The Supreme Court ruled that a party may present evidence through deposition of witnesses located in a foreign country. Specifically:
- An American company, APL, sought to depose two witnesses located in Taiwan given the Philippines' lack of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
- While depositions are usually meant for discovery rather than presenting evidence at trial, an exception allows deposition testimony when a witness cannot appear in court due to being located outside the Philippines.
- A private organization in Taiwan, the Asian Exchange Center, could administer the deposition as it was the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan.
- Dasmarinas, the opposing party, would still have the opportunity to question the witnesses through submitting cross-interrogatories as
The Supreme Court ruled that a party may present evidence through deposition of witnesses located in a foreign country. Specifically:
- An American company, APL, sought to depose two witnesses located in Taiwan given the Philippines' lack of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
- While depositions are usually meant for discovery rather than presenting evidence at trial, an exception allows deposition testimony when a witness cannot appear in court due to being located outside the Philippines.
- A private organization in Taiwan, the Asian Exchange Center, could administer the deposition as it was the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan.
- Dasmarinas, the opposing party, would still have the opportunity to question the witnesses through submitting cross-interrogatories as
The Supreme Court ruled that a party may present evidence through deposition of witnesses located in a foreign country. Specifically:
- An American company, APL, sought to depose two witnesses located in Taiwan given the Philippines' lack of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
- While depositions are usually meant for discovery rather than presenting evidence at trial, an exception allows deposition testimony when a witness cannot appear in court due to being located outside the Philippines.
- A private organization in Taiwan, the Asian Exchange Center, could administer the deposition as it was the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan.
- Dasmarinas, the opposing party, would still have the opportunity to question the witnesses through submitting cross-interrogatories as
DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES,
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents. [G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993 NARVASA, C.J .:]
TOPIC: Mode of Discovery - Deposition DOCTRINE: Deposition was allowed by the Court because the case is an example of one of the exemptions mentioned in RoC and the deposition would still be admissible because Dasmarinas would still have the opportunity to question the testimonies by submitting cross-interrogatories. FACTS: 1. American President Lines, Ltd.(APL) sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc (Dasmarias). to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 2. Dasmarias specifically denied any liability to APL and set up compulsory counterclaims against it. 3. At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan a. It further prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice- consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " b. 5 days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," i. APL prayed that prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ." 4. Motion was opposed by Dasmarias contending the following: a. motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" b. issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" c. the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition." 5. APL submitted to the RTC the following: a. the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" b. a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained. 6. RTC favored APL, granting the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) a. It opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatoriesso as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination." 7. Dasmarias filed a motion fro reconsideration alleging that: a. authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state b. AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority; c. to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty d. depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens." 8. RTC denied the MR for being filed out of time and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. It also ordered APL "to take the necessary steps to implement the order authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional evidence by deposition." 9. Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. 2
a. CA denied the petition for certiorari b. Dasmarias sought reconsideration of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the CA 10. Dasmarias appealed to the SC with the following arguments: a. taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial b. no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge c. the situation is inherently unfair for allowing APL, a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while Dasmarias is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;" d. sanctioning the deposition taking of APL witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions
ISSUE: Whether a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court.
HELD: YES 1. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. 2. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. 3. the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression. a. they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. b. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132. Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. c. any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay since theres no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered 4. HOWEVER, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes mentioned ine Section 4, Rule 24, ROC. 5. The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. 6. How depositions are taken: a. In the Philippines: deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). b. In a foreign country: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24). i. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). ii. the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only 3
"before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms and with such directions as are just and appropriate. Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the country)." iii. Commission: an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal 1. addressed to officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title iv. Letters rogatory: an instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed 1. addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." 2. may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court c. After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " i. The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice, or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24). 7. In the case at bar, RTC issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories)" a. A prima facie showing not rebutted by Dasmarinas that the Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan. b. It also appears that the commission is to be coursed through DFA under Circular No. 4 issued by CJ Teehankee pursuant to DFA directing all judges of the RTC, MeTC, MTC in Cities and MTC and MCTC to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the DFA to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking. 8. On the One-China Policy: What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross- examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party. 9. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre- trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. What the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a RTC "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court", and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment 10. the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. a. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent 4
in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility b. RTC saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, , i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. c. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant (Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. i. even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross- examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross- interrogatories.
The Fundamentals of Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories By SEVERIANO S. TABIOS TOPIC: Modes of Discovery Deposition Cited Case: Dearing vs. Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. FACTS: 1. This case is an example of how written interrogatories are made use as a vehicle of advocacy. 2. After the plaintiff, W. W. Dearing, had filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant, Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. claiming damages under the terms of an employment contract entered between them, he left for the United States so that before the trial of the case on the merits his counsel filed a notice to take his deposition in Los Angeles, U.S.A. upon written interrogatories. 3. On the other hand, because of the announcement of plaintiff s counsel that plaintiff intended to present no other evidence in the case except his deposition sought to be taken, defendant through counsel interposed an objection alleging that it was improper and violative of the spirit of the Rules of Court for said plaintiff to establish his case only by deposition. 4. Subsequently, upon being informed that the lower court had received the deposition of plaintiff, defendant filed a motion to strike out and suppress the deposition on the ground that the provisions of the Rules of Court requiring notice to be given by the officer taking the deposition had not been complied with. 5. Moreover, after the trial court had denied defendants motion to strike out and suppress deposition, defendant interposed another objection, this time during trial, on the ground that plaintiff failed to show that the requisites provided in the Rules of Court had been satisfactorily complied with and that, furthermore, said deposition had been irregularly and improperly taken because the procedure followed by the officer who took said deposition, the Vice Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., did not follow the requirement that the testimony of the deponent be taken stenographically. ISSUE: WON Plaintiff Dearings deposition was improper and violative of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the High Tribunal after observing that the private respondent admittedly received notice from the lower court of the filing with it of petitioners deposition taken abroad before a vice consul declared that such notice from the court or any similar one for that matter, provided the adverse party is informed of such filing should be considered sufficient substantial compliance with the rules. Furthermore, the Supreme Court said that it could not see any point at all in the objection of private respondent, sustained by the Court of Appeals, that the deposition was taken directly on the typewriter instead of stenographically as specified in the rules, particularly because respondent has not alleged any error or mistake prejudicial to it in the typing of the deposition, for in many instances, taking of a deposition 5
direct on the typewriter is even more convenient because the deponent can readily read his testimony even while it is being recorded and could always immediately call attention to any error therein. NOTE: In this annotation, the author discusses the concept of this kind of discovery. The Concept of Deposition Upon Written interrogatories It should be remembered that a deposition upon written interrogatories is one of the modes of discovery recognized under Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. A deposition upon written interrogatories is an instrument of discovery whereby the party desiring to avail of it serves upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.2 It is availed of after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action but by leave of court or if an answer to the complaint has already been served it may be availed of without such leave.3 As the deposition is taken during the pendency of an action, it is distinguished by the phrase de bene esse. The right to take deposition de bene esse is sometime conditioned upon the existence of specified grounds, such as, among others, the impending departure of the proposed deponent from the country, or that certain facts could not be elicited except by means of a deposition.5 However, as the taking of deposition is discretionary, the judge of the lower court cannot be compelled to take the depositions or fix another date for it.6 While the taking of deposition is discretionary on the part of the court, denial of a request to take deposition should not be based on flimsy reasons. Thus, the mere fact that the court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent during the taking of the deposition does not justify the denial of the right to take deposition as such denial would constitute an abuse of discretion.7 Therefore, while the grant of authority to take deposition of witnesses carries with it the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith, such discretion conferred by law is not unlimited and should be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purposes may be attained.8 In the exercise of its sound discretion, the trial court may grant a postponement of a case for the purpose of giving the parties the opportunity to secure the necessary depositions.9 However, if a period of six months have elapsed from the time a postponement was granted to allow parties to take depositions of witnesses but depositions have not yet been taken, the court would be justified to declare the failure of the plaintiff to make efforts to take deposition as a ground for dismissal as there would then be an unreasonable delay in prosecuting the case.10 It should be noted that the taking of a deposition has been alluded to as one in the nature of a fishing expedition. This is because under the Revised Rules of Court the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.12 It can be easily gathered, therefore, that the scope of the examination is limited to matter which are relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action and which are not privileged, so that subject to such limitations, a deponent may be examined on any matter relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party to the action.
G.R. No. 97654 November 14, 1994 INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION, THE HON. BIENVENIDO V. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, San Pablo City, Branch 29, RICARDO L. BRUCAL, OFELIA A. BRUCAL and DONNA A. BRUCAL, respondents. Doctrine: The (Trial) Court also entertains the view that the questions propounded by the defendant in the written interrogatories can be asked by counsel to the witnesses for the plaintiffs during the trial and secure all the answers he wants from them, and if he is not satisfied then the matters sought to be established can be proved through its own evidence. 6
Action: Petition for Certiorari Rule 65 Facts: 1. On 04 April 1989, Ofelia Brucal, together with her daughter Donna Brucal, herein private respondents, claiming to be the designated beneficiaries of Horacio Aquino, brother of Ofelia Brucal, brought an action against Insular Life to recover from the latter the proceeds of an insurance policy covering the life of now deceased Aquino. 2. In its answer, Insular Life contended that the insurance policy was a nullity, there having been gross misrepresentation and material concealment and that, in the death of the insured was not accidental but deliberate. 3. Before pre-trial, Insular Life filed a motion for leave to file a third- party complaint against Ofelia Brucal's husband, respondent Ricardo Brucal, an insurance underwriter of Philam Life Insurance, asserting that Ricardo Brucal forged, or caused to be forged, the signature of Ricardo Aquino on the application for insurance coverage. 4. The trial court granted the motion and Ricardo Brucal filed his answer. The parties thereupon submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. 5. In the course of the proceedings that followed, Insular Life sent private respondents a request for admission along with a set of written interrogatories. 6. Insular Life likewise filed a motion asking the trial court to direct private respondents to produce six (6) other alleged insurance policies, as well as other related papers, covering the life of Horacio Aquino and to allow the inspection of the site where Aquino died. 7. In their manifestation, dated 02 March 1990, private respondents averred that the request of Insular Life was merely designed to delay the proceedings and just a fishing expedition." 8. The trial court, in its 13th March 1990 Order, denied the request for the production of the documents, but allowed the written interrogatories and ordered that the plaintiffs and third-party defendant must answer the interrogatories within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the trial courts order 9. Private respondents failed to give their answers to the interrogatories. 10. On the scheduled initial presentation of evidence by private respondents on 13 June 1990, private respondents still had not provided any answer to the written interrogatories, prompting Insular Life to file a motion to dismiss the complaint and to declare third party defendant Rodolfo Brucal in default. 11. In an Order, dated 05 July 1990, the trial court denied the motion of Insular Life, holding that "substantial justice (would) be better served if the case (were to be) decided on (the) merits. 12. The denial was reiterated in its July 1990 Order, but the court re- scheduled the hearing "to give (Insular Life) ample time to elevate the matter to the higher courts and (to) secure a ruling thereon." 13. Two months later, or on 01 October 1990, Insular Life filed with the Court of Appeals its petition for certiorari, injunction and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order, assailing the 5th July 1990 Order of the trial court. a. On 11 October 1990, the appellate court issued a restraining order. 14. On 07 January 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision ultimately denying Insular Life's petition and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issue: 1. Should the trial court have dismissed the case because of failure of the respondents to answer the written interrogatories?
Held: No! 1. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 25, of the Rules of Court, on the matter of written interrogatories, state:
Sec. 1. Interrogatories to parties, service thereof. Under the same conditions specified in Section 1 of Rule 24, any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served . . . .
Sec. 2. Answer to interrogatories. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answer shall be signed by the person making 7
them, and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories, unless the court on motion and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
2. In order to give life to the provisions on interrogatories, Section 5, Rule 29, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied)
3. The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice. 4. In the case at bench, the trial court, opted to decide the case on its merits. In its Order of 31 July 1990: a. The Court is of the considered view that the greater interest of justice will be better served if the case is tried absent any advantage because of technicalities. The Court is not unmindful of the failure of the plaintiffs' counsel to heed the order of the Court and is not pleased at all with it. But it is guided by established Jurisprudence directing a liberal application of procedural rules.
xxx xxx xxx
b. The Court also entertains the view that the questions propounded by the defendant in the written interrogatories can be asked by counsel to the witnesses for the plaintiffs during the trial and secure all the answers he wants from them, and if he is not satisfied then the matters sought to be established can be proved through its own evidence. 5. The CA sustained this. 6. The real question now before us is whether or not the trial court has committed grave abuse of discretion in its questioned order. a. We are not inclined to conclude that any such clear transgression has been committed by the court a quo. 7. While we do not see the disquisitions made by both the court a quo and the appellate court to be lacking in good coherence, we find it appropriate, nonetheless, to say here once again that the discovery methods under our Rules of Court do not deserve to be taken lightly. a. These discovery rules can contribute in no small measure to the simplification of issues, and in thereby hastening the disposition of cases. 8. At a time particularly when the judiciary is being burdened by a backlog of cases and faced with yet an apparent propensity of parties to fully litigate their disputes, large or small, it should compel us even more now than before to pay close attention to and heed the Court's call.
[G.R. No. 118438. December 4, 1998] ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED, respondents.
8
DOCTRINE: Failure to answer a request for admission within the period set by the court will admit the matters in the request for admission.
NATURE: Appeal
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cherry Valley Farms Limited (CHERRY VALLEY), a foreign company based in England, filed against petitioner Allied Agri- Business Development Co. Inc. (ALLIED) a complaint with the RTC of Makati City for collection of sum of money alleging, among others that:
(a) CHERRY VALLEY is a foreign corporation with principal office at Rothwell, Lincoln, England;
(b) for a period of less than six (6) months, petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten (10) separate orders and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and ducklings;
(c) ALLIED did not pay the total purchase price of 51,245.12 despite repeated demands evidenced by a letter of Solicitor Braithwaite of England in behalf of CHERRY VALLEY;
(d) instead of paying its obligation, ALLIED through its president wrote CHERRY VALLEY inviting the latter to be a stockholder in a new corporation to be formed by ALLIED, which invitation however was rejected by CHERRY VALLEY; and,
(e) ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly acknowledged through a letter the obligation of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY.
2. ALLIED filed an answer
denying the material allegations of the complaint and contended that: (a) private respondent CHERRY VALLEY lacked the legal capacity to sue;
(b) the letter of Quintos to CHERRY VALLEY was never authorized by the board of petitioner ALLIED, thus any admission made in that letter could not bind ALLIED;
(c) the alleged amount of 51,245.12 did not represent the true and real obligation, if any, of petitioner;
(d) to the best of the knowledge of ALLIED, not all ducks and ducklings covered and represented by CHERRY VALLEYs invoices were actually ordered by the former; and,
(e) private respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.
3. CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIEDs counsel a Request for Admission of the above-mentioned allegations in the complaint.
4. ALLIED filed its Comments/Objections alleging that: (a) the admissions requested were matters which the private respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded in the complaint.
5. In its Reply to Comments/Objections to Request for Admission, CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission, for these pertained to incidents personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner alone.
6. TC issued an Order disregarding ALLIEDs Comments/Objections to Request for Admission in view of its non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, 9
otherwise, the matters contained in the request would be deemed admitted. Allieds MR: Denied.
7. ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the request for admission within the additional period of five (5) days granted by the trial court.
8. Hence, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that there was already an implied admission on the matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
9. TC rendered judgment
against petitioner. ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals. 10. CA: rendered a decision affirming the summary judgment rendered by the TC with the modification that ALLIED should pay the monetary award to CHERRY VALLEY in Philippine currency and that the award of attorneys fees and costs of suit be deleted.
ISSUE: WON the summary judgment was tantamount to a denial of ALLIEDs right to due process for not requiring CHERRY VALLEY to produce its own witness?
HELD: NO. Petitioner fails to answer the request for admission by the respondent within the period set by the court pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 26
RATIO: Petitioner cannot also successfully argue that its failure to answer the request for admission did not result in its admission of the matters stated in the request. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Request for admission. - At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested. [13]
The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial court its comments and objections to the request for admission served on it by private respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections and 10
directed petitioner after denying its motion for reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5) days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the matters of which the admission was requested would be deemed admitted.
Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within the period. The matter set forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted by petitioner, i.e., (a) that for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982, petitioner ordered and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings amounting to 51,245.12; (b) that petitioner received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from private respondents lawyer demanding payment of the amount of the purchases; (c) that instead of paying the obligation to respondent CHERRY VALLEY, petitioners president Ricardo Quintos sent a letter to the former proposing the establishment of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY as one of the stockholders; (d) that the proposal was refused by the Director of CHERRY VALLEY; and, (e) that petitioners president Ricardo Quintos admitted the indebtedness of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12. The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.
This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the complaint were not disputed was correctly granted by the trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a partys failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact exists. By its failure to answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against itself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent Date: August 17, 1999 Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago Original Action: Criminal Case for Rape with Homicide Nature of Action in the SC: Petition for review on certiorari Doctrine:
Facts: 1. During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition
praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the following people before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines. a. Steven Bucher: Acting Chief, Records Services Branch, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service in Washington b. Debora Farmer: Records Operations, Office of Records, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service in Washington c. Jaci Alston: Department of Motor Vehicles in Sacramento, California d. Ami Smalley: Department of Motor Vehicles in Sacramento, California e. John Pavlisin: California i. Respondents alleged that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them. 2. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court. 3. The prosecution filed an opposition to the said motion: a. Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; b. Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 11
c. Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction. 4. TC: Denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. 5. MR was filed on the following grounds: a. The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions, and b. Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines w 6. MR: Denied 7. CA: Petition for Certiorari a. Respondent Webb argued: i. The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings; ii. Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, iii. He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due process. b. People contended: i. The questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well within the sphere of her judicial discretion and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that if at all, they may be considered merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due time because: 1. The motion failed to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; 2. The conditional examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and 3. The examination of the witnesses must be done in open court. c. Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition contending: i. The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein respondent] Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 1. The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application in criminal actions such as the case at bar. 2. The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure only provides for conditional examination of witnesses before trial but not during trial. 3. The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction. ii. The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition considering that the proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary exhibits already admitted in evidence by the public respondent. 8. CA: ANNULLED and SET ASIDE the TCs decision and ordered that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California.
Issue: Whether the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court should have been denied. Held: YES 1. A deposition is the testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. a. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the 12
court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript is made of the deposition. b. Testimony of a witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or interrogatories 2. The purposes of taking depositions are to: a. Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; b. Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; c. Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; d. Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; e. Expedite litigation; f. Safeguard against surprise; g. Prevent delay; h. Simplify and narrow the issues; and i. Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial. 3. A deposition should be taken before and not during trial. 4. Rules on criminal practice particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the court below states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion. 5. The only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of the defense exhibits "218" and "219 a. But this issue has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the documentary exhibits by the trial court in its previous order. 6. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of some exhibits readily shows that these are of the same species of documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court in its order. 7. The factual circumstances only; serves to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. a. In this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. 8. The trial court cannot be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 9. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. 10. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. 11. The defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, we sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.
Separate Opinion CJ Davide: Concurred with the majority 1. The trial court had already admitted the exhibits on which the said witnesses would have testified, the taking of the depositions would have been unnecessary. 13
2. The issue of whether the taking of the depositions of such witnesses may be allowed in criminal cases before the Philippine courts must be squarely resolved: YES a. Sec. 4. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. When the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to all other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf in the manner hereinafter provided, but not otherwise. The motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or resides more than 100 kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the same, or that, apart from the foregoing, other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by affidavit of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require. b. Sec. 5. Examination of defense witness; how made. If the court is satisfied that the examination of witness for the accused is necessary, an order will be made directing that the witness be examined at a specified time and place, and that a copy of the order be served in the fiscal within a given time prior to that fixed for the examination. The examination will be taken before any judge or if not practicable, any member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be granted by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated in the order. The examination shall proceed notwithstanding the absence of the fiscal, if it appears that he was duly notified of the hearing. A written record of the testimony shall be taken. i. These Sections refer to the conditional examination of defense witnesses, which is "one mode of perpetuating testimony available to the accused". This deposition, being to perpetuate testimony, may be done before the commencement of the trial state, or anytime thereafter, as the need therefor arises, but before the promulgation of judgment. c. Sec. 7. Depositions pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of Appeals in proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the court in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court. In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same shall state (a) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each; and (b) the reason for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken, and thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under the same conditions as are prescribed in the rules for depositions taken pending actions. d. The only corollary issue that has to be addressed is how to take the testimony of a defense witness who is unable to come to testify in open court because he is a resident of a foreign country. The Rule on Criminal Procedure is silent on this. I respectfully submit, however, that the rule on the matter under Rules on Civil Procedure may be applied suppletorily. i. Sec. 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. In a foreign state or country, deposition may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in Section 14 hereof. ii. There are provisions of the Rule on Civil Procedure which have been made applicable in criminal cases. iii. Section 6 of Rule 1 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure (formerly Sec. 2, Rule 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court), expressly provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Concurring Opinion J. Puno: Agrees that respondent Webb's Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition was correctly denied by the trial court on the ground of lack of necessity. 1. In civil litigation, the development of these rules came at a faster speed. By the 1940's, court rules and legislations promoted the ideal of full and open pre-trial discovery in civil cases. Thus, they provided for depositions, interrogatories, production of documents, inspection of intangible items 14
and physical and mental examinations. Well to note, our first Rules of Court followed this highly developed pattern. The liberalization of discovery and deposition rules in civil litigation highly satisfied the objective of enhancing the truth-seeking process of litigation as all relevant evidence are immediately brought up front in the courts. 2. The liberalization of the rules of discovery in criminal procedure in the United States while slow was unabated. In the 1960's, the movement received tremendous impetus from a liberal US Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren whose decisions radically expanded the rights of an accused. For years and until now, proponents and opponents of liberal defense discovery and depositions in criminal cases continue to lock horns. Proponents of liberal defense discovery hammer on the need to make criminal trials "less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." Opponents of liberalization argue that three factors distinguish civil discovery from criminal discovery, viz: "(1) the criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, which would not permit the fully reciprocal discovery found in civil practice; (2) the greater likelihood that defense discovery in criminal cases would be used to facilitate successful perjury; and (3) the greater likelihood that criminal defense discovery would lead to the intimidation of witnesses." 3. In the case of the Philippines, the move towards a more liberal discovery and deposition procedure in criminal cases is even slower but its march, likewise, appears inexorable. There can be no stepping back for the 1987 Constitution has gone to the extent of constitutionalizing basic rights of an accused, which has not been done in the United States. With this new orientation of the Constitution, this Court itself has taken steps to liberalize our rules of criminal procedure. Thus, Section 1, Rule 118 of our 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the first time ordered the holding of pre-trial when the accused and the counsel agree. The fruitful experience of courts holding pre-trial in criminal cases has impelled requests that our rules be further amended to make it mandatory.
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners, vs. RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, respondents. August 28, 2008 G.R. No. 152643 Nature: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA Decision dated Aug, 15, 2001 and its Resolution dated Mar. 12, 2002. The CA decision set aside the RTC Orders dated Aug. 25, 2000 granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras (Concepcions) motion to take deposition, and dated Nov. 3, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel Bonje. Doctrine: It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. Facts: 1. Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19. The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. 2. Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. 3. Respondents then filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000. 4. This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. 5. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. 6. RTC: granted the motion and ordered the taking of the deposition before the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC. 15
7. CA: reversed the RTC ruling. It ratiocinated that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of Concepcion.
Held: 8. No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor. 9. This rule however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for different MODES OF DISCOVERY that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119, which took effect 1 December 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. 10. In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness who according to the petitioners was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 comes into play and it provides: Section 15. Examination of witness for prosecution - When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence, after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. 11. Petitioners contend that Concepcion's advanced age and health condition exempt her from this application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 12. The contention does not persuade. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. 13. Petitioners insistence that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases is likewise untenable. 14. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. 15. In granting Concepcion's motion and in actually taking her deposition, the rules were not complied with. The taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. 16. The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
16
G.R. No. 175730 July 5, 2010
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), and the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Respondents.
Topic: Deposition? Forum Shopping?
Doctrine: 1. D: There are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. 2. FS: To constitute forum shopping, there should be similarity in the issue and in the relief.
FACTS: 1. The Republic (through the PCGG) filed a civil complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against petitioner Herminio Disini, spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and Rodolfo Jacob. [1987] 2. The Complaint was amended to include Rafael Sison a party- defendant. a. The Amended Complaint alleged that Disini acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation of public funds, plunder of the nations wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption. 3. Sandiganbayan issued summons on the Amended Complaint. a. As to Disini: Returned unserved for the reason that the Roman family occupied the said residence. b. Sison and Jacob filed their respective answers c. Marcos spouses were declared in default. 4. As to his co-defendants: a. Jacob was dropped as party-defendant considering that he will testify as a state witness. b. As to Sison, [1997] the OSG filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Drop Rafael Sison as Party-Defendant. 5. [1998] the Republic filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication (in order to acquire jurisdiction over Disini) a. During the pendency, Alias of Summons was issued twice but both summonses were returned unserved. 6. [2002] the Republic filed a Motion to Resolve (the 1998 motion) - GRANTED a. The summons and the Amended Complaint were published in Peoples Tonight, with a copy sent by registered mail to Disinis last known address. b. Petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his responsive pleading within 60 days from the publication of the summons. 7. Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to resolve the motion filed in 1997 (dropping Sison) so that they could proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence. 8. Years after: a. Counsel of the Republic received an order from the Swiss Federal Court ordering him to submit a forfeiture order from a Philippine court with regard to the assets of Disini not later than Dec. 30, 2006; otherwise, it will revoke the freeze order on the Disini Swiss Accounts. 9. [2006] Petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaims. a. He maintained that he never received summons nor any pleadings from the parties. b. His answer contained affirmative defenses such as the courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his person through service by publication and the failure of the Amended Complaint to state a cause of action against him. 10. Later on, Sandiganbayan granted PCGGs motion to drop Sison 11. Sandiganbayan: Disinis Motion to Lift Default Order is DENIED! 12. Disini filed an extremely urgent motion for reconsideration. a. He prays that the ex parte presentation of evidence be held in abeyance until the resolution of the motion. 13. However, Republics ex parte presentation of evidence began before the Clerk of Court. 14. SC: Disini filed a Petition for Certiorari Rule 65 a. He protests the continuation of the ex parte proceedings 15. Sandiganbayan: Disinis Extremely Urgent MFR is DENIED! 16. The Republic presented 10 witnesses and it filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 17. Despite the pendency of his Petition (Rule 65) with the SC, Disini filed with the Sandiganbayan a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default. 18. From 2009-10, he filed different motions before the Sandiganbayan: 17
a. Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge or Cross-Examine Plaintiffs Witnesses. b. He also filed a Motion to Expunge Evidence c. He filed a Motion to Expunge Rolando Gapuds Deposition d. He filed a Motion to Expunge or Cross-Examine Plaintiffs witnesses. e. He filed a Motion for Leave to Take Deposition.
ISSUE#1: W/N the issue of Validity of Service of Summons is Mooted by Voluntary Appearance
HELD: Yes Petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the alleged impropriety in the service of summons. However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which sought various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its appearance and without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. These motions are: (see #19 facts) (a) Motion to Expunge Exhibits xxx c,) xxx (f) Motion for Leave to Take Deposition based on Section 1 of Rule 23 (Depositions Pending Action or De Benne Esse). 86
In regard to the last mentioned (letter F) Motion for Leave to Take Deposition, it is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case. ISSUE#2: W/N there was Forum-shopping Held: Yes. A Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default was filed during the pendency of the instant Petition. Both remedies seek from different fora exactly the same ultimate relief (lifting of the default order issued by the Sandiganbayan) and raise the same issue (validity of the default order and the propriety of lifting said default order). In availing himself of these two remedies, petitioner has engaged in forum-shopping. There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court. Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as trifling with the courts and their processes. It is proscribed because it unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads, and unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary. It is inimical to the orderly administration of justice as it creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two courts, and opens the system to the possibility of manipulation. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.