ARTICLE 36.

Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not
be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
A prejudicial question is defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would be necessarily
determined.
he ! elements are"
#. he civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action
!. he resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed
$hen will you file a petition for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on the ground of the e%istence of a prejudicial question&
'uring the preliminary investigation, you file it with the prosecutor or
(ffice of the City Prosecutor. (r if the case is already pending, before the
court where the case is being heard before the prosecution rests its case.
)enerally, the right to file a petition for the suspension of the criminal
proceeding is granted to the accused because it is he whose right to the
constitutional provision on speedy trial that would be violated. So, that is
generally granted to the accused.
So, here the criminal proceeding is suspended unli*e that of a civil
action based on the criminal case, where if the civil action is filed ahead,
the civil action is suspended. he criminal case has to move, pending the
resolution of the criminal case before the civil action can be heard.
(ne of the cases where the court that there is a prejudicial question
is the case of"
TUANDA vs. SANDIAN!A"AN #$ct. %&' %(()*
his involves the appointment of ! sectoral representatives in one of
the towns of +egros (riental. he mayor objected to the appointment of
,strellanes and -inaohan as sectoral representatives because it did not
observe the requirement under -P ../ 01ocal )overnment Code2, where
it was required that before a sectoral representative can be appointed,
there must be first a representation with the sectors that would be affected
by such appointment. his was not complied with. hen Sec. 1uis
Santos merely appointed them without complying with the requirement.
So, 3ayor uanda filed a complaint before the 4egional rial Court
for the nullification of the appointment of -inaohan and ,strellanes as
sectoral representatives because of the non-observance of the
requirement under -P ../.
3eanwhile, -inaohan and ,strellanes filed a complaint before the
Sandiganbayan. According to them, there was this alleged failure on the
part of the mayor to pay them their salaries, wages as well as their per
diems.
uanda moved for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan on the ground of e%istence of a prejudicial question.
5s uanda correct&
According to the Supreme Court, all the elements of a prejudicial
question are clearly and unmista*ably present in this case. here is no
doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal
case are closely related. he filing of the criminal case was premised on
petitioner6s alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents6 salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the
civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the
designation of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made
in accordance with law.
he general rule is that in order for a prejudicial question to e%ist, one
must be criminal and the other civil. -ut there are e%ceptions.
5n the case of"
+UIA,!A$ vs. $S$RI$ #,arc- %6' %(..*
5n this case, one is administrative and the other is civil law.
$hile according to the Supreme Court, the actions involved in the
case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to spea* of.
,qually apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said
two proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends
primarily on the pending administrative case.
+UIA,!A$ vs. $S$RI$ #,arc- %6' %(..*
/ACTS0 Private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry against
7uiambao alleging that they were the legitimate possessors of a parcel of land
in 3alabon, 4i8al e%ecuted in their favor by the former 1and enure
Administration. hey also alleged that 7uiambao surreptitiously and by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a portion of the said land,
placed bamboo posts and began construction of a house thereon. hey
contended that these acts of 7uiambao were unlawful per se and as such,
they are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to the ejectiment of
7uiambao from the lot in question.
7uiambao filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and upon denial
thereof, filed his answer to the complaint, specifically denying the material
allegations therein and averring that the Agreement upon which private
respondents base their prior possession over the question lot had already
been cancelled in an order signed by )ov. ,strella. 7uiambao alleged that
the pendency of an administrative case before the (ffice of the 1and Authority
between the same parties and involving the same piece of land is a ground for
dismissing the civil case. 5n the administrative case, 7uiambao dispute private
respondents6 right of possession over the property in question by reason of the
latter6s default in the installment payments for the purchase of said lot.
7uiambao asserted that the administrative case was determinative of private
respondents6 right to eject petitioner from the lot in question and hence, a
prejudicial question
ISSUE0 $hether or not the administrative case constitutes a prejudicial
question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case
1ELD0 he doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-
emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
hus, the e%istence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the
criminal case to acause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
he actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and
administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial
question to spea* of. ,qually apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
between said ! proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject 7uiambao from the disputed portion depends primarily on
the resolution of the pending administrative case. 9or while it may be true that
private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of
the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been
terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the 1and
Authority of the Agreement to Sell e%ecuted in their favor. $hether or not
private respondents can continue to e%ercise their right of possession is but a
necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending
administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement
to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. 5f the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner
are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject
7uiambao from the disputed area. (therwise, private respondent:s light of
possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
Another question, where both cases are civil in nature, in the case of"
CIT" $/ 2ASI vs. C$,ELEC #Sept. %3' %(((*
/ACTS0 he residents of ;arangalan <illage petitioned that they be
segregated from its mother -arangays 3anggahan and 'ela Pa8, City of
Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay. he City of
Pasig passed and approved an ordinance creating -arangay ;arangalan in
Pasig City. A plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was then set.
hereafter, the City of Pasig issued an ordinance creating -arangay
+apico in Pasig City. A plebiscite was also set.
=pon learning of such ordinances, the 3unicipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the plebiscites scheduled and filed petitions with the
C(3,1,C. he 3unicipality of Cainta called called the attention of
C(3,1,C to a pending case before the 4C of Antipolo, 4i8al for settlement
of boundary dispute, wherein the proposed barangays involve areas which are
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case.
ISSUE0 $hether or not the plebiscited scheduled for the creation of
-arangays ;arangalan and +apico should be suspended or cancelled in view
of the pending boundary dispute between the two local governments
1ELD0 he civil case involving the boundary dispute between the 3unicipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may
be held.
he City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. $hile this may be the
general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,
i>/?
that, the court can very well suspend action on one case pending the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated or lin*ed to the first.
$hether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the 3unicipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed -arangays ;arangalan and +apico.
5ndeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction
to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised
in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
e%ercise in futility.
he plebiscite on the creation of -arangay ;arangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of
Pasig and the 3unicipality of Cainta by the 4egional rial Court of Antipolo
City.
5n the case of"
U,ALI vs. IAC #4une 5%' %((3*
here is no prejudicial question which stems from a contract of sale
where the buyer paid its purchase price in installment and issued several
post-dated chec*s.
$hen the second chec* was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the ban*. 'espite demand, no payment was made.
And so, the seller filed a criminal case for violation of -P !!. he
buyer moved for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of
the e%istence of prejudicial question because according to him, he filed an
action for the annulment of the deed of sale as there was fraud on the part
of the seller when he was not told that the property was occupied by
squatters.
5s there a prejudicial question&
According to the Supreme Court, there is no prejudicial question.
,ven if the civil case were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the
deed of sale should be annulled, such declaration would be of no material
importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case of the latter involving -P !!. -P !! is a special law.
+ow, let us go to newer cases.
21ILI22INE AILA SATELLITE' INC. #2ASI* vs. LIC1AUC$
PAS5, through the confirmation of then '(C Secretary 1agdameo,
was awarded ! orbital slots. $hen it received confirmation that they were
awarded two orbital slots, they undertoo* preparations for the launching,
operation and management of the satellites. 5n order for that to be
reali8ed, they intended to obtain loans from several ban*s.
(ne of those ban*s was 1and -an* of the Philippines. he
President of PAS5 wrote the 1and -an* President of the approval and
attached with it is the letter of confirmation by Secretary 1agdameo.
$hat 1apu8, the president of 1and -an*, did was to forward the letter
of 'e )u8man, the president of PAS5, to '(C =ndersecretary @osefina
1ichauco.
1ichauco denied that PAS5 was awarded ! orbital slots. According to
her, PAS5 was only awarded # orbital slot. his is for the purpose of
operating as a satellite. And subsequent to that ma*e an offer for other
bidders with respect to the remaining orbital slots, including that one
orbital slot which was supposedly awarded to PAS5. According to her, isa
lang man ang binigay sa PAS5. he other orbital slot was not. She
included that orbital slot for bidding and was awarded to an un*nown
bidder.
$hen PAS5 learned of that award, PAS5 filed an action before the
court for the annulment of the award plus damages. Subsequently, PAS5
filed, through its president, filed a criminal complaint before the
Sandiganbayan against 1ichauco.
he (ffice of the (mbudsman, who conducted the preliminary
investigation, found out that there was a prejudicial question and
dismissed the complaint that was filed before the Sandiganbayan
because of that e%istence of prejudicial question.
$as it proper for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal
complaint&
Citing Yap vs. Paras, which is a )eneral Santos case, it should not
have been dismissed but only suspended. 5t can only be made only upon
petition, and not upon the instance of the judge alone or as in this case,
the investigating officer.
5n short, according to the Supreme Court, if there is a prejudicial
question, then, there is a prima facie case. And therefore, it should not be
for the investigating officer to dismiss it and even to suspend it because
the suspension must come from the accused, not from the judge or the
investigating officer, as decided in the case of Yap vs. Paras.
here is this case of "
$,ICTIN vs. CA #4an. 55' 533&*
(mictin was appointed as (perations 3anager Ad 5nterim of Saag
Phils., 5nc. Ae accused 1agos for estafa, for his refusal despite demand
to return ! company vehicles that were entrusted to 1agos when he was
still President of Saag Phils., 5nc.
1agos, on the other hand, moved for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on the ground that he filed before the Securities and
,%change Commission questioning the appointment of (mictin as
(perations 3anager Ad 5nterim of Saag Phils as well as an as President
Ad 5nterim of Saag Phils.
According to 1agos, there was this agreement between Saag Phils.
and Saag Singapore, the major stoc*holder of Saag Phils, that in the
event that there will be intra-corporate disputes, and one of them should
resign, the shares of those who resigned should first be offered to the
directors or directors still holding such positions. -ut this was not
followed. 5nstead, Saag Phils appointed (mictin and an. 1agos
resigned and he did not return the company vehicles. hat was the
reason why there was that estafa case filed.
Detailed Look at te !a"ts of te Case
'ue to intra-corporate disputes, )an and hiang, members of the -oard
of 'irectors of, resigned and divested their shares in Saag Corporation 0-hd2,
thereby resulting in a change in the controlling interest in Saag 0Singapore2.
-arely . months thereafter, 1agos resigned his post as president of Saag
Phils., 5nc. while still retaining his position as a director of the company.
According to 1agos, the joint venture agreement 0@<A2 between him or Saag
Phils., 5nc. and Saag 0S2 Pte. 1td. provided that should the controlling interest
in the latter company, or its parent company Saag Cofrp. 0-hd2, be acquired
by any other person or entity without his prior consent, he has the option either
to require the other stoc*holders to purchase his shares or to terminate the
@<A and dissolve Saag Phils., 5nc. altogether. hus, pursuant to this provision,
since 1agos did not give his consent as regards the transfer of shares made
by )an and hiang, he made several requests to +icholas +g, who replaced
)an as director, and @anifer Beo, ,%ecutive 'irector of Saag 0S2 Pte. 1td., to
call for a board meeting in order to discuss the following" a2 implementation of
the board resolution declaring dividendsC b2 acquisition of private respondent6s
shares by Saag 0S2 Pte. 1td.C c2 dissolution of Saag Phils., 5nc.C and d2 the
termination of the @<A.
+g and Beo failed to appear, however, in the scheduled board meetings.
5nstead, they issued a letter appointing an as President Ad 5nterim of Saag
Phils., 5nc. an, in turn, appointed (mictin as the company6s (perations
3anager Ad 5nterim.
Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution authori8ing the
continued operations of Saag Phils., 5nc., 1agos retained his possession of the
office equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the
corporation pending its dissolution andDor the resolution of the intra-corporate
dispute. Ae li*ewise changed the loc*s of the offices of the company allegedly
to prevent an and (mictin from sei8ing company property.
5s there a prejudicial question&
According to the Supreme Court, ultimately, the resolution of the
issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or
innocence of 1agos in the crime of estafa.
1ogically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party
is Saag Phils., 5nc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person ma*ing such a
demand on the company6s behalf. 5n as much as 1agos is challenging
(mictin6s authority, then, it must first be resolved.
5f indeed there was no ground for the appointment of (mictin, then,
there can be no criminal case of estafa.
5n the case of"
,AESTRAD$ vs. 2E$2LE #4ul6 %3' 533&*
3agestrado obtained a loan from 1ibrojo, secured by a real estate
mortgage. he title to the property was surrendered by 3agestrado to
1ibrojo.
-ut after that, 3agestrado, just li*e in the case of !rias vs. #ison,
e%ecuted an affidavit of loss of the title of the property when in truth and in
fact, the title was in the possession of 1ibrojo.
$hen 1ibrojo learned of that affidavit, he filed a case against
3agestrado. 3agestrado moved for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings based on a prejudicial question. According to him, the civil
action for the cancellation of the mortgage must first be resolved before
the criminal case can proceed.
5s he correct&
According to the Supreme Court, a perusal of the allegations of the
civil cases is principally for the determination of whether a loan was
obtained by petitioner 1ibrojo and whether 3agestrado e%ecuted a real
estate mortgage involving the property.
(n the other hand, the criminal case involves the determination of
whether the petitioner committed perjury in e%ecuting an affidavit to
support his request for issuance of a new owner6s duplicate copy of the
title.
5t is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other. 4egardless of the outcome of the ! civil
cases, it will not establish the innocence or the guilt of the petitioner in the
criminal case for perjury. he purchase by 3agestrado of the land or his
e%ecution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on
whether petitioner *nowingly and fraudulently e%ecuted a false affidavit of
loss.
ARTICLE 3&. @uridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
Article ./ on juridical capacit6 and capacit6 to act. 4uridical
capacit6 is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacit6 to act is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
hat is why an unborn child has the capacity to receive donations
and to be recogni8ed as a legitimate child because both are favorable to
the unborn child.
$hile it may be true that birth determines personality, the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it provided it
be born later in accordance with the provisions of Article E#.
ARTICLE 73. -irth determines personalityC but the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article.
ARTICLE 7%. 9or civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother:s womb. Aowever, if
the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb. 0.Fa2
5f it has an intra-uterine life of at least / months, it is sufficient that it
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother6s womb.
-ut if the intra-uterine life is less than / months, then, the child must
be alive for at least !E hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb in order for it to acquire civil personality, in order for all those acts
favorable to the child shall become valid.
ARTICLE 73. 5f there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who
are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the sameC in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Article E. is only for purposes of succession, only questions on
succession.
+ormally, this happens between a parent and a child or a
grandparent and child.
his was as*ed in the !FFF -ar ,%ams, where the father
predeceased the parent. So, the children shall inherit by right of
representation.
Article E. can only be invo*ed on questions involving succession. All
other questions would be resolved by the presumption on survivorship
under the 4ules of Court.
hat was as*ed in the #GGH -ar ,%ams. his involves a life
insurance policy. 5n that case, that should be resolved based on the
presumption on survivorship, not based on Article E.. 4emember that
Article E. will only apply to questions involving succession and there is a
doubt as to which of them died first. So, in the absence of proof, they are
presumed to have died together and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other.
i