The Idea of Globalisation and the Analysis of World Politics: Beyond

the Third Wave of Globalisation Theory

Craig Berry
Department of Politics
University of Sheffield



c.berry@sheffield.ac.uk









Paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, University of Bath, 11 April 2007


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International Political Economy (IPE) is unquestionably among the most innovative
and diverse fields of study in contemporary social science. Whether its origins are
attributed to the splintering of some theorists away from the tired discipline of
International Relations (IR), in order to focus more on economic phenomena, or to a
heightened interest in a resurgent classical political economy approach, its emergence
and ongoing institutionalisation within academia is a cause for celebration. IPE is, of
course, a divided discipline. Several scholars distinguish between American IPE
(what Craig Murphy and Douglas Nelson call the IO school in honour of
International Organisation, a hugely influential journal within which American IPE is
dominant (2001)) and British/Canadian IPE (Murphy and Nelson refer to the British
School). The distinction between the two can be conceptualised in terms of either
focus or epistemology both are helpful. American IPE focuses upon the traditional
concerns of IR: the interaction of states, the emergence and operation of multilateral
institutions, order and stability in the international system, and the position of the
USA as a hegemonic power. This focus is distinguished from traditional IR by the
addition of economic factors as a part of explanation, and by the belief that economic
relations between states are as important, if not more so, than political and military
relations. British/Canadian IPEs focus is much more diverse: it includes states and
multilateral institutions, although they are usually conceived in different ways, but
also inequality, sub-state and transnational relations, gender, normative issues and,
of course, economic structures and processes. In terms of epistemology, American
IPE generally reproduces the rationalist and behaviouralist foundations of IR.
British/Canadian IPE takes inspiration from radical social science, and self-identifies
as a form of critical scholarship. A less austere approach to science is endorsed,
involving qualitative methods, alongside quantitative, more systematically. Neither
politics nor economics are essentialised they are deemed to be constitutive of one
another. The distinction between the international and the domestic is eagerly broken
down. The two approaches also embody different understandings of power. For
American IPE, power is relational this assumption is only partially mitigated by
institutions. For British/Canadian IPE, power can also be structural; according to
Susan Strange, this is precisely why economic processes need to be investigated: they
are a source of political power (Strange 1988).
I make no claim to bipartisanship: we should uphold the inherent value of
critical scholarship, radical social science and the broader new political economy
project articulated by Andrew Gamble (1995). Thus it is exclusively the
British/Canadian version of IPE that should be celebrated. It is to theorists within this
approach that this paper is primarily addressed, and to whom its findings will
hopefully be of most use. Like all disciplines, British/Canadian IPE has weaknesses,
which this paper will explore and attempt to partially resolve. I think its weakness
can be understood primarily in terms of the way that it treats agency or the role of
agents in structural change, or indeed the maintenance of structure. I think this
weakness is largely attributable to the influence of globalisation theory, and this will
be the focus of the paper. The third wave of globalisation theory represents the most
promising body of theory on globalisation but, as I will argue, it is hampered by its
attachment to certain positions within earlier waves of globalisation theory, and also
by certain analytical shortcomings. It is therefore unable to fully rehabilitate the study
of agency in IPE.

Globalisation as material reality
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Globalisation theory generally takes one of two forms: where globalisation functions
as an independent variable, and where globalisation functions as a dependent variable.
In terms of its relationship with IPE, the former is far more important than the latter.
Of course, its proponents would disagree that they are simply treating globalisation as
an independent variable. And it is true that most globalisation theorists in this camp
provide rigorous definitions of globalisation, and in doing so point to social, political
or economic factors which have caused globalisation, that is, upon which
globalisation is dependent. The point is that these theorists assume that globalisation,
independently of whatever brought it about, has become established, and now exists
as a structure in its own right. Globalisation, then, has become a cause of change.
The wider implication of this argument, which this chapter seeks to uncover, is that
agency is assumed by these theorists, and by association by IPE scholars in general, to
be derivative of the agents location in relation to or within the structure of
globalisation. Furthermore, globalisation is almost always conceptualised as a
material structure. The material reality of globalisation is said to cause certain forms
of agency, and therefore certain political outcomes. Too often, theorists assume they
can understand outcomes simply by understanding the process of globalisation. But
globalisation, as we shall see, simply does not do its job as an analytical concept when
employed principally as an independent variable.
The theorists that maintain that globalisation must be treated as a dependent
variable generally present their work as a corrective to the flaws of mainstream
globalisation theory. In the language of the third wave, these scholars belong to the
second wave. I do not support the wave thesis, which is one of the reasons I am
discussing the second wave first. The second wave theorists are more commonly
known collectively as sceptical theorists. These scholars test what they see as the
globalisation thesis against empirical evidence. The most well-known example is
Paul Hirsts and Graeme Thompsons Globalization in Question. In questioning the
reality of globalisation, they shatter the illusion that globalisation necessitates certain
outcomes (1996). However, the globalisation thesis tested by Hirst and Thompson
(that is, the hyperglobalisation thesis (see below)) is a limited one; as we shall see,
there are other accounts of globalisation that are less vulnerable to their data.
Furthermore, demonstrating the possibility that one version of structure and structural
change is flawed does not mean that Hirst and Thompson have successfully, as they
claim, brought agency back in to IPE especially given that they deem sovereign
statehood the only important form of agency. The problem, here, is that Hirst and
Thompson clearly conceive of the system of states as a structural phenomenon
(following the realist tradition of IR); they may, in their conception, be
reinstrumentalising agency, but they are not in fact overcoming the weaknesses of
globalisation theory. Demonstrating the hypothetical agency of certain actors does
not mean that the integral part actually played by certain agents in the global political
economy is being appreciated. This is not to say that their contribution to
globalisation theory, and thus IPE, is not highly useful; indeed, it has been used as an
empirical basis by a number of globalisation theorists that have genuinely made
theoretical advances within the subdiscipline, such as the third wave, as we shall see.
There are many other theorists that have been labelled sceptical, all questioning the
main tenets of globalisation theory, some more successfully than others. These
theorists have variously provided evidence of other types of structural and
institutional phenomena that are more important than the material structure of
globalisation, or upon which globalisation as a process of material change is
dependent (Hall 1986; Helliwell 2000; Ruigrok & van Tulder 1995; Zysman 1996).
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There is not space here to detail these contributions to globalisation theory. What can
be stated is that they have not succeeded in dislodging from IPE the notion that
globalisation is a material reality, which causes certain outcomes, especially when
IPE adopts the more nuanced and robust definitions of globalisation that will be
discussed in this section. In general, we can say that mainstream IPEs treatment of
the concept of globalisation has survived the sceptical assault. We will turn now,
then, to the task of describing this treatment in more detail, in order to arrive at a
clearer understanding of how to overcome its flaws.
As suggested above, the general orientation of IPE is such that globalisation is
treated as a material reality; that is, either the evidence in favour of globalisations
existence is accepted or, more likely, globalisation is accepted as an analytical
concept that enables IPE to process evidence about structural change in the world (of
course, for many scholars, these two outlooks are not mutually exclusive). Within
globalisation theory, there are generally two types of scholarship that give rise to this
approach to globalisation: first, where globalisation is treated as an economic
phenomenon, and second, where it is treated as a geographical phenomenon. The
former is often labelled the hyperglobalisation thesis or the first wave of
globalisation theory by its detractors, in order to highlight the fact that its claims on
globalisation are inflated, or that its analysis of globalisation has been surpassed by
subsequent waves. Instead, the economic approach will be further divided into two
camps, the neoclassical approach and Marxist approaches, in order to clearly identify
its analysis with its epistemological foundations rather than simply its place in a
fashionable debate. The geographical approach usually goes by the name
transformationalism. Again, this label was invented to identify the approach with a
particular place within the globalisation debate, between the conservative sceptical
approach and the radical hyperglobalisation approach, and will not be reproduced
here. The geographical approach is much broader than the economic approach, and
many of its proponents would probably not associate themselves with this depiction of
the kind of analysis embodied by transformationalism. Nevertheless, the opinion of
this author is that an argument about geographical change has a pivotal, if
underappreciated, place within many examples of theorising on globalisation. Colin
Hay and the third wave theorists overlook the geographical approach completely. I
believe that this is a problem for their argument, albeit not the biggest problem.

The neoclassical approach and Marxist approaches
The neoclassical approach to globalisation was undisputedly the first to popularise the
concept. And although its own popularity has waned to some extent, it is still treated
as the point of departure for many contributions to globalisation theory, and its
influence is still identifiable within IPE, where epistemological positions are less
precisely articulated than in the globalisation theory subdiscipline (see Watson 2005
for a full exposition of this argument). Moreover, it warrants an airing due to the fact
that so many real-world political actors, especially political leaders in rich, Western
countries, appear to subscribe to it.
The basis of this approach to globalisation theory is, of course, neoclassical
economic theory. Neoclassical economic theory is an approach to economics based
on the presumption of perfect markets. Commodities are exchanged and capital flows
via market mechanisms. The epistemological foundation of neoclassical economic
theory is the atomistic, rational individual, endowed with pre-ordained material
interests in an environment of scarce resources. Markets both exist because of and
operate according to this human nature. The neoclassical approach to globalisation,
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then, assumes the realisation of a global competitive marketplace, or rather argues that
the realisation of such an economy is inevitable, and that its emergence is now
apparent. This conception has led to the charge that the neoclassical approach has an
unnecessarily simplistic view of the economic processes associated with globalisation.
However, although relatively straightforward, the way that neoclassical globalisation
theorists understand the operation or emergence of the global marketplace is not
necessarily simplistic. Existing reviews of the hyperglobalisation perspective are too
unsympathetic in their summary of its central arguments, but at the same time too
generous in failing to adequately detail the shortcomings of its epistemology (see, for
instance, Held et al 1999).
The main progenitor of the neoclassical approach is Kenichi Ohmae. Ohmaes
work (particularly his book The Borderless World (1993)), more so than the work of
any other theorist, seemed to encapsulate much of the thinking that had occasioned
the rise of globalisation as an analytical concept. Ohmaes most familiar argument,
then, concerns the redundancy of national borders. In short, countries are becoming
less different or, more precisely, differences between countries matter less. Economic
activity has become global, and much less susceptible to the interventions of nation-
states. This activity is assumed to constitute a marketplace, and it is the inexorable
logic of market competition that has caused economic processes to transcend national
circumstances. Essentially, however, Ohmaes work is a narrative (based on
empirical, albeit anecdotal, evidence) about the transformed nature of corporate
organisation Ohmae worked for twenty-three years as a management consultant and
business strategist. It is therefore transnational corporations (TNCs) in particular,
embodying the norms of post-Fordism, that are deemed to have become global.
TNCs are the exemplary institutions of the global marketplace, as both architects and
the architecture of globalisation. The extent to which the transformation of TNCs is
the essence of globalisation, or merely epiphenomenal of the development of a global
economy, is open to interpretation, but this perspective has certainly been fleshed out
beyond Ohmaes original narrative (not least, by Ohmae himself (see 1995) to
comprise the more general argument. There is some room within the neoclassical
approach for reference to non-market or non-economic factors in explaining
globalisation. Theodore Levitt, of the Harvard Business School, believes that
technological change is a determining vector of globalisation, and that it is this,
alongiside market logic, that has contributed to the redundancy of differences between
countries (1986). This is not an uncommon argument indeed, it is present to a lesser
extent in Ohmaes work and, as such, the hyperglobalisation perspective strays, as
we shall see, into the territory of the arguments of other globalisation theorists.
1

Economics, as conceived by neoclassical economic theory, is still the central driving
force of globalisation, but neoclassical globalisation theory argues, additionally, that
factors such as corporate organisation and technological development help to give
contemporary market relations their specifically global character.
It must be noted that the hyperglobalisation perspective is intimately related to
neoliberal ideology, in terms of both policy prescriptions and a priori assumptions
(see, in particular, the work of Martin Wolf (2005)). This is not to say that its
relationship with neoliberalism disables its capacity to contribute to theory (as
claimed by some critics), but it nevertheless must be acknowledged. Furthermore, as

1
In fact, Ohmaes latest book, The Invisible Continent (2001), has a distinctly transformationalist feel,
in that the outcome of the process of globalisation is described as a global space, rather than simply a
global economy. However, the space is characterised mainly as an economic space, and its existence is
owed to economic processes.
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suggested earlier, relations between an approach within the globalisation theory
subdiscipline and an ideology upheld by certain political actors is natural and
inevitable; noting the existence of the neoclassical approach here will therefore aid the
analysis of agency in subsequent chapters. What is disabling for the neoclassical
approach to globalisation theory is, rather, its relationship to neoclassical economic
theory. The neoclassical approach is both highly structuralist and highly materialist.
The global or globalising economy is presented as a structure with determining force,
reproduced by its own logic (that is, the logic of the competitive marketplace).
Agents are not conceived as possessing any significant capacity to author, control or
even alter its constraints. Of course, the neoclassical theorist may retort that
individuals are key to the markets operation, but this would be an insufficient
defence. The marketplace and rationality are universal notions, assumed not to be
variegated at the micro- or meso-levels. We therefore do not need to investigate
human minds in order to understand how or why they take particular actions. Agents,
then, are not conceived as having different conceptions of their structural
environment, or of change within that environment (that is, of globalisation). This
fallacy is applied, by neoclassical globalisation theorists, to political actors as well as
economic actors, and thus the crucial role of ideologies in shaping any process of
change in the global political economy is overlooked. The neoclassical approach has
no capacity to understand the agency to which it contributes. Moreover, as suggested
above, sceptical theorists have shown that the empirical claims of neoclassical
theorists are inaccurate; in fact, many theorists broadly associated with the sceptical
perspective have provided an additional critique by questioning neoclassical
assumptions about the asocial nature of corporations (see Zysman 1996).
Transformationalism has a better defence against sceptical arguments, but not, as we
shall see, against the general critique of IPE being constructed by this author. First,
however, we shall turn to the Marxist approaches. There are two that I want to
discuss: traditional Marxism, and neo-Gramscianism.
We will not dwell too long on the traditional Marxist approach. This is not to
deny its inherent value, but rather because as an approach within IPE it exists mainly
as a caricature rather than a functioning theoretical framework. Nevertheless there is
a distinctive, traditional Marxist position on globalisation, albeit rarely heard. Its
most vocal proponent is probably Alex Callinicos (2001; 2002; see also Callinicos et
al 1994). The traditional Marxist and neoclassical approaches are strikingly similar in
some regards, particularly in that they both maintain that globalisation is primarily the
realisation of a global economy, and that this economy has a determining effect upon
subsequent social and political changes. They both also point to the emergence and
power of global corporations as a key element of globalisation; this argument is
probably the central feature of traditional Marxisms approach to globalisation. Of
course, traditional Marxists conceive of the global economy as a system of capitalism,
rather than a marketplace. It is for this reason that this perspective is sometimes
labelled the anti-globalisation perspective, since its proponents generally oppose
global capitalism. It is an unfortunate misnomer, because traditional Marxist
globalisation theorists in no way deny globalisations reality, and in fact generally
believe that it would be impossible and undesirable to reverse globalisation; they
would much rather an alternative form of globalisation be established and, in line with
traditional Marxism, they of course argue that such a form is emerging, or will
inevitably emerge, from the global proletariat that has arisen, or will arise, to service
global accumulation processes. The label is useful, however, for suggesting the
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ideological link between this perspective and the anti-globalisation movement,
although the movement itself is of course inaccurately named, for identical reasons.
One apparent difference between the neoclassical and traditional Marxist
approaches to globalisation theory is that traditional Marxists make more reference to
human agents. This is because capital accumulation obviously depends upon human
beings for its operation and institutionalisation. Thus the existence of a global class
elite is described (this finding is, of course, not exclusive to traditional Marxism).
This elite is centred around the activities and interests of TNCs, but also encompasses
the neoliberal political elites of most capitalist countries. However, while some
traditional Marxist theorists place emphasis on the determining role of such agency, in
general the agency of these actors is considered to be a mechanical response to the
needs of capital accumulation (see Callinicos 2002). This position can be identified,
to some extent, in the work of many IPE theorists, even those that would not
necessarily advocate radical political solutions in response to global capitalism.
Those traditional Marxist globalisation theorists that advocate a socialist perspective
do so on the basis of their perception of an emergent global proletariat. As described
above, this new class is endowed with revolutionary potential. Yet, again, the
instrumentalism of this class in opposing global capitalism does not mean that it has
real agency, since theorists generally imagine that such actors are destined to form a
project of collective action due to their location in the global system of production. In
general, theorists that interpret globalisation as the realisation as a global capitalist
economy imagine that agents interact with this structure on the basis of their location
within it, and not on the basis of their subjective and intersubjective interpretations of
their material structural context. Traditional Marxist theorists do not, therefore,
analyse the role of ideas in the construction of agency. Although they usually
acknowledge the links between certain ideological positions and certain groups of
actors, ideology is considered to be derivative entirely of material experience, or
material interests (in the next section, we will see how third wave theorists make an
identical claim, albeit on the basis of a different reading of globalisation).
How does neo-Gramscianism differ? In my opinion, not much. There is no
absolute distinction between traditional Marxism and the neo-Gramscianism
described earlier. In many ways neo-Gramscianism is simply a less purist application
of traditional Marxism. It is for this reason that the traditional Marxist position has
few adherents in IPE, since scholars of Marxist inclination tend to adopt the more
flexible neo-Gramscian approach. I will briefly discuss neo-Gramscianism here,
because it has been important to IPE, or to IPEs capacity to take ideas, and therefore
agency, seriously, but also because one of its major proponents, Mark Rupert, has
attempted to detail the ideologies of globalisation. I think his attempt is extremely
problematic.
Leaving aside the difficulties of interpreting Gramscis work, and for that
matter transposing it into more contemporary contexts, the main problem, from my
perspective, is that neo-Gramscian theorists do not use Gramscis work as a gateway
to a sophisticated epistemology of agency, despite regularly pronouncing that
Gramscianism combines structural, agential, materialist and idealist theorising (see
for example Gill 1993; Rupert 2005).
Randall Germain and Michael Kenny argue that using Gramscis ontology is
fraught with difficulty. Simply, it is not clear that Gramsci prevailed over the
structuralism and materialism of traditional Marxism, or that he even sought to.
Gramsci of course upheld some form of structure-agency synthesis material
structure constrains and constitutes action, and actions can alter structures. But
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exactly what is possible and, more importantly, how are the limits of possibility set?
How do we come to know these limits does such knowledge exist naturally in our
minds, is it imposed upon us, like capitalism itself, by hegemonic forces, or do we
learn over time what may be possible? (Germain & Kenny 1998:8-10). For Gramsci,
proposing the dialectic of structure and agency was not mere cant, but for
contemporary thinkers, the operation of the dialectic requires more exposition.
Several neo-Gramscian theorists responded immediately to the critique of
Germain and Kenny. Craig Murphy fixated on two aspects of their argument: first,
the notion that there are many Antonio Gramscis, meaning that presenting a definitive
interpretation of his work as the basis of a theoretical framework is unfeasible.
Second, the contention that the Gramscian understanding of civil society could not be
globalised, that is, translated so as to make it applicable to an account of world order
in the contemporary global political economy (1998:417). The current paper is
obviously not the place for adjudication on the latter. It should be noted, however,
that Germain and Kenny argue not that the neo-Gramscian work on global civil
society is unsound, rather unGramscian (1998:14-17). On the former, Murphys
argument appears misdirected. He says that although there are many Gramscis, the
Gramsci that neo-Gramsscians have chosen to adopt is the historicist, idealist
Gramsci, the one most attuned to the role of agents and ideas and the maintenance and
transformation of structure. The problem, here, is that Murphy fails to address the
main thrust of Germain and Kennys argument. Gramscis work does not bequeath to
us a range of ontological positions to choose from, but rather a fundamentally
ambiguous position. To imagine that a position that, one way or another, holds the
key to understanding change in social, political and economic structures and loyal to
agency, which can be applied far beyond Gramscis spatial and temporal environs,
can be found in Gramscis work is to ask too much of his work. Of course, from the
perspective of this study, the problem with neo-Gramscianism is not its relationship
with Gramsci, but rather its relationship with reality. It is on these terms that Murphy
asks for his work to be judged (1998:417). There can be no doubt about Murphys
valuable contribution to the enterprise of IPE (see in particular his work on global
governance and industrial change (1994)) but it nevertheless fails to escape
excessively structuralist and materialist explanations. In general, the innovative but
ultimately limited way in which Gramsci incorporates ideational phenomena into his
account of agency and analysis of structure is, as we shall see, sufficient for neo-
Gramscian scholars.
Another theorist critical of Germain and Kennys position is Mark Rupert.
Since Rupert has addressed globalisation theory directly, his work will be considered
in more detail here. He criticises their diagnosis that, for all Gramscis contemplation
of ideational phenomena and the potential of agents to transform structure, it remains
that in the last instance agency is deemed to be governed by material interests.
Instead, he says, material interests govern agency in the first instance: they condition
but do not determine (1998:427,431). However, as well as representing Germain and
Kennys argument somewhat crudely, the distinction Rupert makes between the last
instance and the first instance is not as insightful as it may initially appear. The
first instance may not invoke the notion of material life as an ultimately
nonnegotiable constraint, but we must still ask how long the first instance lasts. How
extensive is its influence, and how is it experienced? A close reading of Ruperts
work suggests that he gives considerable weight to material interests in accounting for
agency. Marxs materialism is clearly the foundation of his theoretical framework;
Gramscis thoughts are employed to emphasise the importance of political struggle
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(the status of which is apparently uncertain for Marx) (1998:428; see also 1993; and
2000). Mark Ruperts book Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a
New World Order (2000; see Drainville 2004 for a similar analysis) represents his
contribution to globalisation theory. In fact, it is probably the most important attempt
by a neo-Gramscian to address ideational aspects of the process of globalisation, an
ability supposedly inherent to Gramscian thought. Yet it is not a study akin to the
current one. Globalisation is not, in general, treated as an ideational phenomenon,
which may more or less accurately refer to aspects of material life. Rather, it is
treated primarily, and without problematisation, as a material process of structural
change which, moreover, is exogenous to agents. Glibly, of course, it is argued that
agents have a role in altering structures encouraging this is a central objective of the
book, just as it was for Gramsci and Marx. But neither the constitution of structures
in political action nor the constitution of agency in subjective and intersubjective
understandings of structure are not recognised, or at least form no part of Ruperts
analysis of agency or indeed ideology. His empirical focus is neoliberalism, so-called
grassroots socialism (with Marxs distinction between a class-in-itself and a class-
for-itself assuming central importance here), and fascism, with the focus principally
on the United States. Each, including neoliberalism, is treated as a response to the
material structural change of globalisation. They are (imperfect) products of new
class relationships. It is only in this sense that they are ideologies of globalisation.
This is not to claim that the emergence of new ideological positions, which Rupert
expertly documents, has nothing to do with real-world change. It has a great deal to
do with structural change and material conditions, only not in the simplistic (and
unidirectional) way suggested by Rupert.
Nevertheless, Germain and Kenny are probably a little unfair in describing
neo-Gramscianism as ultimately problematic, in that this phrase suggests that there
is little value in pursuing neo-Gramscian inquiry. In social science, surely there are
few epistemological frameworks which are not problematic, from some vantage.
Neo-Gramscianism should therefore be applauded in many ways. What has been
criticised here is its failure to establish a sophisticated inquiry into ideational
phenomenon. It has more than this to offer, so its value is nevertheless assured. I will
now discuss the geographical approach to globalisation theory, which is left out of the
wave thesis. I actually think this approach is the most important theory of
globalisation in critical IPE.

The geographical approach
The geographical approach to globalisation theory also conceives of globalisation as a
material reality. But the change to which the concept of change refers is primarily
spatial, rather than economic. Changes in geographical structure are deemed to have
underpinned changes in other spheres. In practice, IPE theorists influenced by the
geographical approach may not subscribe unerringly to its conception of
globalisation, or are not explicit about or even conscious of its influence, but
nevertheless the geographical approach to globalisation theory is shadowed by a
general mindset among many IPE scholars that globalisation is primarily spatial. The
approach was christened transformationalism by David Held, Anthony McGrew,
David Goldblatt and J onathan Perraton in their seminal book Global Transformations
(1999), in a conscious attempt by those theorists to distinguish their work from the
work of theorists such as Kenichi Ohmae and Alex Callinicos on the grounds that
their approach was less deterministic (or, more cynically, to justify their liberal/social
democratic response to globalisation, in contrast to neoliberal or socialist responses.
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We will return to this point later). The central argument of this approach, then, is that
a new global or transnational social space exists, and that all social, political and
economic activities are affected by its existential logic.
The most important proponent of the geographical approach is probably J an
Aart Scholte. He is not the principal intellectual force within the transformationalist
camp, but has provided the clearest articulation of its contribution to globalisation
theory. In other words, Scholte best typifies the strengths and weaknesses of the
geographical approach. Scholte uses the term supraterritoriality to denote his
understanding of the material structure of globalisation. This refers to the
development of a social space not bound by territory and distance, with concomitant
social, political and economic activities whose nature is determined by the nature of
the supraterritorial space. Globalisation, then, is a process of respatialisation
(Scholte 2005). Scholte does not believe that the geographical change is the only
structural change to have occurred recently within the global political economy; he
refers, also, to changes within production, knowledge, governance and identity
structures. What is more, change within these structures has occurred partially
independently of the geographical change, and has interacted dynamically with
respatialisation (2005:22-3). However, it is clear from Scholtes work that the
geographical structure has primacy over the others; geography, in the last instance,
directs social, political and economic forms. (This aspect of Scholtes work, as we
shall see, has been subjected to polemical attack by J ustin Rosenberg.) Furthermore,
the process of geographical change is the only one to which no agents are attached by
Scholte this is an important point to which we will return. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that Scholtes understanding of globalisation enables him to
accentuate the open-ended nature of change in the global political economy.
Theorists of the economic approaches imagine that certain economic forms
necessitate specific political forms, but transformationalists understand the effect of
geography in a different way: the creation of supraterritorial space is imagined as a
universal, existential change to which all other structures and agents must adapt, but
specific instances of adaptation entail path dependency and an element of
contingency.
Scholtes approach to globalisation is largely reproduced in Global
Transformations, though less precisely. The definition of globalisation provided by
Held et al employs the term time-space compression, and accordingly refers to the
stretching of social relations once hindered by territory and distance (1999:2-3). A
global social space is said to exist, and to have transformed previous forms of social,
political and economic activities, and therefore to have shaped change within the
global political economy. Although Held et al do not contribute to a theory of
globalisation to the same extent that Scholte does, they are able to detail empirically
the multifarious nature of social, political and economic changes associated with
globalisation. Held et al also note more explicitly the debt transformationalists, and
thus those influenced by the geographical approach in IPE, owe to the sociology of
Anthony Giddens (time-space compression is in fact Giddens term (1990:20-1))
and Manuel Castells. Giddens conception of high modernity and Castells
conception of network society are both, essentially, narratives about the emergence
of the global, transnational or supraterritorial social space (Castells 1996; 1997; 1998;
Giddens 1990). Importantly, both Giddens and Castells both provide details of the
epistemological and technological foundations of geographical structure, suggesting
that globalisation has causes as well as effects. However, both argue that it is the
space itself that provides the contemporary social world with its global character, and
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thus it is this argument upon which transformationalists base their contribution to
globalisation theory.
The fact that these theorists see globalisation as a geographical structural
change rather than an economic one means that their work contains a different
account of agency; that is, they are less inclined to argue that structure determines
agency. Supraterritorial space is primarily the context of agency rather than a force
that agents must cope with. Of course, the geographical approachs depiction of the
economic and political processes that geographical change has necessitated is similar
to depictions within the other perspectives (see, for instance, Giddens more recent
work (1998; 2002), and in particular Peter Dickens Global Shift (1998; 2003).
Dicken is actually a geographer, and his narrative about globalisation centres on the
growing importance of global corporation). However, there is some room for agency,
in that political and economic processes that result from globalisation can be
embodied in various different social forms, which can be variably influenced by
various ideological perspectives and result in differential outcomes. As such,
theorists of the geographical approach acknowledge the importance of the ideational
realm in responding to globalisation. The relationship between transformationalism
and political philosophy illustrates this: Held and McGrew, in particular, as we will
see in later chapters, straddle IPE and political theory; their account of globalisation is
intertwined with their cosmopolitan democracy perspective on how to respond to
globalisation. Alas, there is no room within transformationalism for the notion that
agents are responsible for the construction of any material structure of globalisation,
and moreover, that they may have been motivated by different conceptions of
globalisation when engaging in political action. Globalisation is still treated as a
singular, material phenomenon to which all agents relate in the same way; it is only in
responding to this relationship that agency is important. Even neoliberalism, for
instance, is seen exclusively as a response to globalisation, not as an influence upon
its trajectory and, in particular, the governance arrangements that have emerged at the
global level (see Held et al 1999:144-50; Scholte 2005:39-41). Such arguments
cripple the geographical approach, and reverberate unhelpfully within mainstream
IPE. It is clearly still the case that for the geographical approach, structural change,
that is, respatialisation or time-space compression (even where other factors, like
technology, are identified as the cause of this change), occurs independently of
agency. Agency is only identified as a response to change, rather than constitutive of
it, and in fact the only agency deemed viable by transformationalists is that which
accepts the reality of the material structure of globalisation. This hinders, for one
thing, the geographical approachs ability to provide a critical account of
globalisation. Some theorists may be able to identify different kinds of agency within
the global political economy, but they are not aiding our understanding of such
agency.
See, for instance, the geographical approachs account of global governance.
Scholte and Held et al, alongside other theorists within this camp such as J ames
Rosenau, assume that international institutions such as the United Nations and WTO
represent a global political system. This system occupies the supraterritorial space; it
exists to regulate the social, political and economic activities that derive from
globalisation, which traditional nation-states have been unable to contain or manage.
This argument is essentially functionalist. It is assumed that, for instance, increases in
world trade are an inevitable product of globalisation, and that the WTO has been
created to manage these increases (Held 1999:50-1,175-6,182-7; Rosenau 1997;
Scholte 2005). Such a view, based upon regime theory, has been widely discredited
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within IPE in general, but flourishes within the transformationalist contribution to
globalisation theory (see for instance Strange 1988; 1994). Bureaucracy and
regulation are assumed, following Giddens, to be essential features of modernity, so if
a new geographical space exists within which modernity is experienced, there must be
regulatory institutions equivalent to the states traditional role within national spaces.
Theorists want to see changes in governance arrangements commensurate with their
view of geographical change, despite a large amount of contradictory evidence and
analysis concerning the nature of international institutions. The possibility that
governance arrangements are neither global nor regulatory is not considered by the
geographical approach. This is because it is unable to appreciate the role of agency in
shaping any material process associated with the concept of globalisation. Theorists
are eager to show that the different actors derive different, or unequal, returns from
nascent governance arrangements (although this certainly applies to some theorists
more than others), but not to show that the differential power, interests and ideologies
of political actors are constitutive of these arrangements. This is not to say that the
existence of international institutions is not influenced by the kind of structural
change that the geographical approach defines as globalisation, but the fact that it
assumes the nature of global governance institutions without examining the acts that
created them must be noted.
J ustin Rosenbergs centres his critique of globalisation theory on the
geographical approach. This fact alone is interesting, since transformationalists
usually claim to be overcoming the restrictive use of the concept of globalisation by
economic approaches. For Rosenberg, the geographical approach is similarly
restricting. Like some sceptical and third wave scholars, Rosenberg says that,
potentially, globalisation can be a useful analytical concept of treated as a dependent
variable; that is, if globalisation is a measure of spatial change. His problem is that
the process of globalisation is treated as a cause of change in the social, political and
economic spheres. He differs from sceptics by arguing not that this has not happened,
but rather that it cannot happen. Simply, geography cannot cause change. Rosenberg
argues that

no human ever experiences spatial or temporal determinants which are not
mediated or constructed in particular socio-cultural forms (2000:4-5).

Geography is important, but since time and space cannot be known in isolation from a
social, political and economic context, we cannot base a theory of change on
geographical factors. Globalisation theory oversteps that verge (Rosenberg 2000:7).
Rosenberg blames Giddens for initialising this form of anlaysis, but his most
interesting critique is of Scholtes Globalization: A Critical Introduction. The
conceptual inflation of space which is intrinsic to globalisation theory, left
empirically unverified by Giddens (Rosenberg has no doubt felt vindicated by
Giddens progressive dependence upon the economic approach to globalisation
theory, as he has tried to relate his work to the real world) essentially does not work,
because of the nature of geography and according to Rosenberg, Scholte is ruefully
aware of this. As noted above, Scholte believes that globalisation, as respatialisation,
has interacted dynamically with change in other structural spheres, yet in each
relationship it is the senior partner. But which, then, asks Rosenberg, is the essence of
change? Scholte wants to say geography, but he cannot, because he seemingly accepts
the fact that geography is a vacuous analytical category independent of its social,
political and economic contexts. Scholtes globalisation is therefore meaningless, and
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his work is inherently craggy. Rosenberg still finds Globalization: A Critical
Introduction magnificent, due in fact to its cragginess (that is, Scholtes ability to
bring such a wide range of phenomena into a single analytical framework). The
problem is that it does not work as an analytical framework, and what is left is an
unverifiable argument about geographical change as the basis for arguments about all
kinds of structural change, which are left verified empirically but theoretically
nonsensical (2000:17-19). Rosenberg quips that

Rarely does one see such bold theoretical arguments being subjected to such
sweeping empirical qualification by their own author in the very process of
their formulation (2000:18).

What we have learned so far is that where IPE is based on the assumption that
globalisation whether conceived economically or, more broadly, geographically it
will fail to adequately take into account the fact that agential and ideational
phenomena, are constitutive of processes at all levels within the global political
economy. Institutional analysis therefore sits somewhat uneasily alongside analysis
of the broader political and economic contexts of institutions. Lacking a secure
footing for the analysis of agency, IPE is unable to show exactly how structural
relates to institutions. The most important attempt to analyse the ideational dimension
of globalisation has come from the third wave. But as I hope to show, there is too
many simplistic assumptions within the third waves ontology of ideas to enable it to
form a sophisticated ontology of agency for IPE.

The third wave of globalisation theory
The third wave is set up as an approach that treats the idea of globalisation more
seriously, but its assumption is actually that globalisation is a duplicitous idea. Its
main architect, Colin Hay, believes that the third wave is the theoretical breakthrough
that globalisation theory and IPE have been desperate for, but, although many of
Hays intentions are sound, certain weaknesses of his approach actually prevent him
from fulfilling them. Superficially, it appears that the third wave succeeds in bringing
agency and the ideational back into globalisation theory. However, as we shall see,
the implicit foundation of the third wave is, in fact, a traditional Marxist argument,
that is, the notion that ideologies can be duplicitous inventions, developed in order to
hide ordinary people from their real interests. The duplicitous idea of globalisation
derives, ultimately, from the material structure of capitalism, so although the third
wave bestows more attention on ideas and agency (in fact, such endeavours are an
explicit element of the third waves self-rationale) than the economic and
geographical approaches to globalisation theory, ultimately it does not escape the trap
of materialism. The reason that the third wave is distinct from the other traditional
Marxist approach already discussed is that it largely accepts the sceptical thesis, or the
second wave, at least the version articulated by Hirst and Thompson, and does not
believe that there is a single global economy, whether conceived as a marketplace or a
capitalist system. Economics, they say, is still constrained by local political
conditions and institutions. This is the mechanism by which the focus on agency and
ideas is adopted: the third wave believes that globalisation is false, so it wants to
demonstrate that the actors that spout globalisation discourse are doing so
unnecessarily. The main focus here will be Colin Hays work; he is the progenitor of
the third wave, and its most assiduous exponent.
Before discussing Hays work in more detail, we must note Hays awkward
relationship with the Marxist notion of false consciousness. Hay criticises Steven
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Lukes for resurrecting the spectre of false consciousness within political theory
(1997:47-8). His argument, which incidentally is rebuked by Lukes (2005:148-9), is
that Lukes treats human beings as ideological dupes, incapable of perceiving their
true interests. For Hay, we need a much more optimistic idea of the human being.
The problem, from the perspective of the current study, is that although Hay disputes
the view of the agent inherent to the false consciousness thesis, he does not challenge
the equally-obstructive notion that their can be true or real interests which we can
ever know, in relation to ourselves or others, objectively. He does not dispute the
possibility of false consciousness, but rather is arguing that it is much more difficult
to operationalise than Lukes seemed to suggest, and that the achievement of real
consciousness is a genuine possibility. In his theory of globalisation, as we shall see,
Hay actually comes close to depicting globalisation discourse, or the globalisation
myth, as false consciousness. The term is not applied to his work here, given the
current authors doubts about its general utility, and also because of the scepticism
previously expressed by Hay.
Hay argues that the concept of globalisation is used by political leaders in
order to make contingent policy decisions seem inevitable. Invariably, these are seen
by Hay as undesirable policies, which favour the interests of capital over the public in
general. In short, the third wave disputes the logic of no alternative. The first major
problem of Hays work is that he always assumes, with little demonstration, that
references to globalisation are representations of the neoclassical approach to
globalisation, that is, are derivative of neoliberalism echoing Hirsts and
Thompsons repudiation of the hyperglobalisation thesis, while not addressing other
possible meanings of globalisation (this problem derives, as we shall see, from the
weaknesses of Hays epistemology this will be dealt with more later).
2
Hay
accordingly utilises much of the empirical evidence provided by Hirst and Thompson
to back up his argument (1997; 1998; 2002; Hay & Marsh 1999; see also Watson
1999); he assumes that if globalisation is proved false which is of course
impossible, since truth is subjective then references to globalisation must be
examples of false consciousness and thus at odds with general public interest. In the
opinion of this author, Hays argument is not without merit. It is necessary and
perhaps urgent to challenge the assumption that globalisation has excessively
constrained political actors. But his approach does not fully account for the partially
independent role of the ideational realm, since the ideas and discourses related to the
concept of globalisation are deemed to be ultimately derivative of the material
interests of capital. As such, Hay cannot provide a satisfactory commentary on
agency in the global political economy. He may describe the agency of certain actors,
but he does not understand it. Hays ambition to restore agency to IPE is therefore
misguided. He may be able to show that alternatives to current (neoliberal) policies
are possible, but he does not provides a sufficient basis for the epistemological
restoration of agency to IPEs study of change within the global political economy.
It would be helpful to trace the emergence of Hays contribution to
globalisation theory by recalling his earlier contributions to several important debates
within political economy. First, his repudiation of the structural dependence thesis.
He disputes the notion that social democratic parties, by not seeking to depose
capitalism, are bound to the interests of capitalists and therefore innately constrained

2
As we have seen, transformationalism has shown that there are many possible types of agential
responses to globalization. This opinion is based upon a problematic epistemology, but nevertheless
demonstrates that the third waves assumption that all references to globalization mean the same thing
is too restrictive.
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regarding the extent to which they may pursue redistribution and equality. He
believes that the structural dependence thesis adheres to a simplistic, historically
undifferentiated model of the relationship between state and capital (1997), and is
therefore too pessimistic about the potential of social democracy. Second, directly
related to the first point, Hays opinion on the transformation of the Labour Party
under Tony Blairs leadership. Hay argues that the adoption of neoliberal policies, or
the accommodation to the economic change engineered by Margaret Thatchers
government, is unnecessary, and represents a contingent capitulation to powerful
economic interests rather than a necessary modernisation. The structural context
depicted by New Labour is not as constraining as is claimed by the Partys leaders
(1999). Third, Hays critique of Antony Giddens structuration theory. Hays
alternative account of the relationship between structure and agency emphasises the
strategically selective nature of structure, and the differential power of actors to
engage in the strategic selection of structure (1995; 2002). There are common themes
throughout these arguments. Hay seeks to expose the falsity of structural constraint,
especially when claimed by centre-left parties. He notes the ability of powerful actors
to author their own constraints, and assumes that an objective reading of reality would
reveal the potential for political agency that challenges the interests of capital.
Hays alternative to structuration theory, the strategic-relational approach
(which will not be discussed in great detail here), seems to offer two distinct
epistemological positions. The first is a radical agent-centrism, where agents are said
to be under no necessary constraints, other than their lack of power relative to other
actors in an institutional setting. Exogenous, structural constraint is deemed to be
largely ideational, in that agents author their own constraints in developing a political
strategy to achieve some outcome, including the acquirement of more power. The
second, more implicit, position is that political actors, or more specifically political
leaders, genuinely believe in structural constraint for instance, they believe in the
reality of globalisation despite the objectively-verifiable unreality of this constraint
(Hay 1998; 2002a; 2002c; Hay and Marsh 2000). This argument has similarities with
the approach to agency attempted by the current study. Sometimes, both arguments
are present in a single work (see Hay 2002b). However, and unfortunately, neither
position reinstrumentalises agency in the sense claimed by strategic-relational
theorists like Hay. The problem with Hays work is not the relationship between
ideas and agents, which can never be fully known, but rather the origin of ideas. We
will return to this later after addressing the third wave more directly.
On globalisation, Hay asserts that the idea and discourse has become
ascendant at least in part because it privileges the political interests of an ascendant
social class to the exclusion of others (Hay & Watson 1999:419). As such,

it is the political deployment of the discourse of globalisation, rather than the
transformation of the international political economy that such a discourse purports
to represent, that is the most significant factor in restricting the parameters of that
considered politically and economically possible (Hay & Watson 1998:812).

Hay has applied this argument to specific policy areas, such as welfare and corporate
taxation. The retrenchment of welfare provisions, considered to be in the interests of
capital, is justified by the need to create a more flexible workforce in conditions of
global trade competition, although evidence on the nature of such competition is
unconvincing (Hay 1998). Similarly, the argument that corporate taxation levels need
to be low due to the global mobility of capital is disputed (Hay & Rosamond
2002:148-9). A general argument about the redundancy of the neoclassical
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perspective and its duplicitous deployment by political leaders emerges from this
analysis. It has been bolstered and promulgated by the work of several theorists. It
must be noted that Hay does not always entirely deny that structural change has
occurred in the global political economy (his work is somewhat inconsistent in this
regard, though there certainly are third wave theorists that do not accept the sceptical
thesis (see for instance Wincott 2000)). The general, more limited argument of the
third wave, then, is that the interpretation of structural change as globalisation (and
therefore unalterable, since globalisation is defined in neoclassical terms) is wrong,
and that whatever structural constraints exist there is always scope for agency. To
reiterate an earlier point, though, showing the hypothetical possibility of agency is not
the same as showing the actuality of agency.
Furthermore, we must remember that the context of this work is Hays belief
that globalisation is a false idea, distinguished from a more objective reading of
change in the global political economy. What is at stake regarding the tension in
Hays work, then, between the notion that globalisation discourse has structural
properties and thereby has an independent influence upon the agency of political
actors, and the notion that the idea is simply chosen to suit pre-ordained interests, is
not the relationship between ideas and agency. This is a central dilemma for
constructivism, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Instead, the issue is the
extent to which political leaders, as one type of agent, are authors or merely carriers
of the duplicitous idea, and thus reflects the tension within traditional Marxism about
the autonomy of the state vis--vis capital. It is Hays (understandable) inability to
answer this question that creates problems for the incorporation of ideational
phenomena, like globalisation discourse, into the strategic-relational approach.
The origins of ideational phenomena, irrespective of their relationship to
political actors, do not give Hay sleepless nights, unlike constructivists. This is
because the idea of globalisation is assumed by Hay to derive entirely from material
factors, that is, the interests of capital. Such an assumption clearly contravenes the
notion that ideas have partial independence from material interests, despite the fact
that Hay occasionally argues that political elites genuinely believe that they are being
constrained by global economic processes, or genuinely perceive the world as
globalised or globalising. Independence from agency is permitted; independence
from material conditions is not. The realm of ideas is treated as secondary to the
material world, which can be known objectively by some self-interested economic
actors, and presumably by some political economists, but clearly not by all actors all
of the time (thus the temptation to ally Hay with the false consciousness thesis). This
reading of Hays treatment of ideas is consistent with the most complete statement of
his epistemology, in his book Political Analysis (2002c). Hay consistently refuses to
endorse the notion that ideas may be analysed on an equal footing to material factors,
despite his sustained focus on ideational phenomena his claim to represent
constructivism (2002c:206) is therefore extremely misleading. It is not enough to
occasionally assert that political actors internalise as well as utilise ideas one
also has to believe that the ideas being internalised are not false. This is not to
suggest, of course, that they may be true.
It is not the case that ideas are ever completely malleable. They cannot simply
be replaced by a more objective understanding of, say, current economic conditions.
It needs to be demonstrated that all ideas about reality and change are simply
interpretations, but also that they are necessarily interpretations since we can never
know our material context objectively. Only by treating the ideational realm as a
legitimate aspect of agency can agency be adequately understood. Precursors of this
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type of argument have long been present in responses to Hays work. Mike Kenny
and Martin Smith argue, in response to Hays argument that New Labour represents
an accommodation to neoliberalism rather than a modernisation of social democracy,
argue that the concept of modernisation should not be dismissed simply on the basis
of an attempt to assess, objectively, what does and does not modernisation. If the
discourse of modernisation is part of the way that New Labour understands itself, then
it must be seen as constitutive of New Labours agency (Kenny & Smith 2001:240-1).
Hays contribution to the debate on the structural dependence of social democracy has
been similarly criticised. David Coates argues that while Hay is right to uphold the
hypothetical space for social democrats to challenge capitalism, due to the fact that
material constraints are never wholly determining, social democracy is not an anti-
capitalist ideology, and it is therefore likely that its adherents will uphold uncritical
accounts of the operation of capitalism (Coates 2001).
Perhaps we can say, in conclusion, that Hays work is best regarded as a study
of actors that he considers, not unjustifiably, to adhere to neoliberal ideology. The
neoclassical perspective is related to neoliberalism, and there is widespread agreement
within IPE that neoliberalism is intimately related to the material interests of
capitalists, or the maintenance of the process of capital accumulation. Neoliberalism
appears to be the near-exclusive focus of all theorists within the broad remit of the
third wave. As such, Hay and others provide a valuable case study of the way that
neoliberals understand the concept of globalisation. The epistemological problems
remain, but do not necessarily invalidate the findings of third wave theorists in their
entirety. Of course, Hays field of inquiry within globalisation theory is limited, and
probably necessarily so. Nevertheless, the third wave directs the attention of
globalisation theory towards globalisation as an idea, and must be commended
accordingly. The task from here could be viewed as a widening of the focus of the
third wave to include different actors that may view globalisation in different ways,
although this author would argue that this must be accompanied by a substantial
refinement of the theoretical framework of the third wave.

Conclusion
There is evidence that Hay is capable of a wider and more flexible form of ideational
analysis, in his work with Ben Rosamond. Together, Hay and Rosamond have
detailed how different governments within the European Union talk about
globalisation in different ways. This does not resolve the ambiguity within Hays
epistemology, but rather adds to it, since there is clearly a disparity between
Rosamonds epistemological assumptions, as demonstrated in various works, and the
third wave as generally presented (see Rosamond 1999; 2003). Rosamond is
consciously opposed to materialism, despite the critical nature of his work (and he has
praised structuration theory, which Hay opposes). However, it does suggest that
materialism is a tendency within Hays work, rather than a fixed position, which may
be softened in relation to political ideas not associated with neoliberal ideology.
What the third wave generally does not give us is a sophisticated epistemology
of agency. Ideas are not assessed for their own sake, or for understanding agency.
Hay already has his opinion on the reality of globalisation, and his attention to ideas is
couched as a project for exposing the falsehoods of our political discourse. Ideas are
therefore generally treated as duplicitous. The prospect of a post-ideational politics is
implied by Held, when we have all discovered truth, or are not deploying ideas
strategically on the basis of some material interest. It is uncertain why Hay arrives at
this opinion. Ontologically, he is a materialist. This is not in itself a problem: what I
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am advocating is an epistemology of agency different theorists may have different
opinions on, say, where ideas come from, while maintaining that we need knowledge
about ideas to understand social and political reality. The problem appears to be more
one of epistemology, or more specifically the way that Hay converts his materialist
ontology into an epistemology that says we do not need knowledge of ideas to
understand agency, we only need knowledge of material interests. Ideational analysis
can only ever be a form of critique, of the way some material interests are favoured
more than others. Robert Coxs pathbreaking work in IPE showed that it is possible
to maintain ontological materialism whilst employing a sophisticated epistemology of
agency that gives ideas analytical equality. Perhaps the main source of Hays failing,
however, is his loyalty to an earlier wave of globalisation theory. Having accepted
the crude analysis of the second wave, which offers very little to the analysis of
agency, Hay hampers his own potential by allowing his work on ideas to be framed by
a particular reading of globalisation which has no basis in serious ideational analysis.
Thus the third wave is a microcosm for IPE in general: extremely promising, but
dogged by its attachment to existing globalisation theory, and its poor epistemology
of agency.
I am not interested in ontology. I accept that ideational and material life are
both significant. But we do not need to decide on which has ultimate reality to assert
that if we wish to understand a persons agency, we need to understand their ideas and
perceptions, as well as their material context. Their context is meaningless if depicted
without reference to what they actually think of it. This is precisely why discourses of
globalisation remain central to analysing world politics, despite the frustrating nature
of current and recent debates. People appear to use the idea of globalisation as they
come to understand their material and structural context. My methodology involves
Manfred Stegers approach to ideologies. Ideologies are treated as conceptual
structures. Empirically, I think it is possible to show how the concept of
globalisation, and related concepts, have been brought into agents ideological
structures. In this way, we can leave aside the issue of whether globalisation is
accurate or inaccurate, and assert that agency will only be comprehensively
understood if we appreciate what agents do with the idea and its surrounding
discourse. The third wave does not enable such analysis.



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