resistance group known as the Gerakan Aceh Meredeka (GAM), or
"Free Aceh Movement," was formed in 1976, comprised mostly of
Islamic fundamentalist rebels opposed to the uneven distribution
of revenue, and seeking independence for Aceh. As many as
15,000 Acehnese have been killed by the Indonesian military in the
years since the group's formation. In 2003 the area was placed
under martial law, until a year later when a State of Emergency was
declared until the tsunami occurred.
In the Philippines, Islamic fundamentalists, communist rebels and
indigenous tribal peoples have clashed violently with government
forces. In the southern Philippines islands (including Mindanao),
a sense of lawlessness has developed. In response, most people
who live on the islands carry guns with them at all times. More
than a few underpaid police and military officers supplement their
incomes by selling their own ammunition. Kidnappings of tourists
for ransom or for media attention by separatist groups have
become more common. Piracy is also a growing concern in the
waters off the Philippines. Many of the countries in Southeast
Asia are oil producers who rely heavily on secure shipping lanes
for their oil tankers.
Thailand that is exposed to the challenges arising from resurgent
extremism in its Muslim-majority provinces in the south, has seen
more than 800 people killed in last 19 months, creating more fear
among people of these areas. Moreover, the activities of Southeast
Asian terror network are raising serious continuing concerns.
Governments of all the countries of this region are making arrests
and trying to overthrow the establishments of the network, even
though the network is capable of continuing its extreme vision of
Islam and carrying out its activities. Thus, the presence of the
network remains serious threat to the regional security and
integrity.
This carnage against Muslims in Pattani will have significant
internal repercussions. The Thai government has thus far failed to
realize that heavy-handed security-based approaches result in
radicalizing oppressed communities and increasing popular
support for resistance groups. The US invasion of Afghanistan and
Iraq and the continuing presence of foreign troops in many
Muslim societies have already worked to radicalize the Muslim
community in Thailand and increase their awareness of global
Muslim grievances.
This increased awareness contributed to the Pattanese perception
that Thai oppression against them is part and parcel of a global
campaign aimed at suppressing Muslims worldwide. Last year,
reports indicated that the US was seeking to establish a military
base in Thailand to help government forces combat Muslim
separatists. If the US eventually takes an active role in suppressing
Muslims in the south, the global confrontation between Muslims
and the US will definitely widen. Moreover, the crackdown on
Pattanese Muslims may also have an impact throughout Southeast
Asia due to the multiple ideological and logistical linkages between
Muslim separatists operating in the region. Given recent US war
crimes in Iraq and Americas insistence on militarily confronting
Islamist groups throughout the world, Al-Qaedas ideology will
definitely become more prevalent among oppressed Muslims
worldwide.
The literature review of separatist movements in Southeast Asia
particularly Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines and their
impacts reveals that Southeast Asian separatist movements has
caused vulnerability to the region by making it haven for
international terrorism, has caused the deaths of thousands of
lives, affected international trade, created security concerns in the
form of refugees, and deterred foreign investment and tourism.
The governments of the respective countries need to improve the
circumstances of disadvantaged minorities. To avoid separatism
and to preserve the union of a particular state a special
constitutional arrangement with the regions in which separatism is
growing, is to be established. A confederation or commonwealth
should be settled for the republics or provinces that would like to
break away.
References
1
Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org
2
Ganguly, Rajat and Macduff, Ian (eds.), Ethnic Conflict & Secessionism in
South & Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions, Sage Publications Pvt.
Ltd., New Delhi, 2003, p.16.
3
www.answers.com/topics/separatism
4
Ganguly, Rajat and Macduff, Ian (eds.), op.cit., p.11.
5
Haseman, John B., Indonesia: A Difficult Transition to Democracy ,
in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek (eds.), Asian Security
Handbook: Terrorism and the New Security Environment, M.E.Sharpe, Inc.,
Armonk, New York, 2005, p. 130.
6
Abuza, Zachary, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder Co. U.S.A. 2005, pp.65-68.
7
Haseman, John B., op.cit., pp. 131-132.
8
Wincek, David G., Thailand: Resurgent Extremism and Other
Challenges , William M. Carpenter and David G. Weincek (eds.), Asian
Security Handbook: Terrorism and the New Security Environment, M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., Armonk, New York, 2005, p.295.
9
http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery;jsessionid=b6e4hlc6n5rv?
method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Thailand&gwp=8&curtab=
2222_1&sbid=lc04b
10
Haseman, John, and Angel, Rabasa, The Military and Democracy in
Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, www.rand.org/publications/
MR/MR1599/
11
Paul A., Rodell, The Philippines and the Challenges of International
Terrorism in Paul J. Smith (ed.), Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia:
Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,
New York, 2005, pp. 124-125.
12
Sirajul Islam, Syed, Ethno-Communal Conflict in the Philippines:
The Case of Mindanao-Sulu Region , in Rajat Ganguly & Ian Macduff
(eds.), Ethnic Conflicts & Secessionism in South & Southeast Asia: Causes,
Dynamics, Solutions, Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2003,
pp.206-207.
13
Frost, Dr. Frank; et.al., Current Issues, www.aph.gov.au/library/
intguide/fad/sea.htm
14
Carlyle Thayer, Back Issues, www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back
/journals/2003/vol29_4/5.htm
JAPAN S BID FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Murtaza G. Khoso
Introduction
In July 1993, the Japanese government stated, in an official
response to the UN Secretary Generals enquiry about Security
Council reform, that Japan is prepared to do all it can to discharge
its responsibilities on the Security Council
1
This was to be
followed by other similar statements which were meant to express
Japans candidature for a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council. Since that Japans quixotic quest for a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council has been pursued with more vigor than
success for close to four decades. Undeterred, Tokyo is pressing
harder than ever this year. It has formed a tactical alliance with
three other aspirants for permanent seats-Brazil, Germany and
India in the hopes of getting a General Assembly vote in
September this year on expanding both permanent and
nonpermanent seats. But the closer Japan gets to its cherished goal,
the higher the obstacles become and the more distant it begins to
appear. Chinese street demonstrations, United States recent
opposition to the Security Council expansion and the official
statements opposing this step suggest that Japan is nearer to, and
farther from, its goal then ever. Once again, the smart money says
that this will not be Tokyos year.
The start of this quest for permanent Security Council
membership is traced back to the beginnings of Japans post-War
foreign and multilateral diplomacy. Japan has long been keen to be
a permanent member of the UN Security Council but did not
express its desire explicitly. Since the beginning of the 1970s,
Japan has implied this desire through its call for the need to
reform the Security Council.
Kiichi Aichi, then Foreign Minister of Japan, in his speech to the
26
th
General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1971,
suggested that member states should not rule out the possibility of
reviewing the UN Charter and that the mechanism of the Security
Council was outdated and should be reformed.
2
In September
1976, Zentaro Kosaka, Foreign Minister at that time, in his speech
to the UN General Assembly referred specifically to the need for
restructuring the Security Council.
The United States has supported Japans desire to be included in
the Security Council but is not in the favour of any expansion to
the UN Security Council. In August 1973, when President Richard
Nixon and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka met, they announced a
joint communiquwhich stated that the United States supports a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council for Japan. This was
further endorsed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his
speech to the UN General Assembly. Again in 1977, Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda and President Jimmy Carter met and
announced a joint communiqu which stated that the United
States believed that Japan was qualified to be a permanent member
of the Security Council. However, this mood to expand the
permanent members of the Security Council and to support
Japans permanent membership faced a major setback by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which destroyed the atmosphere
of dtente. The P-5 vetoed many of the resolutions and the
Security Council went back to its states of paralysis. The tide for
restructuring the Security Council to include a permanent seat for
Japan as well as Germany has surged again in the 1990s.
Japan who was joined by Germany for seeking a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council now has two other partners India and
Brazil, the Group called G-4. When the United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan met with Japanese Foreign Minister
Nobutaka Machimura in Egypts Sharm el Shaikh last year he
asked whether the so called G-4 nations campaigning for UN
Security Council reform stands for the Gang of Four . No it is
the Gentlemens four , Machimura replied.
3
Japan will gear up its campaign to obtain a permanent seat on the
Security Council now that a UN panel has presented
recommendation to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on
reforming the World body. The report made two proposals on
Security Council reforms. One is to create six new permanent
members, but without veto power, while the other is to create
eight new seats whose occupants will serve four years, instead of
the current two, and can be elected for another term.
4
Japan is facing problems in its campaign for a seat on the United
Nations Security Council from her neighbors China, South Korea
and North Korea. Both South Korea and China are demanding
formal apologies and compensation for Japans past atrocities
during and before Second World War against Chinese and Korean
People. Chinas officially scripted mob protests against Japan in
April 2005 appeared designed to torpedo Tokyos bid to become a
permanent member on the UN Security Council.
This paper will examine Japans early UN Policy and also the
Security Council issue in its United Nations policy. The paper also
examined why Japan deserves the seat in the United Nations
Security Council and why its neighbors oppose Japans bid.
Japan and the UN
Yasuhiro Ueki argues that the Yoshida doctrine, which relied
heavily on the United States for security, maintained minimum
self-defense capabilities, and pursued economic gains, was too
successful to discard. Contrary to the official pronouncement of
the UN centrism or UN centered diplomacy , Japanese
diplomacy has been far from UN centric.
5
This view has been
shared by some in the US and in the international community to
the extent of labeling Japan a free rider of multilateral
institutions from GATT to the United Nations.
6
Japan, however, did not intentionally opt for free ridership in
multilateral institutions. On the contrary, its US drafted
constitutional restrictions against deploying Self Defense Forces
(SDF); personnel beyond its boundaries have made participation in
the UN security activities difficult. Parliamentary debate on peace
keeping operations has been full of soul-searching in an effort to
reconcile Japans past aggression with its future responsibility.
When the Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June
1945 in San Francisco, Japan was still at war. Japan following
World War II, aspired to be recognized as a legitimate citizen of
the international community. Membership in the United Nations
was perceived as a status symbol and a vehicle for Japans
readmission into the international community.
Admission to the United Nations was one of the highest ranking
and most urgent policies pursued by the Japanese government and
which began as early as the allied US led occupation period. The
preamble of the Peace Treaty of September 1951 says that Japan
declares its intention to apply for membership of the United
Nations. The combination of motives which drove the aspiration
to be admitted to the UN is complex and reveals interesting
insights into one of the main motives leading later to Japans bid
for a permanent Security Council seat as well as into one of the
main problems of this bid, that is the scope of Japans
contribution to the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO).
Major foreign policy goals are usually politically and
administratively supported by various constituencies of policy
makers with their own motivations. The main driving force for
admission to the UN was to gain an international cachet for
Japans re-entry into the world community and to restore Japans
prestige. Having become an outcast of international society,
notably in Asia, as a result of its role in the Second World War,
Japan saw UN membership as a means of overcoming this
situation. Membership was also to provide Japan with an
additional channel through which to convey its position on major
issues and promote its national interests. However, its
subordination to the US in its foreign and security policy severely
circumscribed the scope of only significant independent action in
the UN. At the same time, membership also provided the
opportunity to obtain information from outside the usual US
channels about world issues which affected Japans interest.
UN membership also had benefits for domestic politics which in
turn helped the government to forge a close security relationship
with the United States. It helped Japans leadership to bridge the
gap between the pacifist inclinations of a majority of the Japanese
public as epitomized in the so called Peace Constitution, and the
realist foreign and security policy of Japans conservative
leadership as epitomized in the Japanese American Security Treaty
of 1951. However, this help was to come at a cost which Japan is
still paying in terms of international acceptance of its Security
Council bid.
Before addressing this issue, one has to go back to the
deliberations about a new constitution in 1946.At that time
questions were raised in the Imperial Diet about the compatibility
between the renunciation of belligerence and the renunciation of
maintaining any kind of armed forces as proposed in the draft of
the new constitution, on the one hand, and the UN Charter, on
the other. The articles of the UN Charter referred to were Article
43, which mentions the provision of armed forces by member
states to the UN on the basis of a special agreement, and Article
51 which clarifies that the Charter is in no contradiction to the
inherent right of individual, and collective self-defense in case of
attack. On the issue of the true meaning of Article 9, Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1946 was adamant in stating that
Japan abandoned with this article the right of self defense.
7
But
notably leftist forces not only questioned the compatibility of the
new constitution with Article 43 of the UN Charter but, owing to
their strong pacifism, were even doubtful whether Japan should
get involved in the UN as an arena of power politics.
8
The
governments response on the issue of compatibility was
procrastination and prevarication. Prime Minister Yoshida
basically explained that the whole issue of Japans UN
membership should be left until that had been accomplished, since
retrieving national sovereignty and independence was the more
immediate and pressing objective.
9
Kanamori Tukujiro, minister
in charge of constitutional amendments, recommended similarly
that Japan had better study the problem related to the UN some
time in the future.
10
Foreign Minister Shidehara declared,
however, that Japan would have to enter appropriate reservations
to Japans candidature.
11
The issue of constitutional compatibility
was raised many times in the Diet later as well. In 1951, when the
Diet was deliberating the Security Treaty and the Peace Treaty
and questions were asked how Japan could discharge the
obligation to give the United Nations every assistance in any
action taken under the Charter (a promise contained in the
preamble of the Peace Treaty), the government replied that Japan
could do so within limits of Japanese Law.
12
This phrase was used
again much later in 1994. However, in the letter of application to
the UN of 16 June 1952, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo merely
stated that Japan accepted the obligations in the UN charter by all
means at its disposal without any reservations.
13
This was exactly
the phrase used in 1993 when the government for the first time
went public with the bid for permanent Security Council
membership, and before it was forced by domestic opposition to
revert to the reference of the Constitution in 1994.
Japan s UN Policy and the Security Council Issue
In the absence of access to the diplomatic papers documenting
Japans policy on the quest for permanent Security Council seat,
research at this time has to rely on public statements, newspaper
reports and interviews published in various magazines. Since the
issue was addressed only in an indirect way until the 1990s, it is
difficult to say when exactly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
established a policy to pursue a permanent Security Council seat at
least as a long term goal. The available evidence suggests, however,
that right from the start of Japans UN membership, a policy was
laid down to pursue a UN policy which would reinforce Charter
revisionist tendencies among the UN membership, promote in
various ways Japan as a major UN member and strengthen the
UN functions for keeping world peace. This policy was general
enough to get the support of most policy makers in the Ministry
as well as in the ruling party since its implementary policies which
were dear to or at least acceptable to a number of policy maker
constituencies. At the same time this general policy did not imply
any deadline while leaving open the goal of a permanent Security
Council seat. As we will see, the policy was also flexible enough to
allow variable momentum or the pursuit of only some of the
implementary policies at a given time, depending on external
circumstances or even on the enthusiasm of individual policy
makers. We thus find over time statements referring more or less
directly to the ultimate goal of a permanent Security Council seat,
as well as statements ignoring it. In sum, it was a policy which was
able to muster maximum consensus while allowing various policy
maker constituencies to have different ideas about its ultimate
finality.
Charter revisionism was almost universally acceptable, whether
implicitly or explicitly, as it can be taken for granted that the
enemy clauses were always unacceptable to most policy makers in
the Ministry as well as in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
particularly the early days since they were considered injurious,
discriminating and contrary to the very initial goal of UN
membership, that is reinserting Japan into the world community as
an equal member. Since Charter revision was needed to delete the
articles, moods and moves in favor of Charter revisionism had to
be encouraged even if this would only result in the deletion of
these articles and nothing more, and the agreement among policy
makers on Charter revision only extended that far. However, there
were also policy makers who did not care about addressing the
issue, either because they considered the enemy clauses redundant
and not worth investing any political capital in, or because calling
for their deletion might have hurt other policy goals. As a result,
there are periods where official statements did not address the
issue, or at least not directly. But it also became apparent ever the
years that some Charter revision might be necessary (and the
Japanese government pressed this point) to improve the peace-
making capability of the UN (emphasized since the 1960s), and
this had to aim particularly at the Security Council and its modus
operandi (for example, the veto power). Japan had to support the
movement to increase membership of the Security Council even if
it may have meant to many policy makers only increasing the
number of non-permanent Council members.
The second goal of turning Japan into a major member of the UN
also had some Charter revisionist implications. Apart from those
who promoted Japans bid for a permanent Security Council seat,
it was also supported by the constituencies which pursued the goal
for reasons of national prestige, implementing the goal of restoring
Japans status in the world, or strengthening Japans multilateral
diplomacy in order to provide some balance against Japans
overriding bilateralism with the US. The major relevant policies
concerned the improvement of relations with Asian countries and
the Third World by emphasizing Japans interest in development,
stressing Japans keen interest in disarmament, and making
constructive proposals for enhancing the ability of the UN to
maintain world peace. In order to promote Japan as a major UN
member, it became early on a policy goal to be elected as often as
possible to a seat on the major committees of the UN, in particular
the two most prestigious institutions of the UN, the Security
Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). One
former diplomat confirmed that this became an established policy
as early as the 1960s.
14
It is clear that such a policy could not but
enhance the credentials of Japans bid for a permanent Security
Council seat, whether the decision was initially only supported by
the non-bid constituency or not. At least some in the government
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already in the mid 1960s a
future candidature for a permanent Security Council seat in mind
when arguing for more UN activity, as is evident form the
following answer by Foreign Minister Ohira to a question at the
Upper House Budgetary committee on 6 March 1964:
With reference to the question of our country seeking permanent
membership in the Security Council, we are prepared to do our
utmost to realize this when it becomes apparent that the majority
of the nations favors this step and when the time is regarded as
opportune. Accordingly, we believe that it is essential that our
country should cooperate and should substantially increase its
contributions to the activities of the United Nations.
15
Japans foreign and security policy in the 1980s was very much
shaped by Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-7). While being a
fervent nationalist and speaking his mind about what Japans
status in the world should be, he worked closely with the US and
managed to smooth the relationship which was suffering from
conflicts about burden sharing and trade disequilibrium. Given
this nationalist credential and the determination in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to pursue the bid for a permanent Security
Council seat, it is surprising that seemingly no more happened on
this front.
However, Nakasone was indeed very much interested in the bid
and worked for it, but that the international environment was not
yet right and his strong US focused bilateralism prevented him
from putting more efforts at an earlier time into it. According to
the six volumes of the published Nakasone papers, he mentioned
the bid for permanent Security Council seat only once in a written
document, which he prepared for the LDP convention shortly
before he assumed the post of party president in November 1982.
In it he wrote that Japan should become a permanent member
because for a UN of peace (heiwa no kokuren) it was not appropriate
that only nuclear weapon states were permanent Security Council
members. He also noted that the enemy clauses were outdated and
should be deleted. For unknown reasons, however, he did not
mention these two points in his speech.
16
Two years later, it was
reported that Nakasone mentioned at the LDP meeting of the
national research committee (Jiminto zenkoku kenkyukai) that Japan
was the second biggest contributor to the UN and therefore had
no need to be shy.
17
Nakasone later confirmed himself his interest in the bid and the
deletion of the enemy clauses in an interview with his former
Foreign Ministry secretary:
Immediately when I became Prime Minister, I ordered the
Gaimusho, I think you (Kimi) know this as well, delete the enemy
clause! We have to become a permanent Security Council member!
I told the Gaimusho about these two ideas and to study them. But
the Gaimusho practically refused it. Then (I ordered) do the
enemy clause first! Consult with Germany about it, with Kohl that
is what I ordered the Gaimusho. The Gaimusho did not really
agree, and probably did not consult that much with Germany.
18
There are several reasons which account for the surprisingly
lukewarm reaction of the Gaimusho. First of all, there was certain
coolness by the Ministry towards Nakasone when he became
prime minister, and Hasegawa Kozutoshi even speaks of
antipathy.
19
Nakasone had never been foreign minister and
therefore had not developed a centric of Gaimusho officials. He
was also seen as a nationalist, which must have looked dangerous
for a bureaucratic institution like Gaimusho which wanted to
maintain control, proceed carefully and certainly not reinforce a
foreign image of Japans rising nationalism. Right at all the
beginning of his premiership; Nakasone must have confirmed all
the prejudices of the Ministry by engaging in direct diplomacy,
sending a personal friend, Sejima Ryuzo, to South Korea to
improve the bilateral relationship, thus circumventing the Ministry.
He also used private advisory committees which tended to
sideline the Ministry. The Ministry was also very much opposed to
Kose Shumichi, a harsh critic of the Ministry and rather
nationalistic prolific writer, but who was a close friend of
Nakasone. Kase was a strong proponent of the deletion of the
enemy clauses. Finally the main decision makers in the Ministry
considered Japans bid as not having very much chance at that
time owing to the opposition by the Soviet Union as well as by
France and the UK.
20
Secondly, Germany was not yet interested in demanding
permanent membership because of its national division and
concerns about negative consequences for its ostopolitic of taking
up the deletion of the enemy clauses. This was made clear to
Nakasone when he met Kohl.
21
In addition, even in the Gaimusho,
opinions were split on the wisdom of mentioning the issue of the
enemy clauses, which led Nakasone to abandon his intention to
mention the demand in his General Assembly speech in 1987.
22
Finally, and probably most importantly, Nakasone was almost
totally preoccupied by his efforts to put the bilateral relationship
with the US on a better foundation. The relationship was seen by
Nakasone in the 1980s at its worst in economic and political terms.
The domestic fallout from his predecessor (PM Suzuki) calling the
Japanese American security relationship an alliance (domei) had
resulted in a low point.
23
However, interest in a permanent Security Council seat was also
present in other parts of the LDP leadership of the time. In 1985
(May4-14) Fujio Masyuki, head of the LDPs Policy Research
Council (chosa kaicho), was sent as the prime ministers emissary
(shusho takushi) to Southeast Asia. During his meeting with
President Suharto, he asked for Suhartos support for Japans bid
for permanent Security Council membership. This request was met
by strong opposition in the local newspapers.
24
It is not quite clear
whether this was really Fujios own initiative without any input
from Nakasone. According to newspaper reports at the time, the
request for support was greeted by Nakasone.
25
However, Fujio
strongly insisted that his demarche had nothing to do with
Nakasone and the latter commented that he did not realize that
Fujio would take the issue up. The main purpose of Fujios trip
was to calm the fears of Southeast Asians about Japans
remilitarization in the wake of stronger military ties with the US
and the abolition of the 1 per cent ceiling on military
expenditures.
26
Towards the end of his premiership, Nakasone seems to have felt
in a stronger position to pursue the bid. Not only had the Japanese
American relationship considerably improved (for example the
existence of the so called Ron-Yasu relationship), but Japan had
played a constructive role as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council 1987-88 in the ending of the Iran-Iraq War.
27
This was only marred by the fact that Japan had achieved this sixth
term with a mere four votes more than required and this was most
likely because of Prime Minister Nakasones slanderous statement
about ethnic groups in the US which, together with Japans shaky
support of the UNs anti-Apartheid policy, made many Third
World countries vote for India, the other Asian candidate.
28
On
the other hand Nakasone showed his interest in the UN by giving
a speech to the General Assembly not only in 1985 on the
occasion of the 40
th
UN anniversary but also in 1987. In his
speech in 1985, Nakasone referred carefully to the Charter revision
in the context of mentioning Foreign Minister Abes proposal
about the establishment of a Wisemens Group, saying merely we
must not shrink from the task of continually reviewing and
improving the functions of our United Nations in order to
maximize its effectiveness.
29
In the case of his 1987 speech he had
originally planned to refer more strongly to the need of UN
reform, and of the role of Japan and Germany in it still being
suppressed, but he was talked out of it by a senior diplomat of
the Ministry.
30
Instead, he revived the slogan of UN centrism as
being one of the pillars of Japans diplomacy and urged constant
reform in view of the increased number of member states.
31
But Nakasones most surprising effort to promote Japans bid for
a permanent Security Council seat was undertaken in 1987 when
he asked President Reagan at the G7 meeting in Venice that Japan
should be treated as a permanent member of the Security Council
in order to join talks among the five permanent members for
ending the Iran-Iraq War. The Japanese had earlier conveyed this
idea to US Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur when he
visited Japan at the end of May 1987. At that time Nakasone had
also met Sigur.
32
The US reportedly basically agreed to the
proposal but nothing ever followed from it, nor was the idea
followed up by the Japanese side.
33
There was no US enthusiasm
for opening the Pandoras Box. For Nakasone the quasi was an
alternative (hitotsu no sentaku shi) to the seemingly unachievable
permanent Security Council membership.
34
The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, however, was not very keen on the proposal since
it meant making a concession on the character of Japans future
permanent Security Council seat, considering such a proposal only
as a fall back position.
35
It is not clear where the idea for this new category of a permanent
Security Council member had come from, but it was an idea which
had been floating in the UN reform debates since the 1950s.
36
It is
strongly reminiscent of the American proposal of quasi UN
membership (that is without voting rights) between 1953 and
1954 to overcome Soviet opposition to the admission of 14
Western countries to the UN. In 1954, Japan (together with Korea
and Jordon), had finally accepted such a compromise despite
strong initial objection to such a second class status and fear of
delaying full membership.
37
It is not also clear what exactly was
meant by quasi permanent Security Council membership, but
almost likely it was to mean that certain countries would be
continuously on the Security Council, thus not applying Article 23,
para.2. This, however, would also have required a revision of the
UN Charter. In its opinion to the Secretary General in 1972,
Canada refers to such semi-permanent members.
38
Wherever
Nakasone and his advisers had picked up the idea, it was soon
abandoned since Nakasones successors were not very interested
in investing political capital for the quest for a permanent Security
Council seat, and the Bush administration was even more reluctant
about UN reform.
During the period from 1960s to the end of the 1980s, the
confrontation between the East and the West and Japans US
focused bilateralism did not allow an open and explicit candidature
for a permanent Security Council seat. At the same time, these
factors did not prevent the pursuit of policies which not only kept
the issue alive, but actually prepared the ground for pursuing an
open candidature for the time when circumstances would be
judged more conducive, as Ohira had put it already in 1964. These
policies were aimed at making Japan a major UN member and at
setting into motion a movement resulting in the review and
ultimately revision of the Charter. These policies were general
enough to find early on a broad consensus in the bureaucracy. At
the same time, there were always bureaucrats and political leaders
willing to promote the bid in a more explicit way. However, the
two highest ranking politicians who were keenest on a permanent
Security Council as well as on the deletion of the enemy clauses,
Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi and Prime Minister Nakasone, were
after all too much involved in their bilateralist agenda to invest
more efforts in promoting the bid. Despite these ups and downs,
one can assume from interviews that, some time during the mid
80s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had achieved some consensus
about the two goals of making Japan a major UN member and
pursuing Charter revisionism to be no longer an end in itself with
some vague hope of permanent membership in the distant future,
but to obtain a seat in the not too distant future. However, it
would take until 1989-90 before the means to do so were agreed
upon.
The Security Council Reform
Efforts to reform the Security Council have been underway since
January 1994 in a special organ set up under the General Assembly,
called the Open Ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of
the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security
Council. But the deliberations have failed to make headway, and
the working group ended its decade of talks without coming up
with any clear prospect for implementation of the Council reform.
When established, the United Nations had 51 member states and
the Security Council had 6 nonpermanent seats. When it was
decided in 1963 to increase the number of nonpermanent seats to
10 (became effective in 1965), the total UN membership stood at
112. Since then, the number of members has risen to 191, while
the number of seats on the Security Council for nonpermanent
and permanent has remained fixed. The resulting shrinkage in
chances for UN member states to participate in the Council is
another major reason for the widespread for reform more
specifically, for expansion of the Council.
TABLE 1
Ratio between Members of the United Nations
and Members in the Security Council
Year
UN
Members
Security
Council
Permanent
Members
Non
permanent
Members
1945 51 11 5 6
1965 115 15 5 10
1996 185 15 5 10
2004 191 15 5 10
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/un/reform/index.html).
TABLE 2
Geographical Distribution of
the Security Council Seats
Regional Group
Number
of
Countries
Number of
Non
permanent
seats
Number of
Permanent
seats
Asia 48 2 1 (China)
Africa 53 3 0
Central and Latin
America
33 2 0
Western Europe and
others
27 2 3 (US,
UK,
France)
Eastern Europe 20 1 1 (Russia)
/policy/un/reform/index.html).
At the moment, the United Nations Security Council has only five
permanent members, the so called P-5, and the Security Council is
represented by the major victors of the World War II. These P-5
members are the United States of America, Great Britain, Russia,
France and China. There is no great difference among the
permanent members when it comes to using their veto power to
push the deliberations of the Security Council in a direction that
suits them. For example, the real reason for Chinas 1999 veto of
an extension of the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia is
widely regarded as having been Macedonias establishment of
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And in 2002 Washington used
its veto to prevent the International Criminal Court for having
jurisdiction over cases involving US soldiers.
Such behavior by the permanent members reveals the limits of the
Security Council as a forum for the pursuit of international
coordination. But this is a reality to which we must not close our
eyes, clinging to an illusive view of the Council.
The UN panel has presented its recommendations to Kofi Anan
on reforming the world body. The report made two proposals on
the Security Council reform. One is to create six new permanent
members, but without veto power, while the other is to create
eight new seats whose occupants will serve four years, instead of
the current two, and can be elected for another term.
39
The deliberations on the Security Council reform have failed to
lead forward an agreement because the interests and intensions of
the countries involved differ significantly on three key questions,
namely, how large an expanded Council should be, what countries
should be selected to be new permanent members and how, and
what should be done about the veto.
On top of that, the fact that the working group operates on a
consensus basis has stood in the way of progress, because this rule
has made it possible for a minority to block approval of motions.
Consequently, a group of no more than 20 countries that have
been advocating a cautious approach toward reform, particularly
such countries as Italy and Pakistan that oppose the expansion of
permanent membership for their own particular reasons have been
able to manipulate the course of the working group proceedings.
But that is as it may, my personal assessment is that an agreement
on the size of an expanded Security Council is within reach,
because Washington, which had adamantly opposed expansion
beyond 21 seats, announced in 2000 in response to persuasion
from Tokyo its willingness to consider a slightly larger number of
seats. With this, it now seems likely that an agreement can be
reached on a number in the vicinity of 24, which is what Japan
and other countries like Britain, France and Germany have been
proposing.
With a view to make a reformed Council more representative of
the present day world, Japan has been proposing doubling the
number of permanent seats to ten with two of the additional five
seats going to major industrialized nations Japan and Germany and
the remaining three going one each to Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. The hot favorites for these three seats are Brazil and
India, while third seat might go to Nigeria or South Africa.
The African Union also demanding some seats in the expanded
UN Security Council. Without support from the African Union,
the G-4 plan to expand the Security Council does not have the
required two-third majority and a compromise on the African
Unions plan is difficult because African group wants to add
permanent members with veto rights, where as, the G-4 in its
resolution has put off the veto issue for 15 years.
40
African Union
on 14 July 2005 already submitted a resolution calling for
increasing the permanent membership of the UN Security Council
by six, including two from Africa with veto rights, and additional
nonpermanent members.
41
The allocation of permanent seats to countries from the
developing world is also necessary in order to secure the approval
of two-thirds of the entire UN membership that will be required
for revision of the UN Charter to implement the Council reform.
Among the present permanent members, however, reluctance to
give a veto to new permanent members from the developing world
runs deep, and this sentiment carries weight, because revising the
Charter requires approval and ratification by all of the permanent
Council members.
Since the year 2005 will also make an important juncture as the
fifth anniversary of the Millennium Summit, it would be possible
to characterize the 2005 Summit as an opportunity to review the
progress towards achievement of the agenda set forth in the
Millennium Declaration adopted at the 2000 Summit. It would
thus offer a natural way of creating a political opportunity to give
momentum for progress towards the goal of strengthening the UN
particularly toward the reform of the Security Council, which was
stressed in the Millennium Declaration.
With regard to what will have to be achieved at such a summit, it
is most important to reconfirm the key issues as identified by the
reform debate to date and to give the working group a mandate to
find solutions for them within a defined time frame.
It is also important for the summit to change the modus operandi
of the working group from the existing consensus based approach
to a rule that matters be decided by a two-thirds vote of the
countries in attendance and that procedural matters be decided by
a simple majority. Since it is evident, as noted above, that the
consensus approach has prevented the reform debate from
progressing, this change in decision making procedures alone
would help move the reform debate forward.
The United States of America, which is main supporter of Japans
bid for becoming a permanent member on the UN Security
Council, wants some delay in the Security Council reform. In a
telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Nobutaka
Machimura, the American Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
urged Tokyo to refrain from submitting the resolution too early.
There would be confusion if it is submitted too early and if the
resolution is submitted in haste, we would have to oppose it , a
senior Japanese ministry official quoted Rice as telling
Machimura.
42
Although the United States has publicly voiced support for Japans
candidacy to become a permanent Security Council member, it is
widely believed to be reluctant to expand the membership because
it could make consensus-building harder. Some argue that the
United States does not want any expansion in the UN Security
Council. John Bolton, the ambassador of the United States of
America to the UN remarked, If I were doing the Security
Council today, I had only one permanent member (the US)
because that is the real reflection of the distribution of power in
the world.
43
The critics further argue that the United States will
not participate in an institution whose purpose is to limit its
power.
44
However, the Security Council reform not only needs two-third
majority support in the General Assembly but it also needs
backing of all five permanent members of the UN Security Council
including the United States.
Why a Seat for Japan?
Within Japan some still question the idea of seeking a permanent
seat on the Security Council, but at the United Nations the
majority view is that Japan should naturally become a permanent
member if and when the Council is reformed. The only outright
opponents are Japans East Asian neighbors. China has said
nothing before Tokyos approval of the history text books but
recently it is opposing Security Council enlargement.
45
Though
China should not stand in the way if a majority were to back Japan
at the stage of implementing the reform.
There are few reasons for Japan to seek a permanent seat on the
Security Council: first to secure greater say in international
politics, second to transform the United Nations from a post
World War II organization to an organization befitting the 21
st
century. Furthermore, Japan has global perspective as an economic
super power; Japan is sympathetic to the plight of developing
countries as a leading provider of official development assistance
(ODA). Japan is a non-nuclear power, so can play a big role
towards disarmament. Japan also is an Asian Democracy where
one can not find any crime ratio, and more than all Japan pays 20
per cent of the total UN budget.
46
Japan also has taken an active
and constructive role in the maintenance of international peace
and security. Japan has contributed to the international community
in many fields including consolidation of peace and nation-
building, human security, disarmament and non proliferation.
A representative example of Japans international contributions is
its humanitarian and construction assistance in Iraq. It is critical
not just to the Middle East but to the world as a whole that Iraq
not become a breeding ground for terrorism, but be rebuilt into a
peaceful and democratic state. Japan is doing its part to make this
a reality by providing aid and making humanitarian contributions
through its Self-Defense Forces. Japan decided to provide a total
of $ 1.5 billion in grant aid in Iraq
47
and has placed priority on
improving public security and rebuilding the local infrastructure
on which the Iraqi people depend, including such areas as
electricity, education, water and sanitation, and healthcare. The
SDF troops that have been dispatched to the area around
Samawah in the southern part of the country are helping in
numerous ways, such as by providing medical care, supplying clean
water, and repairing and building schools and other public
facilities.
The fact that Japan is actively fulfilling its responsibilities as a
member of the international community in the reconstruction of
Iraq lends weight to the Japans case that it should become a
permanent member of the Security Council. Japan is also
emphasizing the humanitarian contributions it has made in
Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of
Congo), the Golan Heights, and East Timor.
Because of the size of its economy and other factors, Japan is
required to pay nearly 20% of the UN budget, more than the
combined percentages of the all permanent members of the
Security Council aside from the United States. Tokyo holds that
the provision of this large amount of funding entitles it to have its
voice heard and that the nation is meeting the necessary conditions
for participation in the decisions of the Security Council. In 2005
the United States is paying a share of 22% of the UN budget,
while Japans share is the second highest at 19.46%. Looking at the
permanent members of the Security Council aside from the United
States, Britain and France pay more than 6% each, China just over
2%, and Russia just 1.1%.
48
Budget Contributions by P-5 + Japan to the United Nations
/policy /un/reform/index.html).
With this kind of role the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi is very optimistic about permanent membership on the
United Nations Security Council, we believe that the role that
Japan has played provides a solid basis for its assumption of
permanent membership on the Security Council.
49
Clearly making
such country a permanent member would have some effect on the
Security Council.
Opposition by Neighbours
Since the reform of the Security Council requires two-third
support in the UN membership and support from all the P-5
members, Japan hardly needs to convince its neighbors for its
desire. China previously was silent on the issue but the approval of
history textbooks from Japan and anti-Japanese street
demonstrations in China and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizmis
regular visits to Yasukuni Shrine have worsened the situation.
The confrontations between Japan and China in their relations are
historical. During its colonization period the Japanese badly
mistreated Chinese people and before and during the World War
II, the Japanese forced Chinese people to work under worst
conditions and used Chinese and Korean women as sex slaves for
the Japanese soldiers fighting in the War. The China always
demanded formal apologies from Japan for its past atrocities, but
Japanese always denied doing that because if Japan officially
apologizes they will be asked to compensate for that historical
mistreatment to the Chinese people. The situation became even
worse when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizmi decided to visit
Yasukuni Shrine where Japans soldiers are buried and also those
15 to whom the world and particularly Chinese consider the war
criminals.
Meanwhile, when Japan approved history textbooks which
according to critics whitewashed Japans militaristic past, resulted
in massive anti-Japanese protest in China. The protesters also
damaged Japanese embassy in Beijing. Japan hardly made a
diplomatic protest over a violent rally outside its embassy and
demanded an apology, but China refuses to apologize. The
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told his Japanese
counterpart that the Chinese government has never done anything
for which it has to apologize to the Japanese people.
50
The
relations which have fallen to their lowest point because of
territorial dispute, Chinese boycott of Japanese products and
Tokyos approval of new history text books can block Japan to
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Not only China but all Japanese East Asian neighbors are
considering Japans bid for becoming a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council very seriously, because of Japans
mistreatment to the region before and during the World War II.
North Korea clearly opposed Japans bid through a letter to the
UN Secretary General Kofi Anan by their ambassador to the UN
Pak Gil Yon. The North Korean ambassador called Japans bid a
military threat to the region.
51
Japans permanent membership of
the UN Security Council can not be tolerated at all as it
contravenes the main mission of the United Nations, considering
its past crimes against humanity, todays revival of its militarism
and threats to neighboring countries , Pak Gil Yon further wrote
in his letter.
52
Though South Korea and Japan not only both are frontline allies
in the region but also are partners in their efforts to end the North
Korean nuclear programme but South Korea never compromised
with Japan on its past atrocities and continued diplomatic struggle
in order to force Tokyo for an official apology. South Korean
President Roh Moo Hyun urged Japan to consider making a fuller
apology for its brutal occupation of the Korean Peninsula.
53
First
time since taking office in 2003 President Roh hinted that Seoul
may want to reopen a 40 year old pact on compensation as he
criticized Japan for the way it has expressed regrets for the 1910-
45 colonization.
54
Japan not only beware of the Koreans for its bid but also hardly
needs healthy relations with China in order to receive Chinese
support both in General Assembly as well as in the Security
Council.
As the quotes from Prime Minster Koizumi and Secretary of State
Rice Highlight, this is quest for honor as much as seat at a table.
55
That goal cannot be achieved without the support of Japans
neighbors, the one peace of the puzzle Tokyo-and only-Tokyo-can
define through its words and deeds. Japan is winning its global
campaign for acceptance, but all those efforts will mean little if it
fails to confront its past and heal its historic wound with its
neighbors, Japan has more at stake than the other aspirants. Its
neighbors realize this and are placing a high but not unreasonable,
premium on its quest. Now Tokyo must decide whether it is
prepared to pay the political price not just for the seat, but for the
larger goal of reconciliation, healing, and the honor that will come
with them.
Conclusion
Japans bid for a permanent Security Council membership over
four decades reveals an interactive network of motivations,
achievements and opportunities, with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in the central role of promoter. The desire of recognition
for the achievements of its multilateral diplomacy in the wake of
having become the worlds second largest economic power has
further fuelled this ambition. While Japans bid has thus widely
won support from many UN member states, the intrinsic problems
of Security Council reform have so far prevented any
breakthrough.
The imminent cuts in the ODA as a result of the economic crisis
slightly reduced the strength of the financial rationale for the bid,
although Japans assessed contribution continued to tower above
that of all other countries, except the United States. One can
expect that politicians will partly justify these cuts with the failure
to achieve permanent Security Council membership, and make the
cuts in the multilateral aid rather than bilateral aid. Japan clearly
declared on 27 July 2005 that it could face strong public pressure
to cut off its contribution to the UN if it fails to win a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council.
56
Such a procedure will not
necessarily improve Japans reputation in view of the UNs
experience with US arrears, although this will not count much in
the parochial system of Japans domestic politics. However,
Japans policy makers should be aware that such a vengeful
reaction will reinforce the perception which has gradually been
spreading since the economic crisis became more acute in 1997
that Japans power has reached at its peak. Jeffery Lauranti also
made the point that Japans permanent Security Council
membership would hurt the national interests of the developing
countries because Japan would no longer need court them
periodically for nonpermanent membership elections.
57
The worst outcome of the present stalemate would be for Japan to
revert to passivity and isolationism that would endanger relations
with its Western partners and many other countries which expect
more Japanese international burden sharing, but would also
deprive Japans diplomacy of an increasingly important tool.
Japans growing multilateralism should not become hostage to a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to the quest for
the illusive goal of international justice based on quid pro quo for
international burden sharing. Now when China and the United
states unanimously declared that they will prevent any expansion
of the United Nations Security Council
58
, and African Unions
decision not to withdraw from veto right, the Japan along with
other G-4 countries not expect too much hopes from the
Millennium Summit this year.
However, Japans effort in this regard throughout its bid is
appreciable in compare to other permanent seat seeking countries.
According to Pakistans former Minister of State for Foreign
affairs Inam ul Haq that if Japan fails to achieve a seat on the
United Nations Security Council no any other country will be able
to achieve it.
59
References
1
Views of the Government of Japan on the Equitable Representation on and
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council ( General Assembly
Resolution 47/62), 6 July 1993, in Security Council Reform: Basic Documents,
Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN Policy Division, 23 January 1996.
2
Speech by Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi to the 26th General Assembly of the
United Nations, September 18, 1970. (www.mofa.go.jp)
3
Japan to accelerate push for permanent UNSC seat , The Japan Times, Dec 3,
2004.
4
Ibid.
5
Yasuhiro Ueki, Japans UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism,
in Gerald L.Curtis (Ed), Japans Foreign Policy: After the Cold War, M.E. Sharpe,
New York, 1993, p.347.
6
Quoted in Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of
Multilateralism, MacMillan, London, 1999, p-54.
7
Report of a study group set up by the Japanese Association of International
Law, prepared for the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, Japan and
the United Nations , Manhatan Publishing Co., New York, 1958, p.17.
8
Ibid., Chapter 11.
9
Koji Sato, The Pursuit of the Principle International Cooperation in the
Constitution of Japan , The Japanese Journal of International Law, Vol.36, 1993,
pp.13-14.
10
Ibid., p.15.
11
Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN, Routledge, London, 1997,
pp.57-58.
12
Ibid., p.81.
13
Defining UN Security Role Problematic for Japan , The Japan Times,
October 20, 1990.
14
Interview conducted by Reinhard Drifte the author of Japans Quest for a
Permanent Seat on the UNSC:A Matter of Pride or Justice, MacMillan Press, London,
2000, p.20.
15
The Diplomatic Theses and Documents of Dr Morinosuke Kajima, Tokyo, Japan
Times Ltd, 1969, p.11.
16
Nakasone Speeches, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (www.mofa.go.jp).
17
Nakasone Shusho no koen no yoshi , (Girst of PM Nakasones speech),
Yamiuri Shimbun, 18 September 1984.
18
Interview with Nakasone Yasuhiro by his former private secretary from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a
Permanent Seat on the UNSC:A Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.47.
19
Remarks by Hasegawa Kazutoshi, 7 April 1998, quoted in Reinhard Drifte,
Japans Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC:A Matter of pride or Justice, op.cit.,
p.47.
20
Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1985.
21
Interview with Nakasone Yasuhiro by Ambassador Hasegawa Kazutoshi,
February 6, 1993.
22
Quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC: A
Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.48.
23
Ibid., p.48.
24
The Japan Times, May 9, 1985 and Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 1985.
25
Ibid.
26
Interview with Nakasone Yasuhiro by ambassador Hasegawa, February 6,
1993 quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC:
A Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.49.
27
Robert Immerman, Japan in the United Nations , in Craig Garby and Mary
Brown Bullock (eds), From Japan: A New Kind of Super Power?, Woodrow Wilson
Centre Press, Washington DC, 1994, p.188.
28
A Greater UN Role for Japan , The Japan Times, Oct 29, 1986. On
Nakasones statement see William Wetherall, Nakasone Promotes Pride and
Prejudice , Far Eastern Economic Review, February 19, 1987, pp.86-87.
29
Statement by Prime Minister Nakasone, October 23, 1985. (www.mofa.go.jo).
30
A senior Japanese diplomat quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a
Permanent Seat on the UNSC:A Matter of Pride or Justice, op.cit., p.49.
31
Statement by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, 21 September
1987(www.mofa.go.jp).
32
According to Nakasones published six volumes, he met Sigur on May 28,
1987 from 11:22am to 11:55 am, Nakasone naikaku shi, shiryohen.
33
Japan Eyes Seat with Big Five for Gulf Talks , Daily Yomiuri, June 8, 1987.
34
Interview with Nakasone Yasuhiro by Ambassador Hasegawa Kazutoshi,
March 31, 1988 quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a Permanent Seat on
the UNSC: A Matter of Pride or Justice?, op.cit., p.49.
35
A senior Japanese diplomat said on November 20, 1997 quoted in Reinhard
Drifte, Japans Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UNSC: A Matter of Pride or Justice?,
op.cit., p.50.
36
For details, see Juka Shihvo, Pandoras Box: Reviewing the Composition of
the UN Security Council in the Light of the British and French Experience
1945-1963 , Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol.66, 1997, p.283.
37
Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 1979.
38
UN Document A/8746 August 22, 1972, p.10.
39
Japan to Accelerate Push for Permanent UNSC Seat , The Japan Times,
December 3, 2004.
40
Dawn, July 18, 2005.
41
The Japan Times, July 15, 2005.
42
Japans UNSC Bid Dealt Below by U.S. , The Japan Times, June 8, 2005.
43
The New York Times, March 9, 2005.
44
Thomas G.Weis, The Illusion of the UN Security Council Reform , The
Washington Quarterly , Autumn 2003, p.155.
45
Dawn, August 5, 2005.
46
Reform of the UN Security Council: Why Japan Should become a
Permanent Member , March 2005, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
(www.mofa.go.jp/UN Reform).
47
Hanaoka Nobuaki, Japans Case for a Permanent Seat , Japan Echo, Vol.32,
Special Issue 2005.
48
Ibid.
49
Address by the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the 59th session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations on September 21, 2004.
50
The Guardian Weekly, Vol.172, No.18, April 22-28, 2005.
51
Daily Times, March 10, 2005.
52
Ibid.
53
Daily Times, March 3, 2005.
54
Ibid.
55
Quoted in Edward C. Luck, Tokyos Quixotic Quest for Acceptance , Far
Eastern Economic Review, Vol.168, No.5, May 2005, p.10.
56
Dawn, July 29, 2005.
57
Quoted in Reinhard Drifte, Japans Quest for a Permanent UN Security Council
Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? op.cit., p.197.
58
Dawn, August 5, 2005.
59
The Views of Pakistans former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Mr InamulHaq quoted in a workshop held in the Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad, May 20, 2005.
ETHNIC AND COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN WEST
KALIMANTAN: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Mukesh Kumar Khatwani
Introduction
The four province of West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South
Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan are situated on the island of
Borneo. The island boosts what has been one of the largest
rainforest in the world. Indigenous Dayaks constituted around
forty per cent population of Kalimantan and settlers from the
island of Madura under five per cent while remainders are
constituted by Javanese, Burgis and other settlers
1
. Kalimantan
makes up some 30.37 per cent of the countrys total land area
accounts for only 5.49 per cent of the countrys total population or
with an average of 20 heads per sq km.
In West Kalimantan, the Dayaks are an indigenous people. The
term Dayak is a collective and often confusing term for hundreds
of groups on the island of Borneo related to one another by
language or culture. It is the term that these groups and
government use to define their ethnicity, so they are Dayaks as
opposed, for example, to Malay, Javanese or Chinese. Most of
Dayaks in West Kalimantan are sedentary Swidden (slash and burn)
farmers who produce rice but continue drive a substantial part of
their livelihood form rainforest products, including tree crops such
as durian (a fruit) rubber and resin. They are predominantly
Christian and Catholic Church in particularly provides strong
institutional network in the area but also hold strong animist belief.
The Madurese (who are Muslims) first came in West Kalimantan
in small numbers around the turn of century, with their number
increase in the 1930s and 1940s, when they are brought in as
contract of indentured labour to clear forests and start up
plantations. They have been arriving in considerably greater
number from 1970s onwards. Many Madurese in urban areas work
in cheap transport ( river crossing ferries, pedicabs) and as coolies,
drivers, stevedores, day labourers or petty traders, with Madurese
women selling fruits ad vegetables; in the countryside most are
wetland rice farmers. They are stereotype throughout Indonesia as
being coarse, violent and dishonest; many Dayaks say they do not
feel safe involving with Madurese
2
.
For the most part, the Madurese who came in West Kalimantan
bring their old traditions and customs, such as carrying sharp
weapons, murdering, stealing, robbing and forcing their will on
others. In cities, for example, if a potential passenger does not
want to ride on one of their pedicabs, water taxies or minivans, he
is pulled, shoved, and threatened with a knife.
Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations
Before having discussion on ethnicity and ethnic relation, it is
very important here to understand the term ethnic group and
ethnicity. An ethnic group has a distinct cultural tradition that its
own members identity with and that may or many not be
recognized by others. An ethnic group need not necessarily be a
numerical minority within a nation (although a term sometimes is
used in that way). Many ethnic groups from sub-cultures usually
possess a high degree of internal loyalty and adherence to a basic
customs, maintaining a similarity in family pattern, religion and
cultural values. They often possess distinctive folkways and mores;
customs of dress, art, and ornamentation; moral codes and value
systems; and patterns of recreation. There is usually something
that the whole group is devoted to, such as a monarch, a religion,
a language, or a territory. An ethnic group may or may not have
its own separate political unit
3
. Ethnicity and religious affiliations
are sited in the inner most feeling of every single person. As such
solidarity based on ethnicity and religion is trespassing national
geographical boundaries.
According to Fredrik Barth, ethnicity is an individual phenomenon
that emerges in social interaction, and it varies depending on the
various kinds of interplay between individuals and groups with
their natural and social environments. The environments include
ethnic categories and cultural system of power that describe
significant political, economic and social norms. All of these
functions in interethnic relations, which in turn direct and
establish norms and positions as defined and acknowledged by
members of ethnic groups concerned, thus characterizing the
environments.
Ethnic group is seen as a category of ascription as; it classifies
a person in terms of his basic most general identity, presumptively
by his origin and background. In this sense, ethnic group is seen
as social category functioning as a set of reference system for
identification in interethnic relations
4
.
Ethnic group and ethnic culture, especially religious culture or
religious belief, are attached to an individuals ethnic identity of
ethnicity and to the ethnic group. Ethnic mobilization and
solidarity are collective self- reaffirmation that employs those two
primordial factors for ethnic relations purposes. Every person
develops a sense of belonging to a certain ethnic category and is
aware of being partially determined by it, as are others belonging
to the same origin and tradition of his ethnic community, and
contrast to others of different ethnic communities.
5
Local people such as Dayak perceive Javanese, Madurese and
Sulawesian who settled in Kalimantan much later than the
Chinese, as non-bumiputra (migrants). In West Kalimantan
Chinese are seen as bumiputra (native) most of the time as their
ties with the Dayak and other local people (economically as well as
culturally) are much stronger. This explains why the Dayak leaders
were easily compelled to expel the Madurese when they found
their behaviour inappropriate with their customs and sense of
propriety
6
.
Defining Ethnic Conflict
According to Gillin and Gillin Conflict is the social process in
which individuals or groups seek their ends by directly challenging
the antagonist by violence or threat of violence . Conflicts are
classified as Corporate and Personal. Corporate conflicts occur
among the groups within society of between societies. Race riots,
ethnic conflicts, communal upheavals, religious persecution,
labour management conflict and war between nations are the
example of corporate conflict
7
. According to sociologists, conflict
is part of human life and can never be eliminated form the course
of human history. Interpersonal, intra personal and inter-group
conflicts are a constitutive part of human history. The variety of
ones desires, and unfulfilled desires can bring about conflict.
Different interpersonal opinions can also result conflict. Conflicts
arise in the context of personal and human history. Unpleasant
and bitter history indeed causes prolonged conflict and it can even
create hate and hatred for generations
8
.
During the ethnic conflict, ethnicity becomes the major reference
for identification. Ethnic conflict is basically a conflict to destroy
each others ethnicity through the acts of destroying ethic
attributes. Each side intends to destroy and eliminate the existence
of each other. In ethnic conflict, ethnicity shifts from an
individual phenomenon to an ethnic category. Ethnic attributes are
targets of to be destroyed as they are seen as representing the
presence of the enemy. Such attributes include members of the
opposing ethnic group, their property and their cultural traits.
History of Ethnic Conflicts/Clashes
According to Indonesian sources, the history of ethnic conflicts
between Dayaks and Madurese go back as far as 1983, when many
died in clashes in Pontianak, the capital of West Kalimantan.
The Madurese (Muslims) first cam in West Kalimantan in 1930s,
but the numbers increased during the 1970s. This was the result of
Indonesian governments transmigration plan, which encouraged
people to leave more populated islands such as Madura and Java
for low populated islands such as Kalimantan. Little consideration
was given to the indigenous Dayaks. As the rainforest was cut
down and replaced by palm oil and coconut plantations, the
indigenous tribes found themselves at the bottom of a complex
hierarchy of different groups, unable to continue their traditional
patterns of agriculture and slow to adapt new types of employment.
The Christian Dayaks now share the low end of the economic
ladder with Madurese. There are about 100, 000 Madurese in
various parts of Kalimantan and two million Dayaks from at least
ten separate tribes
9
.
In 1968, Sani, a Dayak, who was head of Tolo sub-district, was
stabbed by a Madurese in Anjungan, near capital city Pontianak.
Since then the clashes between the two are onward without any
solid solution. In 1977, a Madurese named Maskot stabbed a
Dayak policeman named Robert Lonjeng to death in Singkawang,
Sambas district. His death led to riots in Samalantan sub-district,
about 180 kilometers north of Pontainak, in which more than five
died and seventy two houses were destroyed. In 1979, a dispute
over a debt led to an attack by three Madurese on a Dayak in
village Bagak district Sambas. Two other Dayaks were almost
killed by a Madurese. The attack led to a large communal clash in
Samalantan, in which fifteen Madurese and five Dayaks lost their
lives and twenty nine houses were burned down, half of them
Madurese and half Dayaks. The unofficial death toll ran into
hundreds. Such clashes were seen in 1982, 1983 and 1993
10
.
Since 1963, based on the unofficial records disagreements,
antagonism and conflicts between members of the ethnic
community groups have taken place at least 12 times. Of these
twelve conflicts, four were massive, bloody ones.
The 1967 conflict between Indonesian of Chinese descent and the
Dayak community took place in the interior valley of West
Kalimantan. Based on unofficial sources the above conflict was
caused more by political factors, including indication of the
involvement of the army in creating the conflicting. The
Samalantan and Sanggau Ledo bloody conflicts took place between
members of the Dayak and Madurese communities in 1979/1980
and in 1996/1997. Another eight smaller conflicts also occurred
between the two communities between 1993 and 1995. Some
recent, serious and damaging ethnic conflicts in Kalimantan are
listed below:
1. The Malays against the Madurese migrants in Sambas,
West Kalimantan (1996-1997)
2. The Dayaks against the Madurese migrants in Sambas,
West Kalimantan (1999)
3. The Dayaks against the Madurese migrants in Central
Kalimantan (2001)
The Malays against the Madurese Migrants
In Sambas, West Kalimantan (1996-1997)
In late 1996 and early 1997, communal violence between
indigenous Dayaks and migrants (Madurese) from island of
Madura, erupted in the province of West Kalimantan (on island of
Borneo, which Indonesia shares with Malaysia). Dayaks waged a
ritual war against Madurese communities, following a fight in
Sangau Ledo, West Kalimantan between Madurese and Dayaks
youth during which two Dayaks were stabbed. The Dayaks burned
houses and killed Madurese. In some cases they severed the heads
of their victims and ate their lives, in a rival of traditional Dayaks
method of revenge. Human Rights Watch reported that around
500 people mostly Madurese were killed and about 20,000 were
displaced. UNHCR noted, however, that the province still indeed
harbors a potent threat of unrest due to simmering feud between
the Dayaks and Madurese
11
.
As a result of April 1997 conflicts, the press reported that 3,054
homes had been destroyed and more than 15,000 people, almost
all of them were Madurese, had been displaced. Those figures were
probably low and as it were difficult to make an accurate count.
Some Madurese returned to Madura, others move in with relative
in other parts of West Kalimantan, some were housed in
temporary barracks at army posts and in other holding centers.
The districts of Sambas and Sanggau were the most affected, with
respectively 5,000 and 3,122 known displaced, although again, the
figures are almost certainly too low. An Australian paper quoted
Transmigration Minister Siswono Yoduhusodo as saying that at
least 20,000 Madurese remained in refugees camps and were too
traumatized by the violence to go back to their homes
12
.
The Dayaks against the Madurese Migrants
in Sambas, West Kalimantan (1999)
In March 1999, communal conflict erupted once again in the
province of West Kalimantan. Indigenous Dayaks and local Malays
carrying machetes, spears and guns attacked Madurese
transmigrants (whom they blamed for the loss of jobs and tribal
land) in the costal district of Sambas. The attackers burned homes,
decapitated people, and revived the tradition of eating the organs
of the vanquished.
Indonesias former president Soeharto, began moving many
Madurese from Madura to West Kalimantan in the 1960s to
alleviate over population in Madura. Since then eight conflicts
have been broken out between Madurese and Dayaks and one
between Madurese and ethnic Chinese. But this one was the most
bloody and damaging one, in which at least 200 Madurese were
killed and some 35,000 (35% of Madurese population in West
Kalimantan) fled to provincial capital Pontianak, and other nearby
towns and also to Java island
13
.
Based on the 1997 records of Pemda Kodya Pontianak (the
Pontianak City Government) there were a number of Indonesian
ethnic group such as the Sundanese, Buginese, Javanese,
Ambonese, Timorese, Papuan, Minangkabau, Malay, Batak,
Acehnese, Banjarnese, Manadois, Butonese, Macasarese, Balinese,
Torajan, and sasak in WK province. However they did not actually
involve themselves directly or indirectly in the 12 conflicts that
took place in WK province. Why were only members of certain
community groups involved in the conflicts? This shows that inter
community conflicts in WK were unique to the people of WK
(Dayak and Madurese Majorities) and that the larger community is
more open and does not merely hate members of all communities
or ethnic groups.
The Dayaks against the Madurese
Migrants in Central Kalimantan (2001)
The recent conflicts sparked on 17
th
February 2001 in Sampit,
when a house belonging to an indigenous Dayak was burnt down.
According to local accounts gangs of migrants Madurese rode
round Sampit in trucks shouting Death to the Dayaks. Hundreds
of the Dayaks fled the town or sought refuge in churches. As the
news of conflict spread, Dayaks returned to Sampit in force to
take revenge. Six people were killed. The violence spread rapidly
into neighbouring towns and villages and as far as Palangkaraya,
the provincial capital, 220 km to the east. In the worst single
incident during the violence more than 118 Madurese were killed
by Dayaks in the villages of Parenggean on February 25, 2001
14
.
By March 2
nd
, the violence had subsided sufficiently for Vice-
President Megawati to make a visit to a refugee camp in Sampit,
followed on 8
th
March, by a brief visit to Sampit and Palangkaraya
by the then president Wahid. Further violence followed Wahids
visit and up to six Dayak protesters were shot dead by police. On
22
nd
March there was more violence in and around the district
capital of Kuala Kapuas, in which 17 people were reported dead
and more homes and property burned. In April another round of
house burnings was reported in Pangkalan Bun. According to local
police, the violence was started by some 400 people arriving in
trucks from the direction of Sampit who managed to evade police
efforts to prevent them entering the town. They started burning
Madurese houses, prompting a further out flux of refugees.
Four years after the earlier out break in 2001, there are still an
estimated 40,000 Madurese refugees living in wretched conditions
in temporary camps in west Kalimantans provincial capital
Pontianak.
Causes of Ethnic Conflicts in West Kalimantan
The ongoing slaughter can not be simplified as ethnic conflict
between Dayak and Madurese, even less so as religious conflict.
Rather the roots of this ethnic conflicts and violence were
established a long time ago when the New Order government
supported by international creditor agencies , jointly invested in
these giants projects; also planting the roots of the ongoing
conflict that characterizes the humanitarian situation in Indonesia
in general.
A major cause of the conflict between indigenous Dayaks and
migrants Madurese, and other ethnic conflicts in Indonesia has
been the development that the Soeharto regime promoted over
thirty years. Natural resources, including Kalimantans forest and
minerals were handed out as concessions for powerful business
elite. The customary landowners, the indigenous Dayaks were
systematically denied their land and resource rights, they have had
no recourse to legal action to defend their rights since, under
Indonesian law, forest belong to state.
Based on various researches, that have been conducted, there were
at least six triggers and root causes, which produce the conflict in
WK
15
such as:
Cultural differences;
Unfair competition;
Gangsterism and criminality;
Very centralized policies of the central government;
Uneven, unfair social- economic structure and competition,
and
The inability and powerlessness of the local apparatus
Cultural difference s arising in culturally plural society were a
trigging factor, but that factor was not only the responsible for
causing inter- community and inter ethnic conflicts in Kalimantan
in general and West Kalimantan in particular.
Cultural difference arose because the Madurese new comers
seemed more prone to practicing their original cultural value
system called acarok- which tended to led violent actions by
insulted parties, some times over trivial or unintended insults the
Madurese saw themselves as morally obligated to avenge any threat
to their self esteem. Or harm or sham committed against their
families and friends ( Alqadrie, 1987) this has led many observers
to describe parts of or members of Madurese community in WK
(especially males) as short-tempered , stubborn , very touchy about
their honour and self- esteem , and having a tendency to settle
such differences violently
16
.
Based on above research finding it could be said that the main
causing factors interacting with each other to produce the inter-
community conflicts were cultural factors, generally called cultural
pluralism or multiculturalism, on the one hand and structural
factors including security, law, economic and political ones, on
other hand. Loss of ethnic identity on the one hand, and the birth
of ethnic consciousness by the community members in the interior
WK o the other, has created hatred towards the central
government that is the personification of the political culture of
the Javanese Sultanate instead of being directed towards Javanese
people, the hatred was transferred to members of the Sambas
Madurese community. The substitution of the hatred from
Javanese with the Madurese community has been caused by
cultural and habitual facts, such as:
1) Unlike of the members of Madurese community in the
Sambas areas and in other interior areas of WK, members
of the Javanese ethnic groups are highly flexible in their
social relations and have a very strong ability to conform to
local culture and social conditions. They always settle
problems through consultation and deliberation end never
physically.
2) Unlike Javanese people, in general, members of the
Madurese community in Sambas and other interior areas of
WK (also in the interior areas CK) tend to carry arms
wherever they go. This habit is usual for and disturbed to
members of Dayak and Malay communities in these area.
They tend to get easily involved violent actions and to
quickly use their arms, sometimes over trivial or
unintended problems.
3) Unlike Javanese people, a small number of Madurese
community to tend to deal with their socio- economic
competitors physically or in other vulgar ways.
4) Unlike most other migrants, a small part of the Madurese
community in WK used Gangsterism, criminality and other
pressures to achieve their goals.
Faced with grassroots Dayak and Malay community who are lower
class and almost uneducated , the substitution of hatred became
easier and proceeded smoothly , and even was utilized by society
leaders and political elite of the local community in WK and CK,
for the pursuit of narrow economic and political interests .
The members of ethnic groups also have economic and political
interests that are same as or different to those of other ethnic
groups. This phenomenon, if it proceeds smoothly and contains
win-win relationships, tends to result in cooperation,
accommodation and in-group or out group solidarity. When the
economic and political interest of one of the parties and smooth
working network and win-win relationship does not exist between
them anymore, inter community conflicts tend to be unavoidable.
Conflicts and hostility that tend to proceed broadly and deeply
because they are the result of economic and political interests and
have structural root causes, are neatly covered by cultural
differences and pluralism
17
.
Besides, cultural factors, there were structural factors providing
the conditions for inter community conflict to occur. The latter
were shaped in unfair, unjust socio-economic and political
competition and in the domination of certain ethnic groups against
other groups in certain fields.
Except of these causes of ethnic and communal conflicts in WK,
the other main cause is Transmigration Plan by the central
government. The resettlement program started mainly because of
Indonesias swiftly growing population. The government started
policy in 1950 that would relocate great number of people from
the overpopulated islands to those with fewer. An estimated 1.5
million families have been moved since 1950, to less populated
islands by the government the main areas for settling
transmigrants are Kalimantan, Irian Java and Lampung.
Kalimantan was chosen not only because of its low population
density but also because of its natural resources
18
.
Transmigration, both government-sponsored and spontaneous,
has greatly altered the population balance in the province of West
Kalimantan. In 1980, about 1.4 per cent of the province
populations consisted of transmigrants; by 1985, the proportion
was up to 6 per cent. In Sanggau Ledo, where the 1996-1997
conflicts broke out, settlers mad 15 per cent of the population by
1980 and the proportion is likely to have risen since. In 1994 alone,
an estimated 6,000 families or about 25, 000 persons migrated to
West Kalimantan
19
.
Recommendations
On the basis of the facts and findings explored through this
research papers, following suggestions can be put forward for
making harmony and peace among the two ethnic groups (Dayaks
and Madurese):
Central Government must revise the transmigration plan
and also revise the policies regarding to social and
economic development in the area;
as the rain forests is main source of livelihood of local
people, hence government should find out alternate
rather than giving these forest to the commercial
companies, which are exploiting the local people;
there is dire need of changing the negative attitudes of
both ethnic groups with each others, particularly of young
generation, for this purpose NGOs and civil society
organizations can play important role through organizing
interactive theatres and social mobilizations;
social conflicts using ethnic and religious symbols must be
quickly handled and a way out must be found that does
not damage moral and social values;
social dialogues should be launched between the leaders
of the two groups;
cultural activities should be enhanced and promoted by
the government as well as civil society organizations for
peace and tolerance in the area; and
religious / traditional communities should critically
reconsider their communal conceptions, particularly those
traditions that can contribute to an inclusive and dynamic
social ethics.
Conclusion
Conflicts are social and natural phenomena that have always
existed in the live of every community, and they could not be
abolished and avoidable. There fore what could be done is to
manage them so that conflicts occurring between opposite social
forces would not emerge in the form of violence and ethnic
extermination, which eventually would produce disruption and
national disintegration
Social facts in Indonesia usually have religious, ethnic and cultural
dimensions. This may not be clear at first glance, but at one point
or another in social developments, religious, ethnic and cultural
dimensions come to the surface. Ethnic conflict in Indonesia is
basically a conflict between local and migrant ethnic groups. In a
plural society such as Indonesia, where ethnicity is everyday fact of
life, ethnic competitions for resources and positions may create a
kind of delicate equilibrium of groups.
The ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan are result of wrong
policies of the government such as transmigration plan,
deforestation, and negligence of the indigenous people rights over
forest and other mineral resources and to some extent to pay
attention only the migrants people for settlement, that further
made local people Dayak resent and frustrated.
Ethnicity and religious affiliations are sited in the inner most
feeling of every single person. As such, solidarity based on
ethnicity and religions are trespassing national geographical
boundaries.
References
1
Chris Wilson, Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and
Sustainable Resolution , Jakarata: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group,
2001, p.5
2
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/kalimantan.htm.
3
Henry L. Tischler, Introduction to Sociology, fifth edition, Harcourt Brace
College Publishers, New York, 1996, p.284
4
Fredrik Barth, Introduction , in Fredrik Barth (Ed.), Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries , Little, Brown, Boston, 1969, p.35
5
Parsudi Suparlan, The Javanese in Surinam: Ethnic in an Ethnically Plural
Society , Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1995,
p.55
6
R. Trockary, Rujiao in Historical Perspective, The House of Confucian, Jakarta,
2001, p.45
7
Sachdeva and Gupta, A Simple Study of Sociology , Students Welfare
Academy, New Delhi, 1989, p.81
8
Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryans Turner, The Penguin Dictionary
of Sociology , Penguin, London, 1996, p.63
9
Dian Linder, Ethnic Conflicts in Kalimantan , ICE Case Studies, 20012002,
p.41
10
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ice/Kalimantan.htm
11
12
13
14
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/default.asp?foldername =20010531
15
Sahrif Hidaytullah, Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia, Jakarta: Bahasa
dan Budaya Centre for Languages and Cultures, Jakarta, 2002, p.139
16
Harold Foster, Flowering Lotus: A View of Java, Longmans, Amsterdam, 1959,
p.25
17
Parsudi Suparlan, Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Indonesia , KULTUR,
Volume I, Number 2, 2001, p.50
18
Alqadrie, Syarif Ibrahim, Cultural Differences and Social Life Among the Three
Ethnic Groups-Dayaknese, Madurese and Malay-In West Kalimantan, M.Sc. Thesis in
Department of Agriculture and Rural Sociology, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, August, 1987, p.27
19
AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 1945 1952:
A POLITICO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Samreen Fatima
Introduction
There is no denying the fact that in the world of international
politics, the decisions of sovereign states are always governed by
their perceived interests and off course not by the principles of
humanity. This is the general perception of International
Community that, present economic power Japan, who occupies a
predominant position in the existing international economy, owes
much for its development to the U.S occupation after world war-II
These institutions and policies would never have succeeded if
the United States had not imposed revolutionary political and
economic changes during its occupation of Japan (1945- 1952).
First the United States pumped in $2.2 billion of humanitarian and
development aid over seven years, and then contributed tens of
billions of dollars more through the procurement policies of its
military forces based in Japan and the
1
region.
1
In order to
analyze the real story behind this fact, it is imperative to answer
different questions. Whether it was done only on pure
humanitarian basis or any kind of U.S personal interest was
involved in it? Or why only Japan was favoured? These are the
general outlines frameworks on which the paper is organized.
Though we found several research on the topic, but here some
new facts and realities would be sorted out which will contribute
to the readings of international relations.
According to the realist school of thought, no state maintains
relations or takes interest in the affairs of other states until or
unless its own interest is not involved. According to Norman J.
Padelford and George A. Lincoln international politics is the
interaction of individual nation states in the pursuit of their
perceived national interest and goals.
2
Besides Parkash Chander is
of the view that nations try to safeguard their interest by trying to
influence and control the behaviour of other nations.
3
In the light of these statements it can be easily guessed that there
must have involved the economic, strategic and political interest of
the United States, behind its undertaking of Japans occupation.
Hans Morgenthau maintained whatever the ultimate aims of
international politics, power is always the ultimate aim .
4
Politics
and power thus decide, Who gets what, why, and how .
5
The paper points towards the secret and open intensions of USA,
which she tried to achieve after acquiring control over post war
Japan and Japanese response in consequence. The role of bipolar
politics is of critical importance, which had indirectly contributed
to the recovery of Japan. As Kenneth Waltz adds that Politics is
pre-eminently the realm of unintended and unexpected
consequences one is powerful to the extent that he affects others
more than they affect him .
6
During 1948, the American attitude
gradually changed as cold war developed in Europe and
Koumantang crumbled in China, they felt the need for a strong
ally in Southeast Asia and began to encourage Japanese economic
recovery. An analysis of the facts and the way occupation was
conducted is also included here. An historical perspective of the
politico-economic survey that provides an insight of U.S personal
interest for which it had long been aspiring for, will rationalize U.S
degree of involvement under the shield of Allied occupation of
Japan. It will also explain that the occupation of Japan was in all
respect an American Undertaking.
7
Historical Perspective
Up to the first war 1914, USA was adhering strictly to the policy
of isolation and resorted to same policy soon after the end of
First World War. This state of affairs continued on the whole till
the outbreak of World War-11 in 1939 and even some times after
that. Second World War introduced a new phase of US foreign
policy when Japanese forces attacked on Pearl harbour, brought
America on the forefront and become responsible in enhancing its
influence in the whole world particularly in the Asia Pacific via
Japan. Mean while the European war had become a truly global
war.
On December-7 Japan made a surprise attack on American naval
base pearl harbour and Precipitated a Pacific war. Here a new
history of cold war begin which had its origin in the post war
peace settlement and was marked by the rivalry of two super
powers US and former USSR. This post war politics brought
drastic consequences for the whole field of international relations.
That period marked by the rivalry of two super powers which
obviously led the United States to have an occupation of post war
Japan so that she could manage the effective control of Fareast
Asia, the region shares its geography with the former Soviet Union.
According to the theories of international political geography and
the writers like Mackinder, geo-political location of a country
determines its geo- strategic significance in the existing
international system. Geo-political issues certainly make the
headlines .
8
Moreover the political actions of a country can best
judge according to its economic needs and personnel intensions of
the ruling parties under its historical perspective. Every day the
worlds 190-plus states conduct thousands of negotiations over
thousands of issues The vast majority of these issues, however,
directly involve the security of influential interest group rather
than the entire nation .
9
Some secrets points of American policy
towards Japan, in the post war period however, can also be dug in
the light of these basic features of state- system.
The First World War catalyzed Japanese ambitions in the Asia-
Pacific. Under the pressure of political parties and their economic
needs for power thrust had lead Japan towards the aggressive and
expansionist policies in inter-war period, thus proved the above
statement related, to the indication of state policies.
On the other hand when one goes through the history of US it
becomes clear that from the very inception economy dominated
the U.S foreign policy. In the words of Thompson and Black
economic factor occupies the pre-dominant position in the foreign
policy of USA. U.S, after its independence from British colonial
rule since 1776 was determined to improve their political power
and develop their economy under the shield of Monroe doctrine
and isolation policy from European affairs. Here Hans J.
Morgenthaus statement comes true that international politics is
the politics of power.
10
The history of U.S is full of commercial
aims because most of American citizens are the dissidents of
Europe who came here for the exploitation of economic gains.
Even the revolt of the American colonies against the mother
country was fought with the economic slogan, No taxation
without representation .
11
Historical perspective of U.S foreign policy endeavours indicates
that economic factor along with security concerns could have also
remained predominant in Asia Pacific region behind the
occupation of Japan. The onset of the Cold War involved U.S
political interest too. At this critical juncture, it was indeed not
possible for the United States of America to let Japan free with its
militaristic or aggressive tendencies, since American experience of
Japan in pre-war world was not good. Throughout the Inter-War
period, after extending its interest into Asia, Japan was interested
to have complete hold of Asia. Asia for the Asians was the
popular slogan of Japanese, specially, in the Inter- War period.
This is also termed as the, Asian Moonroo doctrine.
12
Eventually
this expansionist policy of Japanese then government led Japan to
intervene into the World War-11 and clashed with the economic
interest of Europe and U.S.A. In the light of such harsh
experiences made occupation of Japan indispensable for the
United States of America.
Geo- strategic importance of the Asia pacific region can rather
better explain the political economic interest of U.S.A behind
Japans occupation, which she is still availing.
Geo-Strategic Importance of Asia
Generally & Pacific Particularly
Southeast Asia may be defined roughly as the area of continental
Asia and the offshore Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos lies
south of China and east of India.
13
Before European colonial rule of Asia, it was famous for its
backwardness, myths, and completely diversified culture. For
Europeans and especially for Americans, East Asia has remained a
world apart until very recently. The distant land of Far East was
called by American as strange and outlandish, inhibited by the
oriental despots and heathen uncivilized society. In fact there are
many historical factors that explain the American neglect of this
larger world. For convenience American interest in the region can
be divided into two basic and historical periods.
1. Pre- War and historical era of isolation.
2. Post-war period.
Since the emergence of a new society in the U.S.A, it desired
separation from Europe, which she achieved through Atlantic
Ocean. Later they saw an opportunity of great commerce through
the Pacific Ocean in Asia. They even pictured Pacific as an
American Lack . They were satisfied with wide range of Pacific,
which kept far away Asian domestically hence, could best fulfil
isolationist aims. In fact the internal pressure groups in the United
States were more active in Pacific. In the reawakening of
American interest in the foreign affair more particularly in Far
Eastern affairs, domestic forces were important .
14
There were American traders, businessman, sea captains,
missionaries, and historians who were not strangers to Asias lands
and people. Particularly since the last years of the 19
th
century, U.S
interest in foreign affairs re-awakened and the point of high
interest lay in the Pacific and Far East. When U.S based to be an
explorer of primary products and entering into competition for
world markets in goods, railroads had been built, the mines and
other deposits of natural resources opened or claims to them
stacked out. The giant corporations were in the process of
formation. The U.S. therefore, had been most active economically
in the Pacific, throughout the first half of the 19
th
century.
The 1
st
centres of the interest were Samarai in the South Pacific
and Hawaii in the mid Pacific. Here American concern was
mainly naval since possession of the base in Soma would provide a
screen for the protection of an Isthamaran canal, a project that
had figured in American Political and military thinking since the
middle of the century. Hawaii was of greater and moral lasting
importance too.
15
In fact U.S interest in the islands goes back to
the early part of the 19
th
century, while vessels began to put into
there for water and supplies mostly latter. Traders and
missionaries also followed these passages. To further these
interests, reciprocity treaty was negotiated between United States
and Hawaii in 1875 by which Hawaiian Sugar (nearly all American
owned) came into the United States duty- free. Subsequently
United States obtained the right to establish a fortified naval base
in sheltered waters near Honslulu, known as Pearl Harbour.
Reciprocity on sugar served the States especial interest in Hawaii.
In 1893 Americans headed Hawaii. Eventually in 1898, through an
incidental accompaniment to the Spanish-American war, Hawaii
was annexed. Thus the United States obtained its first territorial
possession outside the continental boundaries.
Region During and after World War-II
A Series of events which began after the Japanese occupation of
Southeast Asia during World War-11, then the Peoples Republic
of Chinas emergence, Korean War of 1950, long drawn out
conflict and eventual unification of Vietnam with the surrender
and U.S occupation of Japan (1945-1952) has transformed the
entire region into one of the most strategic and sensitive areas of
the world. For several breathless days in April 1954, as the eyes
of the world watched the merciless drama of Dienbienphu unfold,
the United States verged on war in Indochina. For a moment in
time, direct American participation in another Asian war was
averted; but, immediately afterward, the United States became
committed as never before to be involved in Southeast Asian
Afairs .
16
To use Mackinders geo-political term it is the heartland of
those times. In terms of bipolar politics, cold war had provided
the impetus to the validity of region as strategically most
important era of the world.
Both the super powers, the United States and Soviet Union along
with China and Japan were vitally interested in the politics and
economic potential of the region . In terms of bipolar politics U.S
was apprehended of U.S.S.R while U.S.S.R of the United States
and both could not permit Beijing to bring the states of Far East
and Southeast Asia into a subservient relationship as China had
done previously. Since this victory would have enlarge the
parameters of communist power generally and Chinas power
particularly. In fact the whole Asia was full of potential and
energetic resources. Particularly United States could not permit
communists to gain influence in Southeast Asia, besides this
security concern, a communist dominance might have deprived the
rest of the world, largely unexploited, immense and precious
minerals and oil deposits of the area, in addition to denying as easy
access from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.
This was and really is a matter Japanese vital interest. Since Japans
power was and is based on economy, industrial and technological
powers survival depends on her trade and transport of oil and raw
materials from the Middle East, Africa, India, and Southeast Asia
as well. In addition Japan dispatch her finished goods to the
markets of all these areas and in European markets through
Southeast Asian sea lanes, obviously involving American interest
as well, since is Japan is the strategic partner and ally of America
since 1952. It is also worth noting that at any time have is a
Japanese tanker or fighter almost every one hundreds nautical
miles in the Indian Ocean area.
United States of America during its occupation of Japan totally
transformed the aggressive society of Japan and brought her under
its defence parameters. The U.S itself had a wide national interest
in the region. It has economic and political interest to maintain
the status quo and her hegemony in the region. Americans had
infect, trade, investment, technological and other interest too, in
the period after the occupation was terminated. Besides, being a
super power, especially in Post Cold War, America wanted to play
a hegemonic role in the region. Therefore, it was imperative for its
interest, to maintain stability in the region and in Japan after
occupation, which in the long run, would provide her an
opportunity to keep her forces continually here and use Japanese
territory as her military base.
In contrast, before 1945, American foreign policy towards the Far
East was frankly imperialistic. Its objective was to check the
growing power of Japan. The open door policy in China was
merely an indirect way of containing Japanese expansion.
Conclusion
The occupation of Japan can easily divided into three phases, each
was essential for Japanese development and fulfilment of
American interest in the Pacific. During the first phase (1945-
1947) Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (ACAP) attempted
to demilitarized and democratize Japan. The Second phase is
called, as an economic revitalization phase (1947-50) in which
Japan was developed as the workshop of Asia and all efforts were
made to promote Japans product in world markets, in order to
boost its economy. The third phase was pushed by the extension
of Cold War in Asia.
When in 950, the war in Korea was started and America felt
essential to remilitarize Japan. Therefore remilitarization phase
started from (1950- 1952). Since then, Japan is continuously under
the pressure of America to share American responsibilities in the
region. However whatever the interest of America behind its
undertaking of Japanese undertaking, may be, the fact is that it
resulted in rapid modernization, great power status for Japan and
international recognition of these accomplishments. Soon after
her rearmament began, Japan had also regained her formal
independence. Logic suggested that a free Japan under a friendly
and conservative government would make America a better ally
than one condemned to continuing foreign rule.
17
Imperialism, however, now remain a tool to these ends, though
strongly discredited. Although it was ruled by a foreign military
government, Tokyo brilliantly maximized its foreign policy goals
during the American occupation (1945-52) while maximizing the
effect of any Washington pressure for significant Japanese
rearmament of reforms that would, have underwent Japans
economic power. Nowadays members of international community
are becoming very sensitive of the Japanese security role. There is
a common demand that in commensurate to its economic power,
Japan should be given political role, necessarily needs strong
military, and privileges in the international community of states.
In 1952, Japan signed a defence treaty with America. The vital
interest of Japan to have signed defence pact with USA was to
achieve two fold objectives: the first is to get American aid and
second is securing for her the security umbrella. Infect the interest
of both the United States and Japan was presented under security
alignment.
The Japanese alliance with USA meant that Japan felt well
protected and was therefore able to invest in industry that would
otherwise have gone on armaments. For American interest, an
economically healthy Japan was vital for providing strong bulwark
against communist in Southeast Asia. Therefore Japanese goods
were allowed into American markets on favourable terms and the
USA supplied aid and new equipment. Profits from export were
fully utilized, as a result Japanese goods (motorcycles, cars,
televisions and hi-fi equipments and ships were therefore highly
competitive on world markets. Recovery was helped by a series of
stable governments, mostly conservative in character, which had
the soil support of the farmers who was benefited from the land
reforms carried out through the Americans. Thus Japanese
recovery was an internal and external contribution and was
reformed thoroughly by American administration. The defence
pact of 1952, also imported a good deal of anti- American feelings
inside and outside Japan particularly in Southeast and Far East
Asian countries.
Nowadays Japans future security role in Asia Pacific has become
burning issue in Japans politics. Besides Southeast Asian countries
are very sensitive to the Japanese security role. Japanese masses
considered the security pact as shameful , dishonourable and
tantamount to in reducing the country to a colonial status.
It is probably true that the United States could not have agreed to
a peace treaty of such a generous nature if it had not also received
military bases. The containment of communist influence in East
Asia and Southeast Asia was the major driving force for US
interest. The start of Korean War on June 25, 1950 further
enhanced the geo- strategic significance of Japan and accelerated
mutual security arrangement between Japan and the United States.
The American bases in Japan were also to be used for protecting
South Korea and Taiwan. Under Article -111 of peace many
Japanese islands i.e. Benin, Ryakyu and Okinawa were put under
the American Jurisdiction.
Afterwards many other developments emerged in U.S. Japan
alliance, which had accelerated Japanese involvement in World
affairs in collaboration with United States of America.
References
1
William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21
st
Century,
Wardsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont, 2001, p.364.
2
Noman J. Padelford and Jeorge A. Lincolan, The dynamics of International Politics,
Third Edition, Macmillan, New York, 1976, p.203.
3
Parkash Chandra, International Politics, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1979, p.6.
4
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5
th
ed, Knopf, New York, 1973, p.28.
5
Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, Smith, New York,
1936, 1950.
6
Kenneth Waltz, Americas European Policy Viewed in Global Perspective, in
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, (ed.) The United States and Western Europe, Winthrop,
Cambridge, 1974, pp.13.14.
7
W.G. Beasely, The Modern History of Japan, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1963, p.280.
8
William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21
st
Century,
Wardsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont, 2001, p.7.
9
Ibid.
10
Hans J. Morgenthau, op.cit, p.14.
11
V. D. Mahajan, International Relations Since 1900: International Politics, Chand
and Company, New Delhi, 1986, p.185.
12
K. Perry, Modern European History, Heinemann Professional, Oxford, 1976,
p.226.
13
JohnKerry King, Southeast Asia in Perspective, Macmillan, New York, 1959,
p.xiii.
14
D.R. Sardesai, South East Asia: Past and Present, 2
nd
edition, West View Press,
1989, p.3.
15
Ibid.
16
John Kerry King, op.cit, p.1.
17
W.G. Beasley, op.cit.
CHINA S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THEIR
INDEPENDENCE
Dr Saifullah Joyo
Sino-Central Asian relations have roots in history because Turkic
tribes for a period during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
A.D ruled parts of China; and Chinas Han Dynasty ruled large
tracts of Central Asia until the second century A.D. For more than
a thousand years ago an epic legend has also been handed down
through generations of Kyrgyz tribes. Its millions lines tell of the
famous warrior Manas, who conquered lands from Central Asia to
Beijing (China), and whose descendants carried on the family name
and established traditions still honored among the Kyrgyz.
1
Poets
could spin-out the tale of Manas into weeks, even months, of
narrative episodes of adventure, conquest and romance.
The Silk Road which is dated back to more than 2,000 years ago
is also a historical testimony of traditional economic and cultural
exchanges between China and Central Asia. The Silk Road also
testifies to the great contributions that China and Central Asia
have made to the development of world civilizations. The Silk
Road , which has now been revived at the dawn of the 21st
century, is likely to exert greater impact on Central Asia.
China shares the largest border with Central Asia and Russia.
Three out of five successor states to the former Soviet Union in
Central Asia, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share
more than 3,000 km border with China.
2
Their independence has
drastically reduced Chinas common borders with Russia,
especially in Northwest China. It has also created a large buffer
between China and Russia. It has so happened because, sixty
percent of Sinkiang s (China) 15 million population are: Uighurs
(7 million), Uzbeks and Kazakhs (1.5 million), Kyrgyz (140
thousands), Tartars and other Turkic-speaking Muslims who share
religious beliefs, cultural values, and a common heritage with their
cousins in Central Asia.
3
According to Chinese statistics, about
600,000 ethnic Chinese were also living in Central Asia.
4
There have been large-scale cross-border migrations since 1917.
Nomads entered Sinkiang with their flocks during the Civil War
and Collectivization Campaign , and there were similar
migrations from Sinkiang to Soviet territory during Maos Great
Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the
1960s. Right after the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was a
flurry of activity between China and Central Asia, which included
trade, setting up of joint ventures and communication links. In the
past, Chinas policies towards its northwestern frontiers could be
summarized in one word: defence , but now, the main thrust of
Chinese policies is opening .
5
There has also appeared the possibility of a political
rapprochement between the Turkic populations of the Chinese
Western province (Sinkiang) and their ethnic cousins in Central
Asia. The end of July 1992 saw an unexpected appearance of
forces whose activities may provoke clashes between China and
Kyrgyzstan. In Bishkek, the Party for a Free Uighurstan held its
founding congress. It declares as its goal, the creation of a state of
Uighurstan out of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China
bordering on Kyrghzstan.
6
An appeal was also made to the peoples
and parliaments of the world to support the aspirations of the
Uighur people for a state of their own. In October 1992, the
Justice Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, in line with leaderships attempts to
remove any troublesome issues between Beijing and Bishkek,
refused to register the partys statute, and some aims stated in this
document were described as interference in the internal affairs of a
sovereign state.
On the political front, China made no territorial claims on eastern
Central Asia, and it cooperated with new states on border
demarcation.
7
Similarly, recognizing the negative and destabilizing
influence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan and
Tajikistan signed an agreement on September 8, 1994 in Minsk on
negotiations with the Chinese on the border demarcations and for
reducing their troops in the border regions.
8
This agreement is
generally viewed as an encouragement of tmst and understanding
in Asia. Besides this, by April 1995, fifteen rounds of border talks
had been conducted between the working group of the joint
delegation of the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. On 26 April 1996, China, Russia and Central Asian
states also signed a Five-Nation Agreement on Confidence
Building in the Military Forces in the Border Areas , at a Summit
Meeting in Shanghai. This agreement was a crowning achievement
in defence and military cooperation between these states.
China is following the policy of establishing and promoting
relations with Central Asian Republics. There is opening up of
Sinkiang for traffic of Central Asian Republics through nine entry
and exit points. In 1989, some 40,000 people crossed this border,
while their number increased to 100,000 in 1994. There is also a
trend in the region for the development of a Trans-Eurasian
Railway. The Chinese Railway System has been plugged into the
Central Asian Railway Network and today Shanghai on the Pacific
rim is linked with Vienna in Central Europe and beyond with the
ports on the Atlantic. Its another branch will link the Turkish
Mediterranean ports through Iran with Central Asia. Alma-Ata is
the hub of this vast railway communication network. Due to the
development of transport links, a lively trade is also being
developed in the recent years between Sinkiang and Central Asian
Republics. Uzbekistan too, has expressed great interest in
importing Chinese consumer goods. Fourteen urban areas in
Sinkiang have been declared free trade zones as part of their
economic development efforts, including incentives for capital
investments.
According to official Chinese statistics, in 1992, Chinas foreign
trade with five newly independent Central Asian states was a total
of US $475 million. It is more than ten times that of 1990. In 1993,
Chinas trade with five Central Asian states continued to grow to a
total of more than US $600 million. The annual increase rate was
31 percent.
(For details see Table of Sino-Central Asian Trade, 1992-1993).
The picture of Chinas trade with Central Asia in 1994 was more
complicated. The total trade stood at US $577 million, which was
5 percent less than in 1993.
Over a thousand economic and trade agreements have been signed
between China and the CentraJ Asian Republics. These cover
cooperation in the field of industries like construction, oil,
met al l ur gy, t ext i l es, paper manuf act ure, el ect roni cs, and
aluminum production. According to the official Chinese statistics,
at the beginning of 1993, there were onl y 95 Chinese joint
ventures in Central Asia. A year later, that figure went up to 453.
They were al l i n t hree Cent ral Asi an st at es, Kazakhst an,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Of these 453 Sino-Central Asian joint
ventures, 313 were in Kazakhstan, 75 in Kyrgyzstan, and 65 in
Uzbekistan.
9
The Chinese have setup therapy centers and are
TABLE OF SINOCENTRAL ASIAN TRADE, 19921993.
(In million US dollars)
1992 1993 Country
Imports Exports Total Imports Exports Total
Kazakhstan 141.2 277.1 368.3 263.0 171.7 434.7
Kyrgyzstan 16.64 18.85 35.49 65.87 36.55 102.4
Uzbekistan 13.63 38.89 52.52 11.45 42.80 54.25
Turkmenistan 0.41 4.09 4.50 0.80 3.85 4.65
Tajikistan 0.80 1.95 2.75 5.87 6.48 12.35
Source: Yearbook of Chinas Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade, 1994-5, (Beijing: The Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation, n.d), p.472
making medicines in Uzbekistan. China has also contracted to
purchase cotton from Uzbekistan, Chemical fertilizer from
Kyrgyzstan, and to exchange textiles for chemical fertilizers with
Kazakhstan. There is also under consideration, the construction of
a gas pipeline to China from Turkmenistan.
In March 1992, Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited Beijing
and signed fifteen agreements with the Chinese Government that
laid the ground work for bilateral relations.
10
Similarly, the Chinese
Prime Minister Li Peng who arrived in Uzbekistan on
18th
April
1994, with Chinese businessmen delegation, wanted to encourage
trade and economic links with Uzbekistan in particular and Central
Asian Republics in general.
11
In the light of contemporary international and domestic
considerations, Chinas policy in Central Asia in the aftermath of
independence has been prudent, focusing on two axes i.e.,
commercial and political. As far as commerce with Central Asia is
concerned, it has grown considerably and China is now a major
trade partner of this region. From the Central Asian perspective,
the China provides an additional trade partner, and offers a
counter-weight to Russian influence. However, at the political
front, relations with China are complicated by a number of
conflict prone issues. The most obvious is the issue of territory.
For many decades the Chinese authorities have made territorial
claims to the former Soviet Union, in particular to a number of
areas of present-day Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Though officially
the problem was resolved by the legal registration of border in
1994, but the actual geo-political and demographic situation may
well raise the issue again, particularly with regard to possible
political changes on either side of the border. Similarly, China may
prove cautious in expanding its ties with Central Asia, because of
the danger that too-free exchange with Western Turkistan may
prove destabilizing to Eastern Turkistan , as Uighurs call
Sinkiang . Therefore, Chinas policy is to ensure that Central
Asian resurgence does not accentuate the ethno-religious separatist
movement in Sinkiang region. It is the fact that China is reportedly
going ahead with its plans to settle a large number of Hans from
Central China in the Muslim majority region of Southern Sinkiang,
as a means to pre-empt any secessionist move in that area.
The changing geo-political and geo-economic situation in Central
Asia has also entailed a number of new policy considerations for
China. Before the independence of Central Asian states, China had
to deal with only one country the Soviet Union. Now China
has to deal with a number of independent sovereign states
on its periphery in the north-west. Since the Central Asian
Republics are now independent sovereign states, different and
some time divergent foreign policies are made and pursued to
serve their national interests. It is therefore imperative for China
to have a comprehensive strategy and flexible policies towards
Central Asia in order to meet the regional challenges.
At the end, we can say that there are two aspects of Central Asias
independence for China positive and negative. The positive
impacts can be seen for example, in the following:
1. The independence of Central Asian states has largely
eliminated the military threat to Chinas north-west, from
the former Soviet Union.
2. Just like Mongolia, the Central Asian states will serve as a
buffer to compromise the possibility of direct conflict
between China and Russia in Chinas northwest.
3. With the independence of the Central Asian states, a large
market has emerged to Chinas northwest, with rich mineral
and human resources. It has opened new opportunities for
the opening of Chinas northwest and in particular for
economic cooperation between Sinkiang and Central Asian
states.
There are also some negative impacts, such as:
1. The rise of ethno-nationalism of titular nationalities of the
newly independent Central Asian States has extended its
influence across borders into China. Moreover, the
penetration of the increasing influence of Pan-Turkism into
Sinkiang also impairs the stability of the region.
2. Islamic fundamentalism and its organizations, such as
Islamic Revival Party (IRP) in both Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, have engaged in activities that may have
serious implications for political stability across the border
in Sinkiang.
However, looking back at the last few years, it should be argued
that after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the
independence of Central Asian states has mostly exerted a positive
rather than a negative impact on China.
Affairs in collaboration with United States of America.
References
1
Tashkend Defied Communism to Keep its Traditions IntactIV , The
Pakistan Times, Mid Week, July 14, 1992.
2
Kazakhstan has 1,700 km of common border with China, Kyrgyzstan about
1,000 km, and Tajikistan has more than 400 km.
3
The News International, 21 April, 1994, p.8.
4
Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds.), Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders:
Chinese and Russian Perspective of the Central Asian Conundrum, Macmillan Press
Ltd., London, p.88, (here after cited, Zhang and Azizian, Ethnic challenges
beyond borders).
5
Joyo Saifullah, Post Soviet Central Asia: An Analysis of Internal Conditions and
External Relations A Case Study of Uzbekistan, Area Study Centre for Russia,
China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar, 2000, p.357.
6
Keith Martin, China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and suspicion ,
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.25, 1994, p.29.
7
Liz Fuller, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 80, 27 April 1994.
8
Tariq Aqil, Kazakhstan: A Role in EuroAsian Security , The News on Friday,
31 March 1995, p.33.
9
Zhang and Azizian, Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders, op.cit., p.183.
10
Qaisrani Shahnawaz, The Newly Independent Republics of Central Asia: An
Overview, Central Asian Culture and Trade Foundation, The Netherlands, 1993,
p.80
11
China and Central Asia , The Economist, 23 April 1994
CHINA S ENERGY PROBLEM
Dr Muhammad Ijaz Butt
China is an energy poor nation on a per-capita basis, despite the
abundance of energy resources. The most significant energy
resources problem is not extraction or development, but
distribution. Almost without exception, energy resources are in
wrong places, far from consumption centers and hard to reach
where they needed.
1
Growing demand and inefficiency are the main cause of Chinas
Energy shortage. Accelerating development of power-intensive
machinery, auto, steel and manufacturing sectors, the growing pace
of urbanization and low energy efficiency are the main causes of
Chinas extensive energy shortage, which may worsen before 2020.
An industrial report of a State Information Center with the
National Bureau of Statistics forecasts China will face more severe
power shortage this year than it did in 2004. A total of 24
provincial areas imposed power brownouts in the past few months.
A leading official with the Energy Bureau of the State
Development and Reform Commission said Chinas output of
primary energy was equal to 1.603 billion tons of standard coal last
year, up 11 percent over the previous year .
2
But demand outpaced supply as shortage of Coal power, and oil
were reported in many areas of China, whose economy grew by
9.1 percent last year and over 7 per cent in the two years before
2004.
3
Growing Demand
The year 2004 saw many coalfired power plants in China sound
the alarm bell of running out of coal, and 22 provincial areas
imposed brownouts due to power shortage. China produced 170
million tons of crude oil in 2004 and imported about 100 million
tons of crude and refined oil.
4
China is now in the middle stage of industrialization phase
characterized by faster development of energy-extensive machinery,
auto, iron and steel sectors. Urban residential consumption of
energy also rose dramatically due to the countrys fast pace of
urbanization and improved standard of living.
5
Statistics from the Ministry of Construction show that from 1978
to 2003, the level of urbanization in China increased from 18% to
40%. A growing number of the urban residents have more
spacious houses, more electronic consumer goods and vehicles,
which push up the per-capita consumption of energy. The per-
capita energy consumption for urban residents is 250 % more than
that of their rural counterparts. With increased automobile use by
the urban population, oil demand is likely to grow somewhat faster
than overall energy demand, so Chinas oil imports could easily
reach 300 million tons in 2020.
6
Meanwhile, overseas investors are relocating their processing and
manufacturing sectors, especially the manufacturing sector
characterized by high energy consumption such as iron and steel,
electrolytic aluminum, and cement production etc. has been
another contributing factor of the power shortage in China.
Excessive investment has been made in these heavy energy
consumer sectors in the last 5 years.
7
Energy Inefficiency
Low energy efficiency remains a problem for China as its
comprehensive energy efficiency stands at 33 %, ten percent lower
than that of developed countries and Chinas energy consumption
for per-unit output value is twice as much as that of developed
countries. A survey conducted by Chinas power sector shows its
coal-fired power plants and power transmission companies would
save an equivalent of 120 million tons of standard coal if their
energy efficiency was raised to the advanced level of developed
countries.
8
Wan Guangtao, Chinas Minister of Construction has
said that energy consumption of buildings in China is double or
triple that of developed countries of comparable climate.
Many experts estimate that if new buildings and existing buildings
in China all confirm to advance energy conservation standards by
2020, their energy consumption would drop by an equivalent of
335 million tons of standard coal per year. Thats about one fifth
of Chinas annual energy consumption.
9
Chinas energy problems did not emerge overnight. The country is
rich in coal, so after 1949 revolution China overwhelmingly relied
on coal for power generation 94% in 1953. The discovery of
major oil reserve in Daqing, in north eastern China, in the late
1950s brought much needed diversity, further helped smaller
offshore oil finds in the 1970s. Coals share of Chinas primary
energy consumption had dropped to 72% in 1975. However,
following aggressive oil exports that followed the Chinese
communist partys open door economic policy launched in 1978,
the countrys coal dependence had risen to 75% in 1990.
10
Pollution caused by coal extraction and consumption was so
serious and acid rain so rampant, that in 1998 China accounted for
seven of the worlds ten most polluted cities.
11
The need to reduce
coal dependence was not in doubt, but the problem was lack of an
affordable and clean alternative.
12
Hydro power has been a major focus of alternative energy
development due to Chinas abundance of rivers. Three Gorges
Hydro power projects of 18.2 gigawatt has been started a decade
ago but is not due to be completed until 2010. Another hydro
project twice the size of the three Gorges project is on the drawing
board, but will probably take even longer to complete.
13
Hydra-electricity accounted for 21% of Chinas electricity
generation in 1990, but that ratio slipped to 18% in 2001 and that
ratio will not change dramatically in short period of time.
Natural gas is another alternative. Its production grew in the 1960s
and 1970s after the discovery of a major gas field in Sichuan
province in Chinas remote West. But the sectors growth has
lagged due to the cost of delivering it to the population centers in
the east. Still, construction of a 4200 kms pipeline began in 2002
to bring natural gas from Xinjiang in the west to Shanghai in the
east. Another 4000 kms pipeline is being built to bring offshore
gas from Hainan Island to the Southern and Eastern coasts.
Construction could take 15 to 17 years, so natural gas contribution
to Chinas overall energy consumption (2% at present) will not
significantly increase for some time.
14
In 2001, China embarked on two infrastructure projects, necessary
to start importing liquefied natural gas. Beijing has contracts to
obtain liquid natural gas from Australia and Indonesia but its
facilities would not be ready until 2010 and 2011 respectively.
15
China is the worlds largest consumer of coal, burning one in every
three tons of coal used worldwide in 1995. Coal accounts for
nearly 80 % of primary commercial energy use and 75% of
residential use. Strong growth in energy demand over the next 25
years, combined with a dearth of affordable alternatives, means
that China will continue to burn coal on a massive scale for the
foreseeable future.
16
Scramble far Oil
In the absence of immediate alternatives to coal, oil is of critical
importance for China. Her dependence on oil imports is on the
rise. Between 1990 and 2000 oils share of Chinas primary energy
mix increased from 17% to 21%.
Production in Daqing, which supplies half of Chinas oil needs is
declining, while other fields, including those off-shore and in the
remote West, where extraction is difficult, are not coming along
adequately.
China became a net oil importer in 1993. Recently it overtook
Japan to become the second biggest oil importer in the world, just
after the US. Its dependence on oil imports is expected to rise to
50% by 2010.
17
Moreover, nearly 60% of Chinas oil imports come from the
Middle East and have to be shipped through the Malacca Strait, a
strategically vulnerable bottleneck that China, unlike the US, doest
not have the military capability to defend. This vulnerability
explains why Beijing has been working overtime to diversify its
sources of oil imports, with priority given to Russian and Central
Asian sources.
Beijing knows that Washingtons bid to control the Middle East is
also aimed at controlling the critical oil supplies to its economic
competitor China.
18
Oil multinational companies of Europe and
America are also unwilling to share it with China which makes
things worse for China.
BG, a British group, agreed to sell its 17% share in a Kazakhstan
oil Joint venture, to two Chinese state oil companies. But in May
2003, ENI of Italy, EXXON of the US, Total of France and
Anglo-Dutch shell collectively exercised their rights as existing
shareholders to buy that stake in order to block out China.
19
China has been obtaining oil from Russia via train but this is
expensive and only allows limited supply. Similarly its bid to build
a pipeline to access east Siberian oil has been frustrated. Beijing
has been competing with Japan to obtain Moscows blessings for
two alternative pipeline proposals. Chinas proposed route is 2400
kms and will cost $2.5 billion. Ending at Daqing city, it will serve
the Chinese market only. Japans proposal is 3900 kms. long route
and will cost two to three times the cost of the Chinese route, but
it is backed by $7.2 billion worth of Japanese finance. The pipeline
is to end in the port city of NakhodKa, on Russias Far-East coast
and theoretically can serve markets other than Japan. Japan has
won the deal though it proposes to build an even longer pipeline
to accommodate a branch to Daqing (city of China).
20
Conclusion
At an average annual growth rate of almost 8%, total energy
consumption in China will triple over the next 25 years. But even
a major shift towards alternative sources of energy will not
significantly reduce coal dependence. Even if China were to
develop every viable hydroelectric power site, hydropower would
supply just 8% of primary energy demand in 2020. An even if
China were to install ten new 600 megawatt nuclear power plants
a year, it would contribute only 6%. Although certain renewable
energy sources, especially wind power, are particularly promising
in China, even major development would meet only a tiny
fraction of energy needs. Not only these alternatives are
inadequate in the face of energy demand, they are also costly.
Even after taking into account the social costs of coalfired power
generation, and ignoring the substantial environmental concerns
about massive nuclear and hydroelectric development, Chinas
abundant coal reserves ensure that most alternatives are simply
more expensive per unit of power produced. In fact, the only
sizeable and affordable alternatives to coal over the medium term
are oil and natural gas, primarily from imported sources.
21
China consumes about 150 million tons of oil a year and its
production capacity is estimated to be about 200 million tons a
year in 2020. With increased automobile use, oil demand is likely
to grow somewhat faster than overall energy demand, so oil
import could easily reach 300 million tons a year in 2020.
Although the cost of these imports at current prices ($42 billion)
will be less than 5% of Chinas expected export earnings of $700
billion.
References
1
Chinas Energy: A Forecast to 2015 China Energy Data Book, p.1
2
Xinhua News Agency Article, January 6, 2005
3
Ibid
4
Hamilton Tyler, Chinas Energy Leap The Toronto Star, Canada, February 9,
2005, p.2
5
bid, p.3
6
Santhanam K., Palli Konda, Asian Security and China 2000 2010 New Delhi,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2004, p.486.
7
Xinhua News Agency Article Growing Demand Inefficiency Blamed for
Chinas Energy Shortage June 6, 2004, p.2
8
Ibid. p.3
9
China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, World Bank, 1997, p.75
10
Eva Cheng, Energy Crisis Loams Over China Green Left Weekly, May 30,
2004, p.2
11
Asian Security and China, op. cit. p.73
12
Ibid
13
Eva Cheng, op.cit. p.3
14
Radio Free Asia, Chinas West East Pipeline Highlights Energy
Problems . www.rfa.orp
15
Ibid
16
World Bank Report 1997
17
Asian Security and China , op. cit, p.487
18
Ibid
19
Ibid. p.488
20
Eva Cheng, op. cit. p.3
21
World Bank Report 1997
EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS
IN INDONESIA: AN OVERVIEW
Jamila Jarwar
The republic of Indonesia covers most of the worlds largest
archipelago, a domain of over 3000 equatorial islands stretching
more than 5000 kilometers east to west across seas that separate
continental southeast Asia from Australia. It is the worlds fifth
most populous nation, with over 150 million residents in the early
1980s.
The extent of Indonesia was originally determined between the
early seventeenth and early twentieth centuries by a succession of
Dutch colonial conquests. Over a 350-year period. sea traders and
soldiers from the Netherlands won control over more and more
islands eventually forming the Netherlands east Indies colony as it
existed prior to the second world war Throughout this same
period the Moslem religion, introduced earlier by traders from
India, spread throughout the islands peoples to become the
dominant religion of the region.
In 1942, the Japanese army and navy captured the East Indies,
ousted the Dutch colonist, and ruled the territory until the
Japanese themselves were defeated by Allied troops in late
1945.following the Japanese surrender, the Dutch returned to
reclaim the region. However, on August 17, 1945, the indigenous
peoples of the archipelago declared their independence and then
fought the Dutch army over the next four years until the won
uncontested self-rule at the close of 1949.
The nature of the present-say Indonesian educational system has
been significantly influenced by both the geography of the nation
and the peoples experience under Dutch colonialism and under
Islam. One outcome of the geography of widely dispersed islands
was the emergence over the centuries of a multiplicity of distinctly
different cultural groups, a diversity of societies caused by peoples
being separated by barriers of seas, mountain, and dense jungles.
This isolation fostered the development of over 400 languages and
dialects.
Such ethnic and linguistic variety has posed problem for both
political leaders and educator s. the question of what language
would best serve as national tongue, unifying the many sub
societies, was settled when independence was declared in 1945. the
republics leaders choose a version of Malay as the official
language and labeled it Indonesian has been leaned willingly by
virtually everyone. It has served as the language of government, of
mass communication, and of instruction at all educational levels
above the second grade of primary school. Local languages have
been the media of instruction in the first two primary grades and
have been taught as subjects in upper grades. Such a pattern of
instruction is designed to promote the national motto of unity in
diversity (bhinneka tunggal lka). This language policy has faced
educators with special problems in textbook production, teacher
training, and teacher placement.
The nations geography and the way the population is distributed
across the islands have affected the efficiency of administering the
centralized system of schools from the capital city of Jakarta on
the island of java. Because of the great distances between islands
and the shortage of transportation facilities, school supplies and
directive sent to remote islands can take months to arrive. The
task of collecting accurate statistics from all parts of the nation for
purposes of national planning has been difficult.
The rate of population increase has also strongly influenced the
task of education. Under Dutch colonialism, prior to 1942, only a
minor segment of the school-age population attended school. But,
under the republic, after 1950, the goal of providing every
Indonesian with at least six years of primary schooling was
included in the basic education law. The government sought to
achieve this ambition by erecting more schools and training more
teachers each year. How ever, a high birth rate and decreasing
death rate continually accelerated the growth of the child
population, so that by the early 1980s the goal of universal
education still had not been reached. The burden of providing
schooling was particularly heavy since such a large part of the
population was under the age of 15 (46 percent of the populace in
1975), that is the nonproductive segment of the population,
consisting of children who could not be expected to contribute
effectively to the nations economy. Prior to the 1970s, little or no
effort was exerted to limit the birth rate. How ever, under the
Suharto government, which took office in the late 1960s family-
planning programs have been set up, aimed at reducing the
number of children born each year. According to the 1980 census,
the growth rate was 2.34 percent. If such a rate continues, the
nations population will reached 200 million by the mid-1990s.
Two additional factors influencing the progress of education are
political and economics conditions at different times between 1950
and the early 1980s. Under the government of president Sukarno,
from 1950 until late 1965, the Dutch and other European interests
that still played a significant role in the islands economy were
gradually eliminate and their enterprises nationalized. At the same
time, the Indonesian communist party gained increasing influence
over national affairs in comparison to other political factions
including the religions parties. The bonds of national unity were
also threatened during the 1950s by periodic armed rebellions
against the central government on the part of separatist groups.
These disturbances, coupled with an economic policy that spurned
both local capitalistic enterprises and investment by foreigner,
contributed to the accelerating e accelerating decline of the
nations economy. Under such conditions, the ability of the
educational system to fulfill its function deteriorated as well. While
enrollment continued to increase, they did so at a slowing pace,
school buildings fell into disrepair, teachers salaries were
insufficient to pay even minimal living expenses, pupil dropout
rates were high, and class size were large.
In October 1965, an unsuccessful coup attempt, for which the
Indonesian communist party was held responsible, launched the
nation on more than a year of civil strife and resulted in the fall of
the Sukarno government. The new Suharto government welcomed
investment and financial and technical aid from the west, and the
economy rapidly improved. Because Indonesias major export
product is oil, increases in world oil prices since the mid-1970s
brought large sums in to the national treasury, and a significant
portion of this income has been allocated to improving the
educational system. For example, in 1973, president Suharto issued
a special instruction providing extra funds from oil revenues to
erect thousands of additional elementary-school buildings each
year. By 1978 the number of such buildings in the public-school
sector had reached 24,065, representing 30 percent of the nations
total of secular public schools. The 1980 national budget provided
for the construction of 10,000 more and for the addition of 15,000
new classrooms in existing schools and repair of 15,000 existing
buildings.
In summary, the increase in political stability and economic
prosperity over the 1950 to 1980 era was accompanied by
increases in the size and quality of the facilities of the nations
educational enterprise.
Structure and Size of the Educational System
By the early 1980s, the nations goal of achieving universal literacy
and compulsory schooling for at least six years had not yet been
reached. How ever, substantial progress had been made, so that by
1980 an estimated 70 percent of the population over the age of 10
had at least minimal reading skills, while perhaps 75 percent of
children aged 7-12 were in primary school and 40 percent aged 13-
18 were in secondary school
1
.
These enrollment figures must be regarded as only general
estimates, since the compilation of statistics in Indonesia has been
confounded by two factors. Firstly the system for collecting data
from the nations more than 160,000 schools spread across
hundreds of islands is far from perfect. Secondly, schools are of
two major varieties; secular (under the ministry of education and
with school enrollment trends. As the graph illustrate, the rise in
enrollments has been particularly steep in recent years as
increasing amounts of oil revenue have enrollments in non-Islamic
schools administered under the ministry of education totaled
27,990,275 at the elementary level, 6,543,200 in secondary schools,
and 616,117 in higher education. The proportion of males to
females was 52/48 in elementary schools, 59/41 in secondary
school, and 68/32 in tertiary institutions. At the secondary level,
87 percent of the enrollment was in general academic schools, 9
percent in vocational school, and 4 percent in teacher training.
The teacher/pupil ratio in elementary schools was 1:29. Children
in nursery schools and kindergartens, all of which were privately
administered and financed, totaled 1,242,215
2
.
The growth of higher education over the 30-year period from 1950
was even more dramatic than that of primary and secondary
schooling. Since private schools were not obliged to send statistics
to either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Religion, the
exact total of postsecondary schools and students is not known.
How ever, general estimates are available. In 1950, there were 10
higher learning institutions enrolling 6,500 students. By 1970 there
were over 450 institutions and 237,000 students and by 1980 over
480 institutions and more than 400,000 students
3
.
The expansion id higher education has been motivated not only by
Indonesias modernization program which has called for more
highly trained personnel, but it is been stimulated even more by an
increasing demand for advanced schooling on the part of the
populace. Studies conducted in the early 1980s showed that 90
percent of the students in representative high schools planned to
enter higher learning institutions. Since the most prestigious public
universities had room for only 10 percent of applicants in the early
1980s, increasing numbers of private colleges were being set up to
accommodate the rejected applicants. In addition, demands from
political leaders in outlying islands to have their own universities
caused the central government to establish even more public
institutions. In 1981 two new universities in Central Sulawesi a
were added to the nations existing 40 public universities and
institutes despite the warnings of academicians that quality
education could not be expected under conditions of rapid
expansion in remote region. Furthermore, because of increasing
attendance in higher learning institutions the nation was faced with
the prospect of growing numbers of unemployed college graduates
and of youths over-qualified for the jobs they could find.
To improve the quality of education under such conditions of
rapid growth, the Ministry of Education in the early 1970s set up
consortia consisting of academic departments of identical type in
different universities.
The consortia are made up of departments of medicine,
agricultures education, the sciences, social science, and the like.
The moist mature universities in each consortium are designated
as centers of excellence, responsible for upgrading the staffs and
facilities of less advanced institution.
In addition to the formal schools, Indonesia in recent years has
developed a broad variety of nonformal program intended to
serve the needs of both the populace and the countrys economic
development plans. During the 1970s efforts in both the public
and private sectors were directed toward increase adult literacy,
providing out-of-school primary and secondary education for
school dropouts, improving community health. By 1979, more
than 5,400 private commercial organizations operated vocational-
skill courses attend by an estimated 900,000 participant
4
.
Administration and Finance
Indonesias schools, from kindergarten through universities
operate under a centralized system directed from the nations
capital in Jakarta, with directives channeled through educational
offices in the nations 27 provinces. Around 75 percent of
educational institutions, including private schools sponsored by
christen societies and secular groups, are under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Education and Culture. Nearly all the remaining 25
percent are Islamic schools, public and Private, operated under the
Ministry of Religion. Many private schools receive government
financial subsidies, a practice inherited from Dutch colonial time.
Funds for schooling derive from a variety of sources. The
Ministry of Education finances teachers salaries and the
construction of facilities for secular secondary and tertiary
Education; the minister of home Affairs does the same for
elementary schools; and the Ministry of Religion is responsible for
public Islamic schools. Private Schools are funded by religious
organizations, fees paid by parents, and government subsidies. In
public Schools in recent years, parents have paid a special
educational tax for those of their children who are enrolled above
grade three in a primary school, however, in addition, most
schools individually charge parents a variety of special fees,
although without government approval. As a result of these
practices, the 3 or 6 percent of the national budget listed officially
as the nations annual expenditure for education is a marked
understatement of the actual cost of schooling in Indonesia
Supplying Educational Personnel
In the early 1950s, after the Republic had emerged from four years
of Japanese military occupation followed by the four year
revolution against the Dutch, the nation suffered an acute shortage
of teachers. Not only had the existing supply of teachers been
depleted by the social upheaval of the latter 1940s, but the nation
was now seeking the entire population rather than the minority
served during colonial times.
To solve the problem of teacher shortage, the government
established a hierarchy of training programs at the beginning of
the 1950s. The lowest level courses consisted of a short period of
study for primary school graduates who then became primary
school teachers. A more advanced training program for primary
teachers was given in special junior high schools, while a still
higher level was offered in senior-high teacher-training schools. To
provide secondary school teachers, in 1954 the government
opened the first of a series of teachers colleges, offering a three
year program for preparing junior high teachers and a five year
program for preparing senior high instructors. The Ministry of
Religion later created similar set of secondary teacher training
schools and colleges to provide teachers for Islamic primary and
secondary Schools.
By the 1970s, the standard qualification for primary teachers was a
certificate from a teacher training high school, while secondary
teachers were qualified upon graduating from a teachers college.
However, compared to these standards, many of the nations
educational personnel, the Ministry of Education began in the
mid-1970s to provide inservice training that would reach virtually
all teachers. A short course for primary teachers was given by
teams of instructors from teacher training high schools who
traveled in motor vans and power boats to all sections of the
archipelago. Courses for secondary teachers were offered in
district centers. Radio broadcasts also played a significant role in
inservice teacher education.
Traditionally, training the administrative positions in the
educational system has consisted of on-the-job experience and
such continues to be the case for most headmasters (and
headmistresses) and supervisory personnel. However special
training in administration is also offered in the teacher training
colleges and during workshops for administrators currently in
service.
Problems and Prospects
As in the past, the most serious problems for educational planners
in the 1980s and 1990s will continue to be the rising number of
candidates for schooling. Unless the population growth rate can be
decreased substantially, these appear little hope that even the
present levels of enrollment can be maintained. The goal of
universal primary schooling is still a realistic expectation if the
high level of funding for education made possible by high oil
export prices in the 1970s can be maintained. However during the
early 1980s the drop in world crude oil prices strongly affected the
Indonesian economy and made the continued high investment in
educational facilities and improved teacher salaries problematic.
Expanding secondary school facilities will become even more
difficult in an economy of diminishing income from exports. Thus,
reducing the population growth rate by means of the nations
family planning program will be even more important in the
coming years than it was in the past.
In Addition to the problem of furnishing ever greater quantities of
education, Indonesia faces the task of solving the deficiencies in
the quality of schooling that were identified during the extensive
educational evaluation programs conducted in the 1970s.
Experimental projects designed to test ways of improving the
quality of formal and nonformal education were assessed in the
early 1980s so that features of the successful projects could be
disseminated into the general school system beginning in the mid
1980s. The innovations that showed promise for such
dissemination were ones involving self instructional materials,
improved textbooks, science teaching methods social sciences
teaching methods (including history), a more efficient educational
supervision system preservice and inservice teacher education,
achievement testing programs, experimental services for the gifted
and talented as well as evaluation and modification of the 1975
curriculum.
References
1
Postlethwaite T N, Thomas R.M, Schooling in the ASEAN Religion. Pergamon,
Oxford, 1980, pp. 6872
2
Rangkuman Statistik Persekolahan 1979/1980 [Schooling Statistical Summary
1979/1980] Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1981, p.1
3
Nasoetion N, Djalil, et. al., The Development of Educational models in Indonesia,
International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, Paris, 1976, p.52
4
Thomas R.M, A Chronicle of Indonesian Higher Education: The First Half Century
1920-1970. Chopmen, Singapore, 1973, pp.1392
C O N T R I B U T O R S
Ambassador (R) Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty, is a retired diplomat and
Vice President, Islamabad Council of World
Affairs, Islamabad.
Ambassador (R) Najmul Saqib Khan, is a former diplomat. He
currently resides in Karachi.
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah, Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh.
Firdous Nilofer, Associate Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh.
Altaf Hussain Ansari, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East
& South East Asia, University of Sindh
Dr Muhammad Ijaz Butt, Associate Professor, Department of Political
Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
Dr Saifullah Joyo, Assistant Professor Political Science, Government
Boys Degree College, Naushahro Feroze.
Jamila Jarwar, Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East & South
East Asia, University of Sindh.
Ghulam Murtaza Khoso, Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East &
South East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Naureen Nazar, Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
Samreen Fatima, Lecturer, Department of International Relations,
Mukesh Kumar, Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East & South
East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro

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