Management Education

An International Journal
ONTHEORGANIZATION.COM
VOLUME 13 ISSUE 2
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Nationalism and International Relations
Education
'International Relations' as a Political Actor
BENEDICT E. DEDOMINICIS
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
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Nationalism and International Relations
Education: International Relations
As a Political Actor
Benedict E. DeDominicis, The Catholic University of Korea, Republic of Korea
Abstract: The Cold War and its end had a powerful impact on the social sciences and the educational socialization of
succeeding generations of international relations scholars. The assumption of successful US containment of an
expansionist USSR is supported by the vast network of vested bureaucratic organizational interests created during the
Cold War. Their command over extensive research, educational and career resources promotes this view of recent world
history. It also serves as a justification for the global expansion and institutionalization of American hegemony into
regions hitherto divided into US and Soviet spheres of influence. The assumption of the benignity of this hegemony is
problematic because of US opposition to some nationalist movements challenging their regional political status quo.
Specific US evaluation of these movements depended largely on their perceived role in facilitating Cold War
containment of Soviet imperialism. Some nationalist movements, such as Zionism, succeeded in intensifying US
support partly because of the perceived Soviet alliance with rejectionist Arab regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Third
World nationalist movements including political Islam tended to be seen with trepidation because of their opposition to
the post-colonial order. These international client states and regimes were creations of the British and the French,
critical European US allies during the Cold War. Nationalisms nature requires sovereign independence for the nation,
but US failure to perceive this imperative led to Cold War tragedies such as the Vietnam War. The predominance of neo-
realism in international relations theory reflects this legacy and the vested interests that developed around it which thrive
today.
Keywords: Arab, Cold War, international relations, Israel, nationalism, neo-realism, political Islam, soft power, United
States, Vietnam
Introduction
ccording to one international relations theorist for a field that appears to be perpetually
consumed by identity crises, careful attention to some of the previous identities by
which we were possessed would represent a fruitful research agenda (Schmidt 2013,
22). Classical realism as an international relations theory had a strong emphasis on
nationalism, focusing on the Great Powers. According to one standard undergraduate textbook,
neo-realism lost this focus on state-level factors such as nationalism in explaining state behavior
(Nye et al. 2013, 60). The focus of neo-realism is on international systemic imperatives rooted
ultimately in the anarchic nature of world politics.
1
This focus, however, has been portrayed as
inadequate to explain US behavior after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US (Krebs et al.
2007, 449-50). Nevertheless, neo-realism continues as the predominant theory in US
international relations academic discourse. It provides a scholarly underpinning for US post Cold
War global hegemony claims. Nye et al. state that the collapse of communism in Europe and the
USSR shifted international politics to the US itself and its role as the sole, remaining
1
Within the realist international relations paradigm, classical realism assumes that power-driven human nature impels
states to act as if the optimization of power and influence is their primary motivation in international relations. Neo-
realismemphasizes the anarchic, self-help nature of the international relations system, i.e. no world government, as
generating the overriding imperatives for states to act to optimize their relative power and influence (Walt 1998, 31). It is
traditionally contrasted with liberalism/idealism, with the latter paradigms assumption of an essentially pragmatic,
mercantile human character impelling states to promote international commerce and finance, supporting cooperation and
liberal economic and political development (Walt 1998, 32).
A
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MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
superpower which was now the hegemon (2013, 47). It has undermined a theoretical focus
on nationalism in relation to political change due to demands for mass political participation
(Parent et al. 2011, 194). The expansion of the national development stabilization model
favored by the US supports cooperative local political elites. The establishment of a network of
global American style universities typifies and exemplifies this trend and its concomitant value
system and supportive attitudinal worldviews (Amthor et al. 2011, 77). Establishment of these
international academic institutions both reflects the selective soft power appeal of the US
model, as well as reinforces it. The prospective establishment of such academic institutions
within states resistant to US political development influence in places such as China, Iran and
Russia is unlikely. Other state (e.g. Bulgaria) and non-state (e.g. the predominantly Kurdish
Iraqi Autonomous Region
2
) actors seek objectives through intensive cooperation with the US.
Establishing an American university serves as a statement of a commitment of allegiance to
American regional foreign policy aims. One example is USAID-supported American University
in Bulgaria.
3
It came into existence in 1991 at the beginning of the violent disintegration of
neighboring Yugoslavia. These benefits may include overcoming a crisis of national
development with the collapse of Soviet hegemony as with Bulgaria (Mearsheimer 2013, 24).
4

They also may include support for implicit, critical objectives such as national sovereignty and
self-determination. Some actors aspiring towards national self-determination, however,
established themselves as opponents of US regional foreign policy objectives during the Cold
War. Today, they are likely to be portrayed as rogue elements within the international
community (Cottam et al. 2001, 116-17). US soft power approaches will therefore be less
effective towards such actors as they represent powerful mass public national self-determination
aspirations. The inability of the US to control political dynamics in Afghanistan highlights these
challenges (Jones 2013).
A persistent assumption in contemporary US-led state-building policies is that national
identities can be constructed within more or less arbitrarily defined territorial boundaries.
Moreover, these shared, community-wide identity-loyalties will be sufficiently strong to support
democratic governments. However, these policies failed in South Vietnam, and their
effectiveness is questionable in multi-ethnic Afghanistan and in multi-national Iraq.
International relations disciplinary theorizing should incorporate Great Power support for
self-determination for nations aspiring to sovereign unity as a critical component for soft power
capability. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has proposed a hard versus soft power dichotomy that has
become part of journalistic and political discourse.
5
Hard power is the ability to get others to do
what they would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward and soft power is
the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion, because others
want what you want (Nye 2001, 354). A state with borders arbitrarily defined by previous
2
The American University of Iraq Sulaimani. Accessed J uly 7, 2013. http://auis.edu.iq/.
3
American University in Bulgaria, Accessed J uly 7, 2013.
http://www.aubg.bg/template5.aspx?page=4092&menu=000000003.
4
Originally writing in The Atlantic, November 1990, Mearsheimer references Bulgarian nationalist claims to neighboring
Yugoslav Macedonia as one of the conflicts between Eastern European states [that] might also threaten the stability of
the new European order.
5
e.g. Luke Harding (Berlin) and Nicholas Watt (Brussels), Bulgaria and Romania to join EU in 2007 despite corruption
fears, The Guardian, April 4, 2006. Accessed J uly 6, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/apr/04/eu.politics
and Olli Rehn, Brussels must offer the Balkans a credible future, Financial Times, April 2, 2006. Accessed J uly 4,
2006. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/85843b30-c269-11da-ac03-
0000779e2340,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F1%2F85843b30-
c269-11da-ac03-0000779e2340.html&_i_referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F#axzz2YHXBKRG7.
According to EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, The prospect of EU membership anchored the transition of
these countries fromcommunism after 1989, boosting the modernisers who opened up their economies to foreign
investment and reformed the state. Enlargement is an extraordinary example of soft power and it is one of our most
powerful and successful policies.
14
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
colonial administrators is more likely to lack a strong community-wide, shared primary national
self-identification. The post-colonial state itself may be perceived by the modal citizen as
opposed to national self-determination aspirations for his or her actual national identity
community. This de facto national self-identity community of the modal citizen may have
boundaries defining the demos that clash with existing state territorial boundaries.
6
In such a
state, democratic governments are more likely to be vulnerable. These national self-
determination demands may require secession as in the case of multi-national Yugoslavia and the
USSR. They may also require irredentism/reunification/unification as in the case of Vietnam,
Germany and Korea (the last case is of course not yet successful). Failure to accommodate
nationalism as the aspiration to national unification and self-determination contributes to failed
state-building policies.
International relations theorys weaknesses stem from too close association with US power,
due specifically to the legacy of the Cold War. The focus on this two-generation international
systemic conflict undermined the necessary focus on internal factors such as nationalism for
explaining security challenges today.
Globalization, Americanization, and Development
United States national influence dominated trends in mobility of students and faculty following
World War II among those countries allied with it during the Cold War. With the collapse of the
Soviet system at the end of the twentieth century, the American academic model has become
predominant throughout most of the world (Wildavsky 2012, 3-4). According to Ben Wildavsky,
the modern American research university adapted and perfected the model first developed in
Germany of combining research and scholarship. Thereby, for the last 50 years, American
universities have been the envy of the world, and may well remain so for decades to come (4).
Wildavsky continues that the emergence of a global free trade in minds has accelerated as
a result of the globalization of the US national academic model. It is partly the consequence of
the emergence of a competitive meritocracy in global academia both in student admissions and
faculty hiring and promotion (5). In this emerging world, according to Wildavsky, globally more
and more people will have the opportunity to advance on the basis of what they know, rather
than who they are (5).
A difficulty with this claim is that this international academic market, as with any market,
cannot exist outside of a social context that creates and supports it. Reciprocally, strong states,
not weak ones, create national markets. This globalized-American global academic market has
been significantly dependent upon respective national foreign policy objectives that are at least
congruent. The rise of political Islam throughout the Greater Middle East, however, raises
questions about the extent to which the global liberal academic utopia envisaged by Wildavsky is
likely. Furthermore, the claim that American models are destined to prevail seems to echo a
tendency to continue to celebrate a supposed American victory in the Cold War. American liberal
models may have superseded Soviet Communist ones. American models did so, however, insofar
as these American models were associated in terms of local public opinion with human rights
ideals, including national self-determination. The bloody conundrum that the US faces at least in
the Middle East is that the US is seen generally as having a problematic relationship to popular
self-determination in this region.
7

6
Robin Wight, Imagining a Remapped Middle East: [Op-Ed] New York Times, September 29, 2013, p. 7. Accessed
October 1, 2013. ProQuest. The piece concludes noting that Robin Wight is also a distinguished scholar at the United
States Institute of Peace.
7
AzamAhmed, 11 Afghan Children Killed in 2 Taliban Bombings, New York Times, J une 3, 2013. Accessed J une 8,
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/world/asia/young-afghans-and-nato-troops-killed-in-taliban-attacks.html. The
report concludes with a Kabul-based analysts comment: One of the main reasons that despite heavy civilian casualties
15
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Advancing on the basis of what they know, rather than who they are is problematic when
what they are is intensely contested. This dichotomy is a problematic one. Participation in
American-centric international regimes exploiting American models includes a desire to exploit
these regimes and models for national development. National economic development is not only
desirable for achieving the economic development of alleviating poverty. It is also a precursor for
creating the power capabilities necessary to achieve national independence, dignity and unity, if
not grandeur (Cottam 1977, 36-37). In other words, who they are in terms of nationalism has
been a critical, contested variable determining participation in US-anchored international
academic networks. Development policy sectors will likely display a central national leadership
component. This state leadership will be particularly evident in policy sectors with critical
international components, i.e. international trade. Similarly, individual and faculty student
success in participation in the globalizing academic market place will likely be a product of a
long term national policy commitment.
Successful national competitive participation in the postwar US-centric global political
economy is an issue of state policy. National academic, and therefore research and development,
success is therefore also a product of national policy. A commitment, however, to achieving
national unity, independence and dignity is likely to be problematic in a polity in which no
societal consensus exists on the boundaries of the national demos. Political trade offs have to be
made, for example, in developing Egypt through close alliance with the US. Doing so may
require forsaking pan-Arab and pan-Islamic objectives that will more likely generate hostility
among sympathetic Egyptian societal constituencies. The US government created the National
Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute to support less coercive
forms of US intervention in the post Cold War era. They aimed to influence the internal political
development of target states.
8
They were subjects of international media attention immediately
following the Egyptian military-led removal of President Hosni Mubarak.
9
Consequently, a
discussion of academic globalization requires a parallel critique that applies to globalization as
Americanization more broadly. It requires a critique of the assumptions that characterize the
view that globalization is inherently a positive political process.
US-dominated globalization and development in the Middle East has long been
problematic. As illustrated by the recent Hollywood film production, Argo, the US positioned
itself in opposition to Iranian nationalism during the Cold War. The beginning of the film
highlights the US role in the overthrow of the secular nationalist regime under Mohammed
Mossadegh in 1953. This film is typical of portrayals of the event in its view that the primary
motivation of the US was oil. Mossadegh nationalized the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian oil
company. Oil and oil company profits, however, were only secondary motivations for the US in
this case. More important was the US view that the range of Mossadeghs policies were making
people support the Taliban is the presence of the foreign forces in the country, [] People indeed blame the foreigners
for everything that happens in Afghanistan because they believe that if it was not for the foreigners the Taliban would not
have killed civilians.
8
Barbara Slavin, Foreign policy 'all about' interference U.S. has cloaked a few daggers in its Cold War days, USA
Today, J uly 21, 1997. Accessed in May 2013 on ProQuest.
9
Stanley Meisler, Why Egypt Doesnt Trust Us: Private pro-democracy groups funded by the U.S. have a troubling
history, Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, March 7, 2012. Accessed J uly 5, 2013.
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/07/opinion/la-oe-meisler-prodemocracy-20120306. Stanley Meisler, a former
foreign and diplomatic correspondent for The Times, is the author most recently of "United Nations: A History." Yet,
the Egyptian military removed the elected Islamist president of Egypt and has been a major annual recipient of US
military aid for decades, e.g. Mandy Clark, Analysis: US billions prop up military that toppled Egypt's elected
president, NBC News, J uly 4, 2013. Accessed J uly 5, 2013.
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/04/19283700-analysis-us-billions-prop-up-military-that-toppled-egypts-
elected-president.
16
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
Iran vulnerable to Soviet-inspired subversion by the local Communist, Tudeh party.
10
This
view that US intervention in the Middle East is primarily motivated by economic considerations
continues stubbornly to persist. Given the potential corporate profits that the US has forsaken in
Iran through its isolationist efforts since the Islamic revolution, this argument is questionable.
The Cold War protagonists behind what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s
recognized the Islamic Republics potential usefulness in combating Soviet Communist
expansion.
11
Both the US and the USSR had justified their Cold War support for authoritarian
client regimes as serving modernization and development (Baber 2001; Gilman 2003, 9-20).
American political science helped lay the foundations for this contemporary tendency to
promote globalization as Americanization during the Cold War. It started with the assumption
that radicalism in the Third World was to be viewed with suspicion as undermining containment
of Soviet influence under the guise of Communism. Third World revolutionaries were either
sympathetic to Soviet objectives, or were generating such turmoil that Soviet agents would
exploit it. Political science as a field developed within this context. Development was
juxtaposed to decay by one of the founders of the political development field, Samuel
Huntington (1965). The new left had its expositors in the academy that gained particular
prominence during and immediately after the Vietnam War. A consequence of the Vietnam
debacle was to generate greater disagreement within the international relations academic field.
According to Richard W. Cottam, these differences may be understood as differences in
assumptions regarding the fundamental motivations for state foreign policy behavior (1977, 2-8,
15-30, 22-23, 29-30).
The impact of the Vietnam War on the political science subfield of international relations
arguably contributed to the dissensus in the field that never subsided. Nevertheless, factions
within it demonstrated predominance. The lack of consensus on the nature of international
relations is highlighted in popular introductory graduate textbooks surveying the international
relations discipline. Constructivist contributors to one textbook claim that the neo-realist
perspective highlights maintenance of international hierarchy.
12
They claim that neo-realism
emphasizes this hierarchy as the antidote to violent state behavior deriving from the national
security dilemma deriving from international anarchy (Eckersley 2008, 348; Shapcott 2008,
332; Burke 2008, 365).
13
The dominance of neo-realism in the field is acknowledged; neo-
realism is the foil against which alternative paradigmatic approaches have developed is another
theme in this standard textbook (Quirk 2008, 520).
Another graduate textbook reviewing the development of the international relations field
declares that it has been critically shaped by developments in international relations (Schmidt
2013, 6, 21). It is a field in which American and to some extent British parochialism is evident
with its focus being their foreign policy topics of the day (Schmidt 2013, 7).
10
Central Intelligence Agency. November 1953. Probable Developments in Iran through 1954. National Intelligence
Estimate. 170 (pdf pagination); Scott A. Koch. J une 1998. Zendebad, Shah!: The Central Intelligence Agency and the
Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953. Washington: History Staff, Central Intelligence
Agency. 224-25, 228; Central Intelligence Agency, 2008. Agency and the Hill CIAs Relationship with Congress, 1946-
2004. Washington: CIAs Center for the Study of Intelligence. 279-81. Accessed J uly 5, 2013.
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/BPCIA.pdf.
11
United States Congress. 1989. US Congressional Serial Set, Senate Report No. 216, Iran-Contra Investigation,
Appendix C, Chronology of Events, 100
th
Congress, 1
st
Session, 1987. Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office. 166-67. Accessed J une 6, 2013. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Report-of-the-
Congressional-Committees-Investigating-the-IranContra-Affair.pdf.
12
Constructivismis a postmodern international relations paradigm emphasizing the political construction of reality
through dominance of communication to determine prevailing givens in international relations, e.g. the assumption of
international anarchy as inexorably impelling states to extend their domination where they can (Walt 1998, 40-41).
13
In the security dilemma, one actors redoubled security efforts are perceived as threatening the security of its
neighbors and prospective rivals. A possible result is an arms race and conflict spiral raising the probability of the
outbreak of war (Hampson 2001, 390-93).
17
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Cold War Lessons
Nationalism as a factor challenging international political stability received renewed academic
international attention with the collapse of European Communism (e.g. Gurr 1996). It witnessed
the reemergence of long-suppressed ethnic nationalist animosities around the world, but
scholarly attention initially focused on the Balkans. The emergence of Serb nationalist leader
Slobodan Milosevic was problematic from a Western perspective. US influence had generally
supported the respective, prevailing self-determination goals of west European nations. A
consequence was complacency in assuming that NATOs interests corresponded with European
democratic national self-determination.
14

Earlier in Southeast Asia, the US confronted a collectivist Asian peasant populist movement
articulating its goals in Marxist terminology, and the US suffered a tactical defeat. The Vietnam
episode had subsequently been basically dismissed as an anomaly due to poor US diplomacy.
The inability to preserve South Vietnam and prevent Communist victories in Laos and Cambodia
has been explained away as due to a combination of factors. These include poor strategic
planning, in combination with Soviet and Chinese assistance to their regional neighbors opposing
the US. The collective tendency towards de-emphasis of this case has its foundations in an
overarching prevailing assumption: that the USSR was indeed an aggressive, imperialist actor.
US containment strategy suffered a defeat in Southeast Asia, but it was only one extended
battle in one regional theatre of the global Cold War. The case did not successfully challenge the
prevailing assumption of US-Soviet competition as the primary source of causation of change in
international relations. Poor US diplomatic leadership during the Johnson administration resulted
in US full-scale direct intervention in a land war on the Asian landmass (Record 1998).
The view that the US ultimately prevailed in this Cold War was reaffirmed by the rapid,
peaceful disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Critique of the assumption that the
USSR really was a global imperialist power was eclipsed. The rise of Ronald Reagan with the
defeat of Jimmy Carter was followed quickly by the international dtente efforts of the new
Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.
The speed and impact of these political events overwhelmed disciplinary challenges to the
assumptions of containment that emerged following the Vietnam catastrophe. The prevailing
(though certainly not the only) view was that American power and influence brought peace and
prosperity through alliance with US regional interests. Stability in international relations
became equated with preventing instability and chaos. In this view, the latter earlier had been
subversively promoted and exploited by the expansionist USSR. Soviet imperialism was
perceived as promoting and exploiting instability primarily through proxies and subversion. In
this Cold War worldview, Soviet success was supposedly evident in Soviet advances during the
Carter Administration.
15
Reagan political allies pointed to Soviet extensions in Africa (the Horn,
Angola, Mozambique) and in Latin America (Nicaragua, Grenada, an insurgency in El
Salvador).
16
The culmination was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, occurring in the midst of
the US national humiliation of the US diplomats being held hostage in revolutionary Iran. The
14
e.g. Slate.com. Was Slobodan Milosevic Ever Democratically Elected? October 12, 2000. Accessed J uly 11, 2013.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2000/10/was_slobodan_milosevic_ever_democratically_elect
ed.html.
15
J eane J . Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships & Double Standards, Commentary, November 1979. Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standards/. Prof. Kirkpatrick was the US ambassador
to the UN during the Reagan administration.
16
e.g. Constantine C. Menges, That Old Summit Magic, National Review, J une 24, 1988. 40,2: 37-40. Accessed May
25, 2013. Academic Search Premier. Writing fromhis position in the American Enterprise Institute, former Reagan
administration National Security Council member Menges argued that in the three US-Soviet, dtentes preceding the
late 1980s dtente, the Soviets exploited American relaxation of vigilance against Soviet expansionismto expand
throughout the world.
18
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
Carter administration had more Cold War oriented members. The most prominent was
Zbigniew Brzezinski. He viewed events in revolutionary Iran overwhelmingly in terms of the
US-Soviet cold war conflict with little significance attributed to Iranian nationalism (Cottam
1988, 175). National Security Adviser Brzezinski eclipsed the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
who did not see the USSR as aiming at imperial expansion (Aronoff 2006, 430). In its final
years, the rhetoric and policies of the Carter Administration converged with those of its explicitly
Cold War-oriented successor administration (Njlstad 2004, 218-19).
In the rhetoric of the Reagan campaign, Carter had diverted the US into a human rights
focus away from the Soviet threat, allowing the USSR to make critical gains (Nichols 2002, 30-
31).
17
Ronald Reagan would reaffirm and solidify this refocus on the Cold War with his Evil
Empire speech in March 1983.
18
In this speech, he described the Soviet Communist leadership:
they are the focus of evil in the modern world.
19
This speech highlighted the predominantly
Manichean worldview that had characterized the prevailing view in the US during the height of
the Cold War. As a consequence, alternative, fundamentally independent sources of disturbance
to the international status quo, including Third World nationalisms, were downgraded.
This politically resurgent worldview in Washington corresponded with clear signals of what
appeared to be the decline of the Soviet Union. Gorbachevs emergence and declaration of
perestroika and glasnost, along with his call for new thinking confirmed the worldview of the
neo-Cold Warriors. The Soviet Union had surrendered following the reassertion of the will and
determination of the US to resist. This will and determination included complete support for the
Islamic resistance in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation.
20

Europe, in contrast, was a center of global economic and military capability. The US enjoyed
politically prevailing sympathy with nationalist public opinion there against authoritarian Soviet
domination. The challenge of competing intra-Yugoslav nationalisms to the European political
status quo post 1989 was therefore a crisis precipitator. Together with the Iraqi military
annexation of Kuwait, these events instigated the US political establishments collective
reassessment of the US role in the post Cold War world. The focus was on regions like the
Persian Gulf and Europe where the US had built up large Cold War era political and military
assets. In contrast, the relative lack of US willingness to maintain its commitment to its
humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the face of local resistance was notable. The later
absence of US collective political willingness to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 fits
with this pattern.
The prevailing assumption in US policymaking circles was that the US won the Cold War;
the US liberal political and economic challenge to the USSR was responsible for this outcome
(Raymond 1992, 77). Within the field of international relations, one point of agreement across
the disciplinary divides within it is that it failed to predict this momentous event culminating in
17
Nichols argues that Carter inherited the preceding Republican administrations commitment to cooperation with the
USSR that facilitated Soviet advances. The Carter administration returned to a US containment policy based on
increasing nuclear military strategic capabilities years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
18
President Ronald Reagan - "Evil Empire" Speech, Miller Center, University of Virginia. Accessed March 30, 2013
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=do0x-Egc6oA. Described as Address to the National Association of Evangelicals in
Orlando, Florida that would come to represent Reagan's view of the Soviet Union. Reagan defends America's J udeo-
Christian traditions against the Soviet Union's totalitarian leadership and lack of religious faith, expressing his belief that
these differences are at the heart of the fight between the two nations.
19
The complete transcript of the speech available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3409 (Miller
Center, University of Virginia). Accessed March 30, 2013.
20
The Power of Nightmares: The PhantomVictory, BBC News, J anuary 14, 2005. Accessed J uly 6, 2013.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/3951615.stm. On 25 December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. []
The invasion gave a common cause to an extraordinary alliance of radical Islamists in Afghanistan and around the world
and to the neo-conservatives in the US. It was a key battleground of the Cold War []. Full documentary accessed J uly
3, 2013. http://archive.org/details/ThePowerOfNightmares-Episode1BabyItsColdOutside. Also available on
www.youtube.com.
19
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
the end of the USSR itself (Barnett et al. 2008, 66). One writer describes it as a dismal failure
in explaining the rise of constructivism as an alternative paradigmatic approach in international
relations (Adler 2013, 118). A consequence has been encouragement of increasing disciplinary
theoretical diversity that initially intensified following the Vietnam debacle.
According to Shapcott, the catastrophe and failure of American policy guided by positivist
thinking in Vietnam was caused by a technical reasoning orientation. Hans J. Morgenthau and
other classical realists shared this concern. This failure together with the revival of the Cold War
in 1980, invigorated the critical theory school as a challenge to prevailing neo-realism (331).
Schapcott quotes Robert Cox, theory is always for someone and for some purpose. It
thereby reflects their cognitive interests and purposes. Critical theorists claimed that Waltz and
the neo-realists effort to develop a social science of international relations excessively
emphasized parsimony. They thereby overlooked the potentialities for change in global society.
Instead, they saw only a world of war, great-power rivalry, and systemic reproduction. It thereby
endorsed the status quo of nuclear terror, and neglected to see terror as a moral problem, and
therefore as a political issue, rather than as a merely technical one. According to critical theorists,
the neo-realists see a world in which only state sovereignty, necessity and anarchy as part of
immutable laws determine human destiny. Language and communication give material
conditions meaning, according to hermeneutic approaches. They interpret and understand the
self-understanding of an actors others, rather than focus on independent explanation of a
mechanistic process (331-33).
The dissensus in the international relations subfield of political science has been addressed
by at least two predominant graduate seminar textbooks marketed and sold. They acknowledge
that international relations theory has not developed a unified and synthetic understanding of
international relations. The progress in individual areas of international relations theory has,
paradoxically, not aggregated into progress for the field as a whole (Reus-Smit et al. 2008, 32).
Reus-Smit and Snidal argue that a primary obstacle to progress in this direction is what they call
identity politics. They credit postmodernist international relations theory with this insight: A
central insight of postmodernism is that actors construct their identities through the construction
of radical others who we are is defined against an other who is everything we are not (32).
They claim that the problem in moving towards such a synthesis in international relations theory
is this identity politics.
State Failure and State Building
In the post Cold War policy analysis arena, failed or weak states became a prominent term
within the discipline. They constitute one of the main challenges that the global US hegemon
faces (Crenshaw 2007, 81; Kemp 2007; Ayoob 2007; Gurr 1996, 64; Freedman 2001, 315;
Williams 2001; Brown 2001; Nye 2001, 360-61). The various regional and global regimes in the
political and economic field became valuable legacies of the Cold War that were to be expanded
and developed. These regimes were the tools that implemented the containment strategy assumed
to be successful in preventing the victory of presumed Soviet global imperial intentions (Mastny
1999).
21
Instability became therefore not only a challenge to particular American interests, but
also to these globalizing economic and political regimes that had emerged during the Cold War.
Failed states are a threat because they allow for anarchy within which militant non-state actors,
particularly militant Islamist jihadists, may exist and thrive. The sources of this instability were
not adequately examined because of the apparent, supposed overwhelming Cold War victory of
21
Mastny addresses the revisionism gaining ground within the American intelligentsia that the Soviet Union may not
have been aggressive, but by doing so he demonstrates that this initial presumption predominated during the Cold War.
20
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
the US-led international regime system. The view that failed states can be rectified through
state building has come under strong criticism.
22

Conceptualizing the academic response to the collapse of the Cold War and the rise of the
international unipolar moment requires sampling of representative material (Cottam et al. 2001,
246-49). It is evident in the content of three textbooks published by the US government-financed
United States Institute of Peace, which first received Congressional funding during the Reagan
administration in 1984.
23
These textbooks are described as focusing particularly on those
students preparing to assume professional positions in organizations participating directly in
intervention (Solomon 2007, xi).
24
They all start from the assumption that the US must and will
be in a position to provide global leadership in meeting post Cold War international challenges.
The first is Managing Global Chaos: Sources Of and Responses To International Conflict,
Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela All, eds. (United States Institute of
Peace, 1996). It came out just a few years after the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, US withdrawal from Mogadishu and the
disintegration of the USSR. The title indicates the perspective; the end of the Cold War had
resulted in chaos, which the US then had to manage.
In the next edition of this large edited volume, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, eds.
(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), represents the analytical focus of policy makers
during an interregnum. NATOs air war against Serbia over Kosovo had recently concluded.
Macedonia had demonstrated tendencies towards violent disintegration, which had been averted.
One chapter in Turbulent Peace highlights the role of UN peacekeeping in leading this successful
case of international intervention (Jentleson 2001, 256). It was followed by Leashing the Dogs of
War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson,
Pamela Aall, eds. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
25
The last included
the response to the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The three large edited volumes contain almost no references to the US Vietnam failed
intervention and expansion of the war in Southeast Asia.
26
A brief substantive reference to
22
AdamNossiter, Rebuilding of Mali Faces Daunting Obstacles, Despite Outside Aid, New York Times, May 17, 2013.
Accessed J uly 7, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-
aid.html?_r=0. Nossiter quotes an economist Professor Easterly of New York University, who warned in regard to the
panoply of programs constituting international intervention in Mali against the Islamist extremists, that "It's almost a
self-satirizing plan," that may end up as in Afghanistan "pouring in money to a fictional government. [] In the past
few years there's been this delusion of fixing failed states," [] "Instead of the common-sense view that it's extremely
difficult to fix failed states with aid, it sort of goes to the reverse extreme: that it becomes one of the best possible
opportunities to comprehensively transformthe whole country."
23
Al Kamen, J ust Give Peace a Chance? Washington Post, February 24, 2013. Accessed J uly 7, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/24/AR2011022406522.html; Richard Solomon,
President, USIP, Opinion Contributor, No compromises on national security, Politico, February 17, 2011, Accessed
J uly 7, 2013. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49723.html; Stephen Zunes, Progressive Defense of Weiner
Overlooks His Right-Wing Foreign Policy, Truthout, J une 20, 2011. Accessed J uly 7, 2013. http://www.truth-
out.org/news/item/1696:progressive-defense-of-weiner-overlooks-his-rightwing-foreign-policy. Zunes, a professor of
politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco, where he chairs the programin Middle Eastern
Studies, writes that [t]hough the organization [USIP (BD)] is ideologically diverse in orientation and sometimes
criticized fromthe left for its rather centrist orientation, Weiner apparently considers its "peace" orientation a threat to the
American and Israeli wars he has so eagerly supported. Congressman Anthony Weiner (D-NY) (since resigned) and
Congressman J acob Chaffetz (R-UT) led a 2011 attempt to end US government funding to USIP.
24
Solomon is writing as the President of the United States Institute of Peace.
25
Note that this volume has received the following endorsement featured prominently on the front cover: Leashing the
Dogs of War receives Outstanding Academic Title Award by the library journal CHOICE. [sic] at U.S. Institute of Peace
Press, Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Accessed J uly 9, 2013.
http://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=146848.
26
The one substantive reference among these three volumes claims that the Vietnamepisode taught American
policymakers that Americans will not tolerate high casualties, which restricts American policymakers decisional
21
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Vietnam is limited to the 2007 volume, noting the political impact of high US casualties in
limiting US military intervention options (Kemp 2007, 62-63). Somalia is similarly referenced in
this perspective. No discussion is present about the assumptions that lead to these failed policies.
Rather, the focus is on the political conditions and limitations for imposing US will. Kemp
references Serbian aggression and notes that the NATO-low casualty areal bombardment
attack in the Kosovo crisis was the model for interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)
(2007, 60). Kemp notes that the US intervention in Iraq then developed in ways that began to
generate significant casualties.
Leashing the Dogs of War especially focuses on failed states as creating these conditions
for radicalism. State building is necessary to counteract the internal domestic environments
within states that engender extremism and terrorism and insurgency. Again, the focus is on
stability of sovereign authority within existing state borders. This focus was subsequently
suspended when US alliance with secessionist forces exceed the willingness of the US to commit
sources to resist them. If the US allies with them, as in the case of Kosovar Albanian nationalism,
then the secessionist forces will eventually succeed. The strategy therefore may seem to focus on
stability. However, this stability is self-serving. The US abandons the stability strategy if and
when resistance to change intensifies conflicts to the point that it risks a threat to more important
US interests. Consequently, the US supported Kosovo independence in 2008 to avoid
intensification and targeting of resistance by nationalist Kosovars. The US acquiesced to it rather
than risk the rise of militant political Islam among the Kosovars.
27

Conclusion
The US collectively has difficulty accommodating nationalist pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism
today because of their problematic relationship to US Middle East allies and Cold War
containment policies. US nationalism associates the perceived Cold War victory with these US
national security establishment actors and the vast organizational and financial resources they
control and allocate (Cottam et al. 2001, 246-49). In the Middle East, the US alliance with Israel
has helped place the US in opposition to pan-Arab and pan-Islamic nationalism. During the Cold
War, the US authorities tended to view Israel as a primary US Middle East ally in containment
against regional Soviet allies expanding Soviet influence. As a result, US policy today rejects
post Cold War militant pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism political motivation. Instead, it describes
such actors as adversaries in the war on terrorism. Militant Islamists are even metaphorically
described as a manifestation of a form of global pandemic (Stares et al. 2007, 427).
A theory of human rights that incorporates national self-determination for aspiring nations
should constitute the foundation for a justice-based conflict resolution strategy. To the extent that
international relations as a field has peace as a primary objective, then it needs to conceptualize
national self-determination in relation to development. It needs to conceptualize the national
self-determination drive in terms of behavior and causes. It requires a useful theoretical
conceptualization of this behavior, i.e. a theory of nationalism with its basis in the psychology of
individual and group identity (Cottam et al. 2001). US foreign policy will promote or obstruct
peaceful conflict resolution significantly to the extent that it promotes or obstructs this national
self-determination drive. US political models advocated through American style universities
will contribute to peaceful conflict resolution to the extent they promote human rights. This
latitude today with regard to US military interventions, which the Mogadishu, Somalia debacle in the early 1990s
reinforced (Kemp 2007, 61).
27
Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs, Future of the Balkans and U.S. Policy Concerns, May 13, 2009.
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, RL32136, pp. 10-11 (The War on Terrorismand the Balkans). Accessed J une
8, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32136.pdf
22
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
conceptualization of human rights needs to include national self-determination for communities
partitioned as a legacy of imperialism.
The problem is one of inconsistency. The US has favored some nationalist social movements
while it has opposed others. The causes have to do with other US regional and international
foreign policy objectives. US support or opposition to particular nationalist movements has been
a tactical level response in the pursuit of other strategic objectives. Transnational social
movements typically challenge the political status quo. During the Cold War, the US foreign
policy authorities tended to view radical, pro-change political actors as vulnerable to
manipulation to serve Soviet expansionism. Nationalist actors advocating redrawing of
international borders created by imperial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were
and still are viewed with suspicion. A strategy for peace should recognize the Arab and Muslim
mass sentiment opposing the legacies of colonialism. It requires creation of a political
community superseding established international borders through regional leadership in regional
solutions to regional security problems.
More generally, an international relations disciplinary reassessment regarding the
fundamental assumptions regarding the 45 year-long Cold War would be appropriate. The
prevailing view among both practitioners and political scientists appears to be that the USSR was
a global imperialist power that the US successfully contained. This assumption conintues to
underpin contemporary analysis of the US role international relations. In the Third World, this
assumption of US benignity is less prevalent than in Europe. A reassessment of the Cold War is
important for understanding contemporary sources of conflict, particularly for formulating
political strategy in the Greater Middle East.
Graduate level education in international relations should provide leadership for this
reassessment of the fundamental assumptions of the Cold War specifically regarding Soviet
motivations. Addressing this issue is necessary for more effective critique of the discourse
surrounding the assumption of the necessity of US leadership for responding to todays
extremism, which in one form is terrorism.
28
As noted, the politically prevailing view among
academia and among the US authorities more broadly is the US successfully contained and
thereby defeated an imperialist Soviet totalitarian superpower. This assumption justified
American-led intervention in those regions that were perceived as vulnerable to Soviet
subversion and aggression. Those regions included Third World states with arbitrarily defined
borders often ruled by new ruling elites who remained on cooperative terms as clients of the
former imperial power. Militant pro-change actors in these regions were often seen by the US
government as witting or unwitting agents of Soviet subversion and expansionism. They often
did accept aid and assistance from the Soviet bloc to counter the aid that their pro-Western
domestic adversaries received. As a consequence, these militant pro-change movements
challenging the post-imperial status quo, including pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism, today are
often portrayed as remnant rogue elements with their roots in the Cold War (Cottam et al. 2001,
116-17). The authorities depict them as threatening the fundamentally benign myriad of formal
and informal political institutions and relationships that constitute the US-led international
community that earlier saved world civilization from the USSR.
This worldview may be fundamentally self-serving with regard to US global interventionist
policies today. It may reflect deep motivations in US national identity as well as in the vast
network of vested organizational bureaucratic interests that grew during the Cold War. These
interests include the beneficiaries of decades of US governmental financial and political support
to be found throughout the US academic and policy analysis community. Significant sections of
the discipline of international relations have been coopted into this worldview. Support for this
28
Richard Kemp, Our soldiers didn't die in vain: 446 British lives were lost not for Afghanistan's reconstruction but to
kill violent Islamic extremists The Times [London (UK)], November 9, 2013, p. 22. Accessed November 21, 2013.
ProQuest.
23
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
conclusion is logically apparent when contrasting the predominant US domestic political
discourse immediately following the end of the Second World War with the discourse
immediately post-1989.
As outlined in this essay, in the post-1989 era, the presumption of the necessity and
inevitability of US global leadership prevails within the policy analysis and academic
communities. In the mid 1940s, a vigorous and profound US domestic political debate ensued
about the nature of Soviet motivations and the appropriate role of the US in international affairs.
Those who viewed Soviet belligerency as due to justifiable Soviet suspicions regarding the
ultimate intentions of the Western capitalist powers had powerful advocates. One such voice was
the US vice-president, cabinet secretary, and 1948 Progressive Party presidential candidate,
Henry A. Wallace.
29
The political ascension of the view within the US elite of the Cold War
assumption that the Soviet Union was a Russian version of Nazi Germany which only US
leadership could stop encountered significant resistance. Yet, the power factors supporting a
claim to US global leadership in 1945 were much greater than they were in 1990, after which
pundits and analysts proclaimed the US to be the sole superpower. In 1945, the US had emerged
virtually unscathed from a war that destroyed much of the economic capacity of potential rivals,
with the US alone producing nearly half of the worlds manufacturing output.
30
The US had a
monopoly in nuclear weaponry. Yet, the US establishment elite in 1945 as a whole did not easily
shift to assume that the US must play the global leadership role as US elite political and
mainstream policy analysis circles did immediately after 1990 (Cottam and Cottam et al. 2001,
246-48).
In the light of the political debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US academy should lead the
educational effort to critique the assumptions underlying these presumptions to US global
leadership in international relations. The assumption of the essential benignity of Western-led
Cold War institutions may not correspond with powerful populist/nationalist pro-change political
trends in the Greater Middle East and beyond it. A far-reaching critiquing of the expectations
underlying these failures should have a focus on the assumptions regarding the Cold War. The
US academy is in the best position to lead this critique in the classroom and within the broader
community. Many extensive vested organizational, economic and national pride interests are at
risk preventing the US political establishment from leading this critique. Yet, these same interests
have permeated the US academy, making the challenge more difficult than it was immediately
after the Second World War. As Jrgen Nielsen notes in relation to teaching history:
Where it took only a decade for the discovery by geologists of the phenomenon of
tectonic plates to get into schoolbooks and syllabuses, it takes at least a generation for
something similar to happen in the teaching of history. There are simply too many
vested interests which are obstacles to change. Given that history is so often used to
mobilize communities to conflict it seems obvious that the subject must at least be
taught in such a way that it cannot be thus used (2012, 5-6).
Similar challenges apply today to critical analysis and teaching of contemporary international
relations in the United States.
29
Henry A. Wallace, Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence: Henry A. Wallace Offers an
Alternative to Cold War Containment. J uly 23, 1946. Accessed November 16, 2013 at
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6906/.
30
Paul Kennedy, The (Relative) Decline of America, The Atlantic Monthly, August 1987, 29.
24
DEDOMINICIS: NATIONALISM, POLICY, AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
Acknowledgement
This article was produced through the support of the Catholic University of Korea research fund
and with the support of the University of Illinois Summer Research Laboratory on Russia, East
Europe and Eurasia. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their
positive evaluations. The author would also like to thank the students at the American University
in Bulgaria and the Catholic University of Korea whom the author had the privilege to teach for
their insights and comments. Any errors are solely the authors.
25
MANAGEMENT EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Benedict E. DeDominicis: Assistant professor in the International Studies Department at the
Catholic University of Korea.
28
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