PIANSAY V.

DAVID

As it may be true that the parties who agreed to attach the house in a chattel mortgage may
be bound thereto under the doctrine of estoppel, the same does not bind third persons.

FACTS:
Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at 12% per annum from Claudia B.
Vda. de Uy Kim, one of the plaintiffs, and to secure the payment of the same, Conrado S.
David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at 1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila.
The mortgage was foreclosed and was sold to Kim to satisfy the debt. 2 years later after the
foreclosure, the house was sold by Kim to Marcos Magubat. The latter then filed to collect
the loan from David and to declare the sale issued by Kim in favour of Piansay null and void.
(It appears that Kim sold the house to two people, namely Piansay and Magubat) The trial
court approved of the collection of the loan from David but dismissed the complaint
regarding the questioned sale between Kim and Piansay, declaring the latter as rightful
owner of the house and awarding damages to him. CA reversed the decision making David
the rightful owner and ing him and his co-defendant, Mangubat, to levy the house. Now
Petitioners are trying to release the said property from the aforementioned levy by claiming
that Piansay is the rightful owner of the house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale between Kim and Piansay was valid?
RULING:
Since it is a rule in our law that buildings and constructions are regarded as mere accesories
to the land (following the Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is
logical that said accessories should partaked of the nature of the principal thing, which is the
land forming, as they do, but a single object (res) with it in contemplation of law. A
mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof
by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared
null and void with respect to said real properties acquires no right thereto by virtue of said
sale Thus, Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel mortgage constituted in
her favor, because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. It follows that the
Sheriff was not authorized to sell the house as a result of the foreclosure of such chattel
mortgage. And as Mrs. Uy Kim could not have acquired the house when the Sheriff sold it at
public auction, she could not, in the same token, it validly to Salvador Piansay. Conceding
that the contract of sale between Mrs. Uy Kim and Salvador Piansay was of no effect, we
cannot nevertheless set it aside upon instance of Mangubat because, as the court below
opined, he is not a party thereto nor has he any interest in the subject matter therein, as it
was never sold or mortgaged to him At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract
constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to said contract, the
same cannot and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the aforementioned
contract or their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in the
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar
as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said
sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that she could not have transmitted to her
assignee, plaintiff Piansay any such right as against defendant Mangubat. In short plaintiffs
have no cause of action against the defendants herein.

SIBAL V. VALDEZ

For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.
FACTS:

(this case has a lot of confusing facts, just read the original if this digest fails to compress
everything) The Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant
Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of
land. Included also in those attached were real properties wherein 8mout of the 11 parcels
of land, house and camarin which was first acquired by Macondray & Co and then later on
bought by Valdez in an auction. First Cause for petitioner: That Within one year from the
date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and
tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter,
the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the
purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the
money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Second Cause for petitioner: That Valdez
was trying to harvest palay from four out of seven parcels of land. Petitioner filed for
preliminary injunction to stop defendant from 1) distributing the lands 2) harvesting and
selling the sugar canes, and 3) harvesting and selling the palay. The writ was issued which
prevented defendant from planting and harvesting the lands. Defendant later appealed
claiming that he was the owner of many of the alleged land thus he also owns the crops of it.
The court awarded the defendant 9,439.08 because the petitioner unduly denied the
defendant to plant in his land thus preventing him to profit thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane is personal o real property? (The relevance of the issue is with
regards to the sugar cane of the Petitioner which came from the land that now belongs to
the defendant)

RULING:

It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as
"ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of
article 334 enumerates as real property the following: Trees, plants, and ungathered
products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable
property." That article, however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the
Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may
be considered as personal property.

In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as personal property. In
the case of Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court said:
"True, by article 465 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of
trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down . . . are considered as part of the land
to which they are attached, but the immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and
without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the
property to which the crop is attached. . . . The existence of a right on the growing crop is a
mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable
quoad the right acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of
the growing crop."
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. SC lowered the award for
damages to the defendant to 8,900.80 by acknowledging the fact that some of the sugar
canes were owned by the petitioner and by reducing the calculated expected yield or profit
that defendant would have made if petitioner did not judicially prevent him from planting
and harvesting his lands.

RUBISO AND GELITO V. RIVERA

FACTS:
Gelito & Co. was owned by Bonifacio Gelito and Chinaman Sy Qui. One of the properties of
the company was a pilot ship/merchant vessel called Valentina, whose ownership is at
question here.
A series of sales had taken place:
First, Gelito had sold is 2/3 share to Chinaman Sy Qui.
When Sy Qui acquired full ownership of the company, he sold Valentina to Florentino Rivera
for P2,500 on January 4, 1915. The sale was registered in the Bureau of Customs over two
months later on March 17, 1915.
Shorty after the sale to Rivera, a suit was brought against Sy Qui to enforce payment of a
certain sum of money. Valentina was placed at a public auction and was purchased by Sy
Quis creditor, Fausto Rubiso. He bought the vessel for P55.45. The sale was registered in the
Office of the Collector of Customs on January 27, 1915 and in the commercial registry on
March 14, 1925.

The first buyer, Florentino Rivera, contends that he had lost the ship when it got stranded
somewhere in Batangas. He claims that Rubiso took possession of the vessel without his
knowledge or consent. Rivera seeks to be indemnified for the profits he could have collected
from the vessels voyages had Rivera not taken it. But, does he have the right to the vessel?

ISSUE:
Who is the rightful owner of the merchant vessel--Rivera or Rubiso?

RULING:
Rubiso. It is true that the sale to Rivera had taken place prior to the public auction where
Rubiso bought the vessel, but the same was entered in the customs registry only on March
17, 1915. Rubiso, however, had acted more swiftly by registering the property much earlier
in the Office of the Collector Customs and in the commercial registry in the same month.
Although the sale to Rivera had taken place first, the registration made by Rubiso was made
earlier.

Rubiso did the smart thing by registering the property at the commercial registry. Pursuant
to Article 573 of the Code of Commerce, the acquisition of a vessel must be registered at the
commercial registry in order to bind third parties. Such registration is necessary and
indispensible in order that the purchasers rights may be maintained against a claim filed by
third persons.

With respect to the rights of two purchasers, whichever of them first registered his
acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to enjoy the protection of the law. By first
registration, he becomes the absolute owner of the boat and is freed from all encumbrances
and claims by strangers.

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY V. JARQUE

FACTS:
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the
motor vessels Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and
encumbrances of the vessels for the port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel
mortgage.

The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was
executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the
Chattel Mortgage Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the
foreclosure/institution of the insolvency proceedings.

Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be
declared an insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarques properties were then assigned
to Curaminas.

A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the
mortgages, and instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits
of good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING:
Yes. Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an
affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against
creditors and subsequent encumbrances. The judge was correct.

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference
between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that
the first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds.

US V. CARLOS

FACTS:
Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court
issued warrant for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that
what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of
larceny applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and
spirited away.

Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year
in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cant be stolen (how can one steal
an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance
affirmed the decision. The case reached the supreme court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity.

HELD:
Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current
was secured by
Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.

Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen. However, the true
test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal
or incorporeal, but whether is is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner.
It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of
science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property,
used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

US V. TAMBUNTING

FACTS:
The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at
Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services
discontinued.

Later Mr Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to leech free
gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The prosecutor
filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court
ISSUE:
Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.
HELD:
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable
merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place. Articles 517 and 518 sets
parameters for the theft of gas and it is a valid ordinance.
INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V. RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 SEPTEMBER
1922)

FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered
also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of
Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another
mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property

RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property
mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles
335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be
mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)

2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is
sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property
shall be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable
inquiry and investigation, to identify the same. In the case at bar, his half interest in the
drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125,
District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.
3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the
debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the
registration of the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can the
mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as
there was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date, but not a mortgage
upon property, and much less upon the property in question.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law
was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of
submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares
of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and
void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved
and issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate
that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the
issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had
encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject land is submerged in water during
high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion of the
parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering
the land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides thatlands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of
the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grantThe contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance
as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use
of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In
Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the
Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this
case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Lanzar filed an application for registration of title to a parcel of land,
alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the lad in question and asking that the title
thereto be registered in his name. The Director of Lands filed an opposition on the ground
that the land is a foreshore which forms a part of public domain. RTC decided in favor of
Lanzar holding that the property in question has been possessed by the applicant publicly,
continuously and adversely for more that 30 years. CA reversed, holding that the land, being
an accretion formed by the action of sea, is property of public domain and not susceptible of
appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the title to the land may be registered on the basis of adverse possession for
over 30 years?

HELD:
No. The shores and lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to
public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons,
remain part of the public domain and are of public uses, and, until they are converted to
patrimonial property of the State, such lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the
shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to
the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the
provisions of article 1936 of the civil code.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335

FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged
he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said
land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because it refers
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by accretions
caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer
necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in
question forms part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.

VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS 309 SCRA 193

FACTS
Sps. Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a
parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said application was
opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the public
domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for private
appropriation. The TC dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain
therefore the certificate of title is void. The CA affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, thus
the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property still forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
> The SC held that both the TC and the appellate court correctly adjudged the area to be
within the unclassified forest zone therefore incapable of private appropriation.
> There has been no showing that a declassification has been made declaring the said lands
as disposable or alienable and the spouses have not showed evidence to lead to the court to
rule otherwise.
> Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
VILLANUEVA V. CASTAEDA, JR.

FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by the municipal
government. They were ed to lease the said land through a municipal council resolution in
1961.

The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently issued a new
resolution revoking the right previously granted to the vendor. Said resolution indicated that
the said area will be a parking space for the town plaza.

Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging that they have the
right to use the said lang because the resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a
contract between them (vendors) and the municipal government.

CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from the area. But such
eviction was not enforced and the number of stall owners even grew.

After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners
making them lawful lessees of the land

2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was previously used as a
town plaza and being such it is considered as beyond the commerce of man and cannot be
the subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the first
place to occupy the disputed premises.

2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area such as
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible of fire endangering
public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic

3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for public use), the
petitioners must yield to the police power exercised by the municipal government. It is a
well settled rule that any valid contract may be cancelled if it causes danger to the public.
DACANAY V. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in
accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in
the streets of Caloocan.

January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use
of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a
case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon
and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current
mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in
the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the
stalls in their street

ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance
or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD: NO

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to
serve such as for traveling

3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street
because it is going to be contrary to the general law
DACANAY V. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city registered being a public road
intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man. After hearing the parties, on 11 October 1914 the trial court issued an
order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. Hence, the instant
petition for review.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court, and the ordered said court to
proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid

RULING: Yes it is.
1. City is empowered to close city road or street and withdraw the same from public use.
Section 31 of the Revised Charter of Cebu City (Legislative Powers) provides that any
provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall
have the following legislative powers xxx to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard,
avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed." It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to
close a city road or street.

2. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the court. The city
council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still
necessary for public use. The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary, and the
discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain
case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will he presumed. So the
fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation
ordinance.

3. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property; Subsequent sale valid.
When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion
becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly
provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State."

Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states
that "property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V. BERCILLES
66 SCRA 431

FACTS:
The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street.
Through a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City
development plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was
the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land but his application was
dismissed.

HELD:
The portion of the city street subject to petitioners application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion
becomes patrimonial property of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that
property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797

FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines
from Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine
Embassy was once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was
decided that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction
was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.

HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through
reparation agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the
Philippine embassy.

It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
payment, in application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens
only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.