An Unjustly Vexatious Law

21 May 2002

If you are asked to avoid committing unjust vexation in the same way as you should avoid
committing theft, murder, rape or any other crime, would you know what to avoid? Would
you be in a position to know exactly what particular acts or omissions you should avoid? I
guess you wouldnt! Unlike the crimes of theft, murder and rape that are specifically defined
in the Revised Penal Code, one may search for the definition of the crime of unjust vexation
but it is conspicuously absent. How can you therefore expect a person to avoid something that
is not even defined by our criminal statutes?

Unjust vexation is punished under the 2nd paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code that says:

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both.

Professors of Criminal Law justify this apparent lack of definition saying that unjust vexation
is a catch-all crime that applies whenever the act or omission complained of does not
specifically fall under any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. But we do not even
allow common-law crimes, so how could we countenance the existence of having catch-all
crimes in the face of the due process guaranty?

An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would show that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code has been used to punish a great variety of different acts:
In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934, Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code was used to punish the defendants for unjust vexation for the act of disturbing or
interrupting a ceremony of a religious character;
In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was used to prosecute the accused of
unjust vexation committed by stopping the jeep driven by the complainant in a
threatening attitude and without any just cause therefor and telling him to stop driving
for the City of Manila while the strike of city laborers was still going on;
In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that the act of seizing, taking
and holding possession of passenger jeep belonging to complainant, without the
knowledge and consent of the latter, for the purpose of answering for the debt of the
said owner, constitutes unjust vexation;
In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was convicted of unjust
vexation for the act of compelling the complainant to do something against his will, by
holding the latter around the neck and dragging him from the latter's residence to the
police outpost;
In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was prosecuted for unjust
vexation for the act of embracing and taking hold of the wrist of the complainant;
In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was convicted of unjust
vexation for the act of threatening the complainant by holding and pushing his
shoulder and uttering to the latter in a threatening tone the following words: What
inspection did you make to my sister in the mountain when you are not connected with
the Bureau of Education?;
In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held that the absence of an
allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for acts of lasciviousness converts the act
into unjust vexation;
An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 2 of 7
In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28, 1969, accused were
found guilty of unjust vexation under an information charging them with the offense
of offending religious feelings, by the performance of acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful;
In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a accused was convicted of
unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the left breast of the complainant against her
will;
Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November 23, 2000, the act of abruptly
cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of a business establishment
causing interruption of its business operations during peak hours was held as unjust
vexation.
The aforementioned cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court readily show that Art.
287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to prosecute a well-defined or
specific criminal act. Instead, it was used as a catch-all provision to prosecute acts which
are not expressly made criminal by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. Isnt this
anathema to criminal due process that requires notice of what specific act or omission is
punished by law?

It will not burn too much brain cells to realize that Article 287, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code that punishes unjust vexation suffers from congenital defects and should be
declared unconstitutional for the following reasons:
Article 287, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no specific or definite
act or omission thus failing to define any crime or felony;
Said penal provision is so indefinite, vague and overbroad as not to enable it to be
known what act is forbidden;
Such vagueness and overbreadth result to violation of the due process clause and the
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged; and
Such vagueness and overbreadth likewise amount to an invalid delegation by
Congress of its legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should be
held criminal and punishable.

A CRIMINAL OR PENAL LEGISLATION MUST CLEARLY DEFINE OR SPECIFY
THE PARTICULAR ACT OR ACTS PUNISHED.

It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or
specify the particular acts or omissions punished. As early as 1916, in the case of UNITED
STATES VS. LULING, 34 Phil. 725, the Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:

In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The
state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations,
has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and
then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and
are not committed with any criminal intent or intention." (cited in the fairly recent case of
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994) (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by Justice Johnson in the case of
An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 3 of 7
In re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38 Phil. 41, April 16, 1918, where he stated that:

In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by law. The law must specify
the particular act or acts constituting the crime. If that were not so, the inhabitants could
not know when they would be liable to be arrested, tried and punished. Otherwise the
mandatory provisions of the law, that all criminal laws shall be prescribed, would prove to be
a pitfall and a snare. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, whether citizens, denizens or
friendly aliens, have a right to know, in advance of arrest, trial and punishment, the particular
acts for which they may be so tried. They cannot be arrested and tried, and then be informed
for the first time that their acts have been subsequently made a crime, and be punished
therefor. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando in his concurring opinion in PEOPLE v. CABURAL,
G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also made a similar observation, stating that:

The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It is in accordance
with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable
corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then that
while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the
punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can
be fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism
mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as the
dispenser of justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The rationale of the doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify
the particular act or acts punished is ably explained by the United Stated Supreme Court in
the case of LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:

It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and
warns against transgression. x x x No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CONDEMNS NO
SPECIFIC ACT OR OMISSION! THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY
CRIME OR FELONY.

Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define, much less specify, the
acts constituting or deemed included in the term unjust vexations resulting to making the
said provision a sort of a catch-all provision patently offensive to the due process clause.

The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. Each State has the
authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of
criminal procedure. Pursuant to this power to define and punish crimes, the State may not
punish an act as a crime unless it is first defined in a criminal statute so that the people will be
forewarned as to what act is punishable. The people cannot be left guessing at the meaning
of criminal statutes.

An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 4 of 7
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines FELONIES (delitos) as acts or omissions
punishable by law. Article 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no specific act or
omission! THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR FELONY! Instead, any
and all kind of acts that are not specifically covered by any other provision of the Revised
Penal Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed may be punished as unjust
vexation.

ART. 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE SUFFERS FROM A
CONGENITAL DEFECT OF VAGUENESS AND MUST BE STRICKEN DOWN AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The term "unjust vexation" is a highly imprecise and relative term that has no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents. Thus, for its
vagueness and overbreadth, said provision violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.

This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on ground of vagueness and
overbreadth is not entirely novel in our jurisdiction. In an en banc decision in the case of
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 4880, the Supreme Court ruled that the terms election campaign and
partisan political activity which are punished in R.A. 4880 would have been void for their
vagueness were it not for the express enumeration of the acts deemed included in the said
terms. The Supreme Court held:

The limitation on the period of "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" calls for a
more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act No. 4880: "It is unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not
a political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding an
election involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding an
election for any other elective public office. The term 'candidate' refers to any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office regardless of whether or not said person has already
filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate.
The term 'election campaign' of 'partisan political activity' refers to acts designed to have a
candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office . .
."

If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of
vagueness and may be stricken down. x x x

x x x x x x x x x

There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be faced. The practices
which the act identifies with "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" must be such
that they are free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly, and freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional objection
of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms "election campaign"
or "partisan political activity." (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 5 of 7

Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes unjust vexations and that is all there
is to it! As such, applying the incontestable logic of the Supreme Court in said case of
GONZALES v. COMELEC would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that said penal
provision suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness and must be stricken
down as unconstitutional.

In the case of CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 269 U.S. 385, cited by
our own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967), the United States
Supreme Court ruled:

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play
and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
because it punishes unjust vexations without even defining or enumerating the acts
constituting the said crime thus leaving men of common intelligence necessarily guessing at
its meaning and differing as to its application in complete disregard of constitutional due
process.

Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1, held that one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Said
ruling cites the landmark case of U.S. v. L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81, where the
United States Supreme Court in striking down Section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of
August 10, 1917, as amended, as unconstitutional, declared that:

The sole remaining inquiry, therefore, is the certainty or uncertainty of the text in question,
that is, whether the words 'that it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully ... to make
any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries,'
constituted a fixing by Congress of an ascertainable standard of guilt and are adequate to
inform persons accused of violation thereof of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. That they are not, we are of opinion, so clearly results from their mere statement as to
render elaboration on the subject wholly unnecessary. OBSERVE THAT THE SECTION
FORBIDS NO SPECIFIC OR DEFINITE ACT. It confines the subject matter of the
investigation which it authorizes to no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to
which it provides. It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of
which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard
against. In fact, we see no reason to doubt the soundness of the observation of the court below
in its opinion to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section would be the exact
equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the
estimation of the court x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 6 of 7
In COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United States Supreme Court
passed upon the issue of constitutionality of a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:

"It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a public meeting of
citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots, or mouths of alleys, and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent
buildings. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding
fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days or
both." Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance in its
landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court held that:

Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague,
not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all. As a result, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types of conduct clearly
within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so, indeed, it is. The city is free to
prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing
assaults, or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the
conduct to be prohibited. It cannot constitutionally do so through the enactment and
enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a
policeman is annoyed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Same thing can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes unjust
vexation. As previously shown, the term unjust vexation is broad enough to encompass
many types of acts or conduct. But while these acts of types of conduct are within the States
police power to prohibit and punish, it cannot however constitutionally do so when its
violation may entirely depend upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or
conduct and whether or not said act or conduct is unjust is the estimation of the court.

ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS AN INVALID
DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO DEFINE WHAT ACTS
SHOULD BE HELD BE CRIMINAL AND PUNISHABLE

The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or specify the act or
omission that it punishes likewise amounts to an invalid delegation by Congress of its
legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should be held criminal and punishable.
Potestas delegata non delegare potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another (United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330).

Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an attribute of sovereignty may not
An Unjustly Vexatious Law


Page 7 of 7
be delegated to the courts. When a criminal legislation leaves the halls of Congress, it must be
complete in itself in that it must clearly define and specify the acts or omissions deemed
punishable; and when it reaches the courts, there must be nothing left for the latter to do,
except to determine whether person or persons indicted are guilty of committing the said acts
or omissions defined and made punishable by Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the immortal
words of Justice Isagani Cruz in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the
law becomes a roving commission, a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing, in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable and ascertainable
standard of guilt, but leaves such standard to the variant and changing views and notions of
different judges or courts which are called upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific
acts or omissions punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine what acts or types
of conduct constitute unjust vexation. Moreover, liability under the said provision is also
made dependent upon the varying degrees of sensibility and emotions of people. It depends
upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct. As previously
intimated, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable
and an ascertainable standard of guilt.

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it appears that the law that was intended to punish unjust vexation turns
out to be an unjustly vexatious law. Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes
unjust vexations is unconstitutional on its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or
definite act or conduct. It suffers from congenital vagueness and overbreadth which are
anathema to constitutional due process and the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature of the offense charged.

Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the justness or unjustness of an act
or conduct that is not clearly defined or specified by law constitutes a fixing by Congress of
an unascertainable standard of guilt and therefore an invalid delegation, if not an abdication,
of legislative power.

As such, it is now high time that this unjustly vexatious law be declared unconstitutional and
be wiped out from our statute books. Lawyers defending a client for unjust vexation should
raise this constitutional challenge against this unjustly vexatious law and they are free to cite
the arguments articulated herein.

Art. 287, par. 2 cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution, much less conviction. An
unspeakable injustice was therefore done to all those who were convicted under this unjustly
vexatious law. If this law is not declared unconstitutional by our Supreme Court or is not
immediately repealed by Congress, many persons would still fall prey to its snare unaware.