The intervention of IMF in

support of the Greek economy

Dimitris Routos


Law for Business and Trade in Eastern and
SouthEastern Europe
!rofessor" Ioannis T#ionas
April 30, 2013
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 2
$BSTR$%T
The global financial crisis of 2007 200 caused by the colla!se of the
mortgage backed deri"ati"es market in the #$% &as transformed into
so"ereign debt crisis across the 'tlantic( Greece being the )&eak link* in
the +uro area% &as the first country to face huge !roblems in funding its
so"ereign debt( The origins of the Greek-so"ereign debt crisis &ere the
country*s large fiscal and e,ternal imbalances( Greek go"ernments in the
last -0 or so years ha"e !ro"en to be incom!etent and corru!t and along
&ith the domestic !olitical and economic elites ignored the chronic ills of
the Greek economy and transformed Greece into a state based on
)corru!t legality*( IMF and +# u!on the risk of a Greek insol"ency offered
their assistance in the form of t&o bailout !rograms( IMF ha"ing the
)technical kno&-ho&* formed the conditionality of these !rograms( The
IMF*s !ro.ections are notorious for being consistently off the mark%
!recisely because they are fi,ated on im!osing antigro&th /structural
ad.ustment0 re1uirements% that ty!ically !roduce massi"e economic
de"astation( The Greek case &as no e,ce!tion(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos -
I&TR'D(%TI'&
2n '!ril 2-
rd
2030% the Greek go"ernment a!!lied for a bail-out of its ailing economy%
through a rescue !ackage issued .ointly from +#% +45 and IMF 6Troika7% totaling 330
billion 8( This de"elo!ment &as the result of a series of e"ents that follo&ed the
continuing deterioration of all Greek financial indicators since 200( The enormous
amount of the unsustainable Greek !ublic debt% &hich reached at 299 bn( 8% or
329%2: !ercent of G;< in 2009% soared the 30-year Greek bond s!reads in early
2030% o"er =00 b!( related to the German bond 6figure 37(
Ten)ear Government Bond Spreads to German E*uiva+ent ,Soverei-n Interest Rate . German
Interest Rate/
+,tracted from> )$a"ing Imbalances and the +uro 'rea* by ?iggins M( and @litgaard T(
Figure 1
This signaled the !ractical inability of the Greek go"ernment to borro& from the
markets% and the 1uest of some sort of a rescue !ackage &as una"oidable( The
alternati"e o!tion &as default( The Greek so"ereign debt crisis follo&ed the
uncertainty of the global economy% due to the colla!se of the #$ banking sector after
the 2007 sub-!rime mortgage crisis( Ahen the &orld financial crisis began in 200%
the Greek economy did not seem to be !articularly affected% mainly due to its banking
sector*s structural characteristics including moderate de"elo!ment and lo& e,!osure
to /to,ic0 financial !roducts( G;< gro&th for 200 &as around 2%9 !ercent and the
4entral 5ank of Greece !redicted stagnation for 2009( 'ccording to +urostat% Greek
G;< actually shrank by 2 !ercent in 2009 and &as !redicted to shrink by - !ercent in
2030( Therefore Greece% being the &eak link in the +uro area% &as easily targeted by
the #$ rating agencies% its !ublic finances &ere se"erely scrutiniBed% its inability to
reform hea"ily criticiBed% and the result &as &hat has been re!orted as the /Modern
Greek Tragedy0(
3
3
Martin Fernando% Aaller 4hristo!her% $o"ereign ;ebt> ' Modern Greek Tragedy% Federal
Reser"e 5ank of $t( Couis% 2033 'nnual Re!ort% May 2032% !!( =-37(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos =
The accumulation of Greece*s !ublic debt started after 390% and its !ublic debt to
G;< ratio deteriorated shar!ly in the follo&ing years 6from 22%D !ercent in 390 to
300%D3 !ercent in 399-7( ;es!ite the efforts for stabiliBation of the !ublic debt at
sustainable le"els from 399- u! to 200= 6around 300 !ercent of G;<7% since 200D
!ublic debt got out of control% going u! to 329%2: !ercent in 2009( $imultaneously the
Greek economy suffered from the so called )t&in deficits*% that is go"ernment*s
budget deficit and current account deficit( 5eing in relati"ely manageable limits since
399D% these t&o indicators started to slide after 200= and both of them reached the
astonishing le"el of -3D !ercent in 200 and 2009( This e,!losi"e blend in !ublic
finances &as not "iable under any circumstances% since the !ro.ections of !ublic debt
to G;<% &ith a high degree of !robability% &as o"er 30 !ercent for 203- 6figures 2 E
-7(
RF G 0%-9
0H
20H
=0H
:0H
0H
300H
320H
3=0H
3:0H
30H
200H
397D 390 39D 3990 399D 2000 200D 2030 203D
GREE0 !(BLI% DEBT to GD!
<ublic ;edt as Hof
G;<
+,!on( 6<ublic ;edt as
Hof G;<7
Source: IMF, WEO Database, Own calculations, April 2013 Figure 2
The !roblem that Greece had been confronted &ith% &as the combination of a high
debt% big t&in deficits and lo& com!etiti"eness( The amalgamation of these factors
had resulted in the cost of Greece*s borro&ing from financial markets steadily rising(
For the !ayment of its debt% Greece should succeed on t&o frontsI first there should
be an im!ro"ement in the !ublic finances and the go"ernment should ha"e an
im!ortant !rimary sur!lus( $econd% the economy should become more com!etiti"e(
The success on both fronts !resu!!osed great reforms( The ones that refer to the
!ublic economy include austerity measures% like increases in !ublic re"enues and
cuts of !ublic s!ending( More radical reforms had to follo&(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos D
-3%00H
-3:%00H
-3=%00H
-32%00H
-30%00H
-%00H
-:%00H
-=%00H
-2%00H
0%00H
399D 399: 3997 399 3999 2000 2003 2002 200- 200= 200D 200: 2007 200 2009 2030 2033
!EE" E#O$OM%&s 'WI$ DEFI#I'S
G2J( 5#;G+TH
to G;<
4' 5'C( Hto
G;<
Source: Fe(eral !eser)e *an+ o, St- .ouis, IMF Figure 3

IMF and GREE%E
The International Monetary Fund 6IMF7 is an international organiBation that &as
initiated in 39== at the 5retton Aoods 4onference and formally created in 39=D by 29
member countries( The IMF today is an organiBation of 3 countries% &orking to
foster global monetary coo!eration% secure financial stability% facilitate international
trade% !romote high em!loyment and sustainable economic gro&th% and reduce
!o"erty around the &orld(
2
The organiBationKs stated ob.ecti"es are to !romote
international economic coo!eration% international trade% em!loyment% and e,change
rate stability% including by making financial resources a"ailable to member countries
to meet balance of !ayments needs(
-
The IMF is acti"ely engaged in +uro!e as a !ro"ider of !olicy ad"ice% financing% and
technical assistance( IMF &orks both inde!endently and% in +uro!ean #nion 6+#7
countries% in coo!eration &ith +uro!ean institutions% such as the +uro!ean
4ommission 6+47 and the +uro!ean 4entral 5ank 6+457( The IMFKs &ork in +uro!e
has intensified since the start of the global financial crisis in 200% and has been
further ste!!ed u! since mid-2030 as a result of the euro area crisis(
=
$ince 200% IMF &as in"ol"ed in the +#% !ro"iding loan facilities to +# countries
&hich &ere facing difficulties in their !ublic finances( This in"ol"ement &as initiated in
2
IMF% 'bout the IMF> htt!s>LL&&&(imf(orgLe,ternalLabout(htm(
-
Ibid(
=
htt!>LL&&&(imf(orgLe,ternalLn!Le,rLfactsLeuro!e(htm(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos :
?ungary 6Mo"ember 2007% and continued in Cat"ia 6;ecember 2007% and Romania
6May 20097( In the +uro area% Greece &as the first country that a!!lied for a loan
facility in '!ril 2030% along &ith its a!!lication to the +# for financial assistance( 2n
2 May 2030% the +urogrou! agreed to !ro"ide bilateral loans !ooled by the +uro!ean
4ommission 6so-called NGreek Coan FacilityN GCF7 for a total amount of 80 billion
to be disbursed o"er the !eriod May 2030 through Oune 203-( 6This amount &as
e"entually reduced by 82(7 billion% because $lo"akia decided not to !artici!ate in the
Greek Coan Facility 'greement% &hile Ireland and <ortugal ste!!ed do&n from the
facility as they re1uested financial assistance themsel"es7( The financial assistance
agreed by euro-area Member $tates &as !art of a .oint !ackage% &ith the IMF
committing additional 8-0 billion under a stand-by arrangement 6$5'7 facility 6figure
=7(
Figure /
;es!ite the &ell-ackno&ledged debt tra! that Greece &as facing at the moment%
there is also a criti1ue regarding the unconcealed incenti"es of the bailout( 'ctually it
is noted that the bilateral loans gi"en to Greece by its +uro area !artners and under
IMF*s $5'% &ere interest bearing loans not a grant% and &hich in effect &ere
re!lacing maturing !ri"ate debt(
D
?a"ing a closer look in Greece*s non-residents
!ublic debt holders% &e can assume that ma.or +uro!ean banks% funds and other
non-financial entities% &ere among the &inners of this bailout deal 6figure D7(
D
4hamley 4hristo!he% <into 5rian 620337 NAhy 2fficial 5ailouts Tend Mot To Aork> 'n
+,am!le Moti"ated by Greece 2030%N The +conomistsK Joice% ;e Gruyter% "ol( 637% !!( 3-D(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 7
Figure 5
Follo&ing Greece*s route% Ireland 6;ecember 20307 and <ortugal 6May 20337 asked
for a bailout by the .oined forces of IMF% +45 and +#% as they &ere both 6for different
reasons7 facing se"ere economic !roblems( The IMF*s loan facilities to these t&o
countries &ere !ro"ided under the +,tended Fund Facility 6+FF7% and not under the
$5'(
Ahen a country borro&s from the IMF% its go"ernment agrees to ad.ust its economic
!olicies to o"ercome the !roblems that led it to seek financial aid from the
international community( These loan conditions also ser"e to ensure that the country
&ill be able to re!ay the Fund so that the resources can be made a"ailable to other
members in need( In recent years% the IMF has streamlined conditionality in order to
!romote national o&nershi! of strong and effecti"e !olicies(
:
IMF*s conditionality
!olicies% as described in the Memoranda of #nderstanding 6Mo#7 that each country
signs &ith the IMF% are closely connected &ith harsh austerity measures% aiming in
healing !ublic finances dise1uilibria( ' com!arison bet&een the three +uro area
countries 6Greece% Ireland and <ortugal7 regarding the im!osed measures% highlights
the similarities arising from a s!ecific economic !olicy angle 6figure :7(
It is also remarkable that in the cases of the +uro area countries% IMF for the first time
circum"ented its o&n 1uota rules of -00 !er cent annual and :00 !er cent cumulati"e
borro&ing rights 6figure 77(
:
htt!>LL&&&(imf(orgLe,ternalLn!Le,rLfactsLconditio(htm(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos

Figure 0
Figure 1
The Greek bailout !rogram &as scheduled based u!on three ma.or ob.ecti"es>
a7Im!lementation of austerity measures% to restore fiscal balance% b7<ri"atiBation of
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 9
go"ernment assets &orth 8D0bn by the end of 203D% to kee! the debt !ile
sustainable% and c7Im!lementation of outlined structural reforms% to im!ro"e
com!etiti"eness and gro&th !ros!ects( The !ayment of the Greek bailout &as
scheduled to ha!!en in se"eral disbursements from May 2030 until Oune 203-( ;ue
to a &orsened recession and the fact that Greece had &orked slo&er than e,!ected
to com!ly &ith !oint b and c abo"e% there &as a need for one year e,tension to offer
Greece both more time and money in the attem!t to restore the economy( In 2ctober
2033% +uroBone leaders conse1uently agreed to offer a second 83-0 billion bailout
loan for Greece 6IMF contribution 2 billion 87% conditional not only the
im!lementation of another austerity !ackage 6combined &ith the continued demands
for !ri"atiBation and structural reforms outlined in the first !rogram7% but also that all
!ri"ate creditors holding Greek go"ernment bonds should sign a deal acce!ting lo&er
interest rates and a D-%D !ercent face "alue loss( This !ro!osed restructure of all
Greek !ublic debt held by !ri"ate creditors% &hich at that !oint of time constituted a
D !ercent share of the total Greek !ublic debt% &ould according to the bailout !lan
reduce the o"erall !ublic debt burden &ith roughly 8330 billion( ' debt relief e1ual to
a lo&ering of the debt-to-G;< ratio from a forecast 39 !ercent in 2032 do&n to
roughly 3:0 !ercent in 2032% &ith the lo&er interest !ayments in subse1uent years
combined &ith the agreed fiscal consolidation of the !ublic budget and significant
financial funding from a !ri"atiBation !rogram% e,!ected to gi"e a further debt decline
to a more sustainable le"el at 320(D !ercent of G;< by 2020( The second bailout
deal &as finally ratified by all !arties in February 2032% and became acti"e one month
later% after the last condition regarding a successful debt restructure of all Greek
go"ernment bonds% had also been met(
7
4ommenting on the restructuring of the Greek debt Mouriel Roubini noted that>
A myth is developing that private creditors have accepted significant losses in the restructuring of
Greece's debt, while the official sector gets off scot free. . . . The reality is that private creditors got a
very sweet deal while most actual and future losses have been transferred to the official creditors i.e.
ta!payers". . . .Greece's public debt will remain" unsustainable at close to #$% per cent of gross
domestic product& at best, it will fall to #'% per cent by '%'% and could rise as high as #(% per cent of
G)*. +hy, A -haircut- of .##%bn on privately held bonds is matched by an increase of .#/%bn in the
debt Greece owes to official creditors. A significant part of this increase in Greece0s official debt goes to
bail out private creditors& ./%bn for upfront cash sweeteners on the new bonds that effectively
guarantee much of their face value. Any future further haircuts to ma1e Gree1 debt sustainable will
therefore fall disproportionately on the growing claims of the official sector. 2oans of at least .'5bn from
the 3uropean Financial 4tability Facility to the Gree1 government will go towards recapitalising ban1s in
a scheme that will 1eep those ban1s in private hands and allow shareholders to buy bac1 any public
capital in5ection with sweetly priced warrants. The new bonds will also be sub5ect to 3nglish law, where
the old bonds fell under Gree1 5urisdiction. 4o if Greece were to leave the euro6one, it could no longer
pass legislation to convert euro7denominated debt into new drachma debt. This is an ama6ing
sweetener for creditors. . . .The reality is that most of the gains in good times . . . were privatised while
most of the losses have been now socialised. Ta!payers of Greece's official creditors, not private
bondholders, will end up paying for most of the losses deriving from Greece's past, current and future
insolvency.8
9
The 3
st
Greek bailout !rogram failed and as far as the 2
nd
one is concerned% the
+urogrou! met on 32 Mo"ember 2032% to discuss and decide on the e,act siBe and
terms for the Ne,tra bailoutN and the offered Ndebt restructureN( The need for the latter
7
htt!>LLen(&iki!edia(orgL&ikiLGreekPgo"ernment-debtPcrisis(

Mouriel Roubini 67 March 20327( NGreeceKs <ri"ate 4reditors 're the Cucky 2nesN( The '-
Cist( FT(com( Retrie"ed 2 May 203-(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 30
&as recently confirmed by the +uro!ean 4ommissionKs official autumn economic
forecast 2032% finding that if no ne& e,tra Ndebt restructureN is offered% then the debt-
to-G;< ratio &ould rise into ne& heights of 377 !ercent in 2032 and 3 !ercent in
203-(
9
The e,act reasons for the failure of the t&o Greek !rograms% lie on the sim!le
com!arison of IMF*s estimations and the reality that follo&ed 6figure 7(
Figure 2
The IMF*s !ro.ections about the effects of austerity are based on certain
assum!tions( ;es!ite the Fund*s su!!ort for !rotecting s!ending on !o"erty
alle"iation% o"erall e,!enditures cuts including !ublic in"estment and !ublic sector
em!loyment could ha"e detrimental conse1uences for long-term gro&th and
de"elo!ment !ros!ects( 's IMF*s main focus is the re!ayment of !ublic debt through
go"ernment budget*s sur!luses% and the lo&ering of !ublic debt to G;< ratio at
sustainable le"els% one should ha"e in mind the fraction &here the numerator is
!ublic debt and the denominator is G;<( Ae ha"e to decrease the numerator and
increase the denominator( Ahich in turn means increase in !ublic re"enues% and
decrease in !ublic s!ending for the numerator% and gro&th of the economy 6increase
in"estments% boost internal consum!tion% increase e,!orts7 for the denominator( The
im!osed austerity measures and the subse1uent cuts in !ublic s!ending mainly
through &age cuts% !ension cuts% health and education cuts% s1ueeBed li1uidity in the
internal market% &hich in turn increased unem!loyment% businesses defaults% non-
!erforming loans in the banking system( The do&nturn s!iral of the economy &as
una"oidable( <aul @rugman% in his article /?o& the 4ase of 'usterity ?as 4rumbled0%
notes>
9
N+uro!ean economic forecast - autumn 2032N 6<;F7( +uro!ean 4ommission( 7 Mo"ember
2032( Retrie"ed 7 May 203-(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 33
/The turn to austerity after '%#%, however, was so drastic, particularly in 3uropean debtor nations, that
the usual cautions lose most of their force. Greece imposed spending cuts and ta! increases amounting
to #5 percent of G)*:.and unli1e the half7hearted efforts at stimulus, these cuts were sustained and
indeed intensified year after year. 4o how did austerity actually wor1, The answer is that the results
were disastrous75ust about as one would have predicted from te!tboo1 macroeconomics(
30

%'&%L(SI'&S
The &ell-kno&n long lasting &eaknesses of the Greek economy are fueled by &idely
s!read ta, e"asion% corru!tion% bureaucracy% im!artiality% and an e,tensi"e
underground economy 6bet&een 22H and 29H as a !ercentage of G;< for the years
399 to 20307
33
( 's a conse1uence Greece is suffering from lo& !roducti"ity% lack of
inno"ation% absence of Foreign ;irect In"estments( In addition to that% one of the
basic "ulnerabilities of the Greek state is the lo& 1uality of go"ernance% and the
subse1uent result of inca!ability to create go"erning institutions that &ill !romote
social trust( 's Rothstein notes>
;A high level of generali6ed trust is caused by what has been called high <uality government
institutions, especially the institutions that implement public policies. The central basic norm
for these institutions is impartiality. This implies that things li1e discrimination =whether based
on ethnicity, gender, class, etc.>, corruption =in its many forms>, clientelism, nepotism and
political favoritism are very rare or non?e!istent when public officials or professionals
implement public policies:.Thus, designing institutions that implement public policy is to
create =or destroy> social trust.0
#'
Greek !olitical elites !ro"ed to be inca!able in im!osing the needed reforms that
&ould enable Greece to e,!erience sustainable gro&th along &ith fiscal disci!line
and social !ros!erity( The inability of the Greek !olitical elites to im!ose these
necessary reforms of the Greek economy and society% in order to !ro"ide a decent
!resence of Greece in the euro area% has long-li"ing roots in the "arious mechanisms
&hich !re"ail in Greece( Rent-seeking interest grou!s dominate the Greek economy
and society% earning a comfortable income &ithout !ro"iding any &ork at all( These
rent seeking grou!s interact in numerous formations and alliances% su!!orting each
other% e"ery time a reform !olitician or an +# directi"e threatens their rents( These
grou!s are re!resented by key actors in the Greek !olitical arena% and the Greek
economy( They strongly o!!ose any reform &hich may alter the status 1uo% and !ut
in danger the ability to continue earning their immoral and unethical rents( 2n the
other hand the rationally ignorant "oters% suitably mani!ulated by the media 6&hich
are o&ned in a large !ro!ortion by re!resentati"es of the aforementioned rent
seeking grou!s% or members of these grou!s7% also o!!ose any reform% because they
are con"inced that the reforms &ill hurt either their economic or their social &ell-
being( Thus they become a large !ressure grou! against reforms 6and actually
30
htt!>LL&&&(nybooks(comLarticlesLarchi"esL203-L.unL0:Lho&-case-austerity-has-crumbledLQ
!aginationGfalse
33
$chneider Friedrich 620307% The @nfluence of the economic crisis on the shadow economy in
Germany, Greece and the other A3B) countries in '%#%& +hat can be doneQ !a!er a"ailable at>
htt!>LL&&&(econ(.ku(atLmembersL$chneiderLfilesL!ublicationsLCatestResearch2030L$had+cGreec
eP$e!t2030(!df
32
Rothstein 5o 620337% 4reating a $ustainable $olidaristic $ociety> ' Manual% My Tid Ra!!ort
9% 'renagru!!en% $tockholm% $&eden% !( 37(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 32
against their o&n interests7% acting in fa"or of the rent seeking interest grou!s( The
una"oidable result is the entra!ment of any reform !oliticians% the failure of any
reform efforts% and ultimately the general go"ernance failure(
3-
Greek !olitical elites
ha"e lost their legitimacy and so ha"e the !olicies that are im!lemented since the
first Mo# had been signed% bet&een the Greek go"ernment and the Troika( <eo!le
are e,tremely frustrated because the mandate holders delegated to Troika the
res!onsibility to design the domestic !olicies( 5uilding social trust% through the radical
reform of institutions% is one of the ma.or !rere1uisites for the ad.ustment of the
Greek society( The economic crisis and the im!osed austerity measures intensified
all these !roblems and had disastrous effects in both the economy and the society(
Greece is e,!eriencing for the first time since AAII% such high le"els of
unem!loyment% e,treme !o"erty for large !arts of the !o!ulation% marginaliBation of
the &eak !arts of the society( There is an urgent need for an e,!ansionary economic
!olicy% in order to o"ercome the crisis and to re"erse these de"astating results(
2ther&ise the sliding &ill continue and country*s default &ould be the only solution(
'nd in this case% social unrest cannot be e,cluded from the !robable outcomes(
3-
Mitso!oulos Michael and <elagidis Theodore 620337% Cnderstanding the Brisis in Greece From Doom
to Dust% <algra"e Macmillan% #@(
IMF and the Greek economy - Routos 3-
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The +uroBone*s &asted 2!!ortunity for a 5anking #nion that <rotects $o"ereign Finance%
4+$ifo Forum =L2032(
+4 ;irectorate-General for +conomic and Financial 'ffair 620307% The +conomic 'd.ustment
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Foundation for +conomic and Industrial Research 6I25+7 620307% The Greek +conomy% Uuarterly
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Frankel Oeffrey 620337% 2"er-o!timism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its im!lications%
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Gros ;aniel 620307% Greece and the IMF% 4+<$ 4ommentary% 2= March 2030(
GuraBiu Rudi and Te1o +!idamn 620327% $o"ereign ;ebt 4risis and its Im!act on Aorld Markets% @D)3
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?acker% Oacob 620327% The politics of redistribution% 2,ford !resentation% <olicy Met&orkL F+<$% 2--
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